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YEAR STAMP
1973
-
- H
Mr. Wilford
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Cappy. No 4 of
6
ד'
Chinese Representative in Hong Kong
The Secretary of State has seen your minute of
yesterday and has commented:-
2.
"Yes, I will accept your alternative draft. The commonsense thing would seem to be to have a representative sooner rather than later, but the Chinese Government is a Communist government and one must not give up any card too soon.
(+
I am despatching the letter to Lord Bridges.
Copied to:
PS/Mr. Royle
Mr. Youde Mr. Stuart
Mr. Evans
1
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(P.H. Grattan)
16 November, 1973
A
546
Mr. Wilford
Chinese Representative in Hong Kong
The Secretary of State has seen your minute of yesterday and has commented:-
2.
"Yes, I will accept your alternative draft. The commonsense thing would seem to be to have a representative sooner rather than later, but the Chinese Government is a Communist government and one must not give up any card too soon.
I am despatching the letter to Lord Bridges.
Copied to:
PS/Mr. Royle
Mr. Youde Mr. Stuart
Mr. Evans
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(P.H. Grattan)
16 November, 1973
The Secretary of States
minutes recorded on a
Keinutt
by
π Gattan
on the substantive fill.
..../i
SECRETARY OF STATE
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Fatty 3/2.1,
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altemalive the lemon-flate
It wentar see I be to have a refereventative scom then farter but the Chinese
Comment Chinese Representative in Hong Kong Government & ma
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Cance
I recall that when you discussed this issue on leaving
Peking last November at the meeting with the Governor and
unofficials in Hong Kong you took the line that sooner rather
than later you felt that we might be wise to accept a Chinese
representative in Hong Kong. In preparation for Chi Peng-fei's
visit here we went over all the ground with you again and I
thought that you had accepted the argument contained in your
own DOP paper, which has the endorsement of your colleagues,
that it would be unwise to contemplate discussion of the future
of Hong Kong with the Chinese Government in the foreseeable
future. [The paper is one which is due to be brought up for
reconsideration by DOP on 1 December an annual event]. The
-
paper equally makes clear if my recollection is correct
-
and
that if it
I cannot get a copy of the paper at this moment
becomes clear that the Chinese will not contemplate an extension
of the lease and therefore that Hong Kong is somehow going to
revert to Chinese sovereignty we should seek a favourable
moment at which to negotiate about it. Equally in discussions
which I have had with Sir M. MacLehose about this he has said
that the appointment of a Chinese representative might well be
one of the steps envisaged in a negotiation, but only once it
/has
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X
has become apparent that cession was inevitable.
2.
Because we would not now advise you that the moment had
come to embark upon a negotiation in the terms of the DOP paper
we would much prefer that you should not go on record in the
memorandum to be attached to your Private Secretary's letter
minute.
to the PS at No. 10 in the terms set out in your own manuscript
Still less do I think that it would be appropriate for
such a far reaching change of policy to be included simply in
the Private Secretary's letter. When the matter is discussed
with the Prime Minister you would no doubt have the opportunity
to develop your thought if after further study of the DOP paper
you still hold to your view.
3.
I would greatly hope therefore that you would not insist
on this, with respect, heretical thought being included in the
memorandum going to No. 10. If however you would like some
mention of the possibility would you consider the addition of
a new penultimate paragraph to the memorandum as follows:-
"Nevertheless it is accepted that a time may come when,
if there is to be a change in the status of Hong Kong,
there will have to be some agreement with the Chinese
which could involve the appointment of a Chinese
representative to live in Hong Kong. But the time for
this is not now, since it would lead to a loss of
confidence which the Governor attaches the highest
importance to avoiding".
K.M. Wilford
J
15 November, 1973
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I
Copy No
о
A
Mi Davis?
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Enver and x.
Pope: redroxied before submission to Si Evic Nomis.
OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
Background
1.
RE.
29/1
During the Secretary of State's visit to Peking both the
Chinese Foreign Minister and the Chinese Prime Minister asked
him to reconsider his refusal of the Chinese proposal to
establish an official representative in Hong Kong. The
Secretary of State told Chou En-lai on 1 November that he would
like to think about the matter and would get in touch with
Chi Peng-fei in due course. On 29 December, the Permanent Under-
Secretary told the Chinese Ambassador that the Secretary of State
was giving the matter his personal consideration but that, because
of the problems which the proposal raised for us, consideration
would have to be long and careful. The Chinese Foreign Minister
is to visit London from 22 to 25 February. He is certain to wish
to bring up the matter.
The views of HM Ambassador Peking and the Governor of Hong Kong
2. Sir John Addis's views are set out in detail in his despatch
of 18 December. They can be summarised as followB. Undue delay
in replying to, or outright refusal of the Chinese proposal carry
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/the
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the risk both of adversely affecting the good relations we currently
enjoy with China and of forgoing improved Sino-British co-
operation over matters affecting Hong Kong in a period of
evolution leading up to 1997. Sir John Addis therefore
recommends:
(1) that there should be no further delay in replying
to the Chinese; and
ly should not
re-negativej
B
3.
(ii) (i) that we should explore the ground further and discuss
with the Chinese the appointment (with functions defined to
our satisfaction) of a Chinese Government representative in
Hong Kong as part of a wider normalisation of relations
between Hong Kong and China, making our agreement contingent
upon satisfactory agreements on other matters affecting
Hong Kong (and ensuring that any agreement can be presented
in a way which will not shake public confidence in the
Colony).
The Governor of Hong Kong takes a different view. It is
set out in detail in his despatch of 11 January and can be
summarised as follows. The risks inherent in any concession to
the Chinese continue to be greater than any threat yet made by
the Chinese. Refusal of the Chinese proposal would be reversible;
acceptance would not. Public confidence would be bound to be
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/affected
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-3-
affected. We should therefore maintain our courteous refusal.
If, and only if, it becomes clear that this position is untenable
in the light of Chinese reactions should we attempt to negotiate
the best terms we can on the lines suggested by Sir John Addis.
In the meantime our approach should not be entirely negative.
The Governor proposes that he should slowly advance the degree
of official contact with the present "semi-official" Chinese
representative, Leung Wai-lam, the Head of the NCNA office in the
Colony. Eventually this would bring us near the Chinese position
except that the representative's position would be unacknowledged
and thus could be dropped at any time. In other words our tactics
should be to give a practical and positive response on our own
terms while formally maintaining our refusal to the Chinese
request as framed in their terms, The Governor would ensure
that this trend was "fully discernible" to the Chinese before
Chi P'eng-fei's visit to London, The release of the remaining
four confrontation prisoners by May would help to sugar the pill
for the Chinese.
4. It is worth remarking that what the Governor now proposes,
and has indeed acted upon to some extent already, represents a
/considerable
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-4-
considerable movement in his position from the rather rigid
opposition which he expressed when the Chinese first brought
up this issue with us again in 1971-2.
THE OPTIONS
5. There are six possible courses open to us:
(a) to tell the Chinese that we have given further
consideration to their proposal, but to make it clear
that the time is not ripe to agree to it; [such a
refusal could nevertheless be accompanied by the making
of certain practical concessions towards the CPG's
position in Hong Kong, eg increased contact between the
Governor and Leung Wai-lam, in a way which would not fail
to escape Chinese notice;]
(b) to tell the Chinese that we could only consider their
proposal if their representative were specifically appointed
(and publicly designated) as Consul-General;
(c) to reject the Chinese proposal;
(a) to tell the Chinese that we are still unable to give
an answer, ie to play for more time;
(e) to tell the Chinese that we wish, through discussions,
to explore their proposal further;
(f) to agree outright.
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/6.
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-5-
6. The following paragraphs examine these options in greater
detail.
(a) to tell the Chinese that we have given further consideration
to their proposal, and that the time is not ripe; but at the same
time to make some positive practical, if minor, concessions in
Hong Kong.
This is the course favoured by Sir Murray MacLehose. It amounts
to rejection of the Chinese proposal but recognition that the
situation may change in the future. The arguments for this course
are well set out in the Governor's despatch. They are, however,
based on the assumption that the Chinese will not at this moment
insist to the point of rupture. The Governor also proposes for
the future that we should not give way until we have to. This
could lose the potential advantages of agreeing while the atmos- phere is favourable, including the possibility that the Chinese might now be willing explicitly to limit the Representative's
functions, so as to minimise the harmful effects of his appoint-
ment. In any event the Chinese would almost certainly continue
to press us to reconsider.
sugar the pill by building up the position of the present No 1
(Leung Wai-lam) in the Communist hierarchy in Hong Kong, and by
making the trend of these concessions "fully discernible" to the
The Governor suggests that we should
/Chinese
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Chinese before Mr Chi P'eng-fei's visit to Britain. The Secretary
of State could then draw attention to these concessions by saying
to Mr Chi that the Chinese should "judge us by our actions" in
Hong Kong
This possibility assumes, however, that the Chinese Government
want to upgrade one of the present Communist hierarchy in Hong
Kong to the position of official Representative. It is possible
that the reverse is the case, that the Chinese want to appoint
The ut
a serving Foreign Ministry official as/Representative and to clip
the wings of the local Communist hierarchy. But even if this is
so, it would be possible for the Chinese eventually to introduce
a newcomer as head of NCNA in Hong Kong. This development would
therefore remain of value to them.
We might make a further practical gesture to the Chinese, although
this suggestion is the Department's and has not been cleared with
the Governor or Sir John Addis. Although Sir John Addis believes
that the Chinese want an official overseer of all Chinese Communist
activities in Hong Kong, their intentions are in fact far from
One point which they have consistently stressed is that
communications between Hong Kong and China are inconvenient and
that there is no visa-issuing office in Hong Kong. We might take
further steam out of the Chinese request by proposing that they
clear.
/set
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set up a visa office in Hong Kong. Thic dould be located in the
office of the China International Travel Service which might be
named the "China International Travel Service and Chinese Gover-
ment Visa Office", Consular functionaries from the Chinese MFA
could be posted to this office with no more grandiose title than
Visa Officer.
(b)
to
to tell the Chinese that we could only consider their proposal
if their representative were specifically appointed (and publicly
designated) as Consul-General.
The drawback to saying no to the Chinese is that it surrenders
the initiative to them and leaves us on the defensive for the
foreseeable future. They have said that they do not want to
disturb the status quo in Hong Kong. We are entitled to take them
at their word and to explain that, although we accept their good
faith, the appointment of a Representative would inevitably raise
doubts and disturb confidence. This would be against the interests
of both of us. These harmful effects could only be avoided if the
appointment explicitly and unequivocally recognised our present
right to administer Hong Kong.
If the Chinese Government accepted this, it would have some of the
public effect of confirming our right of tenure of Hong Kong, at
least until 1997. The Defence and Overseas Policy Committee are
/being
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-8-
.
being invited to agree that, although this is desirable, we
should not ask for it directly. In practice, however, whatever title the Representative was given, the Governor's concerns about
the immediate effect on confidence and about creeping loss of
control would remain valid. Moreover a Consul-General would have
the explicit right under international law to intervene in
matters affecting the affairs of his nationals, and might there-
fore have a greater power of mischief than a Representative.
such offer would therefore have to be carefully considered with
the Governor before it were made.
Any
Finally the Chinese would probably reject such a proposal anyway,
since it would be inconsistent with their public stand that Hong
Kong is already an integral part of China. The proposal's advan-
tage is therefore likely to be presentational. It would give us
a counterproposal to put forward whenever the Chinese raised the
subject and might make them conclude that it was not worth
pursuing. its risk is that they might merely be irritated by what
they would regard as a transparent manoeuvre. In addition it
would be open to the Chinese to propose a counter-tactic eg to
accept our proposal "in principle" and to invite us to show an
equal degree of "goodwill" by modifying our position through
discussion.
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(c) to reject the Chinese proposal
Total rejection would have all the drawbacks of course (a) and
none of the possible advantages. The Chinese have already shown
that they will not take no for an answer. They would thus retain
their freedom of manoeuvre and we would lose ours. The consequences
of giving a totally negative answer could be disagreeably harsher
than those of the more placating response suggested in course (a).
(d) to tell the Chinese that we are still mable to give an
answer, ie to play for more time
The Chinese accept that their proposal needs careful consideration.
Mr Chou En-lai told the Secretary of State that he "realised that
this was a problem which concerned the British side. There was
no need to worry. The Chinese did not want to settle the question
at one stroke". Mr Chi P'eng-fei also admitted that "this was 8
big question ... not something that the British Government could
decide today". It would therefore be possible to tell Mr Chi
that we had still not had enough time to study the matter since
the Secretary of State's visit. But this could only buy a little
time. It is now almost two years since the Chinese first brought
the matter up with us again (March 1971).
When the Chinese first brought up the proposal during the fifties
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/we
L
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we deliberately used the tactic of not replying.
This tactic
succeeded only for about a year and we were eventually constrained
Chinese
to tell the Chinese outright that we could not accept.
irritation would grow with what they would rightly regard as our
delaying tactics. Within six months or a year this irritation
might reach the point where it could affect our general relations
and make an agreement to differ on Hong Kong harder to achieve.
For practical purposes the chances of changes in the Chinese
leadership and Chinese policies within that time scale which
could increase the chances of agreement in our favour
discounted.
can be
(e) to tell the Chinese that we wish, through discussions, to
explore their proposal further
This is the course favoured by Sir John Addis. The arguments
in favour are set out in his Despatch. They are, briefly, that,
as the end of the New Territories lease approaches, we shall need
an authoritative Chinese in Hong Kong with whom to deal, and that
now while our relations are good is the time to define the terms
under which we would allow him to operate. The Chinese clearly
set great store by this proposal and are likely to put various
difficulties in our way if we do not agree. We should take our
/courage
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courage in both hands and negotiate.
However, Sir Murray MacLehose argues, almost certainly rightly,
that to agree to negotiate is, in effect, to agree to accept a
Representative, with only a short time gap between the two. This
proposal could therefore lead to all the ill-consequences which
he foresees from the Representative's appointment. Indeed,
since the news of the discussions would almost certainly leak,
uncertainty about their outcome could itself affect confidence.
The Defence and Oversea Policy Committee have concluded that we
should seek to stay in Hong Kong at least until 1997. The
effect both of the appointment of a Representative, and of the
public reaction in Hong Kong would be to lower confidence. This
would not bolster our administration. Rather it would be likely
to lead to its collapse well before 1997.
(f) to agree outright to the proposal
If we decided to accept a Representative, there would be every
reason to bargain to define his functions as closely as possible
and to get as much as possible in return for his appointment.
This course therefore has nothing to commend it over (e) above.
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