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FILE No.
No. F TITLE: HONG KONG
HONG
---------------ELIZA
LEGAL AFFAIRS
I 2011I I‒‒LLL-N
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DETAINEES AND POLITICAL PRISONERS,
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ARCHIV. a No.31
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370
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NOTES ON ITEMS FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE GOVERNOR OF HONG KONG:
22-23 OCTOBER, 1968
DETAINEES AND CONVICTED PRISONERS
of the various "demands" which the Chinese made at the time of confrontation last year, the one to which they have attached the most importance and which might in consequence be considered to contribute most significantly to an easing in Sino-British relations is the release of persons detained under Emergency Powers and serving sentences of imprisonment after conviction by the courts for offences connected with the communist campaign of confrontation.
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2. At 20 June fifty-two persons were held in detention in Hong Kong under Emergency Regulations. They were a mixed bag of active communist supporters trade union members and officials and others prominent in organising both the violent and non-violent aspects of confrontation, against whom it was not possible to produce evidence that would stand up in a court of law. Eighteen detainees have been released since June. Before long releases will reduce the detainees to a hard core of militant communists and it may not be possible to contemplate releases on the same scale of recent months.
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3. Some 1,500 persons were sentenced by the courts to imprisonment for offences arising out of confrontation. those convicted on relatively minor charges have since been released. There remain several hundred serving sentences for violent crimes or other offences which cannot be lightly condoned.
4. The Chinese probably do not differentiate between detainees and convicted prisoners, as they regard both as having been "illegally" detained. From our point of view, however, the release of detainees is a much easier proposition in that they are held under administrative procedures and can be released, by executive decision, at any time. They are normally held under warrants valid for twelve months which can, if necessary, be renewed. The release of convicted prisoners on the other hand raises awkward problems of amnesty and interference with the administration of justice.
5. It is in the field of detainees therefore that the Governor has felt able to make releases as gestures designed to contribute to "de-escalation" in Hong Kong and an easing in Sino-British relations generally. But the Governor has been understandably reluctant to release convicted prisoners except under the normal provisions of the law e.g. under the rules applying to ordinary remission of sentences and to the premature release of juveniles
/on
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on probation or to reformatory institutions. This problem has come to the fore in connection with the possibility of exchanging Grey, the Reutera correspondent detained in Peking, for one or both of the NCNA journalists serving sentences in Hong Kong. The release of convicted persons has only been seriously considered in this limited context and the issues are summarized in a separate note. The following paragraphs are
concerned with the release of detainees.
Views of H.M. Mission in Peking and the Governor
6. Our Mission in Peking have argued, both in relation to convicted prisoners and detainees, that some major gesture in this direction is necessary if we are to make any real progress towards a detente in our relations with China. An amnesty for prisoners convicted of comparatively minor offences, some large scale release of detainees these in the Mission's view are the signs that the Chinese Government is looking for to moderate their own stance.
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7. The Governor has pointed out that there is no real evidence that concessions on our part have had any effect on Chinese policy or could lead to matching concessions on their part. line with agreed general policy that we should not make concessions that would weaken our position in Hong Kong, he has argued that security requirements in Hong Kong must be the paramount consideration in deciding how many detainees to release and when; that we must also take into account public reaction to concessions of this nature and the effect on confidence in Hong Kong (a factor in this would be the propaganda use the communists might make of our concessions); and that there was danger in using detainees as political pawns or bargaining counters. Subject to these points the Governor has been prepared to release detainees as part of a process of "de-escalation".
8. The Mission have in turn questioned whether security considerations today justify holding people in detention or even retaining emergency powers to detain without trial; they have doubted the likelihood of an adverse public reaction in Hong Kong to large-scale releases; they have pointed out that communist propaganda has so far treated such releases in a very subdued vein and that we started on these moves with the intention of giving the communists a small face-saving victory; and they have expressed the view that political offenders may properly be used to gain political benefits.
9. There is clearly room for argument here, but our conclusions are that:-
(a) The release of detainees is most unlikely to produce matching
concessions in relation to detained British subjects in China; nevertheless concessions of this kind can contribute to a process of de-escalation. The Governor is right in insisting that security requirements and the likely reaction on public confidence in Hong Kong must be paramount considerations. These are essentially matters for local assessment, by the Governor.
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(b)
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We must accept that the chinese may make propaganda out of these releases. They have made little use of them for this purpose so far, a favourable indication possibly that they seek and favour de-escalation along these lines,
Some political benefit can perhaps be derived from the timing of releases. There would, however, be risks in departing too obviously from the principle that the use of powers of detention rests on internal security considerations: to do so must cast doubt on the motives which led to the decision to detain these people originally.
It would be useful to discuss with the Governor the part which the release of detainees should play in our general policy, and what public reaction there might be to a policy of continuing releases.
Hong Kong Department
18 October, 1968.
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