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(M). The potang down alat must be the same at that at the highest graded LOCATION contuler can The appropriate upgrading, khọa mauna be độblind when ever necessary)
FOREIGN
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TOP SECRET
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DATE DEPT.
REFER TO
NAME
REFER TO
DATE
DEPT.
-
NAME
425
FB.
PA
PA
म.
RA
220.
270.
וחיחיח וי
--
----
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TALL LAKAI JAU JEU ▬▬
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........MIZ. I. ...
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SKZISTRY
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FILE No.
F213/8
24.9.68
st of the highest gradeć clland when ever. MELESSNEJO
TOP SECRET
DATE
MR. J. MURRAY.
TOP SECRETOREIGN Office RECEIVED Y
in postuantur
ре
pera 4 with its
int of delay into
ARCHIVES No.3:
198
1.1 OCT WE
F41318
ibe Now few With the Compliments of the Lelur sunr
Care Political Adviser
Hong Kong for PA
bee
2.
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TSX 4/68TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
O
248)
Political Adviser
Mr. Jay spoke to me yesterday and asked whether I would care to see him concerning the meeting he had had earlier that day (with LI Cho Chih). I arranged to see him at 3.30. p.n.
2.
Jay was a very different person from what he had been the day before: he was relaxed, confident and in a very good mood. He started off by saying that he was now absolutely
He had had convinced that he had given me the right advice. a message relayed to him from Peking. Apparently Small LEUNG is unwell and his duties have been taken over by a Mr. PANG. PANG had sent a message by telephone via Canton, giving the Prime Minister's personal regards, etc., etc. to Jay and stating that in regard to Jay's recent message, the Prime Minister was in fact quite concerned at the position and would be acting "when the opportunity occura". CHOU En Lai had allegedly issued instructions that LI Cho Chih was to make available to Jay all the papers on the detention of Grey (Jay explained that the communist reporting system was "quite good": when something occurred in London, then copies of the report would be sent not
The Prime only to Peking but to other interested offices). Minister had asked that Jay should give an assessment of the situation and send it to him in Peking.
3.
Jay said that his discussion with LI lasted something over an hour but that the main point LI had to make was that LI had received instructions to the effect that Jay was not to push ahead with his proposal concerning the possibility of a swop for Gray. LI allegedly then went on to explain the reasons for this decision: Peking were concerned that if negotiations were to start on Jay's proposal, they could be highly embarrassed as there were some 15 or so newspaper people in prison at the moment and their employers could well raise serious difficulties as to why a N.C.N.A. employee was being given this special treatment and consideration, and not their employees. In particular, difficulty was seen with the Ta Kung Po: WONG Hing of the T.K.P. had been given a prison sentence of five years it was highly unlikely that the Hong Kong Government would allow out somebody like him before completion of his sentence, and yet FEI Yi Ming of the T.K.P. would certainly want to press the
(Jay With HSUEH Ping due out of prison next month issue. assured me that LI was firmly of the opinion that HSUEH was due out next month and not in November), it was felt that the price would not be good enough: they would much prefer to have no price at all and just release Grey. I asked Jay what was meant by this. Was there an attempt here to "ante up Jay denied this most strongly and said that it was simply a question of their preferring to release Grey "when the time came" rather than attempt to negotiate over somebody who in any event was due out of prison in a few weeks' time: simplifying the matter, he Bald "it is rather like you saying to me that you would like to buy this couch I am sitting on for $2; my reaction would be, 'please take the couch, I don't want your $2'"
..
/contd.
TOP SECRET
4.
TOP SECRET
2
TOP_SECRET
Jay then went on to discuss the possible time factor in Grey's release. He personally thought it would be in the "fairly near future", but suggested that it was unlikely to be later than early 1969: he explained the later date by saying that a new target of lat January had been set for complete de-escalation: he then added: "indeed it could well be when the Governor returns from leave in mid-December",
5.
Jay said that he would like to send his assessment of the situation to CHOU En Lai within the next day or two. The line he was thinking of taking was to say fairly briefly that this was the one important item which is outstanding from last year's difficulties, that the eyes of the Western world and particularly of the press had been focussed on this question of Grey, and undoubtedly their interest could again be easily stirred up; that from conversations with influential friends in Hong Kong (Jay again emphasised that his mission in Hong Kong was to contact Europeans and "senior people") there was a strong feeling that the Chinese action in detaining Grey was barbaric. He asked for advice as to whether anything else might be said on the subject and I took the opportunity of saying that I should like to think the matter over and contact him in the next day or two.
6.
were:-
Other points allegedly made by LI in the discussion
(1) City District Officers System LI said that local communists were most auspicious of the Government's action in introducing the C.D.0. scheme. They were convinced that it was the first step in the introduction of local elections leading to internal self-government. LI said that if this were in fact the Hong Kong Government's intention, then it could not possibly be tolerated by the Chinese Government. Jay claims that he hotly refuted the idea that the introduction of the C.D.0. scheme was a forerunner of internal self-government in Hong Kong. He said to LI that the British would not be so stupid as to run such a risk, that they were very well aware of the situation and needed no guidance how to handle this sort of situation. In spite of this, LI apparently still held some doubts about the Government's intentions and thought that if he were right in his suspicions, one of the first moves of the C.D.O's. would be to have elections to local committees.
(11)
Alleged S.B. Surveillance of Jay. Jay said that LI had again expressed concern about this: he had been thinking the matter over since his previous discussion with Jay and felt that in spite of the assurances Jay had received there was still something in the Peking warning. Apparently he explained himself by saying that it was not necessarily the case that Cater or the Governor, or even the Director Special Branch would know what was happening: it was possible, for example, that the surveillance was being carried out by the Americans or by the Nationalists. Jay rejected the idea of the Americans being responsible "they are so clumsy in these affairs H - but thought it possible, even probable, that the Nationaliste were behind the whole thing. He Baid that the Nationalist agents and the communist agents within Special Branch clearly knew each other although they would pretend not: he thought it highly likely that the Nationalists may from
TOP SECRET
/contd....
SPERS OP SECRET
--
1
J
3
TOP SECRET
within Special Branch have set up surveillance of him without letting their senior officers know the position.
If it had not
(Comment: I find myself a little confused. been for the rather extraordinary meeting on the 24th September, I think I should have been quite pleased with yesterday's discussion with Jay. In spite of his incon- sistencies, it is my opinion that the line of action now apparently being pursued is best for Hong Kong and, I think, Grey. I should appreciate an opportunity to discuss the present position with you in order to clarify my own mind and in particular to discuss what additional comments, if any, I It is possible, might ask Jay to make in his "assessment",
of course, that H.E. may wish to discuss this next move with us also.)
26th September, 1968.
0.0. D.S.B.
H./A.R.G. 3.9.9.
(J. Cater)
TOP SECRET
+
T
L
1
I
Folitical Adviser
TOP SECRET
49
Early this afternoon, K.C. Jay telephoned to say that he was anxious to see me as soon as possible. Because of other commitments, I suggested 4.30 p.m. but Jay asked me to make it before that if possible In the event, I saw him at about 4 p..
2.
He apologised most profusely for asking to see me so urgently but said that arrangements had been made for him to see LI Choh Chi to-morrow (September 25th) morning at 9.30 a.m. at Jay's home. Jay said that he had suggested a rather earlier meeting but that LI had indicated that this was the earliest he could make it.
3.
Jay then began a rather meaningless commentary on a visit he had just received from Hammond, the Solicitor, and Eric Ho Tung concerning the possibility of Ho Tung becoming an exchange broker! Jay had indicated, apparently, that this was unlikely to be agreed. And various other etceteras. In the midst of a discourse on how Lawrence Kadoorie had at one time tried to get Solly Saul accepted as an exchange broker he suddenly reverted to the question of LI's visit. He underlined the fact that it was clearly important as I would be visiting him on his own. This, "as we all know", is most unusual for a Communist and indicated that LI was working on specific instructions from a senior person in Peking. From what LI had said, the meeting was to be about Anthony Grey. Here Jay said to me "perhaps you can have some pictures taken of his ugly mug" and later, on two or three occasions during our long, complicated discussion he made similar comments, afterwards suggesting that he hoped S.B. would be alerted to look out for LI who could, Jay warned, arrive earlier than the agreed time of 9.30 a.m.
(Comment: I was able to be absolutely noncommittal as Jay was in full flood: I was glad of this in case he was sounding me out on the old question of "S.B. surveillance" which he later specifically mentioned).
4.
I expressed surprise that Peking might have reacted so promptly. Jay assured me that Peking could, and did, react very quickly on such matters and said that important messages would usually be sent by courier to Shum Chun, thence to Canton and then by air to Peking. A reply by telephone could thus easily be given in two to three days. I said that, even so, the reaction would have been very quick indeed as we had only met at midday on Saturday I then asked when II had actually asked for the appointment on the 25th. Jay said that I had mentioned it to him yesterday (Monday) but had only given him a firm time this morning (Tuesday), Un reflection Jay agreed that the time-scale seemed very short (!) and said that possibly it was in response to a message which LI might have sent last Wednesday after his discussion with Jay, or even in response to Jay's message to Small LEUNG last Tuesday or Wednesday. I picked him up at this point, and said that it was my understanding, from our discussion of last Saturday, that Jay had not yet sent the communication previously agreed. Momentarily he was thrown, but suggested that perhaps he had inadvertantly misled me in the discussion on Saturday as he had, in fact, sent a communication "in very
J
/contd...
TOP SECRET
T
+
+
of inconsistent paragraph!
TOP SECRET
2
general terms" on Tuesday/Wednesday, but had not mentioned Grey by name and had referred to him (among others) only as the "Reuter correspondent".
I asked whether he had written to
Small LEUNG again as agreed over the weekend: he confirmed that he had, and this time had specifically mentioned Grey.
5.
Jay wanted my advice as to what he should say to LI to-morrow. I suggested that he should say no more than what we had agreed on Saturday, i.e., he had spoken to me about the possibility of an exchange of HSUEH Ping for Grey: that I was not very keen etc., etc., but would consider it. Jay immediately said that he had already appraised II of this. I expressed surprise at this, and said that it was my understanding that Jay would be delaying reporting any of this to LI for some time, at any rate for a few days, thus giving time for Small LEUNG to respond to his message. Jay said "Oh, I happened to speak to LI over the weekend
6.
I
This
Returning to the matter in hand, Jay asked what further information he could now give to LI. I suggested that it would be entirely reasonable for him to say that I still had the matter under consideration and that he, Jay, would be taking me up on this in a few days' time. Jay was moat anxious, however, to say something more specific and wanted to know whether in fact he could say that a "swop" for HSUEH Ping would be approved. said that he should go no further than I had suggested. matter was to be raised many times in almost precisely the same terms during the next hour's conversation. At one time, Jay expressed great concern that possibly I was disappointed in, or annoyed with, him for having made the counter proposal (to contact LEUNG) rather than to pass on my enquiry concerning a possible exchange of HSUEH/Grey. I immediately reassured him that this was not the case: indeed, so impressed was I by his comments and proposal, that I at once agreed with him. He then went into a lengthy discourse on what his position might be in the future via a vis the Hong Kong Government. He knew, for example, that the Governor was going on leave in mid-October and, if I were to be transferred (?) then it would leave him in a very exposed position. He dragged up the old question again of the 5.B. surveillance and, rather forlomly at one stage, commented that the Communists did not know that he was a British Subject and that in any event they would probably not worry about him in the future.
7.
Jay speculated as to what the Peking message might be, and wondered what the position would be if Peking had said that they were not interested in obtaining an exchange for Grey: would this not upset everything, and would it not mean that his proposal and action had merely worsened the situation? I pointed out that this was certainly not the situation: even if Peking were not to show specific interest at the moment, the way would be clear for us to come back in a few days' time and say that we had considered K.C. Jay's proposal and would like it taken up specifically with Peking. It seemed to me that the options would still remain open to us.
a.
He asked for precise instructions as to what he should do at the meeting with LI to-morrow. I said (rather obviously, perhaps) that he should listen to what LI had to say. Then, if
/contd...
TOP SECRET
1
3 - TOP SECRET
LI were to enquire as to what progress had been made on the HSUEH/Grey swop he should say that the matter still remained with Cater and that he would chase Cater up on this in a few days' time. With a little luck, I suggested, he may have had a response from Small LEUNG by then.
(Comment: Jay is, of course, a consummate actor: however, he appeared genuinely to be in a state of nervous tension: for much of the time he was depressed but occasionally showed flashes of his usual arrogance and over-confidence.
His inconsistencies in reporting were obvious and he was clearly embarrassed on more than one occasion, even though I drew attention to them in a kindly manner. It is probably anybody's guess precisely what Jay has said and done in this matter of the йSUEH/Grey awop. In the past we have agreed that it would be prudent to assume that Jay reported back fully his discussions with me. I think that almost certainly he has done so in respect of these discussions on Grey. There is the additional factor of Jay taking the initiative with his "counter-proposal" to write to LEUNG. This may have placed him in a difficult position particularly in regard to me. This, plus perhaps genuine nervousness and forgetfulness on his part, probably led
He is the to the inconsistencies in the discussions to-day type of wheeler and dealer who likes to be in command of a given situation: it seems clear from to-day's performance that, at the moment, he is not.)
24th September, 1968.
16 fi Cater
(J. Cater)
c.c. D.S.B.
H./A.R.G.
B.9.5.
L
+
TOP SECRET
TOP SECHST No. 73% 53
HONG
25 Sqn 68
KONG
COVERNME
+
292
TOP SECRET
Gali
CYPHER/CAT A
PNIORITY HONG KONG
27 SEPTEMBER 1968.
TELEGRA HNUMBER 2031
TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICERECTI
ARI U
8-ver 1968
8/110
F21318
TOP SECRET
ADDRESSED CO TELNO 2031 OF 27TH SEPTEMBER RFI PEKING AND PA
SINGAPORE.
MY TELEGRAM 2030 GREY.
I HAVE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON THESE TWO MEETINGS.-
CAD IT IS BY NO MEANS CLEAR WHAT COMMUNICATIONS CONTACT HAS HAD
WITH PEKING, BUT AN INCLINED TO THINK HE HAS PROBABLY HAD SOME
GUIDANCE THROUGH LI.
(B) IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE MESSAGE INTENDED TO BE CONVEYED
IS THAT THE PRICE DEMANDED BY PEKING FOR GREY IS THE RELEASE
OF ALL 15 NEWS WORKERS,
(C) I AM INCLINED, HOWEVER, TO BELIEVE THAT CONTACT MEANS TO
"ONVEY EXACTLY WHAT HE HAS SAID I.E. THAT WE SHALL GET NOWHERE
BY TRYING TO PROPOSE A BARGAIN, OTHER THAN BY AGREEING TO
UNACCEPTABLE TERMS. THE SUPPORTING ARGUMENT THAT DISCRIMINATION
IN FAVOUR OF THE NONA AND AGAINST THE OTHERS IMPRISONED WOULD
PRODUCE EMBARRASSMENT FOT THE COMMUNISTS IN HONG KONG RINGS TRUE.
(D) EVEN IF ONE DOES NOT ACCE 'T.CC) ABOVE, IT IS DIFFICULT TO
BS! EVE THAT WE COULD MAKE PROGRESS IN PROPOSING A BARGAIN
THROUGH THIS CHANNEL OR ANY OTHER. FURTHERMORE, IN VIEW OF
CONTACT S FIRM ADVICE THAT TO INDICATE WILLINGNESS TO BARGAIN
WOULD RESULT IN DIFFICULTIES AND FURTHER DANGERS IN THE FUTURE,
1 FEAR | MUST NOW ADVISE THAT, FOR THE PRESENT, TO PROCEED WITH
THIS ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE AN EXCHANGE WOULD CONSTITUTE AN UN-
ACCEPTABLE RISK TO HONGKONG CYOUR TELEGRAM 1375 PARAGRAPH 5
REFERS).
TOP SECRET
/(E) ASSUMING CONTACT
TOP SECRET
-2-
(E) ASSUMING CONTACT IS WELL-INFORMED (SEE PARAGRAPH 3 BELOW IT
SEEMS CLEAR ALSO THAT THERE IS NOTHING TO BE GAINED BY A UNILATERAL
RELEASE OF HSUEH. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT GREY WILL COME OUT ONLY
WHEN THE CHINESE ARE READY TO RELEASE HIM AND THAT HSUCH IS NOT
A REAL FACTOR IN THE SITUATION. IF WE NOW RELEASE HSUEH WE MAY
EVEN EMBARRASS THE MODERATE CHINESE WITH THEIR OWN PEOPLE, OR
THEY MAY BECOME IRRITATED AT HAVING THEIR ADVICE IGNORED AND FEEL THAT V.
HERE TRYING TO FORCE THEIR HANDS AFTER THEY HAD EXPLAINED. THEIR
POSITION.
2. I HAVE INSTRUCTED CATER THAT, WHEN HE SEES CONTACT AGAIN TODAY,
HE SHOULD CONFIRM THAT WE HAVE NOTHING TO ADD TO PARAGRAPH 5 OF
·MY TELEGRAM 2030 AND THAT HE SHOULD URGE CONTACT TO EMPHASISE AS
(272) MUCH AS HE CAN THE INTEREST WHICH THE PEKING GOVERNMENT ITSELF
HAS IN RELEASING GREY FAIRLY SOON.
3. AS TO THE WORTH OF THIS CONTACT, HE HAS IN GENERAL PROVED
HIMSELF TO BE RELIABLE IN HIS FORECASTS AND A USEFUL SOURCE OF
COMMENT, BUT HE IS SO DEVIOUS THAT HE IS A VERY DIFFICULT INTER-
MEDIARY TO DEAL WITH. NEVERTHELESS, AS A BROKER BETWEEN US AND THE
CHINESE I BELIEVE HE IS WELL INTENTIONED AND IS PROBABLY AS
USEFUL A MAN AS WE WILL FIND.
FO PLEASE PASS PRIORITY PEKING.
SIX D. TRENCH
REPEATED AS REQUESTED
COPIES SENT TO CABINET OFFICE (FOR SIR B. TREND) AND TO SECRETARY J.1.0._J
FILES
0.0. H.K. DEPARTMENT.
P.A.D.
P.S. TO LORD SHEPHERD
MR. MASON
HR. HOB.
F.O. P.E.D.
SIR D. ALLEN
P.U.5.D.
PRIVATE SECRETARY. DIS. M.O..
XXXXX
TOP SECRET
E
+
TOP SECRET
Fabri
(292)
разбит
TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
*YFRER/CAT A
PRIORITY HONG KONG
EGPA NO. 230
P SECRET
37 SLFTEN BER 1968
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
AVER.SSEC CO TELMO 2020 OF 27TH SEFTE ER FFI FEKINGÍA
Ꭱ-
ØET 1968
газр
SINGAPORE.
.
Y TELECA DOD : G "IY,
..
CONTACT ASHLI PE ACTHER PESTING PITE CATE: 01 247}. SEPTEMBER
TC GC OVER TIL CROUTE AGAIN IN PREFARATION FOR A FRETING PRICH
CONTACT WAS GOING TO HAVE WITH LI CHOCNIH IN THE MORNING OF
THE 25TH. CON ACT FET CATER AGAIN IN THE AFTERNOON OF KE 25TH
AFTER HIS FEETING WITP LI. AT THIS LATER MEETING, CONTACT SFOPE
TO CATER CP THE FOLLOWING LITES.
.. KE SAH TEAT HE WAS ADOLUTELY CONVIFCEL THAT HE FAC GIVEN
CATER THE RIGHT ADVICE CKY TELEGRA" 2001) CONTACT HAD HAD A
HISSAGE FROM FERI!G CC ́ VEYING CHOU EX LAT'S FERSCHAL REGARDS
AFE STAT NG THAT HE WAS CONCERNED AT THE POSITION OVER GREY AND
WOULD BE ACTING "WHEN THE OPPORTUNITY cccles'', WHICH I TAFE
OCCUPS'',
TO JEAN MEN CITU ET LAI'S FOSITION IN FEKING IS STROIGEE. CHOU
יי
H
PAD ASHAL CONTACT TO SENT TO FI: M ASSESSIEIT OF THE SITUATION
CONCEMENT GREY.
+
281
3. ACCOELING TO SCYTACT, 11 HAD FECT NOU IFSTRUCTIONS THAT CONTACT
SPOL. 107 FUSH AREAS FITF DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE FOSSIFILITY OF AN
*EXCHANGE FOR OPEY. LI SAID THE REASON WAS THAT PEKING WOULD FIN
SIP LEGOTIATIONS LITHLY ENVT"/SONY, THEY PITI PAVE TO ASK FOR
THE PALACE OF MEL JEWS JUST ESTER WO FACTATLY AT LEAST TEL 15
JETSKOTILENT TEAY GOLET EXTLY, FOR EXAMPLE, JUSTIFY TO TELJA
SUPROTEAS DE 10% 10
A FIN THE AGENTILATION IN
"FAVCUP OF THE TVR NOLA ESHRE DE 1801 'FILST LEAVIT, CUT
TIA CIFÈR JOURNALS AND COTPRONTATION FRISCHERS. ON THE OTHER
HAND THE BARGAIN OF CREY FOR TE RELEASE ONLY OF HSUE!, 10 IS
['S OUT VERY COAT, MAD RAFELY ENCUCI, FEFING VOULD PREFER TO HAVE
ד
י
-
•
I
TOP CICRET
/NO PRICE
-
TOP SECRET
2 -
KC FFICE AT ALL AND SIMPLY RELEASE GREY IN THEIR OWN GOOD TIME.
CATER PRESSED CONTACT IN ORDER TO FIND CUT WHETHER THESE REMARKS
ATTRIBUTED TO LI FEANT THAT FEIINC DAS TRYING TO RAISE THE STAI
EUT CONTACT DENIED STRONGLY ANY SUCH TACTICS BY FERING AND INSISTED
THAT TELY FILFEFGED TO RELEASE GREY WHEN THE TIPE CAME.
4.
CATER TEEN FFESSED CONTACT TO EXPLAIN WHEN THAT WOULD BE.
CONTACT EXPRESSED A FEFSONAL VIEW THAT IT VOLLE EE IN THE FAIRLY
ILAR FUTURE AND IN ANY CASE BY THE END OF THE YEAR, SINCE PE
SAIL THAT THE 1ST JANUARY PVTD ELEN SET AS THE TARGET CATE FOR
COMPLETE DE-ESCALATION IF FELATICIS ETHEEP CHINA AND EPITAIN.
5.
CONTACT SAID THAT WHEN HE PREFAPLD HIS ASSESSMENT FOR CHOU EN LAI HE PROPOSE: TO SAY THAT THE GREY CASE WAS THE ONE INFOPTANT ITEM OUTSTANDING FROM LAST YEAR'S DIFFICULTIES, THAT THE WEST=RM PORLL ANT FARTICULAFLY THE FEESS HAS FOCUSELL ON THIS FUESTION, ALL THAT THEIR INTEREST COULD EASILY INCREASE. HE WOULD EXFHASISE THAT THEFE LAS A STI CIG FEELING THAT CHINESE EEHAVIOUD OVER GREY KAS FARBARIC. HE ASKED CATER FOR ADVICE WHETHER HE SHOULD SAY ANYTHING ELSE. CATLE FROHISED TO SEE KIT AGAIN IN A DAY CE TVC.
FULL RECCPL OF DISCUSSIO*** 6. SEE ALSO NY TELUGTAN RUIKER 2121.
FOLLON BY
.
*.0. PLEASE PASS :RIORITY PEKING
SIR D. TRENCH
FILES
C.O. H.K.D.
P.A.D.
293
[RIPEATED AS REQUESTED]
[COPIES SENT TO SIR B. TREND, CABIMET OFFICE AND TO
SECRETARY J.I.C.]
P.S. TO LORD IPHERD
LR. LASCH
12. 203
P.O. P.T.D.
SIR D. ALLEN
P.U.S.D.
FRIVATE S.CRETARY DIG 1.0.D.
·
TOF SECRET
ד
+
212
أيا
1992). 102641. 1,200 pada. 15
291958. 1,800 jada.
Coda-or-Code R~
ADVANCE COPY
RS. GAM/147, P. & S. OK,999 | LAT,
Eneû
INWARD TELEGRAM
Cypher OTP CAT- A.
Laking
FROM IS
[Signature]
No.& 11
[Date]
It keptom but it18 [Priority)RITY
Topkicnet.
T
[Distribution
Heading]
29
DSY 16
jupassio
TO Linguis
D. 0415 2 0
hrs
24.415
#611 2hrs 21968.
ADVANCE COPY
sent is And Hong Kong hot
D
to
And for
Celem de Foray & Office telegram number 891 36 September repeated for information sto Haus Kerly.
How Ping dels
Dec 4, and 208: GREY.
Fourt
(273
DISTRIBUTION
CANCE
I. TO:-
+
de
to be getting trainer
on these lye keer gubi riginal meeting
with "ENTER contact has still not bent bitter de l'heniseal thou h
+
11 heptahir Ke
promised a reply within a muck or ad mest 10 d'oup. If he new dies as he Anys, the week write to to home sc
• Houthout fupporting that the matol be day dounterparty
+
+
пра
s
•
+
2. Howeve
i we must astırmer
that a secch
ou
A Lanes
messerye
well de
I
sent nice by Lil to seems to have hern antisccted in eclea of kome kinti of £fchange. His will rimost certainly life!
Suggestion
counterpart.
"SUE!" as "cz
mussaight
t
possible
3. Jele mot Inow what Whencze Devernment will theik of all that, but they will a stainly
eeter what they
get the
Zar
ibtown something for Grey Meancinit
time runs on; it is 4 weeks
since idea of scicates was Laum-bad
in its latest form
ferm in
number 1:15.
your dinjas
4. dis can at altogether nute out the porribility of a quick and ipful reply of rom i hans. But the clanget is pewing there are shall, werenying
7. de
we Souths
conceping
our siadinis f
ツ
der Grey
moment when I suck" is
Acer inst of his pentence
расс
L
I
.3.
that his release will have West almost all value as a oneersion. Apekanges with
se vect
freather
my use up short time remaining
may
If facia by actual release of Hauch new thiness well let bacy out. But the present approach arch
delay it involves.
and
W
mean that when Chineas
finally make
munis on an
up
their
on an epelange.
Aruch mice have me puta. they will with for mure; and Gicy's detention well this
Llic
pirotinud.
Britan
to the damage [sp under
done. La crewd of
Sitication
vetering I bricomumenal ave to soush Conrides releasing beach with of we re sitive Erisponde
Houch Mercloveth
н жас
m thinice
ice lu
Stelm
+
سوم
1
+
:
1. K
This would of course be an act faith but it would greatl
Denise imbarrassment
C
way, to which both, contact
tiremature velase
and fripy
at too mucks would sortly be a motor bending
principic
n our suite, Comme
las Laure almadly intimated to
bedinice).
A
Sst would
in the claer hand offer them
a small d'ad having consistin
****
need on parle d
may need co
they may
rifs release.
6. The balternaturs 15Hi
ivant areal ero
bárd char.co
of
maher, a cougestion over tisuc!! nut him ftime as UMC TELE do dichone se we ask be regain.
intimate
+
52 pass routine Hong Konj.
L
-
I
FILR/CAT A
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RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
281
TURITY HONG KONG TO COLAKOME:LTH OFFICE
26 SEP 1968
.U. 2001
20
SEPTEMBER 1968
FZ1318
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DRESSED COMMONWEALTH OFFICE AS MY TELEGRAM NO. 2001 DATED 20TH
SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO PEKING.
Jum
20/3
MY TELEGRAM NO. 2000 : GREY.
230
FOLLOWING IS EXTRACT FROM CATER'S REPORT:-
LLO
AT THIS STAGE I SAID THAT WE VERE DELIGHTED THAT VISAS HAD NOW
BEEN ISSUED TO ALL THE OLD PEKING MISSION STAFF, AS INDEED CONTACT HAD PROMISED THAT THEY WOULD BE. CONTACT WAS CLEARLY TICKLED BY THIS
AND RAMBLED ON AT SOME LENGTH TO THE EFFECT THAT IT WAS A GOOD THING
THAT ALL QUOTE THE OLD PROBLEMS UNQUOTE HAD NOW BEEN SETTLED. THIS
GAVE ME AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY TO SAY THAT THIS WAS TRUE EXCEPT,
OF COURSE, FOR THE OUTSTANDING CASE OF ANTHONY GREY, THE REUTERS
CORRESPONDENT. I THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT I HAD SEEN THINKING THE
MATTER OVER RECENTLY: WE WERE AWARE THAT GREY HAD NOT BEEN WELL IN
RECENT WEEKS AND IN SPITE OF CONSIDERABLE PRESSURES HAD DONE OUR
BEST TO CURS PUBLICITY ON THIS RATHER EMOTIONAL MATTER. ALTHOUGH
CLEARLY DIFFICULTIES WERE INVOLVED, I WONDERED WHETHER IT WOULD BE
POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN GREY'S RELEASE JF, SAY, WE WERE TO CONSIDER RELEASING HSUEH PING. CONTACT REACTED VERY STRONGLY TO THIS AND
INTERRUPTED SAYING THAT THIS WOULD BE A VERY SILLY THING TO DO.
TRIED TO CONTINUE MY EXPLANATION BUT AGAINST THE GREATEST OF OPPO-
SITION: CONTACT CONTINUALLY GUTTED IN, SAYING FINALLY THIS WOULD BE
QUITE STUPID OF US TO THINK IN THESE TERMS. ON ASKING HIS REASONS, HE SAID WITHOUT HESITATION THAT IT WOULD BE AN OPEN INVITATION TO
GRAB BRITISH PEOPLE IN CHINA AND TO HOLD THEN AS HOSTAGES IN ORDER
TO FORCE OUR HAND ON OTHER MATTERS: THAT TO SHOW INTEREST OF THIS
SORT WOULD CLEARLY LEAD TO DEMANDS FOR A GREAT DEAL MORE THAN THE
RELEASE OF HSUEH. IN ANY EVENT, CONTACT SAID, HSUEH WAS NOT THE
PRICE PEKING WANTED FOR GREY. WHEN THE OPPORTUNITY AROSE I SAID THAT
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WE HAD
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VEN
VE HAD GAINED THE IMPRESSION IN PEKING THAT GREY HAD BEEN PLAT
UNDER HOUSE DETENTION AS A REPRISAL FOR THE ARREST AND IMPRISONMENT
OF HSUEH AND THAT ACCORDINGLY GREY WOULD NOT BE RELEASED UNTIL
THE SORT PING WAS RELEASED. CONTACT REPLIED THAT THIS COULD WELL BE
OF ANSWER THAT PEKING MIGHT GIVE IN RESPONSE TO AN ENQUIRY FROM THE
CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, BUT WHAT ELSE, HE ASKED, COULD THEY HAVE SAID? - THEY HAD TO HAVE SOME LOGICAL REASON FOR DETAINING GREY. IT WAS CONTACT'S UNDERSTANDING THAT PEKING IN FACT WERE HIGHLY EMBARRASSED BY GREY'S SITUATION, AND HE BELIEVED THAT IT WAS ONLY A MATTER OF
TIME, AND NOT A GREAT DEAL OF TIME. BEFORE THE CHINESE WOULD RELEASE HIN. HAVING SAID THIS, HE REMINDED ME THAT PREVIOUSLY I HAD SAID THAT AS THE JUDICIARY AND THE ADKINISTRATION WERE QUITE SEPARATE IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO ARRANGE THE RELEASE OF A CONVICTED PRISONER. I SAID THAT, WHILST CLEARLY THERE WOULD DE DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED, WAS CONFIDENT THAT I COULD PERSUADE THE GOVERNOR TO RELEASE HSUEH
HSL PING IN THESE RATHER SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND ESPECIALLY AS HSH PING HAD ALREADY SERVED OVER A YEAR OF HIS SENTENCE. AFTER FURTHER LENGTHY DISCUSSION ON THESE LINES, CONTACT SAID THAT HE THOUGHT IT QUITE, DISASTROUS FOR US TO MAKE AN OFFER OF THIS TYPE. HE THOUGHT THAT IF ANYTHING WERE TO BE DONE AT ALL ON THIS, THERE SHOULD BE NO MENTION OF NY MAKING AN ENQUIRY BUT THAT HE SHOULD WRITE TO CHOU EN LAI'S SECRETARY STATING SIMPLY THAT, NOW THAT RELATIONS WERE SO KUCH BETTER BETWEEN BRITAIN AND CHINA, IT SEEMED A PITY THAT THERE REHAINED THE ONE OUTSTANDING PROBLEM OF ANTHONY GREY: HE WOULD ASK WHAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES WERE CONCERNING THIS AND WHETHER ANYTHING COULD BE DONE. I COMMENTED THAT THIS WAS CERTAINLY ONE METHOD OF APPROACH BUT WOULD IT NOT TAKE A RATHER LONG TIME TO OBTAIN A DEFINITIVE ANSWER. HE IMMEDIATELY SAID NO, THAT IT WOULD NOT TAKE LONG, NO MORE THAN A WEEK OR PERHAPS 10 DAYS. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND IN THE FACE OF HIS VERY STRONG REACTION, I ACCORDINGLY AGREED THAT HE SHOULD PROCEED AS PROPOSED. HE THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT AT THE SAME TIME HE WOULD TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY OF MENTIONING JOHNSTON SO THAT IT WOULD NOT APPEAR THAT THERE WAS OVER-ANXIETY IN REGARD TO GREY. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, I OF COURSE MADE NO MENTION OF LO.**
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[
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HONG KONG TILEGRAL NO. 2001 TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
-3-
R. CATER COLENTS IN HIS REPORT THAT HE IS ONLY TOOWELL AWARE HE DID NOT CARRY THROUGH YOUR INTENTIONS BUT HE CONSIDERED THAT BY ACCEPTING CONTACTS PROPOSALS THERE SHOULD BE NO GREAT LOSS OF TILE AND THERE LIGHT BE SUBSTANTIAL ADVANTAGE.
F.O. PLEASE PASS PRIORITY PEKING.
SIR D. TRENCH
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
FILES
C.O. H.K.D. P.A.D.
P.S. (C.0.)
LORD SHEPHERD MR. MASON
MR. ROB
F.O. P.S. (F.0.)
SIR D. ALLEN
MR. BUTLER (P.U.S.D.) F.E.D.
P.U.S.D.
DIS 1.0.D.
SIR B. TREND (CABINET OFFICE) SECRETARY (J.I.C.)
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CYFTER/CAT A
PAJORITY HONG KONG
TELEGRAM NUNDER 2000
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RECEIVED IN [ARCHIVES No.31
26 SEP 1968
F4318
280
9.
. TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
20 SEPTEMBER 1968
заранта
ka 27/4
28
ADDRESSED CO TELEGRAM NO. 2000 OF 20TH SEPTEMBER REPEATED PEKING,
AND PA SINGAPORE.
HY TELEGRAM NO. 1068 : GREY.
NY TELEGRAM NO. 2001 CONTAINS A VERBATIN EXTRACT FROM CATER'S
IMPORT (UITH MIKOR OMISSIONS FOR BREVITY) OF THAT PART OF THE MEETING
17 SEPTEMBER WHICH CONCERNS GREY.
2. MY INSTRUCTIONS TO CATER VERE THAT WE SHOULD BEGIN BY MENTIONING
KOUCH ALONE BUT THAT TOWARDS THE END OF THE CONVERSATION HE SHOULD
HENTION THE POSSIDILITY OF RELEASING LO AS WELL. AS YOU WILL SEE,
THE DISCUSSION TOOK A TURN WHICH MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR CATER TO
FOLLOW HIS INSTRUCTIONS, AND HE SEEHS TO HAVE HAD LITTLE OPTION BUT
TO ACCEPT CONTACT'S COUNTER PROPOSAL. THE OCCASION TO MENTION LO
NEVER AROSE.
-
+
3. I HAVE ASKED CATER IN CLARIFICATION WHETHER, FROM WHAT CONTACT SA12, CONTACT UCULD HAVE OBJECTED EQUALLY TO A PROPOSAL TO RELEASE NGƯCH WITHOUT NEGOTIATION IN THE HOPE CF A RESPONSE OVER GREY.
CATER'S VIEW IS THAT CONTACT WOULD HAVE EQUALLY STRONGLY ADVISED
AGAINST THIS COURSE. CONTACT'S VIEW WAS THAT 'HSUCH IS NOT THE PRICE FOR GREY' MEANING THAT THE CHINESE HAD NO PARTICULAR CUID
PRO QUO IN MIND FOR GREY AND WOULD RELEASE HIM IN THEIR OWN GOOD
TIME SCHIDOLON PERHAPS QUITE SCON IN VIEW OF THEIR EMBARRASSHENT
OVER HIX,
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/4. AS THE
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4. AS THE CONTACT HAS BEEN WELL INFORMED OVER OTHER MATTERS SUCH 7.5 EXIT VISAS FOR THE MISSION AND CHUNG WAH SCHOOL, IT IS POSSIBLE HE WILL TURN OUT TO BE RIGHT ABOUT GREY TOO. I THINK THEREFORE
VE OUGHT TO WAIT TEN DAYS OR POSSIBLY TVO VEEKS 1.E. UNTIL AFTER 1ST OCTUBER, TO SEE WHETHER THERE IS ANY REPLY. CATER WILL IN ANY CASE HAVE A CHANCE TO ENQUIRE ON A SOCIAL OCCASION ON 25TH SEPTEMBER.
5. COPIES OF CATER'S REPORT FOLLOW BY BAG.
FO PLEASE PASS PRIORITY PEKING,
8IK D. TRENCH
FILES
C.O.
H.K.D.
P.A.D.
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
F.0.
PRIVATE SECRETARY
LORD SHEPHARD
MR.MASON
HR. ROB
PRIVATE SECRETARY
SIR D. ALLEN
K. BUTLER P.U.S.D.
F.E.D.
P.U.S.D.
DIS MOD
SIR B. TREND CABINET OFFICE DECKETARY J.1.C.
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Spare copy retained in Dept.
NB
I Spare Copy
CHEER/CAT A
די
Flagay.
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PRIORITY HONG KONG TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELNO. 2008
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23 SEFTE! BER 1968
¡RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
25 SEP 1968
F= 1318 Jum 2524
ADDRESSED CO TELEGRAM NO. 2008 OF 23RD SEPTEMBER. REPEATED
PA SINGAPORE AND PEKING.
273
MY TELEGRAM NO, 2007 CONTAINS A REPORT ON CATER'S MEETING WITH CONTACT ON 21 SEPTEMBER,
2. 1 HAVE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS TO NAKE:
(A) IT IS UNSATISFACTORY THAT CONTACT EXCERCISES HIS OWN JUDGEMENT ABOUT THE NATURE AND TIMING OF THE MESSAGE HE WILL PASS. WE CANNOT BE SURE THAT HE WILL NOW PASS TO PEKING THE MESSAGE WITCH HE SAID ON 17 SEPTEMBER HE WOULD PASS, BUT I THINK VE MUST WAIT AND SEE. (3) IT IS INTERESTING THAT, ACCORDING TO CONTACT AT LEAST, LI CHOH CHI HAS FORMED THE SAME JUDGEMENT AS CONTACT ABOUT GREY'S RELEASE AND THE POSSIBILITY OF DOING A DEAL.
FO PLEASE PASS PRIORITY PEKING.
SIR D. TRENCH
F.0.
FILES
H.K.D.
P.A.D.
{REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
P.S. TO LORD SHEPHERD
KR. KASON
MR. ROB
F.E.D.
SIR D. ALLEN
R. BUTLER P.U.S.D.
P.S.
DIS M.O.D.
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+
!
CYPHER CAT A
PRICCITY HONA KONG
SODA HUMMER 2007
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TO
273
CTA, OFFICE
RECEIVED IN 23' AROMIZES ER.3152
1
Spare Copy retained in dept F Ragy
25 SEP 1968
F413/8
к
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ADDRESSED CO TELEGRAM NO. 2007 OF 23RD SEPTENDER REPEATED PEKING
FÅ SINGAPORE.
240
Jana 2525
MY TELEGRAM NO. 2000 ↑ GREY,
CONTACT ASKED CATER FOR ANOTHER HEETING WHICH TOOK PLACE ON 21
SEPTEMBER. THAT PART OF THE HEETING WHICH CONCERNED
GREY MAY BE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS.
KONG
2. CONTACT APOLOGISED FOR NOT YET HAVING COMMUNICATED WITH CHOU
EN LAI'S SECRETARY AS PROMISED ON 17 SEPTEMBER, THE REASON WAS THAT
HE HAD REEN HAVING SEVERAL LENGTHY 'CONVERSATIONS WITH LI CHOH CHỈ OF THE PANK OF CHINA ON OTHER MATTERS AND HAD TAKEN THE OPPORTUNITY
TO MENTION GREY TO LI. IT HAD REEN EASY TO RAISE THE SUNNJECT
MECAUSE LI HAD COMMENTED THAT (ELATIONS WITH BRITAIN AND HO SEEMED TO BE IMPROVING ALONG THE LINES DESIRED BY PEKING. CONTACT
THEN MENTIONED GREY AS AN OBVIOUS EXCEPTION. CONTACT HAD WONDERED UHETHER PEKING INTENDED TAKING ANY ACTION ABOUT GREY. LI REPLIED THAT IN HIS OPINION GREY WOULD PROBABLY RE RELEASED IN THE NEAR FUTURE SINCE IT WAS CLEAR HE WAS SOMETHING OF AN EMBARRASSMENT TO PEKING,
CONTACT THEN ASKED WHETHER PEKING HAD EVER THOUGHT OF ASKING FOR
SOMETHING IN EXCHANGE AND IN REPLY TO A QUESTION FROM LI SUGGESTED
THAT PERHAPS HSLER PING WAS THE ORVIOUS COUNTERPART. LI THEN SAID HE
THOUGHT IT HIGHLY UNLIKELY PEKING WOULD BE INTERESTED IN SUCH AN
EXCHANGE BECAUSE HSUEH WAS OF NO VALUE AND WAS A VERY LOW GRADE
EMPLOYEE.
I
3. AT LATER POINT IN THE CONVERSATION, LI SAID THAT HE HAD ALWAYS
UNDERSTOOD THAT IN ANY CASE IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE
PRITISH TO RELEASE A CONVICTED PRISONER, BUT ON REFLECTION THOUGHT IT
MIGHT BE WORTHWHILE SOUNDING OUT CATER ON THE POSSIBILITY OF AN
EARLY RELEASE. CONTACT AGREED TO SPEAK TO CATER ON THOSE LINES. /4. WHE
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4. WHEN CONTACT EXPLAINED THIS TO CATER, CATER SAID THAT MY
PREROGATIVE COULD RE USED ONLY IN VERY SPECIAL CIRCU'ISTANCÈS
J
SUCH AS RELEASE IF NEW EVIDENCE CAME TO LIGHT OR IF THE CONVICT MAN VAS SERJOUSLY ILL, BUT THAT AS HSUCH PING HAD ONLY ANOTHER FEW WEEKS TO GO THE PRECEDENT MIGHT NOT BE TOO AUKVARD. AFTER FURTHE? DISCUSSION, CONTACT SAID THAT HE WOULD NOW VRITE AT ONCE TO CHOU EN LAI'S SECRETARY, WHO HE SAID WAS KNOWN AS ''SHALL LEUNG", ALONG THE LINES AGREED ON 17 SEPTEMBER, 1.E. ENQUIRING WHAT WAS THE POSITION ON THIS MAIN CUTSTANDING PROBLEM FROM LAST YEAR, WITHOUT SUGGESTING THAT THERE VOULD BE ANY COUNTERPART. CATER ALSO TOLD HÌM THẤT · IF LI PRESSED HIM FOR AN ANSWER ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EXCHANGE, CONTACT SHOULD SAY THAT HE HAD TAKEN UP THE MATTER WITH CATER BUT THAT CATER HAD NOT BEEM VERY KEEN ON THE FROPOSAL AND HAD SUGGESTED THAT THERE WERE CONSIDERASLE DIFFICULTIES IN DOING A DEAL ON THOSE LINES, ALTHOUGH IT MIGHT JUST BE POSSIBLE TO USE THE PREROGATIVE SINCE HSUCH PING'S TERM HAD NOT LOIK TO GO. HE COULD ALSO SAY TO LI THAT CATER WOULD BE THINKING THE MATTER OVER AND WOULD SPEAK TO CONTACT ABOUT IT LATER.
FO PLEASE PASS PRIORITY PEKING.
i
SIR D.TRENCH
FILES H.K.D.
P.A.D.
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
[COFIES SENT TO SIR B. TREND, CABINET OFFICE AND SECRETARY
F.O. F.E.D.·
SIR D.ALLEN
P.S. TO LORD SHEPHERD MR. BUTLER P.U.S.D.
MR. MASON
MR. ROB
P.S.
DIS MOD
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J.I.C.]
Cypher/Cat A
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LORITY
PEKING TO
FOREIGN OFFICE
Telno 883
24 September 1968
SECRET
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
24 SEP 1968
271
51318
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 883 of 24 September. Repeated for information to Hong Kong and POLAD Singapore.
Telegrams Nos. 2000 and 2001: [from Hong Kong to
Commonwealth office].
Grey.
240
28/
на
24/4
I am rather concerned at the decisive role which contact seems to have played at this meeting. Instead of acting as a channel of communication for our specific proposal he has apparently, on the basis of his personal views, made a generalised approach himself to the Chinese, There is a danger that his letter, if phrased as vaguely as telegram No. 2001 suggests ("whether anything could be done" etc.) may be interpreted by the Chinese as an invitation to ask for the moon. I understood it was our intention to avoid such open-ended offers. Indeed such a course is difficult to reconcile with the advice contact himself [? gp omitted ? gave] when he said "to show interest of this sort would clearly lead to demands for a great deal more than release of Haeub". Should we not seek to obtain text of contact's letter to the Chinese?
2.
Both Cater and contact seen misinformed about the circumstances or Grey's arrest. N.G.N.A. item 072108 issued on day of his arrest 21 July 1967 made it clear that Grey's detention was in retaliation against imprisonment of N.C.N.A. and other Communist Journalists. This was not therefore merely an"impression gained in Peking".
Foreign Office pass Priority to Hong Kong and POLAD
Singapore.
Mr. Cradock
FILES
F.0.
[Repeated as requested]
F.E.D.
Private Secretary
kr. Butler, P.U.S.D.
P.U.S.D.
0.0.
H.K.D.
F.A.D.
Private Secretary
Lord Shepherd
Mr. Mason
Mr. Rob
DIS MOD
Sir B. Trend, Cabinet Office
The Secretary, J.I.C.
EEKNE
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