FCO 21/192 Internal political situation in Hong Kong disturbances and Communist agitation

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FOREIGN OFFICE

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DEPT. FAR EASTERN

HONG KONG

POLITICAL AFFAIRS (INTERNAL

GENERAL SITUATION AND POLICY

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DO NOT RETAIN FILES AND PAPERS UNNECESSARILY

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67/6/67118.8.67 "FD 1/1

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Dr.

Whism

With the Compliments of TRECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES No.31

Political Adviser 14 AUG 1967

Hong Kong

FDI||

CS. 41A

REF. 18.1/3/1168/47

182

COLONIAL SECRETARIAT

LOWER ALBERT ROAD

HONG KONG

183

5 August, 1967.

LAST PAPER

The highlight here over the past fortnight has

been the crop of bomb incidents which have been more

@umerong and

for the bomb disposal experts Our telegram No. 1166 to Commonwealth

They have, however, caused surprisingly

lony, and by and

than dangerous, office gives details,

large have happened awa from the Central district of the Island so that on her little of them in one's daily life. The police seem to 'ave got some good leads very quickly and there has been a sharp decrease in the number of incidents in the last few days. I hope that it means that they are getting the better of the perpetratora, The bomb a themselves have been in

ated, but the fact that black powder is so unstable as an explosive means that great cure in handling them is necessary,

The frontier remains a source of trouble.

Ian Ramgay gave me a first hand account of phase one of the Lo Wu incident of 3 August. He wondered if they had been deliberately held back to witness it, It le possible. Our troops really behave with the greatesÍ íkaninð, given that practically every day urchins throw stones at them either from the bridge or from the far bank of the river. To suggest as N.C.F.A. have done that the "masses" were provoked into action by the Gurkhas is turning the truth on its head, but we're all used to that by now. We are considering making a film of one of these incidents just to show the people of Hong Kong - and audiences elsewhere - what our frontier guards have to put up with.

Yesterday's dramatic helicopter raids on the

bint and adjoining buildings seem to have gone very well. I watched with amusement in the afternoon one of the Hong Kong Government helicopters flying in the near neighbourhood of the Bank of China building which drew several people on to the roof and upper storeys, no doubt thoroughly apprehensive, Today they are probably telling other Communist bodies how right they were to create defences on their roof!

D. C. Hopson, Esq., C.M.0., D.8.0., MO., T.D., Charge d'affaires,

PEKING.

/40

4. We quite understand your preference for swift action against the Communist press. We have a feeling, however, that we may see a real cave in in the worst offenders if we take action as has been proposed We may be wrong, but we felt

strongly that since the press is practically the only weapon remaining intact to the Communists they may feel that they must try to retain it at least and may therefore bahave with prudence. If we can achieve our aim without using the big sledge hammer wo should "23ke toặ

side the

na we have indications that on the money

Whether the further

$10 million has actually been paid over is in some doubt, and it has also been suggested that the paymasters are getting a bit tired of pouring money down the drain to no purpose.

I am sending a page from one of our Commanist papers to show what's happening at Lo Mi (not copied to others). Most of thess plotures were taken on 3rd August.

The N.C.N.A. accounts of events here are, as ever, pretty fanciful. It was funny that they should have alleged use of helicopters (quite incorrectly) before we used them (see N.C.N.A. 072925). The worker, Su Chuan, (your telegran Fo. 1008) was, of course, the chap shot by a detective while throwing a petrol a bus. As for their treatment of the shipping "strike" their flights of fancy are without limit. If ever you feel you need facts about any of these events, please ask. Do you, in fact, receive the H.K. papers still? I saw that the bankers in tob Shanghai are no longer receiving them.

ありが

Filt

I am sending copies of this letter to Eddie Bolland to to Gilmore in Washington to fill them in on the atmosphere, facts they will know already.

(K.M. ilford)

180

En Clair

POLAD SINGAPORE TO FOREIGN OFFICE

KVED IN ¡ARCHIVES No.31

Telno 297

UNCLASSIFIED

- 7 AUG 1967

4 August 1967

FD1/11

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 297 of ↳ August. Repeated for information to Peking, Tokyo, Hong kong, Washington,

Ottawa and Canberra.

Hong Kong Shipping Strike.

Following from shipping Adviser.

On Hong Kong telegram No. 1161 of 4 August to you I would add Blue Funnel here tell me that after some embarrassment they have made increased space available for loading from Hong Kong and that this extra is being consistently utilised.

2. Foreign Office please pass Board of Trade.

Mr. Watson

FO/CO/TH DISTRIBUTION

F.E.D.

Sent 0820Z/4 August

Read 09472/4 August [Copies sent Board of Trade]

Teaming not clear.

عم

142

PPPPP

INWARD TELEGRAK

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (0.A.G.)

En clair

D. 4 August, 1967. R. 4

07552

No. 1161.

RECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES No.31

- 7 AUG 1967

рекла

Addressed to Commonwealth office.

Repeated

Ħt

Peking No. 480.

" POLAD Singapore No. 283. Ħ Tokyo No. 38.

"Washington (Saving) No.

(3. of S. please pass to

Washington)

" Ottawa No. M.122.

"Canberra No. 25.

.120.

} (Saving)

180

Shipping 'Strike'.

Communist press here have made following claims:

(a) 33% less ships came in July,

(b) Transhipment of goods is down by 66%.

(d) Vessels berthed have been reduced from 60 to

40 daily.

Following facts controvert the claims:-

(a) 541 ships cleared through the port in July,

compared with 551 in June and a monthly average of 512 in 1966,

(b) Monthly tonnages for imports and exports:-

Monthly average for 1966 import 589,978 export 189,066. July 1966 import 586,680 export 262,848. June 1967 import 590,999 export 209,432. July 1967 import 581,517 export 184,268.

Though slightly down these figures hardly suggest paralysis.

from China of foodstuffs.

(d) No ship has yet been prevented from sailing for lack

of a crew.

(e) On 1 August 104 ships were in harbour (number did

not drop below 88 in July) against average over firat six months 1967 of 97.

13.

3. Strike or not Hong Kong still has fastest cargo handling and turn round in the East while delays often measured in weeks rather than days are being encountered in Chinese porte.

Please pass copy to Board of Trade.

(Copies to D.S.A.0. (OBR) for Washington)

Distribution H.K. WID 'C'

I.G.D.

J.1.C. External Distribution DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Copies also sent to:-

P.8. to Prime Minister Cabinet Office

Foreign Office

神

F.O./C.O. (1.R.8.)

(I.F.G.D.)

Treasury

Export Credits Guarantee Dept.

Ministry of Defence

情

Board of Trade

Rm. 7365)

Rm. 7163

Rm. 5131)

(CRE 4)

Hong Kong Government office

Commonwealth office (News Dept.

Foreign Office

News Dept.

D.1.0., J.I.R. P.S. to Mr. Rodgers Mr. de la Mare

Mr. Bolland

Mr. Wilson

Mr. Denson

Mr. Foggon

Mr. Littlejohn-Cook

Mr. J.H. Feck

- Mr

Kr. D. Hawkins

Mr. C.P. Rawlings Mr. Henn

Major Koe

1.0.2.

kr. J.A.B. Darlingti Kr. B.E.P. MacTavis. Mr. P. Sedgwick Mr. Glover Duty Officer

Ed (1626)

Reference

FDI11 (79)

See ANNEX.

Orense

Hans;

Hongong

(Previous

Reference: CC(67) 50th Conclusions, Minute 2)

Extract from

7 higher.

SEORE Teference

¡RECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES No.31

- 3 AUG 1967

FD1/1

cc (67) 53rd Meeting, heic 27 Julz

по

THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY såid that the situation in Hong Kong had improved, that the number of incidents there had declined and that morale was now much

Two Chinese journalists from the mainland, one of whom had only been in Hong Kong for six weeks, had been imprisoned for terms of two and five years on criminal charges; other Chinese journalists were detained and were to be tried shortly. The possibility of arranging an exchange with the Chinese Government of the two convicted journalists for Mr. Gray, the representative of Reuters who was under house arrest in Peking, was being considered.

1) M. Hokk #2412

2) FE Dept I enter by 3 Aug

ра

3.2

SPORET

Bd (1634)

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (0.A.G.)

Cypher

D. R. 31

31 July, 1967.

09292

R112.

177

IVED IN

› →→VES No.31

- 1 AUG 1967

FD!||

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 1141.

176

Addressed to Commonwealth Office

Repeated

"Peking No. 466

"POLAD Singapore No. 275 "Washington No. 244.

ра

(S. of S. please pass all)

My immediately preceding telegram; comment is

as folloWB; -

Paragraph 2. Although bomb disposal teams have only disposed of 57 bombs in this period, inspections of suspected have also taken up much time. For instance on 29 and 30 July there were over 100 suspected bombs (some of them deliberately designed to resemble bombs) which turned out to be false alarms. the army has taken steps to reinforce its bomb disposal teams and a joint bomb operations group has been set up at the Colony Pol/Mil H.Q.

Paragraph 5. Although only minor incidents have occurred at the border the risk is always present that any one of them could have serious repercussions.

(Passed as requested with advance copies to F.0. F.E. Dept.. Commonwealth Secretary's Private Office and News Dept.)

Distribution H.K. WID 'C'

- I.G.D.

J.I.C. External Distribution

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Copies also sent to:-

P.8. to Prime Minister

Cabinet Office

Foreign Office

CONFIDENTIAL

D.I.O., J.I.R.

P.S. to Mr. Rodgers

Ir. de la Mare

- Mr. Bolland

Mr. Wilson

Mr. Denson - Mr. Foggon

/F.0./0.0.

CONFIDENTIAL

F.O/C.0. (I.P.G.D.)

(I.R.D.)

Treasury

Export Credits Guarantee Dept. Ministry of Defence

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Rm. 7163)

Rm. 5131)

Board of Trade

H 11 (CRE 4)

Commonwealth Office (News Dept

- MR. Littlejohn-C;

Mr. J.H. Peck Mr. D. Hawkins - Mr. C.P. Rawlings

Hr. Henn Major Koe N.0.2

Hr. J.A.B. Darlington Mr. B.B.P. MacTavish Mr. Glover

Foreign Office

News Dept.

Hong Kong Government office

Duty Officer Mr. Bedgwick

CONFIDENT LAL

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (0.A.G.)

RRESTEIVED

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31

- 1 AUG 1967

FD1/1

176

En Clair

D. 31 July R. 31

July 1967

0925Z

ра

MMEDIATI No.1140

Addressed to Commonwealth office (D.T.D.) Repeated to: Peking No.465

POLAD Singapore No.274 Washington No.243

(8. of S. please pass Washington)

Sitrep as at 31 1600.

Bom

हि

now given way

to praces aimed at Five Communist reporters, TheTuning "öne from the N.O.N.A. have been arrested for trying to incite a group of teenagers. The border has remained quiet with only sporadic stone throwing incidents.

There have only been isolated incidents of crowds gathering unlawfully. The most serious was in Kowloon on the evening of 26/7 when a number of vehicles were stoned or set on fire. A man involved in a bomb explosion near a bus was shot dead by a detectiva.

59 bo

Since 25 1600, bomb dispersal teams have dealt with

They are not vary sophisticated, but some booby

and all are intended to go off if moved. In almost every case the explosive has been Black powder, normally used in making firecrackers. This is very unstable, which means that the devices often have to be exploded in situ. Delignite and dynamite are much used here in quarrying and construction work, but only in a few cases have these explosives been used. Controls on both firecrackers and other explosives are being tightened up. The worst incident was a bomb hidden in a straw effigy which exploded on being moved by a beggar, injuring ten people including four children in a tram queue. Casualties otherwise have been light. Statistics for the period 25 1600 to 31 0800 hours are:

Explosions 35

Bomba disposed of by Army or Police 57

The number of bombs has risen sharply in the past three days.

4. The arrest of five reporters including one from N.C.N.A. who were observed distributing leaflets and inciting a crowd of young people brings to three the number of N.C.N.A. employees awaiting trial.

Border

5. There have been a few relatively minor incidents only on the border, mostly cases of stone or bottle throwing by groups of children. On one occasion, an air gun was fired at the

/District

District Officer Tai Po and bottles thrown at the Gurkha Commanding Officer and Company Commander in Sha Tau Kok.

Police Raids

6. Since 25 1600 there have been 12 raide by polid (on some occasions with military support) on Communiat premises. 100 persons were arrested or detained for enquiries and quantities of improvised weapons, gasmasks and subversive posters and other material seized.

Recovery of Prolosi▼OR

7. After two bombs had been found in the possession of two men in Kowloon on 26/7, police followed up information and seized six further bombs and 32 sticks of commercial gelignite in a village near Kwun Tong. A package containing nine bomba was also found in Tsuen Wan on another occasion.

8. Comment follows in my immediately following telegram.

(Passed as requested and advance copies to F.E. Dept., Foreign Office, Mr. Glover, News Dept., Commonweal th office and Private Office for Commonwealth Secretary)

Distribution

H.K. W.I.D. 'C' I.G.D.

J.1.C. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Copies also sent to:

P.S. to Prime Minister

Cabinet Office

Foreign Office

PO/CO (IPED)

(IRD)

Treasury

Export Credits Guarantee Dept. Ministry of Defence (Rm.7365)

Board of Trade

(Rm.7163) (Rm.51 31)

(CRE 4)

Commonwealth Office (Nowa Dept.) Foreign Office (News Dept.) Australia House (Senior External

Affairs Representative)

Canada House (Counsellor) Hong Kong Government office

Dolove, JoIoR.

Mr. de la Mare

Mr. Bolland

Mr. Wilson

Mr. Denson

Mr. Foggon

Mr. Little John--Cook

Mr. J.E. Pack

Mr. D. Hawkins

Mr. C.P. Rawlings

- Mr. Henn

Major Koa

1.0.2

Mr. J.A.5. Darlington

Mr. B.E.P. MacTavish

Mr. M. Giover

Duty Officer

Mr. T. Critchley Mr. K. MacLellan

Mr. Sedgwick

Mr. de

не завате

SECRET

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31 27 JUL 1967

45.

HONG KONG

Recent violence in Hong Kong and on the border makes

it necessary to reconsider our assessment of the intentions

of both the Chinese Government and the local Communists and

the implications of this assessment for our own policy.

The Situation in Hong Kong

We have no evidence at the moment of any new direct

orders from the

leadership in Hong Kong. We do however have evidence of

indirect instructions.

An editorial in the People's Daily

to be galo

包

new stage in the struggle with the Hong Kong Goverment.

This editorial again laid down strike action as the main weapon of the campaign but it also threatened "the very few national traitors" .e. Chinese loyal to the Hong Kong Government7 and "the incorrigible hired thuge who have

served as sagassins".e. the police and security forces

saying specifically that "those who kill people must pay with their lives". To' POTENT

·be hall responsible

Ꭲ.

for the recent wave of violence against the police.

3. There is some evidence to show that, in this new phase,

there are differences within the leadership of the Hong Kong

Communista. The older leaders are much more cautious in their

approach and reluctant to become involved in violence, while the féusrer and

nanced by the

SECRET

/atmosphere

SECRET

atmosphere of the Cultural Revolution) are pressing for

The younger leaders appear to be

gradually gaining the ascendancy.

The Situation on the Border

Careful examination of the evidence suggests that the

inoident at Sha Tau Kok over the weekend was planned with

the foreknowledge of at least the local authorities.

possibly an attempt to demonstrate the ability of the Chinese

It was

to create serious incidents on the border at any time. There

is however no evidence to suggest that the Communist leadership

in Hong Kong was in any way involved in the planning of this

incident. Nor do we know that Peking was involved.

There is

therefore a possibility that Peking will now try to ensure

that such incidents do not recur but, if this incident was in

fact part of a new plan for creating tension on the border,

we must expect repetitions in the near future.

Implications for our own policy

5. We have in the past assumed (rightly I think) that Peking

was reluctant

involtad

Hong Kong Goverment but was responding to events in Hong Kong

sécurred without direct orders Eren Peking. We

therefore calculated that our own policy must be determined

the need to take strong enough action in

bonfidance, and the necessity not to

by two factors:

Hong Kong

rie deciding to take tougher setion in or

against the Colony.

SECRET

/6.

SECRET

るー

Flag B

FD1/1/173

6. There is still no evidence that Peking have decided to

take over Hong Kong. Irrespective of what interpretation is

put on the Sha Tau Kok incident, the Chinese appear however

to have taken a decision to step up the campaign against the Hong Kong Goverment and to use violence to this end, possibly

in the form of

British 'ant

galice and

Chinese with British sympathies (Hong Kong telegram No. 1013).

This is probably because of the Laddare of previous attempts

at strikes and intimidat-but- It also reflects the increasingly

extremist and doctrinaire approach to foreign policy problems

which, as we have seen in China's treatment of Burma and Nepal,

has recently appeared in Ring. The objectives of Peking

appear, however, at the moment to remain limited to Nazisting

the British as they did the Portuguese in Macao and as a consequence forcing castats concessions from the Hong Kong

Government -

price for

donschten af violence, dovğa

Lossen. Clearly we

must still #oid creating a situation which will encourage

Peking to decide positively to take over Hong Kong, since

they would almost certainly succeed. One such situation would

be a breakdown in law and order. What we must do is to

demonstrate conclusively that the present violent tactics

are not going to succeed.

At this stage I think that the arguments against certain measures in Hong Kong on the grounds that they will provoke Peking are less strong than before. It will probably now be /necessary

SECRET

- 4

necessary to takovval

steps to disrupt the Communist

leadership in Hong Kong, if necessary by selective deportations,

and to neutralise certain Peking agencies in the Colony, e.g.

the N.C.N.A., against a member of which action has for the

first time just been taken. Such action may, of course, cause

Peking in turn to take stronger, sounterikšasures:

commenting

on the use of British troops, the "People's Daily" has said

today that the opposition will match this "serious escalation";

and the Chinese are now refusing to allow Reuter's correspondent

to leave Peking in retaliation against the arrest of the

N.C.N.A. man. But in the present situation I think that we

have less to fear froh this than from allowing the situation

in Hong Kong to get out of control. The Hong Kong Government

are already planning t ke further metion. We should, I

suggest, continue, as we are doing, to support them in this

and not try to hold them back, even though this will entail

further escalation at least for the time being and increased

risk of further unpleasantness for our Mission in Peking.

Copies to:

Mr. Samuel

Planning Staff

Mr. Carter, D.T.D.

SECRET

Slland

(2. "Holland) 14 July. 1967

/minnitas

This

mininths have approved the planning Activities of the Ha, Kong Committee. This will serve to

ensure that, if minister approve any given action against the Chinese, it can be put into effect without delay.

2 The latest situation report from Hauskang is encouraging. The more rigorous action now being taken by the authorities against The trouble makers is clearly welcomed by The people, and has improved the morale of The police. The mitiative is again simsing

back to us.

Powali searcling.

Mr. Rodgers finit.

C.f. de ho ba

17/17

assome that Miiviko tive be able to casiber to comme

future action and not just and her steps and Ath, at all stapis, & implications for

make clear.

is qutting

We me

wmying then these mumba Seem to take on boox. Wht the 545 Commmmuted I his genople should mat with us

Isha

our

Mission in Pekking

em citmention sporopuce, fin

Pelling with be

17 Roda 14.7.4)

Sax racord of the / mesting. SEE F$1/336

бы

(174

SECRET

INWARD TELFORAK

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31

28 JUL 1967

FROM HONG KONG (0.A.G.)

Cypher

D. 28 July 1967 R. 28

09352

IMMEDIATE SPORET No.1129

FD!!!

怏

Addressed to Commonwealth office Repeated to: Peking No.459

POLAD Singapore No.272 Washington No.240

(8. of S. please pass to all)

Following is weekly assessment of situation as at midnight 27/28 July.

The principal features of the Communist confrontation over past week have been:-

(a)

(b)

a continuation of home-made bomb atta

The number

of these attacks increased sharply on 26 July, when 11 explosions took place, mainly in Kowloon resulting in 13 people being injured and one man, involved in the attacks, being shot dead by police. For the first time in more than a week, small scale mob violence broke out, also on the 26th; however these disturbances were quickly quelled by police action;

further minor incidents of missile throwing including incursions at Security Forces on the border;

to striking workers. This will be a lengthy business as the majority of the union members are being paid at home. In one case, the Tramways Workers' Union, a Communist bank has refused to honour in full made out to strikers, claiming that there a. insufficient funds available, This has causež

dissatisfaction amongst the strikere and may indicate that the Communist labour movement is running short of funds to support the strikers;

(d) attempts by officials of the Hong Kong Seamen's Union,

which to a large extent have proved abortive, to spread the seamen's strike. So far only two vessels, both of which were scheduled to sail for China, havo been delayed as a result of the strike, though a number of others have sailed with slightly reduced crewa;

(e)

a continuation of violent anti-British propagerda ** Communist press, the major emphasis being attar police for action against Communist orga Propaganda from China continues to concentrata upon the arrest and trial of N.C.N.A. and other local Communist reporters.

1:36

/2.

SECRET

Police action, in the larger operations assisted by military forces, has continued against Communist organisations, in the course of which union and school premises, Communist organisations, China product stores and homes of Communist cadres have been raided and quantities of weapons, inflammatory posters and documents of intelligence interest seized. Apart from one incident in the New Territories, no physical resistenc has been encountered in any of these operations The continued action has had the affect of severely disrupting the Communist leadership, which has now disappeared into hiding, and has seriously affected the morale of Communist supporters, many of whom see little point in continuing the struggle.

3. Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the past week has been the lack of G.P.G. reaction to the offensive novea made by Government. Apart from championing the cause of the N.C.N.A. staff arrested by police and taking retaliatory measures against the Reuter's correspondent in Peking, the Chinese have given no indication of taking official cognizance of the developments here. This, in itself, has lowered morale of Communist supporters even further, as they feel they are being let down by China in their hour of need.

4. The disruption of rail services between Canton and Shum Chun seems to have been related solely to the chaotic conditions in Canton, Deliveries by road and sea of foodstuffs have been stepped up. Relaxation of 0.0.A. control on the border area due to preoccupation in Canton could directly influence the situation for the worse.

5. Despite the lull in Communist activities on the ground, apart from the bomb attacks, there is no room for complacency in that there is no indication that the Communist leaders will discontinue the confrontation. At present however, the border is the main area of tension, where the comparatively minor stone throwing could quickly flare up into a major incident between the Army and possibly the C.C.A.

(Passed as requested with advance copies to Foreign Office

(F.E. Dept.), Commonwealth Secretary's Private Office

and News Department)

SECRET

/Distribution

SECRET

Distribution

H.K. W.I.D. 'C' I.G.D.

J.1.C. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

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Copies also sent to:

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Cabinet Office Foreign Office

D.I.O. J.I.R.

P.S. to Mr. Rodgers

Mr. de la Mare

Mr. Bolland

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Mr. Denson

FO/CO (IPGD)

IRD)

Treasury

Export Credits Guarantee Dept. Ministry of Defence (Rm.7365)

Rm.7163) Rm.51 31)

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1.0.2

Mr. J.A.B. Darlington Mr. B.E.P. MacTavish Mr. P. Sedgwick

Mr. Glover

Duty Officer

SECRET

Ed (1626)

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Minutes.

FDI/I

173

SEE ANNEX

171

R 117. 172)

Cypher

INMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM FONG KONG (0.A.G.)

D. 25 July 1967 R. 25

CONFIDENTIAL

No.1109

Repeated to:

1000Z

***

"FIVED IN

jARCHIVES No.31

26 JUL 1967

FD!|!

geke

متر

Addressed to Commonwealth Office

Peking No.447

POLAD Singapore No.266 Washington No.238

Canberra No.67

(Please pass PRIORITY to all)

Sitrep as at 25 1600.

1. The Colony has remained generally quiet although sporadic bomb and incendiary attacks have occurred. On the border stone throwing at police, immigration officials and troops has continued despite intervention from time to time by C.C.A. guards. Police raids on Communist premises have recovered more documents and improvised arms and a number of people have been arrested including one senior Communist official. The Seamen's Union strike has still not had any significant effect on shipping (my telegram No.1105 refers). There are reports that there is to be another

oyment from Communist funds to those dismissed after recent strikes. There has been no rail traffic from Canton to Shum Chun since 23 July. (My telegram No.1107 refers.)

Fuße

There have been two or three bombing attacks a day for the last four days, none causing any casualties or major damage. Police stations and army married quarters and billets have been the main targets, though there have been two explosions, one in a lavatory and anether at the entrance to a subway, which could have been designed to cause civilian casualties. Two bomb throwers have been injured and arrested. Incendiary attacks, sometimes with home made bombs, have continued with slightly more success, the main targeta being taxis and buses.

3. Stoning of Security Forces on the border both by children and adults who advance into British territory for the purpose, bas continued. C.C.A. guards on at least two occasions have ordered the demonstrators away, but the possibility of an incident, which could have repercussions, increases as the Chinese become more arrogant and our forces more irritated.

4+ Police raids have continued without resistance but with decreasing dividends. However, one prominent Communist leader has been arrested and also one trouble maker from Kowloon City whe jumped his bail in early May. Improvised weapons and gas masks in considerable numbers have been recevered as well as a great deal of propaganda material and some documents. A school raided on 24 July produced the largest single haul of subversive leaflets etc. and had obviously been used as a distribution point. Police

/have

CONFIDENTIAL

have also removed or obliterated inflammatory propaganda on Communist buildings in some cases painting over windows where there are illegal displays.

5. There are reports that union members who have been discharged for industrial misconduct are shortly to receive further payments from Communist funds. The degree of confusion caused by police raids on union premises is bound to make this a lengthy and difficult process.

6. The continued bomb and incendiary attacks, although ineffective and infrequent, have succeeded in maintaining a certain degree of tension. Otherwise there has been a noticeable increase in confidence in all quarters except among the Communista whose morale appears still to be declining. The main problen at the moment is the border which remains difficult.

(Passed to D.S.A.0. for repetition to Washington

and Canberra and as advance copies for Commonweal th Secretary, Far Eastern Dept., Foreign Office

and News Dept., Commonwealth Office)

(Fncyphered text passed to L.T.C. for repetition

to Peking and POLAD Singapore)

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CONFIDENT I AL

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO_THE_COMMON.BALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (0.A.G.)

Cypher

D. 25 July 1967

081 32

R. 25

17.

171

IVED IN

¡ÅRCHIVES No.31

26 JUL 1967

FDI/!

If Shotad

站 B. Jensen

рако

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

No.1105

Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D.) Repeated to: Peking No.443

POLAD Singapore No.264

(Please pass to both)

Seamen's Strike.

The strike has now been on for nine days. Hong Kong Seamen's Union which is normally well organized, is making every possible effort to prosecute the strike, but has so far not been very effective. Where seamen have left their ships because of the expiry of agreement or for other reasons there has been little difficulty in finding replacements through the seamen's recruiting office. One or two ships have sailed short with the intention of picking up crew in Singapore. No ship has been prevented from sailing.

One effect of the strike has been to make owners of ships cautious about sailing to South China ports because of threats to boycott them and of arrest and detention. S.S. TAILUNGSHAN at Whampoa is not yet working cargo, but this may be no more than normal congestion there. 3.5. HOI KUNG carrying passengers for Whampoa from Singapore overcarried Hong Kong-bound cargo. She has reloaded at Whampoa and is returning to Singapore direct. Our knowledge of the situation in North China la sparse. Congestion and delay have been a feature of these porte for a long time. China transhipment cargo normally exported through Hong Kong has ceased but this representa 1% of cargo handled here. Mainland Export Corporation are now making alternative arrangements for transhipment in Japan, Singapore or within China or by direct services.

3. A shipping intelligence unit has been set up to gather and analyse information obtainable through ships* Masters and crawa on arrival here. Pressures within China might cause shipowners to make the choice of cancelling calls either at Hong Kong or Chinese ports. This may well hurt the Chinese more than us and in any case, only affects a minority of shipping.

4. It is noteworthy that there has been no interruption in C.P.G. registered junk and lighter trade between Hong Kong and Chinese ports, and several small Chinese ships have cleared the port during the past week.

(Passed as requested)

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RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31

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FDI!!

Reference...

FOY

170

oversea Altaus

..ct from

Hong Kong

(Previous

Reference: CC(67) 46th Conclusions, Minute 1)

ес

(St) Soth Meeting, held do fuly

The situation on the border between Hong Kong and the People's Republic of China was now quieter; although there had been some signs of movement of Chinese troops, both sides had withdrawn heavy weapons from the frontier itself. Incidents were continuing in Hong Hong and Kowloon, the Hong Kong police had raided Trade Union and Communist headquarters and 15 leading Communists had been detained. Although disturbances in Hong Kong were being supported by the Peking Government, there was no evidence that they had been responsible for their outbreak.

1) An de la 2) FE. De

26/7

ful.

Чи

enter by 28 July

Ed (1626)

SECRET

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (0.A.0.)

RECEIVED

RECEIVED IN

169

ARCHIVES No.31

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FDI/I

Cypher

D. 21 July 1967 R. 21

11152

INMEDIATE SECRET

No.1085

Repeated to:

Addressed to Commonwealth Office

Peking No.431

POLAD Singapore No.258 Washington No.233

(S. of 3. please pass to all)

Following is weekly assessment of the situation as at

midnight 20/21 July.

Principal features of the Communist confrontation over

the past week have been:

(a) A virtual cessation of mob violence

except for one day in the New Territories,

but there have been up to six home-made bomb attacks daily on targets such as police

yon

gafé-bină dings, vehicles and

service establishments.

(b) The strike called by the H.K. seamen's union has achieved little auccess except that some crew members of ships sailing to Chinese ports have refused to sail for fear of trouble there. There has been an improvement in public transport following a setback earlier in the week.

press has continued, the highlight being a statement published on 16 July by ACAPTO which was virtually calling for armed insurrection. Peoples Daily called for continuation of the struggle on the same day. The police have been active and successful against propaganda posters displays.

(d) There have been minor incidents involving stone

throwing, effigy hanging and poster pasting at Lo Wu.

(e) Memorial services for those who have been killed have been held though without much publicity and there has been little reaction to buriala undertaken by Government. Arrests following demonstrations against police action have

included 5 Communiat journaliste (2 NCNA) and 18 teachers from Communist schools.

12.

SECRET

N61

Throughout the week police, assisted by military forces, have continued with offensive action against Commun organisations and personalities in the course of which union, school and commercial organisations have been raided, together with the homes of a number of Communist cadres. Large quantities of weapone, including acid and petrol bombs, have been seized together with considerable quantities of inflammatory propaganda and documenta, many of high intelligence value. No physical resistance has been encountered in any of these operations, although in most cases it has been necessary to force open iron grilles, So far 19 people of security interest have been detained under the provisions of the Deportation of Aliens Ordinance. 90 have been charged in court for offences connected with these operations.

3. Reliable sources have indicated that the morale of the Communist workers has been seriously affected by these actions and that the leaders are afraid to gather together in recognised Communist buildings, apart from the Bank of China and NCNA premises. Union members have been instructed to remain at home until contacted and there is little doubt that the Communist organisation has been disrupted, at least for a time. There 18 no indication that the Communist leaders intend to desist from the confrontation and there is little doubt that, following a brief lull during which they will regroup and plan their next move, there will be a renewed outbreak of anti-Government activities. These may take the form of increased terrorist and sabotage activities, possibly utilising more sophisticated equipment.

4. The reaction from China to the offensive moves by Government against Communist organisations in Hong Kong has, Bo far, been surprisingly mild and has evoked, to date, no official protest.

5. See also my telegram No.1070.

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FROM HONG KONG (0.A.G.)

D. 21 July, 1967. R. 21

ÁÅ

1159Z

168

REVIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31

24 JUL 1967

Fili

рако

CONFIDENT LAI

No. 1087.

Addressed to Commonwealth office

Repeated

"Peking No. 432.

"P.A. Singapore No. 259.

Washington No. 234.

"Canberra No. 66 (3. of S. please pass

all).

My telegram No. 1065.

Nit Read

SITREP as at 21 1200,

There has been no mob violence for several days though sporadic hit and run attacks with improvised borbs and incendiaries have continued against the police, military and Government premises. Our officials at Lo Wu have been harassed. There is a steady extension of bus and tram services where morale of employees has improved. The strike of the Seamen's Union (HKSU) has had little effect. Food supplies are normal.

2. 18 July.

The first day without mob violence for some time. There were a total of fie indido delegents with only one minor casualty. At Lo Wu, unarmed civilians and farmers returning from their land in British territory threw stones, shouted slogans, broke notices and put up inflammatory posters on our side.

The police carried out five raids in the urban areas, arresting seven people, and also cleared posters from outside Communist shops and a cinema, Two British owned ships sailing to Thampoa were delayed by reluctance of the crew to risk an unfriendly reception, although another British ship did sail there, The Bank of China has set up a barbed wire entanglement on its roof, presumably al

sinager)." (Some

water tanks may also have been erected which makes the bank liable in law to having its supplies cut off).

3. 19 July.

Again a quiet day with two unsuccessful incendiary and three bumping attacks. One bomb thrower was hoist with his own petard and is now in hospital under guard. He may provide a lead on the

ion. There was a repetition of harassment at Lo Wu, The police carried out three raids and evicted a CPG shop from its premises in a resettlement area. 23 people in all were detained. The bus and tram situation showe further signs of improvement, Three more ships delayed sailing to Chinese ports, but the seamen's recruiting office is continuing

/to

CONFIDENTIAL

to receive applications and to place men. An attempt to enforce a four hour stoppage in the Kowloon slaughterhouse by preventing the delivery of live stock from China from the lairages achieved only minimal delay The Communists are continuing in their attempts to gain a dominating position in the various markets.

4. 20 July.

One

There were four bomb incidents, including one in a lavatory in Tai Tak, and one incendiary attack in Kowloon. person was slightly hurt, the lavatory and a meat van damaged. Except for two cases of rubbish fires there was no mob violence. Intermittent stoning continued at Low Wu and spread to

Man Kan To. 16 people have been detained as a result of five police raids on Communist premises and to arrest wanted men.

5. During the last week the bodies of nine more men killed in recent clashes have been buried under Government arrangements without exciting major comment.

6. The Kal Tak incident may be the first move in an attempt to bitüp botrorism in order to offset the loss of

porch das resulted fro

So far, the bombs used have been

r ineffective.

The harassment of immigration and police officials has been stepped up and could lead to a nasty incident which could easily get out of hand.

(Passed as requested.

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INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMON.EALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (0.A.G.)

דיי

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31

For?

Cypher

D. 20 July, 1967.

R. 20

09402

Good

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

2.PA

No. 1077

Addressed to Commonwealth Office.

Repeated

Peking, No. 429

(8. of S. please pass)

21 JUL 1967

FD!|!

You 15.

edi

ん

(a)

(b)

Following for J.I.R.D. from Wilford.

1₤2017

Two recent events seem to merit your attention:-

In full view the Bank of China are engaged in erecting what appear to be defences against a helicopter landing on their roof. These take the form of heavy guage steel wire rope joined together by a web of barbed wire, the whole supported on steel stanchions. The story has been widely splashed in the local press here and seens worthy of a little ridicule. I suggest that it should be described as defences against ghosts and monsters not against helicopters,

Despite support from the Seamen's Union of China for the Hong Kong Seamen's Union strike called on 17 July, (N.C.N.A. 071824) one of the ships which sailed from Hong Kong on 19 July was the C.P.G. ship "NAN HAI 133" which discharged her cargo on 18 July and sailed yesterday from Whampoa. Local press has carried these details. As you will know so far the strike has had extremely little success. It is interesting to see the C.P., in the role of strike-breaker.

(Passed as requested)

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Messrs. de la Mare, Wilson, Bolland and Denson, and Mr. Glover News Dept.)

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고

(FD 1/1)

Foreign Office,

S.W.1.

SECRET

17 July, 1967.

Thank you for your letter HWB 13/7 of 7 July enclosing a copy of Hong Kong despatch no. 1164 of 23 June about recent developments in Hong Kong.

I agree with your two comments but have nothing further to add. I think the despatch gives a very fair description of events.

(E. Bolland)

Far Eastern Department

W. S. Carter, Esq., C.V.O.,

Dependent Territories Division,

Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

166

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

FROM HONG KONG (0.A.G.)

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31

1 8 JUL 1967

FDI1

165

Cypher

R. 17

D. 17 July, 1967.

06272

IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL No. 1049.

Addressed to Commonwealth office.

Repeated

Peking No. 420.

" POLAD Singapore No. 258. "Washington No. 229.

ре

बीम

"Canberra No. 63. (0.0. please pass

Ky telegram No. 1037.

SITREP as at 16 1200.

PRIORITY to all).

164

Isolated attacks on police and on public transport

Disorder spread for the first time into the New Territories town of Tsuen Wan on Saturday night. There have been more cases of the use of explosives, the police being the main targets.

have continued, mainly in Kowloon.

Two English

TV cameramen were assaulted by a group from the Bank of China on Saturday and had their camera seized and broken (my telegram No. 1043 refers). 28 men and women including representatives of the N.C.N.A. were arrested after a demonstration outside

The rumoured stoppage Government House on Saturday afternoon.

The police

Fonhof food supplies has not so far taken place.

carried out a number of raids on Communist premises over the weekend.

Friday 14 July.

Five vehicles were burned and 12 others stoned on Friday night. Four home made bombs were thrown at police patrols in Kowloon where there were two riotous gatherings. In dispersing one the police had to fire a round from a Greener gun. One man was killed and another wounded. Police arrested fifteen when dispersing a crowd in Wanchai. Three off duty policemen were assaulted. Shortly after 15 0200 the police raided a Chinese Communist school in the western district of Hong Kong The students of the school had almost certainly been involved in the incident when a policeman was killed with a cargo hook on 9 July. Two arrests were made a quantity of improvised weapons and seditious pamphlets recovered. no violence.

Saturday 15 July.

There was

There was a demonstration outside Government House by a deputation, which included representatives of the N.C.N.A., local reporters and school teachers, against the arrest of the N.C.N.A.

They refused to disperse reporter (my telegram No. 1002 refers).

At and were arrested, which they must have known would happen. 2230 an explosive charge was thrown at the door of a block of naval other ranks quarters causing damage to windows but no casualties.

Fo13/80

CONFIDENTIAL

/In

CONFIDENTIAL

In Kowloon there were two riotous assemblies both quickly dispersed and one bomb thrown at a police vehicle. All posters, slogans and newspapers were removed by the police from the outside of major Communist premises in Nathan Road during the early hours of the morning.

In Tsuen Wan, disorderly crowds formed and were

dispersed by the police. Two detectives were stabbed, one seriously, while making arrests and another was injured by a bomb. A series of police raids were carried out in one of which a man was found dead who is believed to have been wounded in a clash with police. Various improvised weapons were recovered. 26 people, in all, were arrested.

(Passed as requested)

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CONFIDENTIAL

for 117

163 Fanful $1014

CONFIDENTIAL

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TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

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RECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES No.31

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FROM HONG KONG (0.A.G.)

Cypher

D. 14 July, 1967. R. 14

1020Z

ра

KIEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL No. 1037

Addressed to Commonwealth office (D.T.D.)

Repeated

Peking No.412,

Singapore No.241

Washington No.227,

Canberra No.62

(Please pass PRIORITY

a11) 661

My telegram No. 1028.

SITREP as at 14 1800.

The tempo of violence dropped yesterday but there were isolated attacks with explosive and incendiary devices, Kowloon being most affected. There was a minor demonstration opposite Lo Wu which was quickly stopped and dispersed by C.C.A. personnel. The police successfully raided another union premises in Kowloon,

A bomb was throm from a cer at a poliçe station in Kalibon labe in 43 July without vänsing oñsualties or significant damage. Two petrol bombs were thrown, one at a car and the second during the early hours of this morning into a telephone exchange on Hong Kong Island. The resultant fire was quickly extinguished. Small crowds continued to gather in Kowloon to throw stones and paint slogans but quickly dispersed when the police arrived.

3. At 14 0200, the police raided the Kowloon Dockyard Workers' Union and an Associated Workers Children's school in the same block in Kowloon. The army provided the cordon party as on the previous two raide and did not otherwise participate in the operation. There was determined resistance and iron grilles across the staircases took time to breach. Bottles, daggers, acid and fire bombs were all used by the defenders and it took three hours to complete the break in. Police used tear gas and firearms. The secretary of the Union was killed and four other members injured. The police had four minor casualties. A total of 81 were arrested, including senior office-bearers of the union. A number of home-made weapons and a quantity of documents were discovered. Police morale is high as a result and it was a noteworthy feature that other occupants in the block which was raided obviously approved of the police action.

CONFIDENTIAL

4. There have been resignations from the public transport companies and a noticeable and understandable reluctance to take out buses and trams after dark, Although the scale of attack has diminished in the last two days, particularly in Hong Kong, public transport remains a priority target. The increased use of explosive devices is a disquieting development. Plastic explosive is not difficult to obtain here and there is considerable expertise in its use mainly for illegal fishing.

(Passed as requested)

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CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (0.A.G.)

Cypher

D. 14 July, 1967.

E1.

サ

09502

1622

R.117 163

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31

17 JUL 1967

FD10/4

INKEDIATE SNCRET

No. 1035.

مه

Addressed to Commonwealth office.

Repeated

"Peking No. 411.

" POLAD Singapore No. 240. "Washington No. 226.

121717

(Please pass

PRIORITY to all).

Following is weekly assessment of the situation aa at midnight 13/14 July.

The principal features of the Communist confrontation

with Government over the past week have been;-

(a)

(b)

(c)

(a)

the incident at Sha Tau Kok on the 8 July (see detailed reports). Since then there have been no new incursions from China, but, regular demonstrations have taken place on the Chinese side of the border. AB a reault of one of these opposite Lo Wu, on 12 July, a number of villagers have evacuated their homes;

a C.P.G. protest to the Chargé d'Affaires in Peking which alleged that the Sha Tau Kok incident had been instigated by the British and included several demands for compensation, apologies, etc. This protest, which was rejected, received widespread publicity in the local Left Wing press which made no reference to the British protest on this event;

Police

an increase in violence in the urban areas of the Colony on 9 July (telegram 999, paragraph 3) which has since been renewed each day. Public transport and police have been the main targets for attack. have been compelled to use gas and firearms on a number of occasions to disperse the crowds and in self-defence. A variety of weapons have been used by the rioters including bottles filled with a corrosive liquid and home-made bombs which have been thrown from buildings at police vehicles and, on two occasions, at police stations. Curfews were imposed on parts of Hong Kong Island on the nights of the 11 and 12 July, and on parts or Kowloon on the night of 12 July. One police constable and four rioters were killed during the incidenta and many injuries, mostly of a minor nature, were suffered by both sides.

the holding of further memorial services by individual Communist organisations for the workers who have died in the confrontation. There has been more talk at Communist meetings, of a mass funeral procession to be held towards the end of this month. The bodies of seven

/workers

SECRET

(0)

(f)

workers were buried by Government, on the night of 12/13 July as their relatives had failed to collect them despite repeated requests to do so. So far there has been little reaction from the Communists but no doubt there will be accusations of "secret burials to conceal atrocities"

Talk of renewed disruption of food supplies from China. The tentative date for this stoppage has been set at 17 July, and it is expected to last for two weeks. There are signs that this stoppage will be better organised than the previous one and the Communists will, undoubtedly, use terrorist tactics to intimidate lorry drivers, hawkers, stall-holders and others who deal in local produce to "persuade" them to join the strike;

an attempt to extend the stoppage in the harbour by obtaining control over lighters has been made, but so far, there has been no serious effect on the working of cargoes. The Hong Kong Seamen's Union has announced that, to support the "anti-British struggle" it will shortly be calling a strike of seamen on vessels which call at Hong Kong, particularly those bringing food.

(g) An attempt to persuade overseas buyers of C.P.G. goods

to bypass Hong Kong

fport. Stocks of materials destined for overseas, are being held in Communist godowns in Hong Kong on the pretext that, because of the disruption caused by the strike, it is impossible to ship them out. Buyers are being asked by the China Resources Company (C.R.C.) to recommend alternative ports of transhipment for any goods they purchase;

(h) despite further talk in Communist organisations, of a refusal to pay taxes and other fees to Government, no action has been taken;

(1)

a continuation of the anti-British propaganda in the local Communist press which has applauded the violence committed and made exaggerated claims about its effect. The police force is still a major target for attack, it being falsely alleged that morale is low and widespread resignations are taking place. Leaflets, postera and slogans continue to appear but are taken down or obliterated as soon as they are discovered;

both N.C.NA, in Peking and their local branch have protested about the arrest of a N.C.N.A. reporter who was detained for taking part in an unlawful and intimi- dating assembly.

On the nights of 12/13 and the 13/14 July, police raided a total of three Communist Union premises and one Communist school, which have been directly involved in the confrontation, in the course of which weapons, consisting of sharpened bars, home-made spears, acid, etc., inflammatory posters and documents were confiscated and arrests including a union chairman and a number of other office-bearers, were made. Strong resistance was encountered by police trying to obtain entry to one of these premises, th Kowloon Dock Workers' Amalgamated Union, in the course of which the defenders used a variety of weapons including aciu. Police were forced to use gea and firearms and when access was eventually obtained one dead body, the Union paid secretary, and three people

/with

SECRET

with injuries, two serious, were discovered amongst those present. There is little doubt that these raids, in which military participation has been confined to cordon duties, have made the Communist leadership and rank and file extremely nervous and the morale of the Communists, which had been revived following the Sha Tau Kok incident, and, what they considered to be the successful hit-and-run tactics on the streets, has now fallen sharply. The police action has also demonstrated to the general public that Government is not afraid to enter Communist premises and intends to do everything necessary to maintain law and order.

3. As regards the general situation ir' assessment remains as set out in telegrams Nos. 1012" and 1013. The offensive operations referred to in paragraph 2 have served to confuse the opposition and to boost public confidence.

(Encyphered text passed to L.T.C. for repetition

to Peking and POLAD Singapore. Passed to D.3.A.0. for repetition to Washington and as advance copies for Commonwealth Secretary, Far Eastern Dept., Foreign Office, and News Dept., 0.0.)

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SECRET

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (0.A.G.)

D. 13 July, 1967.

R. 13

1150Z

نعم

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.3 |

17 JUL 1967

FDI/I dla

IMMEDIATE SECRET

No. 1028

Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D.).

Repeated

"Peking, No. 410.

"POLAD Singapore, No. 236.

"Washington, No. 225. "Canberra, No. 61.

(Please pass PRIORITY to all.)

My telegram No. 1014.

SITREP as at 13 1200.

Violence broke out again in the Colony yesterday. Kowloon was the main centre. A curfew from 2000 hrs. effectively limited disorder on the island. A curfew was also imposed on Kowloon at 2300. Public transport was again the main target and a number of buses were damaged in Kowloon, four being burat out. The police successfully raided the main and one subsidiary branch of the Motor Transport Workers' Union (M.T.W.U.) on the island. The bodies of the seven men were buried during the night. There was a build-up of militia opposite the Lowu Bridge, resulting in the deplovent of one company of 1/7 G.R.

uro TalpO R

300

Office just after a meeting had been due to start. Casualties throughout the night were few but two rioters were killed and

sinse di* let wound.. Both the Auxiliary Police and the Hong Kong Regiment were called out, the latter on a limited basis only. Initially today, there were fewer buses on the road in Kowloon and the New Territories. A home-made explosive charge was thrown into a police station in Kerloon during thận

The curfew was imposed on the same area of Hong Kong Island as from 2009 to M130'18/43 July both as a precautionary

There measure and as a preliminary to planned police action. was some atone and bottle throwing during the day and three home-made bonds were throw as the nášias after the curfew came

rự into force, Otherwise the area was quiet, probably because the Communists were convinced that a major attack was imminent on the Wah Fung Emporium, and were grouped accordingly. The raide on the two union premises were carried out without major

/difficulty

SECRET

diffiquity, assistance being provided by the military and the Hong Kong Regiment. There were 42 arrests, a mumber of home-made weapons were discovered as well as posters, inflammatory material and records which may be of use. Casualties were one policeman slightly injured and two prisoners detained with gunshot wounds.

3. In Kowloon a number of incidents developed after 2000. Вивее,

Buses, taxis and cars were stoned, a small group of rioters adopted hit and run tactics over a wide area. A curfew was imposed over the greater part of the peninsula at 2300 hrs. but sporadic disorders continued until about 0300. Several buses, taxis and private cars were burned or damaged. One auxiliary policeman reporting for duty was badly beaten up. The police had to open fire on several occasions; two rioters were killed and three injured of whom one has since died. There were seven other civilian casualties and five policemen were injured. In Taipo at 1740 there was an explosion in the Rural Committee buildings in a room in which a meeting, fortunately postponed, had been due to start at 1700. There was apparently a timing device on the bomb though, technical evidence is not yet available. Three people have been arrested.

ونا

At Lowu shortly before midnight there were reports of a build-up of militia in the area of the Bridge. This caused alarm to the local villagers, many of whom evacuated their homes. One company 1/7 G.R. took over from the police but there were no further incidents. However a senior Chinese officer has been seen today in Sha Tau Kok apparently on an inspection and extensive digging is now taking place on the forward slopes on the Chinese side.

5. There are further rumours of another food stoppage being planned in the immediate future, which is expected to last for a considerably longer period, It is of intereat that the Treasurer of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, the Chairman of the Hong Kong Seamen's Union and the Manager of the China Travel Service all crossed into China early this morning. All three would inevitably be involved in any such food stoppage. They may well, therefore, be going to Canton to co-ordinate planning.

6. There are indications of further defensive measures being taken in Communist premises both on the island and in Kowloon. Except for a home-made bomb being thrown into a police station, which damaged a car, there have been no reports of violence, Small crowds have gathered outside Communist shops and union premises but have dispersed without incident.

7. The statement by the Colonial Secretary yesterday and the successful raids on union premises last night have encouraged those supporting the Government. We mist, however, contime to put on the pressure if we are to have success in demonstrating to the Communists that they will not profit by their present campaign of violence. We can, therefore, expect a continuation of attacks against public transport and the police and stiff resistance to raids on Communist strong points.

(Passed as requested)

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12 17.

ند

Ferry

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RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES Nø,31

13 JUL 1967

FD1/1

(

160

China and Hong Kong

As requested I attach short notes on developments

in China and Hong Kong during the past fortnight for

Mr. Rodgers.

Af Wyl

P.A.

SECRET

سماج

(E. Bolland) 6 July, 1967

Flag A

FD1/6 BS

SECRET

HONG KONG

FO!!!

For the last two weeks the situation in Hong Kong

has been uneasy but there have been no major clashes between

the Government and the Communists. The Communists have

concentrated their attentionum

public

utility and transport services.

Although action of this sort

is potentially very serious the effect of the strikes has so

far been very limited. There has been disruption to transport

services particularly in Kowloon and some interruption with

shipping in the port but in general these strikes have had

litere mez O

mazdance effect. On 29 June the Communista

also organised a four-day strike of food distributors.

was only partially successtol but they did manage to prevent

supplies of fresh food reaching Hong Kong from China.

This

2. The attitude of the Chinese Government appears to have

changed little during this period. The policy they are

advocating for the local Communists in Hong Kong still appeara

to be the gr

support coupled with

demonstrations of their power by organising strikes. They do

not yet appear to have taken any decision to force an immediate

British withdrawal. The latest Chinese Government pronounce-

ment on Hong Kong was an editorial in the "People's Daily" on

5 July (Peking telegram no. 825 attached) which sought to

represent the strike as

mplied that strike

action was expected to continue. The only new and significant

point about this editorial was the emphasis it placed on the

/"crimes"

SECRET

This is an undisguised threat to those Chinese who have

supported the Hong Kong Government. It is likely that

intimidation of such Hong Kong Chinese will be a major

feature of the Communists' campaign from now on and it could

be a difficult one to combat.

Two official committees have now been set up to advise

on Hong Kong. One as part of the

to produce an interim and longer term study on the

prospects for Hong Kong and on what action we should take

depending on various possible developments. The other,

under the

Office, is

planned as a directorate at Under-Secretary level to co-

ordinate action on Hong Kong and consider ways in which we

can maintain the confidence of our friends in Hong Kong and

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KON3 (0.A.G.)

X117

(159

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31

1 3 JUL 1967

FDI|1

Cypher

D. 12 July, 1967. R. 12

10162

IKMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL No. 1014

Addressed to Commonwealth Office

Peking No.408,

POLAD Singapore No. 234,

ра

palag

Repeated

Washington No.224,

Canberra No.60

(S. of S. please pass PRIORITY to all)

Sitrep as at 12.00 hours 12 July.

There were again disturbanças, en Hong Kong island

Wanchal, following

in the easton areas of Korth dỡ the same pattern as the previous two nights. A curfew was imposed on the shi

northern shore of the island from ed by midnight. The Wah Fung emporium at North Point which was again a focal point for rioters, was damaged by fire.

During the late afternoon there were attacks on buses in Kowloon, By 1830 on the island determined attempts were being made to stop public transport, the main trouble areas being Wanchai and Korth Point. Many of the more active members of the mob appeared to be dismissed transport workers and a degree of control was exercised by four motor cyclists all subsequently arrested. The crowds again adopted hit and run tactics with the police, using Communist premises as refuges. Police and public transport were stoned; bottles, including some filled with quick lime, were flung or dropped | from buildings and a number of minor fires were started. Police used both tear gas and denli ams to re-establish control but there were only minor casualties. An explosion near a pelice vehicle was probably caused by a home-made bomb which may indicate that these weapons are now to be used in

Towards midnight, a fire broke out in the ground floor of the Wah Fung emporium. Firemen were hampered by bottle throwing but with police protection succeeded in putting it out. The ground and first floors were damaged. The cause is not certain but it could have been tear gas missiles. By mignight the situation was quiet and it has remained so except for a further case of bottle throwing from the Wah Fung store this morning directed at a police patrol removing posters.

CONFIDENTIAL

Public transport has again been normal this morning having stopped at 21.00 hours on the island yesterday There has been one case of intimidation reported and

there is no doubt that considerable apprehension is building up among transport workers about the present trend of eventa.

There have been a total of thirty-two arrests

on the island during the last twenty-four hours. Two of these had been wounded by gun fire and one by falling off his motor bicycle, There were no police

casualties.

The Communist press today gives prominence to protests about the arrest of the N.C.N.A. reporters and alleges deliberate police action to danege Communist premises. Right-wing papers unanimously call for stronger Government measures.

There is every indication that the Communist plan to continue with and extend their present campaign of Tiolence with the police and public transport as the main targets. They obviously believe that these tactics

have given them the initiative which they intend to exploit.

((Passed as requested)

(Advance copies passed to Messrs. de la Mare, Wilson, Bolland and Denson, Foreign Office (F.E. Dept.),

Commonwealth Secretary and Mr. Glorer,

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FROM HONG KONG (O.A.G.)

RII?

RECEIVED IN ¡ARCHIVES No. 31 12 JUL 1967

FDI ||

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D. 11 July 1967

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IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

No.1006

Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D.)

Repeated to:

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Canberra No.59

(S. of 3. please pass PRIORITY to all)

My telegram No.999,

·156

}

PD13/80

Sitrep as at 11200,

Trouble again broke out in the Eastern District of Hong Kong Island about 2230. Once again the Wah Puang China Products Company emporium and other CPG-owned buildings in the area were involved. The pattern was similar to the previous night. The crowd, never particularly large, dispersed into alleyways on the arrival of police and reformed elsewhere. AB before, few, if any, members of the public joined in. Busea

tras stopped and burned. During this incident * and killed. Attempts were made to set fire to buildings, including a clinic, and also to vehicles; windows were smashed. The police were constantly bombarded with stones and bottles, the latter often being dropped from above from the Wah Fung emporium and other CPG-owned buildings in the area. Some were reported to contain acid. The situation was restored by about 0200, except for a further short attack with bottles on a police working party at about 0500. Kowloon remained relatively quiet.

2. Police ammunition expenditure was mainly tear gas shells and cartridges, some of which had to be fired into buildings including the Wah Fung emporium to discourage bottle throwers. Ball ammunition expenditure was one round each from a carbine, 38 revolver and a Greener gun. Police casualties

were three injured and admitted to hospital and 18 slightly hurt. One civilian was killed (stabbed) and another injured and admitted to hospital. There were eight arresta in the whole Colony, including this injured man. Among them was a NCNA journalist (see my telegram No.1002).

3 Despite the attacks on public transport yesterday there was no decrease in the numbers of buses and trams running today. Police are providing patrols for routes.

(Passed as requested)

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7 July, 1967

159

کھلی

Dear Eddie,

Foll

its

Toom, 10

I enclose a copy of despatch No.1164 of 23rd June 1967 from the Governor of Hong Kong reporting on the principal developments in Hong Kong during the period 15th December 1966 to 4th June 1967. We are arranging to print it.

2. Te shall be sending a formal reply in due course. to make:

(a) Paragraph 16, third sentence in the phrase

I have two comments

"compel Paking to intervene militarily in Hong Kong", I think that "directly" would be a better and broader description of what we have to fear than "militarily".

(b) Paragraph 20

the despatch is dated 23rd June.

Interruption of food supplies has since occurred for four days from June 29th.

Please let us know if you have any comments for incorporation in our reply.

Yours

Bunny

(W.S.GARTER)

I have no additurias comments. I alloch a dratt, reply.

Who brime

E. Bolland Egg Foreign Orrife, Whitehall, London, S..1.

SECRET

MELIG OF. IN

Ref: SCR 1/4841/55

SECRET

GOVERNMENT HOUSE,

HONG KONG.

No. 1164

sir,

DUPLICATE

I have the honour in this despatch to attempt a review of certain major events which have affected Hong Kong since my last periodic despatch dated 15th December, 1966, up to th June, 1967

The progress of events in China has continued its shadow on the Colony, The imposition at the end of 1966 and the beginning of 1967 of some measure of control over the youthful and hitherto totally

finen kou vuls at first encouraged a less anxious mood amongst residents here. However, by the early spring, events in China and the apparent inability of the regime to control "Red Guard" mobs effectively even in Peking re-aroused apprehension about what the future held for China and, by extension, for Hong Kong.

In the spring of 1967, the situation did not look too dangerous. By the end of March, border incidents (mainly matters of commune officials across the border chasing refugees into British territory), which had earlier in the year created Fome concern, ceased. The military takeover of the administration in Kwangtung province came to be seen as a measure for ensuring stability in the province and therefore very welcome from

The Canton Fair which took place from

mid-April to mid-liay, while not particularly successful in business terus, was taken as a sign of a reasonable degree of normalcy in Kwangtung. However, a number of fairly minor events which occurred within the Colony and which suggested the possibility of a repetition here of the crisis in Macau still gave cause for alarm.

In 1966, for the first time in many years, events in Macau had beco

On 15th November a scuffle took place on Talpa Island between the Macau police and pro-Communist supporters over the illicit reconstruction of a Communist school, The pro-Communists in Macau took up the matter as a major issue, perhaps largely because of the encouragement given to revolutionary militancy by the Cultural Revolution in China; but perhaps also because they may have genuinely feared that the incident indicated a A hardening of the Portuguese policy toward the Communists. new Governor of Macau arrived on 25th November and soon thereafter was besieged by a series of delegations from various pro-Communist organisations demanding cẻ domen and satisfaction for the incident. The situation rapidly deteriorated and calm as eventually restored only after eight Chinese had been shot dead and well over a hundred injured.

THE RIGHT HONOURABLL

HIERERT BODEN, C.3....., M.F.

/5..

SECRET

CHIEF PEGISTRAR'S OFFICE 27 JUN 1967

SECRET

There then began a period of nearly two months of negotiations

Portuguese for a settlement. The local Communist leadership in Macau demanded public apologies by the Governor, dismissal of certain officials, and compensation for those killed and injured and those who had suffered loss; while the C.P.G., through the Kwangtung Foreign Affairs Bureau, reinforced these demanda and added one of their om, the cessation of Kuomintang activities in Macau and the handing over to China of seven K.L.T. agents arrested by the Portuguese in 1963. A policy of conciliation at almost any cost eventually had to be accepted b. the Portuguese Government. Towards the end of January an agreement was reached that the Kacau Government would issue a formal apology for the two incidents, recognise the guilt of the officials concerned, pay compensation amounting to the equivalent of over hk 2 million, hand over the seven K.K.T. agents and take action to restrict K.M.T. activities 271 Macau in future. Today, although the administration of the Colony remains nominally in the hands of the Portuguese, it is quite clear that their authority to impose their vill, at any rate on supporters of the C.P.G., has almost entirely disappeared.

Although Hong Kong's involvement in all this was minimal, the implications of the

re-instantial. It appeared that the C.F.0. still conside ed that the advantage of having Macau (and hence Hong Kong) under sliedenistration were too important to sacrifice and that they had deliberately avoided taking back Hacau, but had used t】 the dispute to seduce more limited alm K.E.7. activities an ufluchce in the Province and the imposition of the maximum degree of hur For tuguese authorities. A vere obvious Lessons YOW here in

the elimination of

the

The first demonstration that these lessons of kacau had been learnt by the Communits in Hong Kong came in pe

and Maroj pon, under pressure from the Hong Kong Seamen's Union (H.K.S.U.) the Royal Interocean Line (R.I.L.) management was compelled to apologise publicly and dismiss the captain of one of their ships, who had shot and wounded four Chinese members of his crew whilst in Australia. In April pro-Communist workers in a number of other companies began to put pressure on the

ats and a new spirit

of militanoy amongst the rank and file became obvious. at the same time it became clear that pro-Communist leaders had released the tight control which they had hitherto exercised over their union members and were, in accordance with the precepts of the Cultural Revolution, allowing the

r freedom to

le". The pro- Communist prose was also becoming increasingly abusive, attacking the Government on a variety of grounds but particularly over the issue of visits of American ships and servicemen to the Colony.

In these conditions there was grave danger that a comparatively minor issue would stret

cozialration. The spark as provided by a dispute which arose in April in two artificial flower factories where the management

/ was

SECRET

8063460 0.T. 316

SECRET

- 3-

was trying to impose more stringent work schedules. On 6th May disturbances broke out outside one of the factories in Kowloon and as a result 21 persons were arrested (including the Chairman of the union concerned with the artificial flower trade), The next day, the union, which was later backed by the pro-Communist Federation of Trade Unions (F.T.U.), made four demands to the Government - the release of all those arreated, the punishment of those responsible and the payment of compensation, a guarantee of workers' safety and finally that the police should not henceforward interfere in labour disputes. This was followed on 11th May by further disorders in which 143 people were arrested. On each occasion, the police were forced to intervene after repeated warnings when the crowd refused to limit its behaviour to peaceful picketing.

In the early stages of the crisis which followed, up to lup kay, the trouble was confined to le

It was supported by paid hooligans and centred on the courts in which those arrested on 6th and 11th Hay were being tried, around the artificial flower factory, and in a resettlement estate near by. The police behaved with reat restraint and, with the aid of nick cur ews on

th lay, succeeded in restoring order. Altogether 556 people were arrested; 28 Police and 39 others were injured. The only fatality was a bystander killed by a stone.

10.

On 15th Hay, the situation took a more serious turn when a statement was issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Peking condemning the British Government and authorities in Hong Kong for acts of brutal suppression and fascist atrocities in collusion with the United States. It also listed five demands which were to be accepted unconditionally and immediately. These included the immediate acceptance of the four demands of the Hong Kong Unions, the release of all those arrested in Hong Kong with apologies and compensation, the cessation of all Fascist measures and a guarantee against any recurrence of such incidents.

11.

On 16th Hay, as the trouble in Kowloon began to subside, the focus shifted to Hong Kong Island as the result of the presentation to Government House by pro- Communist delegations of petitions supporting the "five demands". Seventeen Hambers of the All Circles Anti- Persecution Struggle Committee, which had been formed as the ostensible spearhead of the agitation for acceptance of the "demands", twice appeared outside the gates of Government House demanding, in an offensive and peremptory way, to see me. When this was refused, the temper of the demonstrators became hotter. The numbers of delegations quickly grew and their members became increasingly arrogant, demanding and noisy. quantities of posters were affixed to the gate at the entrance to the Government House grounds. By 20th May, crowds of over 3,000 were involved and, being denied immediate access to Government House, spread out into the city creating trouble wherever they went, egged on by inflammatory and anti-European broadcasts over loud speakers from Communist-ormed concerns particularly the Bank of China. The climax came on 22nd May hen a major

/trial ....

SECRET

DOOSANI O F. JH

SECRET

trial of strength took place. Twice the crowds tried to break through the Police cordons round Government House and a well planned but poorly executed attempt was made to dramatise police brutality by the manufacture of false victims and the maximum exploitation of real casualties. Elsewhere in the city dangerous crowds built up and traffic was brought to a standstill when bus drivers abandoned their vehicles blocking all the major roads, while there was renewed trouble in Kowloon. A night curfew was declared in the north of Hong Kong Island, and measures forbidding any public procession or meetings.ithout police approval were brought into force. Order was restored and, with this, it could be said that the first violent phase of the confrontation with the Communists had ended. The police had behaved with exemplary restraint despite bearing the full brunt of Communist propaganda and being exposed over long periods to deliberate provocation. The total number of arrests had risen to 816. Casualties were now 35 Police and 83 others injured, but there had been no further fatalities.

12.

The Foreign Secretary's strong protest to the Chinese Charge' d'Affaires on 19th Kay had most valuable bac¶ on mort during this critical period, while the arrival of Sir Arthur Galsworthy, Mr. Bolland and ir. Carter on 21st May served to emphasise H.b.G. 's complete support for a do cermina uron

13.

Our own counter propaganda at the time achieved considerable success in demonstrating the limited support on which the Communists would rely. The campaign to get individuals, institutions and communities to declare their support for law and order evoked a moi with well d

their support to Government. Fund which rapidly built up

sou na et

ally pledging So. too. aid the Police Education

llion as a gesture of

thanks to the Police for thei" successful action in controlling kuce. The countering of rumours, the encouragement of resistance to intimidation and the exposure of the more blatant Communist claims ere also tackled successfully.

14.

It must now have become clear to the Communist hierarchy here that they lacked the broad base of support fron which to intimidate tl:e Government.

They had

live, but could not afford to alienate the Chinese majority who, despite their innate patriotism, had demonstrated their disinterest in indeed, abhorrence for any forcible

change in the status quo.

15.

A new phase therefore opened on 23rd May, when Communist tactics switched to the labour field and a series of token strikes began in all public transport and utility companies as well as in other concerns where Communist influence predominated. This policy was backed by intimidation and increasingly virulent propaganda in the local Communist press, by posters and over mainland Chinese radio stations, the police still being the main object of attack. The stoppages were successful in that they succeeded in keeping the dispute before the eyes of the public without, however, inconveniencing anyone greatly or disrupting the life of the Colony seriously. The policy could be said to be effective within its limited scope, but it was essentially defensive in nature though it carried the threat of major strike action in the future.

SECRET

/ 16

6003160 G P 316

SECRET

16.

The battle is now one, on our part, to preserve public confidence in our ability to maintain control here (which is what all but a handful desperately hope we can do); and, on their part, to break this confidence down and persuade or terrorize sufficient numbers into compliance with their commands. Neither ve nor the Communists have much freedom of manoeuvre. On our side, we cannot afford to provide a casus belli which would compel Peking to intervene militarily in Hong Kong or provoke an unauthorised intervention by extremists in Canton. We have, therefore, to proceed very carefully in our action against the press, unions and particularly against the C.P.G.-owned concerns which provide the direction and backing for the local Communists. On the Communist side, they must at all costs gain more support amongst the general public. They cannot do this by causing disturbances which upset the life of the Colony; on the other hand, they cannot allow the issue to drop even temporarily. Their situation has been worsened rather than improved by the ambiguous terms of the editorial in the People's Daily in Peking on 3rd June. This, though arrogant and offensive, appeared to lay emphasis on the need to plan for a long drawn out struggle with the definite implication that the local hierarchy cannot expect active support from China other than by way of propaganda.

The danger is that the more militant rank and file may take this editorial, which was given wide publicity here, at its face value and see in it an encouragement to further action, thus making it more difficult for the more moderate of Communist leaders to exercise restraint.

17.

A second major factor is the situation in China. Accounts of disorder approaching anarchy continue to come in. It may become increasingly difficult for Peking to exercise

hotheads, both here and

in Kangtung. There is al rays the possibility that extremists in Canton might try to come to the aid of their fellow countrymen here, in defiance of Peking. However, the Chinese Army is the authoritative body in Kwangtung and it exercises firm control over the border area. This would Beem to lessen the likelihood of such action.

18.

It is too early as yet to assess with any accuracy what effect the present confrontation with the Communists will have on the economy. If, as appears likely, it continues for some time, the consequences could be seri damage done to Hong Kong's reputation

eff twent centre for foreign and local business alike will continue until some sort of accommodation (tacit or otherwise) with the Communista is reached which can be seen to have some degree of permanency.

19.

There has been no noticeable effect as yet on exports and, provided that the present Communist-inspired stoppages are not switched from utility services to the industrial sector, there is no reason why there should be any significant loss of exports. In this main sector at least the economy should remain strong. The tourist trade, however, is likely to be affected to some degree depending on whether any more disturbances occur.

SECRET

/ 20

SECRET

20.

It is noticeable that the Communists have not so far made any sustained attempt to disrupt the Colony's food supplies from China. Nevertheless, the present situation has led to some price rises in basic commodities, particularly in rice (of which less than 30% comes from China) as a result of rumours and hoarding. A request for additional water July-made in accordance with our water agreements, has not been answered and it remains to be seen whether it will be net.

21.

Government

Stock Exchange prices have been depressed by up to 20% and the price of gold has soared from $262 per tael to about $290 depending on the day to day situation. expenditure has increased though not too significantly at present; a more serious effect may be a fall in Government revenue later should there be, as could happen, a slump in the economy generally, and in particular the loss of foreign investment capital.

Conclusion.

22.

This,

This crisis is by no means over. We have weathered the initial storm pretty well; and, at the time of writing, appear to have forced the Communists to think again. however, the local hard core are doing with a malevolence probably enhanced by their initial failures, future lie

in main

The keys to the

e in itself;

and in our

for if our economy fails, all fails with it ability to continue to do business; and, finally, in the attitudes towards us of a China in convulsions.

I have the honour to be,

Sir

Your most obedient, humble servant,

SECRET

Anmer

GOVERNOR.

יו

1st

R.11) (D)

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (0.A.G.)

Cypher

D. 10 July, 1967. R. 10

11002

IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL No. 999.

Addressed to Commonwealth Office

Repeated

RECEIVED

ARCHIVES No.31:

11 JUL 1967

FD!|!

Ured for pa

Peking No.402, POLAD Singapore No.229, Washington No.221 and Canberra No.58

бсе

(Commonwealth office please to all PRIORITY)

Sitrep as at 101800.

There were, in addition to the Sha Tau Kok clash, six minor demonstrations in Hong Kong on Saturday 8 July. During Sunday 9 July there were a series of scattered insidents, mainly on the island, on the same lines, which appear to have been deliberately created in the hope of Angmarating the situation

On Saturday at midday students from Communist- controlled schools in groups of 150-200 staged three demonstrations on Hong Kong island and one in Kowloon. These were short, well disciplined and dispersed quickly of their own accord. In each case they were held in the vicinity of a mainland products store and it is probable that had the police had to disperse them there could have been serious totiater attacks from these stores. At about the same time a similar demonstration was ataged on the island by employees of the C.P.G.-owned commercial press near their own building. At 20.30 hours there was a repetition on a smaller scale, again on the island, outside a China products store. There is no indication that these demonstrations had any connection with the Sha Tau Kok incident. Their aim appeared to be to boost Communist morale and discipline and to provide propaganda material.

On Saturday, trouble broke out in the late afternoon and was on Hong Kong island and was centred mainly in the eastern distalets of North Paint and Wanchai. The focal point was the

takes Company which was usel

demonstratore who retreated inside when police arrived, emerging again and again to cause trouble. In the western district a police unit was attacked while debussing to investigate a student demonstration. Iron bars and cargo hooks were used by the crowd, The police

/opened

CONFIDENTIAL

By 2230

opened fire in self defence injuring three of the crowd,

Police had three casumities including one killed in the meles. violence had grown in the eastern district with the crowds stopping and

es, setting one bus on fire, demonstrating outside a Right-wing newspaper and threatening to set fire to buildings. Three American servicemen were also chased. Crowds dispersed by police action including the usa off 2AB, continually reformed until shortly after midnight when the ringleader of a hostile group, which refused to disperse, was shot and killed by the police. Shortly after this, order was restored. During this time,

there were three minor incidents in Kowloon, where several buses were also attacked, one being set on fire. Total casualties

Iliane killed, ten policemen and three others injured. There were 22 arreste.

The characteristics of the last two days' demonstrations were the use of students in comparatively minor demonstrations as bait in the area of a mainland store or office with an ambush party ready to take on the police when they arrived. The violence which developed marked a new phase. It is of interest that there was little support from the general public on the island; although some hooligans joined in, the response was much less than occurred in May in Kowloon. The reasons for this new violent development is probably frustration over previous

juveedus, though the incident at Sha Tau Kok

may have had some influence.

Situation in Sha Tau Kok.

WAS

thrown into British territory slightly injuring a Gurkha ( so? Mor. The local commander arranged for the police

to broadcast a message by loudspeaker to the local Chinese commander seeking his co-operation in preventing incidents like this. Only response was broadcasting by the Chinese of the Peking Note on Sha Tau Kok incident. The majority of inhabitants of British territory have now voluntarily withdrawn to stay with friends deeper inside new territories, If all continues to be quiet, they may well return. If not, Sha Tau Kok

Sha Tau Kok (B.T.) may become a virtually dead town a sort of no man's land.

There have been several reports that formal applications are to be made by relations or their authorised representatives for the handing over of the bodies of the original seven dead men. The presence near the mortuary of a large number camerenen and reporters mainly from pro-Communist papers during the day seemed to confirm that such a move was planned. Nothing, however, eventuated.

There were no incidents until just after 16.00 when a crowd of about 400 formed near the Star Ferry, Kowloon, probably coming from the large C.P.G. owned building opposite. They beat up a bus driver and a European soldier, then moved up Nathan Road shouting slogane and stoning buses until dispersing without further incident in the Jordan Road area, The soldier was admitted to hospital suffering from slight concussion.

(Passed as requested)

CONFIDENTIAL

/(Advance

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

(155

SECRET

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (0.A.G.)

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31

10 JUL 1967

FD!|!1

Cypher

7 July

7 July, 1967.

11302

ра pa ..

PRIORITY SECRET No. 979.

Addressed to Commonwealth office.

Repeated

"Peking No. 389.

"P.A. Singapore No. 218.

"Washington No. 212. (8. of 8. please

pase all).

151

My telegram No. 945.

H.K. Confrontation.

Following is LIC assessment of the situation as at midday 7 July,

Principal features of the Communist confrontation with Government over the past week have been; -

(a) The continuation of the strike in public transportation,

utilities, port facilities and the textile industry. Despite Communist attempts at intimidation and bribery of workers, there has continued to be a steady return of strikers to work and services to the public, in the transport field, are gradually improving, Most of the companies affected by the strike are taking on new labour but in the case of the bus companies, particularly in Kowloon, it will be some time before a full service can be resumed. Work in the harbour which was slightly disrupted for some time as a result of a refusal of motor boat and lighter crews to work on the ships in midstream, is now practically back to normal. In a general attempt to keep the strikers from returning to work the Communists have now standardised their strike

pay (apparently for the month) at 500 dollars per man

and have offered to subsidise alternative accommodation for workers who are evicted from company quarters as a result of their dismissal.

(b) The disruption for four days of food supplies from China

(paragraph 2 (B) of telegram No, 945 refers). On the whole, this strike had surprisingly little effect on the local community Indeed apart from a shortage of pork and eggs and a rise in price of vegetables and some other

/types

SECRET

types of food it was hardly noticed. Supplies from China resumed on the 2 July, and for the past few days there has been a glut of food on the markets, resulting in a drop of prices. Some pressure, however, has been exerted by the Communists on dealers in and carriers of food from China in an attempt to ensure only those who fully support the confrontation handl CPG goods and produce. Dealers in poultry and eggs who did not close during the stoppage are being black- listed and told that they will receive no further supplies of these commodites from China.

on the 4 July met with little success and only a few of the smaller bakeries closed down completely.

(a) The holding of memorial services by individual Communist

organisations for workers who have died in the confrontation. There has been considerable talk over the past few days in various Communist spheres of a mass funeral procession for the three "martyrs" who died as a result of incidents on the 8 June. (See my telegram No. 831) whilst the Communist leadership is reluctant to risk another major confrontation on the streets it could be forced to give way to pressures from below.

(e) The visit of three small student delegations to the

head office of the Education Department to protest about the arrest of students by the police, One of these delegations chanted slogans for a few minutes and put up a number of posters on the building before departing.

(f)

Propaganda in the local Left Wing press has continued to make exaggerated claims about the success of the strike action undertaken by the Communista.

The police force remains the major target for attack and following the charging of three policemen with "inflicting grievous bodily harm" on a prisoner, the Communist press has, in an attempt to split the force, claimed that these three are being made "scapegoats" Senior Chinese police officers have received letters purporting to originate from friends of an ex-police superintendent who was deported in 1962 for involvement in Chinese Intelligence Service activities. They call on the addressees to "change sides in the present struggle".

(g) A "Peoples Daily" editorial on the 5 July, subsequently

reprinted in a special edition of the local Left Wing press, which calls on "compatriots" in Hong Kong to persist with the struggle until victory is achieved. Mention is made also of "mobilising the several hundred thousand students"

(h) A number of very minor incidents on the border such as

Betting off a firecracker at Sha Tau Kok near the police post and the haranguing of officers on duty near the border, no injuries or damage resulted from these incidents.

(1) Meetings of representatives of Communist banking and

commercial organisations and businessmen who have dealings with CPG trading agencies, at which the

/general

SECRET

general manager of the Bank of China announced that the next move in the anti persecution struggle would be the refusal by "compatriots" to pay taxes and fees of any kind to the Hong Kong Government.

Reliable information shows that the local Communist leaders are somewhat concerned about the morale of the strikere, many of whom apparently wish to return to work. Others have been classified as greedy because they were asking for increased strike pay.

The expense of continuing to subsidise strikers is worrying the Communist hierarchy. A senior Communist has said they could not afford to pay out more money. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that they intend to continue with their confrontation. The incitement of pro Communists to refuse to pay taxes could become a direct challenge to Government authority, and foreshadow a broader civil disobedience campaign.

30 Although the four day disruption of food supplies from China did not achieve the success anticipated by the Communists, the present attempt to tighten control over dealers and carriers of mainland produce could presage further disruption of supplies Any prolonged interference with food, however, would not only antagonise the local populace but have an adverse effect on China's economy.

4. The Peoples Daily" editorial of 5 July will give further encouragement. to the local Left Wing leaders and the call to "mobilise the students" may result in an increase in activity in this field which, up to the present, has played a relatively small part in the confrontation. There is no promise in this editorial of any further assistance from China and information from reliable sources continues to show that the local Communist hierarchy realise that they will have to rely on their own efforts to achieve success in the present "struggle" with the Hong Kong Government. However the more militant of the rank and file still harbour the delusion that the Chinese Communist army will intervene if the situation so demanda. This may account for Communists at union level seemingly seeking a head on collision with Government through the medium of a funeral procession for the "three martyrs" whereas the leadership shows little enthusiasm for such an event. We would be faced with a serious security problem if, once more, those in "authority" in the local Communist movement bow to the will of "the masses" on this issue.

5. In broad terms however the situation at present is well under Government control. So far none of the Communist attempts to exert their will has met with the success anticipated. Indeed over the weeks the Communists have alienated the general public through interference with essential services and food supplies and their representation in many essential services has been decimated. Although their aim is clearly to wear down the Government, many of their rank and file are becoming restless. Any apparent inability of the Communists to continue to subsidise strikers could well undermine yet further the morale of their supporters,

(Passed as requested)

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and Denson and Private Office Commonwealth Secretary)

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SECRET

Rie 117 (154)

SECRET

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

TO HONG KONG (0.A.G.)

: RECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES No.31

1 0 JUL 1967

FDI

Cypher

Sent 7 July, 1967.

2231 Z

IMMEDIATE SECRET

No. 1388

Addressed to 0.A.G.Hong Kong Repeated

Peking.

Your telegram No. 972.

153

We agree with view expressed in last sentence

of your paragraph 4. We hope that need to take such action will not arise; but if a situation of the kind envisaged in your paragraph 3 should develop, we must accept any action either by the Court or the Attorney General as inevitable,

(Passed to D.S.A.0. for repetition to Peking.)

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Mr. J.A.B. Darlington Mr. B.E.P. MacTavish

Hong Kong Government Office Mr. P. Sedgwick

SECRET

INWARD TELFORAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

ROOM 117 (153)

RECEIVED IN.

ARCHIVES No.31

LC 1967

FD1/1

FROM HONG KONG (0.A.G.)

Cypher

D. 6 July 1967

IMMEDIATE

R. 6

09052

SECRET

ра

No.972

Addressed to Commonwealth Office Repeated

"Peking No.387

(C.0. please pass IMMEDIATE)

Your telegram No.1038.

As you are aware from my telegram No.948 one police corporal and two constables are in gaol custody charged with causing grievous bodily harm to a man in police custody. They are expected to appear on remand before a magistrate on 7 July, when it is likely that they will also be charged with murder of another prisoner in the cells.

2. On 30 June, following Communist press comment, the Attorney-General found it necessary to issue a warning to the press that nothing whatsoever should be said in public which could in any way deny the three policemen a fair trial. Between 1st and 3rd July the Communist press has challenged this warning by saying that the charged policemen were deliberately being used as scapegoats by this Government and their arrest was but a trick to terrorise the public under a pretence of demonstrating the "fairness" of British justice.

3. There is a definite possibility that one or more of the Communist newspapera may at any time commit a grave contempt of court of the kind that constitutes interference with the due administration of the law and the prevention of a fair trial. In these circumstances it may become necessary for the Attorney- General to take rapid action and equally the court or the defence may do so.

4. It is difficult to forecast the outcome of such action but there is a risk that it might lead to a major confrontation with the Communist press since even the service of a writ might call for strong police action. On the other hand, this may be as good ground as any for taking the initiative against the excesses of the Communist press.

5. I will keep you informed of developments but it may be necessary to set quickly.

(Passed as requested)

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CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

152

FROM HONG KONG (0.A.G.)

Cypher

D. 5 July 1967

R. 5

1032Z

IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL

No.971

Addressed to Commonwealth Office Repeated to:

Peking No. 386

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31

JUL 1967

1/7

FD1/1

POLAD Singapore No.217 Washington No.211

Canberra No.57

(S. of S. please pass to all)

The general situation remains quiet, the main problem in the immediate future being the possibility of a major clash over the funerals of the seven men, three of whom the communists have widely exploited as "martyrs". An attempt is being made to restrict the movement and sale of mainland products to known communists' supporters. There has been a small demonstration by students.

2. Pressure seems to be building up for a major communist effort to mark the funerals, particularly of the three "martyrs" who died as a result of incidents at the Government workshops and the gasworks in Kowloon on 8 June. (Our telegrama Nos.831 and 875 refer.) The local leadership is probably reluctant to risk another major confrontation but could again be forced to give way to pressures from below as has been the case in the past.

3. Agents for mainland goods are trying to prevent anyone but pro-communists from handling C.P.G. goods and produce. Some success has been achieved in the transport field and pressure is being brought to bear on retailers particularly those handling poultry and eggs, over 90% of our supplies of which come from China.

4. The public transport situation continues to improve slowly though the services in Kowloon are still well below normal. The port is operating satisfactorily but there are fewer ships than usual because of the blocking of the Suez Canal.

5. A minor demonstration took place outside the Education Department near the Cathedral this afternoon. 20 30 students emerged from the area of the Bank of China, festooned the main entrance to the Department with posters, chanted and then dispersed before the police arrived. We may well have other pinpricks now that the end of term is near, each of which, however, could start a serious incident.

(Passed as requested with advance copies to F.0. F.B. Dept.

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CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (0.A.G.)

Cypher

D. 30 June, 1967.

11152

151

RECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES No.31

1967 الماني

PRIORITY SECRET

No. 945.

R. 30

Addressed to Commonwealth Office

Repeated

忖

Peking No.372 and

POLAD Singapore No.209

Washington No.206

(S. of S. please pass to all)

My telegram No. 891.

Hong Kong Confrontation.

134

FDI1

से

Following is L.I.C. assessment of the situation

as at mid-day 30 June.

(a)

(0)

stra

Principal developments over the past week have been:-

the strike in public transportation, utilities, which spread also to port facilities and the textile industry. This strike which began

on 24 June, has achieved varying degrees of success in these fields but there has been no complete disruption in any one area. The buses, particularly those of the Kowloon Motor Bus Company were worst hit, but restricted services have been maintained. Gas and electricity supplies have not been affected despite some absenteeism among labourers. The ferries were least affected only one route being out. The tram company was able to keep about half its fleet running. In the harbour, work continued as usual on ships lying alongside but because of a refusal on the part of tow boats and lighters to work in mid-stream for fear of intimidation, delays have occurred in the loading and discharging of cargo from ships at buoys. Since the 24 June, there has been a slow but steady trickle of strikers returning to work and it is hoped that this trend will continue. The majority of the employers concerned, have dismissed the strikers though, in some cases, they are offering reinstatement, on a selective basis:

an attempt to call a four-day stoppage commencing on the 29 June of hakere, livestock dealers, retailers, tradesmen and employees of commercial organisations who are largely dependent on supplies from China for their livelihood. To support this strike local communist food importers have ended food deliveries from China starting on ti. L5 June,

/although

SECRET

although it is not clear to what extent this action has the concurrence of the Kwangtung provincial government authorities. Present indications are that normal supplies will be resumed at the end of the four day period but in the interim there will be a shortage of some types of foodstuffs:

(c) an increase in intimidation of workers who have refused to obey the call for atrike action. (New emergency legislation has been promulgated giving Government additional powers to deal with this offence. A number of arrests have

(a)

(e)

(r)

already been made. These may have a salutary effect):

a stepping up of attacks on isolated bodies of police. In addition to the incident involving members of the Rubber and Plastic Workers' General Union (see my telegram No.894), police have been attacked on three other occasions when arresting persons in connection with intimidation and posting slogana:

a demonstration by some 500 persons, including a number from Chinese territory, on the British side of the border at Sha Tau Kok on 24 June, Following police intervention to break up a procession, another crowd, also including persons from Chinese territory, attacked the police with various missiles, surrounded the Sha Tau Kok police post and set fire to a police vehicle nearby. Police used tear gas to disperse the crowd and it was subsequently alleged that some of the spent cartridges had been found in Chinese territory, During the incident, border guarde manned machine gune in Chung Ying Street, China territory, apparently as a counter measure to two police armoured cars parked near the police post. They made no attempt to interfere. On 27 June, several anti-British demonstrations took place in Chinese territory near the border including two at Lo Mu Bridge, involving several thousand people, one near Lo Fong village and one at Sha Tau Kok. The crowds were orderly and were controlled and no incidents occurred:

a speech by Chou En Lai made in Peking on 24 June, in which he referred to the suppression or Chinese in Hong Kong. The People's Daily of the same date hailed the strike of 24 June as a "fierce blow dealt by the workers to the Hong Kong authorities:

(g) a C.P.G. protest Note of 27 June. This Note, which

H.K. Charge d'Affaires in Peking refused to accept, was in violent and extravagant terms and reiterated the previous demands on the Hong Kong Government by local communists and Peking. It did not, however, contain any new threats other than inference that China does not intend to allow local confrontation to die:

SECRET

/(h)

SECRET

(h)

(1)

(a)

a one day stoppage of scholastic activities by 32 local communist schools. In fact only three of the schools closed completely whilst the remainder spent the day holding political studies and memorial services for workers who had died in the confrontation:

a continuation of the vitriolic anti-British propaganda in the local left wing press which has made exaggerated claims about the success of the atrike action undertaken by the communists.

There were several very strong attacks on

His Excellency, immediately prior to, and following his departure from the colony; and

a continuation of the distribution of

inflammatory leaflets, some of which are being thrown from the topa of high buildings.

Posters and painted slogans continue to appear on buildings and public places during the night. These are obliterated by police as soon as they are discovered. Inflammatory posters and newspaper articles are still displayed on much the same scale, in the windows and show-cases of communist controlled premises.

Reliable information shows that the local

communist leaders are disappointed with the support that the strike of 24 June has obtained but feel that now that they are committed, they must continue with their present course of action. Whilst this strike has caused some disruption particularly in the bus services available to the public, the local communisty has shown its usual resilience and apart from a greater number of people walking to and from work and a general reduction in the crowds on the streets during the evenings, life in the community goes on very much as normal. The delays in loading and off-loading ships in the harbour will, in due course, affect the commercial life of the colony but it is hoped that over the next few days there will be some improvement in this area. Increased intimidation is the only tactic open to the communists if they wish to achieve any greater success in this strike action but the additional powers granted by the new legislation should have a deterrent effect.

The interference with the flow of food and other supplies from China, albeit on a temporary basis, is a new phase of the confrontation. It seeme improbable that C.P.G. concerns such as Ng Fung Hong and China Resources Company would become involved in such action without approval from China, but it is significant that livestock and other food have continued to arrive at the border, only to be refused by local communist importers who are doing so on the quite fictitious grounds that no transport or unloading facilities are available as a result of the strike. The stoppage is obviously designed to intimidate the local populace into siding with the communists in the confrontation, by reminding them how much they are dependent upon China for their food. However, any prolonged interference with food supplies must have an adverse effect on China's own economy, at least

SECRET

in its foreign exchange position. On the other hand, whilst the colony can find alternative sources of supply, these apart from the local farmers and pig-raisers, cannot be tapped at short notice. Consequently there will be a shortage of some types

of foodstuffs over the next few days resulting in a rise in price of such food as is available. There are reserves of most easential foods in the colony, however, and no more inconvenience should be experienced than during the period of a prolonged typhoon,

There has been continued talk in communist organisations throughout the week of a mass funeral procession but there is still no evidence that the communist leadership wish this to take place.

A number of memorial services for workers who have died in the confrontation have taken place inside individual communist controlled premises throughout the week and it could be that this will be the limit of their endeavours in this direction, at least for the time being. Meanwhile, the bodies of the workers are still in the Government mortuary.

There have been further indications from reliable sources that the local communist leadership believe that, to a large extent, they will have to rely on their own efforts to achieve success in the confrontation. This appears to be borne out by Chou En Lai's speech and the latest C.P.G. protest Note both of which were strongly Worded but contained no new threats. The resuscitation by the C.P.G. of the original demands indicate that it is not prepared to allow the confrontation to die and this protest Note will undoubtedly encourage local communists to continue their struggle but its ain may have been to bring the dispute on to the normal diplomatic network and thus incidentally to indicate to the contending parties in Hong Kong that it is basically a matter for London and Peking to settle. It is notable in any case that, contrary to the pattern in Macao, no new demands have yet been added to the original five,

(Passed as requested with advance copies to

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怵

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情

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SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (O.A.0.)

Cypher D. 3 July, 1967.

1107Z

RECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES No.31

FBUY: 1967 FD1|1

150

INMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL No. 956.

Belle

Addressed to Commonwealth office (D.T.D.).

Repeated

"Peking No. 379.

"P.A. Singapore No. 215. "Washington No. 210.

Ħ Canberra. No. 54. (8. of S. please pass

PRIORITY to all).

My telegram No. 948.

SITREP as at 031800.

149

Transport of food from Chiną vaa resumed yesterday Sunday 2nd when waggons carrying 7,500 pigs and 428 cattle, Hore than a day's supply, were sent in by rail. Large supplies of pigs, cattle, poultry, fish and vegetables continued to arrive today by road, rail and sea. Local supplies of fish and vegetables have been maintained, and the marketa are rapidly returning to normal. Prices are still slightly high, but are

expected to return to normal after tomorrow.

2. Public transport continues to be restricted. Buses on Hong Kong Island about 50% of normal, trams about 75%. In Kowloon the bus service is only about 25% and although this is improving slowly, many drivers have been discharged, complete rescheduling of routes is necessary and it will be some weeke before anything approaching a normal service can be resumed.

3. The port continues to be affected by the strike instigated by the Coxswains and Engineering Union. This strike is mainly affecting the two big European managed companies, Hong Kong and Kowloon Wharf and Godown, and China Provident, because the majority of their lighter crews are unionised. However, work in the port

is continuing at about 95% of normal by the use of amall firms employing casual, non-unionised labour. Mainland barges appeared for the first time this morning since Thursday and this led to a resumption of work along the waterfront. However, there are reports of further stoppages being planned.

4. All public utility companies affected by strikes are pursuing a cautious policy of re-employment involving detailed screening of applicants making use of police records.

(Passed as requested)

(Advance copies passed to D.8.A.0. for

Messrs de la Mare, Bolland, Wilson and Denson (F.E. Dept.) and to Prive Office for Commonwealth Secretary).

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Affairs Representative) Canada House (Counsellor)

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Eг. J.A.B. Darlington kr. B.E.P. MacTavish Mr. P. Sedgwick

Mr. T. Critchley Mr. K. MacLellan

CONFIDENTIAL

FD!!

(149)

SECRET

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (0.4.G.)

Cypher D. 1 July, 1967.

R. 1

K117

RECEIVED IN

ARCHIV

10552

-3 JUL 1967

FO!/

INMEDIATE SECRET No. 948.

pales

Addressed to Commonwealth office (D.T.D.). Repeated PRIORITY to Peking No. 373.

计

My telegram No. 930.

SITREP as at 011800.

"P.A. Singapore No. 210. "Washington No. 207.

"Canberra No. 52. (s. of S. please

pass to all),

148)

No goods have been received from China but there have been no serious shortages of food and prices have begun to go down. Working of ships in the harbour is improving but there are still hold ups on the Kowloon wharves. H.M.S. MINERVA has been accused of encroaching into Chinese waters when carrying out speed trials in the Lamma channel south of Hong Kong. Three policemen are to be charged in connection with injuries to a man arrested on 24 June and now in hospital.

2. There has been no sign of any break in the hold up of supplies by China although there are reports that stocks are coming in by sail to the border area. Beef and pork prices have begun to drop but the latter is still scarce despite increased supplies from the New Territories. Fish landings were unusually high on Thursday and Friday because a storm warning brought the fleet into harbour. Prices have dropped,

3. Harbour working has continued to improve although the storm warning and weather disrupted work over the previous 3 days. Marine police patrols appear to have reduced the thrt of intimidation. Nevertheless there are still delays due to lack of labour and there is room for considerable improvement still.

4. H.M.8. MINERVA was signalled by the Chinese station on the north east head of the Lema Islands while rounding Po Toi Island preparatory to a speed trial in the East Lamma channel. This is a normal procedure which does involve a minor and short encroachment into Chinese waters. The station on north east head fairly frequently sende warnings in these circumstances but on this occasion the message was prefixed 'I lodge a protest' which is unusual.

5. A corporal and two police constables are to be charged with causing grievous bodily harm to a man held in custody from 24 to 26 June and now in hospital. There is a possibility of

a more serious charge being raised.

SECRET

/(Passed

SECRET

(Passed to D.S.A.0. for Washington, Canberra, F.0. F.E. Dept. (Messrs. Wilson, Bolland, de la Mare, Denson) Resident Clerk and Private Office for Commonwealth Secretary)

(Passed to Singapore and Peking)

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R17

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FRON HONG KONG (0..G.}

Cypher D. 28 June, 1967.

RELIVED IN ¡ARCHIVES No.31

30 JUN 1967

FD1/1

1255Z

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 930.

Addressed to Commonwealth office. Repeated PRIORITY to Peking No. 366.

"P.A. Singapore No. 205. "Washington No. 205. (s. of 3.

please pass to all).

147

My telegram No. 926.

SITREP as at 28 1800.

ре

The public transport situation has improved slightly. There have been no deliveries of livestock, vegetables or poultry from China. Attempts are being made to prevent the landing of fish and a four day strike in the distribution and sale of foodstuffs is being planned.

2. There has been a small increase in the number of trams and buses running except in Kowloon where however two shifts are now running again and a larger and better service is being provided. In the harbour, shortage of lighter crews continues slightly to hamper the discharging of ships lying off the wharves- On land, the strike of lorry drivers has created problems in the distribution of food, particularly that of Chinese origin.

3. The stopping of deliveries of foodstuffs from China appears to have stemmed from the initiative of workers here who during the last two days have refused to handle arrivals.

As a result a more general attempt is now being made to paralyse the Colony's distribution and retailing of food. The pigs held in Kowloon last night were eventually unloaded at 2200, but there was a shortage of pork today because kills were restricted. Prices rose about 15%. Only limited supplies will be available tomorrow, No vegetables were delivered but this has presented no problem. Attempts to stop fishermen landing their catches here are being made and it is too early to assess how effective this will be. Rice distribution, nearly back to normal, is not a problem. The main issue is certainly the supply of pigs. If the strike lasts only four days, as forecast for the C.P.G.- owned shops known to be taking part, the difficulties are summountable. If however supplies are withheld for a longer period, the situation could become difficult. There is no evidence however that any such policy decision has been taken by the C.P.G.

CONFIDENT IAL

/(Passed

CONFIDENTIAL

(Passed as requested and advance copies to

Commonwealth Secretary and Messrs. Bolland, de la Mare and Denson, Far East Dept.)

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Ħt

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Dept.

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幛 Rm. 7163)

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INWARD TELEGRAM

R. 197

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (0.A.G.)

Cypher

D. 27 June, 1967. R. 27

10152

VED IN

HIVES No.31

29 JUN 1967

FD1/I

The

هم

47)

PRIORITY CONFIDENTIAL No. 926

Addressed to Commonwealth Office

Peking No. 364

Repeated

POLAD Singapore No.203 and Washington No.204

(S. of S. please pass to all)

My telegram No. 908.

31 trep as at 27 1800.

139

There has been no significant change in the

public transport situation.

Difficulties have been

experienced in road haulage particularly of foodstuffs. Intimidation has continued to affect the operation of the wharves in the western part of Hong Kong Island and also the distribution of rice from the main go-downs there. The supply of pige to the Colony has been disrupted although nearly 1,500 have been sent in from China. There have been demonstrations in Chinese territory opposite Lo Wu and Sha Tau Kok.

Refusal of transport workers to move cargoes from the wharves coupled with some intimidation and heavy rain seriously delayed working in West Point of Hong Kong Island. The main centre of intimidation 18 a C.P.G.-owned go-down which is inside the main rice storage area. Distribution was interrupted until mid-day. Elsewhere in the harbour there was a general improvement, only six out of 81 ships were affected by the strike.

A supply of over 300 pigs arrived by road from China but was sent back by the C.P.G. agency here. The same happened to six railway trucks loaded with vegetables. A further 1,100 pigs delivered by rail have not yet been unloaded here. There seems to be a disagreement between the C.P.G. importing agency and the local communists, particularly the lorry drivers, who refuse to deliver goods to market and regard the agency as acting like strike breakers. As a result there is likely to be a shortage of pork tomorrow particularly on the island. Prices could go up by as much as 25%. The future beyond tomorrow is obscure.

CONFIDENTIAL

140

CONFIDENTIAL

A crowd, several thousand strong, moved in procession from Shun Chun to Lo Wu this morning starting at about 0900 then eastwards to Man Kan

to returning to Shum Chun in heavy rain at about mid-day. There were at least 200 armed militia and 75 C.C.A. with fixed bayonets. Although noisy the crowd

was well disciplined and obviously working to orders. About 500 gathered on the Chinese aide of the border at Sha Tau Kok at about the same time. This crowd also dispersed after shouting slogans and behaved in a reasonably orderly fashion. Further details will follow.

(Passed as requested with advance, copies for Foreign office (F.E. Dept.) and

Commonwealth Secretary, Private Office.)

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FROM HONG KONG (0.A.G.)

Cypher D. 27 June, 1967.

0915Z

Folio 14-6

dow entered on

149

FO3/1/5 RECEIVED IN K117

ARCHIVES No.31

عم

28 JUN 1967

FD1/1

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 922.

135

Your telegram No. 1292.

I must apologise for not having responded earlier to Montagu's very helpful offer. This has been discussed with British Trade Commissioner and we believe that a visit would be very useful largely because we believe that his reports on return would assist in the restoration of any loss of confidence there has been amongst U.K. businessmen. It might be convenient to tie his visit in with the three British Trade Missions coming to Hong Kong in the autumn in case the reasons for it are misinterpreted.

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艹

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Lih 20.6.0)

KR. SAMUEL

Thank fo

ん

Gonfrontation in Hong Kong

142

folios 143-4

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31

27 JUN 1967

西

Bill

Mr. Rodgera minuted on the attached copy of Hong Kong

telegram No. 809: "What is being done to consider these

suggestions?"

2. On receipt of this telegram Kr. de la Mare called a

meeting of representatives of the Dependent Territories

Department of the Commonwealth Office and Far Eastern

Department to consider these ideas. As a result, Mr. Carter

of the D.T.D. and I drafted a telegram to Hong Kong setting

out our preliminary thoughts (see Commonwealth Office telegram

to Hong Kong No. 1228).

3. Mr. Carter has now called a meeting for tomorrow after-

noon of the Inter-departmental Committee which has been set

up to consider these questions in more detail. It includes

representatives of the Board of Trade, Treasury and Hong

Kong Government Office, as well as those from the Foreign

Office and the Commonwealth Office.

AM)

13+4

PA. Ser

Slland

ר.'

(E. Bolland) 19 June, 1967.

SECRET

SECKA

KR. BOLLAND

(141)

تلا

FIVED IN

ARCHIVES No.31

2. JUN 1967

FDI

Lagainst

FD":"

Telepon agrad

& despaldad

In Hong Kong telegram lie,845, the Governor asks permission to deport (or detain if entry is refused) three or four of the cgitztere in Communist Unions who have figured prominently in the rosent stoppages. He says that there is sone mounting şublie demand for døpertation action against such people. He will only take such eation if and when he considers it desirable to da se.

prețoml

2. I consider that this proposal should be approved and attach a draft teleɛrın which has been agreed with the Foreign Offics.

3. In paragraph 3 of our telegram ïo.1038, we autherised the Governer to take deportation astion/selected Comunist leaders with a view to disrupting the Communist leadership. In his talegan No.677 seeking this muthority, the Governan perrrel be a list of 24 persons against when nation had been approved by his Amsoutive Council. The persons the Governor now wants to deport are not, it appears, these key leaders but secondary simbers of the Comaniat organisation she cre prominent in native operations. I do not think that it has been our intention to restrist the Governor's use of powers of deportation to this list of 24 "key" persons. The object is to disrupt the current operations of the Comunists and if that is more likely to be achieved by action against these sekivists who are leading the operations in the field rather then against the top leadership the remain for the meat pert in the background, then this is surely the right way to pressi.

There is săditionally the question of Faking's recotiens. to have always feared that strong cation agcinst the Countrist leadership sight be regardes at provocative in Feking. The danger is perhaps reduced if we pressed against the second file; the 7.0, assessment is that a roastion in Faking is likely, although we would expect this to be reflected only in their propaganda.

The following paragraph appears in Hong Kong telegram No.89% (reecived this morning, not yet sofisë);=

"(g) À Fross statement by Lemg Tai Lan Director

of the Hong Kong Branch of the N.G.N.A. Lassed on 13th June, on instructions from Canton, which said that whilst China would always walesme "Compatriots' from Bong Kong who returned to the mother country of their om free will, deportation without sufficient

vould not be countenansed by the Chinese people. Leung's statement mas nade following publisity given to the serving of deportation orders on three people surrently serving sentemans for offenses in connection with the disturbances, and a reecomendation by a magistrate that two people he had sentenced for terms of imprisonment for similar offenses, mould be considered for deportation".

This is not an entirely unexpected development, and it sa one which the Governor will me doubt bear in mind when rosshing a dosision to set in the way he proposes.

PA. Say

Copy to: Mr. X. Bolland

(7.0.)

(7,3. Carter) 16/6/67

da for B.X.

telegram Ke.

815.

PRIORITI

GOVERNOR,

ELI LE

PROING

POLAND SINGAFÖRT

WASHINGTO

SECRET

Your telegram No.845.

Disturbances,

To agree. You will of course bear in mind that

there is almost certain to be an adverse reaction from

Faking. But if you consider this step necessary you

have our authority to take it.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (0.A.G.)

RECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES No.31

27 JUN 1967

FDI||

Cypher

D. 26 June 1967 R. 26

11302

IMEEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

No.918

Addressed to Commonwealth Office

Repeated to: Peking No. 361

POLAD Singapore No.198 Washington No.202

(Please pass PRIORITY to all)

My telegram No.908.

-139

ре

140

Sitrep as at 26 1900.

There have been no reports of violence, but there has been evidence of successful intimidation among dock workers. The transport situation has slightly improved and only the working of ships is seriously affected by strike action at the moment, although both the electric light companies are still short staffed, Water supplies from China have ceased (my telegram No.912 refers), Sha Tau Kok has remained quiet.

2. The shortage of lighters, tugs and tally clerka continues to limit port operating. Two junk-loads of pigs and vegetables from mainland China could not be unloaded because of reluctance of stevedores on the island as result of intimidation. Unloading of rice from China has also been interrupted.

3. It was noticeable that there were no deliveries of fresh vegetables by sea from Canton, Whether this is a beginning of a boycott or because the shippers are taking account of labour difficulties here is not yet clear. Since arrivals of livestock overland have been nearly normal, the latter appears the more probable.

4. The public transport situation has continued to improve slightly although both bus companies are either closing or cutting down their services early this evening. In Kowloon, this is almost entirely due to shortage of staff. In Hong Kong, the fear of intimidation of crews after dark, particularly by those living in Kowloon is probably an important factor.

5. The Communista are continuing their efforts to spread the strike despite its manifest unsuccess so far. Only in the harbour is there a serious interruption of services. The position in the wharves on Hong Kong has deteriorated under the threat of intimidation which it hoped to counter by police protection tomorrow.

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R117

CONFIDENTIAL.

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (0.A.G.)

>¿CEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31

27 JUN 1967

FD1|1

Cypher

D. 25 June 1967

H R. 25

1230Z

ре

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

No.908

2724

Addreased to Commonwealth Office Repeated PRIORITY to: Peking No.358

POLAD Singapore No.196 Washington No.200

(S. of S. please pass to all)

My telegram No.904.

Sitrep as at 251900,

137

Ferry

Public

The situation has been calm with no reports of violence. Labour situation continues to be encouraging but attempts by Communists to intimidate workers are still being made. road transport is running at about 50% of normal. services are running normally although one company will stop the services one or two hours earlier than usual. About 60% of the operational staff in the Power Company on the Ieland reported for duty but the position in respect of the Power Company in Kowloon is slightly worse at about 30%. No absentee has been reported from the Hong Kong and China Gas Company Ltd. In the port 14 of the 58 cargo working vessels are working slower than usual because of shortage of lighters, stevedores and tally clerks. All vessels alongside are working normally. Labour is abundant but appears to be afraid to work afloat. Eleven marine police launches are keeping watch, and the wharf companies are trying to assure workers that they are adequately protected.

More dismissals of staff are taking place, including 58 in the Urban Services Department and probably around 200 in

The East Sum Textile Company Ltd. the Telephone Company. spinning and weaving factory in Kun Tong, which employs several hundred workers, has 200 workers on political strike. company has been advised to enforce its rules to suspend absentee workers.

The

Radio Villa Verde in Macao appears to have been taken over by the Communists and is broadcasting anti-British propaganda. At Sha Tau Kok 6 police were slightly injured yesterday and there were 12 arresta, one of whom was seriously injured whilst trying to escape. Situation at Sha Tau Kok remains quiet. The Governor departed for leave as planned without any incidents.

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117

135

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CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

D. 24 June, 1967 R. 24

IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL No. 906

137

1 300Z

Addressed to Commonwealth office

Repeated to Peking, No. 356,

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31

27 JUN 1967

FD1/1

" Political Adviser, Singapore, No. 194, "Washington, No. 199 (please pasa

PRIORITY to all).

My telegram No. 904.

The situation in the urban areas of Kowloon and Hong Kong throughout the day has been quiet. No incidents of disorder or violence have been reported, other than those at Sha Tau Kok which were the subject of my telegram No. 905.

2. Casualty figures resulting from last night's disturbances as at 0600 today are:-

Police

others

4 admitted to hospital; 9 treated and discharged;

1 dead;

8 admitted to hospital.

1 treated and discharged.

Of the 8 civilians hospitalised, one subsequently died. Preliminary enquiries reveal that he was one of group who barricaded themselves in the union premises in Canton Road last night and suffered injuries in attempting to evade arrest by jumping from loft.

3. The strike called for by Communists in public utilities today failed substantially to realise its target. Gas and electricity companies were able to maintain supplies despite some absenteeism anong labourers and junior staff. Star Ferry services remained at level recently maintained although the Hong Kong Yaumati ferry operated a slightly

/ reduced

CONFIDENTIAL

reduced service.

A little

China Motor Bus Company and Kowloon Motor Bus Company were able to operate reduced services on a restricted number of routes throughout the day although both propose to close down earlier than normal. under half available trams continued to ply throughout the âay.

At the Government Dockyard only 44 out of 85 launches were manned and there was some cessation of services in Kowloon Docks whose tugs and lighters crews ceased work. 90% of all workers at Taikoo Docks reported for work. Other Government services remained normal.

4. At Shạ Tau Kok there have been no further incidents since my last sitrep and the area is quiet.

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INWARD TELEGRAM

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RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.3:

2-JUN 1967

FD1.

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench) also external

D. 24 June 1967 R. 24

07 30Z

F03/1

ра

26tví

137

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

No.904

Addressed to Commonwealth Office

Repeated

Peking No.354

"POLAD Singapore No.192

" Washington No.197 (Please pass PRIORITY to all)

My telegram No.894.

Sitrep as at 241200.

Order was restored in Kowloon soon after midnight and there have been no further disturbances. Police casualties last night were thirteen injured, of whom four are still in hospital. One civilian was killed and nine injured, eight being detained in hospital, 56 were arrested. One of these fell through a trapdoor in attempting to avoid arrest. He died five hours later in hospital of a ruptured spleen.

2. Despite the Communist call for a strike and the considerable sums they have paid out to support it, the transport situation is encouraging. Only in Kowloon has there been a major disruption, and even here emergency services are being run and increasing in scope. On the Island, trams are running nearly normally while bus services, though restricted, are adequate. At midday, Star ferries are operating normal services, Yaumati ferries 90% normal services. As usual the majority of the population have succeeded in going about their business regardless of transport difficulties.

3. In the rest of the labour field the position is equally encouraging. The two electric companies are short staffed, particularly in Kowloon, but are coping. Some staff has failed to report in the telephone company. In the docks, work on ships alongside has continued at about half normal efficiency, but lighter crews are for the most part on strike. There is little change in the pattern in Government departments already short staffed as a result of previous strikes. There has also been some strike action and withdrawal of labour in textile factories and the sugar refinery, none of it serious,

A machine-gun has been erected in Chinese territory near Sha Tau Kok village. At midday a crowd of about 500 pro- Communists collected on one side of the frontier watched by a smaller crowd on the Chinese side. There are over two companies of police in the area trying to reason with the crowd. At about 1315 a police vehicle was set on fire and some attacks made on the police. The local Police Commander has situation in hand and has alerted military units in vicinity to stand by for assistance if necessary.

15.

CONFIDENTIAL

5. The Communists are now fully committed to the strike and will spare no efforts to spread it. Intimidation of right- wing and neutral workers can be expected. Providing we can reassure the public of our ability to protect them against threats and can maintain essential services, there is a good chance of breaking the back of the strike.

6. As of 1500 hours, the situation at Sha Tau Kok appears to have returned to normal.

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CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

·YED M D No.31 2 JUN 1967

FDI/I

Cypher

D. 24 June 1967 R. 23

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IMMEDIATE

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No.894

Addressed to Commonwealth Office

Repeated to: Peking No.353

POLAD Singapore No.190 Washington No.196

(Please pass PRIORITY to all)

My telegram No.875.

133

24h.

Sitrep as at 232359.

During the afternoon it became clear that a strike in essential services, particularly transport, was imminent. Shift workers failed to report on both the bus companies, that in Kowloon being particularly affected. The electricity company in Kowloon also suffered and the telephone company is expected to follow auit.

2. At the same time an increasingly truculent attitude was demonstrated by the opposition in Kowloon. A Police party dealing with seditious posters outside the Rubber and Plastic Workers Union H.Q. was attacked by 14 men with bludgeons. Two policemen were wounded. One shot was fired resulting in the death of one assailant. A Police raid on the union H.Q. subsequently obtained access with great difficulty and after some resistance. Thirty men were arrested, including the union Chairman who had jumped his bail after arrest in early May. series of hit and run attacke were also mounted in Kowloon mainly by hooligans, These included the burning of a car in which a Government servant was seriously injured. So far no ourfew has been imposed.

3. There is a slight chance of a skeletor bus service in Kowloon tomorrow. Services in Hong Kong Island will probably be halved. The ferries are expected to continue unaffected. Strikes in the electric light companies may well occur but are not expected to affect services immediately. There will inevitably be incidents between pickets and workers in public transport willing to work,

4 Emergency legislation has been introduced to combat intimidation and the two main power stations have been declared closed areas to protect them against interference by pickets or possible sabotage.

(Fassed as requested)

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CONFIDENTIA

CONFIDENTIAL

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

TÓ HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

Cypher

Sent 23 June 1967.

22392

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

No.1292

FD1/1/130

135

TO IN

2.31

26 JUN 1967

FD1/1

Our telegram No.1228, paragraph 3(11).

Montagu.

Grateful to know early whether you think

visit would be useful.

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}

Cypher

IMMEDIATE BECRET

No. 891.

SECRET

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

D. 23 June, 1967.

R. 23

0945Z

Addressed to Commonwealth Office

(134

RECEIVED IN |

ARCHIVES No 31

26 JUN 1967

Repeated

POLAD Singapore No.189,

Peking No. 352,

計

Washington No.195

(3. of S. please pass all)

My telegram No. 854.

H.E. confrontation.

Following is L.I.C. 98sessment of the situation

as at mid-day 23 June.

The principal features of the communist confrontation with Government over the past week have been:-

(a)

(b)

Preparations for a strike in the transport industry. Attempts are being made to persuade workers

in bus, tram and ferry companies, as well as lorry, taxi and "private car hire" drivers, to join in the strike. It seems almost certain that it will begin on 24 June. There has been mention also that the strike will be called simultaneously with a funeral procession for the three workers who died

subsequent to police action. (See my telegram No. 875 and paragraph 2(b) below). In an effort to obtain support for the strike action, subsistence allowances to workers of up to (H.K.) 500 a month, are being paid or promised before strike action starta. It is known however, that doubts exist amongst the communist leadership as to the amount of support this strike will receive, They would have preferred to defer this action until they achieved greater consolidation but are pressing on, apparently to meet the expressed wishes of the more militant rank and file, and also to exploit his excellency departure;

preparations for a funeral procession/memorial service for the three deceased workers referred to above. Whilst it is known that senior communiste in labour circles would prefer to hold orderly memorial services inside communist controlled premises, there has been considerable talk at union and other meetings of a mass procession. Although the leaders are at present striving to obtain control over the confrontation, at least in as far as it affects labour circles, it is possible that they may succumb to pressure from below and agree to a funeral procession:

SECRET

/(0)

(c)

SECRET

an increase in the numbers and a strengthening of the tone of anti-British posters and slogans on Chinese goods wagons coming into Hong Kong. On some days, straw effigies of His Excellency the Governor have been sent in, hanging from the side of the wagons. Portraits of Mao Tse Tung have been placed on British owned shunting engine which crosses into China daily to pick up the Chinese goods wagons:

(a) the continued display of posters and newspapers

containing inflammatory material, on much the same scale, by a number of concerns under communist control. There has been a continued use of small slogan painting parties, supported by a bodyguard, which have been sent out at night to paint slogana on public buildings and in roadways. These slogane are then photographed by the communists for propaganda purposes, particularly when they seek to suggest that a neutral organisation has joined their forces. They are being obliterated by police as soon as they are discovered:

(e)

(r)

an increase in the communist campaign to spread disaffection amongst Government employees. This has taken the form of sending stencilled pamphlets to all members of the clerical grades in Government Service, calling on them to "rise against the British" and to "make a wise choice or be subjected to national discipline". The vast majority of these pamphlets were handed in by recipients to their departmental senior officers. The police force continues to be one of the main targets of this campaign:

an increase in propaganda directed at studenta. Inflammatory leaflets have appeared in a number of non-communist schools calling upon studente to support the workers in their struggle against Government. Allegations have been made also, in the local left-wing press, of the formation of anti-persecution struggle committees in several local neutral schools and in a Government secondary school. There is no foundation for these reports and statements of rebuttal have been issued by headmasters of the schools concerned:

(g) a continuation of the vitriolic anti-British and

anti-Hong Kong Government propaganda in the local left-wing press.

Attacks have also been made on organisations and individuals which have come out in support of Government, with the warning that, unless they choose the "right side", they will have to suffer the consequences. The explosion of China's first hydrogen device on the 18 June, was hailed by the local communists as an inspiration to continue the struggle:

(h)

an anti-British demonstration held on the 18 June on the Chinese side of the border at Sha Tau Kok in which about 500 people, including some 100 members of the P.L.A. and about 60 representatives from the British side of Sha Tau Kok village, participated. This was followed by a meeting held in Sha Tau Kok 0.7. to celebrata China's detonation of a hydrogen device; and

/(1)

SECRET

(1)

SECRET

an instruction to distributors from the major C.P.G. import agency in Hong Kong dealing in livestock from China, to levy a surcharge of 10 cents per bird on poultry and 30 cents per head on other livestock, as a contribution to the All-Circles Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee funds.

2. There is little doubt that a strike in the transport field and a function to mark the deaths of the three workers referred to above, will take place in the near future. Contingency planning to cope with a transport strike is in hand by Government and, as in earlier attempts to call strike action, it is hoped to isolate the communist element from the neutral and right-wing workers. However, as the communists have greater support in this sphere, it is likely that their action will have some degree of success, particularly in the bus company in Kowloon, but it remains to be seen to what extent the provision of financial assistance by the communists will counteract a firm stand by the management in respect of dismissals, etc., for illegal strike action. The payment of one month's subsistence allowance to the workers before strike action starts suggests that the stoppage will be prolonged. In addition, it is known that the communiat leadership now considers short token strikes 'valueless' in the confrontation and, once strike action commences, it can be expected to do everything in its power to extend it.

While there is no intention by Government to interfere with any memorial service for the dead workers if this is held indoors, a funeral procession on a large scale would be a different matter and very careful consideration would have to be given about whether it should be permitted or not. However the communist leadership favours memorial services held in premises in which the participants can be kept under control and, so far, apart from discussions, in individual organisations, there appears to be no organised plan for a procession.

The propaganda machine remains the communista' principal weapon, although it may be that the population is becoming more aware that the anti-Government stories it publishes are, in the main, either completely untrue or highly exaggerated. This is reflected in the circulation of the communist press which, at the outset of confrontation, rose to almost double ite normal figure, but has now returned, in most cases, to the pre- confrontation level. Propaganda directed at individuals not unnaturally causes some initial disquiet but here again it appears that in general terme the targets remain unaffected.

The crux,

of course, lies in the confidence of the public in Government's ability to uphold law and order and the continued display of an intention to maintain its position in Hong Kong.

5. The assessment of last week that the local communiata can expect little more than financial, moral and propaganda support from China, still holds good. Although there have been no further authorative pronouncements since the 13th June from Peking on the local situation, it is perhaps too early to dwell on the significance or otherwise of this.

(Passed as requested and advance copies to Foreign Office

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CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD TLLEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

D. 21 June, 1967.

I R. 21

12452

133

RECEIVED it. ARCHIVES No.3

23 JUN 1967

FD1/1.

cloude

IKKEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 875.

Addressed to Commonwealth office.

Repeated

Peking No. 348.

"Political Adviser Singapore

No. 187.

"Washington No. 191. (Please pass

PRIORITY to all).

131

My telegram No. 854.

SITREP as at 21 1900.

The situation has remained quiet but there are indications that a widespread transport strike is being planned for the near future. Posters continue to appear but the only difficulty has been with those put on goods waggons by C.P.G. railway staff. The body of a second man has been found in the Kowloon gas works. Stencilled anti-British pamphlets have been posted to local clerical staff in Government offices.

2. There are numerous reports of an impending major transport strike. offers of compensation are being made to those prepared to come out, both during the strike and after if they are dismissed. Such compensation is already being paid to many who have been dismissed for their part in recent strikes. Great emphasie is being laid on this financial backing, No firm date for the strike is yet known. It is hoped that if both Government and employers stand firm there will not be a complete disruption. However the Communists are strong in the transport unions particularly in Kowloon.

3. Posters continue to appear on buildings and to be removed but without any repetition of last week's violence, A Hong Kong Government locomotive used for shunting waggons across the border into and out of China has been covered with posters and two large pictures of Hao. The drivers of this engine, who work in shifts, have been made to join in chanting of slogans and have been warned not to remove postera, Waggons carrying mail, livestock and vegetables from China into Kowloon have also been festooned with posters, portraits and straw effigies. The General Manager of the railway has writtent to the authorities in Canton seeking assistance. This is unlikely to meet with any constructive response and other measures are being examined. A decision to remove all these posters, etc., could lead to an interruption of supplies which might cause difficulties (my telegram 851 refers) particularly as delivery of the extra quota of water is due to begin on 26 June and this too could be stopped in retaliation.

4. The second body found on 17 June in the Kowloon gas works had been there since the incident on 8 June. There is no evidence of foul play. The Communists will of course seek to exploit this case as well as the other two deaths (my telegram 831).

CONFIDENTIAL

80 far

/there

CONFIDENTIAL

there have been no funeral or memorial services. The holding of a joint service may be planned by the Communists to mark the opening of a new phase of activity.

5. The pro-Communist press has been slightly more defensive lately although virulent attacks continue. An interesting feature has been the claim, mainly in China but repeated in Hong Kong, that the Colony has been paralysed by a successful general strike since 10th June. This is complete wishful thinking. A new propaganda gambit has been the posting of pamphlets to Government clerical staff calling on them to repent and redeem themselves by rising against the British.

6. The key points for the future are the memorial or burial services for the three dead men and the transport strike, if and when it takes place. My own departure on leave may also be marked by attempts at disorder. However the defensive tone

of the Communist Press coupled with reports of low morale amongst Communist supporters, give grounds for hope that degree of disruption achieved will be far less than the Opposition hopes despite the large sums of money which they can now call upon to back then,

(Passed as requested to Peking, POLAD Singapore

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Kr. Critchley

Mr. K. MacLellan

CONFIDENTIAL

Stesen Affaria: Extract from

Hong Kong

(Previous

Reference: CC(67) 33rd Conclusions, Minute 2)

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SECRET

Reference..

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132

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THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY said that the situation in Hong Kong was still uneasy and there were widespread rumours of further strikes and other disturbances. There was some evidence that the Communist leaders in Hong Kong were no longer wholly in control of the situation, Government of the People's Republic of China were urging the Hong Kong conmunists to await a call to action, but this might mean either that the Chinese Government intended to bring further pressure to bear upon us or alternatively that they were seeking a relaxation of the present tension. Governor of Hong Kong who had been ill, had been due to go on leave before the disturbances, He had delayed his

The

departure when they broke out and his firm and skilful handling of the recent troubles had been responsible for keeping the situation under control, but he would shortly

ļ have to take his deferred leave if there were not to be a serious risk to his health.

Ed (1426)

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31

19 JUN 1967

FDI/l

Solla J.

Züch

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geld 16/vi

Cypher

PRIORITY SECRET No.854

119

SECRET

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

D. 16 June 1967 R. 16

13A

KL. D IN ARCHIVES No.31

19 JUN 1967

FDI/I

08502

ро

Addressed to Commonwealth Office Repeated to: Peking No.339

POLAD Singapore No.180 Washington No.187

(C.0. please pass to all)

My telegram No.808.

Hong Kong Disturbances.

L.I.C. assessment of the situation as at 1200 hours

June 16th is as follows:-

The principal features of the Communist confrontation with the Government over the past week have been:

(a) The attempt by the Struggle Committees of the

Government, Armed Forces and Hospitala

Hospitals' Chinese Workers' Union (GAFHCWU), the Marine Department Chinese Workers' Union, the Postal Workers' Union and the Waterworks Chinese Employees' Union, to call a joint strike of all members together with employees of public utility companies and the Dairy Farm Company, from 10th June. This attempt met with limited success, only the Gas Company and Dairy Farm being seriously affected, initially at any rate. Pira action by the Government Departments and the private companies concerned in suspending and dismissing workers, had a salutary effect. Consequently, apart from minor disruptions to deliveries of milk and the production of ice, the strikes caused little or no disruption of essential services.

(b)

The attempt to call token strikes by food stall- holders and hawkers, building trade workers and tredesmen in the wood-carving industry. Here again, these moves received little more than marginal support. Although efforts were made to put pressure on hawkers who deal in mainland foodstuffs, the vast majority ignored the threats to curtail their supplies and the only real success was among dealers in pork and eggs. This was the first occasion that the confronta- tion, in terms of strikes, entered the economic sphere;

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/(0)

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containing inflammatory material, on much the same scale, by a number of concerns under Communist control. A new feature has been the increased militancy displayed by Communists, on a number of occasions, when private citizens have attempted to remove or interfere with posters.

(a)

(0)

The continued absenteeism, though on a much reduced scale, of workers in Government Depart- ments and private companies where action was taken last week to remove poaters. (The suspension of all absentees by Government and the companies affected, has resulted in a flood of applications for re-employment.) The Star Ferry was able to resume a limited service on the 10th June. The reopening of the Taikoo Dockyard on 14 June passed off without incident and the Company is now operating at virtually full strength apart from the 168 workers whom it does not intend to recall for duty.

A cable sent to H.E. the Governor by the local branch of the N.C.N.A. on instructions of its head office in Peking, protesting against the continued "fascist atrocities" of the police (see my telegram No.819 of 12 June).

(f) An anti-British demonstration in Sha Tau Kok

(close to the border with China) on the 10th June by about 1,000 people who paraded through the streets singing songs and chanting slogans, sticking up posters on public and private buildings. The demonstrators subsequently held an "anti-persecution meeting" in the rural committee premises.

(g)

A press statement by Leung Wai Lan, Director of the Hong Kong branch of the N.C.N.A. issued on 13th June, on instructions from Canton, which said that whilst China would always welcome "compatriots" from Hong Kong who returned to the mother country of their own free will, deportation without sufficient reason would not be countenanced by the Chinese people. Leung'a statement was made following publicity given to the serving of deportation orders on three people currently serving sentences for offences in connection with the disturbances, and a recommendation by a magistrate that two people he had sentenced for terms of imprisonment for similar offences, should be considered for deportation; and

(h) the N.C.N.A. release from Peking on 13th June,

of a statement by a spokesman of the C.P.0. Ministry of Foreign Affairs which said, inter alia, that the people in China have made "all the preparations" and can support at any time, the "patriotic compatriote" in Hong Kong with "actual actions". No indication was given of the action envisaged but the following day, the All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU),

/Paking

SECRET

Peking made a donation of HK 10 million dollars to All Circles Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee (ACAPSC). Also on the 13th June the People's Daily carried a 'commentator' article which condemned the oppression of the"British Imperialists" and called upon people in the

enemy camp" to repent and redeem their crimes,

2. There was reliable information on the 12th June, that senior local Communists in the labour field were dissatisfied with the lack of support from the C.P.G. (absence of any real pressure on Hong Kong from the mainland) in their confrontation. They also lamented their inability to involve more workers directly in strikes because of the fear of dismissal, and it was felt that the poster campaign had been a failure because of poor planning and organisation. On the brighter side, from the Communist viewpoint, they agreed that the New Territories offered tremendous opportunity for furthering the confrontation, quoting alleged reluctance on the part of the police to intervene in political activities. Despite the difficulties they were convinced that they must continue the struggle until final victory.

3. The presentation of 10 million dollars from China, the statement by the C.P.G. Foreign office spokesman and the commentator article in the People's Daily, will reassure, at least the local militant Communists, and make them more determined than ever to succeed in their struggle. In particular the 10 million dollar gift from China, will provide adequate financial resources, at least for the time being, and this could mean that a fresh round of token strikes, may start in the near future. There is little doubt also that the virulent anti- British propaganda will continus. The current theme is a call for the local population to make the British atone for their suppression during past hundred years and bring about, at an unspecified date, their eventual eviction from the Colony.

Whilst it is clear the Communist leaders are conscious of the absence of any widespread following in the population, there is still a demand amongst the more militant cadres for direct action. To this end there are plans to form "small fighting groupe" for aggressive action against Government supporters and other tasks such as the protection of posters by the use of strong arm tactics. Therefore, although the situation on the ground has been relatively quiet over the past week and the Communists have failed to gain much support for their attempts to engineer strike action, there is no room for complacency.

5. Peking, of course, still holds the key to the present situation in Hong Kong. Whilst the propaganda which has originated from China over the past week must have given some encouragement to the local Communiste, the tone of the statements and articles issued from Peking indicate, yet again, that they must be prepared for a long hard struggle and can expect only financial, moral and propaganda support from China.

(Passed as requested)

(Advance copies to DSAO for Mesars. de la Mare, Bolland,

Wilson, Denson and Private Office (Commonwealth

Secretary)

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Kr. Denson

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Treasury

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RB.7163)

Rm.51 31)

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Mr. Hern

Major Koe

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Mr. J.A.B. Darlington Mr. P. Sedgwick

SECRET

130

SECRET

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

FROM THE COMMON/ALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

TO HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

RECEIVED

ARCHIVES No.31

19 JUN 1967

Cypher

Sent 16 June, 1967.

2320Z

pc.

PRIORITY BECRET

れ

No. 1228

Addressed to Governor, Hong Kong

Repeated

POLAD Singapore

Washington.

Your telegram No. 809.

Confrontation in Hong Kong.

An inter-departmental committee has been

120

set up to consider questions such as those which you have raised. At present we intend to confine membership to a few departments (Sedgwick of course will also be a member), bringing in other departments ad hoc as required.

Our preliminary thoughts on your other suggestions are as follows:-

FD10/1 (133

127

(a)

(b)

(0)

We will send circular guidance to Commonwealth and foreign posts;

we agree that occasional visits by large American naval vessels may help to keep the Chinese guessing about American intentions in relation to Hong Kong. We think that some of the American requests for such visits could be accepted, each request being considered on its merits in the light of the situation at the time. Accordingly we are content that you should agree to the visit of the U.S.S. HANCOCK (your telegram No. 835 refere). We also agree that for the time being we should do nothing to reduce visits by troops from Vietnam (paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 727). We feel some doubts "about more direct indications of American

interest and concern in Hong Kong. There is perhaps a danger that these might serve the purposes of the extremists in China rather than act as a deterrent. Clearly we need to look very carefully at the form and content of any American gesture of support. We are studying this and will let you have our further views;

we see many difficulties in the idea that Hong Kong might seek closer alignment and identity of interests with countries in the region that are regarded by the Chinese as "anti". What dividend this might bring for local confidence could be more than offset by the provocation it will give in Poking;

SECRET

/(a)

(a)

(e)

SECRET

we do not think an approach to the Japanese Government would produce any useful response. We are considering other methods;

We really do not see any future in trying to find out what would satisfy Peking.

An approach in a third country or through a third party will not result in a response that would be any different to the one we would get if we made our own approach in Peking or London; no such approach would be answered directly but would be referred back to Peking whose response in present circumstances must be the reiteration of their full demanda. With the example of Macao before us we must avoid entering into any negotiations unless Peking itself offers terms that could provide the basis of an acceptable settlement

Your paragraph 2(f). You should know of the following developments:-

(1) In answer to the few trade enquiries received,

we and the Board of Trade are taking the line that Press reports may have tended to give an impression of more widespread disturbances than have actually occurred and that there has been very little disturbance to commerce and industry. We have suggested that no precipitate action is called for in abandoning projected deals and in using more than normal caution in the conduct of business. E.C.G.D. have not altered the terms on which they are prepared to cover exports to Hong Kong,

(11)

(111)

(iv)

(4)

At the B.N.E.C. Asia Committee yesterday, Montagu suggested that he might visit Hong Kong with a view to reporting on the attitude they should take to trade with Hong Kong. We shall be grateful for your views on this and for those of the Trade Commissioner.

As you are probably aware, the Hong Kong Association have made various proposals, details of which are available at their Hong Kong office. They have seen the Minister of State and also Cowperthwaite. We understand that some of these can only be put into effect if you could help with financial support.

We shall do what we can to back up Sedgwick's efforts to push the line that Hong Kong remains a good market for British exports and that Hong Kong industry and trade continues to function normally. We have made some suggestions to Sedgwick about extending the distribution of the material now being put out by his office and will continue to keep in touch with him on this.

We know of Boxall'e contacts with our News Department and 0.0.1. on question of strengthening your London Office staff.

(Passed to D.S.A.0. for repetition to Singaporo

and Washington.

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SECRET

KLCEIVED AN ARCHIVES No.31

19 JUN 1967

FD1|1

小

129

potl

Zzdvi

Cypher

PRIORITY DECRET No. 1226

SECRET

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

TO HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

8ent 16 June, 1967. 22522

Addressed to Governor, Hong Kong Repeated

= =

Peking

POLAD Singapore Washington

Your telegram No.845.

Disturbances

We agree.

127

You will of course bear in mind that there is almost certain to be an adverse reaction from Peking. But if you consider this step necessary you have our authority to take it,

(Passed to D.3.A.0. for repetition to Peking,

Singapore and Washington)

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忖

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Mr. Denson

Mr. Foggon

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(RE. 7163) (Rm.5131)

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Cypher/Cat A

SECRET

IMMEDIATE PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 712

S...RET

16 June, 1967

Addressed to Hong Kong telegram No. 181 of 16 June. Repeated for information to:

Foreign Office

Washington.

128

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31

16 JUN 1967

Singapore

Your telegram No. 845 to Commonwealth Office: Deportation

FDI16(57)

As you will know (see also my telegram No. 701 to Foreign Office and N.C.N.A. in English item 061426 of 14 June) Hong Kong Director of N.C.N.A. has already made strong protest about deportation orders. We may conclude that this will be a sensitive point for the Chinese, and anyone who is successfully deported will no doubt be given a hero's welcome here, with maximum publicity, demonstrations, etc.

Foreign Office pass Washington No. 349.

Mr. Hopson

Sent 0839Z 16 June

Recd 11152 16 June

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

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S.E.A.D.

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uuuuu

F.E.P.D.

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ADVANCE COPIES SENT.

No action as thei

komen.

p.c

SECRET

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31

16 JUN 1967

FD1|1

127

Cypher

D. 15 June, 1967.

R. 15

08452

co.or

replying

PRIORITY SECRET No. 845.

Addressed to Commonwealth office (D.T.D.).

Repeated

"Paking No. 337.

" POLAD Singapore No. 178. "Washington No. 185 (8. of S. please

pass PRIORITY to all).

ра

16/vi

Your telegram No. 1038 paragraph 3.

Disturbances.

As I have previously explained, I must, to maintain and bolster public confidence and morale, be in a position at all times to take action to seize and keep the initiative whenever desirable. Your telegram under reference relates to deportation action against selected key Communist leaders, but there is a class of agitators in Communist unions responsible for the stoppages which have recently occurred, and whom it might be salutory to take action against. not key leaders, they are of importance in the context of Peking Daily editorials which put Hong Kong workers in the forefront of the struggle here.

While

2. I would like to have your permission now to pick up and deport (or detain if entry is refused) 3 or 4 such men if and when I consider it desirable to do so, even though the immediate situation has not deteriorated but is, currently, fairly quiet. In this connection there is some mounting public demand for deportation action against such people: public opinion generally would probably favour it.

(Passed as requested and advance copies to

Private office for Commonwealth Secretary, Messrs. de la Mare, Wilson and Bolland)

and

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輯

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Denson

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Ed (1636)

FD 1/1.

Reference

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126

SEE ANNEX

حما

R117

Cypher

INMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

D. 13 June, 1967. R. 13 #

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 832

07052

Addressed to Commonwealth Office

Peking No.332

Repeated

輯

POLAD Singapore No.176

體

122

Washington No.182

RECEIVED IN

ARCHIV. !

14 JUNJ7

(3. of S. please pass to all PRIORITY)

My telegram No.818.

Sitrep as at 13 1100.

Normal supplies of fresh foodstuffs have been

interrupted by a partial stoppage in some markets, but only pork and fresh water fish supplies are affected to any extent. The labour situation generally has improved although the Gas Works is still seriously undermanned. Prices of food have dropped.

As a result of action taken by distributors of mainland supplies, no pigs were slaughtered yesterday or this morning.

No vegetables were delivered yesterday from the mainland, but many market stalls have been selling remaining stock from yesterday and fresh supplies from the New Territories. Landings of marine fish have been normal, but some delay has occurred in distribution. Beef supplies are normal. Since this is the aftermath of a holiday, food purchases are below average and it is still too early to judge the effect of these disruptions. The position is not serious at present. The timing of these incidents is believed to be an effort to demonstrate Communist ability without arousing serious opposition from either retailers or buyers.

As a result of measures taken last week the retail price of rice has dropped very quickly and the situation is now considered to be satisfactory.

Re-registration of Gas Works employees is going very slowly. Staff of the Dairy Farm are returning, however, despite the issue of dismissal notices yesterday and there is now no danger of a failure in the cold storage plant. The Star Ferry is now operating three vessels normally with five at rush-hours.

(Passed to D.S.A.0. for Far Eastern Dept.

and Private Office to Secretary of State for

Commonwealth Affairs)

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Treasury Export Credits Guarantee Department Ministry of Defence (Room 7365)

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Mr. T. Critchley

(Senior External Affairs Representative)

Canada House (Counsellor)

- Mr. K. MacLellan

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher

SECRET

OUTWARD TELEGRAN

FROM THE COMMONTEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

INMEDIATE

SECRET

No. 1133.

sent 6 June, 1967. 22382

Addressed to Governor Hong Kong. Repeated for information IMMEDIATE

ROUTINE

RECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES No.31

15 JUN 1967

FDI/I

سامی

to Peking.

" POLAD

Singapore. "Washington.

124

西

IED

Your telegram No. 768.

Disturbances.

We agree that courses outlined in paragraph 4 of your telegram under reference are not so severe as deportation and are open to less criticism. But, on the assessments of CPG involvement in Peking telegram No. 626 to Foreign Office and your telegram No. 776, we judge it would be wiser to avoid action against their "officials" in the NCNA, Bank of China and China Resources Company if at all possible, since this would make it more difficult for them to disengage from a policy of all-out confrontation.

2. On the other hand, we appreciate that officials of the NCNA and Bank have been in the forefront of the anti- Government propaganda campaign which must be effectively countered if the confidence of the ordinary people of Hong Kong is to be retained.

3. Question of NCNA here is not seen to be particularly relevant. Its representatives are of course no danger to internal security here (as they are in Hong Kong) and any action against them would be purely retaliatory.

Home Office agreement is required and consultations are proceeding with a view to deciding what action might be taken if any should be considered necessary or desirable.

The paramount consideration is the need to maintain internal security (and therefore public confidence and morale) in Hong Kong. We must leave it to you to decide whether in the local circumstances such measures as you propose are required but we hope that you can hold your hand as long as possible.

(Passed D.S.A.0. for repetition as noted and for advance copies to P.8. to Commonwealth Secretary and to Messre. de la Mare, Bolland, Wilson, Far East Dept. F.0.)

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片

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[1] Rm. 7163)

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123

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

RECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES No.31

13 JUN 1967

FD1|1

Cypher

D. 12 June, 1967. R. 12

09272

IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL No. 819.

Repeated

Addressed to Commonwealth office

"Peking No. 328. "POLAD Singapore No. "Washington No. 181.

174.

ре

(8. of S. please

pass Routine to all).

Hy immediately preceding telegram,

The text of the telegram sent by Leung Wai Lam, Director of the local branch of the N.C.N.A. at 2400 hours on 10 June is as follows:-

"Mr. Trench (G.H. Upper Alber Road).

During the past few days the Hong Kong British authorities have deployed large groups of police and "anti-riot equads" to carry out extreme Fascist atrocities in persecuting

forbidding our patriotic compatriots in Hong Kong and Kowloon; the pasting up of posters of Mao Tse-Tung's thoughts, and also posters disclosing the atrocities of the H.K. British authorities, as well as big character posters and pictures, and suppressing our compatriots' anti-persecution struggle.

On 8 June, the H.K. British "anti-riot squads" again attacked the workers in Government electrical and mechanical section of the P.W.D. depot and the Gas Company at Tokwawan; they beat up large numbers of workers and arrested some five hundred odd persons, Up to now, there are still a large number of workers detained by the police without reason. the persons arrested was a worker of the G.E.M.E. of P.W.D., Twui Tin Port (1776-3944-3134). Teuit was later beaten to

death by the H.K. British police.

Among

Late in the evening of 9 June, the H.K. British police and their special agents carried out another premedi- tated plot in attacking the Silver Palace Theatre in Kwun Tong, Kowloon. There they beat up staff members of the theatre and arrested, without just cause, the manager and twenty odd employees. At the same time, articles were stolen.

The most important thing was that the police and their special agents dared to smash to pieces a statue of Chairman Mao;

and to tear to pieces pictures and posters of Mao Tse-Tung's thoughts. This is a direct insult to the great leader of the Chinese people, and is an extreme political

CONFIDENTIAL

/provocation

CONFIDENTIAL

provocation. This form of atrocities will never be forborne by the Chinese people. I therefore, once again, lodge with you the most strongest and the most urgent protest against this action.

We compatriots of Hong Kong and Kowloon and all the Chinese people who armed with Kao Tse-Tung'a thoughts, know only too well how to finish off you Fascist bandits. A11 blood debts must be paid by blood. The illegal occupation of Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and the New Territories by British Imperialists over the past 100 odd years will be completely cleared. If you do not bow and admit your faults, and insist on being the enemy of the Chinese people, the result can only be your being beaten to pieces by all the Chinese compatriots in Hong Kong and Kowloon. There is no other solution,"

2. This adds little new but there are two obvious lines for future exploitation.

(a) The destruction of a bust of Mao and the tearing

down of posters of kao's thoughts. There was quite a brisk resistance to the police raid on Friday night. Busts of Mao were plentiful and the fact that only one was broken in the melee is remarkable. In general Kao's thoughts are not touched. It is possible that the odd poster bearing them has been removed but the policy is to limit action to obviously inflammatory material. 0.1.8. here are countering these allegations.

(b) The death of a gas works employee in police custody which has already been reported. Another body has now been found in the Kowloon Gas Works in a coal bunker below ground level. It is estimated that death occurred two or more days ago so the man may have hidden in the bunker or fallen in during the police action on Friday. The result of the post mortem is not yet known,

(Passed as requested)

(Passed to L.T.C. for repetition to Peking,

POLAD Singapore and D.8.A.0. for Washington, and advance copies for Far Eastern Dept.. Foreign office and Commonwealth Office Private office.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

D. 12 June, 1967. R. 12 H

0800Z

, RECEIVED IN [ARCHIVES No.31

13 JUN 1967

For

722)

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 818

Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D.)

Peking No. 327

Repeated

POLAD Singapore No.173

释

Washington No.179

(S. of S. please pass to all PRIORITY)

My telegram (?).

Sitrep as at 12.00 hours 12 June.

The industrial scene is still uneasy with numerous

them

rumours of widespread action impending. Only in the Gas Works and the Dairy Farm are there serious stoppages at the moment. There was a large pro-Communist demonstration in the border village Sha Tau Kok in British territory on Saturday. Police took action against a loudspeaker in a Communist owned cinema in Kowloon on Friday night. A further telegram or protest has been received from Leung Wai Lam, local director of the N.C.N.A. There are further rumours of attempts to interfere with the distribution of food on the island tomorrow.

Despite the failure of the proposed general strike on Saturday there are rumours of another attempt being made. Today is a Chinese holiday so we cannot expect much action. The Government policy of dismissing absentee workers and re-registering which has been followed by two major public utilities may have discouraged the repetition of small scale token strikes. The Gas Works labour force strength is still only 10 per cent the Government assistance continues. The Dairy Farm is not producing ice which will affect the fishing and food supply industries. Some difficulty is being found in keeping the cold storage plant going where the majority of our reserves of perishable foodstuffs is kept. Government assistance is being considered,

Some 1,000 people paraded in Sha Tau Kok and plastered the area with posters. These will be removed but this is a very sensitive area where the border runs through the main street of the village.

and

On Friday night a Communist cinema, which had been periodically broadcasting a short but virulent anti-Government diatribe, was raided. Twenty-five people were arrested and charged with obstruction and assault on the police using iron bars. A mumber of batons, home-made bludgeons and crude gas masks were found as well as quanitities of food and posters.

CONFIDENTIAL

15.

CONFIDENTIAL

The protest by Leung Wai Lam (text as in my following telegram) followed the usual propaganda lines emphasising the tearing down of posters bearing Mao's Thoughts and "the beating to death" of a prisoner. It adds little that is new and is probably designed mainly for internal consumption by the Communist Party supporters in Hong Kong. However, another dead body has been found in the Gas Works in Kowloon and this could well give renewed impetus to allegations of brutality.

(Message passed to D.S.A.0. for repetition PRIORITY to Peking, POLAD Singapore and Washington and

Foreign Office Far Eastern Dept.)

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CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Bir D. Trench)

Cypher

R. 6

D. 6 June, 1967.

13372

IMMEDIATE SECRET No. 785.

FD1 | 1 (113)

Addressed Repeated

121

IN No.31, 1967

FDITI

ра

เท่ง

to Commonwealth office (D.T.D.).

"Peking No. 317.

"P.A. Singapore No. 165.

"Washington No. 169. (Please pass

PRIORITY to all).

SITREP at 061900.

My telegram No. 770.

There has been no strong Communist reaction to the removal of posters, nor has there been any concerted attempt to replace them.. On the other hand, their removal has been made the excuse for a further series of token strikes of which there have been six so far with at least one more rumoured for the near future. There has, as yet, been no reaction to the H.M.8. BULWARK incident,

Kowloon Motor Bus (KMB) maintenance crews staged a

against token atoppage affecting two shifts on 5 June Hong Kong Government brutality'. Very few new posters were put up on KMB vehicles however. On 6 June, the majority

This could be an attempt of star ferries carried new posters. to test our reactions but it is possible that the crews acted on their own initiative. The intention is for the police to remove these posters tonight. Elsewhere in the Colony there has been no increase in poster activity. The emphasis is now on displaying local Communist newspapers, particularly special editions. It is of interest that the CPG-owned Bank of Communications has removed its inflammatory displays and substituted newspapers.

Prosecution action against Communist premises still displaying inflammatory material is being prepared.

3. There have been token stoppages today among cargo supervisors, electric meter readers, tailoring and lighthouse maintenance workers, in Kowloon docks and in the Taikoo dockyard. In the last case, two Europeans were cornered and detained for several hours. Violence seemed likely and there was some intimidation of right-wing and neutral workers. The situation eased during the afternoon and the workers

The Government dockyard continues dispersed peacefully at 1700.

There are forecasts of

to operate on a much reduced scale. further stoppages in the next few days, notably in the urban

SECRET

/services

SECRET

services department. All this activity indicates an increasing control 18 being exercised over Communist activity against the Government.

4. None of the stoppages during the last two days nor those forecast are expected to cause much general inconvenience or to disrupt the Colony's life seriously, The present Communist aim seems to remain at keeping the temperature up without risking any further loss of public support. We can, therefore, expect a continuation of these incidents but not a major industrial confrontation,

(Passed as requested)

(Passed to D.8.A.0. for Commonwealth Secretary,

Messrs. de la Mare, Wilson and Bolland)

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JUN 1967

FD |||

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PRIORITY SECRET No. 809

SECRET

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

The Belland

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

D. 10th June, 1967 R. 10th

04002

the tole

120

Hi: seggstions

See

PP.W.T

Rodgra :/

reporch minité

переть

at (142) Sq

Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D. T.D.). Repeated P.0.L.A.D. Singapore No. 171.

H Washington No. 176.

(Please pass to both.)

ky telegram No. 808.

119

P.az%.

Confrontation in Hong Kong.

I would be very glad to have some idea of what diplomatic, economic or other similar moves in support of the situation here in Hong Kong are being undertaken or contemplated by you: particularly details of any that happen to be of a kind which could be publicized as a stimulant to local confidence. In this connexion I do hope it is fully realized how extremely dangerous the aituation here remains and is likely to remain; and that we shall need every ounce of assistance and support we can get if we are to come through. We can win every battle locally, and still be brought down if our economy withers in a few months time.

If I have any suggestions to offer for ways in which help could be given I will, of course, forward them; but I fear that in general we are too isolated here to be able to produce many ideas. Neverthelesat-

(8) Could not friendly Commonwealth and foreign opinion generally be mobilized and at least stimulated to offer expressions of support, if they cannot be induced to hint at active help if the pressure becomes too great?

(b) I believe there may well no longer be any virtue in asking the United States to stand aside, and that an indication of American interest and concern, coupled with a renewal of visits by major vessels, would be regarded by the Chinese as a reminder of the need for caution on their part. They now seem likely to be as wary of American intervention here as we are of Chinese intervention. this fresh line of thought could be studied.

Perhaps

(c) Should we not be making some gestures towards friendly S.E. Asian countries who are having rather similar troubles, e.g. Singapore and Malaysia and even Indonesia and Taiwan? I notice Tunku Abdul Rahman recently referred to the similarity of the situations here and in Malaya! and I am told Singapore very recently deregistered three unions. The time may have

/come

SEGRET

SECRET

come when Hong Kong should abandon its deliberate isolation from the budding political alignments of the region, for fear' of Chinese reactiona, and seek to see what strength and confidence we might be able to drew from these alignments. As a start, we might seek to exchange visits of suitable officers with Malaya and Singapore for the mutual gathering of experience, and publicize the visits.

(a) Japan in particular has big commercial and industrial interests here and perhaps could be induced to let the word get to the Chinese that she would be very unwilling to see them interfered with.

(e) Is there no neutral ground (Pakistan?) where our diplomatic representatives (or other mission on our behalf) could approach the Chinese representative and try to find out just what Peking would be satisfied with? Locally, we are getting practically nowhere in our contacts and it is doubtful where the power lies.

(2) Can anything be done, at least in the United Kingdom to induce importers not to write us off but to re-order confidently? Any signs of lack of confidence of this kind in the United Kingdom would be disastrous indeed.

The recent reported increase in shipping insurance rate is certainly very damaging.

(g) Could an interdepartmental standing committee be set up in London to keep the situation under review and to suggest what measures could be taken to help us from outside Hong Kong? Sedgwick might be able to help on this committee and Bank of England representation would seem desirable.

3. I am afraid the above is very scrappy, but I hope it may serve to stimulate some new lines of thought and action. should be glad of your views.

(Passed as requested).

(Passed to Diplomatic Service Administration Office as advance copies to the Private Office for Commonwealth Secretary, Resident Clerk and Kessrs. de la Mare, Bolland and Wilson).

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119)

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INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

Cypher

D. 9 June 1967 R. 9

11142

PRIORITY SECRET No.808

Repeated

.1967

FD 1/1

Deseuseed

Diseased with Co. of 22/vi. Delon

Addressed to Commonwealth orriwell follow by them

offi

"Washington No.175 "Peking No.325

"P.A. Singapore No.170

(C.O. please pass to all

My telegram No.776.

712

p.a.

12/vi

Hong Kong disturbances.

L.I.C. assessment of the situation as at 1200 hours

9 June is as follows:

The principal features of the Communist confrontation with the Government over the past three days have been:-

(a) Token Strikes: There was a revival of stoppages

of work, mainly in protest against Government action in taking down posters, which affected tally-clerks and workers in the Taikoo dockyard, the tailoring trade, one of the electric companies, the main wharf company and Government waterworks. As a result of the stoppage by Government waterworks employees notices of interdiction were served on twelve workers, following which some 300 workers at the Kowloon Branch walked out.

(b)

The partial stoppage of work at the Government slipway, operated by the Marine Department, has continued. As a result it has been possible to man only about 30% of the launches operated by the Department.

reduced scale) and newspapers containing inflammatory material by a number of concerns under Communist control Employees of the Star Ferry Company went on strike on 6 June 1967, following action by police to remove posters which had been put up again on ferries. All floating staff of the company(about 4,000)have since been suspended and the Company is now inviting applications for re- employment but has no intention of re-engaging the 60 persons believed to be behind the trouble. On the morning of 8 June employees of the Government Maintenance Garage in Kowloon and the Kowloon depot

/of

SECRET

of the Hong Kong and China Gas Company, which are in close proximity to each other, barricaded themselves in their respective yards and put up posters, threatened physical violence and malicious damage to property. Police were forced to intervene to clear the premises and arrested 545 persons of whom 115 were charged with various offences. About 15% of the labour force of 800 at the Hong Kong Island Maintenance Depot stayed off duty on 8 June, whilst P.W.D. electrical workers, at a Kowloon depot, put up posters and refused to work, (a) The holding of the general manager and assistant

general manager of the Taikoo dockyard as hostages within the dockyard by the workers until under duress they had signed an apology for taking down posters, agreed to the display of fresh posters, and promised not to call in the police. Subsequently the management announced on the night of the 7 June that there would be a temporary suspension of work in the dockyard during which all the workers would be paid. So far, there has been little overt reaction to this move. When the dockyard reopens, possibly early next week, the management intends to recall only those workers whose services they wish to retain.

(e) An attempt by the local Commmists to single out for action those Government Departments and

European owned concerns in which they are strongest, in the hope that they can bring them to a standstill thereby demonstrating Government's inability to deal with the situation.

(1) The local Communist press has continued to

publicise the 3 June editorial from the People's Daily, using it as a rallying call for their supporters in conjunction with a sustained anti- Government propaganda campaign which reached its height on 8 June, when articles appeared calling on Government servants to rebel and alleging that anti-suppression groups had been formed w thin the police force.

(g) A new facet of the campaign to disaffect the

police force has appeared, this time by dissemina- tion of printed pamphlets containing an appeal allegedly from police officers who have "turned their guns". These documents, which have been addressed to formations within the police force, call upon Chinese officers to turn against the

'British leaders"

(h) A continuation of attacks by anonymous lettera

and overt propaganda, directed at. individuals and organisations announcing their support for Government.

(1) An increase in intimidation of workers to

participate in strike action. This usually takes the form of references to a "future day of reckoning" or an open show of force without verbal threats.

SECRET

12.

SECRET

2. There have been reliable indications that some action in the past has been taken, by unions and other left wing groups, without the consent or even the knowledge of the All-Circles Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee (A.C.A.P.S.C.) and that the local Communist hierarchy, in the name of this body, 18 endeavouring to tighten its control. In the context of the poster campaign, the initial reaction of the A.C.A.P.S.C. appears to have been to refuse to remove posters but not to offer physical resistance to their removal by the security forces. However, as manifested by the actions of the workers in the Government Garage and the Gas Company, there is no doubt that some elements in the local Communist movement have recently seized upon posters as an issue on which to have a major confrontation. While it is known that resistance to these workers to the removal of the posters was approved by their individual parent Union Struggle Committee, it is not clear whether or not this line of action was authorised by the A.C.A.P.S.C. Nevertheless, the Star Ferry stoppage illustrated that, once action has been taken by a group of workers, the A.C.A.P.S.C. is reluctant to direct a return to work even though, by failing to do so, it may alienate a large section of the uncommitted population whose support it is seeking.

3. It is clear that during the past few days, following the pattern of the Marine Department and Taikoo Docks, the Communist workers expected to have their own way through threats of violence, thus placing the Government in the invidious position of either retreating in the face of open defiance or taking physical measures to maintain law and order. provocative tactics were, of course, the same as those followed in the demonstrations at Government House last month.

These

Lizar Although we are faced with a greater number of simultaneous confrontations there is no evidence that these have been occasioned by any central planning. However, there is no doubt that, individual directions apart, the pro-Communist press has clearly incited and stimulated workers to offer resistance where Government takes the initiative by insisting upon the removal of inflammatory posters. Posters, are in fact rapidly becoming the symbol of resistance to Government authority and although the Communists are preparing for a long struggle, a real trial of strength may be imminent, as the absence of any prolonged resistance to police in the two actions of the 8 June may not be truly representative.

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SECRET

INWARD TELEGRAM

THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM MONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

Cypher

D. 9 June 1

1967 R. 9

10252

IMMEDIATE SECRET No.806

(118)

UN 1967

FOYA!

117

My telegram No.799

I have the following general comments of the situation

as reported in that telegram.

2. I believe that, at the time of drafting this (09 1545), the situation is worse than it has been for a fortnight: although today has been quiet, helped by heavy rain, at the hard-core, militant, level of union leadership, we are faced with a deliberate challenge to Government's authority. Attacke appear to be concentrating on Government Departments and British owned firms including utilities:

to the point of violence.

and to be being pressed in some cases

3. On the other hand, the only overt support for these actions seene to be coming from the left-wing press and posters in hard-core C.P.G. premises. Some covert supporting economic action may be being taken and intimidation of various kinds is of course a feature of the whole campaign.

4. It is also the case that the Communiste, although strong enough in the areas in which they are causing (or can cause) trouble to enable a small number of them to intimidate the remaining workers, who lack the courage to oppose them, nevertheless control a limited (although very important) range of concerns only. At present, they are disrupting two or three undertakings at one time; and they show signs of attempting gradually to increase the number in which they foment simultaneous stoppages. Our riposte at present is to deal with these outbreaks as they occur, and use the opportunity each gives us to try to get rid of the worst trouble makers in each case.

5. It remains to be seen whether our countermeasures achieve sufficient success to weaken the communist ability to cause stoppages at will, and to separate the militants from their more half-hearted and reluctant adherents. The chances of this may be improved, if, as seems to be the case, there is inadequate central direction in the communists tactics and a degree of spontaneity in the outbreaks, Assuming reasonable success on our part, the likely result would be another lull; probably while the local leadership consolidated its control and built up more formidable attack on a more solidly organised basis.

6. But if we are unsuccessful in our immediate tactics, the probability is that the stoppages will increase in violence, frequency and duration until there is a general stoppage. At this point, or when we see it clearly developing, we may have to

/pull

SECRET

pull out all the stops and hope that extreme action on our på deportations, closing the press, etc., etc., will another the opposition without Chinese intervention.

7. I think, therefore, we may again be approaching a crucial point in affairs. Much will depend on the next day or two: and my purpose in this telegram is to ensure that we do not misunder- stand each other and that it is appreciated that I may have to take strong action soon at short notice.

Finally, public confidence is certainly suffering from the prospect of a long-drawn-out confrontation; but remains reasonably firm under the circumstances while police morale is still good. Any fresh statements indicating firm U.K. support would be of great help.

(Passed to D.S.A.0. for Measra. Bolland, Wilson and

de la Mare and Private Office (Commonwealth Secretary)

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SECRET

Cypher

SECRET

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

D. 8 June, 1967.

R. 8

13152

RE ARCH

woh Bur

1/11

وهر

INMEDIATS SECRET No. 799

12-1

Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D.) Repeated PRIORITY to Peking No.323

to P.A. Singapore No.169

Washington No.171

(8. of S. please pass to all)

SITREP as at 08/1800.

My telegram No. 785.

The storm over the removal of posters broke yesterday and continues. There have been 7 protest strikes against Government action in the last two days and two major concerns have suspended operations in a move to purge their work-force of trouble-makers and re-establish discipline. Government organisations and public utilities have again been the main targets of strike action but no essential services have been interrupted. The police have been mobilised in emergency structure to prevent or deal with disorders in Kowloon and on the island. In Kowloon tear gas has twice been used.

Star Ferry crews refused to work at 06 2345. The management refused to accede to demands for the replacement of posters and finally suspended all workers. Re-registration has started well but resumption of operations may be made difficult because of the hostile attitude of dock workers near the Ferry berths.

The

The Taikoo dockyard today suspended operations temporarily pending reorganisation after it had become clear that management had lost control. Workers are still being paid. Attempts to stir up trouble outside the gates today were foiled by the presence of police in strength but the militants among the workers are particularly tough. situation remains dangerous. In Kowloon this morning, the workers at the Government electrical and mechanical (E. and H) workshops barricaded themselves in and began putting up posters. The scene became so unruly that police moved in, using tear gas,

426 men were taken away for questioning of whom 8 have been detained. Trouble also occurred at the nearby gasworks where an ugly situation developed during the afternoon. The police again used tear gas against a hard core barricaded into one part of the plant and 104 arrests were made.

SECRET

14.

SECRET

There were also stoppages in the island

electricity station, two Government waterworks depots and the Government .and H. workshops on Hong Kong Island. In the last three cases trouble built up over the serving of interdiction letters and attempts to compel the management to accept workers already interdicted as part of the normal work-force. Further interdiction letters are to be issued tomorrow. Meanwhile the Government dockyard continues to work with a much reduced labour force and lighthouse maintenance men have remained on strike. There are indications that there may be stoppages in the telephone company, and in an urban services depot tomorrow while a repetition of disturbances in the waterworks and the E, and M. workshops seems probable.

Hoarding of rice is causing concern. Prices are rising despite public reassurances that more than adequate stocks are held. Although this seems to be more of a reflex action than part of a Communist inspired campaign, I am making special efforts to deflate the artificial market. Action is being considered against those importers and wholesalers who are believed to be taking advantage of the situation. There have also been rumours that pro-Communist distributors are putting pressure on retailers, including hawkers, and threatening them with cutting off all supplies of foodstuffs unless they co-operate.

Food and water supplies continue to come in from China but the import of livestock from the mainland has been disrupted to some extent by transport difficulties in

China.

There is a noticeable shortage of Chinese rolling stock, and wagons are doing two or more Journeys into the Colony per day which is most unusual. Mainland exporters have admitted having difficulties over the railway.

The

All the indications are that the initiative on the poster issue comes from the rank and file. higher echelons are believed not to welcome a major confrontation at this time but appear, temporarily at least, to have lost control. There is a danger that this continued intransigence will generate a major conflict with the police. There are reports of increased bellicosity among some of the workers particularly those in Taikoo docks and on the waterfront. The next few days could well be very difficult.

(Passed as requested and advance copies to

Private Office for Commonwealth Secretary, Messrs. de la Mare, Wilson and Bolland.)

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LIB 1/14

116

With the compliments of

COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

A.W. CAMINARI

2 force 1967

LONDON, S. Wet. LONDON

FFVED IN

- JUN 1967

FO1/1

2600029 C.8. 200

•

SECRET

From the Governor, Hong Kong Commonwealth Art No. 9.76. To the Secretary of State for "Gabodes |

.9.7.6........

Repeated to:-

ARCHIVES No.Rd..

Repeated to:-

Dot

- JUN 1967 No.

18th May, 1967.

My Reference TS...1/3/1168/47

Your Reference

The Communist Challenge in H.K.

An Annexe, for your information, is a paper prepared by Special Branch examining the capacity of the Left Wing in Hong Kong to exert pressure on the Government, and considering some of the counter measures available to the Hong Kong Government.

Enol.

7. Denay

Mr.

the

Fuseful paper

Sec. L.I.C.

fensoo.

نگشت

Para. 18. pérlé

で

problem there will be of the Commit deant I we the Schoolchild in a

ལ༽

SECRET

ра

0003160 0.7. 316

SECRET

Ref: GEN/14/368/3 (3)

THE COMMUNIST CHALLENGE

Special Branch,

Hong Kong Police.

15th May 1967.

The following note is a preliminary examination of the capacity

of the organised left-wing in Hong Kong to exert pressure on Government,

should it wish to do so, and considers some of the counter-measures avail-

able to the Hong Kong Government in such an eventuality.

It is assumed that any trial of strength undertaken by the

organised left-wing would be planned in advance and controlled from its

inception by a central co-ordinating body such as the Hong Kong Federation

of Trade Unions (F.T.U.) or the Hong Kong office of the New China News

Agency (N.C.N.A.); that it would be put into effect by officials of the

co-ordinating body acting openly who, however, might be advised or direct-

ed by other communist personalities who would remain under cover; and

finally, it is assumed that any campaign to coerce Government would be

undertaken only with the agreement of the C.P.G. and would then be carried

only so far as the C.P.0, decided it could go.

THE MINIHOD

The manner in which the communists of Hong Kong are able to bring

pressure to bear on the colonial authorities falls into three broad categ-

ories, which are examined separately below. They are -

(a) labour;

(b) propaganda; and

SECRET

/ External Support

External Support

SECRET

Page 2.

In addition to whatever action the Hong Kong left-wing might

take, attempts to bring pressure to bear on the Government of Hong Kong

can also be made by the C.P.G. through such means as :

(a) the interruption of the normal supply

of water and foodstuffs; and

(b) an increase of Chinese military

activities in the border region calcu-

lated to to preoccupy the attention of

the British Military Forces that they

are unable to support the Hong Kong

Police during civil disturbances.

LABOUR

The communists have a wide choice of action in the field of

labour and, by agitation, could spread disaffection in many sectors of

essential services. However, they would probably choose to avoid,

initially at least, any action where the weight of its effect would fall

on the Chinese population, since they would be reluctant to be charged

with causing hardship to the local population whose interests they claim

to champion. The greater probability is that they would seek to incon-

venience and embarrass the European element of the community and Hong

Kong Government employees, in an attempt to sap their morale and to show

up their own activities to the general public in a favourable light, as

was done in Macau

One of their best assets in this direction would be strike

action by those workers who serve the mainly European community, e.g.

SECRET

/ domestic servants,

0001160 0.F. DIE

SECRET

Page 3.

domestic servants, hotel employees, etc., auch strikes could be inter-

mittent or continuing. The unions in which they would choose to agitate for strike action would naturally depend very much on the political complexion of their membership. (Details of membership of the unions which could be involved are attached at Appendix 'A')

Public Utilities

Insofar as public utilities are concerned, the factor noted in

para 5 above would probably inhibit the controllers of the left-wing from

taking any drastic action, but token strikes could be expected in such

utilities as the bus companies, and maintenance staff in the gas and electricity companies could also probably be induced to strike long enough to impress upon Government the dangers of a full scale strike but short

enough not to cause the general public any great inconvenience, so as not

to alienate their sympathies.

The principal utilities likely to be affected are as follows :-

(a) Waterworks

Over half the labour force belongs to a left-wing union.

However, a full-scale strike which resulted in the disruption of the

Colony's water supply would bear hardest, on the poorer classes of the

community and the left-wing might suffer a substantial propaganda set-back.

In view of the praise showered by left-wing propagandists upon China for

her solicitude in supplying water to the Colony, it seems improbable that

action on this scale would be resorted to. On the other hand, the cutting

off supply to specific areas such as the Peak, Government House, police

stations and other particular buildings, might be attempted but this could

be quickly countered by alternative arrangements made by P.W.D. A token

strike would seem more probable.

SECRET

The Electric Companies

0003160 0.P. 316

SECRET

Page 4.

(b) The Electric Companies

More than one quarter of the labour force employed by

the China Light & Power Co. Ltd., and one half of the Hong Kong

Electric Co., are members of left-wing unions which are fairly active. Strike action by these unions would boomerage on the left-wing element

by necessitating the closure of the industries which employed labour, but token strikes or local power cuts might have serious effects on the

community without seriously inconveniencing the poorer classes, few of whom use electricity for domestic purposes other than lighting. The security forces would not be likely to be seriously affected, having

alternative arrangements to which they could resort.

More than two-thirds of this Company's work force are

The main effect of a total members of a fairly active left-wing union.

strike in this concern would be the closure of certain industries which

would have an adverse affect on the workers' livelihood. Here again, a

token strike, or the withdrawal of services from particular areas or from

certain segments of the population, e.g. Europeans, would cause consid-

orable inconvenience.

(d) The Telephone Company Telephone_Company

The left-wing press has already accused the authorities

of disrupting telephone services. In view of this, and of their own

need for telephonic communications (in which they differ from the security

forces which have other means, such as radio), it is improbable that

strike action would be taken in this industry, notwithstanding the fact

that a third of the Company's work force are members of a left-wing union.

The withdrawal of telephone services from European premises could cause

SECRET

inconvenience,

900JH0 C.P. DIE

SECRET

inconvenience, however, and maintenance could be affected.

Public Transport

Page 5.

The left-wing is relatively weaker in the field of public

transport than in some of the essential utilities and the majority of

the European population, which would be a major target of left-wing dis- suption, is perhaps less vulnerable to the effects of strike action in

this field than the local population. Nevertheless limited action in

some branches of transport could lead to inconvenience and could have

an adverse psychological effect on the public. The major divisions of

public transport are as follows :-

(a) Cross-harbour ferries

Less than half the work force of the Star Ferry Company

are left-wing; only a handful of the Hong Kong and Yaumati Ferry Company

are left-wing. Indeed, the majority of union members in the last-mentioned

company are right-wing and can be expected to oppose any communist agitation.

Although strike action in either company seems unlikely, it would not

A sudden token hinder the movement of security forces should it occur.

strike, however, could cause disorderly crowds at the ferry termini.

(b) Buses

Well over a third of the Kowloon Motor Bus Co., and a

quarter of the China Motor Bus Co., work forces belong to active left-wing

unions. There have already been incidents which indicate an antipathy on

the part of some of the staff towards Government and the Police, e.g.

posters on K.M.B. buses. A strike in either or both of these companies,

even if of short duration, would be very effective but could just as easily

discredit the left-wing in the eyes of the inconvenienced public as impress

SECRET

/them with

0003100 Q.P. DIE

SECRET

Page 6.

them with a display of left-wing power, In addition to strike action, or

instead of it, workers in these companies could :-

(1) plaster their vehicles with posters;

and

(11) refuse to carry Europeans and other

designated passengers,

Nearly two thirds of the work force are left-wing and they

could adopt the same policies as union members in the bus companies.

(a) Railway

Union members comprise less than a quarter of the work force

and are mainly neutral. Combined with their status as Government servants,

this might render strike action less likely. However, should a strike

occur, it could seriously interfere with food supplies entering the Colony

from China.

Government Departments

10.

Seven thousand employees of Government belong to the Government,

Armed Services and Hospitals' Workers' Union, a left-wing union affiliated

to the F.T.U. Were such a body to become inflamed against their employer

a serious disruption in the public service could occur. Dislocation in the

Urban Services Department alone, 3,150 of the staff of which are members of

the union, could have grave consequences to public health if the refuse

removal services were withdram, even if it were done on a selective basis.

The work of the Public Works Department, with 2,000 union members, could

SECRET

be slowed down or

0003160 0.7. JI

SECRET

Page 7.

be slowed down or brought to a halt and other essential services, such as

those provided by the Medical and Health Department (with 570 union

members) and the Tung Wah Hospitals Group (also 570 members) would be

seriously interfered with,

Persons in "Western Style Employment"

11.

Of an estimated labour force of 28,930 working in what is known

as Western-style employment (domestics, office clerks, lift attendants and

watchmen for European firms, etc.), 6,357 are members of the Union of

Chinese Workers in Western Style Employment, a labour organisation affil1-

ated to the F.T.U. Whether any large number could be persuaded to with-

draw their services is debatable, since they themselves would be the first

to feel the pinch from loss of employment.

It is probable, however, that

a certain amount of inconvenience could be caused either by go-slow move-

ments, by non-cooperation or by the temporary withdrawal of staff from

such areas as the hotel trade (800 union members), clerical staff in non-

local firms (1,800 members) and the domestic service of Europeans.

Counter-measures which could be taken in regard to Labour agitation

12.

The counter-measures which Government could take to cope with

left-wing attempts to disrupt labour would inevitably have to be tailored

to fit each specific situation. A number of general measures could be

instituted, however, such as 1-

(a) the initiation of an intensive propaganda

campaign emphasising the necessity of

keeping the Colony tranquil for the good

of all and for the workers in particular,

and indicating the suffering which would

be caused to the goneral public by ill-

advised left-wing activities;

SECRET

/ (b)

0003160 0.F. 314

SECRET

(b) the provision of guards at key points

such as telephone exchanges, electric

sub-stations, pumping stations, water

turncocks, Cable and Wireless installa-

tions, etc;

transport, the use of Government vehicles

for public transport and appeals to the

public for assistance in offering lifte,

etc; and

(d) by ensuring that efforts are made in

right-wing and neutral unions to ensure

that strikes do not become general

possible by intervention by the Labour

Department and by bodies such as Fedora-

tion of Industries, Chinese Manufacturers'

Association and so forth.

PROPAGANDA

Page 8.

13.

The main vehicles for left-wing propaganda are the newspapers,

radio (from Canton and Peking), and posters. Malicious propaganda could

be expected to be disseminated by all three media which could also serve

to 1-

(a) re-assure those involved in disturbances

in the Colony that the protection afforded

by the C.P.G. was close at hand;

(b) persuade the uncommitted that the left-

wing account of events was true and

SECRET

/ deserving of

0003166 G.P. DIE

SECRET

deserving of support;

the employees of other Government

departments by singling out particular

units and individuals for special

attack; and

(d) publicise the scope and nature of pro-

tests, petitions, demonstrations and

marches organised by the left-wing.

Page 9.

14.

The wall poster (big character poster) has been especially

favoured in China over the past year as the medium for registering pro-

tests against authority and passing on news of a revolutionary nature.

Its use was adopted in the Macau riots and it is already being used

extensively in the present Hong Kong trouble on premises and on buses.

Its use would probably be greatly extended, and it is likely that a mass-

ive poster campaign could be mounted with a relatively small organisational

effort. Such a campaign would probably be supported by the widespread

distribution of handbills (small character notices) which could be pro-

duced easily and economically.

15.

Two courses of action to counter such propaganda are open to

Government. First, to publish the true facts of the situation fully, prompt-

ly and as widely as possible, and to repeat them in every medium available

to Government. Second, to take prompt legal action against the newspapers

which publish subversive material and those who put up offensive posters

or distribute objectionable handbills, not only to restrict their capabil-

ity for doing damage but also because they stand openly in defiance of

authority and may symbolise in the minds of many, including Government

servants, a lack of will on the part of Government to act against the

left-wing.

OVERT POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

SECRET

8003160 C.P. 314

OVERT POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

SECRET

Page 10,

16.

Communists in Hong Kong have the capacity to organise public

demonstrations and the manpower to present a considerable problem to the

Police. One of their most effective weapons is the use of school-children,

indoctrinated in left-wing schools, full of the enthusiasm of youth and

armed with the invincible Thoughts of MAO Tse Tung. An organised march by

children from left-wing schools, on Government House for example, would

pose an extremely difficult problem for the Police, on tactical as well as

humanitarian grounds. This particular manoeuvre was used to great effect

in Macau and the efficacy of this means of "persuasion" cannot have been

lost on the leaders of the left-wing here who, during the past few months,

have made a close and detailed study of the "Hacau campaign". The partici-

pation of school children in any demonstration of protest is a severe handi-

cap to Police action, and one which the left-wing can use to make more

effective their harassing tactics designed to reduce morale in Police and

Government.

Counter-measures in connection with Political Action

17.

It is not the intention of this note to try to formulate a code

of tactics to be used on the ground but in broad terms it would seem that

Government can beat nullify the effects of overt political activities by

left-wing organisations first by exercising the utmost restraint when

dealing with demonstrations and processions, and secondly by effective

use of counter-propaganda (..g. distribution of Government-produced leaf-

lets).

18.

The employment of school children for political ends, however,

is a more difficult problem to resolve. The essential strength of the

school children lies in their obvious sincerity and in the natural

sympathy which sincere young people evoke, For Government to hold back

SECRET

/when faced with

2003164 Q.T. JIE

SECRET

Page 11.

when faced with demonstrations of this nature would, however, be taken as

a sign of weakness and in any event matters might easily get out of hand.

It appears necessary, therefore, to exercise the utmost restraint in

handling any procession or demonstration in which children play a promin-

ent organised part. When it is known that children are to be used for

such purposes, it is essential that the full force of Government's informa-

tion media be brought into play and parents be cautioned against allowing

their children to be used for political purposes, making it clear at the

same time that all who break the law, children as well as adults, will be

treated with due process.

19.

A further challenge which the communists could offer would be

the open defiance of Government regulations. A civil disobedience campaign

could be launched in which there would be a refusal to forward tax returns

or pay taxes, as was done in Macau. The counter to such attempts would be

propaganda by Government coupled with due enforcement of the law, if circum-

stances allowed it.

Selective arrest and detention

20.

Should counter-measures by Government fail to achieve de-

escalation, there remains the power to arrest and detain. Key personalities

in the left-wing world could be removed to deny their organisations the

leaders and organisers who serve them, which would quickly but perhaps only

temporarily reduce the effectiveness of left-wing agitation.

21.

To consider the wholesale arrest of left-wing leaders, however,

presupposes an extremely serious internal security situation where a choice

between effecting the arrests or abdicating Government might have to be

made. The small-scale arrest of trade union leaders engaged in agitation

would be unlikely to hinder seriously the progress of organised trade

union opposition to Government as effective replacements would always

SECRET

/ be found,

•

0003169 Q.F. 314

SECRET

Page 12,

be found, but the unions' officers could be prosecuted and closure orders

Additionally selected arrests could be made from

made on their premises.

various left-wing circles and might have a salutary effect, but either

measure could, of course, provoke sharp C.P.G. reaction.

SECRET

0003/60 0.P. JOE

SECRET

"Essential Services"

Work Forces and

Union Membership

Government Departmenta

ANNEX 'A'

Serial

No.

Department

Labour Forca

Union Membership

Medical & Health Dept."

9,500

Medical Dept. Chinese Staff General Assoc. (360/314)

Assessment of Union, etc.

Neutral. In-

active.

360

(Restricted to

Fire Services Dept.

7,800

Medical & Health

Dept. Pharmaceutical

Staff Assn.

(157/122)

G.A.F.&H.C.W.U.

(7000/6000)

Dept.)

Neutral. In- active.

(Restricted to

157

Dept.)

570

L/W. Active

Fire Services Staffa' General Association. .(1000/450) 1000

G.A.F.&H.C.W.U.

(7000/6000) - 5

Neutral but leanings to left. Inactive (Restricted to

Dept.)

L/W, Active

Marine Dept.

1,000.

Marine Dept. Chinese Employees' Union, (469/415)

L/W. Active

469

(Restricted to

Dept.)

Post Office+

800

Postal Workers' Union (450/422)

L/W. Active

450

(Restricted to

Dept.)

Resettlement Dept.

• G.A.F.&H.C.W.U. presently agitating re dismissals, promotions; and conditions in Q.E.H. laundry.

+ Union putting up clain on pay, etc, of

Postmen.

G.A.F.&H.C.W.U. (7000/6000)

L/W. Active.

I/W. Active.

G.A.F.&H.C.H.U. (7000/6000)

SECRET

MESSENTIAL SERVICEST JORK FORCE AND WION MEMBERSHIP

PUBLIC TRUISFORT

issessment of Union, etc.

L/ Active but not in this Company.

Serial

No.

Company/Service ·

Work Force

Union Membership

'Star' Ferry Co. Ltd.*

582

(1) Hong Kong Seamens' Union (26242/13219) - 250 (11) Chinese Coxswain's & Engineers Association

(829/681) - 10

Hong Kong & Yaumati • Ferry Co. Ltd

1800

(i) Hong Kong & Kowloon Ferry Workers General

Union (570/525) (ii)Chinese Coxswains' & Engineers Association

(829/681)

570

300

(iii)Hong Kong Seamens' Union (26242/13219)

ᅧ

Kowloon Motor Bus Co. Ltd. 8,500

Neutral, pro-left

inactive.

R/, fairly active. Restricted to Company.

Neutral, pro-left.

Fairly active.

L/7 active, but not in Company.

L/ active. Restricted to Company.

RAW fairly active. Restricte to Company.

L/ active. Restricted to Company.

-3,100

222

(1) Motor Transport Jorkers' Union Kowloon

Bus Branch (3100/2200) (11)Kowloon Hotor Bus General Union

(222/206)

China Motor Bus Co. *

2,279

(1) Motor Transport orkers' Union (FK)

Bus Branch (600/540)

600

(11)China Motor Bus Workers' General Union

(197/197)

- 197

2/ fairly inactive. Restrict to Company.

LAN

Hong Kong Tramways Ltd.

1,630

(1) Hong Kong Tramway Jorkers' Union (996/598)

(ii)Tramway Free Jorkers' Union (97/97)

996

L/7 fairly active. Restricte to Company.

R/ fairly active. Restricted to Company.

Kowloon Canton Railway

800

(1) Kowloon-Canton Railway "orkers' Union

(110/93)

(ii)Painters' General Union (1439/1003) (111)G.A.F. & H.C...U. (6852/4078)

(iv)Chinese Engineers' ♫ titute (997/465)

110

មានន

Neutral but noving to left. Fairly active.

L/i-inactive, LA-inactive. Neutral.

Serial

Company/Service

Work Force

Union Hembership

No.

Presently holding negotiations with employees regarding demands on wages and conditions of service, Demands are left inspired.

Assessment of Union, etc.

UNION OF CHIN SE "ONKERS' IN JOSTERN STYLE #PLOYIRIT

AFFILIATED TO F.T.U. KEBERSHIP: 6,500/5,000

DISTRIBUTION OF MEMBERS

Serial

No.

Trade/Occupation

Estimated Labour Force

Union Membership

Hotel Trade;

Office-boys,

10,000

800

messengers, etc. in Local firms.

office-boys, messengers, junior clerks and attend- ants in pon-local firms

6,000

1,800

Amahs and cooks

12,000

3,500

600

Dáiry Farm Co. Ltd.

Land and Building companies

300

200

(lift attendants, watchmen etc)

Peak Tram Company

30.

GOVERMEJIT, ARMED FORCUS & HOSPITAL CHEESE OVERS' UNIC!! (G.A.F. & H.C...U.

AFFILIATED TO F.2.0. HABIRCHP: 7,000/6,000

DISTRIBUCION OF BERS

Serial

No.

Department

No. of lembers

Urban Services Dept.

3,150

Public Works Dept.

2,000

Medical & Health Dept.

570

Tung Jah Three Hospitals

570

Dual Membership of other Unions

1) R/H U.C.D. Staff General Association 30 11) R/H U.S.A. Kowloon Morkers' General Union 20 iii) L/W Motor Transport orkers' Union 25

←

1)L/W Government Waterworks Chinese Employees Union ii) LW Motor Transport Jorkers' Union 15

1) Neutral Medical Dept. Chinese Staff General Assoc. 11) L/ Fotor Transport forkers' Union 15

1) R/V Tung Wah Three Hospitals Employees' Assoc. ii) L/W Motor Transport Jorkers' Union

Resettlement Dept.

Misc. Government Depts.

400

1) L/ Postal Workers' Union 11) LA Marine Dept. Chinese Employees' Union iii) L/J Motor Transport Workers' Union 10

Armed Forces

250

(Army

130)

(R.N.

70)

(RAF

50)

· 20

"ESSENTIAL SERVICES" JOSK FORCE AND UNION MEMBERSHIP

UTILITIES

Serial

No.

Company/Service

Work Force

Union Hembership

Assessment of Union, etc.

1 ·

Government aterworks *

1,500

1) Government laterworks Chinese Employees' / Active. Restricted to Dept.

Union (748/568)

748

11) G.A.F. & H.C.7.U. (6852/4078)

L/W active.

China Light & Power ** Co. Ltd.

1,200

1) China Light & Power Co. Ltd., Chinese

Employees' Union (367/324)

367

L/W fairly active. Restricted to Company.

Hong Kong Mectric Co.

1,200

1) Electric Co. Chinese Workers' Union

(674/537)

674

L/ fairly inactive. Restricted to Company.

China Gas Co. Ltd.

450

1) China Gas Co. Ltd. Chinese Employees'

Association (367/324)

367

L/W fairly active. Restricted to Company.

H.K. Telephone Co.

3,000

Demands by departmental Union for more overtime pay for Kowloon twincock operators.

Union preparing to submit demand for wage increase.

1) Telephone Co. Ltd Chinese Jorkers Union

(1247/742)

1247 ii) Telephone Co. Ltd Free Workers Assoc.

(Society, NOT trade Union) (26/23)- 26

LA fairly active, Restricted to Company.

Neutral. Activities not known.

RM 117

115

En clair

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

D. 5 June, 1967

RECEIVED IN |ARCHIVES No.$1

- 8 JUN 1967

F011

R. 5

镡

1030Z

PRIORITY No. 774

Addressed to Commonwealth Office Repeated to Peking No. 309

PA Singapore No. 161 Washington No. 166

(Commonwealth Office please pasa Washington)

My telegram No. 773.

Inflammatory Posters.

The following statement was issued at 1845 hours on 4 June. "A Government spokesman today clarified various points about the scope and intention of the Emergency (Prevention of Inflammatory Posters) Regulations 1967.

These Regulations have as their object the prevention of the public display of posters containing 'inflammatory matter', which may be briefly described as posters displaying material which contain any incitement to violence and law-breaking, any attempt to spread disaffection and to undermine the loyalty of the police force and the public service, or any attempt to stir up 111-will in the community.

An inflammatory poster' is any poster or any photograph or reproduction of any photograph, whether or not accompanied by any written or printed matter, or any banner or similar device which is or contains inflammatory matter in any form, shape or manner whatsoever.

The Regulations are not directed against the expression of any thought or opinion which is not 'inflammatory'."

(Passed as requested and to D.8.A.0. for Messra, de la Mare,

Bolland and Wilson and Private Office (Commonwealth Secretary))

Distribution

H.K. W.I.D. Q. I.G.D.

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EPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Copies also sent to:-

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1a SMG)

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= =

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Department

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(Rm. 7365)

Ministry of Defence

(Rm. 7163)

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(Rm. 5131)

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P.S. to Mr. Rodgers

Mr. de la Mare Mr. Bolland Mr. Wilson

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1.0.2

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CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (8ir D. Trench)

Cypher

D. 5 June, 1967.

10032

21 "

न

114

FD!|!

INKEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 773.

Addressed to Commonwealth office.

Repeated

P.A. 8ingapore No. 160.

"Peking No. 308.

"Washington No. 165.

(Commonwealth office please pass all).

石小

FD1/1(113

My telegram No. 770.

Because of tone and the local source of the N.C.N.A. telegram, I decided not to reply directly. Instead a general statement has been issued by the Director of Information services: text follows in my immediate following telegram.

(Passed as requested)

(Passed to D.S.A.0. Tor Washington and for

Messrs. de la Mare, Bolland and Wilson and Private office (Commonwealth Secretary).

Distribution H.K. WID 'C'

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CONFIDENT LAL

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113

Cypher

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (81r D. Trench)

D. 4 June, 1967. R. 4

IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL No. 770

For

0650Z

Addressed to Commonwealth Office

Repeated

Peking No.302,

悼 P.A. Singapore No.156,

Washington No.163

DE FLE

FO //!!

(Commonwealth office please pass to all)

My telegram No. 767.

81trep 041200.

The police operation mounted between 3 a.m. and 5 a.. this morning to remove posters on buses, the Star Ferry and other selected buildings, has been completed without incident and there has so far been no subsequent reactions.

A telegram addressed to me by the director of the Hong Kong branch of the N.C.N.A. was delivered to Government House. Text follows my immediately following telegram.

[FDI/643

I shall let you know by this evening what response if any I propose to make.

(Passed as requested)

(Advance copies passed to D.3.A.0. for Messrs. de la Mare,

Wilson and Bolland and Private Office, Commonwealth

Secretary)

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INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

D. 5 June, 1967

R. 5

***VES No.3:

JUN 1967

FD 1/1

10402

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ซึ่ง

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1122)

IMMEDIATE SECRET No. 776

Addressed to Commonwealth office

Repeated to Peking No. 311 (Commonwealth Office please

忡

Washington_(by bag) at request of

My telegram No. 714.

pass)

Far Eastern Dept., Foreign Office

(90

Our assessment of the situation as at 1200 hours on

5 June is as follows.

The principal features of the Communist confrontation with the Government during the last ten days have been:-

(a)

Token Strikes. These were a major feature at the beginning of the period but now appear to be on the wane. Until today when 1000 maintenance workers in the Kowloon Motor Bus Company stopped work, there had been none since 30th May.

(b) Trouble at the Government slipway, operated by

the Marine Department. This originated as a protest against the removal of inflammatory posters, but now seems to be on the decline apparently as a result of Government's firm action in suspending many of the trouble makers.

material, are still displayed by a number of concerns under direct C.P.G. control, although the majority have been removed either by the owners themselves or by the police. Today a few new slogans were painted on buses in Kowloon.

(d) The publication of a special joint edition of the Ta Kung Pao (T.K.P.) and Wen Wel Pao (W.W.P.) reproducing the editorial of the People's Daily of 3 June (Peking telegram No. 421).

FD1/6/35

(e) The cable to me despatched by the local office of

the New China News Agency (N.C.N.A.) on the instructions of the Peking Office protesting against police action following the publication by

/Government

SECRET

Government of regulations against inflammatory and seditious material and calling on the

itish authorities to desist. (Hy telegram No. 774 refers).

(f) A sustained anti-government propaganda campaig

which has sought to counter the colony-wide

support of Government by allegations that much of this support is fabricated and that the majority of the people are opposed to Government's measures in opposition to the confrontation. The basic appeal is to the Chinese patriotic sentiment; and a great deal is being made of the support given by China to the 4/5 demands. The principal Government target continues to be the police force.

(g) The issue of a bi-weekly English language edition of the T.K.P. which reiterates articles from N.C.N.A., People's Daily and the Chinese language edition of T.K.P. It appears that this publication is designed for overseas circulation as well as for the local foreign community. Its circulation is dropping as is that of both T.K.P. and W.W.P. the two main procommunist Chinese language papers. The scattering of anti-Government leaflets around the town has been another innovation, although, so far, this particular medium for propaganda has not been sustained.

(h) The advice to all employees of Communist concerns

and members of Communiat organisations to stockpile food and other essential commodities, for as long as three months, in preparation for a further escalation of confrontation, should this be started by the Communists or (in their eyes) by Government. (1) Talk in the unions and rumours of violent strike

action. These were rife during last week but have died down, The terms of the People's Daily editorial has contributed to the reduction of emphasis on violence. Intimidation continues but remains on a fairly low key.

(j) A deterioration of morale in a number of Communist

organisations particularly in the commercial

sphere, where, hotheads apart, there is evidence of a marked desire to continue with "business as usual".

2. There were indications last week that Peking is embarrassed by the extent to which local communist leaders have become involved in a confrontation with the Hong Kong Government. The emphasis of the C.P.G. editorial appearing in the People's Daily of 3 June was on the need for the local hierarchy to plan for a long struggle and to build up the necessary organisation, It is possibly of some significance that no mention was made in it of the five demands nor was there any direct threat of intervention by the C.P.G. The Hong Kong working class were named as the spearhead or the struggle and there was a definite implication that the local Communiste cannot expect active support, other than by way of propaganda,

/from

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from China. This is borne out by a meeting of the all circles Anti-Suppression Committee, Propaganda Section, held on 4 June, at which it was stated that the "struggle" would be carried on by means of 'economic, political and propaganda pressure'. On the other hand, the editorial is likely to be interpreted by the militants as being an encouragement to further struggle to the rank and file Communists, and may make it increasingly difficult for the more moderate of the local Communist leaders to exercise restraint.

3. We expect, therefore, that the main force of the struggle will continue to be directed through the propaganda field though it is possible that more extensive and widespread simultaneous strike action will be taken. In contrast, the suspension of employees of the Marine Department following their participation in illegal strike action, may serve as a warning to potential strikers, particularly if local employers follow Government's lead.

4. In order to maintain the initiative, legal action against selected C.P.G. concerns still displaying inflammatory material is under consideration and it is to be hoped that this will cause the others to remove the inflammatory material of their own volition. If it is taken, the protest by the N-C-N.A. may indicate that there would probably be resistance, possibly physical.

5. In the final analysis, Peking holds the key to the present unsettled situation. But during the past ten days has only given propaganda support to the local Communists and it is, perhaps, significant that no new demands have been made bf the Hong Kong Government. Accounts of disorder approaching anarchy in China multiply, however, and it may be more difficult for Peking now to exercise firm control over local Communist hot-heads, either in Hong Kong or Kwantung, and there is always a possibility that extremist groups in Kwangtung might try to come to the aid of their fellow Chinese here. However, military control of the border remaina firm,

(Passed as requested)

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ཤ

SECRET

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

Cypher

D. 3 June, 1967.

性 09252.

[FD1/I]

lll

PRIORITY STORET No. 769.

Addressed to Commonwealth office.

Repeated

slui

"Peking No. 301. (8. of S. please pass).

My telegram No. 714.

90)

Ho Yin came to Hong Kong on 1 June and yesterday held discussions with members of the local Communist hierarchy

Later he reported the gist of these discussions to Q.W. Lee who in turn passed the information on to Cater. Apparently Ho came to Hong Kong on his own initiative and not at the request of the local Communist hierarchy.

2. Ho reportedly said that the local Communist hierarchy were of the opinion that this was not the time to hold discussions with the Hong Kong Government; that they were confident of final victory. Local Communists held the opinion that in time pressure from the public, and particularly from business people, would force the Hong Kong Government to accede to the four demands. They accepted that this may take a long time, some months, or even two or three years, but nevertheless victory for them in the long term was certain. A problem which was exercising the hierarchy at the moment was the support for the police education fund: they were taking steps to ensure that their own fighting fund would grow rapidly and overtake that of the police fund thus giving them an opportunity of claiming a big victory.

(1)

Q.W. Lee's assessment of the above was as follows:

Communist hierarchy still genuinely do not know what to do and are probably still awaiting instructions from China.

(ii) They are beginning to have doubts as to the type

and amount of support they could expect from China, hence the emphasis on the willingness of local Communista to prepare for a long struggle.

Bearing in mind that this information has been obtained at third-hand, it is considered that Q.W. Lee's assessment is a reasonable appreciation of the present circumstances.

(Passed as requested with advance copies

for Resident Clerk and Foreign office F.E. Dept.)

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110

SECRET

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

Cypher

D. 3 June, 1967.

R. 3

07452

IVES NG3

. 1967

FD1/17

IMMEDIATE SECRET

No. 768.

Addressed to Commonwealth office.

Repeated

"Peking No. 300.

" POLAD Singapore No. "Washington No. 162.

155.

(8. of S. please

pass to all).

My telegram No. 744.

106

Disturbances.

Action against buses, ferries, etc. still exhibiting inflammatory posters will be taken tonight (3 June) while vehicles or vessels are at depots or wharves, if the companies themselves are unsuccessful in getting the posters off by then. Any immediate stoppages will then come on a Sunday when pressure on transport services is not quite so heavy.

2. We can certainly expect some difficulty in getting these posters down, but there is little firm indication yet of how militant the reaction will be.

3. Once the posters are reasonably under control, some action against the Communist press for its continued gross scurrilities cannot be too much longer avoided. Publie opinion will start to become even more critical if nothing is done. Direct action against the newspapera and printing works using emergency regulations would be the simplest course, but the time is not right for this and I am still considering other weapons which might be used.

4. One such weapon might be either:

(1)

(11)

to refuse to allow selected N.C.N.A. and newspaper officials now in China (there are at present three such) to return;

to refuse to renew the visas of some of those here when they run out.

5. These two courses of action could be used also against other selected extremist Communists in suitable circumstances.

6. To act in either of these ways would be a quite different and much less criticizable a course from deportation,

All the senior N.C_NA. although it could have the same effect. staff are considered as C.P.G. officials and have service passports

SECRET

/(except

SECRET

(except for the Director who has a diplomatic passport and whom we would not want to touch at this stage). In addition, a number of the senior officials of the Bank of China, China Resources Co., and press and publishing circles also have service passports. Before even considering using this procedure therefore, I would be glad to know:-

(1)

(11)

whether you agree that to act in this manner would be less objectionable than to deport, and

whether there are considerations vis à vis N.C.NA. in London and Reuters in Peking which must be taken into account.

7. The type of person against whom this action might be contemplated would include:-

(1) the Managing Director of Wen Wei Pao (absent from

Hong Kong since 2 February) and

(11) the Editor-in-Chief N.C.N.A. (absent since 22 February).

8. A probable effect of taking such action would be to discourage others from making short visits to China or from going to Shun Chun to telephone Canton for instructions.

(Passed as requested with advance copy to

Resident Clerk Foreign Office F.E. Dept.)

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INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

Cypher

3 June, 1967.

03402

109

5 .1967

FD 1/1 FD/

PRIORITY SECRET

No. 767.

Addressed to Commonwealth Office.

Repeated

"Peking No. 299.

" POLAD Singapore No. "Washington No. 161.

SITREP at 031000.

My telegram No. 745.

707

5lvi

154.

(S. of S. please

pass all).

After a rather anxious start, the Government dockyard resumed work with nearly half its staff. 256 employees have been interdicted, but so far only 17 have been given their letters of interdiction. The balance did not report for work.

2. Rumours of major strike action over this weekend continue though hard evidence is lacking. The very number of these reports tends to discredit the likelihood of a planned offensive which we would expect to be set up with greater regard to security. The expected stoppage in one ferry company did not happen on 2 June but remains a possibility for 3 June. In the other ferry company a pay claim is being presented. This could provide the veneer of a straight labour dispute to industrial action which has in fact political basis, thus complication any resort to legal action by the Government.

3. There has been no increase in the number of postera displayed. It is intended to watch the situation to see the effect of warnings given by managements as a result of the new emergency regulations. If by tonight there is a substantial reduction in the number of posters we will not force the pace by police action. A decision on this will be made this evening. As a precautionary measure the police, less auxiliaries, were brought to a higher state of readiness from midnight on 2 June.

(Passed as requested with advance copies to

Resident Clerk and Foreign Office F.E. Dept.)

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108

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

Cypher

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

D. 1 June, 1967.

Áð

R. 1

11352.

pa kifavi

RE ARC.

- 2 JUN 1967

F011

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 755.

Addressed to Commonwealth office.

Repeated

"Peking No. 294.

"P.A. Singapore No. 150.

"Washington No. 158. (5. of s.

please pass all).

SITREP as at 01/1800 June.

My telegram No. 745.

107

The stoppage over the removal of Communist posters at the Government dockyard continued until 1700. 90% of the Marine Department's launches were tied up as a result. The strikers, who included most of the crews and key maintenance workers, barricaded themselves into the dockyard and prevented four Europeans as well as loyal staff members from leaving. They refused to accept anything less than the replacement of their posters. (The Government posters which has been put up instead drew attention to the disciplinary penalties applicable in cases of absence without leave). Despite occasional chanting and attempts to foment violence by a small number, they all dispersed at 1700 on receiving a guarantee that they would not be arrested when leaving. They promised a repetition tomorrow if their posters were not put back.

An announcement is to be made tonight over radio and television and tomorrow in the press that the participants have been indicted (1.e. suspended) and disciplinary action will be taken against them. This may possibly provide the pretext for a major confrontation with the Communiata.

There were no other incidents or stoppages today. There are indications that one of the ferry companies may stop work tomorrow.

(Passed as requested)

(Advance copies also sent to D.S.A.0. for Messrs. de la Mare, Bolland, and Wilson Far East Dept. and for P.8. to Commonwealth Secretary)

CONFIDENTIAL

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fir

107

SECRET

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM MONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

Cypher

D. 1st June 1967 R. 1st

02452

IMMEDIATE SECRET

No.745

Repeated

pc. envi

рс

-CEIVED IN

HIVES No.31

2 JUN 1967

FD1/

Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D.)

"Peking No.292

"POLAD Singapore No.149 "Washington No.157

(S. of S. please pass PRIORITY to all)

Sitrep as at 01/0900 houpa

My telegram No.738.

There is evidence that a major confrontation on the industrial side is being prepared. 1st June was the original target date but this may now have been postponed until 3 or 4 June, It is, however, by no means certain that the pro- Communist faction have sufficient support for such action. Planning may be designed to maintain morale rather than an expression of firm intent. Small acale stoppages are expected to continue. Textile factories and the telephone company may be affected today. The latter has only a very small pro-Communist element.

2. Employees of the Marine Department are refusing to work until the Communist posters which were removed on the night 30/31 May and replaced by Government posters are put back. Since we are today taking action to declare inflammatory posters illegal, this could be the beginning of a trial of strength.

(Passed to D.S.A.0. for repetition as requested)

(Advance copy for Messrs. Wilson, Bolland, de la Ware

Far Eastern Dept. and for Private office,

Secretary of State and for Resident Clerk)

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Export Credits Guarantee Department Ministry of Defence (Rm.7365)

Mr. D. Hawkins

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सात R1117 (10

106

Cypher

PRIORITY SECRET No. 744.

SECRET

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

D. 1 June, 1967.

R. 1

paragraph 4.

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES N.. *

- 2 JUN 1967

02452

ра

Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D.) Repeated Routine to Peking No.291

to P.A. Singapore No. 148

Washington No.156

(S. of S. please pase all)

My telegrama No.726 paragraph 2 and No.738

Disturbances.

After consulting Executive Council, I intend to start taking action within the next few days against the many inflammatory posters which are still appearing on buildings, vehicles and harbour vessels and are causing public concern. Emergency Regulations to enable this to be done effectively are being published very shortly.

I hope

later today. A warning in general terms was issued last night.

No action against the press is yet contemplated, except in so far as individual copies of newspapers are stuck up and used as posters.

There is some danger that pro-Communist bus and ferry workers in particular may attempt to counter by fomenting further stoppages but I am sure we must take this risk. We shall of course proceed with caution.

(Passed as requested)

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忖

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(105)

1 RECEIVED IN

F.E.

ARCHIVES No.31 - 1 JUN 1967

TO SI"

amber 230 May

(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROHERTY OF HER BRITANIC M.JESTY'S GOVERNMENT)

| Fot/+

UFD(67)39

24th May, 1967

C..BINET

COTY NO.

DEFENCE .ND OVERJE.. LOLICY COMMITTEE

HONG KONG

عم

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth "ffairs

But

We have always known that Hong Kong wris vulnerable, it is valuable to Ching nd we had casumed th: t 11 we in her interests to maintain the status quo. Indeed there has been evidence in the rest thrt the Central Government have controlled and restrained the Communists in the territory.

2. The scene hrs now chanced, arising cut cf labour troubles a mejor campaign has been mounted in Hong Kong itself linked with hostile demonatrations in Shanghai and Peking and with the expulsion of our representative in Shanghai.

summery of recent developments is rt innex). loc sening of control by mainland China of the Communists in Hong Kong has resulted from recent developments in the Cultural Revolution, The first mass demonstrations in Hong Kong were probably promoted independently by the Communists there, in an opportunist desire to make the most of genuine labcur unrest. Mainland China had to reset to the aitution, nnd chose to give support to the communista in Hong Kong.

The unknown factor in the present crisia ia how for mainland China has now decided to go in bringing pressure on H.M.G., and how for there cre different views there on future policy.

The possible interpret: tions of the Chinese course of action, assuming thrt she is new controlling events, appear to be these:-

(1) Chine has made no bosic policy change, but is trying to

achieve some propaganda victory as the price for calling- off the disturbances. such a propagande gain could relate to the presence of American ships and troops from Vietnam on leave in Hong Kong; or to labour reforma; or to the release from prosecution or imprisonment of the persons charged with or sentenced for their role in the riots.

(11) Chinc h's decided to try to force us to accept a Macao

position in Hong Kong. If this is so, she will continue to escalate Hong Kong disturbances to the point when, in order to remain in Hong Kong, we must capitulate to whrtever demands are made, und, in effect, recept Chinese domination of Hong Kong.

(111) China has decided to sacrifice the economic benefits

she derives from Hong Kong to Cultural Revolution "purity" of doctrine, and to drive us out of Hong Kong completely.

le cannot resist determined attempt to force us cut altoṛether and we could not tolerate the humiliation of remaining in Hong Kong without effective control. I am convinced that a Xaçao solution would be unacceptable. It would be damnging to cur international prestige (at a time when Gibraltar and den are presenting several problems). It would be intolerable for the Governor, and impossible in terms of my responsibility for Hong Kong in rlicment. This being so, it fellows that if China

/18

SECRET

is embarking upon course (11), cur resistance to it might compel

er te resort to course (111).

But there is no need to cssume the worst and our immediate responsibility is to meintein law and crder, retain morale and confidence so that te economy een continue to flourish. Firm action is required to do this but, at the same time we should avoid, as far as possible, action which could be regarded by the C.1.G. as provocative. we should avoid doing anything to "escalate the confrontation" to the extent that we get involved in a situation from which there is no escape except by abject surrender or a futile attempt to fight it out, leading to the seme result. Our sters, therefore, must be directed to the needs of the local security situation, while taking the wider implications into account, and they need to be carefully measured and tiined.

Recommendations

I accordingly ask my colleagues to endorse the views in paragraphs 5 and 6, and to agree to the following action:-

(1) Local Security

(a) We are already sending the Commando Carrier

BULW..RK to Hong Kong where she should arrive by the end of this week.

(b) The Governor has already been authorised to

neutralise several of the buildings from which the campaign is being directed.

(c)

(a)

The Governor hes now naked for authority to pick up end, if possible, deport (or failing that, detain) some of the known leaders of the present campaign limited to 2 or 3 in the first instance, The disruption of the lendership would be a distinct and positive goin and would be seen by the majority of the population as firm action. On the other hand it is unlikely that the Chinese Government would accept these lenders as deportees and, if they were detained in Hong Kong, this would provide Teking and the local Communists with a grievance.

The Governor haa

undertaken not to use this weapon lightly or unnecessarily and, on balance, I recommend that he should be given authority to go ahead if the situation requires it.

Motion against the principal Communist newspaper which is the official 0.i.G. orgen in Hong Kong.

The Governor acce; ts that prosecutions for sedition or inciting the police to disaffection might have dangerous repercussions, and is proposing instead to seek emergency powers to close down the printing presa. But he would only take action after consulting me on each individual case, I would propose to give him a general authority on this understanding.

(11) Labour

Relations between employees and employers in Hong Kong have not been good cnd we should do our best to improve matters. Less than 12% of the total working force are declared members of trade unions and there are 100,000

SECRET

/membere

SECRET

members of the Communist Unions as opposed to 70,000 others. There is a complete split between Communist and K.M.T. unions. The Communist Unions are basically disinterested in genuine industrial issues. I have been engaged in discussion with the Hong Kong Government, through the Governor, about labour reforms. The employers, who have in the past shown a considerable ancunt of resistance to reforms are at present very anxious about the general situation and we could immediately carry through extensive and long-overdue labour reforms.

I would like to

do this. It would be welcomed by the average worker in Hong Kong and would give us a better moral position, but it would be unlikely to satisfy China. Nevertheleas if the Chinese were to seek a lowering of the temperature, this would give the C.i.G. a face-saving formula. I recommend that we should press the Governor to go ahead vigorously with improvements in the labour legislation including early steps to shorten the hours of work of women and young persons.

(111) Other Matters

Facilities to the U.5.

In the background of our difficulties with the C.F.G. lies their irritation at the facilities which the U.3. forces in Vietnam enjoy in Hong Kong. tre hove latterly restricted visits of warships to the same number as last year and more recently have suggested that larger ships should not come. I do not recommend any further immediate ceticn since any significant diminution would be claimed by the Chinese as a propaganda victory. But I am sure that this is something that we should keep under review in the longer term.

Commonwealth Office, B. .1.

24th May, 1967

SECRET

H. B.

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ANNEX

Events in Kor loon

HONG KONG DISTURBANCES

The recent disturbances in Kowloon arise from an industrial

dispute in April between workers and their employers about wages

and conditions of employment involving 650 workers in two

factories producing artificial flowers, The injection moulding

sections of both factories were closed and the workers were

dismissed. The Labour Department of the Hong Kong Government

offered to help the parties to reach agreement but this was

rofused by 1oth partica.

Disturbances broke out on the 6th May outside one of the

factories situated in Kowloon and as a result 21 persons were

arrosted.

3. On the 8th May the Rubber and Plastic Workers Union rut

forward four demands:

(a) immediate release of the workers arrested;

(b) punishment of the ovil doors and compensation; (c) guarantee of the workers and personal safuty;

(a) no interference henceforth by the police in

labour disputes.

4. The pro-communist press endorsed these domande and

deliberately slanted its reporting to create the impression

of unnecessary brutality by the police who had in fact behaved with a cmplary moderation. The pro-communist press also demanded

apologios by the Government.

5. Further disorders broke out in Kowloon on the 11th May and

continued for several days. The police were attacked, cars werc

set on fire and some property was damaged. Curfews had to be

declared in certain arons to help control the situation.

Chincac Government's Statement

6. On 15th May the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs isqued

/a statement

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e statement castigating the Hong Kong authorities for "Facist

atrocities", hostility to the Chinese people and "collusion with

the United States Imperialists". The statement included a demand

that Her Majesty's Government should instruct the Hong Kong

Government to accept all the local pro-communist demands which

the Chinese ust have known to be unacceptable to the Hong Kong

Government. The statement was the strongest and most abusive

about Hong Kong for sɔmʊ years.

7. No direct reply was given to the Chinese Goverment statement

but on the 17th May a statement was released in London referring

to the industrial origin of the disturbances and stating that

"H.H.G. fully support the Hong Kong Govornment in fulfilling its

duty both in maintaining law and order and in the efforts it is

making to bring about a settlement of the industrial dispute".

8. From the 18th May the campaign switched from Kowloon to

Government House on Hong Kong island. At first the demonstratore

were noisy and abusive, Petitions were presented and Government

House was plastered with posters,

On the 20th May the demonstrations began to lose their

orderly and disciplined nature and the lemonstrators started to

resort to rowdiness and violence by molesting spectators and

blocking ronds, particularly in the area of Statue Square and the

Law Courts. Loudspeakers on the Bank of Chinn buildings adopted

an anti-British tune and included such slogans as "Kill Trench"

"British murderere", etc.

10. The Hong Kong Govɩmmont issued notices stating that

disorderly processions or unlawful gatherings would not be allowed

but the people would still be allowed to continue to exorciso

their right to petition the Governor in small, orderly groups

or by post.

11.

The situation deteriorated further and on the 22nd May the

Governor asked for permission:-

(a) to neutralize the buildings from which the campaign

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/is being

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is being directed the Bank of China and the

communist-controlled Federation of Trade Union H.Q.

and the Workers Club; and

(b) to bring the Commando Carrier "Bulwark" to

Hong Kong.

Both these requests were approved.

Attacks on our posts in ceno. Peking and Shanghai.

12. Soon after the disturbances began in Hong Kong, the British

Consulate in Macao was the target of repeated demonstrations and

the staff have been compelled to vacate their quarters for a

hotel.

13. After the Peking statement of 15th May similar demonstrations were mounted against our offices in Poking and on the 16th May

the office in Shanghai was invaded by a mob and sacked. On the

22nd May the Cherge d'Affaires in Peking was informed that the

Chinese Government considered that the 1954 Agreement was annulled

and demanded that the Shanghai office should be closed within

24 hours.

The apparent parallel with Macso

14. There is an apparent perallel with events in Macao which

have been widely studied in pre-communist circles in Hong Kong-

Thero too the crisis began with a local dispute (in the case,

however, badly handled by the police) which led to "demands"

by local pro-communists which were endorsed later by the

Chinese authorities. The Portuguese reacted by trying to

appease the local pro-communists who only stopped up their

Comends. Internal and external pressure was applied, including

the implied threat of Chinese military action, until the

Portugucac backed down and accepted the Chinese demands in

full. The Chinese were entirely intransigent and seemed

determined to enforce their will and to demonstrate that the

Portuguese were remaining in Macao only on sufferance and

subject to them falling in with Chinese wishes on all pin

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www

Covering SECRET

104

REVIVED IN ARC!!

*0.31

- 1 JUN 1367

FD!!!

kir. O'Neill

M. Mulley has

CABINET

DOM 25/V

DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY COMMITTEE

HONG KONG

I attach a brief for the meeting of the Defence

and Oversea Policy Committee on 25 May, commenting on

the Commonwealth Secretary'a memorandum (attached).

Mr. de la Mare has seen and agreed.

105

2. A separate brief will be submitted on events in

China.

John Densu

(J. B. Denson) 24 May, 1967

ра

ilvi

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f Theme News

Cysmy.

CABINET

DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY COMMITTEE

HONG KONG

TALKING POINTS

1. Chinese Motives and Intentions

We agree with the general line of paragraphs 1 to 5 of the

Commonwealth Secretary's Memorandum on Chinese Motives and

intentions. Of the various alternatives in paragraph 4, we

think 4(1) is the more likely, although (ii) probably represents

what the Chinese regard as their present maximum objective.

2. On paragraph 3, we think it likely that there are divergent

views in the Chinese leadership on how to deal with the problem

of Hong Kong as between the moderates, who take full account of

the Colony's benefit to China, and the extremists, who are

prepared to push ideology and damn the consequences. There is

some evidence that present policy represents an uneasy compromise

between these two lines of thought. It is clearly in our

interests to do everything possible to ensure that the "moderates"

are encouraged. This is best done by carefully graduating our

response to Chinese actions and leaving the door open for

a settlement.

The firm but unprovocative measures of the

Governor are conducive to this end.

Measures

3. We have already supported the Governor's measures to

neutralise buildings from which the pro-Communist campaign is being directed and to bring in H.M.S. Bulwark (paragraphs Nos.7(1)

(a) and (b)). We also agree that the Governor should have

discretion to make arrests of pro-Communists, but we consider

that it might be better not even to go through the motions of deportation as the Chinese will certainly not accept auch

deportees (paragraph 7(1)(c))

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14.

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We agree that the Hong Kong Government should be given

general authority to act against the Communist printing presses

(paragraph 7(1)(a))

5. We agree about the importance of pressing ahead with

improvements in labour legislation. One possibility is that

the Governor should be asked to open a commission of enquiry

into the labour disputes which sparked off the present

disturbances.

In this way we would emphasise the origins of

the disputes and possibly give the pro-Communist leadership in

Hong Kong a facesaving device for claiming victory while in no

way damaging our own position (paragraph 7(ii)).

Facilities for United States' Forces

6. We agree with the recommendation in paragraph 7(iii).

Guidelines have been agreed with the United States on the use

of Hong Kong as a leave centre for United States troops in

Vietnam. By this we limit the number of warships and military

personnel visiting Hong Kong. Although in the past two years

there has been an increase in numbers, we have tried to achieve

this gradually and without publicity. Since the disturbances in

Hong Kong, our policy has been to allow United States' visits to

continue but to cancel arrangements for visits by any large or

conspicuous, e.g. nuclear, warships. Any significant drop in

the rate of American visits at present would be claimed by the

Chinese as a victory and lead to further pressure designed to

force us to prohibit such visits altogether. But the Governor

has proposed (since the paper was drafted) that we work out with

the Americans some reduction in the use of Hong Kong by their

In the case of naval visits, there should be

forces.

a restriction to small unite with occasional and well-spaced

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/visits

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visits of larger units.

This is reasonable and we would be

willing to put the proposal to the Americans.

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RECEIVED IM

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ARCHIV

103

Flag A

Flag B

Private Secretary

HONG KONG

-1 JUN 15 and I State

FO!/

ат

Ror

Zeem

|-|·8%

The Secretary of State has asked why we agreed that the

atatement on the disturbances be put out by the Commonwealth

Office in London and not in Hong Kong, as he approved on

Monday, 15 May.

The reasons were:

(a) The Governor of Hong Kong had already made a etaterent

on Monday without consulting London. As directed by

the Secretary of State, the Governor was asked to explain

this. He did so in paragraph 1 of his telegram No. 612.

We accepted that, as he had put out this statement

-38

[102

(b)

(text attached) saying, inter alia, that "an answer must

come from H.M.G. in London", we should not insist that he

put out another.

The Governor argued strongly that the reaction of

ordinary citizens in Hong Kong to Communist pressure was

going to be crucial and would depend on their judgement

of H.M.G.'s determination to resist pressure and to

uphold the Governor in maintaining law and order.

Governor was quite clear that it was a statement from

London that was needed.

The

staterent be put out in Hong Kong was to try to avoid

a polemical exchange with Peking and to concentrate

attention on the local, primarily industrial issues in-

volved. Having accepted the Governor's arguments in

(a) and (b), the Commonwealth Office and we thought we

could still achieve this result by issuing a factual

non-polemical statement and having it put out by the

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/Commonwealth

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Commonwealth Office rather than by the Foreign Office.

We decided, however, that we should divorce our own

statement as much as possible from that made by Peking

and therefore did not accept the Governor's recommendations

that we should mention the Peking statement and refer

to its "demands".

The Governor recommended that we put out our statement as

soon as possible because public expressions of support for the

Government which was beginning to make itself felt needed an

additional boost. Commonwealth Office Ministers took the view

that in these circumstances a statement should be issued here

forthwith. In the Secretary of State's absence, we therefore

cleared the draft statement with Mr. Rodgers and the Permanent

Under-Secretary. I also left a copy in the Private Office

with a verbal explanation of our action as the afternoon box

was just being closed.

The statement was put out by the Commonwealth Office st

5.00 p.m. yesterday.

c.c.

Mr. Rodgers P.U.S.

Mr. de la Mare

سمارة

(E. Bolland) 18 May, 1967

19/5

ра

L2/ri

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RECEN [ARCHIV

T TEVENS GI KUU PÊUT

- 151967

FAC

consider it necessing to state the facts

[02]

3.3.0. Pegret that tuo stātament issueu la Faking on May 15th

N.G. abo to disturbances in Hong Kong showid-apparently have boon_based

on inaccurate reports about "thë actusi esnese of avaRÉS,

tave facts are as follows.

The

2. The recent disturbances in Kowloon arose from an industrial dispute in April between workes and their employers about wages and conditions f employment involving 650 workers in two factories producing artificial flowers. The injection moulding sections of both factories were closed and the workers were dismissed. A settlement could not be reached in negotiations between employers and workers. The Labour Department of the Hong Kong Government offered its services in an effort to help the parties to reach agreement, but this ifer was refused by

Fɔth sides,

anake out on the 6th May takde ore ·f these

actories whẩca más situated in Toul son, The police clearly informed those involved of the laws -overning peaceful picketing, warned them repeatedly of the conseruences of disorder and urged them tɔ desist. These rings went unheeded, and the alice

were therefore obliged to act to ten; the prece, tea re ult, 21 persons were arreste...!. Subsequent efforts by the Labour Department to ering the parties together to discuss their difficulties and try to reach an a reed settlement were frustrated by the o toreak of further disorders on May 11th in the vicinity of the same factory. Again after repeated warnings the police were obliged t. take action to keep the peace and 143 persoN S Dere arrested. there were more disorders in the some area between 12th and 14th May and a further 257 persons were arrested,

11 cames of arrest are being treated in the normal way in accordance with the due process of the iner. By 17th Way of those arrested 123 had been charged with riot, 100 with unlawful rssembly, 91 with breaking the curfew and 88 with such offences as assault and afiray, 14 have been released nå thout charges preferred and 12 have been acquitted,

Throughout the disturbances the Hong Kong police, " number of whom were injured in the three days of rioting, have shown great rest aint in carrying out their responsibilities and have used the minimm force.

5. In labour watters the Hong Yong Government's policy is to make available the specialist services of its Labour Department

to tive impartial help to mnagement and trade unions to settle

ony

any dispute that may arise between them.

it has alrendy done

so on this occasion and remains ready to do all it can to facilitate a settlement,

The Hong Kong Government has an inescapable duty to maintain law and order as impartially and fairly as possible for the benefit of all in Hong Kong, B.M.C. fully support the Hong Kong Government in fulfilling its duty both in waintaining law and order and in the efforts it is making to bring about a settlement of the industrial dispute. It is emphasised that the original cause of these disturbances is a comparatively small industrial conflict which it should be possible to settle soon if the menagement and trade unions would sit down together to discuss it in reason and gooderi 11.

Secretary of State

attached

beland

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HONG KONG

RECEIVED IN j ARCHIVES No.31;

- 1 JUN 1967

FO 1/1

Mr. de la Mare.

Action taken here yesterday was as follows:

(a) The Commonwealth Office issued a

statement on the Kowloon disturbances.

The reasons why this statement was issued

here have been sent to you separately.

(b) We began discussions with the

Commonwealth Office on contingency planning.

Our view remains that the Chinese do not wish

to force us out of Hong Kong. They

probably wish to humiliate us to the

maximum extent without provoking us to

leave. It is however possible that they

may have to go beyond even what they intend

because of pressure put upon them by the

militante and their internal need to be

seen to be as "revolutionary" as their

supporters.

小

18/5

In consultation with us, the Commonwealth Office prepared

a message from the Commonwealth Secretary to the Governor which

we proposed Kr. Bowden should send to the Prime Minister and

you in draft. Mr. Bowden, however, decided to delay seeking

the views of the Prime Minister and yourself until he had had

/a further

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-2-

a further exchange of views with the Governor.

He therefore

sent a telegram to the Governor last night, a copy of which

is attached. The Foreign Office were told that Mr. Bowden

had decided to handle matters this way. We were not

5 consulted in the preparation of the telegram as despatched,

but in fact it closely follows the draft prepared by Foreign

Office and Commonwealth Office officials.

Contingency

3. We are in touch with the Ministry of Defence.

arrangements to reinforce the troops in Hong Kong if Ministers

should decide to do so are being made.

Copies to: Mr. Rodgers

P.U.S.

Mr. Bolland

Af. de lathan.

(A.J. de la Mare)

18 May, 1967

Discursed with fols.

19/5

Folio al..

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