FCO 21/1019 Relations between Hong Kong and China

STAMP

YEAR

1972

¡N.B. The grading of this pachet must be the same at that of the highest graded veteranmad in st. The appropriate upgrading the men be affixed whenever necessary.)

SECRET

DEPT.

Contents checked

for transfer to

[Sgd.)

Date

D.RO.

Lie

5/9/74

EASTERN

H.M. DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

or POST

FAR

427 FILE NOFEH

3/301/2

(Part B )

HONG KONG

TITLE: RELATION.S BETWEEN

CHINA.

REFER TO

NAME

(and dept. when necessary)

TO SEE:

NAME

DATE

(and dept, when necessary)

TO SEE:

NAME

DATE

(and dept, when necessary}

TO SEE:

DATE

FEH 3/301/2

PART B

DO NOT RETAIN FILES AND PAPERS UNNECESSARILY

RETURN THEM TO REGISTRY FOR BU, OR BA

FILE

FCO 21/1019

SEC

UPG

(N.B. The grading of this jachet must be the same as that of the highest graded Zen Lomeamed in 12. The appropriate upgrading skp must be affixed whenever necessary.)

SECRET

CLOSED UNTIE

2003

Registry Address

Room No. 27!

King Charles Street.

REFER TO

YEAR STAMP

1972

יו--וי-ם

CYPHER CAT A

FM F C O 291841Z

CIFIDENTIAL

FEC 3/548/8 Enier. R.E.

1972

TO PRIORITY PEKING TELNO 1176 OF 29 DECEMBER/INFO GOVERNOR HONG KONG (PERSONAL) -

MIPT.

1. DURING HIS CALL ON THE PUS ON 29 DECEMBER THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR ASKED WHAT THE BRITISH SIDE HAD IN MIND FOR THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF SINO-BRITISH RELATIONS DURING 1973.

J 4

2. GREENHILL MENTIONED FORTHCOMING MINISTERIAL VISITS IN BOTH DIRECTIONS AND OUR HOPE OF INCREASED CONTACTS BOTH COMMERCIAL AND POLITICAL WITH CHINA. HE EMPHASISED OUR DESIRE TO CONTINUE POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

3. AT THE END OF THE GENERAL DISCUSSION WHICH FOLLOWED (AND WHICH CONCENTRATED LARGELY ON INTERNATIONAL MATTERS) SUNG REVERTED TO BI-LATERAL QUESTIONS. EMPHASISING THAT HE WAS SPEAKING PERSONALLY AND NOT ON INSTRUCTIONS, HE SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WAS SATISFIED WITH RECENT ACTIONS BY THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT AGAINST SOVIET AND KMT SPIES. THESE ACTIONS DISPLAYED A FRIENDLY ATTITUDE TOWARDS CHINA.

A SUNG THEN REFERRED TO THE QUESTION OF CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG. HE ENQUIRED WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY DEVELOPMENTS SINCE I DISCUSSED THIS QUESTION WITH THE CHINESE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER IN PEKING. HE THOUGHT THE BRITISH SIDE QUOTE DID NOT FULLY UNDERSTAND AND HAD MISGIVINGS ABOUT CHINESE POLICIES AND WORKING STYLE UNQUOTE. OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG COULD ONLY HELP STABILITY IN HONG

KONG AND RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND CHINA: IT COULD NOT HAVE A NEGATIVE AFFECT. GREENHILL TOOK NOTE AND TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT I WAS GIVING THE MATTER MY PERSONAL CONSIDERATION. HE EMPHASISED, HOWEVER, THE PROBLEMS WHICH THE PROPOSAL RAISED FOR US AND SAID THAT FOR THIS REASON CONSIDERATION WOULD HAVE TO BE LONG AND CAREFUL.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES:

ITEAD OF FED

HEAD OF

KIOD

HEAD OF FU3D

went to Head PEELS

PS TO MR. ROYLE PS TO FUS

SIR E. NORRIS MR. WILFORD SIR D. WATSON

CONFIDENTIAL

PUMPEDENITAL

اچھے

seek

IN HONG KONG 29MBiBZ

CONFIDENTIAL

TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 1252 OF 99 DECENBER.1972

YOUR TELEGRAM 1142.

PERSONAL FOR WILFORD FROM GOVERNOR',

CHINESE REPRESENTATION.

MANY THANKS FOR THIS INDICATION OF TIMING,

TOP COPY

谢了

3/3062

HAD KNOVH THAT JOHN

2015 WAS PREPARING A DESPATCH ON THIS SUBJECT IN THE LIGHT OF THE

S. CF S'S VISIT AND HAD BEEN WAITING TO SEE IT BEFORE ADDING

TO WHAT I HAD ALREADY SAID IN MY TELECRAM 1953 1.E. NO HEED TO CHANGE CA LINE FOR CHIAO KUAN HUA'S VISIT,

?. Í GATHER THAT WE MAY NOW EXPECT THE PEKING DESPATCH NEXT WEEK

·D THEREAFTER I WILL EITHER WRITE OR TELEGRAPH.

MACLEHOSE

ว

FUS

I E HORRIS

ERE MIKECH MR WILFORD

SONPEDENITAL

PRIORITY CYPRES CAT/A

F., FCO 2317452

SECRET

[FE]

TO PRIORITY HONG KONG TELEGRA: NUMBER 1142 OF 28 DECEMBER/1972

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR FROM WILFORD

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

1. I HAD BEEN ON THE POINT OF WRITING TO YOU ADOUT HOW WE

SHOULD TAKE THIS MATTER FORWARD WHEN PEKING TELEGRAM NO 1427 ARRIVED. ( THIS HAS BEEN REPEATED TO YOU) THIS SUGGESTS THAT WE

MAY HAVE THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER IN LONDON EARLIER NEXT

YEAR THAN WE HAD ANTICIPATED. ALTHOUGH I DO NOT KNOW YET WHETHER

THE DATES IN LATE FEBRUARY ARE LIKELY TO BE SUITABLE FOR THE

SECRETARY OF STATE, WHO ALREADY HAS A VERY FULL PROGRAMME.

;

I THINK VE MUST TRY TO NAKE UP OUR MINDS SOON HOW TO PLAY OUR CARDS.

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE TOLD CHU EIFLA1 ON 1 NOVEMBER THAT HE

WOULD II: DUE COURSE GET IN TOUCH WITH THE CHINESE FOREIGN

MINISTER. WE MUST THEREFORE BE PREPARED FOR A MOTHER ROUND OF

EXCHANGES WHEN CHI'S VISIT TAKES PLACE. WHEN YOU DISCUSSED

THE SUBJECT WITH DENIS GREENHILL IT WAS, I THINK, LEFT THAT YOU WOULD LET US HAVE YOUR FURTHER THOUGHTS AND ADVICE WHEN YOU HAD

TIME TO BROOD A LITTLE MORE, AND POSSIBLY EVEN TO HAVE FURTHER

DISCUSSIONS WITH YOUR UNOFFICIALS WHEN THEY HAD HAD TIME TO

THIK OVER THEIR EXCHANGES WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE. IT

WOULD THEREFORE BE MUST HILPFUL IF YOU COULD LET US HAVE YOUR

FURTHER THOUGHTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, PERHAPS IN A PERSONAL LETTER TO DENIS OR TO ME. WE SHALL WANT TO PUT RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE BEFORE THE END OF JANUARY AND IT WOULD BE FARTICULARLY HELPFUL FROM MY POINT OF VIEW, SINCE I A TO ACCOMPANY LORD CARRINGTON ON HIS TRIP WHICH BEGINS ON 21 JANUARY, IF YOU WERS ABLE TO GET YOUR COMMENTS TO US BY ABOUT 15 JANUARY. THIS WOULD ALLOW JOHN ADDIS WHO RETURNS TO PEKING ON 6 JANUARY TINE TO COMMENT BY TELEGRAM BEFORE WE NEEDED TO START DRAFTING HERE

AND BEFORE I LEFT LONDON.

SECRET

/ 3. I

SECRET

3. 1 AK LOT REPEATING THIS TO PEKING. YOU WILL NO DOUBT SEE JOIN ON HIS WAY BACK TO CHINA AND CAN TELL HIM HOW THE PROGRAMME ABOVE LOOKS TO YOU SO THAT HE WILL KNOW WHAT TO EXPECT.

DOUBLAS-110. E

FILES

FED

HKIOD

FS TO PUS

JIR E NORRIS SIRD WATSON

MR WILFORD

- 2

SECRET

}

C.8. 41A

10077

20,000-10/71-294667

REF.

CONFIDENTIAL

BY BAG

TS 2/1126/50

R M Evans Esq

FED

F CO

My Jean Richart,

3/30/1

COLONIAL SECRETARIAT

LOWER ALBERT ROAD

HONG KONG

22 December 1972

Mi Dev

Pe. opeor.

R.K,

SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO PEKING: REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

CHINESE

102

I notice that in the last two sentences of paragraph 9 of his despatch No. 3/70 of 5 December John Addis has included a, rather compressed, reference to the discussion of possible Chinese representation in Hong Kong. For reasons of which you are well aware I hope that if you decide to have this despatch printed these two sentences could be omitted; or, if this is impossible, that you will be able to ensure that the despatch does not have A or Q distribution.

MJ Morgan Esq PEKING

JAN Graham Esq CMG WASHINGTON

I B A Scott Esq

MOSCOW

N J Barrington Esq

TOKYO

es,

Your

Zich.

(R J Stratton)

R WH du Boulay Esq CVO

PARIS

%%.

agari

Mi Davi

རི:ཀ་

frier and X

R.E.

371.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

SUMMARY

태

101

The Chinese proposal for an official Chinese representative in

Hong Kong was discussed with you in Peking and you undertook to

communicate further on the matter with the Foreign Minister

(paragraph 1).

Background

There was a Chinese Foreign Affairs Commissioner in Hong Kong

1945-49. Since 1949 there have only been semi-official agencies

there (paragraph 2). In 1955-56 and 1956 the Chinese Government

proposed the appointment of a Foreign Affairs Commissioner. In 1958

they were teld in writing that Her Majesty's Goverment could not

agree (paragraph 3). Chou En-lai revived the proposal in 1971 in

the context of the improvement of relations between Her Majesty's

Government and the Chinese Government, but it was not made an issue

in the negotiations on exchange of ambassadors. It was raised again

as soon as the agreement was concluded. In May the Chinese Government were told that Her Majesty's Government could not agree (paragraph 5).

The Chinese Case

Chou En-lai and the Foreign Minister gave you some clarifications

and assurances on the Chinese proposal during your visit. They

wanted a co-ordinater of the specialised Chinese agencies in

Hong Kong and an official representative.

of setting up a dual régize (paragraph 6).

Argument

There was no intention

There is ferce in the Chinese argument that since the improvement

in our relations the absence of official Chinese representation in

Hong Kong is an anomaly. It is clear that not to agree to the

SECRET

/Chinese

SECRET

Chinese proposal would adversely affect the relations between the United Kingdom and China (paragraph 7). Our improved relations with

China are of political importance at the present juncture of world

affairs (paragraph 8). Commercially, we have the chance of big

contracts in the fields of civil aviation and industrial development

(paragraph 9). Our position in Hong Kong needs the Chinese

Government's goodwill in the evolving situation up to the end

of the Lease. The appointment of an official Chinese representative

would formalise their acquiescence in the status quo (paragraph 10).

Recommendations

In further discussions with the Chinese we should attempt to limit

and define the functions of the proposed representative to our

satisfaction and try to make it part of a wider agreement on the

normalisation of relations between Hong Kong and China (paragraphs

11-13).

3/56

SECRET

BRITISH EMBASSY

FEKING

The Right Honourable

Sir Alec Douglas-Hone KT MP

etc etc etc.

18 December 1972

CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

Sir

1. The question of official Chinese representation in Hong Kong

was raised with you by Premier Chou En-lai and the Chinese Foreign

Minister during your visit to Peking. You explained Her Majesty's

Government's objections, and the Chinese leaders gave some clarifi-

cations and assurances on their proposal. It was left that you

would think over what was said and communicate again with the

Foreign Minister.

Background

2. The Nationalist Government had a Foreign Affairs Commissioner

in Hong Kong from 1945 to 1949. He was sometimes troublesome to the

Hong Kong Goverment in interesting himself in cases of individual

Chinese residents. Since the establishment of the present Government

in Peking there has been no official Chinese representation in

Hong Kong apart from such specialised organs as the New China News

Agency and the Bank of China,

3. In 1955 and 1956 the Chinese Government proposed the appointment

of a Foreign Affairs Commissioner in Hong Kong. Sir Con O'Neill,

who was then Chargé d'Affaires in Peking, recommended in favour of

agreeing; Sir Alexander Grantham, as Governor of Hong Kong, was

opposed, on the ground that the ill-defined duties, status and

authority of the proposed Commissioner would inevitably result in

/interference

1 SECRET

[

SECRET

interference in Hong Kong's internal affairs, Mr Selwyn Lloyd, as

Secretary of State, ruled against the proposal and decided not to

send any reply. Chou En-lai reverted to the proposal three times

with British visitors in 1957 and 1958, In February 1958 Mr Floyd

informed the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires in London in writing that,

having regard to the fact that the Chinese Government were not at that

time prepared to acknowledge the legitimate point of view of the

Hong Kong Government so as to co-operate with it on the problems

arising between them, Her Majesty's Government regretted that "the

present climate of relations does not appear suitable" for the

appointment of a Chinese Commissioner in Hong Kong.

40 The outline of these events in 1955-58, and in particular the

difference of view between the Chargé d'Affaires in Peking and the

Governor of Hong Kong, were apparently revealed in a volume of

reminiscences by Sir A Grantham published in Hong Kong in 1965.

The difference of view is further discussed in the July/September 1972

issue of The China Quarterly. It must therefore be known to the

Chinese.

5. Chou En-lai revived the proposal in March 1971 in the context

of the improvement of relations between Her Majesty's Government and

the Chinese Government. It was not however made an issue in the nego-

tiations for an exchange of ambassadors. But as soon as the agreement

on ambassadors was concluded in March this year, it was raised with

ne on two occasions and with Mr Royle by the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires

in London. When Mr Royle visited Peking, he informed the Vice

Minister for Foreign Affairs that Her Majesty's Government could not

accept the Chinese proposal.

SECRET

/The Chinese Case

SECRET

The Chinese Case

Chou En-lai and Chi P'eng-fei set out the Chinese Government's

position more clearly than before in their talks with you.

(a)

(b)

(0)

The Chinese, they said, are in no hurry to recover

Hong Kong The question should be settled by negotiation.

There was no need to discuss this issue now. They would

not take surprise action, or take over the Colony by force.

The free port should be maintained because it was in

the interests of both countries.

The establishment of an official representative was a

logical consequence of the exchange of ambassadors.

The existing professional (or specialist) agencies needed

an overall (or co-ordinating) body. An official represen-

tative was needed to deal with such questions as trade,

communications (air, rail, shipping, visas), water supply

and border incidents. He would act as the link between

the Hong Kong Government and the Chinese Government.

Moreover, by explaining the Chinese Government's policies

to local Chinese, he could improve relations and prevent

troubles like those of 1967.

The proposal for official representation had no ulterior

motive. The representative would not have a special rôle

but would only perform official duties. There was no

intention to set up a dual régime the result of that

would be daily quarrels between the Governor and the

representative. Her Majesty's Government were ruling

Hong Kong and were responsible.

The Chinese Government

did not quarrel with that and respected the British

position.

SECRET

/(a)

SECRET

(a)

If the question remained unsettled problems might arise

and unpleasant things might happen not serious, but

unpleasant.

The Chinese Government could not guarantee

that frictions would not arise. If there were delay in

settling the question the British Government would be

This was a big

responsible for the consequences,

question, a question of principle.

Argument

7. There is force in the Chinese Goverment's contention that the

absence of official representation in Hong Kong is an anomaly. It

was not inappropriate while there were not full diplomatic relations

between the Chinese Government and Her Majesty's Government in the

United Kingdom; but it is not in conformity with the exchange of

ambassadors and our new relationship. Official Chinese representa-

tion in Hong Kong is a logical consequence of the normalisation of

our state relations. While we delay our reply to the renewed

request, it is certain that we shall make no progress on any

bilateral matters directly affecting Hong Kong such as an air

services agreement which are of importance in a wider context than

that of Hong Kong's own interests.

wn interests. If our reply is unreasonably

delayed, or if we return a definite refusal, we can expect a steady

deterioration in bilateral relations on all fronts, political as

well as commercial.

8. How much would that matter? The answer must take a broad view,

taking into account China's growing importance in world affairs.

This year we have established a new relationship of "respect and

understanding", as you put it, with the Chinese Goverment. The

moves to establish that relationship the agreement on exchange of

/Ambassadors,

SECRET

ambassadors and the frank discussions which you and other Ministers

have had with the Chinese leaders over the whole field of foreign

affairs have been in conformity with the main stream of events in

Asia, with President Nixon's visit to Peking and the normalisation

of relations between China and Japan. We are now in consequence well

placed to have our say and make our voice heard in the discussions

of Asian affairs at the crucial juncture when so many of the basic

positions are in movement China-the United States, China-Japan,

the two Koreas, Vietnam, South East Asia and the South Asian sub-

continent. It is against that background that the political value

of the improvement in our relations with China needs to be assessed.

It acquires an added importance from our entry into the European

Economic Community.

Commercial consideratione are also important.

The Chinese have

begun a long-range plan for the expansion of their civil aviation.

We stand a good chance of getting in on the ground floor as their

main supplier. They are also probably about to embark on a large

industrial development programe involving the purchase of complete

plants, peasibly on deferred payment terms. At present we are well

placed to get our share of these orders too.

10.

Moreover our position in Hong Kong itself depends on the Chinese

Government's good will1. Our position there cannot be static but must

evolve with developing circumstances, particularly over the next

quarter of a century up to the end of the Lerse. We shall need the

Chinese Goverment's co-operation over each stage of this evolving

situation. The appointment of a Chinese official representative in

Hong Kong now would have the double advantage of both facilitating

that co-operation in the future and formalising their acquiescence

in the present position now.

SECRET

/Recommendation

SECRET

Recommendation

11. We should not therefore delay long in giving your reply to

Chou En-lai's and Chi P'eng-fei's representations to you, and your

reply should not be negative. They have already given you some

assurances of their intentions, to meet the misgivings put forward

from our side. We should now in further discussions try to tie

them down further. Our aim should be to define as closely as

possible the functions and status of the Chinese Government

representative in Hong Kong so that Her Majesty's Government's

misgivings can be further set at rest; and we should seek te dress

up the appointment in such a way that it can be presented to public

opinion without shaking confidence in Hong Kong. How can this aim

be achieved?

12. The Chinese leaders themselves have given us a clue in sugges-

ting that the representative for whom they have asked should have

an "overall" responsibility over Chinese Government agencies in

Hong Kong. They already have in Hong Kong the New China News Agency,

the Bank of China and the China Travel Service performing their

legitimate specialised functions. In addition, these agencies have

to perform other functions, such as issuing visas, for which the

proper agencies do not at present exist. Let us therefore agree

that the Chinese Government should set up the agencies or sub-agencies

which they now require for their legitimate official business

e g for issuing visas, for dealing with seamen and shipping matters,

and for handling all aspects of the air travel to China which we

hope will start soon. We could then agree in addition to the

appointment of an offical to exercise "overall" authority over

these agencies on behalf of the Chinese Goverment. He should be

the co-ordinater in charge of the specialised agencies. He should

SECRET

/not

SECRET

not be called the Chinese Government Representative, which could imply too wide powers, or the Commissioner, which is also too vague and has an unfortunate precedent. Ideally, from our point of view,

he should be called the Consul-General, which implies well-defined

functions. The Chinese Government are scarcely likely to agree to

that, in view of their claim to sovereignty, but we could try it on

28 a first gambit. If they reject the title, as they are likely to,

we can ask them to propose an alternative, bearing in mind the need

to define the functions of the official as an overall co-ordinater

of the Chinese Government agencies and nothing more. It might be

easier to define the office than the officer, e g Central Co-ordinating

Office for Chinese Government Agencies in Hong Kong, or words to that

effect. The representative would then simply be called the Officer

in charge of that office.

13. Our line of approach to the Chinese Government in our promised reply, therefore, should be to explore the ground still further and

discuss with them the appointment of a Chinese Government represen-

tative in Hong Kong as part of a wider normalisation of relations

between Hong Kong and China, following on the normalisation of

relations between the Chinese Government and Her Majesty's Government

in the United Kingdom. The appointment should be contingent on

satisfactory agreements on through rail traffic, air links, and any other existing anomalies or difficulties which we should like to take

this opportunity to rectify. All this will take time; that will not

matter. To maintain the political and commercial relations between

our two countries on a satisfactory footing, it will be sufficient

that there is an ongoing negotiation sincerely pursued on our side,

A fairly lengthy discussion will give the opportunity to prepare

opinion in Hong Kong for the changes that will eventually be made.

/14

SECRET

14. I recommend that these further discussions should be carried

on in Peking. It will be appropriate to inform the Chinese

Ambassador in London in general terms, but it is only those who

can be in direct daily touch with Chou En-lai, such as the Vice

Foreign Minister and Assistant Foreign Minister, who can carry on

a meaningful negotiation on such a subject.

subject. Our next move should

be made early in the New Year.

15. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Governor of

Hong Kong.

SECRET

I have the honour to be Sir

Your obedient Servant

".M. Addis

100

SECRET AND PERSONAL

& Fersonal

ir Murray MacLehose XCMG Governor

HONG KONG

CC:

J M Addis CMG FEKING

CHINESE OFFICIAL REFRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

As you know, when Chou En-lai brought up

the matter in Feking, the Secretary of State told

him that he would like to think about it and that

he would get in touch with the Chinese Foreign

Minister in due course. we subsequently talked

about this in Hong Kong. You left it with

Denis Greenhill that you would send us your views

about how the issue should be handled in the light

of the Secretary of State's undertaking.

2. The Chinese have not yet returned to the charge;

but we shall need to let the Secretary of state have

soon after Christras our recommendations about the

for his response to Chi Peng-fei should take. I

should therefore be grateful if you could let us

have your views by 10 January.

SECRET

Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department

cc Far Eastern Department

Sliv

1, ' then P/A

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

Please see attached record of my talk with the 'Portuguese

Ambassador.

It was pretty clear to me that the Portuguese Ambassador was well informed about the Chinese approach to us on repre- sentation in Hong Kong. I doubt if what I said put him off the track. As regards Portuguese negotiations with the Chinese I doubt if he was as ignorant as he said he was.

4 December 1972

SECRET

لد

K N Wilford

SECRET

Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department

Cc Far Eastern Department

5/1v

de. P/A

5/12

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

In the course of a conversation with me on 30 November about relations between Hong Kong and Macao the Portuguese Ambassador said that "he had been told in the Office" that the Chinese had raised with Mr Royle in May and more strongly with the Secretary of State during his visit the question of Chinese representation in Hong Kong. I avoided so far as I could giving any direct reply to this allegation, concentrating on the fact that both the Chinese and ourselves were fully satisfied with present relations between Hong Kong and China. I said that in the past we had had considerable trouble with a KMT representative in Hong Kong who had sought to establish a position for himself with the Chinese inhabitants of the Colony.

This waв the sort of situation which we did not wish to face again and there were in any case plenty of representatives of Chinese parastatal bodies with whom we did business where the need arose. The Ambassador did not press further. Finally I asked the Ambassador whether he was aware of any efforts by his own Government to take advantage of the present climate in Peking to seek closer relations. He said that he was not but that of course the Chinese had a semi- official representative in Macao who was a member of the Governor's Executive Council.

1 December 1972

SECRET

Mr.

KM Wilford

BY BAG

REF TS 2/1126/50

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL

COLONIAL SECRETARIAT

LOWER ALBERT ROAD

HONG KONG

30 November 1972

RM Evans Esq

FED

F CO

My dene Richert,

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

RE IN

R-GRYN

RYN 80

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter to John Moberly (FEH 3/301/2) of 22 November about the Secretary of State's message to Mr. Rogers.

As foreseen in the Governor's personal telegram to you No. 1078 of 17 November the Colonial Secretary spoke to the American Consul-General on 27 November immediately after his return from leave in the United States. It was quite clear that neither Osborn nor his staff knew anything of this suggestion, apart from the speculation they had seen in the press, and more specifically that nothing had been said to Osborn in Washington about the Secretary of State's message. He readily took the point about the delicacy of this question and undertook to discourage any members of his staff who showed signs of interest in it.

Your

ara

Rich

(R J Stratton)

JC Moberly Esq WASHINGTON

}

under Personal cover

C.8. 41A

Mi like tord

حا

Ro05/12

по негает свои

Mi Day.

Enie. RE. 4/12

CONFIDENTIAL Enie

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

196

(C 3/51)

BRITISH EMBASSY 3100 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008 Telephone: (202) 462-1340 27 November 1972

Wilipp.

R. H. Evans, 33.,

Far Eastern Department

Foreign and Commonwealth of he

London, 5.7.1.

Dear Richard

IR ..

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

I think the problem is

be coming

MW%

rather witely

Mi Lidford Sie Einic Park's

W. Haier Ther

не

due contrad in the FE

Exosome Remix (speed suppleg

R.LEMIKS

Thank you for your letter PEH 3/301/2 of 22 November about the Secretary of State's reference to Chinese representation in Hong Kong in his personal message to Mr Rogers,

4112

291

I have now spoken to Al Jenkins on the lines of your paragraph 3 and the last sentence of your paragraph 4. He confirmed that knowledge of the content of the Secretary of State's message would in any case have been restricted to a fairly limiteu circle. This was customary practice with confidential messages exchanged between Mr Rogers and the Foreign Ministers of other countries. Jenkins said he thought it would be best not to send round any formal note about the point I had made to those who would have seen Sir Alec Douglas-Home's messago since this would only draw attention to Sir Alec's comment about Chinese representation in Hong Kong. He thought it would be better to have a quiet word with the one or two people in his department who had seen the message and also to mention the point discreetly to Marshall Green so that he and others higher up in the State Department who might have seen the message, were aware of the delicacy of the section on Chinese representation in Hong Kong. I said that having made our point to him, we must leave it to his judgment to decide how best to handle it.

Jenkins did not say specifically whether the US Embassy in London would have seen the text of the mesango but I made it clear that we left it to him to make our point to the mbacay 17 he thought it necessary.

4. Jenking added that reports of current Chinese interest in representation in Hong Kong had come to the State Department from a number of sources other than Sir Alec Douglen-Home's message. These reports had been distributed rather more widely within the US Government.

CONFIDENTIAL AND I RSON LE

15.

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

Le shall look ai

this. R.E.

29/11.

5. John Boyd has drawn my attention to an article by Gary Catron on Hong Kong and Chinese foreign policy, 1955-60, in the China Quarterly for July/September 1972. In this article there is a section about a Chinese proposal 1955 (?) in 1965, for the stationing of a diplomatic representative

in Hong Kong. Reference is made in the article to a difference of opinion at that time between the British Chargé d'Affaires in Peking, who considered the proposal a good one, and the Governor who "vetoed the proposal". So the fact that this question has been an issue between the Chinese Government and HMG in the past is a matter of public record. The expectation, therefore, now that our relations with China are improving, we may be pressed by the Chinese Government on this issue is presumably not something which would cause any surprise to China watchers.

No.

R.E.

29/11.

Yours was

Jour

(J.C. Moberly)

Copied to:

Mr R.J. Stratton, Political Adviser, Hong Kong.

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

930 8440 Prtn 553

JC Maberly Esq

WASHINGTON

(FER 3/301/2)

22 November 1972

PERSONAL

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

As you know, the Secretary of State mentioned the problem of Chinese representation in Hong Kong in the personal message which he sent to Mr Rogers insediately after his return from the Far East (700 telegram No 2279).

With Antony Acland's agreement, I sent a copy of the message to the Governor of Hong Kong. I now enclose a copy of the personal telegram which he has sent me in reply (Hong Kong telegram No 1078).

3. I should be most grateful if, when you next see Al Jenkins (who told me at the beginning of last week that he had seen a copy of the Secretary of State's message), you would emphasise to him the importance we attach to knowledge of the Chinese proposal being restricted to as narrow a circle as possible. We are giving a restricted distribution here to all papers which deal with it.

I shall not for the moment say anything to Oplinger, or anyone else, at the American Embassy. I do not know whether the State Department will have sent a copy of the Secretary of State's nossage to the Embassy; and we have made a point of saying nothing to members of the Embassy about the Chinese proposal. În speaking to Jenkins, however, you could perhaps ask him to pass on a word of warning if, in his judgment, this might be necessary.

5. I am sending a copy of this letter to Dick Stratton in Hong Tong.

COMFIDENTIAL

RM Evans

Far Eastern Department

Mr. Aste

Confer

Ловатотел

Quiere representation in Hory Kory

I should record that diving the Chinese Tomboy reception on 16 November, Mr LI, First Secotury in Mr CH'IAO's party, toote the opportunity of exchange dort ASA titles with China to emplanse once more the importance his gouement attacled to Chinese representation in Hong Kong The live Mr. Li trole

followed by

was identied to t

Mr Thi Very for and Mr Chon

in the sos's Littles in

bebing.

2. I replied on standard lines.

X. Compton 17/1/42

Enter

+p.a.

ன்

2074

DO #97241 330443 5000 5/77 ON 1697

HOF0825/17

PP FCO

CYPHER/CAT A

FM HONG KONG 1710852

CONFIDENTIAL

на

Hu/FED

ADVANCE COPY

NO DISTRIBUTION

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 1978 OF 17 NOVEMBER.

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR EVANS, FAR EASTERN DEPARTMENT.

YOUR LETTER TO ME OF 7 NOVEMBER, LAST SENTENCE. WE ARE ENDEAVOURING TO PUT A STOPPER IN THE AMERICAN CONSULATE-GENERAL

HERE: PLEASE TRY TO DO THE SAME WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND

U.S. EMBASSY IN LONDON.

MACLEMOSE

MAIN

SENT AT 17/18372 RD

PP FCO

CYPHER/CAT A

на

Ha FED

NO DISTRICUTION

FM MONG KONG 171005 Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 1078 OF 17 NOVEMBER.

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR EVANS, FAR EASTERN DEPARTMENT.

YOUR LETTER TO ME OF 7 NOVEMBER, LAST SENTENCE. WE ARE ENDEAVOURING TO PUT A STOPPER IN THE AMERICAN CONSULATE-GENERAL HERE: PLEASE TRY TO DO THE SAME WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND U.S. EMBASSY IN LONDON.

MACLEHOSE

NNNN

SENT AT 17/1037Z RD

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

930 8440 Extn 553

Sir Murray MacLehose KOMG MBE HONG KONG

7 November 1972

SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO CHINA

1. The Secretary of State sent a personal message to Mr Rogers on the day of his return to this country from China and Hong Kong. With Antony Acland's agreement, I now enclose a copy of the telegram to Washington which contained the message. As you will see, the Secretary of State alluded briefly to the problem of Chinese representation in Hong Kong.

RM Evans

Far Eastern Department

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

fot

Post R

HIE

DAILY TELEGRAPH

16 NOV 1972

cutting dated

HONGKONG TOLD

'COMMUNISTS WILL

NEVER TAKE OVER'

By CLARE HOLLINGWORTH in Hongkong

MR ANTHONY

ANTHONY ROYLE, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, said yesterday that both the Chinese and the British were at present well satisfied with the political status of Hongkong.

"There is no question of Hongkong being taken over by a Communist régime," he told Chinese questioners at a Press conference at the end of his five-day visit to the

Colony.

He thought that relations between China and Britain had reached a very exciting stage.

Not only had the two countries recently raised the level of their diplomatic mis- sions, but there were firm orders from the Chinese for a wide range of Butish aircraft in addition to the Anglo- French Concorde.

He emphasised that talks at a working level to improve land and air Communications be tween Hongkong and China, as well as to extend the tele- communications link, were in progress.

Hotel study

A Chinese delegation was in Hongkong to study the hotel business with the ultimate objec tive of accepting tourists in China,

Mr Boyle dismissed some of the fears in the Hongkong busi ness community about the pos sible adverse e ̋cts of Britain's entry into the Common Market. His statement that there would never be a Communist take-over of the Colony re- assured the two million Hong- kong Chinese, who were con- cerned about their future as holders of British passports.

One of the most serious prob- lents the Colony Faced, Mr Royle suggested, was the rising crime rate. He referred to the severe Bentences which were being given in Britain for "mugging ind other crimes of violence, contrasting them with light penalties in Hongkong.

נו

Друг

No.

ска

Enter. We now have

a letter.

Miss

•

I have seen with

277

Have

RI:

¿HIL

Алый

I th

fuo

167en

PUTIR.

THE TIMES

cutting dated

16 NOV 1977

Cha

Sudden emphasis in Peking on N Korean friendship

From David Bonavia Peking, Nov 15

The newspaper emphasized that the opera's illustration of the international nature of Chin- Western observers in Pekingese aid to Kurth Korea in its are mystified by a sudden new emphasis on a revolutionury drama. The Band of Whire Tigers, which deals with he alliance of China and North Korea in the Korcan war.

The text of this revolutionary opera has recently been re- printed by leading press organs and a film of it is being adver tised on Peking's muin boulevard and elsewhere. However, a rep. resentative of the China Travel Service in a main hotel said that Service in a main hotel said that it was not being shown anywhere in the city and he did not encour age a foreigner to try to see it.

Recently the People's Daily devoted all entire page to critical acclaim for The Band of White Tigers, which is believed to have been produced originally during the Korun war and was one of the few works which continued to be shown during the Great ! Proleterian Cultural Revolution

fight ugainst the Americans, without raising the question of the United Nions' role in the

war.

The People's Daily said that ' the sending of Chinese volun. teers to Korea defended Chinese interests as much as those of 1 China's Korean allies and empha. sized the friendship of the Chinese and Korean peoples. It went out of its way to provide alternative formulas for oaths of loyalty sworn by the "heroes: According to their nationality, they put first either the name of Chairman Mao Tse-tung or that of Narshal kim 11-sung, the North Korean leader.

Two sentences of the full page of articles on the opera attacked "modern revisionism" the * messi- (Soviet Union) for its anic" and "aggressive" foreign policy, specifically bringing up the question of the use of tanks to quell othe, nations.

Reassurance to Hongkong

liongkong. Nov 15-Me Anthony Rayle, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Com monwealth Affairs, said in Hong kong today that there was no question of a communist take over and that the Chinese Gov. ernment was satisfied with the colony's present status.

He was answering questions at a press conference ai the and of a four-day visit to the colony. Mr Royle was asked whether,

in the event of a communist take over, the two million or so Hong. kong-bor: Chinese, who could qualify

British subjects. would be allowed entry into Britain.

The minister said: "There Is no question of Hongkong being taken over.

The question of entry into Britain for Hongkong Brinsh subjects was therefore a hypo- chetical one.-Reuter.

Keep

R..

Enter China /sth. Reales

FET

IS!

151 (105

29 AUG Recd

SCR 7/936/49

При

26th August, 1972

For

Seealth

This is in reply to your letter of 11th August

1/102/

to Philip Haddon-Cave about air services to China. It is also by way of apology for not replying sooner to your letter of 1st May. I can assure you that careful note of it was taken at the time (I can recall seeing it). but it then got rather buried on the file.

The position as we see it is as follows. Nothing can be done about arranging air services to China until à formal Air Services Agreement has been negotiated between HMG and the CPG. HMG have expressed a firm desire to proceed with such negotiations but are still awaiting a firm response from the CPG.

However, pending whatever happens on that front, we have taken note of what you say in your two letters and, in particular, that you have a positive interest in exercising your rights to operate regional services to China should they become available; and we are passing this information on to London.

To be perfectly frank with you, however, the acceptance of CPA as a carrier to China, if services are eventually negotiated, will depend not only on the attitude of HMG but on that of the other side as well. And their reaction to services to Taiwan may, to put it mildly, be somewhat different.

D.R.Y. Bluck, Esq., Managing Director,

Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd, Union House,

9 Connaught Road Centrál, Hong Kong.

c.c. D.C.A.

DJCJ/11

Legy

Spil

(D.J.C. Jones)

There copy better, it weed we

соку

wire Kandins

aready have the more now, Io Phu Luck by the Thompson, Dan Hargstay.

Plox onto som lyötter in the un chion

File

HICIOD

LFRD

[

די

CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS

LIMITED

Union House. 9 Connaught Road, Hong Kong

The Hon. O.P. Haddon-Cave, J.P.,

Financial Secretary

Colonial Secretariat, HONG KONG.

Dear Philip,

Air Services to China

Member of the Swire Group

P. O. Box 1

Gables: AGATHAY

Telex: 1X 3106

Answer Back- aWIRE HKO Telephone: N-150011

11th August 1972.

I refer to my letter to you of let May, at which time

I confirmed 1-

(a)

(b)

(0)

that in our view any traffic rights which may become available to a U.K./H.K. carrier for the operation of regional air services between Hong Kong and Canton or botween Hong Kong and any other points in China should be available to Cathay Pacific, in that historically we are the U.K. and Hong Kong designated carrier for those routes;j

that we have a positive interest in any such rights should they become available; and

we do not believe that our operations to Taiwan should be considered sa preventing C.P.A. from operating any available China rights.

Some montha have passed since I wrote the letter referred to above, and it now occurs to me that it may be desirable for us to more formally record our interest in some way, such as making formal application to the Hong Kong Licensing Authority for the appropriate licence.

I would appreciate your guidance on this point.

a.a. Director of Divil Aviation.\

Yours sincerely,

(Signed)) D.R.Y., Bluck.

D.R.Y. Bluck Managing Director.

DRYB.JO

CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS LIMITED

Union House, 9 Connaught Road, Hong Kong

•

臼

Member of the Swire Group P. O. Box

Cables: AIRGATHAY

Thez: HX 206

Answer Back- SWIRE HKG Telephone: 1-248064 1280011

1st May 1972

The Hon. C.P. Haddon-Cave, J.P..

Colonial Secretariat,

HOC KOEG,

Dear Philip,

Before you departed you asked if I could let you have some of the background information relevant to air services between Hong Kong and Chiną,

As I see it, the basic document is the Hong Kong Colonial Secretary 'o letter to Hong Kong Airways and Cathay Pacific of 4th July 1949 (copy attachmi) which sets out those routes allocated to Cathay Pacific and the routes to be allocated to Hong Kong Airways in terms of traffic rights.

In 1959 it was decided by Jardine Matheson and 9.0.A.C., the then shareholders in Hong Kong Airways, that the company would be sold. All the shares in Hong Kong Airways were first purchased from Jardine Matheson by 9.0.A.C. and subsequently there was an agreement between Jutterfield & Swire (Hong Kong) Ltd., Cathay Pacific and B.0.A.C. which resulted in Cathay Pacific purchasing Hong Kong Airways from 3.0.A.C. this arrangement, B.O.A.C. became shareholders in Cathay Pacific.

At the same time, and as part of

The main assets of Hong Kong Airways at that time were the traffic rights described in the Colonial Secretary's letter of 4th July 1949, and a reference to this letter and the rights which were being transferred to Cathay Pacific, the new purchasers of Hong Kong Airways, is embodied in the agreement between Butterfield & Swire (Hong Kong) Ltd., Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd, and B.D.A.C. This agreement is dated 18th June 1959.

As discussed prior to your departure, we have now had an opportunity of talking to Sir John Keswick. John Browne has also discussed this matter with the Governor who has suggested that we should take no further action at this time pending further reactions from the Chinese authorities, circumstances we will of course do nothing more for the present.

In these however like to confirm that, in our view, any traffic rights which may become

I would available for the operation of air services between liong Kong and Canton, or any other points in China, should, we bellovo, be offered to Cathay Pacific as the owners of Hong Kong Airways. I would also confirm my verbal advico that we have a positive interest in any such rights, and do not believe that .P.A's operations to Taiwan should be considered as preventing us from opérating any available China rights in some form,

Enc. DRY9.JC

Yours sincerely,

D.R.. luck Managing Director.

The original of thár letter doin C.1.A. 'Government S

D.C.A. Feund file 1946

い

Ref: 5/936/47.

1952.

COLONIAL GTCR LIVANI AT,

LONG fchG.

4th July, 1940.

с.

Dear Sir,

I am directed by the Governor to inform you that a comrunicntion dated the 27th May 1949, hao been received from hi Secretary of State for the Colonics concerning the áircursion.. which have taken place in London between principals of Hegras. Hour: Kong Airways and Kessrs. Cathay Pacific Airwnye and offler. from the Coloniel Cifice and the Ministry of Civil Aviation, ao.)- cerning the allocation of air routes based on Hong Kong.

י.

2. It oppears from this communication that a general aprtexti has been reached between Hong Kong Airways and Cathy Freific Airways, the main basis of which is that Cathay Pacific Airways chu exploit the area nouth of Hong Kong and that Hông Hoag Airagya al exploit the area north of liong Kong, and that any intrusion by one compary into the area of the other, except in the case of the service to Macao which it has already been greed should be oper: la by Hong Kong Airways, and the service to Kanila where both compania hold equal rights, shall be by agreement between the companier on reciprocal or other agreed basis.

3. I am to inform you that this Government accepto in pri.... the above described division of routes,

It is understood that the proposed initial division o. routes, as prepared jointly by the two principals is as follc.

(1) Cathay Pacific Airways. The following are the rou bet. the Southern sphere which C.F.A. have at present in m

Hongkong/Bangkok/Singapore. Hongkong/Singapore direct Hongkong/Seipon/Singapore.

Hongkong/Bangkok/Rangoon

longkong/Bangkok/Rangoon/Akyat/Calcutta.

Hongkong/Kanila,

Hongkong/French Indo-China.

Hongkong/North Borneo/Sarawak

Hongkong/Indonesia.

It is understood that as regards the route, llong kong/Indonesia, în Pacific Airways have agreed that it will bẻ undesirable for pres to be exercised to obtain rights for Cathey Iacific Airways to operate to Indonesia until such timo as in fact they were ready themselves to begin operations.

It is also understood that B.C.A.C. although designated lo operate Route No.3 in Schedule II of the Anglo Chinese Air Sprecngai (i.e. South China Seng Circular Route) have now relinquished their claim to this route,ns part of the general settlement, ever, be noted that the route between Hong Kong and Singapore in

It shou directions is an arm of the B.C.A.C. trunk route, and that the Corporation's trunk operatione on this route fall outside ties regional arrangements.

(11) Hong Kong Airways.

The following are the router i Northern sphere which Hong Kong Airwoys have at present in waist-

Hongkong/Canton

Hongkong/zapo

Hongkong/Chonghai

Hongkong/konilo

Hon komaźni

5. It de understood that boll companies have agreed that neåbher company chall make man-ncheduled flights into e territory of the other pave by prior agreemeab.

6. Azrancements are at prevent being made for the establishent by legislation of an Air Tra:sport Licenging Authority which rịn urant licencer' to air-carriera to maintain corkajn air-route ta

7. Tending the formation of this Air Transport Licensing Authpr107, This Government to now prepared, subject to diplomatie clearance where necezanty in respect of foreign territories, la grant to Hong Kong Airways and Cathay Pacific airwayo temporary permita to maintain the servicon detailed above, en condition that confirmation is obtained from both comoonies that ting egrae in principle with the provisions of this letter.

8. It is considered likely that the Air Transport Licencing Authority which is to be set up will accept jenerally the proposed division of routec, but since Government cannot commit theb Authority in advance, it would be propered to grant temporu, permits valid for one year. The licences grented by the Authorit will.probably be valid for five years and would be renownble.

9. It is considered desirable that fores should be agreed boleros the two Companies, and between the two Compunice and B.0.4.0. in casor where they operate the same or equivalent routes. Although 2.1.A. are not members of the 1.A.7.A. it in understood bhab in the discussions held in london, all rides exprecsed willin nece take part in a local Traffic Conference to agree rakos, 1 da proposed therefore that the licences to be issued wouli take cechizance of this undertaking and meuld provide tint, 15, the compenice fail to obtain agredrent, farer should te declied by + Licensing Authority or by the Governor after consultation with :41 parties concerned (it being understood of couro, Vint_345 the e of roubes operated under the terma or bilateral apri"ientu belm ilis Majesty's Government and foreign countries, fired are nor ""Gy subject to the approval of the Governments of the countrica wila parties to the agreement).

•

10. I am to add that this Government is in accord with Mis rojects': Government on the principles which should be followed in allocating routes to ilong Kong Companies:-

I. General Irinciples.

Both long distance Imperial Comunicablong on? locul nervi""" ? have their part to play in contributing to the ccononic well-left of the Colony. It is essential to the economic operation of tl. long distance Imperial routes thet B.C.A.C. should be stle, be enir, intör-stego as well as end-to-end and other long distnice brein. Regional operators may also operate on sectors of the trunk router prövided there is additional sector traffic which D.C.A.0. eranot take on its through services, or if there is a need for short- stace services or for services catering for differing clegres of traffic, in addition to, and not competing with, the trunk servisu. " The operetion of purely regional routes is primarily the preregutive of the Colonial operating companies and" not of 1.0.35.,

] though E.0.A.C, might in special circumstances operate regional

services at the request of the Colonial Government.

II.

Definition of Regional Routeg.

The following definition of remional youtes in the F ban been set out to show those router which is Frjesty'e "re.nobisfied should be left to the discrtion of ülis Gove... to allocate and those ou which Rig. Bajonly '" Government Wenla to be consulted, before authority to operate was given to ʼn loml Company:-

won

ነ

21/2

FED

British Embassy Stockholm

30 October 1972

JTT Boulton Esq

Aviation and Telecommunications Department FCO

SAS SERVICES TO CHINA AND HONG KONG

Thank you for your letter of 16 October to the Head of Chancery with its useful information about the visit of the Chinese civil air delegation to London last month.

2. I passed on the gist of your paragraph two to Jan Kronholm of the swedish Foreign Ministry. Ile seemed quite interested, but he commented that there was a considerable queue of countries wanting to negotiate air service agree- ments with the chinese and that both we and the Nordic countries were far down the list. He mentioned that china has recently concluded agreements on overflights with Iran and Turkey (presumably en route to Romania), and was actively negotiating with canada, Ethiopia and Switzerland. Kronhola himself is going to Oslo on 31 october to concert with the other scandinavian members of SAS the drafting of their Civil Aviation Agreement mentioned in Sheridants letter of 13 October to Cronartie), but he does not think that any substantive negotiations will begin until the spring of next year. Kronholm commented in passing that the Chinese were not really interested in joining ICAO in the near future. Their experience in international organisa- tions is limited and they are still feeling their way, and they are not at present looking beyond their next objective, which is membership of JMCO.

3. Kronholm also discussed the familiar problem of SAS rights to use Hong Kong, and the prospects for the talks scheduled to be held by SAS with the DTI on 21 November. He said he hoped that we would be more forthcoming on this occasion than we were in 1968. He felt in particular that the argument that Scandinavia could not generate sufficient traffic on an end-to-end basis to justify a service to Hong Kong would not really wash, since it was now standard civil aviation practice for long-distance services to pick up ad drop passengers en route, (ie in the Middle Fast and Indo- China in this case). This point will presumably be pressed in London. He added that the Nordic delegation would be

CONFIDENTIAL

led by Bogh, a Norwegian diplomat who is now a senior official in oslo after having spent several years as Counsellor in London. The Swedish component may well be led by the head of one of the divisions of the Commercial and Economic Section of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, named Herr Hans Everlöf, though this is not yet certain. Kronholm enquired whether these were big enough guns to set against a DTI Under-Secretary.

4. I enclose an extra copy of this letter.

Rnc

Copy to:

Chanceries

Oslo

Copenhagen

CRL de Chassiron

CONFIDENTIAL

3/56

CONFT DENTIAL

BRITISH EMBASSY

PEKING

2 November 1972

H 13 Davies Esq

Far Eastern Dept

FCO

Asar Hugh

ᅥ

*༧,།

2.D IN LEIN

R. RLU,

TRY NA 50

1972 !

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

Enter

I have amended in manuscript the record of the talk witte Chi,

in accordance with

1227(behind).

Pekking te wo

1. In addition to the official record of the Secretary of State's third meeting with Chi P'eng-fei, at which Chi raised the issue of Chinese representation in Hong Kong, we thought you and Hong Kong might like to have a full verbatim account of the exchange. I am therefore sending a copy to you and copying this letter and the transcript to Tim George. Also attached is a verbatim account of exchanges on the same subject between the P.U.S. and Chang Wen-chin.

c.c. T George Esq

Hong Kong

Yeurs sum

Xrichael

(M J Richardson)

CONFIDENIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTRACT FROM THE RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

AND HE THE FOREIGN MINISTER CHI P'ENG-FEI

TUESDAY 31 OCTOBER

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

trouble

Mr Chi said that since the Secretary of State had raised the question of a Consular Convention he thought it would be good to mention some other things in principle now. One of these questions was that of China setting up an official representative in Hong Kong. There was not much that they needed to discuss today about Hong Kong it self. The Chinese Government's policy

and they and line about Hong Kong was clear to the British Government whe thought the Balak) (understood, them, The present position of Hong Kong was a legacy

of the past. The Chinese Government felt that to help the authorities in Hong Kong to administer Hong Kong well so that there would be no unnecessary harm to relations between China and Britain, it was necessary to have an official Chinese

representative in Hong Kong. The Chinese side had raised this question in 1956 but up to now had not received a satisfactory

answer from the British Government. The Chinese side understood

that in the past there had been no satisfactory answer from the British Goverment because in those days Sino/British relations

were still in a state of semi-relations. Now the situation had

changed. The two countries had exchanged Ambassadors and had full diplomatic relations. It should therefore be easy to settle this question. Mr Royle when he came to China had had discussions with Vice-Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua on this question. The discussion between them had not been very happy. Mr Royle said that if a Chinese representative were posted to Hong Kong it would disturb the balance in Hong Kong and would result in more harm than good. The Chinese side failed to understand this view. Their view was different, contrary in fact. If there was a Chinese official representative in Hong Kong it

Hong Kong authorities

Some

to deal with any matters, and

would help the

facilitale

would help

at.

between

velopment of

/Sino/British

CONFIDENTIAL

Britain and

лей сніга

Sino/Zzstioh relations. He did not need to elaborate the

Bat

They

did

reasons for the necessity of a Chinese official representative in Hong Kong: if one were posted there he would be able to deal with problems such as communications, trade, travel, the water supply and border incidents. If a Chinese official

have timely discussone representative was there he could out with the Hong Kong authorities very kindly (sie), to solve these questions and

Bould not become complicated. If there was no such representative then things had to go through many processes and did not run so smoothly. Misunderstandings might result. There was for instance the question of civil aviation about which Britain hoped to negotiate with the Chinese Government. There was also the question of direct/communications between Hong Kong and Canton. So in terms of facilitating the settlement of these questions in good time, the presence of a Chinese official representative in Hong Kong would be good for

good Hong Kong and for relations between the two countries. Questions could be settled and understanding strengthened. That was why he wished to take this opportunity to raise this matter. Now was the time to solve this question. In the past

conditions and time had not been right. Now they were. Naturally concrete details could be settled between officials.

ripe

2. The Secretary of State said that he agreed with the Minister about the long-term handling of the Hong Kong situation. They both understood that now was not the time to raise that particular problem. Since Mr Royle's visit he had given very close and careful consideration to the question

raised with Mr Royle about a Chinese official representative. As the Minister knew, the Hong Kong situation was one of

extreme sensitivity and delicacy. Britain was now just beginning to mend her relations with China, which as he had

said the night before, had in the past been uneven. He did

2- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

/not.....

CONFIDENTIAL

not wish to disturb that process. He felt that any disturbance in Hong Kong would damage Sino/British relations

at a time when the British Government wished to build on what

they had begun. So he really had no more to add to what

Mr Royle had said, but he would take careful note of what the

Minister had said. He was afraid that the establishment of

such an office in Hong Kong could do great damage:

damage: he wanted Sino/British relations to proceed satisfactorily and he would

be anxious about them if he was to change his mind. He understood that in Hong Kong there was the Bank of China, the China Travel Service and the New China News Agency: they not function adequately? There were a lot of Chinese activities in Hong Kong covering the questions that the Minister had raised.

did

3. Mr Chi Peng-fei replied that these were professional organs which could not play an overall role. The Secretary

of State asked what an overall role would be? Mr Chi P'eng-fei

said that such a role would be to maintain normal relations

with the Hong Kong authorities, enter into consultations with them, to settle questions, to ask and receive instructions from their respective Governments. He thought that the Secretary of State's argument that the proposal would disturb the balance in Hong Kong was illogical. The Secretary of State had said that he would take notice of what he said, but he would also respect what Mr Royle had said. There was not much reason in this. The Chinese side placed hopes that relations between the two countries would develop. But besides economic and cultural links there was the concrete

situation in Hong Kong. In Hong Kong many diverse affairs

had

ધર્મ ના

needed to be handled. If there was no Chinese official representation it would affect the two countries, rationu, The Seratami

was very clear about the policies

/settlement of

Chinese devernment towards Hong Kong.

The

- 3 - CONFIDENTIAL

/the.

CONFIDENTIAL

What he

the Hong Kong question was a matter of the future. was now asking for was no more than the appointment of an official Chinese representative, to facilitate the

about Mage)

administration (Chinese (sic) in Hong Kong, to know their conditions, to settle questions, and deal with business. Nothing else. If there was a Chinese official representative in Hong Kong, order in Hong Kong would be improved. Take the situation in 1967.

967. The British side was not satisfied with that situation. The Chinese side regretted it too. That situation broke out because there was no overall Chinese official representati on in Hong Kong to take care of such things. If there had been such incidents could have been avoided. So the setting up of an official Chinese representative in Hong Kong would do only good and no harm: the Secretary of State could rest assured about that. The Secretary of State had said that relations between Britain and China should develop and he was discussing this question very frankly. The Secretary of State might think that in proposing this question the Chinese side had an ulterior motive. But their purpose was only to help the Hong Kong authorities and to settle questions together with them, so that things in Hong Kong could be better.

Kong could be better. To look at it in another aspect, he might say that the Secretary of State had expressed the wish that relations between Britain and China should develop. Relations between Britain and China were no mal now. Many countries maintained official offices in Hong Kong but not China. This was illogical and unreasonable. He did not understand why the British side should have set up such a barrier It was not compatible with reason and equality. The Chinese view was that the

on this quaskan

setting up of an official Chinese representative would be only beneficial and would bring no harm. In 1956 it had not been possible to come to an agreement on this issue and that was understandable in view of conditions at that time.

But now

the relationship between Britain and China had developed

- 4-

CONFIDENTIAL

/further....

CONFIDENTIAL

there

further. If this question remained unsolved things would be

problems

happen, which might lead to unpleasant things between the two Governments not too serious but nevertheless unpleasant.

That was what he meant when he said that it was time to settle

the question. The overall role of a Chinese official representative in Hong Kong would not be anything special: he would just be in general charge of Chinese Government

affairs there. Now was the time for serious discussion on

this matter, which would be good for relations between the

two countries.

The Secretary of State said that he would be equally

frank. He himself attached great importance to the creation of a most intimate relationship with China, This was something

which in the two years since they had taken office the

Conservative Government had paid much attention to. Even given

that desire, it had not been an easy political decision, a very

difficult one in fact, when they had decided to end their

previous position on Taiwan and say that Taiwan was part of

China, and to remove their Consulate in Taiwan. This was a

big decision in relation to what had gone before. The Briti ah

people needed time to get used to this view and to a fuller

relationship with China. The change had been made by a

Conservative Government. He looked upon the absence of any friction in the years ahead in this regard as an overriding

political consideration: no friction should disturb this

improvement. The Hong Kong situation was a sensitive one. He had therefore to say that although he noted the Minister's intentions, and the interpretation he put on the function of the individual whom he was asking should be appointed in Hong

Kong, to take charge of Chinese affairs, he could not feel that

the time was safe to do such a thing now. So he took note of

what the Minister had said, but taking Britain's relations with China into account to the fullest possible extent, he had to say no to the Minister's request.

- 5 -

CONFIDENTIAL

15.....

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Chi P'eng-fei said that the Secretary of State had said that it would not be safe to do such a thing now. In what way would it not be safe? The Secretary of State said that it would perhaps be better to change the word to desirable. He thought that the proposal could cause friction within Hong Kong and the last thing he wished to see was friction which could disturb the relations between the two

countries. Any such friction would cause worry at home after what had been a big change in Britain's policy to China.

Time

was a great healer.

6. Kr Chi P'eng-fei said that the Chinese Government had

appreciated some of the policies which the Conservative Government had pursued since entering office, eg entry to the EEC and the improvement of relations with China. But his

impression was that the Government was still very conservative. They had decided on the principle of improving relations with China Why did they do so in such small paces and not bigger ones? They

They might be left behind, Negotiations between the two countries about diplomatic relations had not come to a head because for 22 years the British had not been able to take a decision over representation on Taiwan. The Chinese side

appreciated the British change in policy, but only so long as it meant going forward. They thought generally that they were still behind the times. Only when other countries had recognised

China did Britain catch up. Over Hong Kong they had again

adopted the policy of waiting for the times. The Chinese side was not making any request. He thought it was entirely proper for the Chinese Government to raise this question. He raised it in the spirit of wanting to develop the friendly relations

alt and go forward, between the two countries. The Secretary of State had referred to loss of balance and lack of safety. He believed that his observation of the Hong Kong situation was not in accord with reality. The Secretary of State had said that he did not want friction in Hong Kong. If the question was left unsolved

/frictions....

- 6 -

CONFIDENTIAL

They

frictions would naturally arise. The Chinese side could not guarantee that frictions would not arise. So in raising this question they had no intentions other than to facilitate

relations between the two countries. The British Government

Was ciege quout The Chinese Government's general policy

were in no hurry to recover Hong Kong. They proposed to have

an official Chinese representative in Hong Kong only to help in various respects in Hong Kong, and the official representative

would be able to explain the policies of the Chinese Government

to the Chinese people in Hong Kong: they would tell them about

the new relations between China and Britain to help get rid of the old concepts. These old concepts were quite deep-rooted

among the masses.

no friction.

Otherwise it was only empty words to talk of

He wanted to explore this question with the Secretary of State. If the Secretary of State felt that the time was not ripe to discuss it and preferred to wait, then it was his business. But he wished to make clear in advance that if anything should happen in Hong Kong he could say that they had already had frank discussions on this subject with him and that the British side would shoulder more responsibility, for the situation would be such that the Chinese would be unable

to help.

8. This was a big question, a question of principle, to which the Secretary of State's Government had no doubt already given preliminary considerations. It was not some thing that

wished to make ở vòng sleep in advance) they could decide today. But he hoped that the Secretary of

to the matter, explain the Chunast việu State ould give serious consideration and (reconsider, and respond in) (the spirit of better relations.

-proved

The Secretary of State said that he took note of what Mr Chi had said.

- 7 -

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTRACT FROM THE RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PERMANENT UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE AND H E ASSISTANT MINISTER CHANG WEN-CHIN - TUESDAY 31 OCTOBER 1972

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

1. Mr Chang said he wished to raise another question which concerned Hong Kong. Civil aviation links had already been discussed and there was also the question of through trains between Canton and Hong Kong. There were connections between this and the question of sending an official Chinese representative to Hong Kong. In Hong Kong China already had Government-run agencies and enterprises: all were separate institutions and none had an overall responsibility. Questions of shipping and travel, for example, were separately handled by China and this was not the best method. That morning, Sir Alec had said the presence of an official representative could give rise to friction in Hong Kong: Mr Chang could not understand what this friction would be.

2. Mr Chang said as relations between the UK and China improved, more matters arose in connection with Hong Kong. Each had to be dealt with by a separate institution, although some were beyond the capacity of an interested agency.

If merchant ships carried passengers the shipping company could not deal with them. Similarly, an airline would carry passengers needing visas. This problem would increase as China began receiving more tourists. In 1956

agreement had been reached on a direct train service to

Hong Kong and some technical arrangements had been made.

Because the Hong Kong side wished to restrict the number of passengers from the Chinese hinterland, the agreement had never come into force. China had no desire to send

/large.....

CONFIDENTIAL

large numbers of passengers to Hong Kong to intensify the housing problems which already existed. China could not agree to any method of balancing numbers entering and leaving China. That method was too rigid and would only create difficulties. All these problems were connected to the matter of representation in Hong Kong. As such problems multiplied there would be more need of this

It would not create problems, but would

Facts bore

representation.

help affairs to develop more harmoniously.

that out.

3. The PUS said that the Secretary of State had taken note of Mr Chi's remarks at the morning meeting. He would now inform the Secretary of State of the additional points made by Mr Chang. Mr Chang said he appreciated that this question could not be settled on the spot. He hoped the British side would continue to exchange ideas with the Chinese side in order to identify the problems

and reach a suitable arrangement.

IMEDIATE CYPHER CAT A

FM PEKING 030939Z

CONFIDENTIAL

1972

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELEGRAM NO 1227 OF 3 NOVEMBER AND TO

IMMEDIATE HONG KONG

RICHARDSON'S LETTER 3/56 OF 2 NOVEMBER TO DAVIES, FED,

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.

Mr Davies

1. PLEASE MAKE THE FOLLOWING CORRECTIONS TO THE VERBATIM ACCOUNT OF EXCHANGES ON THIS SUBJECT ENCLOSED WITH LETTER UNDER REFERENCE.

2. PARA 1.

LINE 7: FOR WHO UNDERSTOOD THEM' READ AND THEY THOUGHT

THE BRITISH UNDERSTOOD''.

LINE11 FOR UNNECESSARY HARM'' READ '' "TROUBLE''.

LINE 29: FOR ** MANY'' READ ''SOME'', FOR HELP THE

DEVELOPMENT OF SINO-BRITISH RELATIONS** READ ** FACILITATE

RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND CHINA''.

LINE 35: FOR CONSULT'''READ '' HAVE TIMELY DISCUSSIONS**.

LINE 36: DELETE '

DELETE '' VERY KINDLY (SIC) ''. FOR AND THINGS

WOULD'' READ '' SO THAT THEY DID'

LINE 42: FOR ''DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS'' READ '' DIRECT RAIL

COMMUNICATIONS''.

ZCLINE 461 FOR ** AND FOR** READ AND GOOD FOR**

LINE 56: FOR "

'RIGHT'* READ ** RIPE

RIPESS

4. PARA 3.

LINE 17: FOR '' AFFECT THE 2 COUNTRIES' RELATIONS' READ

'' AFFECT OFFICIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE 2 COUNTRIES''.

LINE 18: FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS VERY CLEAR ABOUT THE POLICIES OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT TOWARDS HONG KONG** READ ** THE CHINESE HAD MADE VERY CLEAR THEIR POLICY TOWARDS

HONG KONG.

LINE 19: FOR ' A SETTLEMENT READ THE SETTLEMENT'', LINE 23: FOR ** OF CHINESE (SIC)** READ ABOUT THOSE CHINESE (SIC) ''.

LINE 48: FOR SUCH A BARRIER'' READ ** A BARRIER ON THIS

QUESTION''.

CONFIDENTIAL

/LINE 55

CONFIDENTIAL

LINE 551 FOR '' THINGS WOULD HAPPEN'', READ'' THÈRE

WOULD BE PROBLEMS',

LINE 57: DELETE" NEVERTHELESS''

5. PARA 6.

LINE 20: FOR

FOR '' BETWEEN THE 2 COUNTRIES READ BETWEEN THE

2 COUNTRIES, TO COOPERATE AND GO, FORWARD*'.

DELETE ** THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WAS CLEAR ABOUT'.

READ.'' GENERAL POLICY WAS

LINE 28:

LINE 29:

FOR ''GENERAL POLICY

CLEAR"".

6. PARA 7.

LINE 6: FOR '' WITH HIM AND READ ** WITH HIM BEFORE

HAND AND'.

7. PARA 8.

LINE 4: FOR BUT HE HOPED THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE WOULD GIVE IT SERIOUS CONSIDERATION AND RECONSIDER IT IN THE PSIRIT OF BETTER RELATIONS' READ ** HE WISHED TO MAKE IT VERY CLEAR

IN ADVANCE THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE SHOULD GIVE SERIOUS

CONSIDERATION TO THE MATTER, EXPLAIN THE CHINESE VIEW, RECONSIDER, AND RESPOND IN THE SPIRIT OF IMPROVED RELATIONS". ADDIS

FILES.

FED

-2- CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

M PEKING 030938Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COAT

1972

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELEGRAM NO 1227 OF 3 NOVEMBER AND TO

IMMEDIATE HONG KONG

RICHARDSON'S LETTER 3/56 OF 2 NOVEMBER TO DAVIES, FED,

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG,

1. PLEASE MAKE THE FOLLOWING CORRECTIONS TO THE VERBATIM ACCOUNT OF EXCHANGES ON THIS SUBJECT ENCLOSED WITH LETTER UNDER REFERENCE.

2. PARA 1.

LINE 7: FOR

FOR WHO UNDERSTOOD THEM** READ AND THEY THOUGHT

THE BRITISH UNDERSTOOD''.

UNNECESSARY HARM** READ '' TROUBLE".

LINE11 FOR

LINE 29: FOR MANY'' READ ''SOME''. DEVELOPMENT OF SINO-BRITISH RELATIONS RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND CHINA''. LINE 35: FOR

LINE 36:

CONSULT''READ

FOR >

'' HELP THE

READ

FACILITATE

HAVE TIMELY DISCUSSIONS''.

DELETE ** VERY KINDLY (SIC) "'. FOR " AND THINGS

WOULD'' READ SO THAT THEY DI D'

LINE 42: FOR DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS'' READ '' DIRECT RAIL

COMMUNICATIONS''.

ZCLINE 46: FOR AND FOR" READ AND GOOD FOR".

LINE 50 FOR ''RIGHT' READ "' RIPESS.

4. PARA 3.

LINE 171 FOR '' AFFECT THE 2 COUNTRIES' RELATIONS** READ * AFFECT OFFICIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE 2 COUNTRIES''. LINE 18: FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS VERY CLEAR ABOUT THE POLICIES OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT TOWARDS HONG KONG'' READ THE CHINESE HAD MADE VERY CLEAR THEIR POLICY TOWARDS HONG KONG.

וי

LINE 19: FOR * A SETTLEMENT READ THE SETTLEMENT''. LINE 23: FOR OF CHINESE (SIC)

'' OF CHINESE (SIC)'' READ ABOUT THOSE CHINESE (SIC) ''.

LINE 491 *.

FOR SUCH A BARRIER** READ A BARRIER ON THIS

QUESTION''.

CONFIDENTIAL

/LINE 55

CONFIDENTIAL

LINE 55: FOR ** THINGS WOULD HAPPEN'', READ'' THERE

WOULD BE PROBLEMS.

LINE 571 DELETE NEVERTHELESS'

5. PARA 6.

LINE 20: FOR

BETWEEN THE 2 COUNTRIES'' READ " BETWEEN THE

2 COUNTRIES, TO COOPERATE AND GO, FORWARD**.

LINE 28

DÉLETE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WAS CLEAR ABOUT''

LINE 29: FOR ''GENERAL POLICY ** READ.'' GENERAL POLICY WAS

CLEAR''.

6. PARA 7.

LINE 6: FOR" WITH HIM AND'' READ * WITH HIM BEFORE

HAND AND''

7. PARA 8.

LINE 4: FOR BUT HE HOPED THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE WOULD GIVE IT SERIOUS CONSIDERATION AND RECONSIDER IT IN THE PSIRIT OF BETTER RELATIONS' READ HE WISHED TO MAKE IT VERY CLEAR IN ADVANCE THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE SHOULD GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE MATTER, EXPLAIN THE CHINESE VIEW, RECONSIDER, AND RESPOND IN THE SPIRIT OF IMPROVED RELATIONS'', ADDIS

FILES.

FED

-2- CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

E HỒNG KONG G163597

CONFIDENTIAL

KOUTING

CONFIDENTIAL

Enter FED

You

TO/F C O TELNO 1898 OF 1ST NOVEMBER, 1972. INFO ROUTINE PEKING BERME AND BCARFE.

180

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 923 AND PEKING TELEGRAM NO. 1159 TO YOU.

HONG KONG/CHINA AIR SERVICES.

WE KNOW OF NO SUCH APPROVAL FROM THE CHINESE AUTHORITIES AND THINK IT UNLIKELY AT THIS STAGE IT WOULD BE GIVEN.

2. APART FROM OPERATIONAL DIFFICULTIES HERE, C.P.A. AND PROBABLY HONG KONG AIR INTERNATIONAL WOULD OBJECT STRONGLY TO THE

PROPOSAL WHICH COULD JEOPARDISE LONGER TERM PROSPECTS OF SCHEDULED ARRANGEMENTS.

3. WE AGREE WITH PARAGRAPH 2 OF PEKING TELEGRAM 1159 AND CONSIDER THAT AN APPLICATION TO THE HONG KONG D.C.A. FOR APPROVAL OF AN UNSCHEDULED SERVICE AS DESCRIBED WOULD ALSO BE UNREALISTIC.

FCO PASS COPY HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICE LONDON.

MACLEHOSE

FILES

ATD

MKIOD

VED

FED

MR BOTTOMLEY

NR WHITEHEAD

(PASSED AS REQUESTED]

COPY TO:

HONG KONG GOVERNMENT

OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

LONDON W 1

MR J STEPHENSON

CA2 DTI

SHELL MEX HOUSE

MR SHARD CRE ↳ DTI

PRIORITY

CYPHER CAT A

FM PEKING 270633Z

RESTRICTED

1972

TOP COPY

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 1159 OF 27 OCTOBER/INFO PRIORITS HONG KONG, BCARFE HONG KONG AND ROUTINE BERNE.

YOUR TELNO 923.

HONG KONG/CANTON AIR SERVICES BY SWISS COMPANY

RY No.50

¿1972

1. WE ARE SURE THAT THIS NEWS WILL STIMULATE FURTHER ACTION FROM CPA (HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO 781) AND HONG KONG AIR INTERNAT- IONAL (HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO 735). IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO KNOW WHETHER THE SWISS COMPANY HAVE RECEIVED THE APPROVAL OF THE CHINESE AUTHORITIES FOR SUCH FLIGHTS. IF THEY HAVE NOT, IT IS CLEARLY IMPRACTICAL FOR THEM TO COMMENCE THE SERVICE DURING THE CURRENT CANTON FAIR WHICH ENDS ON 15 NOVEMBER.

2. IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY SINO/BRITISH CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT, THE APPLICATION SEEMS UNREAL.

ADDI S

[

FILES

FED

A & T D HKIOD

MR WILFORD

MR WHITEHEAD

RESTRICTED

CONFIDENTIAL

Thankyou.

A.R.

Mr Logán

I attach an exchange of telegrams we have had on a

personal basis with the Governor of Hong Kong.

I think that Mr Royle will wish to know about this mysterious

affair before he visits Hong Kong.

26 October 1972

Mani

Eric Norris

REUVED IN

RG NYN *0 ว

FGH 2√20.

You. Exam's

پیرا

RE. 31/10

Miss Kyle Prith Microw's

Deyyes.

2/2

FED {

enter

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

CHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

FM F.C.0, 25172OZ

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL

1972

TO PRIORITY HONG KONG TELNO 932 OF 25 OCTOBER/INFO PRIORITY PEKING (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR).

PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR FROM NORRIS.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 967.

I HAVE HAD NO CONVERSATIONS ON SUBJECT WITH NETHERLANDS WABASSADOR, BUT HIS MINISTER, HUYDECOPER, CALLS REGULARLY FOR A GENERAL RUN OVER ASIAN AFFARIS,

2. Oil 3 OCTOBER HUYDECOPER, DURING ONE OF THESE TALKS, ASKED ABOUT THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO PEKING. เม PARTICULAR HE ASKED WHETHER WE EXPECTED HONG KONG TO BE DISCUSSED. I SAID THAT I DOUBTED WHETHER THE SECRETARY OF STATE WOULD RAISE IT HIMSELF, BUT IT WAS OF COURSE POSSIBLE AND PERHAPS LIKELY THAT THE CHINESE MIGHT DO SO, HE ASKED WHETHER IT HAD BEEN RAISED DURING MR ROYLE'S VISIT AND PSPECIFICALLY (SOMEWHAT TO MY SURPRISE) WHETHER QUESTION OF CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG HAD BEEN MENTIONED, I REPLIED THAT HONG KONG HAD BEEN DISCUSSED BRIEFLY IN SOME ASPECTS, THAT THE ATMOSPHERE HAD NOT BEEN HEATED, AND THAT NO SPECIFIC REQUESTS OR PROPOSALS WERE MADE. WE DISCUSSED BRIEFLY THE DIFFICULTIES WE WOULD SEE IN AGREEING TO A CHINESE REQUEST FOR REPRESENTATION IF ONE WERE MADE.

3. AT MY REQUEST HUYDECOPER CALLED TO-DAY HE SHOWED ME COPY OF

REPORT OF THIS CONVERSATION, WHICH ACCURATELY RECORDS IT AS SET OUT ABOVE. HE WAS AT A LOSS TO UNDERSTAND HOW THE CONSUL GENERAL (WHO HAD HAD COPY OF THIS PART OF HUYDECOPER'S LETTER) HAD GOT IMPRESSION YOU REPORT,

CONFIDENTIAL

4. I ASKED HUYDECOPER WHETHER IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT THERE HAD BEEN ANOTHER CONVERSATION WHICH THE CONSUL GENERAL KNEW OF AND HAD CONFUSED WITH OURS. HE REPLIED HE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF ONE. I ALSO ASKED HIM WHAT HAD LED HIM TO RAISE QUESTION OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION. HE REPLIED IT WAS COMMON SUBJECT OF SPECULATION AND REFERRED ME TO ARTICLE BY RICHARD HUGHES IN SUPPLEMENT IN LONDON V TIMES OF 21 OCTOBER AS EXAMPLE OF OPEN SPECULATION ON THE SUBJECT.

5. HUYDECOPER SAID HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY TAKE STEPS TO PUT RIGHT CONSUL GENERALS MISUNDERSTANDING, HE WAS HOWEVER CONFIDENT THAT

THE CONSUL GENERAL WOULD NOT DISCUSS QUESTION OUTSIDE BRITISH

OFFICIAL CIRCLES.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES:

SIR E NORRTS

KR WILFORD HD / HKIOD HD / FED

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

CYPHER CAT A

FM FCO 231100Z

CONFIDENTIAL

1972

TO PRIORITY GOVERNOR HONG KONG TELNO 919 OF 23 OCTOBER INFO PEKING

(PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)

YOUR TELNO 967

FOLLOWING FROM WILFORD

SIR. E. NORRIS IS ON LEAVE TILL 25 OCTOBER AND I CANNOT DO ANYTHING TILL HE RETURNS. I FULLY SHARE YOUR CONCERN.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES

HEAD HK I OD

HEAD FED

SIR E NORRIS

MR WILFORD

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY CYPHER/CAT A

FM HOM KUNG 210419Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY F C O TELNO 967 OF 21ST OCTOBER, 1972. INFO PRIORITY PEKING(PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR).

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR SIR ERIC NORRIS.

THE NETHERLANDS CONSUL-GENERAL HAS ASKED US FOR CONFIRMATION THAT WE HAVE HAD AN OFFICIAL REQUEST FOR CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG, AND THAT IT WAS REJECTED DURING MR. ROYLE'S VISIT. HE QUOTED YOU AS THE SOURCE, VIA THE AMBASSADOR IN LONDON.

2. WE HAVE EXPLAINED THE SENSITIVITY OF THE ISSUE TO HIM AND THE DAMAGE THAT COULD BE DONE BY PUBLIC DISCUSSION, AND NOW HOPE KE WILL NOT SPREAD THIS SCOOP AMONGST HIS COLLEAGUES.

3. IF YOU HAVE IN FACT SPOKEN IN THIS SENSE TO ANYONE, I DO THINK YOU SHOULD CONSIDER THE ADVISIBILITY OF PUTTING A STOPPER IN THEM. IF THE ISSUE ONCE GETS INTO THE PRESS, OR THE CHINESE BELIEVE THAT IT IS GENERALLY KNOWN AMONGST DIPLOMATS, IT WOULD BE A NEW AND COMPLICATING FACTOR FOR THEM. BOTH THEY AND WE HAVE SO FAR BEEN EQUALLY CAREFUL TO AVOID THIS HAPPENING.

4. OF COURSE IF THEY CONCLUDED THAT THE STORY WAS BEING SPREAD BY US, AND IN BREACH OF CONFIDENCE, FOR SOME REASONS OF OUR OWN,

IT COULD COMPLICATE MATTERS STILL FURTHER.

MACLEHOSE

FILES

HEAD H KI OD

HEAD FED

MR WILFORD

SIR E NORRIS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

CONFIDENTIAL

38.

CONFIDENTIAL

(83

BRIEF NO 9

MR ROYLE'S VISIT TO HONG KONG:

11 15 NOVEMBER 1972

HONG KONG/CANTON AIR LINK

1. This question must be considered in the context of the

inter-governmental Air Services Agreement which we hope to

negotiate with the Chinese in the near future. A preliminary

meeting was held between DTI officials and the CAAC Delegation

which visited the United Kingdom in September.

The DTI team

received the firm impression that the Chinese wanted an Air

Services Agreement but that they were not prepared to discuss

substantive points during the preliminary meeting.

2. The Hong Kong-Canton link is not the first priority for us

in negotiating an ASA. Our first priority should be a BOAC route

to Peking, although BOAC's first preference is to enter China via

Hong Kong. Whichever way one considers it Hong Kong considerably

complicates the question of the Air Services Agreement. First

the Chinese regard Hong Kong as an integral part of China. The

CAAC delegation told the DTI that in their view we would have two

points in China, ie Hong Kong and another point. In discussions

with the Canadians the Chinese have said that routeings between

Hong Kong and points in China would be regarded as internal

routeings. We shall clearly face problems on this point when

negotiations begin.

CONFIDENTIAL

14.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. There are also internal Hong Kong complications. Cathay Pacific Airways (CPA) have informed the Hong Kong Government that

they claim sole rights for any direct service between Hong Kong

and China on the grounds that they had taken over the previously

designated carrier Hong Kong Airways. Hong Kong Air International (Sir John Clague's helicopter company) has also formally expressed

interest in a route between Hong Kong and Canton. The DAI will

have to sort out the respective claims. A Swiss Company Bodmer

Air Taxi has now written to the DTI seeking permission to operate

an air service between Hong Kong and Canton at the times of the

Canton Fair. We await the Governor's views on this, but we should

obviously prefer such a service to be operated by British or Hong

Kong carriera. A draft Air Services Agreement for transmission to

the Chinese in the near future is in course of preparation. The

DTI cannot yet forecast a date when substantive negotiations will

begin.

CONFIDENTIAL

Poভ

HK.

う

Cutting dated

DAILY MIRROR

11 NOV 1972

PEACE PROMISE

FOR HONG KONG

From WILLIAM WOLFF In Peking

CHAIRMAN MAO has ordered that his Communists are to cause no more trouble In Hong Kong.

The pledge was given to Portign Becretary Sir Alec Douglas-Bume in Peking yesterday.

Il aseena that China's claim that Hong Kong belongs to her hus been put on ice indefin- Itely.

Hao's assurance removes the last problem that clouded the relationship Bir Alee la now building with Mao'k ministers.

In return for the pÓN- Interference pledge" Bril- ain is quietly dropping the word Colony from new pasports saved in Beng Kong and from other cto- eini papers.

Cha

أنا

FRIORITY CYPHER/CAT A

RI FCO 241658Z

RESTRICTED

RE.

JER

R.G! TRY NG tuj

27 OCT 1972 Enter FED.

(ATD)

FEM 3/3.1.

19/22

TO PRIORITY HONG KONG TELNO 923 OF 24/10/INFO BGARFE (GOVERNOR PSE PASS) PEKING INFO SAVING BERNE.

HONG KONG/CHINA AIR SERVICES.

1. THE DTI HAVE RECIEVED A LETTER FROM A SWISS COMPANY, BOOMER AIR TAXI (H BODMER AND CO AG), ASKING PERMISSION TO OPERATE

A 40 SEAT AIRCRAFT FOR A ''REGULAR LINE SERVICE BETWEEN HONG KONG AND CANTON 1-4 TIMES A DAY DURING THE CHINESE EXPORT COMMODITIES FAIR.

2. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE SERVICE IS INTENDED TO BE A SCHEDULED OR NON-SCHEDULED OPERATION BUT THE DTI ARE INCLINED SIMPLY TO REFER THE APPLICANT TO YOUR DCA AS TILE AUTHORITY DEALING WITH NON-SCHEDULED TRAFFIC RIGHTS AT HONG KONG. HOWEVER IN VIEW OF THE NATURE OF THE APPLICATION THEY WOULD BE GLAD TO LEARN YOUR VIEWS. 3. NO DOUBT YOU WILL HAVE IN MIND THE INTERESTS OF HONG KONG- OPERATORS BOTH IN RELATION TO THE FAIR AND, IN THE LONGER TERM, TO CANTON. THE EXPERIENCE OF OPERATING TO CANTON FOR THE FAIR WOULD PRESUMABLY HAVE LONGER TER VALUE. THE CHINESE MIGHT FIND İT ODD IF WE WERE TO ALLOW A CHARTER SERVICE OPERATED BY A SWISS OPERATOR BEFORE WE HAVE ANY DIRECT SERVICES FROM HONG KONG* OF OUR OWN.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES

ATD

HKIOD

WED

FED

MR BOTTOMLEY MR WHITEHEAD

COPIES TO

MR J STEHENSON CA2 DTI SHELL MEX HOUSE MR SHARD CRE4 DTI

RESTRICTED

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

Ai F C O 201710Z

SECRET

(FEX

3/20/2

1972

TO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG TELNO 912 OF 23 OCTOBER/INFO IMMEDIATE PEKING,

FOLLOWING FOR POLITICAL ADVISER FROM FAR EASTERN DEPARTMENT,

CLARK'S LETTER TO YOU OF 11 OCTOBER:

SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO CHINA,

1. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE OPERATIVE PASSAGES ON CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG WHICH HAVE BEEN APPROVED FOR INCLUSION. IN THE BRIEFS CONCERNED.

(A) STEERING BAĪEF

BEGINS:

BY FAR THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE IS THE CHINESE PROPOSAL THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE AN OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN HONG KONG. THE SECRETARY OF STATE WILL NOT WISH TO BROACH THE SUBJECT HIMSELF. MR ROYLE TOLD CH'IAO KUAN-HUA THAT WE COULD

NOT ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL, BUT THE CHINESE HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY INTEND 10 REVERT TO IT. IF, AS SEEMS INEVITABLE, THE CHINESE DO SO, THE SECRETARY OF STATE WILL WISH TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE CHINESE THAT, WHILE HE HAS CAREFULLY CONSIDERED THE PROPOSAL, HE DOES NOT FEEL ABLE TO ACCEPT IT, ENDS.

-H

SECRET

/(B)

SECRET

(B) SUPPLEMENTARY BRIEF ON HONG KONG MATTERS.

BEGINST

CHINESE ARE VIRTUALLY CERTAIN TO BRING UP THEIR PROPOSAL THAT AN OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED HONG KONG. IF, BY SOME CHANCE, THEY DO NOT DO THIS, THE SECRETARY OF STATE WILL NOT WISH TO BROACH THE SUBJECT HIMSELF.

FOINT TO MAKE.

+ -

(1) WE HAVE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED THE PROPOSAL AND THE CONSIDERATIONS PUT BY THE VICE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO MR ROYLE WHEN THEY DISCUSSED THIS SUBJECT AT THE END OF MAY, (11) AS BOTH GOVERNMENTS ARE AWARE THE SITUATION IN HONG KONG, IS ONE OF GREAT DELICACY. IT WOULD, IN OUR VIEW, DE A MISTAKE TO DISTURB THIS SITUATION. ANY SUCH DISTURBANCE COULD

DO DAMAGE TO RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND CHINA AT A TIME WHEN BOTH GOVERNMENTS ARE KEEN TO MAINTAIN, AND BUILD ON, THE RECENT IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS, OUR FEAR IS THAT THE ESTABLISH- MENT OF A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

· IN HONG KONG COULD HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT SUFFICIENT PRACTICAL BENEFITS WOULD ACCRUE EITHER TO THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT OR TO THE BRITISH SIDE TO JUSTIFY THE RISK

OF SUCH AN APPOINTMENT. RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND CHINA ARE TOO IMPORTANT TO JUSTIFY THE INJECTION OF ANYTHING MICH MIGHT INFLUENCE THEM ADVERSELY.

(III) (IF PRESSED) THERE ARE ALREADY A LARGE NUMBER OF

CHINESE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN HONG KONG, WHO DEAL VERY

EFFICIENTLY WITH ALL PRACTICAL QUESTIONS OF COMMERCE, CULTURE, INFORMATION AND. TRANSPORT.

/(IV)

SECRET

(IV) (IF PRESSED) YOU HAVE MENTIONED THE PRESENCE IN HONG KONG OF A COMMISSIONER OF THE NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT FROM

1946 TO 1949. QUITE FRANKLY, THE ACTIVITIES OF THIS COMMISSIONER

CAUSED US A GOOD DEAL OF TROUBLE AND EMBARRASSMENT. WE DO NOT

THINK THAT A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CHINESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WOULD CAUSE US EMBARRASSMENT IN THE SAME WAY. NEVERTHELESS, WE BELIEVE THAT THE OVERRIDING CONSIDERATION MUST BE TO PRESERVE A SITUATION WHICH WORKS WELL AND WHOSE DISTURBANCE COULD DAMAGE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

(V) ( IF PRESSED TO RECONSIDER THE CHINESE PROPOSAL)

I HAVE TAKEN CAREFUL NOTE OF ALL YOU SAID.

ENDS.

2. IF YOU HAVE AN COMMENTS GRATEFUL TO RECEIVE THESE BY THE

END OF 23 OCTOBER.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES

FED

IKIOD

PS TO MR ROYLE

MR WILFORD

FFFFF

SECRET

Lung 'heung Daily News (Saturday 19/8/72)

Editorial:

Be on the alerti

Local Communists are now more wicked than in 1967

2/ OCT 1972 !

FEH 3/3.

There is no sign that the ambitions of Maoists in Hong Kong are being abandoned following the recent diplomatic thaw between Peking and London.

They will change their tactics but never their ultimate objectives which will be pursued according to the exigency of the situation.

Like other Western countries, Hong Kong has been the target of Peking's recent "smiling offensive" in an effort to court favour from the people,

of Hong Kong.. This mood of friendliness is diametrically opposite to that displayed in the 1967 episode.

Besides, local leftists are trying secretly to organise a series of "China tours" in a bid to secure the support of those who, they doen, can serve their interests best.

All these are geared to arousing a friendly feeling towards Peking on the part of the general public,making them forget the sins the Communists had done to Hong Kong previously, This is vividly manifested by the motto of "friendship first", echoed by the visiting Chinese table tennis team here recently and intended to cheat the people of Hong Kong.

Peking interprets "friendship" in terms of a total and unconditional submission to it; otherwise, it is "animosity".

A recent survey reveals that local Communists have succeeded in stepping up their infiltration into banking, trade and trade unions since the 1967 disturbances.

The increasing grip of the leftists in trade unions is shown by the fact that there is a substantial increase of membership in left-wing unions since 1968.

These findings point to the fact that the Communists are pursuing a double-faced strategy with the ultimate aim of controlling our economy, finance, education and industries.

The Colony's security will be jeopardised if only half of this malicious plot comes into fruition. Compared with their tactics used in 1967, this is far more wicked. Instead of advocating open rebellion, they are trying to subjugate Hong Kong by strangling its throat.

The public therefore ought to keep constant vigilance even in time of peace and prosperity so that they will not be caught unprepared by another crisis.

ра

Hongkong Times Monday, August 21, 1972.

Editorial:

Beware of local Commumiste

Don't forget the events of 1967

The paper warned that

Chinese Communists in Hong Kong

were still active in their subversive

and infiltration activities although

the 1967 disturbances was a matter of the past.

Both Government and residents

should be on the alert, or they would find it too late to regret when the

Communists aucceeded in their ultimate

goal of controlling Hong Kong, the paper said.

It pointed out that the Chines

Communists in Hong Kong were now using

different tactics from those they used

in 1967.

Instead of laying bomba and

creating bloodshed, they now resorted

to smiling faces and maska of

"friendship."

They were making an all-out

effort in the infiltration of workers,

hawkers, school children, intellectual

elements, and members of the sports

circle, the paper pointed out.

They also tried to pull into

their camp those influential members

of the community who were so shortsighte ed that could be easily lured with

profits.

All these activities were

part of their strategy in controlling

Hong Kong through economic and

political infiltrations, the paper

observed.

評社

一九六七年的一有的人也想要换和浴先战用,大談好,甚到不再歐到人提到

,好大七年畢動的黄岛完全忘坦丁· 刀子殺人不見血,共的类廣新刀乎良,的確然感了不少人, 大饼婺出笑臉,拉乎,到處和人大侠「次道」。常言崗軟袁傳地,這一小说?先學生,人數殊少,活動的發却大他們由一九六七年的露出長牙禨-喊打咪毅,代人算,一雙而學生組織和學生刊物,已被港共嘶業學生听神持,角毛共的洪宕的敦訊,但可惜到了今天,不少人邾息了警六类按帆小发而按蓄份小版市事,除非毒听于看不到這些事實。大萬岩 • 他们正如礁班时用一樣,正在「壇」內潑标向各海坑一些人之所以想了再忘尘,哺因之一★澮代改變了就要‧ 名的學把实,屹立添近剛覆滿地,蒐接六其影響。一些學校的三、這幾年來,馮先濃出了不少躪業學生,渗透到方千六七年的籌翀,對每一航正常的香港人都是一個宽裕「圖睹」、「五山」、伽2小威的對抗機米·高博也道二、小既也是滋於神送拉識的主乎對象之一。推共射小藏自

方起掀起了一场抛動,殺人佈陣,無所不滿,他們公蹉J‧搵一塲排亂,买了年,直到六八年了這不一批有背景有後台的橄榄息份子,由六七年五 .. 港阿肯行实。他們公開大誡:「剪不順,便走,工會內部,剿逬堵「孝啊」、「防間」等活動,無大狼沉,雙五伻逅一九六七年,黃鴻浸奎丁一次的澅和丶「度好」的ÿ,上部不建於力地在各方面単行周建樂好為音港,又把香港變成「失語」,望把售,其工會的力量,通過各種「減利」,脱妆工人參加工會,而在一、沸共主要治力酒是工人。沉幾年來,江洪大力遭美

不要忘記了一九六七年

用激情的「雙期」默阻人,於是在一些知餓衔于选于各概不玉,灘叔獎出一間「模ㄉ舟子 J灼偶蛋而孔行棘戰界:取笑面攻時,實在大陸的知津份于受毛謙导 , 但四、潜共鈡如鉛舟子的控業。最近把年,我略一面對樂

界。濞*活動的携律仍然為老一套:先滲透、姚鲜制。在被肉五、近年來,共也把神送的牙贴扮約轆實界和吃临

和港人物排行美肌。他們目標指向一些帆光慰肯而* 岸而灌水六、海大地柠海拼活動,也沒有立纪向上層社會的若干內近来出现了一些怪乳款,這便是排典活動的結果「,但仍有個別人入

催萬及的

·任何人必須作,五汴事敗取有共时我洶,否則,舷們將焦,集了正義和自由,躪站起来支持政府,亂才被É抑了下

。而目前的共刀子和人的手助,却會使卡本人庚庫,甚悦在岸複查亘中被俘斯及过衡而不自知一九六七年的炸彈公里,容易便人警醒,容易健人挑高警

. 途客制過而来上的涉想,最新的肉根是青联控前开, 己的力量及影響。第一步是进了第二步品控制,由捉濟上粉纪香港居民以光视共的底掌?.

這此地麻岸青海人,加以感動荆噙-結集自己的力量,擴大自岩先所有鋪坦活動,邮觋嚷着一個目的,一個殺署要求,

共康富你們安排好的埔幕中决。有一些人甚至和米共勾勾捕扰,末學去,他們正在一步步林

忘记的。糸·但我们赢就再一次提度一些人:一九六七年的我高是不肯五年制的排钆不少人是忘記了,有些人甚至不歡喜人提

當前的一些事實作苯如此,一些人在灕共君術前完全

2/ OCT MIZ

Editorials

Hong Kong's ct tus in the eyes of Peking

Wah Kiu Yat Fo (Friday 1/9/72)

It is interesting to note that local residents are now more confident over the future of Hong Kong and Kowloon after reading the Reuter's despatch which analyses China's attitude towards the status of Hong Kong and Kowloon on the strength of the new world atlas published in Peking.

No doubt, it would be encouraging if the real attitude of Peking towards our status turns out to be what Reuters reported. But it would be childish if we judge Peking's real attutude just from the new world atlas. The atlas may be good for some time, but Peking can change its attitude at any moment.

We are of the opinion that, because of the close relations between us and the China mainland, it needs Peking's understanding and co-operation if we want to maintain the status quo of Hong Kong and Kowloon,

Therefore we should try to take the initiative to ensure that China

would understand us and be willing to co-operate with us.

We also believe that Peking would respect the status quo of Hong Kong and Kowloon if this twin city is made healthy, peaceful and prosperous.

In order to achieve this, we should prepare bold and long-term plans, stamp out vices and crime, bridge the gap between the rich and the poor, stabilise our economic situation and instill a sense of responsibility among residents.

Tin Tin Yat Fo (1/9/72)

Judging from the new world atlas recently published in Peking, there is indication that Peking is not pursuing a hostile policy toward Hong Kong and Macau.

That Hong Kong is depicted as "busy place for tourism and trade" on the atlas represents Peking's acquiescence in preserving the status quo of the Colony.

Peking's Hong Kong policy seems to center on promoting trade and tourism here. In fact, the good trade relation between Hong Kong and Chira as well as the Colony's key international economic status can assure Hong Kong of a bright future despite any political factor.

Even let alone the vital economic ties between Hong Kong and Peking, the Colony's status quo is an asset to Peking for it can act as a thoroughfare with which Peking finds its way into the international political stage. It is also a buffer area for China in case of any internal upheaval.

/Though

filet pa

Poke

27/10

Though Peking is at present endeavouring to enlarge its foreign economic relations with other countries, Sino-British tie is now in its best form since 1949.

We think "China's needs" do not necessarily dictate the existence of Hong Kong because, as earlier explained, Hong Kong has its own raison détre both politically and economically.

It is absurd to say that Hong Kong has no bargaining power vis-a-vio China. The potentiality of the 4-million-strong population, with the military assistance the United States and various Pacific countries in case of need, makes us feel that Hong Kong is not a peaceful city without any defensive power.

Peking'a new world atlas and Hong Kong

The Reuter cable dateline Peking, August 30 on the new world atlas published in the Chinese capital was of common interest in many major right-wing and independent Chinese newspapers on Thursday, August 31. It was the lead story on the front page of Wah Kiu Yat Po, Kung Sheung Daily News, Ming Pao and Tin Tin Yat Po.

While Wah Kiu stressed in its headline that the atlas hinted that Peking would like to maintain the status quo of Hong Kong and Kowloon, Ming Pao, Tin Tin, Sing Pao and Sing Tao all emphasised that there was no mention in the atlas of Peking's intention to take back Hong Kong. Sing Pao added that Peking was believed to be prepared to let the lease run its course,

Kung Sheung's interpretation reflected in its headline was that the Chinese Communists no longer distorted the status quo of Hong Kong and at the same time evaded to mention anything about the lease period.

Both Kung Sheung and Ming Pao also highlighted the belief that Peking was maintaining a "one China, one Hong Kong" policy for the present.

[

Mr Clark

Mr Evans

rã

Mr Wil£órð

wiljora

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY ·

2/ OCT 12

HONG KONG/CHINA AIR LINK

1. On my minute of 11 October Mr Wilford asked to whom

CPA had expressed their claim for sole rights and on what

basis.

2. CPA wrote to the Hong Kong Financial Secretary on

11 August claiming the rights on historic grounds

since

178

D A

CPA had taken over an earlier company which held these

rights. Hong Kong reported this in their telegram No 781

and replied to CPA on 26 August saying that note had been

taken of their position but action must await the negotiation

of an Air Services Agreement with China. Our comment on the

CPA claim is contained in paragraph 3 of Mr Lush's letter of

22 September to Mr Stratton.

19 October 1972

H L1 Davies

Far Eastern Department

Ellark

201

The passage oix is a paraphrase. The exoci formula wred by

૯

Miñones

To mi Blunck appears in paragraph 2

[Feogo] of his lette of 26 August.

CONFIDENTIAL

Ri. Evans

२.

20 October, 1972.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Clark Mr Wilford

Mr. Stack Mr. Davies

JFED A.R.

Mr Logan

CC ALTO

(for reply to The

Wilford's engaing)

COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN HONG KONG AND CHINA

1. Mr Royle bas enquired what the present position is

regarding the proposed air shuttle service and the proposed

telex link between Hong Kong and Canton.

HONG KONG/CANTON AIR LINK

This question must be considered in the context of the

inter-governmental Air Services Agreement which we hope to

negotiate with the Chinese in the near future. A preliminary

meeting was held between DTI officials and the CAAC Delegation

which visited the United Kingdom in September. The DTI team

received the firm impression that the Chinese wanted an Air

Services Agreement but that they were not prepared to discuss

substantive points during the preliminary meeting.

3. The Hong Kong-Canton link is not the first priority for

us in negotiating an ASA. Our first priority should be a BOAC

route to reking, although BOAC's first preference is to enter

China via Hong Kong. Whichever way one considers it Hong Kong

considerably complicates the question of the Air Services Agreement.

First the Chinese regard Hong Kong as an integral part of China.

The CAAC delegation told the DTI that in their view we would have

two points in Chin, ie Hong Kong and another point.

CONFIDENTIAL

/discussions

CONFIDENTIAL

to whom and

mwhat

Das is

mi.

Plane

lis formed.

4.R.

discussions with the Canadians the Chinese have said that

routings between Hong Kong and points in China would be regarded

as internal routings. We shall clearly face problems on this

point when negotiations begin.

There are also internal Hong Kong complications. Cathay

Pacific Airways (CPA) have claimed sole rights for any direct

service between Hong Kong and China. Hong Kong Air International

(Sir John Clague's helicopter company) has also formally

expressed interest in a route between Hong Kong and Canton.

The DTI will have to sort out the respective claims.

5. The DTI in consultation with Aviation and Telecommunications

Department are preparing a draft Air Services Agreement for

transmission to the Chinese in the near future. They cannot yet

forecast a date when substantive negotiations will begin.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS LINK

6. The General Manager of Cable and Wireless in Hong Kong paid

a very successful visit to Canton at the invitation of the Kwang-

tung Administration of Telecommunications (KAT) in June, The

two sides agreed to consider the installation of a cable system

between Canton and Hong Kong, each side to carry out the works

on their own side of the border. KAT said that they intend to

route all Kwangtung international traffic via Hong Kong. They

envisaged that the cable would also carry telex and leased

circuits. They opposed Cable and Wireless's suggestion for a

tropospheric scatter or microwave link either on the whole

Hong Kong/Canton stretch or on the Hong Kong/Lowu stretch,

insisting (presumably for security reasons) on a cable all the

way. Under present traffic conditions the new cable will be

/uneconomic

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

uneconomic for Cable and Wireless but they believe that it is

a good opportunity to become involved in Chinese future overseas

communications activities. The Hong Kong Telephone Company

have already agreed to grant Cable and Wireless a sub licence to

operate the cable. Cable and Wireless have now formally informed

the Chinese that they are prepared to go ahead with the proposal.

The Chinese have not so far formally responded. The Deputy

Director of the KAT will visit Hong Kong with some of his staff

for seven days from 1 November, to visit Cable and Wireless

installations in the Colony, including their earth-satellite

stations.

They will also presumably continue their discussions

about collaboration with Cable and Wireless.

Aviation and Telecommunications Department and Hong Kong

and Indian Ocean Department concur.

H L1 Davies

11 October 1972

cc Mr Hervey

A&TD HKIOD

Far Eastern Department

Gellark m/w

- 3 -

CONFIDENTIAL

Guf the Off

SAFE

CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS

LIMITED

Union House. 9 Connaught Road, Hong Kong

14/8

IRA 6 see 'RÁ

2 SCR for filing

Lreceive to me

The Hon. C.P. Haddon-Cave, J.P., Financial Secretary,

Colonial Secretariat,

HONG KONG.

₤14/0

DES

7/934/49(5

Member of the Swire Group

P. O. Box 1

Gabler: AIRGATHAY

Telex: xx 3106

Answer Bach. SWIRE HKG Telephone: H-a50011

11th August 1972.

wey

Dear Philip,

-I confirmed

(a)

(b)

(c)

Alr Services to China

ula

I refer to my letter to you of 1st May, at which tins

that in our view any traffic rights which may becons available to a U.K./H.K. carrier for the operation of regional air services between Hong Kong and Canton or between Hong Kong and any other points in China should be available to Cathay Pacific, in that historically we are the U.K. and Hong Kong designated carrier for those routes;

that we have a positive interest in any such rights should they become available; and

we do not believe that our operations to Taiwan should be considered as preventing C.P.A. from operating any available China rights.

Some months have passed since I wrote the letter referred to above, and it now occurs to me that it may be desirable for us to more formally record our interest in some way, such as making formal application to the Hong Kong Licensing Authority for the appropriate licence.

ART REGIST

I would appreciate your guidance on this point,

REGISTRY

Yours sincerely,

ARD LETTER

CONFIDENTIAL

30.659.1A

DATE JEL 127

c.c. Director of Civil Aviation.

DRYB.JG

D.R.Y. Bluck Managing Director.

DES

ዶ.

CONFIDENTIAL

118

PRIORIT

CYPHER/CAT A

FM HONG KONG 261380 2

CONFIDENTIAL

REC > IN

142

1 SEP 1972

MUAY |301||

COPY

TO PRIORITY F C O TELNO 781 OF 26TH AUGUST, 1972. INFO ROUTINE PEKING AND B CARFE.

11D

MY TELNO 735.

AIR SERVICES TO CHINA.

.CPA (BLUCK) HAVE NOW WRITTEN FORMALLY CLAIMING RIGHTS TO ANY REGIONAL SERVICES BCTVEEN HONG KONG AND CANTON OR ANY OTHER POINTS IN CHINA AND EXPRESSING A POSITIVE INTEREST IN SUCH RIGHTS SHOULD THEY BECOME AVAILABLE. THEY SAY THAT HISTORICALLY THEY ARE THE UK AND HONG KONG DESIGNATED CARRIER FOR SUCIL ROUTES, STEMMING FROM THEIR PURCHASE OF HONG KONG AIRWAYS FROM BOAC IN 1959.

THEY ALSO SAY THAT THEY DO NOT BELIEVE'* THAT THEIR OPERATIONS TO TAIWAN SKOULD BE CONSIDERED AS PREVEUTING CPA FROM OPERATING ANY AVAILABLE CHINA RIGHTS.

2. WE HAVE AT THIS STAGE DONE NO MORE THAN ACKNOWLEDGE THIS COMMUNICATION AND HAVE INFORMED PLUCK THAT THE SUBSTANCE IS PEING PASSED ON TO YOU.

FCO PAGS COPY HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICE LONDON

HORHAN-WALKER

See also 1971 tel.

(124).

ce attacked to 124

P.A. here.

and H.K. views in (49

FILE A

VED

TKIOD

AATD

repied to CALDT,

COPIES TO

HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICE

CONFIDERITTAL

SCR 7/936/49

26th August, 1972

་

(151)

الله

see

This is in reply to your letter of 11th August to Philip Haddon-Cave about air services to China. is also by way of apology for not replying sooner to your -letter of 1st May. I can assure you that careful note of it was taken at the time (I can recall seeing it) but it then got rather buried on the file.

The position as we see it is as follows.

Nothing can be done about arranging air services to China until a formal Air Services Agreement has been negotiated between HMG and the CPG. HMG have expressed a firm desire to proceed with such negotiations but are still awaiting a firm response from the CPG.

(D.J.C. Jones)

D.R.Y. Bluck, Esq.. Hanaging Director

Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd, Union House,

9 Connaught Road Central, Hong Kong.

c.c. D.C.A.

DJCJ/11

VED IN

16 OCT 1972

Huy Bor

HUA

CONFIDENTIAL

انجھا کیا

134

MUA 4/301/1

K J Stratton Esq

Colonial Secretariat

Lower Albert Road

HONG KUNG

22 September 1972

See. ako (145)

des (143) - or Pahing.

·1248

Jetr

1. You wrote to Richard Evans on 18 August about the proposed air services agreement with China, and its impact on liong Kong. As you will have seen from our telegrams Numbers 722 to Peking and 794 to Hong Kong, we have already had a preliminary talk withịthe Chinese nud have the glimmerings of an idea of their likely titude towards ilong Kong and the Hong Rung/Taiwan service. 136)

2. We shall certainly see that the liong Kong interests you mentioned in your para (raph 3 will be borne in mind when we

We shall of come to the preparations for substantive talks. course consult both you and Peking before we reach this stage in order to give you an opportunity to comment on the line which our negotiators propose to take.

3. it is not strictly accurate to say, as you do in parn graph 3(a), that CPA possess the rights to operate regional services from Hong Kong to Chinn it is true that ilong Kong Airways was the British airline designated for such services under the previous air services agreement with China, which lapsed in 1951. The fact that CPA bought Hong Kong Airways 8 years after these rights had lapsed dues not give them any sort of legal claim to operate the service. The right to operate a service is not one that can be bought and sold; even the purchaser of an airline with existing rights is not automatically entitled to continue to operate them and, as BOAC have learned to their cost, iliG can even transfer existing rights from one nirlane to another without the consent of the deprived party.

4. No doubt CPA will make strenuous efforts to establish n claim to these routes, and it may be that their purchase of Hong Kong Airways will weigh with whoever has to make a final decision. We should, incidentally, be very interested to see a copy of Bluck's letter referred to in your telegram

/No 781.

CONFIDENT LAL

CONFIDENTIAL

No 781. But, as you say, the CPA service to Taipei makes it unlikely that the Chinese would agree to their being designated, ilong Kong Air international's bid certainly complicates the position, and Tommy Thomson has told me that Sir John Keswick has also expressed interest in ʼn service between Hong Kong and Canton.

5. You will no doubt be considering how to sort out this conflict of interests at your end. As seen from here, this would be better dune with the minimum of publicity. It would be somewhat artificial for the Hong Kong ATLA to have a formal hearing and award the licence to fly to Canton to a particular llong Kong airline when we are still very much in the dark as to what the Chinese will agree to,

Copied to:

Mi Morgan Esq PEKING

RM Evans Esq

For Eastern Dept

E O Laird Esq MKLOD

C D Lush

Aviation & Telecommunications Department

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

CYPHER CAT A

PM PEKING 280635Z

CONFIDENTIAL

RECE

1972

TO PRIORITY FCO TELEGRAM NO 1893 OF 20 OCTOBER INFO PRIORITY HONG KONG.

CHOU EN-LAI'S VIEWS ON HONG KONG.

Fall 3/22 FE$3

1. I ASKED TIMES CORRESPONDENT BONAVIA THIS MORNING TO TELL ME WHAT HAD BEEN SAID ON HONG KONG DURING LORD THOMSON'S MEETING WITH CHOU EN-LA) ON 13 OCTOBER.

BONAVIA SAID THAT IT WAS LORD THOMSON WHO RAISED THE QUESTION, ASKING PERSISTENTLY WHETHER CHOU COULD TELL HIM WHETHER HE WOULD BE WISE TO INVEST MONEY IN HONG KONG. CHOU REPLIED ON THE WHOLE EVASIVELY AND ON STOCK LINES, USING THE FORMULA THAT THE HONG KONG QUESTION WOULD BE SETTLED BY NEGOTIATION WHEN THE TIME WAS RIGHT, BONAVIA SAID THAT CHOU GAVE NO INDICATION

OF ANY TIMETABLE OR WHETHER THE EVENTUAL NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE CONCERMED WITH THE LEASED TERRITORIES ONLY OR THE WHOLE TERRITORY.

BONAVIA MADE NO REFERENCE TO THE QUESTION OF CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG AND I DID NOT THEREFORE QUESTION HIM ON THIS POINT.

ADDIS

FILES:

FED

HKIOD

NEWS DEPT

MR WILFORD

CONFIDENTIAL

نا

Xr Clark

Mr Evans

Mr Wilford

CONFIDENTIAL

F11-

HONG KONG/CHINA AIR LINK

1. On my minute of 11 October Kr #ilford asked to whom

CPA had expressed their clain for sole rights and on what

basis.

CPA wrote to the Hong Kong Financial secretary on

11 August claiming the rights on historic grounds

Bince

CPA had taken over an earlier company which held these

rights. Hong Kong reported this in their telegram No 781

and replied to CPA on 26 August saying that note had been

taken of their position but action must await the negotiation

of an Air Services Agreement with China, Our corrent on the

CPA claim is contained in paragraph 3 of Mr Lush's letter of

22 september to Mr Jtratton.

19 October 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

H L1 Davies

Far Eastern Department

Mr Clark

Mr Evans

Kr Milford

CONFIDENTIAL

HONG KONG/CHINA AIR LINK

1. On my minute of 11 October Kr "ilford asked to whom

CPA had expressed their clain for sole rights and on what

basis.

CPA wrote to the Hong Kong Financial Secretary on

11 August claiming the rights on historic grounds

since

GPA had taken over an earlier company which held these

rights. Hong Kong reported this in their telegram No 761

and replied to CPA on 26 Angust saying that note had been

taken of their position but action must await the negotiation

of an Air "ervices Agreement with China. Our comment on the

CPA claim is contained in paragraph 3 of Fr Lush's letter of

22 September to kr Stratton,

19 October 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

H L1 Davies

Far Eastern Department

Mr Clark

Mr Wilford

Mr Logan

COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN HONG KONG AND CHINA

RECE

......30

CT 1/2

FE # 3/31/2

1. Mr Royle bas enquired what the present position i

regarding the proposed air shuttle service and the proposed

telex link between Hong Kong and Canton.

HONG KONG/CANTON AIR LINK

2. This question must be considered in the context of the

inter-governmental Air Services Agreement which we hope to

negotiate with the Chinese in the near future. À preliminary

meeting was held between DTI officials and the CAAC Delegation

which visited the United Kingdom in September. The DTI team

received the firm impression that the Chinese wanted an áir

Services Agreement but that they were not prepared to discuss

substantive points during the preliminary meeting.

3. The Hong Kong-Canton link is not the first priority for

us in negotiating an ASA. Our first priority should be a BOAC

route to Peking, although BOAC's first preference is to enter

China via Hong Kong. Whichever way one considers it liong Kong

considerably complicates the question of the Air Services Agreement.

First the Chinese regard Hong Kong as an integral part of China.

The CAAC delegation told the DTI that in their view we would have

two points in Chine, ie Hong Kong and another point. in

CONFIDENTIAL

/discussions

discussione with the Canadians the Chinese have said that

routings between Hong Kong and points in China would be regar as internal routings. We shall clearly face problems on this point when negotiations begin,

4. There are also internal Hong Kong complications. Cathay Pacific Airways (CPA) have claimed sole rights for any direct service between Hong Kong and China. Hong Kong Air Internation (Sir John Clague's helicopter company) has also formally expressed interest in a route between Hong Kong and Canton.

The DFI will have to sort out the respective claims.

5. The DTI in consultation with Aviation and Telecommunications Department are preparing a draft Air Services Agreement for transmission to the Chinese in the near future. They cannot yel forecast a date when substantive negotiations will begin. TELECOMMUNICATIONS LINK

Kong pu

Kwan

The

6. The General Manager of Cable and Wireless in the

very successful visit to Canton at the invital.

tung Administration of Telecommunications (KAT) in June. two sides agreed to consider the installation of a cable syster between Canton and Hong Kong, each side to carry out the works on their own side of the border. KAT said that they intend to route all Kwangtung international traffic via Hong Kong. They envisaged that the cable would also carry telex and leased circuits. They opposed Cable and Wireless's suggestion for a tropospheric scatter or microwave link either on the whole Hong Kong/Canton stretch or on the Hong Kong/Lowu stretch, insisting (presumably for security reasons) on a cable all the

Under present traffic conditions the new cable will be

/uneconomic

way.

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

uneconomic for Cable and Wireless but they believe that it i

a good opportunity to become involved in Chinese future over

communications activities. The Hong Kong Telephone Company

have already agrred to grant Cable and Wireless a qui licer:

operate the cable. Cable and Wireless have now formally in

the Chinese that they are prepared to go ahead with the pro,

The Chinese have not so far formally responded. The Deputy

Director of the KAT will visit Hong Kong with some ni his et

for seven days from 1 November, to visit Cable and Wireless

installations in the Colony, including their earth-satellit-

stations.

They will also presumably continue their discussion

about collaboration with Cable and Wireless.

Aviation and Telecommunications Department and liong Ker

and Indian Ocean Department concur.

11 October 1972

cc Mr Hervey

A&TD HKIOD

H L1 Davies

Far Eastern Department

-3-

CONFIDENTIAL

CABLE A.

MINILLIGS LIMITED

MERCURY HOUS .HEOBALDS ROAD LONDON WC1

TELEGRAMS | CABLEWIRE LONDON WOI

TELEPHONE: ON242 4433 · LONDON TELEK 23181 (AQMIN. ONLY)

Please reply to the Secretary quoting referance and date

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No.42

No 1 Whitby

Department of Trade and Industry Export and Livmuslint Dojunctmout Norman Shaw New Building

Victoria Embankment

LONDON WC2

001

Mr W G Moore

9 OCT 1972

OPS/AWS

RECEIVED IN

!R.. Y

68etober 1972

Foreign & Commonwealth Offic04, OCT 1972

Dear Sir

EXPORT ENDÁROS

Ri Copy enterest gestoday? Mr Ecompton RC

Enter

With reference to our telephone conversation of yesterday, this letter is to confirm that we have reached conditional agreement with the Chinese Tolecommunicationa Administration in Kwangchow for the provision of a land coaxial cable system between liong Kong and China. An initial route survey has been completed to our satisfaction and we are now seeking quotations from manufacturers for La suitable coaxial cable system. As a consequence we

have been reminded that coaxial cable and certain other telecommunication equipmont are on an embargo list insofar as export to Communist China is concerned.

Attached are two schedules setting out details of the systems required from British manufacturers, the first in respect of the Hong Kong/Shumchun segment and the second in respect of the Shunchun/Kwangchow (Canton) seyment. It is not yet cortain that the Chinese authoritios will require British manufacturers to provide the equipment for the second schedule (Shumchun/Kwangchow), but in any event approximately 25mg of the Hong Kong/Shumchun segment (first schedule) will be laid in Chinese territory and purchased by the Chinese Administration.

Our negotiations with the Chinese Adrdnistration were carried out with the full approval of both the Drition and Hong Kong Governments and in view of tho prostige involved in this project quite apart from the commercial nepecks we would appreciate it if arrangesien ta could be set in motion for the embargo to be lifted on the coaxial cable and telecommunication equipment necessary for this project. Certain equipment for these systems will be of Swedish origin and we assume that any embargo clearance necessary will be undertaken by the Swedish manufacturer.

Yours/înă Untally

13/0

∙13/10

Slade

Encl'

Group Manacor, International Operations

MEMBER OF THE CABLE AND WIRELESS WORLDWIDE COMMUNICATIONS GROUP

ULE

AUTHORITY No.

.Item Quantity

39,320 motrop

نيا

with status

Cháns Geanial Gable Project Simschung Geblo and Accessoriog

tong Hot

Bang C

Description

2CX 1.2/4.hmm + 4/0.63 POL load covorød, black polythene protected cable to P.0. specifications Loa.06215 and

G.130.

Kooical dzus longtho 615 motrea Maximum Grun

650

Eiznet drum lengtho to be advźood with owlos",

时

3,900 batros

acx 1.2%.hmm " 4/0.63 PCQ load cutored double stool tapo arapurad cabio to P.0.

opacifications Hoa. CH215 and

Kominal drum longthe 615 metros Exsot drum lengths to bo advised with order.

Epoxy-rogin tormination on 25 metro length of 20X 1.2/4.4ma + 4/0.63 201 lend skonthed Call cable, supplied with mating plugs for couzial and Antoraciciul paar uocitova,

65 nota Jointing materials for otraight

through joints in Item 1

comprising lend aloovas, papoz

¡ pleeves, plumbaza moval, colder,

aår valves and all necessary Conaurable stereo,

20 catu Jointing materinia for otraigÂM

Chrudia Sointu an ¿tor 2

compulslag Zoad aineves, Pasor alustu, plumbers woval, wolor, Hár Viavea anu all nocensory ennourable stokon toganlur with

| protostivo Goâat caulsyn

Buż fake fur dimons buviri

provli beg (Levia, Vithout Clo- hamilan.1, so ele valveo fAtcod to the Zevul alusvea.

1 net Sunglah delusii Coal for

elke

02251

Day Tent condagsor

5Meria E3 wolt

1:3

Remarks

SCHEDULE AUTHORITY No.

Item

Quantity

SCHEDULE OF MALARIALS

Hong Kong

Horr Fond

Chim Connial Cablo Project

Description

Shuzehung Cabio and AccomDories

Remarks

88m

loading ooilo, Uniooil

typo grado 1114? puitable for within-joint loading at

1,830 metro intervals in Itome 1 and 2.

ù 6 pota

Tochniaal Anotructiono for oablo installation, jointing, tormiunting and footing.

Landlino boation,

Submarine and Transaiosion Dept.

Cable oni virolo00 Ltd.,

Horcury louau,

Theobaldo ilund,

LÀMOB NC1x BRY

GXT/Y/LL/WKJV/JU

20th September, 1972.

JULE

AUTHORITY No.

Item

Quantity

145

250

OF MATERIAL..

HLNG KONG GTIDA COAXIAL CABLE PROJECT ENUECHUN - KWANGCHIOZ (CANT(B)_CABLE

AND JACULARES.

Description

2C% 1.2/5.4 um • 4/0.63 PEQ lond covered, binck polytliono protected cable to P,0. Specification Non. Cu215 and

CV190.

Epoxy-rosin tormination on 25 ustro length of 2CX 1.2/4.4 ma " 4/0,63 run load phoathed tall cablo, supplied with mating plugs for coaxină and intersticial pair oochoto,

Jointing materials for otraight-through joints in Itop i comprising lend aloevod, parar oluevos, plumbero motul, solder, air valves and all necessary consumatlo storos,

a sota Special Jointing tools for 2

ofcctrically bragod conductor Jointa in coaxial vairo for oporation from a 12 volt ballory.

320

88ell loading collo, Unicoil typo grado 711AP suitable for 1 within joint loading at 1,830 metro intervalo in Item 1.

6 Dots Technical Instructiono for

cablo installation, jointing, torminating and tostánge

Landline Seation

Submarine à Transmizaion Dept.,

Cable & Viroloso Ltdə s

Mercuży Houao,

Thoubalia Roud,

London RCIA ƐRA.

CXT/V/L: /MW/IC

Remarks

21st Soute ber 1972.

RESTRICTED

Enter

11/20

Mr Dav

Davies

Reference... MUA 4/301/1

[

(Far Eastern Dept K 248)

HONG KONG/CHINA AIR LINK

FEH

3/20/2

1. You asked me for a paragraph (for Mr Royle) on the present situation. on the following.

You may care to draw

2. In May 1972 (his telegram No 394) the Governor of Hong Kong hoped that the talks between BOAC and the Chinese authorities would not militate against Hong kong proposals for an air link with Canton. In August (his telegram No 735) he reminded us that CPA claimed the sole rights for any direct service(s) between Hong Kong and China and reported an indication of interest from Hong Kong Air International. Any air service to China will have to be covered by an intergovernmental agreement and when, in September, officials of the DTI met representatives from the CAAC delegation to Farnborough they received the firm impression that the Chinese wanted such an agreement. But, while this meeting broke the ice and both aides a reed that draft texts for an air services agreement should be exchanged, the Chinese indicated that they were not then in a position to discuss details such as the routes which might be exchanged (which would of course include the Hong Kong interest).

3. The DTI, in consultation with ourselves, are preparing the draft of an agreement for transmission to the Chinese in the near future, but we cannot yet forecast a date when substantive negotiations will begin.

4 October 1972

T Boulton

Aviation & Telecommunications Department

G 64/1

RESTRICTED

DONTIE 156596 500M 2/70 GM 3643/2

C.S. 41A

2600077

20,070-10/71-894067

REF.

SCR 27/5701/72

CONFIDENTIAL

дро

R M Evans Esq F# 33012

FED

F C

My Icon Richarl

CABLE & WIRELESS

Entis a..

COLONIAL SECRETARIAT

LOWER ALBERT ROAD

HONG KONG

19 September 1972

972

Mr Magne A+TD Jes by Dex,

(74)

No dimbt (+W love are in the picture.

mileage

Mr Charle Would your

tive be any modest

in this from a fobitel vewport?

(ie estholment of H.K.-Ch Atecommuncations

links).

The Clark 25/9

w 24/4.

R. E.27/9

4K and log! <

A&T and sen

Suart, the General Manager of Cable & Wireless,

wrote to me at the end of last week to say that, as foreseen in paragraph 3 of Hong Kong telegram No. 582 of 28 June, he had just learned that Su Shih-chieh, Deputy Director of the Kwangtung Administration of Tele- communications, had accepted his invitation to visit Hong Kong with some of his staff.

They are due to arrive on 1 November for a stay of about seven days. Suart thought the party would number about 12 but is still awaiting details.

This means of course that, according to present plans (S of S's telegram to Peking No. 646 of 18 August) Su and his party will be in Hong Kong during the S of S's

visit.

cra,

Yous

dick.

(RJ Stratton)

5 2014

FEE

сс

MH Morgan Esg PEKING

CONFIDENTIAL

With the compliments of

HONG KONG AND INDIAN OCEAN

DEPARTMENT

Ir Harvey day 2014

GIS-type informaton

2819

Apaya

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

SW1A 2AH

■

South China Morning Post

Wednesday 16th August, 1972

Communist influence in Colony expands

Hongkong's communists are gradually but successfully increasing their infiltra- tion into banking, trade and trade unions.

Since the 1967 disturbances, the communists have steadfastly been concentrating on these three important sectors.

A recent survey into the growth of trades unions shows the increasing grip that left- the wing leaders have on Hongkong labour force.

At the beginning of 1968, the communists claimed membership of 126,000 workers in leflist unions.

By July of this year, this number had increased to 150,000, ■ jump of about 24,000 workers.

What is even significant is the rise of paid-up members. The real measure of support. In the same four and a half years, the paid-up membership almost doubled from 65,800 to 115,000.

The increase came mostly in unions affiliated to the communist-controlled Federation of Trade Unions, unions that are fully commulted to leftist causes.

Another indication of increasing support for leftist Causes 13 the increase in circulation of left-wing newspapers, which now have a daily circulation of about 300,000, an increase of 16.5 per cent in four years.

In banking, the communists now control about 20 per cent of all banking factities. Three new communist banks have opened in the past yest.

Although no accurate Assessment of commuNISI banking turnover a available, knowledgeable sources say it is about $1,600 million, an

increase they describe spectacular.

The volume of trade carried out by the $5 communist stores in the Colony has grown apace with the banking industry increase.

The Chinese Merchandise Emporium is behaved to have made a clear profit of more than $1 million last year, with all debts and expenses paid.

The Chinese Goods Centre has doubled daily turnover since 1968 and Chung Ku Company handles at least $16. million a year.

The sources say the increase in trade between Hongkong and China is welcomed, but point out that the inroads being made into the control of Hongkong's Commerce should nol unnoticed.

In one basic industry, the communists have gained almost total domination. That is in fishing, with all but 400 of Hongkong-registered fishing boats also having dual registration with China. These 3.150 vestels with dual registration are regarded as being fully controlled by

communists.

The Castle Peak Fisher men's Office, a communist organisation, has total control of all vessels working out of Castle Peak Bay.

In the vital field of education, the communists are patiently building up influence over students.

Crowil. Sony/

In Goody

FEH 356.

The percentage is shil not large but has doubled sauce 1968. There are now about

COMMUNIT 40.000 declared students.

In the school building. fell the communists have opened 70 new schools since 1968 Only 25 of these have appked (+ registration and it seems the remunder obviously intend to continue business with without official registration.

There is a simple mestart in these figures: the commute are determined to continue thui efforts to enlarge their influen in inbour. commerce education.

14 201

To Forgun, CLA

If Thess,

Пау 17 Myles.

full

160

1 ...

CONFIDENTIAL

With the Compliments of the

Political Adviser

Hong Kong

BY BAG

CR 3/4821/52 VII

T W Keeble Esq

UN Dept FCO

CONFIDENTIAL

21 September 1972

FEH 3/30/2

UNHCR/ICEM:

CHINESE VIEWS ON REFUGEES IN HONG KONG

Timothy George and I saw Wyatt on 20 September and, as authorised in your telegram No. 782 of 14 September, spoke on the lines of paragraph 2 of my letter of 24 August. Although he was clearly reluctant to contemplate the possibility of closing down the UNHCR part of his office in Hong Kong Wyatt did not rule it out entirely and agreed that, although it would give rise to staffing problems, the White Russian part of his operation could be handed over to the World Council of Churches.

We agreed that there was little more that either of us could do until we saw how things go at the October session of the UNHCR Executive Comittee and during discussion of the UNHCR's report at the current session of the United Nations General Assembly. We shall of course keep in close touch with Wyatt when these discussions take place.

If the Chinese re-state their position, either on their own initiative or in response to an initiative by others, it will presumably be for the United Nations in the first instance to establish exactly what they are after and to ensure that their demands are based on correct premises.

जिल

(R J Stratton)

cc RM Evans Esq (FED FCO) MH Morgan Esq (FEKING)

DJ Johnson Esq (UKMIS, GENEVA) J DI Boyd Esq (WASHINGTON)

CONFIDENTIAL

2617

254

Eniei.

COVERING TOP SECRET (FUSD PAPERS ATTACHED) (PASS THROUGH PUSD CHANNELS)

SECRET

R.E.

ALA)

Tagree. Tato

адне

ful Hank the Sofs

should use precisely there

Siv D. Watson 117 samme from I loved, as Si E. Nome and by myself. The Lots

this

2673

wizford M. Rogle. agreed taim at the Governors

tention & few weeks ago.

CHINESE REFRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

Problem

FEH

A.R.

1. One of the subjects which is bound to be discussed

during the Secretary of State's visit to China is the

Chinese proposal that we should agree to the appointment of

a representative of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs

in Hong Kong. What line should the Secretary of State

take?

Background

There is a long history to this problem. From 1945

until the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic in

October 1949, the Nationalist Government had an official

commissioner in Hong Kong. He gave the Government of Hong

Kong a great deal of trouble (for example, by claiming a

status superior to that of the consular representatives of

other countries).

3. In February 1956 the Chinese Government formally

proposed to our Chargé d'Affaires in Peking (Mr O'Neill as

he then was) that they should be allowed to establish in

Hong Kong an "Office of a Commissioner of Foreign Affairs

of the People's Republic of China". Mr Selwyn Lloyd decided

that it would be a mistake to accept the Chinese proposal

but that it would be wiser not to reject the proposal outright.

We therefore did not reply to it. In October 1957, Chou

/En-lai

- 1

SECRET

COVERING TOP SECRET

SECRET

En-lai brought the subject up with the Parliamentary Secretary

at the Board of Trade (Mr Erroll as he then was) during the

visit he paid to China at that time. Mr Selwyn Lloyd decided

that this renewal of the proposal made necessary a formal

reply. In February 1958, he told the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires

in London that, given the climate of the relations between

the two countries, we could not agree to the appointment of

an official Chinese representative in Hong Kong. The Chinese

did not formally refer to the subject again for thirteen

years although they brought it up informally from time to time,

the latest occasion being in 1962. In March 1971 Chou En-lai

brought it up during a conversation with our Chargé d'Affaires

(Mr Denson). He spoke of the "contradictory" nature of our

position in maintaining a Consulate in Taiwan while refusing

to allow an "official [Chinese] relationship with Hong Kong".

As it did not seem that this remark amounted to a formal

request or proposal, we did not respond to it.

We reached agreement with the Chinese Government on an

exchange of Ambassadors on 13 March 1972. On 27 March, the

Director of the Western European Department of the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs, told Mr Addis that Chou En-lai had asked

Mr Denson whether it would be possible for China to send an

official representative to Hong Kong (compare Mr Denson's

version of what Chou En-lai said). He went on to ask about

the British reaction. Mr Addis asked what functions the

Chinese Government had in mind for an official representative.

The Director undertook to enquire.

15.

- 2 -

SECRET

COVERING TOP SECRET

SECRET

On 4 May, the Director told Mr Addis that he had looked

up old files and had come across the "concrete proposals"

made by the Chinese Government in February 1956. He made it

clear that his Government were reviving the proposal which had

been made then; ie the proposal described in paragraph 3 above.

The Chinese proposal was discussed when Mr Royle visited

China in May and June. Quite a long exchange took place

during Mr Royle's first meeting with Ch'iao Kuan-hua, the Vice-

Minister for Foreign Affairs, on 31 May. Mr Royle, who

broached the subject, told Ch'iao that we could not accept the

Chinese proposal. He said that the situation in Hong Kong

was one of great delicacy; a balance had been kept which was

well understood in Hong Kong; the appointment of a Chinese

Government representative might disturb that balance and,

in consequence, damage relations between China and the United

Kingdom. Ch'iao asked that further consideration should be

given to the Chinese proposal. In speaking on the subject,

he said he hoped that the British Government would link the

question with "fundamental Chinese policy" towards Hong Kong.

He referred to the fact that the Nationalist Government had

been allowed to have an official representative in Hong Kong

and argued that the development of relations between China

and the United Kingdom strengthened the case for the

establishment of an official Chinese representative there.

He sketched some of the practical difficulties which arose

for all concerned in the absence of such a representative.

Mr Royle took note of what he had said.

- 3-

SECRET

17.

COVERING TOP SECRET

SECRET

7. The Chinese returned to the charge two months later.

On 31 July, the new Head of the Western European Department,

told Mr Addis that he wished to say what great importance

the Chinese Government attached to the "point" which had been

made by Ch'iao Kuan-hua to Mr Royle on the question of

official Chinese representation in Hong Kong; the settlement

of many other questions was connected with it. Mr Addis

merely undertook to report.

Argument

The arguments for and against acceptance of the Chinese

proposal need to be considered in the light of:

(a) Decisions which we have made about the future of

(b)

Hong Kong; and

Our best assessment of Chinese attitudes and

intentions towards Hong Kong.

In December 1971 the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee

of the Cabinet considered a memorandum by the Secretary of

State for the future of Hong Kong. The Committee approved the

memorandum (DOP(71)83 of 13 December 1971) including its

recommendations.

The most important of these recommendations

was that we should seek to maintain the status quo in Hong

Kong for the time being, but take preliminary informal

soundings of the Chinese Government nearer 1997, the date of

the expiry of the lease for the New Territories, with a view

to securing their acquiescence in the status quo at least

until 1997. In his despatch of 5 May about the Chinese

proposal, the Governor of Hong Kong made recommendations which

were founded on the assumption that this would continue to

be our line of policy.

/10.

SECRET

[

COVERING TOP SECRET

SECRET

10. The formal Chinese attitude towards the status of Hong

Kong was set out in a letter which the Chinese Permanent

Representative at the United Nations sent to the Chairman of

the Committee of 24 in March 1972. The crucial sentences

read as follows:

"As is known to all, the questions of Hong Kong and

Macao belong to the category of questions resulting

from the series of unequal treaties left over by

history, treaties which the Imperialists imposed on

China, Hong Kong and Macao are part of Chinese

territory occupied by the British and Portuguese

authorities"

"With regard to the questions of

Hong Kong and Macao, the Chinese Government has

consistently held that they should be settled in an

appropriate way when conditions are ripe".

During his visit to China, however, Mr Royle was assured

informally by Ch'iao Kuan-hua that China had no present

intention of disturbing the status quo in Hong Kong. I am

sure that we can accept this assurance as authoritative.

It is, moreover, given colour by a number of

reports. I attach a copy of the most interesting of these

reports, which gives an account of a conversation between a

Chinese official and a Western visitor to Peking in April

1972. I have ascertained from the Permanent Under-Secretary's

Department that the official was well placed to know what he

was talking about. His most interesting remarks are recorded

in paragraph 7 of the report.

- 5 -

SUCRET

/11.

THIS IS A COPY

THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958

COVERING TOP SECRET

SECRET

11. The principal arguments for accepting the Chinese

proposal are that:

(a)

Given the ethnic character of Hong Kong, its

geographical situation and the fact that we now

enjoy better relations with China than at any time

since 1949, it would be anomalous to reject the

proposal; and

(b) We could suffer penalties,in both political and

practical terms, from rejection of the proposal.

In connection with (b), it might well be that rejection of

the proposal would make it more difficult for us to negotiate

an Air Services Agreement with the Chinese Government. (At

one stage during their exchange, Ch'iao Kuan-hua hinted as

much to Mr Royle).

12. The principal arguments against acceptance of the

Chinese proposal are that:

(a) At a time when relations between the United Kingdom

and China were good, a representative of the Chinese

Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be an alternative

focus of loyalty in Hong Kong;

(b)

(c)

At a time when relations between the United Kingdom

and China were strained, such a representative might

well become the principal agent in a campaign of

agitation and subversion aimed at undermining the

authority of the Governor; and

The appointment of such a representative would be

interpreted by many people, in Hong Kong and elsewhere,

as evidence that we had resigned ourselves to with-

- 6-

SECRET

/drawal

COVERING TOP SECRET

SECRET

drawal from Hong Kong sooner or later (with a

consequent loss of political and business confidence).

13. I judge that, on balance, the arguments for rejection

of the Chinese proposal are stronger than the arguments for

its acceptance.

But each of the two sets of arguments is

powerful. The arguments for rejection of the proposal are

set out in detail in the Governor's despatch of 5 May. The

arguments in favour of our agreeing at least to negotiate

about it with the Chinese Government are set out in Mr Addis's

letter to me 3/56 of 20 June. The most serious weakness in

Mr Addis's line of argument is that it does not flow from the

decisions which have been made in London about the future of

Hong Kong.

Recommendation

14. I accordingly recommend that the Secretary of State

should not accept the Chinese proposal when he visits Peking.

On tactics, my recommendations are that the Secretary of

State should:

(a)

Leave it to his Chinese interlocutor to broach the

subject;

(b)

When, as seems inevitable, the Chinese do this, tell

them that he is carefully considering the proposal,

but does not feel able to accept it;

(c)

If necessary, say that the presence in Hong Kong of

an official of the kind the Chinese have in mind

could prove an embarrassment to all concerned, with

consequent damage to relations between China and the

United Kingdom.

- 7 -

SECRET

/15.

COVERING TOP SECRET

SECRET

15. If these recommendations are accepted, we shall prepare

the Secretary of State's brief on the subject accordingly.

The Political Adviser in Hong Kong has asked to see the brief

in draft. If we send it to him in draft, I think it only

fair that we should send it to Mr Addis as well.

16.

Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department concur.

even

19 September 1972

Mr Laird

亅

agree

for

R M Evans

Far Eastern Department

with M: Evans recommendation and I believe

result of the Governor's talk with the STS

сс

Hal-

Mr Hervey

few

webs

3 roo

afree.

on jo

the Sofs agreed that this was

the right line to take during

سمجھ

I recommend therefor

The Sets

non visit Paking

hmo mom

that the brief be prepares for

on there lines.

трак

To give on this world mpnt

serious risk into them

wish

policies for Shay Kang:

احال

and the counter-arguments do not suggest is me that we need to show give, get at Cant.

I aques

Than Waka

2719

Kun Wilford

27/g

SECRET

FEH 3/30/2

Mr Sinclair (Legal Advisers Dept. - K 164) Mr Hervey (Far Eastern Dept. K 251)

Mr Crouzon (Hong Kong & Indian Ocean Dept. - K 247)

GENERAL ASSEMBLY: CHINA, HONG KONG AND THE COMITTUE OF 24

I attach yet another contribution by Feter Hinchcliffe to the correspondence on this subject.

2. The likelihood of the Committee of 24's recommendation being allowed to pass through the General Assembly without comment by the Russians and extreme Africana seems very small indeed. If there is no debate and the paragraph goes through on the nod then this would seem to make it unnecessary for us to take any stand on whether we were participating in the vote or not. But I think we would still have to make a statement of reservation though we could leave it to the delegates' discretion whether to deliver this immediately after the vote on the paragraph concerned or to wait until the adoption of the Report as a whole. In these circumstances it might be enough to say: "I wish formally to reserve my delegation's position on paragraph X of the Report", This wording could perhaps be taken as covering the Carter XI queation and we need not mention it specifically. Similarly if there were a debate but none of the interventions referred to Chapter XI either specifically or by clear implication then perhaps this formula could replace a reference to Chapter XI. This would mean that the text of our statement would include one or more of 3 possible phrases according to the previous statements made by other delegates:

1. I wish formally to reserve my delegation's

position on paragraph X of the Report" (to be made even if there is no debate).

11.

"Several delegations have made remarks about the territory of Hong Kong which FIG cannot accept and I wish formally to reserve their position on this question" (only if appropriate).

iii. "In my Government's view Hong Kong falls within

the provisions of Chapter XI of the Charter".

3. In my previous minute I did not consider whether we need say anything when the Report is taken in llenary. I would not think it would be necessary since we would have put our reservation on record in the Committee.

25 August 1972

Draina Portache

(Miss) Diana Fortescue for (Miss) TA Soleaby UN Department (K 153)

DO 191:32 $54596 SCOM 2/7 GM 14417

But what da token, which sus

Jur

mor participating

vote is

do is quite passives? If w

وتاه

dor من قام عليم موية

اخان

participation which cone include (b... in finite to) scannť (ÿ). I hav

action provisively wher explanation of you

G-

we lost your for our

the Apache Swe

participatio

JA Si доб

१

29/

Miss Kelly каво

Mr Hervey is on leave. I am sorry to have held this up, but all the papers now appear to have come together.

2. Our main concern should be to avoid a head-on clash with the Chinese. This is not

This is not, of course because we consider that the maintenance of our legal claim to Hong Kong is less important than the need to avoid damagin our improved relations with China. Hong Kong is the most solid factor in our relations with China; in considering these relations we cannot simply put Hong Kong aside.

At the same time it is clearly in our interest to avoid driving China to take up in international bodies too rigid a position on the question of Hong Kong. We have recognised for a considerable time that legalities are of little significance in Peking's continued tolerance of our position in Hong Kong. Both we and the Chinese tacitly accept each other's view of the situation.

For these reasons either abstention or non- participation would fit the bill, and I agree with Miss Solesby that for the reasons she gives non- participation would be the most appropriate. In order to meet the two requirements of keeping our heads as low as possible and at the same time reserving our legal rights I would favour a very short simple statement as in para 2(i) of Miss Fortescue's minute. I hope that Legal Advisers will not feel it necessary to expand this state- ment as Mr Sinclair's minute of 29 August seems to suggest.

We await Peking's comments about the desirability of talking this over with the Chinese. My preliminary view is that since the Chinese have said that they regard Hong Kong as a bilateral question there would be advantage in so doing.

31 August 1972

Kr Crowson to see or

HL Davies

Far Eastern Department

I have taken a copy of Mr Hinchcliffe's letter of 23 August for

Sir Murray MacLehose, as requested in Hong Kong Tel. No 794 (attached).

This question will no doubt be discussed with Sir Murray when he is in the office next week.

Pro Hally

P. H. Kelly

31st August 1972

Mr Javis, FED

agree genially

with

Jur

minute.

I assumes that FED with be

discmany trims with the Governor (? when

Le call on Mi Event on

7 Septimber). D.^.

Lum

4/9

Mr Crowson (HK&IOD)

Mr Sinclair (Legal Advisers Dept)

Miss Solesby (UN Dept)

1. I am sorry that as a result of pressure of business arising out of the Prime Minister's visit to Japan etc

I have not minuted on these papers before. I understand that there was no time to show these to Sir Murray MacLehos when he called here last week.

I agree strongly with paragraphs 2 and 3 of Nr Davies minute of 31 August, in particular the recommendation that non-participation would be the most appropriate solution for us. I would however prefer any statement of reserva- tion to be on the following lines:" "entirely without prejudice to their views about the status of Hong Kong my delegation are content to accept the recommendation of the Committee"x (he recommendation being that referred to in paragraph 2 of Mr Hinchcliffe's letter of 23 August.

15 September 1972

RB R Hervey

Far Eastern Department

DO MT152 154STA SOOM 2/12 OM 14411

RESTRICTED

J M Addis Esq CMG PEKING

930 8440 Extn 553

12 September 1972

You must think me very remiss for having failed to thank you sooner for your letter 3/56 of 20 June.

2. I am about to put up a fresh submission on the subject dealt with in your letter. I shall make sure that your point of view is put on record in what I draft.

3. I have decided that the subject is important enough to warrant our seeking the views of Ministers before we start drafting the steering brief for the Secretary of State's visit to China.

As I discussed the subject at some length with the person to whom you copied your letter, I am not copying this letter to him. He knows how I plan to proceed.

RESTRICTED

RM Evans

Far Eastern Department

GS. 41A

2600077

20,005-10/75-894067

CONFIDENTIAL

2/1126/50

RM Evans Esq FED

COLONIAL SECRETARIAT

LOWER ALBERT ROAD

HOME KENG

13 July, 1972

My dran Richard,

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

FEH3/30/1

669

As a newcomer I have read with great interest the résumé in John Addis's letter to you of 20 Júne. I do not think its arguments weaken the objections from our point of viev raised in the Governor's Despatch of 5 May. Nor does it raise any point about the future of Hong Kong not covered in that despatch. But I do not propose to rehearse the arguments now as the ground has been covered before, and the question vill presumably be looked at again when you are preparing the briefs for the Secretary of State's visit to Peking.

We are assuming that the line on Chinese representation in Hong Kong will be generally the same as the advice provided for Mr. Royle. You agreed when I saw you in London just bebre I came out that we should have an opportunity to comment at the drafting stage. The need for us to do so may depend to some extent on whether the subject is discussed when the Governor calls at the office in September, and on whether the Secretary of State decides to look in here on his way to Peking.

J M Addis Esq CMG PEKING

다리,

रेक

(R J Stratton)

CONFIDENTIAL

109

IMMEDIA

CYPHER CAT A

FM PEKING 310895Z

CRET

•

ເ

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELEGRAM NO 7681 OF 31 JULY INFO ROUTINE HONG KONG ( PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR).

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.

1. AT THE END OF A VERY LONG DISCUSSION OF BILATERAL MATTERS, INCLUDING MR THORPE'S, SIR DESMOND PLUMMER'S PROPOSED VISITS ETC ( SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAMS) AND IMMEDIATELY AFTER A DISCUSSION OF PRELIMINARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR YOUR OWN VISIT, HEAD OF WEST EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT SPOKE TO ME THIS MORNING IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS (CLEARLY ON INSTRUCTIONS).

WANG REFERRED TO THE SUCCESS OF MONSIEUR SCHUMANN'S VISIT AND

SAID THAT HE EXPECTED YOURS TO BE EQUALLY SUCCESSFUL.

BOTH SIDES SHOULD MAKE EFFORTS TO THIS END-TO PROPEL THE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES FORWARD. MR ROYLE'S VISIT WAS A GOOD

PREPARATION FOR YOURS.

THERE HAD BEEN A USEFUL MUTUAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. WANG SAID THAT I MUST HAVE NOTED THAT DURING THE DISCUSSION BETWEEN MR ROYLE AND CHIAO KUAN-HUA ON BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG HAD BEEN RAISED.

HE WISHED IN HIS CAPACITY AS HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT DEALING WITH THE AREA TO SAY WHAT GREAT IMPORTANCE THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT ATTACHED TO THE POINT MADE BY CHIAO CONCERNING THE QUESTION

OF OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.

HE SAID THAT THERE WERE MANY OTHER QUESTIONS, THE SETTLEMENT OF W HICH WERE CONNECTED WITH IT. THIS WAS WHY HE WISHED TO

MENTION IT IN A FRANK WAY.

3. I SAID THAT I KNEW THE REPLY MR ROYLE HAD GIVEN TO CHIAO HAD BEEN THE RESULT OF THE MOST CAREFUL CONSIDERATION IN LONDON OF ALL

ASPECTS OF THE QUESTION.

I WOULD HOWEVER REPORT WHAT WANG HAD SAID. WANG REPLIED THAT WE WERE NOW MOVING FORWARD IN OUR RELATIONS IN OTHER RESPECTS FOR EXAMPLE TRADE, BANKING AND INSURANCE, COMMUNICATIONS AND

TRANSPORT: AND AT THE PRESENT TINE DISCUSSIONS WERE BEING HELD ON THE SALE OF BRITISH AIRCRAFT TO CHINA. HE HOPED THAT WE WOULD MOVE FORWARD ON THIS OTHER MATTER ALSO.

ADDIS

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

FED HKLOD

SECRET

3/56

4...

SECRET

BRITISH EMBASSY

PEKING

LFEH 3/30/2

20 June 1972

RM Evans Esq

Far Eastern Department

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

LONDON SWI

Dean Richand,

HONG KONG AND CHINA

Lave sn: Addiis.

R.EE.

та

79.

Mr Royle discussed with me my views on Chinese representation in Hong Kong, and since his departure I have been thinking further on the subject. I should like if I may to set out my views in the following paragraphs which go a little further on a few points than the necessarily brief telegrams which I have sent from here.

I do not of course have the advantage of having here the various policy studies which have been made on the Hong Kong question, and some of the points on which I myself feel convinced may already have been carefully weished and dismissed.

Taking first the question of the future of Hong Kong at the end of the lease, I feel that there can be no doubt but that Hong Kong will have to return to China. It does not seem to me conceivable that Hong Kong will be able to cont.nue under British rule and under British administration after the end of the lease. It may be that some special status within the Chinese state may be possible for Hong Kong after 1997, and possibly we may be able to negotiate with the Chinese some of the provisions of that special status, if the process of rendition becomes a matter for negotiation. But whatever may be the precise nature of any special status which Hong Kong may be able to enjoy after the end of the lease, it seems to me certain that Hong Kong will at that time be Chinese and c.a no longer be British.

4. It seems to me beyond the bounds of possibility that between now and 1997 it might be possible to negotiate an extension of the lease with the Chinese Government. This seems to me certain whatever the nature of the Chinese Government at the relevant time. I think it is equally out of the question that the present status quo would te allowed to continue after 1997 without a formal enten ion of the lease but with the tacit consent or acquiescence of the Chinese Government of the time. Any policy on the future of Hong Kong based on either of these premises seems to me dangerously illu certain to fail.

BOTY

and

/5.

SECRET

I take it that our major concern in considering the future status of Hong Kong must be the welfare of its inhabitants, and that we must try to obtain for them the best possible terms in the eventual arrange- ment and the easiest transition towards the final result. That consideration must surely have priority over all others, including our own economic interests and such questions as national prestige.

6. The present Chinese Government acquiesce in the status quo in Hong Kong because it is in their own interests to do so. 15 19 only a relatively strong government in China which would be able to overrule in this way the easy claims of irredentism, Any successor to the present Chinese Government would vary probably be weaker and therefore more likely to wish to reclaim Hong Kong for China. The economic value of Hong Kong to China and the relative strength of the present Chinese Government are thus two factors which are favourable to the status quo in Hong Kong at the present time, but which may lost their validity with changing circumstances. These two factors make the present a better time for settling Hong Kong questions with China than any time in the future is likely to be. It goes of course without saying that both the present statua of llong Kong and any change in that status require at least the acquicscence of the Chinese Government of the time.

The present state of relations between HNG and the Chinese Government is also favourable for discussing Hong Kong questions. I am glad that Mr Royle and you have been here this month to see for yourselves how greatly relations between the United Kingdom and China have changed with the exchange of Ambassadors in March. The change has really been v ry complete and profound. The phrase that the Chinese Government use repeatedly is that a new leaf has been turned. The estimates of Chinese attitudes towards our position in Hong Kong which were relevant until a few years ago no lon、 r apply. The Chinese Government have oven gone so far as to let us know, informally but explicitly (Chou En-lai to Neville Maxwell and Ch'iao Kuan-hua privately to Mr Royle), that while they regard Hong Kong as Chinese territory they do not intend to ups. t the present arrangements for the time being. By proposing official Chinese representation in Hong Kong they have in effect off red to fix and formalise their acceptance of the present status of Hong Kong for the time being.

The refus 1 of the Chinese proposal conveyed by Mr Royle at the time of his visit to Peking has not spoiled the new state of good relations between Great Brit: in and China. At the same time, howev r, it has been made clear that the Chinese Government do not accept our refusal as final and intend to revert to the matter. It is certain that if the question is not settled meanwhile it will be a major issue in the Secretary of State's talks with the Chinese leaders when he comes to Peking in the autumn.

In the light of these considerations I still stand by my view tht the right policy is for us to try to reach an acceptable

SECRET

/agreement

SECRET

agr ement with the Chinese Government for their official representation in Hong Kong. If in the process of doing so we secure from them a more formal commitment to the continuation of the status quo in Hong Kong for the time being, I should sec furtar dvantage in that. As regards timing, I think it would be pref rable to try to carry matters a stage further before the Secretary of State's visit in the autumn,

10. In setting out ry views for you in this way I am not asking you to reopen the whole question now. I know that firu decisions have been taken for the time being. But I think it is right that my minority view should be available on the record so that it can be easily referred to ir the subject comes under review again.

Yours ever,

John Addis

J M Addis

Copy to:- Personal

Sir Murray MacLeHose KCMG MBE HONG KONG

י!

SECRET

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

TEA 2/20/2

From the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

31 August, 1972

Thank you for your letter of 3 August about my visit to China.

You said you wondered whether it would be suci. a bad thing if the Oninose were to have a fairly low level mission in Hong Kong. We really think that it would. If an official Chincse representative fere to conduct himself like any other official foreign representative in the Colony, he could be a positive assct in many practical (und perhaps political) ways. But we do not think that he could possibly benave IL this way, even if he wanted to do To. Given that tie Chinese Government maintain that lɔng Kong is Ominute Gerritory, and given that Se per cent of the population of the Colony is of Chinese race, we till.a that he would be bound to become an allcmative focul of loyalty. This, we believe, would be the situation even if he were under instructions to behave wit.. discretion and relations between Uhina and this country were to remain as good as they are now.

K.C.B., K.0.v.0., 0.B.2., D.9.0., M.O., M.A., Headquarters,

General Sir Basil Eugster,

United Kingdom Lund Forces,

Salisbury, Wilts

-Wilton,

/over

-1-

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

PARCOLAL AND CU FIDENTIAL

ever these relations were to deteriorate, we think that the position of the Governor would become well righ impossible.

Therc. is another consideration. Very many people (in the Jolony and elsewhcrc) would interpret our acccptar.ce of wn official Chinese represuntutive us evidence talt we were thinking In terms of withdrawal from liong Kong wd of its ultimate incorporation in the Chinese PČople's Republic.

In those circumstances, we think that we munt continue to play this issue with a very struint but. as part of the procces, we shall have to restrict knowledge of what the Chinese nave proponcu to lo LuProw & circle as possible. I should therefore dir grateful if you would keep all this very much lo yourself.

Anthony Royle

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Flag A

CONFIDENTIAL

Thi Logan.

Mr Vans

165

CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG: GENERAL SIR BASIL EUGSTER'S LETTER

I submit a draft reply to Sir Basil Eugster's letter of 3 August.

2 HKIOD concur.

I have made

some changes.

24 August 1972

HL1 Davies

Far Eastern Department

R.M. Evans

29 Auguoi, 1972.

CONFIDENTIAL

CS. 41A

2600077

29,000-10/71-894067

BY BAG

CONFIDENTIAL

REF. SCR 92/65

Who, I wonder, owned their IN Comaction-buili vessels. ?^un. 50

Mr Daisen (again),

We should have to ark HK but I imagine Bray were

other owned or chartered

CN Co.

H L1 DAVIES ESQ FED

F CO

17/46 Been Hugh

R.E.

16/8

кон

COLONIAL SECRETARIAT

LOWER ALBERT ROAD

HONG KONG

COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN HONG KONG AND CANTON

31 July 1972

Do Evans the

The Hervento 20 3/4 Mr Coorleston R. C.

17/8

HIORD

Рак Enter 1618

The old ferry service last mentioned in the Secretary of State's telegram No. 624 to Hong Kong is ancient history now.

бо

In 1947 China Navigation (one of the Butterfield and Svire companies) vere running three ferries to Canton. Two were London registered and one was registered in Canton; this last was transferred to Hong Kong registration in

February 1949.

In 1948

49 seven river steamers built in Quebec

for the Yangtze River with a Canadian government' loan came to Hong Kong as the Yangtze was by that time controlled by communist armies. These were handsome steel-hulled ships with aluminium superstructures. All were registered in Canton and plied on Passenger and Safety Certificates issued by our Marine Department. By mid-1950 with communist armies in Kwangtung the Canadian government became concerned about the outstanding mortgages on these expensive ships. They vere transferred to the Canadian Flag and registered at Montreal but continued to run between Hong Kong and Canton with their Chinese masters and crews.

CONFIDENTIAL

-/2

CONFIDENTIAL

During 1950 - 51 the China Navigation ships abandoned the Canton service and were transferred to the

Macau run, At intervals up to 1952 the Canadian built ships developed 'engine failure' at Canton and disappeared from the service. In this way the ferry link between Canton and Hong Kong simply withered avay without, as far as ve are avare, official representations on either side.

Yours

Chains

(C J Howells)

What an extraordinary aby &

Chancery, Peking

Chancery, Ottava

CONFIDENTIAL

From General Sir Basil Eugster, KCB, KCVO, CBE.DSO, MC. MA

Cinc 1701

Anthony Royle Esq MP

CONFIDENTIAL

Drati

Parliamentary Under Secretary of State

Foreign and Commonwealth Office London SW1

HEADQUARTERS

UNITED KINGDOM LAND FORCES WILTON. SALISBURY, WILTS

Telephone Salisbury 6222 ext 2208

Mr. Doyles (FED)

reply.

Enter [Chinese Rep mittk

R.E. 29/8

+ resubmit con

3 August 1972

Aletter exple

qui

FELT Stut

My deen Try

火

نيا

love

Repre

entration,

Please

A.R.

I was fascinated to read the report of your deliberations with the Chinese; thank you very much for sending it. I have always felt that the best hope for stability in SE Asia is to press for normalisation of relations between China and Japan. With the recent change of Government in Japan, perhaps an initiative will be forthcoming.

I wonder if it would be such a bad thing if the Chinese were to have a Pirly low level Kission in Hong Kong. It could not carry out any more clandestine activities than the New China News Agency does, or at any rate did; and it ought to improve communications with Canton and Peking on day to day matters. I don't believe the people of Hong Kong would feel that this was a first step towards handing them over to the Chinese, and being, as you stress yourself, so pragmatic they are likely to see the sense of it.

I must say I envy you your visit which has obviously achieved a good deal, which must be pleasing after all the work you have put into Sino British relations over the past years.

eve

You

Back

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD A

VISIT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS TO CHINA 30 MAY TO 6 JUNE

RECORD OF A MEETING AT NO 3 GUEST HOUSE AT 4.30 PM 31 MAY

Present:

Mr Anthony Royle MP

The Hon Adam Butler MP

HE Mr J M Addis

Mr R M Evans

Mr J G B Weait

Mr D BC Logan

Mr M J Richardson

HE Mr Ch'iao Kuan-hua (Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs)

HE Mr Chang Wen-chin (Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs)

HE Mr Sung Chih-kuang

(Ambassador designate to Britain)

Mr wang Tung

Mr Li Pao-cheng

Mr Chang Yi-chun

1. The Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs began by saying that he extended a warm welcome on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Chinese Government to Mr Royle and his colleagues. Their visit provided an excellent opportunity to deepen mutual understanding and to strengthen relations between the two countries and friendship between the two peoples. On procedure, his proposal was that the talks should cover two fields: international problems of common concern and bilateral relations. When the two sides discussed problems in the first field, he hoped that it would be possible for them to have a really free exchange of opinions. The discussions were between governments, but this need not and should not fetter them. He wished to propose that the talks should remain entirely confidential.

2. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State thanked Mr Ch'iao for his words of welcome and for the hospitality which he had himself received on this, the first visit by a British Foreign Office Minister to Peking. He was glad to be back in China again and could already see great changes since his last visit to Canton 9 years before. He hoped that his visit would be the first of a series between Ministers of the two countries. The Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, who sent the Vice-Minister his warmest good wishes, was greatly looking forward to coming to Peking and meeting both him and the Foreign Minister, Mr Chi P'eng-fei. He (Mr Royle), was much looking forward to the Vice-Minister's visit to London and would like to know if the

CONFIDENTIAL

/Chinese

CONFIDENTIAL

Ch ese had yet been able to decide on dates. He wished to have the opportunity to return the magnificent hospitality he already had received. Sir Alec Douglas-Home was similarly looking forward to seeing Mr Ch'i in London. Was there any news about when the Foreign Minister would find it convenient to make his visit?

3. On procedure, Mr Royle said he thought it right that the discussions should cover international affairs and Sino/British relations. He would however like to begin by discussing bilateral matters, There was not much on which the two sides disagreed and the discussion need not be very long. They could then range around the world, which would take time.

4. Mr Royle emphasised how pleased his Government was with the improved relations between Britain and China. When the Conservative Party won the General Election in 1970 the Prime Minister had appointed him to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had given him responsibility for European and Asian affairs. The foremost aim in the foreign policy of the new Government had been to achieve the enlargement of the European Community and to negotiate full membership for Britain. A second important objective had been to improve relations with China. The Government had more or less achieved the first ain; this could be discussed further when the two sides came to talk about international affairs. They had also, he thought, been successful in their pursuit of the second aim. Mr Addis, the British representative in Peking, now had the full rank of Ambassador. Mr Sung would soon be in London also with the full rank of Ambassador. The Conservative Government had also given China consistent support over membership of the United Nations. Now an exchange of Ministerial visits between the two countries was to follow.

5. Mr Ch'iao expressed his thanks for the Foreign Secretary's message. The Chinese Government looked forward to the Foreign Secretary's visit to China. The Chinese had a proverb which said: "for others to come and not to go oneself is discourteous". The Chinese Government were therefore very happy to have received invitations for both the Foreign Minister and himself to visit Britain. As soon as the dates were definite, the British Government would be notified.

6. As far as procedure was concerned, he could agree with what Mr Royle had suggested. Mr Royle said he entirely agreed that discussions should be confidential. He suggested that advisers could get together afterwards to decide what to say to the press. Mr Ch'iao agreed and, after a short discussion on mechanics of dealing with the press, said that he would turn to bilateral relations between China and Britain. Britain was one of the West European countries with which the Chinese People's Republic had had the earliest contacta. But agreement had only been reached on the establishment of full diplomatic relations at a rather late date. The Chinese had another ancient saying which said "sometimes those who come late take precedence over those who came earlier". Although Ambassadors had been exchanged rather late in the day, it was possible and desirable that relations between the two countries could become better than those between China and some other countries. He believed the necessary conditions existed. He agreed with the principles adopted by Britain over the conduct of her relations with

CONFIDENTIAL

/China

CONFIDENTIAL

China, which were based on what Mr Heath had said in his speech to the Conservative Party Conference in 1971. It was the Chinese Govern- ment's desire to increase and develop relations. Accidentally or other- wise, the two countries had reached agreement to exchange Chargés d'Affaires when Mr Eden was Prime Minister. Now full diplomatic relations had been achieved when Mr Heath was Prime Minister. Mr Royle said that he appreciated what Mr Ch'iao had said. In the earlier Conservative Government to which Mr Ch'iao had referred, Mr Butler's father had been a senior and distinguished member.

It was appropriate therefore that fir Butler should be present. Britain had a proverb similar to the one which Mr Ch'iao had quoted.

The

7. Mr Royle said he considered that there were two major areas in which relations between Britain and China could be improved. One was trade. Here there was much to be done; he would discuss the possibilities further with the Vice Minister for Foreign Trade. second was the general field of culture and sport. The Chinese ping pong team had been made very welcome in Britain the previous year. He and Mr Addis had been present when the Prime Minister had received the team at No 10 Downing Street. He hoped that it would soon be possible to send a British football team to China. The British played football better than ping pong. They wished to send a good team because they wished to beat the Chinese. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office were discussing the question with the football authorities, who were aiming to send a team next year. The British would be very glad to receive theatrical companies from China, although there were problems; impresarios had to be encouraged to take them on. There was no govern- ment backing for this sort of thing. British orchestras also wished to come to China. Officials of the two sides could discuss these points in detail. He had been glad that the recent visit to China of the delegation from the Royal Society had gone so well. He hoped that members of the Academia Sinica would be able to visit London soon. Mr Addis added that the Royal Society hoped to invite a group of 5 or 6 members of the Academia Sinica to Britain at the end of September.

8. Mr Ch'iao replied that the Chinese side would consider these ideas. Further exchanges in the fields of trade and culture were, he believed, possible. In principle, the Chinese did not object; but detailed discussions could take place with those concerned. A British football team would be welcome, even if they beat the Chinese. The Chinese would welcome a bit of pressure on their backward football teams. could spin small balls better than they could spin big ones. Mr Royle anything more to say?

They

Had

One was

9. Mr Royle replied that he had one or two more things to say. a request. He had to answer to the British public in Parliament. There continued to be concern in Parliament and among the public in

/Britain

CONFIDENTIAL

Britain about the three British subjects still under detention in China. He would be grateful for any news of them. There was also the case of Mr Edmunds, an elderly British subject who lived in Shanghai and who was unable to obtain exit permits for his family. Could he ask Vice Minister to arrange for the necessary permits to be given on purely humanitarian grounds, so that this old man could leave China with his family? It was a small thing to ask.

10.

Mr Royle said that there was one other matter which he wished to raise. He had dined recently with Mr P'ei in London. Mr P'ei had raised a particular question. This question had also been raised recently with the British Ambassador in Peking. It was that of Chinese representation in Hong Kong. He thought Mr Ch'iao was well aware that the situation in Hong Kong was one of great delicacy. A balance had hitherto been kept which was well understood in Hong Kong " He believed that the appointment of a Chinese Government representative might disturb that balance. He felt that any such disturbance could damage the important progress made in relations between their two countries. For these reasons, the British Government could not accept the proposal made to him by Mr P'ei and by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Mr Addis. Their desire was for better relations; and it had been made clear that the Chinese reciprocated this desire. But he had to say that he feared that the appointment of a Chinese representative in Hong Kong could have an adverse effect. He himself knew Hong Kong very well.

His own feeling was that sufficient practical benefits would accrue neither to the Chinese Government nor to the British Government to justify the risk of such an appointment. He thought that relations between them were too important to inject anything which might influence them adversely.

11. Mr Royle said that he thought an area where there was room for improvement was that of communications. The British Government were most anxious to sign an Air Services Agreement with the Chinese Government. BOAC wished to fly into Peking. He himself wanted to go to London airport and see aircraft in Chinese colours on the tarmac. He also felt there would be a tremendous increase in travel to China in the coming months and years.

What were the views of Vice Minister on a feeder air service between Hong Kong and Canton? He assumed that such a service could not be introduced in advance of the conclusion of an Air Services Agreement. There was a further question of travel between Hong Kong and Canton by train. This was difficult. Would the Chinese Government consider a through-train from Kowloon to Canton which stopped on the border for immigration formalities on both sides? Perhaps the Chinese had proposals to put on more trains. If so, he knew the Hong Kong Government would give such proposals most careful consideration.

The

12. Mr Ch'iao replied he was very familiar with Hong Kong before "Liberation". Since "Liberation", he had been to Hong Kong once. journey had been very troublesome. It had taken place when he went to Geneva with Premier Chou En-lai in 1954. Hong Kong was a very special issue in relations between Britain and China. The Chinese Government had made their proposal (that a permanent representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be stationed in Hong Kong) because of their desire to have a more appropriate form of representation to deal with the troublesome problems which arose between Hong Kong and Canton over visits and other matters. The Chinese Government had been quite candid

gut Jabout

CONFIDENTIAL

about their policy towards Hong Kong and Mr Royle would be clear about it. There was no need for him to rehearse it. He therefore hoped that the British Government would link this question with fundamental Chinese policy towards Hong Kong. Troublesome administrative problems arose between Hong Kong and Canton. These were difficult to deal with without an official Chinese representative in Hong Kong. He therefore found it rather difficult to understand the point which Mr Royle had made about balance. He was himself familiar with the changes in Hong Kong's circumstances which had taken place over the past few decades. He had lived there in the 1930s and the 1940s and had had many friends there. In the 1930s, the Chinese Communist Party and the authorities in Hong Kong had been in constant contact. They had been facing a common enemy; Japan. In China the KMT had been in power. In the 1940s the KMT had had a Special Commissioner in Hong Kong, whom he knew well. During that time the Chinese Communist Party and the KMT had had relations and some measure of co-operation. Since then, relations between the British and the Chinese Governments had developed, in a roundabout manner, to the stage now reached. But relations between the Hong Kong authorities and the Chinese Government were at about the stage that they had been when the Hong Kong Government had first to a certain extent extended recognition to the new Government of China. The Chinese Government was still represented in Hong Kong by the New China News Agency, with semi-legal status. This caused inconvenience in many ways. It was perhaps because of habits developed over the past two decades that the degree of inconvenience did not seen too great. But it was a fact that, in the handling of certain affairs, there was a real need for something better. The Chinese Government had made clear in the past that because full diplomatic relations had not been restored between the two countries, and because the "question of Chiang Kai Shek" still existed, they were prepared to let this problem be. It had been raised by the Chinese Government in 1956 and in 1958. The British Government had replied that the time was not ripe for a change. But now relations were fully restored between the two countries. There was no question of Taiwan or two Chinas or anything like that. In the Chinese Government's view, therefore, the time had now ripened. There should be a Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative in Hong Kong to deal with the necessary and oft-occurring administrative matters which arose. He himself had left Hong Kong in July or August 1949: the state of Chinese representation there was as it had been when he had left. Did Mr Royle really think that this was appropriate to the present state of affairs? There were two points worthy of consideration (he did not wish to exert any pressure, of course). First, the KMT had been allowed a representative in Hong Kong. Why, given the present situation, could not the Government of the new China be allowed one? Mr Royle had mentioned a few of the contacts necessary " There were many detailed matters to arrange. If there were to be an air service between Hong Kong and Canton, where would visas be issued? On Mr Royle's present visit, the aircrew had received their visas from China Travel Service in Hong Kong, who had had to send their passports to Canton. This was a good example of how bothersone things were. His second point was that the development of relations between the two countries made the establishment of an official Chinese representative in Hong Kong even more necessary. Such a representative

/would

CONFIDENTIAL

would deal with the tiresome questions which at the moment were dealt with with difficulty or in a roundabout way. Mr Ch'iao asked Mr Royle to consider the occasion when the Prime Minister of China was able only to stopover at Hong Kong airport. Would that be appropriate to the present state of relations between their two countries?

The British Prime Minister had mentioned that there had been great changes in the world. Certain conditions which existed in the past no longer existed today. If Mr Royle had not mentioned this question he would, of course, have brought it up himself. Mr Royle had said that the proposal was unacceptable. Of course, he could do nothing about that. He only hoped that further consideration could be given to it and that it could be viewed in a wider perspective.

13. As for other issues, such as the detention of those who had committed offences against the law, and the family in Shanghai, these were in the process of being dealt with. Mr Royle asked whether the Vice-Minister could say anything about an Air Services Agreement and communications. Mr Ch'iao said that in principle what Mr Royle had proposed was desirable; It was a matter of time. There were two separate questions. One involved communications between London and China, the other between Canton and Hong Kong. The second in particular was unavoidably linked with the question of Chinese representation in Hong Kong and other questions.

14. In connection with the problem of the detainees, about whom Mr Royle had said there was concern in Britain, Mr Ch'iao said he would like to raise the continued detention by the Hong Kong authorities of 19 Chinese. He hoped of course that they would very quickly be set free. Mr Royle replied that, in his view, the Chinese people and the British people were great pragmatists. In international relations, they never got bogged down in discussion of dogma. They had always worked out practical solutions to problems. There was a wide area of questions in which they were in agreement. But when small matters arose : in which they were in disagreement, they could say so very frankly with- out bitterness on either side. This was something very difficult to achieve, and it was something his Government valued very highly. As far as the problem of Chinese representation in Hong Kong was concerned, he thought that, in practical terms, the arrangements which already existed, although informal, in fact constituted no impediment to efficiency. They seemed to work. As a Conservative Minister, he believed that if things worked out and functioned all right then one should leave them alone. There was no point in change for the sake of change. He thought there was no reason why the present state of affairs should not continue satisfactorily. In the 1950s there had been a great Foreign Secretary in Britain: Ernest Bevin. Mr Bevin had once said that he hoped that the time would come when peoples of all nations would be able to travel freely between each other's countries without visas or passport formalities of any kind. He was sure that the Vice-Minister subscribed to that aim; but because of various difficulties it had not yet been possible to realise it. Britain had some close friends among countries in Europe among whom there was no need for visas. He hoped that would soon happen with China.

CONFIDENTIAL

/He

CONFIDENTIAL

On He would work to that end and hoped that the Vice-Minister would too. the question of balance, there of course existed today a situation which differed from that of the 1950s and even from that of last year. The British Government had no representation in Taiwan and no Consulate in Shanghai (he did not wish to imply that they wished to open the consulate in Shanghai again). The two Governments had Embassies in London and Peking. This was the balance. This was beneficial for the British Government and beneficial for the Chinese Government. He took note of what the Vice-Minister had said.

as a

15. Mr Royle said that, as far as confrontation prisoners were

confrontation_prisoners concerned, there were only 19 still in prison. Some years ago there had been around 1,830. Those in prison had been tried in courts of law for offences under the law and were serving prison sentences as a result. The Governor's Review Board met from time to time; result of its recommendations to the Governor the numbers of prisoners had been reduced very dramatically. The Review Board had met recently and the Chinese Government had already been told that another three would soon be due for release. The Review Board would continue to meet; and matters would no doubt continue as they had in the past. He took note of the Vice-Minister's comments and would instruct HM Ambassador to let the Vice-Minister know the outcome of the Board's meetings in the future.

16.

On communications, he did not want to exert pressure about links between Hong Kong and Canton. The Air Services Agreement would cover wider perspectives. The question of communication between London and Peking was most important and it would be valuable if the two governments could agree to mutual air rights. He would ask Mr Evans, Head of the Far Eastern Department in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to speak on this subject. Mr Evans said that BOAC had recently sent an exploratory mission to China. They had reported that the Chinese Government had said that details would have to await the conclusion of an Air Services Agreement. This point of view was well understood in London; but it was the wish of the departments concerned that the negotiation of an Air Services Agreement should start as soon as possible. As the responsible Department in London, the Department of Trade and Industry were ready to open negotiations as soon as the Chinese were themselves ready, in Peking, in London or anywhere they chose.

17. Mr Ch'iao, turning again to the question of Chinese representation in Hong Kong, said he hoped that further earnest consideration could

The Chinese Government felt be given to his Government's proposal. that the matter had to be settled. Furthermore, they attached great importance to it. These discussions involved a practical issue and it was a very serious one. They had both been very frank about it. kelations between the two countries were in the process of developing. As Mr Royle had mentioned, his own visit was the first of a series. He welcomed what Mr Royle had said about the need for both sides to avoid adopting dogmatic attitudes. He therefore hoped that further serious consideration should be given to the question of Chinese representation in Hong Kong. Possibly they would make further headway

it did not on this question during later discussions, possibly not; matter, because discussions would continue.

18. On the following day, the two sides would be able to continue

CONFIDENTIAL

/discussing

CONFIDENTIAL

discussing any remaining bilateral matters and move on to international affairs. The world was roun.; they would be able to roam from one side to the other. Mr Royle replied that he much looked forward to doing this.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr CACLE AND WINE

GGM/OPS

This expence seems

Slavel

forging ahead.

LAMITED

MERCURY HOUSE - THEOBALDS ROAD · LONDON WGI

TELEGRAMS CABLEWME LONDON MET TELEPHONE PAGE AS DE · LONDON TELEX TIPTRI GADAAN. ONLY)

whary quebej zataraman ang dala

the

3. PA

R.C.

11/8

2nd August, 1972.

Miss N. Farrell,

Aviation and Telecommunications Dept.,

Foreign and Commonwealth Office,

St. George Street, LONDON, S.W.1.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No.42

Dear Miss Farrell,

- ? AUG 1972

HONG KONG/CHINA

MUT 8/393/1

Reference our telephone conver- sation of today, I enclose for your records copies of the communication between myself and our General Manager, Hong Kong which covers the exchange of correspondence between Gable and Wireless Ltd., Hong Kong and the Hong Kong Telco on the discussion with the Colonial Secretary.

Yours sincerely,

J.H. Wilson,

Group Gonoral Manager International Operations.

Encl.

MEMBER OF THE CABLE AND WIRELESS WORLA

NOUR

分

CABLEWIRE LON

HX3240 CW EXEC

CONFIDENTIAL TELEX

FROM: GM HONGKONG

TO:

MD LONDON

W/7

1ST AUGUST 1972.

010720G/TLX/CONF

CHINA FOR WILSON FROM SUART X FURTHER TO PARA. 5

OF MY 010530G/TLX/CONF HAVE SPOKEN TO CLINTON WHO FEELS SURE LEE'S

·SUGGESTED APPROACH WILL BE ACCEPTABLE TO GOVERNMENT X GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL WILL BE INVOLVED X I HAVE ADVISED CLINTON WE PROCEEDING AS THOUGH THE NECESSARY ACTION WILL BE TAKEN X TOMORROW I SHALL ACKNOWLEDGE LEE'S LETTER WITH THANKS X RGDS

END OF MESSAGE

CABLEWIRE LDN

HX3240 CW EXEC

CABLIRE LON

HX3240 CW EXEC

CONFIDENTIAL TELEX

GGH.

1ST AUGUST 1972.

FROM: GM HONGKONG

TO:

MD LONDON

010530G/TLX/CONF CHINA FOR WILSON FROM SUART RE MY 210550G/TLX/CONF

X2 RE MY PARA 10 BERRY AND MEAD LEFT TODAY FOR KWANGCHOW AFTER VISA

DELAYS

X3 RE MY PARA 6 X COLSEC CLINTON SPOKE WITH LEE ON 25TH AUG BUT LEE DUG HIS TOES IN, STATING HE WISHED TELCO TO PROVIDE CABLE WITH

CHINA AS ORDINANCE PERMITTED THIS (IN RESPECT TELEPHONY) X CLIMTON

ASKED ME TO HAVE TALK WITH LEE WHICH I DID AT LENGTH ON 27TH AFTER

WHICH I SENT FOLLOWING PERSONAL LETTER TO LEE:-

''DEAR DICK.

PROPOSED CANTON-HONG KONG CABLE

FURTHER TO OUR CONVERSATION YESTERDAY 1 ENCLOSE TIE

FOLLOVING1 -

TALNO VLI

یاء .

OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND CANDU LTD., 25TH JUNE 1972.

11 (2)

AGREEMENT BETWEEN H.K. TELEPHONE CO. LTD. AND CANDY X LTD.. 7TH AUGUST 1949.

112.

THE FOLLOWING ARE SONE OF THE POINTS WE DISCUSSED, NOT NECESSARILY IN ORDER OF IMPORTANCE:-

(A)

CHINA APPROACHED CABLE AND WIRELESS LTD. ABOUT THE PROPOSED CABLE BECAUSE WE ARE CHINA'S LONG- ESTABLISHED CORRESPONDENT FOR BOTH TELEPHONY AND

TELEGRAPHY.

(B)

WELL BEFORE THE PROPOSED CABLE FILLS IT WILL BE NECESSARY 'TO ENGINEER AN ALTERNATIVE, THOUGH COMPLEMENTARY, SYSTEM BETWEEN CANTON AND HONG KONG TO PROVIDE SYSTEM DIVERSITY, AT, THE MOMENT TROPOSPHERIC SCATTER OFFERS THE MOST ATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVE AND CHINA'S INTEREST IN TROPO' IS

CANDW HAS INDICATED IN PARA. 2 OF ENCLOSURE (1).

EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS TO INTERNATIONAL RADICTELEPHONY, WHICH INCLUDES ''TROPO''.

(C)

THE PROPOSED CABLE WOULD CARRY FOUR SERV [CES: - TELEPHONY, TELEGRAMS, TELEX AND LEASED CIRCUITS,

ALL WOULD BE BOTH TERMINAL CCANTON-HONG KONG ONLY) AND TRANSIT CE.G., CANTON TO POINTS BEYOND HONG KONG). CANDW LTD. HAVE EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS FOR

TELEGRAMS, TELEX AND LEASED CIRCUITS.

TRANSIT

TELEPHONE SERVICES BEYOND HONG KONG ARE ONLY

POSSIBLE THROUGH OUR OVERSEAS FACILITIES.

WE CAN

OFFER CHINA WORLDWIDE ONWARD CONNECTIONS FOR ALL FOUR SERVICES, OUR CNWARD CONNECTIONS CAN BE AUTOMATIC AT ANY TIME CHINA INSTITUTES AUTOMATIC WORKING HERSELF, THROUGH OUR INTERNATIONAL

TELEPHONE EXCHANGE CTELEPHONY), INTERNATIONAL

TELEX EXCHANGE (TELIX) AND MESSAGE SWITCHING

[

COMPUTER (TELEGRAMS AND

INTEREST IN TRANS.

3 OF ENCLOSURE (1).

CHINA'S

120 IR PARA

CANTON-HONG KONG TERI!NAL TELEPHONE TRAFFIC IS OF

THE CROCR OF 1 PERCENT OF HONG KOLC'S TOTAL CADOUT

2.5 PERSENT DURING THE TRADE FAIRS) AND DRE IS

LITTLE LEASON TO EXPECT THIS TO ALTER APPRECIALLY

ment wodo THEREFORE, ŠZZA NO

MĒ NEAR SUTURE.

૧

PARTICULAR POINT IN MAKING SEPARATE ARRANGEMENTS FOR

THIS SKALL STREAN OF TRAFFIC WHEN THE PROPOSED GABLE

CAM CARRY IT, PLUS ALL THE OTHER SERVICES, BOTH

TERMINAL AND TRANS [7

•

LE ALSO CARRY TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH TRAFFIC, BY

H.F. RADIO, WITH SHANGHAI AND ONWARD TO PEKING.

SHANCHAT EARTH STATION OPERATES THROUGH THE PASIFIC

IPTELSAT 4 SATELLITE, AS DOES CUR HK1 EARTH STATION

*MEN TRAFFIC QUANTITIES JUSTIFY IT WE SHALL PROVIDE

SATELLITE SERVICE BETWEEN HONG KONG AND SHANGUV

2 E HAVE EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS TO RADIOTTLE¡ONY,

ICH INCLUDES SATELLITE WORKIN, IT WOULD DAH

KY, TU SI TU YEY LEAST OF 17, FO

FO. AL

-J

AI SHINA TO E VEA CUR

ولاه

A A JOINTILY-

(G)

(H)

SPEED IS OF THE ESSENCE IN THIS PROPOSED PROJECT, WE ALREADY HAVE AN EXPERT HERE FROM LONDON AND HE

HAS MADE A PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF THE ROUTE, HE WILL DE VISITING CANTON IN THREE DAYS WITH OUR MANAGER COVERSEAS SERVICES) TO CONTINUE TECHNICAL

WE ALREADY HAVE ENQUIRIES OUT FOR

DISCUSSIONS. CABLE AND TERMINALS/REPEATERS, MD WE ARE AINING, WITH CHINA, AT A READY FOR SERVICE DATE ABOUT MID- 1973. ENGINEERING OF THE PROJECT, TO C.C.1.T.T. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS, IS PROCEEDING.

I WOULD MENTION THE EASE WITH WHICH THE QUESTION OF

THE SEACON CABLES WAS DEALT VITH

EXAMPLE OF COOPERATION.

AN EXCELLENT

YOU HAVE NO DOUBT HOTICED

THAT THE H.K, TELEPHONE CO. HAS PARTICIPATED IN THE

FINANCIAL BENEFITS OF IMPROVED OVERSEAS COMMUNICATIONS PROVIDED BY CANDW LTD., AND OUR HANY PARTNERS.

THE

SEACOM CABLE MARKED THE BEGINNING OF REAL GROWTH IN

OVERSEAS TELEPHONY IN HONG KONG.

(1)

IN RESPECT OF THE PROPOSED CANTON~HONG KONG TELEPHONE CABLE, THE H.K. TELEPHONE CO. WOULD CONTINUE TO RECEIVE 50 PERCENT OF HONG KONG EARNINGS, AS ALLOWED

THE RATES FOR IN OUR JOINT AGREEMENT, ENCLOSURE (2),

ARE LOW WITH CANTON, SUT OUR EARHINGS WOULD BE THE

CONT'D.....

درا

ཨཱཡཱགཱཧཔ;

010530G/TLX/CONF PAGE 3.

| #

SAME AS THE TELEPHONE CO'S, WE OF COURSE WOULD BE PROVIDING THE CAPITAL, ENGINEERING AND LABOUR FOR

MANUALLY HANDLED TRANSIT TELEPHONE

THE PROJECT.

TRAFFIC WOULD CONTINUE TO PROVIDE EARNINGS FOR THE TELEPHONE CO. TOO.

173.

SORRY THIS IS SO LONG IT SEEMED SHORTER WHEN DEALT WITH VERBALLY. AS AGREED I AM SENDING A COPY TO MIKE CLINTON SO THAT HE MAY BE KEPT AWARE OF THE POSITION.

YOURS SINCERELY,

(SIGNED) BRIAN.

FOLLOWING PERSONAL LETTER FROM LEE RECEIVED TODAY CON TELCO

PAPER):-

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF 27TH JULY, 1972, AND ENCLOSURES FOLLOWING OUR CONVERSATION ON THE SUBJECT OF THE PROPOSED CANTON-HONG KONG CABLE,

AFTER CONSIDERATION OF THIS NATTER IT HAS BEEN DECIDED THAT THIS COMPANY WILL COOPERATE TO THE MAXIMUM WITH YOUR

ORGANISATION IN ORDER THAT YOU MAY PROCEED WITH THE WORK,

AND I HAVE TODAY WRITTEN TO THE ACTING COLONIAL SECRETARY

STATING THAT THE HONG KONG TELEPHONE COMPANY, LIMITED, WHILE

RECOGNIZING THAT THE LAYING OF A CABLE FOR TELEPHONIC

COMMUNICATION IS AN INFRINGEMENT OF OUR FRANCHISE, WOULD BE

PREPARED TO GRANT CABLE AND WIRELESS LIMITED A SUB-LICENCE

AT A NOMINAL FZE OF HKDLR1 PER ANNUM UNDER CLAUSE 35 OF THE

TELEPHONE ORDINANCE, BUT THIS NATURALLY DEING WITHOUT PREJUDICE' TO OUR RIGHTS UNDER THAT ORDINANCE.

WE WILL REVERT TO THIS MATTER AS SOON AS CONFIRMATION

HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM THE ACTING COLONIAL SECRETARY THAT

THIS PROCEDURE WOULD MEET GOVERNMENT'S WISHES.

FYI THE ORIGINATOR'S INITIALS ON THIS LETTER ARE ''CAN'* 1.E., KALE

X5 HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO REACH CLINTON BUT WKUA

END OF MESSAGE

CABLEUIRE LON

HX3240 CW EXEC

HOW RECVD PSE?

DE HO ROK ACM 0715GHT/1ST AUG+++

TKS BI

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

(63)

PRIORITY

CYPHER CAT A

FM PEKING #12430Z

CONFIDENTIAL

FIVED IN !

*RY No 5C

PER

For 1/1/~

가

以

TO PRIORITY FCO TELEGRAM NO 771 OF 1 AUGUST INFO ROUTINE

HONG KONG

YOUR TELMO 624 TO HONG KONG,

COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN HONG KONG AND CANTON.

WE HAVE NO OBJECTION: WE WOULD ALSO WELCOME HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.

ADDIS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FILES

FED

HKI OD

PUS D

PS TO MR ROYLE

SIR E NORRIS

MR WILFORD

COPIES TO

HONG KONG GOVT OFFICE

54 PALL MALT.

CONFIDENTI AL

ENTAL OTENIE

CYPHER CAT A

FM PEKING 310885Z

1/8

४

CRET

RRO

IQP HOOPY

HONG KONG

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELEGRAM NO 7681 OF 31 JULY I NEO, ROUTI

( PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR).

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

FEA 3/4h

1. AT THE END OF A VERY LONG DISCUSSION OF BILATERAL MATTERS, INCLUDING MR THORPE'S, SIR DESMOND PLUMMER'S PROPOSED VISITS ETC ( SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAMS) AND IMMEDIATELY AFTER A DISCUSSION OF PRELIMINARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR YOUR OWN VISIT, HEAD OF VEST EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT SPOKE TO ME THIS MORNING IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS ( CLEARLY ON INSTRUCTIONS).

WANG REFERRED TO THE SUCCESS OF MONSIEUR SCHUMANN'S VISIT AND SAID THAT HE EXPECTED YOURS TO BE EQUALLY SUCCESSFUL.

BOTH SIDES SHOULD MAKE EFFORTS TO THIS END-TO PROPEL THE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES FORWARD. MR ROYLE'S VISIT WAS A GOOD

PREPARATION FOR YOURS.

THERE HAD BEEN A USEFUL MUTUAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. WANG SAID THAT } MUST HAVE MOTED THAT DURING THE DISCUSSION BETWEEN MR ROYLE AND CHIAO KUAN-HUA ON BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG HAD BEEN RAISED.

HE WISHED IN HIS CAPACITY AS HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT DEALING WITH THE AREA TO SAY WHAT GREAT IMPORTANCE THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT ATTACHED TO THE POINT MADE BY CHIAO CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.

HE SAID THAT THERE WERE MANY OTHER QUESTIONS, THE SETTLEMENT OF W HICH WERE CONNECTED WITH IT. THIS WAS WHY HE WISHED TO

MENTION IT IN A FRANK WAY.

3. I SAID THAT I KNEW THE REPLY MR ROYLE HAD GIVEN TO CHIAO HAD BEEN THE RESULT OF THE MOST CAREFUL CONSIDERATION IN LONDON OF ALL

ASPECTS OF THE QUESTION.

I WOULD HOWEVER REPORT WHAT WANG HAD SAID. WANG REPLIED THAT WE WERE NOW MOVING FORWARD IN OUR RELATIONS IN OTHER RESPECTS FOR EXAMPLE TRADE, BANKING AND INSURANCE, COMMUNICATIONS AND

TRANSPORT: AND AT THE PRESENT TIME DISCUSSIONS WERE BEING HELD ON THE SALE OF BRITISH AIRCRAFT TO CHINA, HE HOPED THAT

WE WOULD MOVE FORWARD ON THIS OTHER MATTER ALSO.

ADOIS

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

FED HKLOD

SECRET

ไป

Reling

FCO telegram No,

SECRET

AMENDMENT SLIP

AMEIDAD COPY→ AMENDED DISTRIBUTION-

R44/ 700

(62

telegram No. 168A of 31/1/72. to

.of

[CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG

HONG

Please amend to read - ILONGJ

to FCO

Telegramino, 168.

Fax

Authorised by

Staff Officer Room 131

SECRET

Dato

(Doleto where not applicable

2/8/22

CONFIDENTIAL

28/1

Mr Hervey

Evens. Roogeve

HONG KING - Telegram No 672:

2817

RESUMPTION OF HONG KONG CANTON FERRY SERVICE

We still have not seen Mr Addis's views but

can expect him to be in favour of the proposal.

EMIL IN

3/2/~

I have asked Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department

and Research Department if they know when the ferry

service was suspended. Neither can recall. I assume

that it was probably in 1949; it might be worth asking

Hong Kong. There are still, so far as I know, ferries

between Macao and Canton; these were certainly operating

until about two years ago and probably continue to

operate now.

I submit a draft. HKIOD concur.

28 July 1972

тел

HL Davies

Far Eastern Department

Teem to issue.

CONFIDENTIAL

แ

R.E. 28/7

CONFIDENTI AL

CYPHER/CAT A

FM FCO 231625Z

CONFIDENTIAL..

TO ROUTINE HONG KONG (PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR) TEL NO 624 OF 28 JULY INFO PEKING.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 672, PARAGRAPH 2 COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN HONG KONG

AND CANTON

1. SUBJECT TO THE VIEWS OF PEKING, WE SEE NO OBJECTION TO YOUR ACTING AS YOU PROPOSE.

2. WE CAN FIND NOTHING ON FILE ABOUT THE HISTORY OF THE FERRY

SERVICE OR THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF ITS SUSPENSION. WE SHOULD IN DUE

COURSE BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY BACKGROUND YOU CAN PROVIDE.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES

FED

HKI OD

PUS D

RESEARCH DEPT

(F E SECTION)

P.S. TO MR ROYLE

SIR E NORRIS

MR WILFORD

COPIES TO

HONG KONG GOVT OFFICE

54 BALL MALL

CONFIDENTIAL

YPHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

FM HONG KONG 278125Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO ROUTINE FCD TELNO 672 OF 27 JULY INFO PEKING.

COMMUNICATION : HONG KONG CANTON.

POVEL IN Tev N- 50

FEH 36/2

A FRONT MAN FOR THE LOCAL COMMUNISTS HAS BEEN SOUNDING OUT THE HONG KONG TOURIST ASSOCIATION (HKTA) ON PROSPECTS FOR REVIVING THE PASSENGER FERRY SERVICE TO CANTON. HE SAID HE HAD NOT YET PUT THE IDEA TO THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT BUT THOUGHT THEY WOULD BE RECEPTIVE. IT IS CERTAINLY IN LINE WITH GENERAL REMARKS ON IMPROVED COMMUNICATIONS MADE BY COMMUNIST OFFICIALS HERE SINCE MR ROYLE'S VISIT TO PEKING, THE FOLLOW UP WILL DEPEND ON THE OUTCOME OF HKTA'S PRELIMINARY TALKS AND ON OUR OWN INTERDEPARTMENTAL STUDY OF THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS.

2. AS FAR AS CAN BE SEEN AT THE MOMENT I AM IN FAVOUR OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS AND UNLESS YOU SEE OBJECTION WILL GIVE QUIET OFFICIAL ENCOURAGEMENT.

FCO PASS HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICE LONDON

MACLEHOSE

FILES:

FED

SKIOD

FS/HR. ROYLE

SIR E. NORRIS

MR. WILFORD

COPIES TO:

HONG KONG GOVT OFFICE. 54 PALL MALL

CONFIDENTIAL

(59)

Enter

31/2

CYTHER/CAT A

FM HONG KONG 27#125Z

CONFIDENTIAL

M Land

Yes, I think we

CONFIDENTIAL Huld eas

kaiden but v. Carefully.

Love Dorst went

laŭ bied

hinto the Representation issue.

TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 672 OF 27 JULY INFO PEKING.

COMMUNICATION: HONG KONG

CANTON.

A.R

2. AS FAR AS CAN BE SEEN AT THE MOMENT I AM IN FAVOUR OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS AND UNLESS YOU SEE OBJECTION WILL GIVE QUIET OFFICIAL ENCOURAGEMENT,

· FCO PASS HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICE LONDON

MACLEHOSE

FILES:

FED

KIOD

PS/MR. ROYLE

SIR E. NORRIS

MR. WILFORD

COFIES TO:

HONG KONG GOVT OFFICE. 54 PALL MALL

CONFIDENTIAL

Mi Haring of 3117

To see Mi Royle's

comment, if you

already done so.

luve not виле

ムッ

PRIORITY

EN CLAIR

7 HONG KONG C883457

UNCLASSIFIED

TOP CORY

REG:

26/1

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 629 OF 8 JULY INFO PEKING WASHINGTON.

MR POYLE'S VISIT TO PEKING.

THE 'KUNG SHEUNG DAILY", A RIGHT-WING HONG KONG PAPER, HAS REPORTED IN A FRONT PAGE HEADLINE ARTICLE THAT MR ROYLE'S TALKS IN PEXING LED TO AGREEMENT BY CHINA TO EXTEND THE NEW TERRITORIES LEASE FOR 20 YEARS TO 2017. QUOTE RELIABLE TOP-LEVEL INFORMATION FROM MAINLAND CHINA UNQUOTE IS QUOTED AS THE SOURCE.

2. THIS HAS BEEN TAKEN UP IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE PRESS AND MAY BE RELAYED BY THE AGENCIES.

3. IN REPLY TO PRESS QUESTIONS MY INFORMATION SERVICES HAVE SAID:

BEGINS

THIS IS PURELY SPECULATIVE. MR ROYLE'S TALKS IN PEKING WERE CONFIDENTIAL. WE HAVE NOTHING TO ADD TO WHAT MR ROYLE TOLD THE

PRESS WHEN HE WAS 14 HONG KONG.

ENDS.

FCO PASS COPY TO HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICE LONDON

MACLEHOSE

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

FED

HETOD

NEWS D

IUS D (FE SECT)

COMIES TO:

HK GOVT OFFICE PALL MALL.

PRIORITY

EN CLAIR

FM FCO 191415Z

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 112 108 Z

ID CODY

(FE)K

3/21/2

TO PRIGRITY HONG KONG TELMO 573 OF 18 JUL INFO PEKING

YOUR TELNO 633 CABLE AND WIRELESS

1. YOUR PARAGRAPHĄ NO OBJECTION

DOUGLAS-HOME

عك

FILES

FED

A & T D

HKTOD

MR WILFORD

MR TURPIN

MED A SCOTT

COPIES TO:

HE GOVT OFFICE LONDON

File note

Reference.

Cable & Wireless: Hay hay - Chinon letteremnications

Spoles to Min Farwell, A+ TD, dont proposed

C.+W. project.

Min Farell apeed that it is dessible to keep

the M.P.T.

and if

Post Office-

in the

the latter affirme

offene, de

the Po's

fisture, oin new

C+WT% proposed portefation projected wait to China.

3. Mis Farrell will copy

and our

перву

H.K. tt. 052 t FCO

to Mr C. LOVELL,

C. LOVELL, M.P.T.

frond and confidential bais.

K. Compton

10/7.

Ref. Notes on the talks between Kwangtung Administration

of Telecommunications and the Cable and Wireless Ltd., Hong Kong. signed 25.6.72. already copied to

you

CR 5/1026/49

RECEIVEL in

R...

RS MAIN. .50

With the Compliments of the 1 4 JUL 1972

Political Adviser

Họng trong

гд

Ген

EH 3/3

Far Eastern Department, F.c.o.

CONFIDENTIAL

CABLE AND WIRELESS LIMITED

P.O. BOX 607 MERCURY HOUSE · HONG KONG TELEPHONE PHOVSOD TELEGRAMS - CABLEWING - TELEX: HRANO Please ready to the Company avating reference and data

0.L.3592/72.

CONFIDENTIAL

29th June, 1972.

The Hon. The Colonial Secretary,

Colonial Secretariat,

Lower Albert Road,

Hong Kong.

Dear Sir,

Visit to China, 17-26 June 1972.

I have pleasure in enclosing for your information two copies of the cover sheet and items 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7 of my report on the above; I handed you two copies of items 3) and 4 on 27th June.

As I reported to you verbally yesterday the reaction of my Head Office is to go ahead as quickly as possible with the cable project and at this time the ready- for-service date we are aiming at is mid-1973; this of course is subject to a more detailed analysis of costs, etc., and to the satisfactory resolution of the many problems which will undoubtedly present themselves.

As I think we are agreed that the Lowu-Kowloon railway offers the only practicable route, for a cable I shall be most grateful if we could be given permission to carry out a preliminary survey of that route, together with a connecting route between the railway and the north portal of the cross-harbour tunnel. It is fully understood that if Government can give us this permission there would be no implied commitment at this time for the provision of the route and it is further understood that if such a route is eventually made available some sort of wayleave agreement, and possibly other formalities, would be

necessary.

In anticipation of permission being granted for a preliminary survey my Head Office are making arrangements for a suitable landline expert to come to Hong Kong in about ten days time; hopefully he will be able to have technical discussions with the Chinese Administration in Canton during his visit.

5329

/Cont'd.....

MEMBER OF THE CABLE AND WIRELESS WORLDWIDE COMMUNIGATIONS GROUP

CONFIDENTIAL

0.L.3592/72.

CONFIDENTIAL

29th June, 1972.

I shall keep you advised of all developments on our side and I would welcome your earliest possible comments on the preliminary survey so that arrangements for our landline expert may be finalised. Thank you for your help.

Yours faithfully,

Encs.

c.c.

P.M.G. (with 1 each encs.

P.A.

#trant

(B. Suart) General Manager.

CONFIDENTIAL

་བཀ

CABLE AND WIRELESS LTD.

HONG KONG

--o0o---

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT ON VISIT TO KWANGCHOW (CANTON), KWANGTUNG PROVINCE, 17-26 JUNE 1972.

1. Participants.

Programe.

"Notes on the Talks".

Comments on "Notes on the Talks".

Note on technical alternatives discussed,

Kwangchow-Hong Kong route.

Note on traffic and related proposals discussed.

Note on existing telecommunications facilities within China.

GURE IDENT JAL

CABLE AND WIRELESS LTD.

FLONG KONG

PARTICIPANTS.

Item 1.

Cable & Wireless Ltd., Hong Kong Branch:-

B. Quart,

General Manager.

J. Berry, Manager, Overseas Services.

A. Trigaci, Commercial Manager.

Kwangtung Administration of Telecommunications:-

Su Shih-chieh, Deputy Director.

Chung Kun-liang, Deputy Director of the Administration

Office.

Chief of Section (Telecommunications).

She Chuong-li,

Chen Tsi-jung,

Chief of Section (Services).

Hsu Yiang-lin,

Koo

Assistant to Chief (Services).

Assistant.

Halong Hsi-jung, Interpreter.

Chen Chun,

N.B.

Interpreter.

At formal dinners on 17th and 25th the host was Mr. Yang, Director of Television Bureau for Kwangtung Province.

FERTIAL

CASTE AND WIRELESS LTD.

TRONG CÙNG

Itan 2.

PROGR-VSE.

Morning

Afternoon

Evening

Sat. 17.

Leave Kowloon 0926.

Arrive Kwangchow

Formal Dinner.

1445.

Sun. 18. Discussion.

Museum and

Cantonese Opera.

antiques.

Mon.

19. Discussion.

Discussion,

Free.

Tues. 20. Discussion.

Central Telegraph Cultural Park.

Office.

Telephone Ex-

change.

Wed. 21. Bicycle factory.

Discussion.

Free.

Thurs.22.

People's Commune.

Free.

Fri. 23.

Central Telegraph

Discussion.

Film show.

Office.

Trunk Switch-

boards.

Pagoda.

Sat.

24.

Acupuncture.

Shopping.

Kwangtung Folk

Group.

Antiques.

Sun.

25.

Zoo.

Discussion.

Formal Dinner.

Mon.

26.

Leave Kwangchow

0820.

Arrive Kowloon 1300.

N.B.

Informal discussions continued during the many visits and

while travelling.

CONFIDENT I AL

CARLE AND WIRELESS LTD.

TONG KONG

---000--ve

NOTE ON TECHNICAL ALTERNATIVES DISCUSSED

KWANGCHOW-HONG KONG ROUTE.

Item 5.

The following methods of increasing the capacity between Kwangchow and Hong Kong were discussed.

1. A microwave link.

A tropo scatter system.

A combination of cable and microwave systems, the microwave system being at the Hong Kong end.

A submarine coaxial system.

A coaxial system overland.

6. An extension of the Kwangchow-Shumchun carrier system with onward radio link to Hong Kong.

All systems involving a radio link were pressed on our part but although courteously discussed by the Administration they would not accept a radio link in the chain. They would consider only a cable link with perhaps a tropo or microwave system operating in parallel at a later date.

The Administration found it difficult to see that the domestic system of trunks could not be extended because of franchise and the fact that they involved microwave links in any case.

The question of relative investment in radio and cable systems seemed quite unimportant to the Administration.

-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

CABLE AND WIRELESS LTD.

HONG KONG

Item 6.

NOTE ON TRAFFIC AND RELATED PROPOSALS DISCUSSED

The following points were raised during discussions:- (A) Abolition of the 4-figure group code rate and

the adoption of an accounting rate of GFC. 0.27 for both foreign languages and 4-figure group code.

(B) Establishment of a Pix service between Kwangchow

and Hong Kong at a rate of GFCS. 22.50 for the first 150 SOCMS and 11.25 for each additional 100 SQCMS.

via Kwangchow to Shanghai and Peking - SITA, AFP, Reuters, AP and UPI are interested in leased circuit facilities with China.

(D) Adoption of F.31 format in both directions. (E) Hong Kong/Kwangchow telephone service to be

extended to 24-hour operation during the Kwangchow Fairs.

(F) Establishment of llong Kong/Kwangchow Telex

service during the Kwangchow Fairs.

Mr. Chen Tai-jung, Chief of Section (Services) offered the following comments:-

(A) China is a huge country with thousands of

telegraph offices and it would be most difficult to depart from the existing practice of charging on the basis of half-rate for Chinese 4-figure groups. (Collection rates: Foreign words 32 Chinese cents 4-figure groups 16 equivalent to HK$0.60 and 0.40.)

(B) Under consideration.

(D) As for (A) above, all telegraph offices use the

same format, which is identical to the F12 format, and a change in format would involve a considerable amount of work.

(E) will be taken into consideration in due course

although tha existing VHF system may preclude any extension beyond midnight (Kwangchow Time). (F) Telex service will be established as soon as a

cable is available between Kwangchow and Hong Kong.

Stemming from our offer of direct telephone circuits with countries with which we have direct cable and satellite connections on a rented circuit basis, Mr. Chen enquired about our leased circuit charges. A copy of our leased circuit booklet was handed to him and the basic concept of leased circuit charges was explained in detail.

/Cont'd.....

CONFIDENT LAL

Item 6.

3 copies of our Tariff booklet were also handed to him and ve drew his attention that numerous changes, in respect of all services, have taken place since the booklet was printed in July 1970. We promised Mr. Cheng that copies of our new Tariff booklet would be forwarded to him în August or September 1972.

-------0000000 --- t

-CONFIDENT FAL

CABLE AND WIRELESS LID.

HUNG RONG

Item 7.

(N.B.

EXISTING TELECOMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES WITHIN CHINA.

Items marked with a asterisk were personally seen; other items were learned verbally.)

Approximately 6 yuan

yuan = £1.

1. General.

Trunk distribution is by carrier systems, both under- ground and overhead, with "some microwave".

Much overhead seen west and south-east of Kuangchow. Soundly constructed and maintained. Carrier system 4 kHz channels, 12 per group, 5 groups per supergroup. Underground cable of Chinese manufacture stated to be 1 x 4 or 4 x 4 (i.e., one or four quads), each quad carrying one supergroup. Repeater spacing 20 km maximum; repeaters remotely power-fed. Laid price of one 4 x 4 (excluding building costs) 30,000 yuan per

km.

Kwangchow-Shunchan presently 15 voice channels.

2. Telephone.

Kwangchow stated to have 18 exchanges and 30,000 telephones; present numbers are 5-digit.

Not

One exchange visited using old electro-mechanical rotary selectors of Hungarian manufacture. Stronger design.

About 10,000 lines.

Exchange airconditioned.

Shanghai is making both Strowger and Crossbar exchanges.

Most telephones are for state organisations but a few private telephones are connected.

Rates not given, but charging stated to be on rent plus call fee basis.

Visited Kwangtung Trunk Manual Switchboard; about 100 positions, including the Hong Kong circuits.

Similar switchboards stated to be in each province.

No STD, so all trunk traffic handled nawally with 1 minute minimum.

/Cont'd.......

CONFIDENTIAL

Itna 7.

Charge Kwangchow-Paking quoted as 1.10 yuan per mimite. Keyplate selection used on all boards.

I operator attending ou 6 Hong Kong channels.

During Kwangchow Fairs maximum of 3 girls cover 11 Hong Kong channels.

The standard of operation of Hong Kong channels is alway" satisfactory.

3. Telegraph.

D.C. keying used for local connections.

Voice frequency telegraph stated to be available as 16 to 24 channels per voice channel.

Some government offices said to have teleprinter tielines.

Public messages handed in at telegraph offices which stated to be separate from post offices.

In Tung Fang Hotel one counter available for both telegrams and post.

No phonogram service available.

Cost of telegraph service given as 0.03 yuau per word throughout China.

F12 format used throughout China.

Visited Kwangchow Central Telegraph Office (CTO).

Well laid out, very clean and light, not air- conditioned,

About 90 positions available of which about 50 equipped/manned.

Circuits equipped with Chinese made teleprinters, stated to be 50 or 75 bauds, with twin-head TD's. Looked well made and maintained.

About 4 morae positions also in use.

Total load stated to be about 30,000 messages a day. Other provincial centres stated to be of similar size.

Kwangchow-Shanghai circuit in operation 24 hours a day, others closed before midnight.

Kwangchow-Hong Kong circuit was the only international circuit in the cro. It had a continuously running monitor on the receive side.

Distribution of hard copy to circuits by 24 volt D.C. "railway", about 1'1" gauga, self-reversing at ends of

runs.

/Cont'd.....

Item 7.

Collection of tape/messages from circuits by moving belts in troughs,

Chinese characters handled in 4-figure code.

Operators translate code/characters and reverse without using books.

An experÛental unchine was demonstrated briefly. From 4-figure groups in 5 unit code the machine printed directly very legible Chinese characters about 3/16" square on continuous roll about 8" wide. Printing method not observable.

The printed paper dried by hot lamp.

Printing speed variously stated to be 1500 characters/ minute and 2500 bauds, but certainly very fast.

It was expected that production models would be available in about 2 years.

* Printing machine about 24′′ x 18" x 12" high,

associated with 2 x 5 ft. racks of store and 2 x 5 ft. racks of power supplies.

Stated that machine was developed by research branch of Ministry of Telecommunications and that they were working on a machine to convert from Chinese characters to 4-figure groups.

4. Telex.

No service available in Kwangchow, but it was said to be available in Shanghai and Peking to a small number of subscribers, with international service to a few, unspecified, countries.

5. Television.

Kwangchow service is black and white from a fine 200 metre high maat. There are no plans for introducing colour at present. It was said that programes were exchanged live with Shanghai and Peking but the transmission method was not revealed.

--o0000-

PRIORITY

BER/CAT A

FM HONG KONG 182353Z

CONFIDENTIAL

(PA) L.C. 17/7

541

TOP CON

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY F C O TELNO 533 OF 10

JULY

1972. INFO ROUTINE FEKING.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 582.

REA

CABLE AND WIRELESS.

WE UNDERSTAND FROM SUART THAT CABLE AND WIRELESS IN LONDON HAVE

DISCUSSED WITH YOUR OFFICE THE MESSAGE HE SHOULD NOW SEND THE

KYANGTUNG ADMINISTRATION OF COMMUNICATIONS.

2. HE PROPOSES AND WE AGREE THE FOLLOWING:

BEGINS

I HAVE THE PLEASURE OF INFORMING YOUR ADMINISTRATION THAT

IT IS THE INTENTION OF MY COMPANY TO PROCEED WITH THE

CABLE PLAN DISCUSSED IN JUNE 1972 PROVIDED THAT THE RESULTS

OF THE ROUTE SURVEY WE ARE CONDUCTING ARE SATISFACTORY.

ENDS

3. IF YOU SEE NO OBJECTION SUART WILL PASS THIS MESSAGE AT 0185

GMT ON 12 JULY.

FCO PASS COPY HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICE LONDON.

MACLEHOSE

FILES

FEO

ATD

AKIOD

COMMS D

DWS

FS/MR ROYLE

FFFFF

CONFIDENTIAL

COPIES TO

HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICE

Reference.

enter

W 53

R.C.

717

Proposed paragraph in a letter from Mr.B.Suart, Gen. Manager, C&W Hong Kong, to the Kwangtung Administration',

of Telecommunic tions at Canton

.......I have the pleasure of informing your Administration

that subject to confirmation that you now wish to develop

the cable plan discussed during June, 1972, it is the

intention of my Company to proceed with this project providing

the results of the route survey are satisfactory.

Fear J/../.

1.6/4/7

For 10 sterg Powertkont

Reference

Kr.Slade of Cable & Wireless (242: 44331 Ext.426) ho is dealing with the question of the new greement with the Chinese over China's external telecommuniontions (on the basis of the agreed minutes just received from Hong Kong)

bas telephoned to say that there has now been a shift in the situation as existed yesterday which won to the effect that C&W had been given the reen light to go ahead with a 'feasibility study'only.

C.& W.in Hong Kong are now pressing the Board in London to authorise them to give a "Declaration of Intent" to the Chinese that they will proceed with the contracts.

The question has cropped up in connexion with the arrangements for Kead (C& Hong Kong) to go to Canton. The firm maintain that "it is necessary for us to tell the Chinese Administration of our intention to proceed"; that the

firm would lose fice if they had to tell the Chinese that they had no authority for proceeding with the laying of the cable.

C & W reiterate that it is only a "declaration of intent" which they hope will be forthcoming from the Government in order not to delay, or endanger, the present negotiations.

C & W will be telegraphing to Hong Kong today and would be glad of FCC comments as soon as possible.

I see dijeha.

人

7/7.

1. Forell

Aviation and Telecommunications Dept. G.67/B/1 - GOGLS Ext.386

7 July 1972

See now teams of proposed section in letter from

Mr Snort to Revangting Relmin. of

(1.53)

Telecommunications.

Discrased with Mrs Denza, Mr. Lambert HKIOD + Mr Hury.

see

We are no pobited objection to the poprad form of words.

Thins however makes

no mention

to farm. 4 above).

3. Mas Danga confirms

HMG

in to tast

that such a commercial Declaration

Intent is not normal postice. C. t Wimight be dundotty an open-ended contact

DD737711 5AZLET

beby?!

12/71 GM 10/2

theby? But this is a matter for C+ws.com Commveid judgment.

Informed Mir Favell of gist of 3.44. above She will se inform CAW, London.

Nl. Compton

FEX 7/7/72

Mr Hay Mr Law

Lambyf

7/7.

HK+IO)

Reference...

Мы старта

ма

should swe

blessing

Sve

5820

W(52

Ак та

B517

Cable & Wirelers wait to Aina Horny Kay - Aivan

telecommunications

Please see ettected record, received in FED toky

The London manager of

A+ TD for

Cable & Wireless has been pressing

HME", "folted boring

"politied blessing to the proposed

arangments (Jorn. 15 of Mr Sert's nome

I have aged

love

below).

with Miss Farrell, in Mr Morne's absence, that we shall let (+4. have our pelimmry views as quickly as pooble. (A copy of the wood was sat to ATD today.)

all

our

I can are no potted objection, as the Chinese do not offer to have attusled politied conditions to

this proposed the proposed agrement, or not to HK. In v sich no. 5 for Mr. Royle's wait (fwes. 2+3) affoted (+W's proposals, and angerted att Mor Royle might raise the matter with the Chinese.

bre

14.

апот

His seems to be another encereying fundust of

the aqeens t

t to exchange

بالله

H. Compton

4/7!.

Mr Laufort

We spoke. I have given A+TD the geen light to Five C+W. or blessing.

f.c.

5/7

CR 5/1026/49

Mr Haway

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE FE enter +reschinit

pse R.C.

Mr Lembut HK IOD

Mr Walker

المقبلها

Mr. Minute.

McCartting

With the Complimention FileA+TD (Min Formal)

té

Political Adviser

Ref. Telegram No. 58. 28.6′′92.

Hang

"2. from Gov. HK to

S of S

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTES ON THE TALKS BETWEEN THE KWANGTUNG ADMINISTRATION OF

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE

CABLE & WIRELESS LTD., HONGKONG

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTES ON THE TALKS BETWEEN THE KWANGTUNG ADMINISTRATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE CABLE & WIRELESS LTD., HONGKONG

At the invitation of Mr. Su Shih-chich, Deputy Director of the Kwanglung Administration of Telecommunications, Mr. B. Suart, General Manager of the Cable & Wireless Ltd., Hongkong

Branch and others held talks with Mr. Su Shib-chich in Kwang-

chow on problems of telecommunication of concern to both sides

from June 17th to 25th 1972, and reached an agreement on

the following points:

1. To meet the needs of the development of telecommu.

nication services, it is desirable to connect Kwangchow, Shumchun Both sides have agreed and Hongkong by underground cables. to conduct a further exchange of views on problems relating to

the establishment of the cable lines.

2. Both sides considered it appropriate to apply various

communication facilities between Kwangchow and Hongkong, and exchanged views on improvement of existing communications

-1-

circuits and on application of the tropospheric scatter in com.

punications. Both sides also agreed to continue the exchange of

opinions.

3. Both sides exchanged opinions on transit telephone and

telegraph services and on operation of leased circuits and telex after increase of the capacity of circuits between Kwangchow, Shumchun and Hongkong,

4. Cable & Wireless Ltd., Hongkong invites the Kwangtung Administration of Telecommunications to send its personnel to

explore the communication systems and communication services

in Hongkong at an appropriate time, and the latter accepted this invitation with pleasure.

These notes are signed in Kwangchow on June 25th, 1972 in duplicate, in the Chinese and English languages.

Thihar Brian Suant

General Manager

Cable & Wireless Ltd., Hongkong

切

Deputy Director Kwangtung Administration of Telecommunications

广东省电信局水线无线电公司香港分公司会谈纪要

「

广东省电信局

{

水线无线电公司香港分公司

会谈纪要

水线无线电公司香港分公司总经理布里·苏亚特等,

应广东省电信局副局长苏世杰的邀请,于一九七二年六月

十七日至二十五日在广州就双方关心的问题进行了会

谈,并就下列问题取得了一致意见:

一、为了适应业务发展需要,采用地下电缆沟通广

州、深圳至香港间的通信是可取的。双方同意就建设方面

的有关问题进一步商谈。

二、双方认为,广州、香港问采用多种通信手段是适

宜的,并就改善现有通信电路和采用对流层散射通信问题

进行了商谈,双方同意继续交换意见。

三、双方就广州、深圳、香港间的电路容量增加后的

报话业务转接和开办租用电路,用户电报等问题交换了意

见.

四、水线无线电公司香港分公司邀请广东省电信局在

适当的时候派人到香港对通信设施、电信业务进行考察,

·广东省电信局高兴地接受了一邀请。

本纪要于一九七二年六月二十五日在广州签字,共两

份,每份都用中文和英文写成,

广东省电信局水线无线电公司香港分公司

副局长

总经理

BEE Brian Suant.

苏共

¿PIDENTIAL

CABLE & WIRELESS ITD.

HONG KON

Item 4.

COMMENTS ON "NOTES ON THE TALKS"

1.The Chinese Administration made it clear they were

looking for a cable outlet to Hong Kong (and beyond) apparently as a route offering diversity to satellite working via Shanghai.

It was obvious they referred all moves in the discussions to higher authority for direction (7 Shanghai or Peking).

C.A. stated their intention would be to route all Kwangtung Province international traffic (which, they said, would grow quickly) via Hong Kong on the proposed cable route; this is a remarkable change of attitude from the past, but it must be realised that the traffic is small at present; they would not give past figures, or forecasts, but they did say they were considering telex and leased circuits also for this routing.

4. C.A. agreed that present Kwangchow-liong Kong telephone

traffic is not heavy but claimed it would grow quickly. (It grew about 30% last year, and during the Spring and Autumn Faira is about four times that of normal months.)

5. 'C.A. claimed a big demand for telephone traffic Shameluan-

Hong Kong but could give no figures. (This service was opened via Kwangchow and the existing facilities on 19.6.72 at C.A's request. Cable & Wireless think the demand will be minimal in fact.)

The railway route Kwangchow-Kowloon is as follows, with approximate distances:-

Kwangchow (Canton)

New Mercury House.

Shamchun Lowu Kowloon Hong Kong

145 km

China

36 km

4 km*

Border

*via Cross-

harbour Tunnel

Hong Kong

The C.A. propose laying two 4 x 4 (i.e., 4 quado) carrier cables (their largest standard design) each cable carrying 4 x 60 channels, Kwangchow-Shunchun, during 1973. They wished to reduce to audio level at the border and theyare prepared to provide the cable for 4-wire audio connections across the border to Lowu. They insist upon onward cable connection Low-Hong Kong.

CONFIDENT IAL

/Cont'd.....

TAMMENT LAL

C&J's suggestion of microwave Log-Hong Kong was not acceptable to C.A. However they accented that international connections beyond Hong Kong would in many cases not be cable (e.g., satellite) and are content with this.

9. C.A. appeared to have no interest in exporting their

carrier cable for uce on the Hong Kong side. C&W pointed out the advantages of a homogeneous system, carrier throughout, Kwangchow-Hong Kong but they were adamant at first that they were responsible only to Shumchun, and CQW from Low onwards. Later they appeared readier to consider a through carrier system.

10.

G... accepted that, say, 60 channel capability Low- Hong Kong would be adequate for some time, split, say, 24 channela Kwangchow-liong Kong terminal, the remainder for international traffic.

11. In respect of C&W's suggestion of mutual aid for

Shanghai and Hong Kong earth stations via the proposed cable route they said Shanghai would help Hong Kong and "they would consider" the reverse.

12. Throughout the discussions C&W repeatedly emphasised the economic advantages of a tropospheric scatter or microwave solution, Kuangchow-Hong Kong direct (replacing the present direct VIIF system), and the sense of at least a paper-survey of a submarine cable route Kwangchow-long Kong; these were given the polite attention necessary for guests' ideas but it was made entirely clear that only a cable solution, and the land route at that, was acceptable to C.A.

13.

14.

C&W's off the cuff estimate for a 60 channel carrier system Lowu-Hong Kong is of the order of £200,000- £250,000 completed. This assumes an eadily-found and legally-cleared route and the railway appears to be the only possible route offering a practicable chance of completion in a short period. Caw already has ducts and the necessary wayleave from New Hercury House through the Cross-harbour Tunnel to the North Portal. The assistance of the Hong Kong Government would be essential to obtain the use of a route from the North Portal to the nearest connecting point with the railway route, and thence northwards to Lowi Permission for a preliminary survey will be sought from Government.

(1) The high-cost of the Low-Hong Kong cable system appears most uneconomic, as the only traffic which is reasonably sure at this time is the Kwangchow-Hong Kong stream. This is rising, but it is cheap traffic aut C&W's share of the revenue is low.

(2) The international traffic (telephone, telex and

leased circuite) is likely to be low for some time to come and is at present incapable of measurement (or even, I suggest, of sensible estimate).

/Cont'd.....

•

SINPIAN DE

(3) Mutual aid between earth stations could be of

some small benefit, to both aides.

(4)

A decision from the telecomunications point of view alone is therefore difficult as there is insufficient data and the financial rewards can only be described as pie in the cky.

(5) However, as it is known that the Chinese

authorities recently rejected a proposal by the Japanese for a cable into Shanghai, and it would seem at least likely that the Americans would welcome an opportunity to build a cable to China, this present offer by the Chinese Administration to build a broadband cable system with Cable & Wireless Ltd., together with the indication of its future use for transit traffic via Hong Kong, would seem to be a splendid opportunity for C&W and British interests to become firmly involved in China's future overseas communications activities.

(6) Perhaps the simplest way of arriving at a decision

is to consider the likely future of Sino-British telecommunications relations if we do not meet this, their first open indication of a wish to be connected via C&W facilities in llong Kong to the rest of the world; that future could well be bleak indeed.

15. On the face of it there would appear to be no political

problems about a cable system crossing the border (the railway and a water pipe line already cross) but as political clearance by both the Hong Kong and British Governments must be the first requirement these notes have been copied to the Colonial Secretary, the Political Adviser and the P.M.G., Hong Kong.

16. I wish to stress the urgency with which the C.A. regard

this matter. If it is agreed from all points of view that this project should proceed then I recommend that all the stops should be pulled out with a view to having a functioning system within a year from now.

27/6/1972.

c.c.

lion. Col. Sec. Pol. Adv.

P.M.G.

Wohnout

General Manager.

Mr More, A+TD. Ryned:

Spolie

>_CYPHER/CAT A

& Fee copy top lify

CONFIDENTIAL

FM HONG KONG 280400Z

CONFIDENTIAL

Men bordmann.

R.C.

29/6.

一個

TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 582 OF 28 JUNE INFO PEKING.

PEKING TELNO 588 TO YOU: CABLE AND WIRELESS.

าง

ther confidence don't their par

R.C.

29/6.

SUART RETURNED ON 26 JUNE AFTER A HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL VISIT.

HE HAS AGREED WITH SU SHIN-CHIEN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE KWANGTUNG ADMINISTRATION OF COMMUNICATIONS (KAC) TO CONSIDER THE INSTALLATION OF A CABLE SYSTEM BETWEEN CANTON AND HONG KONG, EACH SIDE TO DO THE WORKS ON THEIR OWN SIDE OF THE BORDER.

2. SUART EXPECTS THIS TO GO AHEAD. IT SEEMS ALMOST CERTAIN TO HIM THAT THE CHINESE INTEND TO USE CABLE AND WIRELESS (C AND W) IN HONG KONG AS A TRANSIT POINT FOR INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC. THEY SPECIFICALLY ENQUIRED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF LEASED CIRCUITS AND TELEX SERVICES ONWARD FROM HONG KONG AFTER THE CABLE HAS BEEN COMPLETED.

3. THE K A C TEAM WERE TECHNICALLY VERY COMPETENT AND HAD THOUGHT THESE PROPOSALS THROUGH CLEARLY BEFORE PUTTING THEM TO SUART. THEY ACCEPTED THE C AND WIRELESS INVITATION FOR A RETURN VISIT WITH EVIDENT PLEASURE AND GAVE EVERY SIGN THAT THEY INTEND TO COME TO HONG KONG IN 3 OR 4 MONTHS, AFTER THE TYPHOON SEASON. THEY ARE THINKING IN TERMS OF A TECHNICAL DELEGATION OF 12 OR MORE TO INSPECT

C AND W'S INSTALLATIONS AND FOR GENERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH C AND

W ENGINEERS.

4. SUART HAS REPORTED ON HIS VISIT TO THE DEPUTY MANAGING DIRECTOR OF CABLE AND WIRELESS IN LONDON. THE RECORD OF HIS AGREEMENT WITH K A C AND HIS COMMENTS ON IT FOLLOW BY BAG.

CONFIDENTIAL

15.

MYDENTIAL

..........

5. THIS IS EXACTLY THE SORT OF DEVELOPMENT 1 HOPED FOR AFTER ROYLE'S VISIT TO PEKING. IF THERE ARE NO HITCHES THERE SEEMS A REASONABLE CHANCE THAT IT MAY BECOME A MODEL FOR OTHER PRACTICAL AGREEMENTS IN THE FIELD OF COMMUNICATIONS.

FCO PASS COPY TO HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICE LONDON

MACLEHOSE

FILES

FED

A & T D

HKIOD

COMMS D DWS

FS/MR ROYLE

COPIES TO:

HI GOVT OFFICE LONDON

-2-

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Evans

EU 278

Reference

Kard

менет

شا

VISIT TO PEKING BY POLITICAL ADVISER, HONG KONG

1. Mr Wilford told me yesterday, 21 June, that he was anxious that Mr Stratton should visit

Feking at an early date after his arrival in Hong Kong. He thought this might be in late August or early September, but in any case

SOA

before the Secretary of State's visit. Mr Stratton has already been in touch with Sir Murray

Maclehose about this.

Роворител

RBR Hervey

22 June 1972

cc Mr Laird

I assume thai thi siration will loculi mi Addne in good fimo. The subject may be discoved

فيه

beiween the Governor and thi

Addi's

wack.

R.M. Evans

23 June, 1972.

DO 737719 557664 300M 2/71 GM 3643/2

Mr Evans

506

VISIT TO PEKING BY POLITICAL ADVISER, HONG KONG

1. Mr Wilford told me yesterday, 21 June, that he was anxious that Mr Stratton should Pisit

Feking at an early date after his arrival in Hong Kong. He thought this might be in late August or early September, but in any case

before the Secretary of State's visit. Mr Stratton has already been in touch with Sir Murray Maclehose about this.

[

22 June 1972

co Mr

по

يارة

RBR Hervey

wife thing Ally

(0.0)

246

MAID IN

TRYNǝ.50

*:32

.alu

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A

RA PEKING 178448Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO ROUTINE FCC TELNO 59S OF 17 JUNE INFO ROUTINE HONG KONG. HONG KONG TELNO 526 TO YOU: COMMUNICATIONS.

1. THE FOLLOWING REPLY TO MY LETTER OF 5 MAY TO CHUNG FUCHSIANG WAS PASSED TO US YESTERDAY BY TELEPHONE.

FEGINS.

Fäll

I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR LETTER OF 4 MAY, I AM GRATEFUL FOR YOUR KINDNESS IN INVITING US TO VISIT HONG KONG STANLEY STATION. I AM GLAD TO TELL YOU THAT THE CANTON ADMINISTRATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS OF OUR COUNTRY PAS INVITED HONG KONG CABLE AND WIRELESS LTD TO CANTON TO DISCUSS APPROPRIATE PROGRAMMES ON COMMUNICATION AND ITS TECHNIQUES. AS REGARDS TO THE SENDING CF OUR TECHNICAL PERSONNEL TO VISIT HONG KONG EARTH STATION AT A SUITABLE TIME THE ADMINISTRATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS OF KWANGTUNG PROVICE WILL HAVE A DISCUSSION WITH HONG KONG CABLE AND WIRLESS LTD''. ENDS.

2. CLEARLY THE CHINESE TOO ARE CONTENT TO AWAIT THE OUTCOME OF STUART'S VISIT TO KWANGCHOW.

ADDIS

FILES

FED

COMMS D

DAS

ATD

#RIOD

PS/MR ROYLE

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

COPIES TO:

HONG KONG GOVT OFFICE

54 PALL MALL SW1

CONFIDENTIAL

150

DWNFO 331/17

ADVANCE COPY

Joe open Part B. trembiunt.

рестрел

X.C.

23/6.

that FED

حمام

Hong Pony Gut office

576 Post Mack Swi.

дл

LIM 48 347/17

་ :[* ge-"

17′′

YOUER CAT A

PEKINA 17 <4AFZ

VTIAL

enter

M: Devic

C. AXTD (Mr Nove HK +IOD to see Ark sta

2.C.19/6

R.E.

19/6.

2316

TO UTINE FCO TELKO BAN OF 17 JUNE INFO ROUTINE HONG KONG,

CHO TALKS 524 TO YOU: COMMUNICATI045,

　1. THE FRESVING REPLY TO MY LETTER OF 5 MAY TO CHUNG FUCHS JANG *** PASSED TO US YESTERDAY BY TELEPHONE

TEGINS.

I HAVE PECEIVED YOUR LETTES OF 4 WAY. I AM GRATEFUL FOR YOUR

KINPUTOS IN INVITING US TO VISIT HONG KONG STANLEY STATION, I AM BLAD TO TELL YOU THAT THE CANTON ADMINISTRATION OF

TELECOMMUNICATIONS DE COUNTRY HAS INVITED HONG KONG CAPLE

I" VIRFLESS LTD TO CARTON TO DIECUCT APPROPRIATE PROGRAMMES

DIEOWS

DE COMMUNICATION AND ITS TECHNIQUES, AS REGARDS TO THE SENDING

OUD TECHNICAL PERTINEL TO VISIT HÔNG KONG EARTH STATION

AT RITABLE TI THE DOMINISTRATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS

OF KVANGTUS" PROVINCE WILL HAVE A DISCUSSION WITH HOHR KONG CABLE AT WIRLES! LTD?''. ENDE.

", CLE.ALY THE CHINESE TOO WE CONTENT TO AWAIT THE OUTCOME

STHASTIC MESIT TO ALLIDSKOM,

Dots

CONFIDENTIAL

TDP CORY

མས་

4+9

CYPHER/CAT A

FM HONG KONG 1658132

CONFIDENTIAL

TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 526 OF 16 JUNE INFO PEKING.

MY TELNO 499: COMMUNICATIONS.

SUART, THE HONG KONG MANAGER OF CABLE AND WIPELESS, LEAVES FOR CANTON TOMORROW, SATURDAY WITH TWO OF HIS SEXJOR STAFF.

2. HE EXPECTS TO INVITE A RETURN VISIT OF THE SAME KIND. THIS COULD AFFECT THE PLANS FOR CHUNG FUHSIANG TO VISIT NONG KONG, SUART WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF PEKING WOULD NOT FOLLOW UP THE ABASSADORS LETTER OF 4 MAY TO CHUNG UNTIL HE HAS SEEN HOW HIS TALKS IN CARTON

GO.

3. WE SHALL REPORT SUART'S IMPRESSIONS WHEN HE RETURYS.

FCO PASS COPY TO HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICE LONDON.

MACLEHOSE

/EPEATED AS PEQUESTED/

COPIES TO:

HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICE

54 PALL MALL S.M

FILES

FED COVVS D

C."'S

A & TD HX120

PS/WR ROYLE

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

Mr Wayford

Private Secretary

CITRAŬ IN

-EGI.

KEM

糖

Secretary + State

le=Kayle thinker that

Hy will accept

D. 71% decision

الله

CHINESE OFFICIAL KEF ROUTENPATION IN HONG KONG

der

Blic

12명

+12/6.

1. The Secretary of State minuted on my submission of 22 May:

"I agree.

to lead them the Chinese politely to foreclose

If ur Royle does it, is this likely

on my meeting in October?"

Our

It is difficult to predict what the substantive Chinese

reaction will be to our rejection of their proposal.

decision was, however, predicated on the belief that the Chinese

would probably accept our refusal with reasonable grace. So

for Peking's reaction, as evinced in the course of Mr Royle's

discussions in reking (Peking tel No 523 and Hong Kong tel No

484), has been mild. The Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign

Affairs has hinted that the Chinese might link the negotiation

of an Air Services Agreement with their proposal; and they may

try to bring public pressures to bear on us. (In this connection

please see the attached extract from the Hong Kong "Star" of

30 May which has just reached us. It seems more than likely

that the Chinese may themselves have leaked their proposal.)

But however the Chinese choose to pursue the matter, I doubt if

they will wish to go so far as to withdraw the Secretary of

State's invitation.

cc: Sir Leslie Monson

Mr Forrester HK2IOD

SECRET

Refoven

R BR Hervey

Far Eastern Department

wat X

agree with

Fümler for 7/6

PUSD MATERIAL

ATTACHED

DELICATE SOURCE

Mr Wilford

SECRET COVERING TOP SECRET

PASS BY HAND

laques A.R/thegal THE W

Mr Logan Private Récretary

Secretary of State

b lead cam furitioly

จ

~ October?

relog dana shit fored ove

TwEvans! keting

CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

The Secretary of State minuted on Hong Kong telegram 23/5.

No 398 of 9 May: "I hope we are getting our Ambassador's

advice urgently". Mr Addis has given us his further views

in Peking telegram No 450 of 17 May. Sir Murray MacLehose

has commented (Hong Kong telegram No 423) on Mr Addis'B

views; the Governor's arguments are, I think, conclusive.

Mr Royle has minuted: "I feel we should stick to our

decision for a clear-cut refusal".

2. In Hong Kong telegram No 424 Sir Murray MacLehose

draws attention to a report

The report, a copy of which is attached,

is clearly important. I agree,

in the light of it, with

the Governor's assessment that a polite but firm refusal

of the Chinese request for official representation in Hong

ĈKong would stand a fair chance of being accepted. I also

agree with him that in communicating our refusal to the

Chinese we should argue the case as little as possible.

A simple but courteous "No" without giving any reasons

would however only invite the Chinese to probe further.

Our response would need to be a little fuller than this.

SECRET COVERING TOP SECRET

Mo Jes (pe Take My)

Exte fos-

THIS IS A COPY

THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958

SECRET COVERING TOP SECRET

3. At Mr Royle's meeting at 4.30 pm on 11 May. it was

agreed that the following recommendations should be made

to the Secretary of State:

(i)

We should reject the Chinese proposal without waiting for further elaboration from them or

considering any counter-proposals. If we delayed

our reply the Chinese might publicise their

proposal, as they did when they last made it in

the 1950s; this would clearly be undesirable.

(ii) Mr Royle should himself inform the Chinese during

his visit to Peking that we are unable to accept

their proposal. The alternative course of action

(to instruct Mr Addis to take action with the

Chinese before Mr Royle's visit) is less desirable.

It would mean that Mr Royle would be open to

counter-attack during his visit; as a matter of

tactics it would be preferable for Mr Royle to

take the initiative in bringing up the issue with

the Chinese rather than to give them an opportunity

to raise it with him.

(ii) Mr Royle should raise the matter with Vice Foreign

Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua in preference to Ch'i

Feng-fei or Chou En-lai. Ch'iao is easier to talk

to than Ch'i and it is by no means certain that

Mr Royle would be invited to meet Chou En-lai.

(iv) Had Mr Royle not received an invitation to visit

Peking, or if the Chinese had suggested another date,

this would not have affected the need for an early

reply to the Chinese. In these circumstances

/Mr Royle

BECRET COVERING TOP SECRET

SECRET COVERING TOP SECRET

Mr Royle would have proposed to speak to the new

Chinese Ambassador soon after his arrival.

It was also agreed at the meeting that the Department should prepare a form of words for Mr Royle's use in speaking

}

to the Chinese. I attach a draft. It is based on Hong

Kong telegram No 398; but takes into account Hong Kong

telegram No 424. If approved, and subject to any further

comments from Mr Addis or Sir Murray MacLehose, it will

form the basis of the brief on this subject for Mr Royle's

visit to China. I also attach 2 draft telegrams to Peking.

Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department concur.

22 May 1972

RBR Hervey

Far Eastern Department

Sir L. Monson has suggested

a counted from

for para 2 of the "form of works'

Sir L Monson

of ways

Mr Evans

Mr Laird

numbered copies wilt what

Mr Wyatt

agree.

It is and

i corporates att bever meta multin.

Kim Wilfo

227

- 3-

SECRET COVERING TOP SECRET

20LED ATE

է:

CYPHC. CAT A

FM FING

SECK

0107002

TO IMEDIATE FCO TELEGRAM NO 523 OF 1 JUNE INFO ROUTINE HONG KONG (PERS INAL FOR GOVERNOR) AND WASHINGTON,

FOLLO NG FROM PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY.

MY THREE IPTS

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.

TOLD CH 1AQ KUAN-HUA THAT THE SI FUATION IN HONG KONG VAS O IE OF DELICACY, BUT THAT THE EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS WORKED WELL.

IN OUR VIEW, THE APPOINTMENT OF AN OFFICIAL CHINESE KEPRE ENTATIVE IN HONG KONG WOULD ADVEI SELY AFFECT THE IMPORTANT ADVANCES ALREADY MADE IN SINO/BRITISH ¡ELATIONS.

WE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE APPOINTMENT WOULD HAVI SUFFICIENTLY PRACTICAL MENIFIT TO EITHER SIDE TO JUSTIFY THE ISK OF DAMAGING

RELATIONS.

2. CH'IAO SAID THAT THE CHINESE GOVE: IMENT HAD RAISED THE SUBJECT BECAUSE OF THEIR DESIRE TO HAV: REPRESENTATION OF A KIND RICH COULD DEAL MORE APPROPRIATE).Y WITH ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS AS THEY AROSE. WE KNEW CHINA'S FUNDAMENTAL POLICY AND PRINCIPLES IN RELATION TO HONG KONG AND HE DID NOT PROPOSE TO REHEARSE THESE, I HAD SAID THAT THE PROPOSAL WAS UNACCEPTABLE-HE COULD DO NOTHING ABOUT THAT. BUT HE WOULD LIKE US TO VIEW THE CHINESE PROPOSAL IN A WIDER PERSPECTIVE THAN THE ONE WE H/D CHOSEN. HE ALSO SAID THAT IT WAS ANOMALOUS THAT, WHILE THERI HAD BEEN A COMMISSIONER IN HONG KONG AT THE TIME OF THE KMT (OVERNMENT, THERE WAS NO OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION NOW.

CHI

HAD TOLERATED AN IMPERFECT STATE OF AFFAIRS BECAUSE OF THE TATE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND CHINA.

ና

BUT IIE POSITION HAD NOW CHANGED.

3. I REPLIED THAT WE FOUND THE LACK OF AN OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRI SENTATIVE IN HONG KONG NO IMPEDIMENT IN THE HANDLING OF PRACTICAL PROBLEMS. FURTHER MORE THERE WAS NOW NO BRITISH REPRI SENTATION IN EITHER SHANGHAI OR TAIWAN: OFFICIAL REPRES- ENTATION WAS BALANCED.

CH'IO SAID THAT HE HOPED THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD RECON- SIDE THE CHINESE PROPOSAL TO WHICH HIS GOVERNMENT ATTACHED GREAT IMPO TANCE. I TOOK NOTE,

4. AT A LATER STAGE, CH'IAO IMPLIED THAT THE CHINESE MIGHT LINK THE EGOTIATION OF AN AIR SERVICES AGREEMENT WITH THEIR PROPOSAL.

ADDI:

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

DEIN #IMENTAL DISTRIBUTION,

FED

HKI D

AED

SECRE 2

EDIATE

HER CAT A

HONG KONG 061317Z

CONFIDENTIAL ECLIPSE

CO: FIDENTIAL

EILIPSE

TO IMEDIATE FOO TELNO 494 OF 3 JUNE INFO PEKING WASHINGTON.

FOLLOVING FROM PARLIAMENTARY UNDER--SECRETARY OF STATE.

1. YOU MAY FIND IT USEFUL TO HAVE AN ACCOUNT OF SOLE OF MY

OR PCIPAL IMPRESSIONS BEFORE I REPORT TO YOU PERSONALLY ON MY VISIT TO CHINA.

2. | SPENT 14 HOURS TALKING TO CH'IAO KUAP-HUA AND AMOTHER TWO TAKING TU CHI PENG-FEL. EVEN ALLOWEN FOR THE TIME TAKEN UP BY IN EXPRETATION, THIS IS LONG: AND CERTAINLY LONGER THAN I HAD EX ECTED. I DID NOT IN THE 2ND KEET CROU CA-LAI, EVEN THOUGH THE CN NESE KENT ON HINTING UP TO THE ED THAT A KEETING MIGHT BE ARI ANGED. HE MAY HAVE HAD SOME SPECIAL COMMITMENT, THERE WERE SIGNS ON MY LAST EVENING IN PEKING THAT SOL THING UMUGUAL WAS COING ON.

3. DURING MY TALKS WITH CI'LAQ, -THE ATMOSPHERE WAS GOOD THROUGHOUT CIT AO EXPLAINED MANY CHINESE POLICIES IN FAMILIAR

TELNS, AND DID NOT HESITATE TO CRITICISE US, PE REVER REVONTED TO THE LANGUAGE OF PROPAGANDA OR POLEMIC, HE VAS HIKSELF

I RESSIVE, HE SPOKC THROUGHOUT WITHOUT NOTES, WAS ALWAYS ARTICULATE

AM REVER CONTRADICTED HIMSELF ON COT MUDDLED. IT CAME ACROSS VIRY

CILARLY THAT THE CURRENT BACKGROUND TO CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY IS CHINA'S FEAR OF THE TWO SUPER-POWERS (ESPECIALLY THE SOVIET UNISH) ANY, TO A LESSER EXTENT, OF JAPAN. CHINA CLEARLY FEARS A MILITARY

AT ACK BY THE SOVIET UNION.

4. GH*TÃO AND I DISCUSSED INDO-CHRA ¿T LENGTH. HE SPOKE IN LOU KEY THROUGHCUT, BUT IT'EMERGED QUITE CLEARLY THAT CHINA IS

AGLINST ANY ATTEMPT TO REACTIVATE THE CENEVA CONFERENCE, I HAVE

THE STRONG IMPRESSION THAT THE CHINEST WOULD ALSO RE OPPOSED TO ANY EFFORT TO ORGANISE A GENEVA-TYPE LOUFERENCE, BUT CH" LAO BADE IT CLEAR THAT CHISA WANTS A PEACEFUL (CTTLEMENT AND ROPES THAT

THE PARIS-TALKS WILL MAKE ONE POSSIBLĮ.

15.

CONFIDENTIAL FOLIIGE

CONFIDENTIAL ECLIPSE

5. CHP' TWO ARD HIS ASSOCIATES SHOVED GREAT INTEREST IN TUE

ENLARGEMIST OF THE CUROPEAN EC141ONIC COMMUNITY AND IN OUR VIEVS ASCUT THE WAY IN WHICH THE COMMUNITY MIGHT DEVELOP. INTER ALIA, THEIR QUESTIONS COVERED THE ARRANGEMENTS WE HAVE NEGOTIATED WITH THE COMMUNITY FOR TRADITIONAL EXPORTS FROM THE COʻRONWEALTH, THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE FEDERAL AND CONFEDERAL APPROACHES AND THE PROSPECT FOR THE VOLUTION OF A COMMON ONETANY POLICY.

6. IN CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG, CH'IAO PUT ON RECORD ARSLERS TO THE POINTS I HAD MADE IN JUSTIFYING DIR HRABILITY TO ACCEPT THE CHINESE PROPOSAL, ONCE HE HAD DONE TRIS, AND HAD ASU.D US TO RECOUSINER OUR ATTITUDE, HE DID NOT MENTION THE SUBJECT AGATE. BUT IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT WE HAVE HOT HEARD THE LAST OF THE

CHI EGE PROPOSAL: AND CH' (AO HIMSELF KAS HINTED THAT THE CHINESE

PAY LINK WHAT THEY REGARD AS PROGRESS OVER THEIR PROPOSAL WITH READINESS ON THEIR PART TO BE ACCOMMODATING OVER THE DEVELOPMENT

OF COMMUNICATIONS WITH HONG KONG.

7. CHI WAS LESS IMPRESSIVE THAN CH'IAO, BUT HE WAS CLEARLY OUT TO

DE FRIENDLY AND HE WAS STUDIOUS IN HIS AVOIDANCE OF ALL SUBJECTS

CH VRICH BRITISH AND CHINESE POLICIES ARE AT VARIANCE (EO INDO-CHLIKA)

OR OF WHICH WE COULD PERHAPS HAVE EXPECTED CRITICISM (EG RHODESIA),

HE MADE A POINT OF EMPHASISING THAT YOU WOULD BE WARMLY RECEIVED

IN PEKING IN THE AUTUIR.

8. (IP TAO AND JITS ASSOCIATES VÆRE QUITE PREPARED TO TALK BUSINESS OUT: IDE THE FORMAL NECTINGS. I HAD USC "UL PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WITH CH' FÃO AND SUNG CHII-KUANG (ANDAS JADOR-DESIGNATE TO LONDON)

AVO'T CHINESE ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE STATUS AND FUTURE OF HONG KONG, AS OPPOSED TO CHINESE REPRESENTATION. IT WAS HAVE CLEAR TO

RE THAT THEY WERE QUOTE VERY HAPPY WIT¡ THE PRESENT STATUS QUO

IN HONG KONG UNQUOTE, WHICH THEY COUSTERED SATISFACTORY FOR BOTH THE CHINEGE AND DRITISH COVERTIME ITS. I TOLD THEM WE WOULD DO

NOTHING TO CHANGE THE INTERNAL ARRAICE CENTS THERE.

19.

CONFIDENTIAL ECLIPSE

3. CH' |AO DID NOT SAY A NORD ABOUT QUUTE UPERIALIS| INQUOTE OR CJOTE REC-COLONTALISH UNQUOTE AND ON Y MENTIONED MAO TSE-TUNG GWE. ALL THE SAME, IT WAS CLEAR THAT CHINESE POLICY IS STILL - F CHULATED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A HARXIST-LENINIST VIEW C: THE WORLD.

** I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THE DEPARTIENT WOULD REPEAT MIS TELEGRAM TO ADDITIONAL POSTS AS THEY THIK NECESSARY,

IACLEHOSE

'I LES

TED

IKIOD

HAN D

GEAD

DESD

[COPIES PASSED TO NO 10 DOVNING STREET]

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

EID (1)

PUS])

RESEARCH D (F E SECTION)

PS/NR ROYLE MR WILFORD

SIR L MONSON

COPY TO: SIR P ADAMS

CABINET OFFICE

- 3.

CC:FIDENTIAL ECLIPSE

السائدة

DONAL

*-* PANASONIC

BREAKFAST AT SIR MORKANE

OCENTI

FÉNAS!

MR ROYLE and bla vita chat with the Gevezzen, Sir Mgray Mazletose at ·

INSET: ATTINng at Goverment Be 206.

R ANTHONY Royle today Is flying to Peking after breakfast with the Governor,

M's

lil Sir Murray MacLehose, and a last-minute briefing on the Hongkong situation.

m Et l {

hr.

20 Began Re-

す

LIE LIE PLETE OPETA

pr Plan from OTMESSIA, The re-organisation

ernested in SH

Mr D.B. Edgi Today the

ar been protected the GovernoERİ,

Hion from th KICH DA SEJA,

Workers *ara besa noticed they will re-

Inform-

ing them whether their

services would still be

The reorganisation Sa sdarglood 19 be going leto effect in November and will result in a re- duction in production of bulk, sugar,

PPA dhalmena koncen

یا

Jon will conitase,

Mr Elgar paid the stact somber of work-

ars the company had

in flamiss bad not bass

bed yet.

Lives

working for the pany for moel of thate

"1 Ба сотраду is

in dutiesity it's not our Audi" con suid.

+++

"Right now the pre

aa Kompany ||17- tars and we bose be Gerrament

Ja Paling, Conese Foreign Sitalstry officials Mi Royia that China wanŁE a form of official representation in Bostkort,

cording to a fuma's ova Grila sources,

She does not west a Conal bare, but a PESTE

L7 L

to can speak for the

Mr Royle, Under-Secretary for Foreign and Commorvaahh. Aftatra, wat put "under velbett from the moment. He Prych Air Furce VC-10 soustad down ar Kalrak,

Ameigikplats, Anapped a few pică li tures of Mr Ronde and the part, including Eig with, being preriad ni Kaink by Sir Mornay, Than a helicopter whisked him to Harcourt Road where he was picked up by car and bilen to Government House for the "working break-

Smile

Mr Royle managed a brand smile for walking

Paking next weeks

Meanwhile, our sources My Chim is sattefted wih je ekoffietal conmets with (British authoritas bera, and wants the ma

At present, most of the "semi-offcla)"' con- eacts are made between the office of the ma

manak kan reprosecutives of the Chinese Government with offices in the Hew CRİM DETALTeter, Wischer

There's no TV like sor trinitron colour

יו

- - -

CYPHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

FM HONG KONG 09080GZ

CONFIDENTIAL

TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 498 OF 9 JUNE INFO PEKING,

RECEIVED IN

REGISTRY No. 5 120011972

PEKING TELNC 240 TO YOU? COMMUNICATIONS.

FEX ||

AS AN IMMEDIATE RESULT OF MR ROYLE'S TALKS IN PEKING A

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY CALLED ON THE GENERAL

MANAGER OF CABLE AND WIRELESS HERE ON 8 JUNE.

2. HE BROUGHT A FORMAL INVITATION FROM THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS

BUREAU OF KWANGTUNG PROVINCE TO THE QUOTE MANAGER AND PERSONS IN

CHARGE OF ADMINISTRATION AND TECHNICS UNQUOTE TO VISIT CANTOM FOR

A WEEK OR 10 DAYS AT A TIME OF THEIR CHOICE, EXPENSES PAID.

3. THE INVITATION WAS ACCEPTED WITH ALACRITY THOUGH THE DATE

REMAINS TO BE FIXED. CABLE AND WIRELESS HOPE TO COVER ALL THE

SUBJECTS GUTLINED IN THEIR LETTER OF 28 JANUARY TO MR CHUNG

FU-HSIANG, THE DIRECTOR OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS, PEKING. PUT THEY

WILL BE CONTENT TO RESTRICT THESELVES TO THE POINTS WHICH DIRECTLY

INVOLVE CANTON IF THAT SEEMS ADVISABLE.

FCC PASS COPY TO HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICE LONDON.

MACLEHOSE

FILES

COMMS D

DWS

FED

PS TO MR ROYLE

CONFIDENTIAL

~R.C./23/16- compion.

ہے

seer

CYPHER/CAT A

(M.Eons (4)

To have door my copy of the

lene. 87 28 Jomary.

CONFIDENTIAL

I showed be mori grajes me it you wored alicat anoke

FM HONG KONG 09088DZ

CONFIDENTIAL

RE. 2316

TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 498 OF 9 JUNE INFO PEKING.

PEKING TELNO 240 TO YOU: COMMUNICATIONS.

Good AR.

AS AN IMMEDIATE RESULT OF MR ROYLE'S TALKS IN PEKING A

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY CALLED ON THE GENERAL

MANAGER OF CABLE AND WIRELESS HERE ON 8 JUNE.

2. HE BROUGHT A FORMAL INVITATION FROM THE TELECO!MUNICATIONS EUREAU OF KWANGTUNG PROVINCE TO THE QUOTE MANAGER AND PERSONS IN

CHARGE OF ADMINISTRATION AND TECHNICS UNQUOTE TO VISIT CANTON FOR

A WEEK OR 10 DAYS AT A TIME OF THEIR CHOICE, EXPENSES PAID.

3. THE INVITATION WAS ACCEPTED WITH ALACRITY THOUGH THE DATE

REMAINS TO BE FIXED. CABLE AND WIRELESS HOPE TO COVER ALL THE

SUBJECTS GUTLINED IN THEIR LETTER OF 28 JANUARY TO MR CHUNG FU-HSIANG, THE DIRECTOR OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS, PEKING. BUT THEY WILL BE CONTENT TO RESTRICT THESELVES TO THE POINTS WHICH DIRECTLY

INVOLVE CANTON IF THAT SEEMS ADVISABLE.

FCC PASS COPY TO HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICE LONDON.

MACLEHOSE

FILES

COMMS D

DWS

FED

PS TO MR ROYLE

This in

pamite

significant -

it cooks

-Com

it then do

حسبان احمد

CONFIDENTIAL

tophen the Reprenentation

تما

camtaganist H.K. Commization

AR.

FED

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE

AND INDUSTRY

Shell Mex House

Strand

London WC2R ODP

Tel 01-836 1207

R+R.

The Mr Auning R.C.

With the Compliments of

876

R. E. CLARKE

Fan 3/20/2

CS 96

Civil Aviation 2(1)A

RIT Grosartie Zaq

Aviation & Telecommunications Dept Foreign & Commonwealth offios

London 811

348

ED 9/2

June 1972

.5 KONG GAITON AIR JANK

I refer to Hong Kong's telegram No 394 of 8 May. In this telegram and an one or two recent documenta we have seen peasing references to the question of a Hong Kong Canton air link. One report that reached us recently was that Mr John Kaswick was hoping to arrange a series of flights between Hong Kong and Canton at the time of the Canton Industrial Fair so that visitors from Western Europe who might have difficulty in finding hotel room in Canton could stay in Hong Kong and commute to the Fair sach day. However, Hong Kong's mention in the telegram to which I have referred of "our own proposals for a Hong Kong - Canton air link" suggests that they might have some- ~) | thing more permanent in mind, and indeed that there is in existence some document

containing their "proposal" which seems inadvertently not to have been copied to us.

I am therefore writing to ask if you or Roger Bervy in Far Eastern Department could give me non enlightenment on this subject. For one thing, if a reciprocal scheduled service by a Chinese airline is contamlated between the cities it would fall to us to licenos it under the terms of the Hong Kong civil aviation licensing regulations. Again, if it is a question of negotiating traffic rights for a scheduled service to Canton by an airline based in UK territory it would presumably fall to us to negotiate the rights. In any case, it seems important that, as we seem to be about to become involved in air services negotiations with the Chinese over trunk routes, we should be fully aware of all factors affecting civil aviation between ourselves

nd the Chinem

Yours sincerely

Clarke

R Hervey Eaq

Far Eastern Department

FOO

Spola A+TD & HK+IOD. Neither don't

sean

any

with safer.

2. A 1 TD /R. is loting through it's files.

8/6

a R.C. 8/6

fuck

Please

отд

Liaise

document

Know

mth A

876

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

CYPHER CAT A

FM PEKING

SECRET

0107002

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELEGRAM NO 523 OF 1 JUNE INFO ROUTINE HONG KONG (PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR) AND WASHINGTON.

FOLLOWING FROM PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY.

MY THREE IPTS CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.

3/4/2

1. ❘ TOLD CH'IAO KUAN-HUA THAT THE SITUATION IN HONG KỘNG WAS ONE OF DELICACY, BUT THAT THE EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS WORKED WELL. IN OUR VIEW, THE APPOINTMENT OF AN OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE IN HONG KONG WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT THE IMPORTANT ADVANCES ALREADY MADE IN SINO/BRITISH RELATIONS. WE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE APPOINTMENT WOULD HAVE SUFFICIENTLY PRACTICAL BENIFIT TO EITHER SIDE TO JUSTIFY THE RISK OF DAMAGING

RELATIONS.

CH'IAO SAID THAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HAD RAISED THE SUBJECT BECAUSE OF THEIR DESIRE TO HAVE REPRESENTATION OF A KIND WHICH COULD DEAL MORE APPROPRIATELY WITH ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS AS THEY AROSE. WE KNEW CHINA'S FUNDAMENTAL POLICY AND PRINCIPLES IN RELATION TO HONG KONG AND HE DID NOT PROPOSE TO REHEARSE THESE. I HAD SAID THAT THE PROPOSAL WAS UNACCEPTABLE-HE COULD DO NOTHING ABOUT THAT. BUT HE WOULD LIKE US TO VIEW THE CHINESE PROPOSAL IN A WIDER PERSPECTIVE THAN THE ONE WE HAD CHOSEN. HE ALSO SAID THAT IT WAS ANOMALOUS THAT, WHILE THERE HAD BEEN A COMMISSIONER IN HONG KONG AT THE TIME OF THE KMT GOVERNMENT, THERE WAS NO OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION NOW. CHINA HAD TOLERATED AN IMPERFECT STATE OF AFFAIRS BECAUSE OF THE STATE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND CHINA.

BUT THE POSITION HAD NOW CHANGED.

3. 1 REPLIED THAT WE FOUND THE LACK OF AN OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE IN HONG KONG NO IMPEDIMENT IN THE HANDLING OF PRACTICAL PROBLEMS. FURTHER MORE THERE WAS NOW NO BRITISH REPRESENTATION IN EITHER SHANGHAL OR TAIWAN: OFFICIAL REPRES-

ENTATION WAS BALANCED.

CH'IAQ SAID THAT HE HOPED THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD RECON- SIDER THE CHINESE PROPOSAL TO WHICH HIS GOVERNMENT ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE. I TOOK NOTE,

AT A LATER STAGE, CH'IAO IMPLIED THAT THE CHINESE MIGHT LINK THE NEGOTIATION OF AN AIR SERVICES AGREEMENT WITH THEIR PROPOSAL.

ADDI S

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

FED HKIOD

ATD

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

TOP C

31/

FM PEKING 2604387

SECRET

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELEGRAM NO 500 OF 26 MAY INFO ROUTINE HONG KONG

(PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR).

HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO 445

For 3/30

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG,

1. FOR MY PART I MUST ARGUE IN FAVOUR OF RETENTION OF THE TWO SENTENCES WHICH THE GOVERNOR WISHES TO OMIT AND WHICH I REGARD AS ESSENTIAL TO THE STATEMENT OF OUR CASE,

GIVEN THE DECISION REPORTED IN PARAGRAPH ONE OF YOUR TEL NO 350 TO ME, I THINK THAT THE PRESENTATION OF THE CASE IN YOUR TEL NO 351 TO ME IS EXCELLENT AND I HAVE NO FURTHER SUGGESTIONS TO MAKE.

3. AS REGARDS THE ISSUE OF TIMING ( PARAGRAPH 1 (B) OF HONG KONG TEL UNDER REFERENCE) I AM SURE THAT IT IS RIGHT THAT WE SHOULD STATE OUR CASE NOW WITHOUT WAITING FURTHER. IF WE WERE NOW TO LEAVE THE NEXT MOVE TO THE CHINESE THEY WOULD MERELY ASK WHAT ARE OUR VIEWS AFTER CONSIDERING THE 1956 PROPOSAL. IT WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY FOR THEM TO DEFINE THEIR PROPOSAL FURTHER AND I DO NOT THINK THAT THEY WOULD DO SO WITHOUT FURTHER QUESTIONING FROM US.

ADDIS

FILES

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

[COPIES SENT TO NO: 10 DOWNING ST]

COPIES TO:--

F.E.D.

HKIOD

N. AM DEPT: PUSD

PS/MR ROYLE

SIR L MONSON

MR WILFORD

SIR P ADAMS, CABINET OFFICE

SECRET

*།༎

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER/CAT A

F HONG KONG 2502CO

SECRET

DESKBY 251033Z

SECRET

TOP COPY

TO IMMEDIATE F C O TELNO 445 OF 25TH MAY 1972. INFO IMMEDIATE

PEKING.

YOUR TELS 350 AND 351 TO PEKING.

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.

MY ONLY SUGGESTIONS ON -

FEH 3

A) NO 351 PARA 2. OMIT 2ND AND 3RD SENTENCES THUS CONFINING THE

STATEMENT TO THE REAL ISSUE AS WE SEE IT. THE REST RELATES TO WHAT THE CHINESE CLAIM IS THEIR REQUIREMENT (THOUGH I BELIEVE IT TO BE SOMETHING ELSE), AND I SUGGEST WOULD BE BETTER LEFT TO THEM TO MAKE AND REBUTTED AS IN PARA. 5 THEY COULD COUNTER ARGUE ON POINTS OF DETAIL AND THE TRICKY ISSUE OF THEIR RIGHT (OR WISH) TO REPRESENT OR OTHERWISE DEAL WITH PERSONS OF CHINESE RACE IS

INVOLVED.

B) NO 350 PARAS 3 AND 4: OF COURSE AGREE THE MAIN POINT IS THAT OUR POSITION SHOULD BE PUT ON RECORD, AND THAT THIS SHOULD BEMDONE AT WHATEVER TIME MR. ROYLE AND H.M. AMBASSADOR THINK BEST.

BUT SINCE IT MIGHT BE ILLUMINATING TO SEE THE WAY IN WHICH THE

CHINESE BRING THIS UP IF LEFT TO THEMSLVES, I SUGGEST IT MIGHT BE WORTH GIVING THEM TIME TO DO SO.

2. GENERALLY I AM MOST GRATEFUL THAT MR ROYLE WILL TACKLE THIS

AND WISH HIM LUCK,

MACLEHOSE

FILES

FED

HKIOD

NAM D

PUSD

PS/MR ROYLE

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

SIR L MONSON MK WILFORD

COPIES TO:

SIR P ADAMS CABINET OFFICE

SECRET

مكن تع

Mr. Evans (FED)

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

1603/20/~

1. At dinner last night the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires raised the subject of Chinese

Aff

representation in Hong Kong, saying that it was natural in the improved climate of Anglo- Chinese relations that the Chinese should have formal representation in Hong Kong.

2. Mr. Royle replied that there were already a number of Chinese representatives of different kinds in Hong Kong who could do whatever was necessary and he therefore did not see the need for such representation. However this was a subject which might be discussed during his visit to Peking.

25 May, 1972

Copied to:

Mr. Wilford Mr Laird

SECRET

D.Poly

D. B. C. Logan

No twaw

сво

2015

279

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

FM FCO 2413452

SECRET

TO IMMEDIATE PEKING TELNO 351 OF 24 MAY. INFO HONG KONG (PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR)

1.1.P.T. : CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

FORM OF WORDS TO BE USED IN SPEAKING TO THE CHINESE

1. THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HAVE BROUGHT UP WITH OUR EMBASSY IN PEKING AND THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE 1 LONDON THE ISSUE OF OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG,

2. THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT ARE AWARE, AS ARE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, THAT THE SITUATION IN HONG KONG IS ONE OF SOME DELICACY FOR BOTH SIDES. NEVERTHELESS, AS FAR AS THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT ARE CONCERNED, PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS UNDER WHICH THERE ARE MANY CHINESE CFFICIALS IN THE COLONY WORK WELL AND THERE APPEARS TO BE NO IMPEDIMENT TO THE MAINTENANCE OF THE NECESSARY CONTENTS BETWEEN THE CHINESE AND HONG KONG AUTHORITIES. THERE IS THEREFORE NO PRATICAL NEED FOR FURTHER CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG. IN ANY EVENT A BALACE HAS HITHERTO BEEN MAINTAINED THAT IS VELL UNDERSTOOD IN HONG KONG. THE SUGGESTED APPOINTMENT OF A CHINESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATI VE IN HONG KONG MIGHT DISTURB THAT BALANCE. ANY SUCH DISTURBANCE WOULD HAVE AN IMMEDIATELY ADVERSE EFFECT ON ANGLO-CHINESE RELATIONS.

3. FOR THESE REASONS, WE DO NOT FEEL ABLE TO ACCEPT THE CHINESE PROPOSAL. OUR DESIRE IS FOR BETTER RELATIONS: WE BELIEVE THAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT SHARE THIS WISH. WE CONSIDER, HOWEVER, THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN OFFICIAL CHINESE

REPRESENTATIVE IN HONG KONG COULD HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON OUR RELATIONS, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE OF SUFFICIENT PRACTICAL BENEFIT TO EITHER THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT OR OURSELVES TO JUSTIFY THIS RISK.

ADDITIONAL DEFENSIVE SPEAKING NOTES

4. NEITHER SIDE HAS BROUGHT THIS ISSUE UP FORMALLY FOR MANY YEARS. IN MARCH LAST YEAR 'REMIER CHOU EIFLM MENTICHED IT TO THE BRITISH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, MR DENSON. HE DID SO IN ORDER TO EMPNACISE THE QUOTE ILLOGICALITY UNQUOTE OF OUR RELUCTANCE TO WITHDRAW THE BRITISH CONSULATE FROM TAIWAN WHEN THERE WAS NO CHINESE GOVERNMENT REPRESEI!TATION IN HONG KONG. IN 1956 THE

SECRET

/CHINESE GOVERNMENT ALSO

SECRET

CHINESE GOVERIMENT ALSO DREW ATTENTION TO THE MAINTENANCE

CF OUR OFFICE IN SHANGHAI AS AN ARGUMENT TO SUPPORT THEIR WISH T HAVE A REPRESENTATIVE IN HONG KONG. AT THAT TIME IT COULD THEREFORE DE ARGUED THE POSITION WAS U'EQUAL.

5. THE SITUATION IS NOW DIFFERENT. WE NO LONGER HAVE AN OFFICE IN SHANGHAI AND WE HAVE WITHDRAWN CUR CONSULATE FROM TAIVAN. THERE ARE EMBASSIES IN PEKING AND LONDON. THIS IS A MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS SITUATION. WE SEE NO NEED FOR FURTHER CHANGES OR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ANY NEW OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION OUTSIDE THE TWO CAPITALS. THE CHINESE SIDE HAVE INDICATED THAT THE PROPOSAL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT FOR SUCH REPRESENTATION WAS MADE CH PRACTICAL GROUNDS. THEY HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS IN HONG KONG IS NOT CONVENIENT. BUT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT ALREADY HAVE A VERY LARGE NUMBER OF OFFICIALS IN THE COLONY WHO DEAL WITH ALL PRACTICAL QUESTIONS OF COMMERCE, FINANCE, CULTURE, INFORMATION, TRAVEL, TRANSPORT AND OTHER MATTERS, THEY ARE NOT HINDERED IN THEIR DEALINGS IN ANY WAY. THEY ARE FREE TO TRAVEL WHERE THEY WISH WITHOUT PERMISSION, TO MEET WHOM THEY LIKE AND TO ENTER AND LEAVE HONG KONG AT WILL. SOME OF THEN HAVE DEALINGS WITH HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WHEN NECESSARY AND VICE VERSA. WE DO NOT SEE THAT FURTHER CHINESE REPRESENTATION IS NECESSARY.

BACKGROUND

6. ON 27 MARCH THE DIRECTOR OF WESTER!! EUROPEAN, AMERICAN AND AUSTRALIAN DEPARTMENT OF THE CHINESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HR CHANG WEN-CHIN, ASKED MR ADDIS WHAT WAS THE REACTION OF THE

BRITISH COVERNMENT TO THE CHINESE PROPOSAL TO SEND AN OFFICIAL

REPRESENTATIVE TO HONG KONG,

7. IN ANSWER TO MR ADDIS'S REQUEST FOR FURTHER DETAILS, MR CHANG

EXPLAINED ON 4 MAY THAT THE CHINESE PROPOSAL WAS ESSENTIALLY THE

SAME AS THAT MADE IN FEBRUARY 1956, ON THAT OCCASION THEY HAD

PROPOSED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN QUOTE OFFICE OF A COMMISSIONER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA UNQUOTE IN HONG KONG. THE BRITISH GOVERMENT GAVE LENGTHY CONSIDERATION TO THE PROPOSAL AND REJECTED IT IS FEBRUARY 1950.

3. MR CHANG REFERRED TO THE CHINESE DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG WHICH EXISTED DURING THE TIME OF THE KUOKINTANG GOVERNMENT HE SAID THAT PAST EXPERIENCE HAD SHOWN THAT THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION WAS TO THE BENEFIT OF BOTH SIDES AND THAT THERE WAS A REAL NEED FOR SUCH A PRESENCE. MR CHANG'S INFORMATION ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF MR KWOK, THE

→2- SECRET

/KUOMINTANG COMMISSIONER

[

SECRET

KUOMINTANG COMMISSIONER, AND HIS OFFICE FROM 1945 TO 1949 13 QUITE DIFFÈRENT FROM OUR OWN. WE CONSIDER THAT FAR FROM BEING BENEFICIAL TO BOTH SIDES, THIS OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION

CONTRIBUTED TO AN EXACERBATION OF RELATIONS WHICH M M G HAVE NO

DESIRE TO SEE REPEATED.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES

F.E.D.

HKIOD

N. AM DEPT:

PUSD

PS/MR ROYLE

MR WILFORD

SIR L MONSON

[COPIES SENT TO NO: 10 DOWNING STREET]

-3-

SECRET

COPIES TO:-

SIR P ADAMS, CABINET OFFICE

SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A

FM F C O 241345Z

SECRET

TO IMMEDIATE PEKING TELO 359 OF 24 MAY, INFO HONG KONG (PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR).

CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.

1. AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION I HAVE DECIDED TO REJECT THE CHINESE PROPOSAL.

2. OUR EXPERIENCE BETWEEN 1956 AND 1958 LEADS US TO ASSUME THAT IF WE DELAYED OUR REPLY TOO LONG THE CHINESE NIGHT TAKE STEPS TO PUBLICISE THEIR PROPOSAL. THIS WOULD CLEARLY BE UNDESIRABLE.

3. MR FOYLE'S VISIT TO PEKING REINFORCES THE NEED TO TAKE EARLY ACTION SINCE THE CHINESE WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY WISH TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH HIM, I HAVE CONSIDERED WHETHER THERE WOULD BE ADVANTAGE IN ASKING YOU TO SPEAK TO THE CHINESE BEFORE MR ROYLE'S ARRIVAL. BUT THIS WOULD GIVE THE CHINESE AN OPPORTUNITY TO RETURN TO THE CHARGE DURING MR ROYLE'S VISIT. TACTICALLY, IT WOULD SEEM PREFEREABLE FOR IR ROYLE TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN BRINGING UP THE ISSUE WITH THE CHINESE RATHER THAN TO GIVE THEM AN OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE IT WITH HIM.

4. I HAVE THEREFORE DECIDED THAT MR ROYLE SHOULD INFORM THE CHINESE IN PEKING THAT WE ARE UNABLE TO ACCEPT THEIR PROPOSAL. I PROPOSE THAT HE SHOULD HIMSELF BRING UP THE ISSUE DURING HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH CHIAO KUAN-HUA, IN DOING SO HE WILL SPEAK ON THE LINES OF M.1.F.T. THE FOR:1 OF WORDS CLOSELY ACCORDS WITH THOSE SUGGESTED BY SIR MURRAY MACLEHOSE IN HIS TELEGRAM NO

O MODIFIED IN THE LIGHT OF HIS TELEGRAM NO 424 (NOT TO ALL).

A SIMPLE QUOTE NO UNQUOTE WOULD ONLY INVITE THE CHINESE TO PROBE FURTHER. I WOULD THEREFORE PREFER A RATHER FULLER STATEMENT OF OUR CASE.

SECRET

/5. I HAVE

SECRET

5. I HAVE CONSIDERED WHETHER OUR RESPONSE SHOULD INCLUDE A SUCCESTION THAT THE HONG KONG GOVERMENT VOULD BE PREPARED TO GIVE SYMPATHETIC CONSIDERATION TO ANY LESS FAR-REACHING CHIKESE PROPOSAL FOR IMPROVING CONTACTS IN HONG KONG DETWEEN LOCAL CHINESE OFFICIALS AND THE HONG KONG COVERMENT. I HAVE DECIDED AGAINST THIS. A CLEAR-CUT REFUSAL AT THIS STAGE WILL PROVIDE A MORE SOLID BASIS FOR FUTURE DISCUSSION WITH THE CHINESE SHOULD THEY DECIDE TO PRESS THE ISSUE. ANY HINT THAT WE MIGHT BE PREPARED TO COMPROMISE WOULD ONLY ENCOURAGE THEM TO KEEP PRESSING.

DOUGLAS-HOME,

(COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET |

FILES

F.E.D.

HKI OD

H. AM DEFT:

P.U.S.D.

P.S.

P.S./MR ROYLE

MR WILFORD

SIR L MONSON

COPIES TO:-

SIR P ADAMS, CABINET OFFICE

-2-

SECRET

PUSD MATERIAL

ATTACHED

DELICATE SOURCE

SECRET COVERING TOP SECRET

PASS BY HAND

(spree. If Secretary of State

ᄂ....

1st likely t

fatitoly

laque AR Light to lead them fully

A.R.

Mr Wilford Mr Logen Private Secretary

that foreclore Telegmes deput

To Evans. meeting

CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

ட:

1. The Secretary of State minuted on Hong Kong telegram

(3-) No 398 of 9 May: "I hope we are getting our Ambassador's

advice urgently". Mr Addis has given us his further views

3) in Peking telegram No 450 of 17 May. Sir Murray MacLehose

138

has commented (Hong Kong telegram No 423) on Mr Addis's

views; the Governor's arguments are, I think, conclusive.

Mr Royle has minuted: "I feel we should stick to our

decision for a clear-cut refusal".

2. In Hong Kong telegram No 424 Sir Murray MacLehose

draws attention to a report

The report, a copy of which is attached,

is clearly important. I agree, in the light of it, with

the Governor's assessment that a polite but firm refusal

of the Chinese request for official representation in Hong M

Kong would stand a fair chance of being accepted. I also

agree with him that in communicating our refusal to the

Chinese we should argue the case as little as possible.

A simple but courteous "No" without giving any reasons

would however only invite the Chinese to probe further.

Our response would need to be a little fuller than this.

THIS IS A COPY

THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958

SECRET COVERING TOP SECRET

13.

ન)

MHG

23/5.

り

Enter fo

2.13

SECRET COVERING TOP SECRET

3. At Mr Royle's meeting at 4.30 pm on 11 May it was

agreed that the following recommendations should be made

to the Secretary of State:

(1)

We should reject the Chinese proposal without

waiting for further elaboration from them or

considering any counter-proposals.

If we delayed

our reply the Chinese might publicise their

proposal, as they did when they last made it in

the 1950s; this would clearly be undesirable.

(ii) Mr Royle should himself inform the Chinese during

his visit to Peking that we are unable to accept

their proposal. The alternative course of action

(to instruct Mr Addis to take action with the

Chinese before Mr Royle's visit) is less desirable.

It would mean that Mr Royle would be open to

counter-attack during his visit; as a matter of

tactics it would be preferable for Mr Royle to

take the initiative in bringing up the issue with

the Chinese rather than to give them an opportunity

to raise it with him.

(Hi) Mr Royle should raise the matter with Vice Foreign

Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua in preference to Ch'i

Peng-fei or Chou En-lai.

Ch'iao is easier to talk

to than Ch'i and it is by no means certain that

Mr Royle would be invited to meet Chou En-lai.

(iv) Had Mr Royle not received an invitation to visit

Peking, or if the Chinese had suggested another date,

this would not have affected the need for an early

reply to the Chinese. In these circumstances

SECRET COVERING TOP SECRET

/Mr Royle

SECRET COVERING TOP SECRET

Mr Royle would have proposed to speak to the new

Chinese Ambassador soon after his arrival.

It was also agreed at the meeting that the Department

should prepare a form of words for Mr Royle's use in speaking

to the Chinese. I attach a draft. It is based on Hong

Kong telegram No 398; but takes into account Hong Kong

telegram No 424. If approved, and subject to any further

comments from Mr Addis or Sir Murray MacLehose, it will

form the basis of the brief on this subject for Mr Royle's

visit to China. I also attach 2 draft telegrams to Peking.

5. Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department concur.

22 May 1972

Six

of worth

Sir L Monson

Mr Evans

Mr Laird

numbered copies wilt which I

Mr Wyatt

RBR Hervey

Far Eastern Department

L. Monson has suggested

revival from

for para 2 of the "form of works'

agree.

Stin

incorporated the beer ma wittin.

with

Kun Will

- 3 -

SECRET COVERING TOP SECRET

sent to

deld. F

#KIC

'S 253

CYPHER/CAT A

FM HONG KONG 180910Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 423 OF 18 MAY INFO PEKING.

ندر

PS by Keyli Wife Belford. Buy Lhows.

PEKING TELEGRAM 450 TO FCO: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG

KONG,

I DO NOT WANT TO ADD MUCH TO THE ARGUMENTS IN MY PREVIOUS DESPATCH AND TELNOS 31 TO PEKING AND 393 TO FCO THE SNAG KH AMBASSADOR'S PROPOSAL LIES IN CHCU EN-LAI'S PHRASE TO MR WILSON QUOTE LET ALONE THE FACT THAT OVER 90 PER CENT OF THE HONG KONG POPULATION IS CHINESE UNQUOTE. IT IS OVER THE RIGHTS AND ACTIVITIES OF THE REPRESENTATIVE IN CONNECTION WITH THIS BASICALLY REFUGEE OR HONG KONG BORN POPULATION WHOSE CORFIDENCE WE HAVE TO RETAIN, THAT ALL THE TROUBLE WOULD ARISE.

2. THOUGH IN THEORY THE CPG MIGHT GIVE US ASSURANCES OF NON- INTERVENTION QUOTE IN MATTERS WHICH ARE THE PROPER PREROGATIV!" OF THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT UNQUOTE (TO QUOTE HM AMBASSADOR) SOOMER OR LATER WE WOULD FIND THAT THEIR VIEW OF WHAT WAS PROVER FOR THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT AND THE REPRESENTATIVE RESPECTIVELY WAS QUITE DIFFERENT TO OURS.

3. EVEN IF A SATISFACTORY DEFINITION COULD BE DRAWN UP IN GOOD FAITH IN ADVANCE, WHICH I BELIEVE IMPOSSIBLE, NO OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE COULD RESIST INDEFINITELY LOCAL PRESSURES TO BECOME INVOLVED IN HONG KONG'S INTERHAL AFFAIRS.

4. NOR IS IT REALISTIC TO ENVISAGE THAT A SITUATION THAT HAD GONE WRONG COULD BE RIGHTED BY THE EXPULSION OF A CPG REPRESENTATIVE. APART FROM THE PHYSICAL PROBLEM INVOLVED

CHINA BUILDING WAS VIRTUALLY A FORTRESS

IN 1967 THE BANK OF SUCH ACTION WOULD

PRECIPITATE THE CONFRONTATION WITH CHINA WHICH WE WANT TO AVOID.

CC}^~^~^\\LTNE~~IWO_OF_PTAST-EAR)

NACLEHOSE

-PSOX PLREAD-

JAS-ETC

200

PRIORITY CYPHER CAT A

KING 170712Z

SECRET

Mr. Evans (FED,

SECRET

I still feet

we should

Mick to our decision fo acles aut refumat.

TO PRIORITY FCO TELEGRAM NO 450 OF 17 MAY INFO ROUTINE GOVERNOR

HONG KONG.

HONG KONG TELNO 398:

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.

1. KEY ISSUE IS WHETHER THERE IS ANY CHANCE OF SECURING TERMS

FOR CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG WHICH WOULD WORK OUT ACCEPTABLY FOR US. IF THERE IS SUCH A CHANCE THEN IT IS WORTH

WHILE TAKING CHANG WEN-CHIN UP ON HIS OFFER OF FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON AN EXPLORATORY BASIS WITHOUT COMMITMENT. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, YOUR DECISION IS THAT THERE IS NO CHANCE AT ALL OF GETTING THE CHINESE TO AGREE TO AND ABIDE BY ACCEPTABLE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THEIR REPRESENTATIVE IN HONG KONG THEN IT IS BETTER THAT WE SHOULD GIVE THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT A FIRMLY NEGATIVE ANSWER SOON AND STICK BY IT.

2. PARAGRAPH 15 OF HONG KONG DESPATCH OF 5 MAY STATES'' IF THE CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE WERE TO CONDUCT HIMSELF LIKE ANY OTHER REPRESENTATIVE HERE, KEEP OUT OF LOCAL AFFAIRS, REFRAIN FROM MANIPULATING THE LEVERS OF CPG INFLUENCE AND FROM DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CHALLENGING THE POSITION OF THE HONG KONG GOVERN- MENT, HE WOULD BE A POSITIVE ASSET IN MANY PRACTICAL AND POLIT- ICAL WAYS''. MY RECOMMENDATION FROM THIS POST MUST BE THAT IT 1S WORTH OUR WHILE TO SEEK THE AGREEMENT OF THE CHINESE GOVERN- MENT TO REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG ON PRECISELY SUCH RESTRICTED LINES. I SUGGEST SHOULD SPEAK TO CHAN GWEN-CHIN ON THE LINES OF THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH.

3. I HAVE NOW LOOKED UP THE EARLIER FILES TO WHICH HE REFERRED AT OUR LAST MEETING. NEITHER THE ORIGINAL. PROPOSAL OF FEBRUARY 1956 NOR ITS REPETITION TO MR ERROLL IN OCTOBER 1957 ( PEKING TELEGRAMS NOS 132 OF 25 FEBRUARY 1956 AND NO526 OF 31 OCTOBER

1957) GIVE A PRECISE IDEA OF WHAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HAD IN MIND. SPEAKING TO MR HAROLD WILSON ON 25 FEBRUARY 1958, HOWEVER, CHOU EN-LAI WAS MORE EXPLICIT ** CHINA HAS STATE ENTERPRISES, BANKS AND OTHER PROPERTIES IN HONG KONG, WITH NEARLY 1,808 EMPLOYEES, LET ALONE THE FACT THAT OVER 90 PERCENT OF THE HONG KONG PULULATION IS CHINESE. WE HAVE MANY BUSINESS MATTERS ON WHICH CONTACTS HAVE TO BE MADE WITH THE HONG KONG AUTHORITIES. IT IS

SECRET

209

}

SECRET

WE SHOULD FIRST, HOWEVER, HAVE TO BE SATISFIED THAT THE CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE WOULD NOT IN PRACTICE EXCEED THE DEFINITION OF HIS FUNCTIONS GIVEN BY

PREMIER CHOU TO MR WILSON: AND THIS LIMITATION OF HIS FUNCTIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE CLEAR TO THE INHABITANTS OF HONG KONG FROM THE OUTSET. WE SHOULD LOOK TO THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT TO COOPERATE WITH US IN MAKING THIS CLEAR THROUGH THEIR OWN CHANNELS ALSO. IT MUST BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD BETWEEN US AT THIS STAGE THAT IF AT ANY TIME THE CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE WERE TO EXCEED THESE FUNCTIONS AND INTERVENE IN MATTERS WHICH ARE THE PROPER PREROGATIVE OF THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT WE SHOULD AT ONCE HAVE TO STOP DEALING WITH HIM AND ASK THE CHINESE GOVERN- >>

MENT TO WITHDRAW HIM. I COULD SUPPORT MY ARGUMENTS BY DRAWING AS APPROPRIATE ON HONG KONG TELNO 398.

IF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT FAIL TO GIVE US COMPLETE SATISFACTION ON THESE TERMS WE SHOULD THEN INFORM THEM THAT THEIR PROPOSAL IS NOT ACCEPTABLE AND WE SHOULD STAND BY THIS POSITION, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT FURTHER ARGUMENT WOULD BE USELESS, I THINK A\CLEAR-CUT REFUSAL WOULD DE BETTER BOTH FOR SINO/BRITISH RELATIONS AND FOR THE POSITION OF HONG KONG THAN A LONG DRAWN OUT AND INCONCLUSIVE DIALOGUE.

ADDI S

FILES

FED

HKJOD

N AM D

P/S

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET/

منام

This would impuriible to CUATED TO:

ཨ༢ཨ་:༦

thaft ༢ ་་

on with

P/S TO MR ROYI.

MR WILFORD

SIR L MONSON

- SIR PADAMS CABINET OFFICE

ཛད་ན་འཚར(?.

NYMN

SECRET

210

PRIORITY

R/CAT A

YANG KONG 0934052

SECPET

SECRET

2. AED

Pher

com love

obr..

TO PRIORITY F C O TELNO 398 OF 9TH MÁY 1372. INFO ROUTINE

PEKING.

Am Venadori

aderci

ungently

कुछ

PEKING TELHO 481: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG. 10/500

IM AFRAID THAT WITH OUT INITIAL RESPONSE OF REQUESTING DETAILS AND NOW WITH OUR OFFER TO EXPLORE FURTHER WITHOUT COMMITMENT, THE CHINESE MAY BELIEVE (QUITE WRONGLY OF COURSE) THAT THEIR PROP- OSAL IS GATHERING WAY. VERY SOON WE MUST FIRE A SHOT ACROSS THEIR BOWS, OR BE PREPARED TO LET THEM SAIL OVER US,

FOR REASONS GIVEN IN MY TELEGRAM NO. 31 PEKING AND DESP- ATCH OF 5 MAY I HOPE THE DECISION VILL DE FOR THE FORMER COURSE, AND IF SO WE HAVE TO DECIDE WHAT TO SAY. ON THIS PERHAPS HER MAJESTY'S MMBASSADOR, PEKIC, COULD BEST ADVISE. BUT FOR HY PART SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING POINTS MIGHT BE MADE :-

(A)

(B)

(C)

WE ARE SORRY THE CHINESE HAVE RAISED THIS OLD ISSUE AT THIS TIME. OUR DESISE IS. FOR BETTER RELATIONS AS WE BELIEVE IS THEIRS, BUT THIS PROPOSAL IS LIKELY TO ACHIEVE THE REVERSE. WE THEREFORE FEEL GFLIGED TO SPEAK FRANKLY. MR. CHANG'S INFORMATION ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF MR, KWOK, THE KUOMINTANG COMMISSIONER, AND HIS OFFICE FROM 1945 TO 1949 IS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM OUR OWN. THIS ''ORGAN** FAR FROM BEING BENEFICIAL TO BOTH SIDES, OR DEMONSTRATING THE NEED FOR ITS EXISTENCE, CONTRIBUTED TO AN EXACERBATION OF RELATIOIS WHICH HMG HAS HO DESIRE TO SEE REPEATED.

A LOT HAS HAPPENED SINCE THE PREVIOUS PROPOSALS WERE MADE. IN 1956 WE HAD AT OFFICE IN SHANGHAI, BUT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HAD NONE ON BRITISH TERRITORY EXCEPT IN LONDON, AND THE FOSITION WAS THUS UNEQUAL, SIMILARLY WHEN CHOU EN-LAI MENTIONED REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG TO MR. DE¦SON

HE DID SO TO EMPHASISE THE ILLOGICALITY OF OUR RELUCTANCE TO WITHDRAW THE BRITISH CONSULATE FROM TAIWAN WHEN THERE WAS NO CHINESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG. HOW THESE OFFICES HAVE BOTH BEEN CLOSED, AND THERE ARE ONLY EMBASSIES IN OUR RESPECTIVE CAPITALS. THIS SEEMS A SATIS- FACTORY AND MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS SITUATION.

SECRET

/(D)

211

(D)

(E)

SECRET

MR. CHANG HAS INDICATED THE PROPOSAL WAS MADE ON PRACTI GROUNDS. BUT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT ALREADY HAVE A VERY LARGE NUMBER OF OFFICIALS IN THE COLONY WHO DEAL WITH ALL PRACTICAL QUESTIONS OF COMMERCE, FINANCE, CULTURE, INFORMATION TRAVEL, TRANSPORT AND OTHER MATTERS. THEY ARE NOT HINDERED IN THEIR DEALINGS IN ANY WAY, AND THEY ARE FREE TO TRAVEL WHERE THEY WISH WITHOUT PERMISSION, AND MEET WHOM THEY LIKE AND ENTER AND LEAVE THE COLONY AT WILL. SOME OF THES HAVE DEALINGS WITH MY OFFICIALS AS OCCASION REQUIRES AND VICE VERSA. THERE IS THEREFORE NO PRACTICAL NEED FOR FURTHER

REPRESENTATION.

THE SITUATION IN HONG KONG IS ONE OF SOME DELICACY FOR BOTH THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT AND OURSELVES. HITHERTO A BALANCE HAS BEEN MAINTAINED THAT IS WELL UNDERSTOOD IN THE COLONY. THE PROPOSED APPOINTMENT MIGHT DISTURB THAT BALANCE. ANY SUCH DISTURBANCE WOULD HAVE AN IMMEDIATELY ADVERSE "EFFECT IT THE COLONY AND THUS ON ANGLO-CHINESE RELATIONS,

SINCE THE CHANGE PROPOSED WOULD BE OF NO PRACTICAL BENEFIT TO EITHER THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT OR OURSELVES, WE DO NOT WISH TO RISK THE ADVERSE EFFECT IT WOULD HAVE ON OUR

RELATIONS.

IT IS NOT FOR ME TO ADVISE ON WHETHER ALL OF THIS COULD PROPERLY BE SAID, BUT I DO BELIEVE THAT AT THIS POINT, WHATEVER CHINESE INTENTIONS TURN OUT TO BE, WE HAVE MUCH TO GAIN BY CLARITY AND MUCH TO LOSE BY RISKING MISUNDERSTANDING THROUGH RELUCTANCE TO MAKE OUR OBJECTION CLEAR.

I AM ALSO MOST CONCERNED TO DAMP OFF THE CHINESE BEFORE THEY HAVE BEEN GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO FORMULATE THEIR PROPOSALS TO US IN DETAIL. ONCE THEY HAVE DONE THIS IT WILL BE MUCH HARDER FOR THEM TO WITHDRAW. 1 THEREFORE HOFE THAT UNTIL NEW INSTRU- CTIONS ARE SENT IN THE LIGHT OF CHANG'S DEMARCHE H.M. A/BASSADOR WILL FEEL ABLE TO SAY, IF TACKLED, THAT PENDING INSTRUCTIONS HE CANNOT DISCUSS THE MATTER FURTHER.

MACLEHOSE

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED ]

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

FILES

PED

HKIOD

NAM D

PS/MR ROYLE MR WILFORD

COPIES TO:

SIR P ADAMS CABINET OFFICE

SIR L MONSON

-2- SECRET

212

ATIONAL

BREAKFAST AT DE MURRAYS

ESCENTE

PENIMSE

DRE POYLE 1 sa vita chan walk the Geverest, fi Xunny Marielose shar

ER ANTHONY Royle today is flying to Psking after breakfast with the Governor, Sir Murray MoeLabèse, and a last-minute briefing on the Pengkeng situation,

* OF

نالت

quina posses

דיי

There's no TV Ke sor trinitron colour TV

20 Sagat Re

Government,

From the minema. VePa

Fie Three VC÷15

12lion from

הל דו של

sochtad Thay vill sta

tia to pikir cong-

Delta Passare

sem tren dreTTELE, The most posipation te ameted 10 sen

Kr D,J. Edgar, today the spe

inform-

bag than whether their persions voeld still be zesized.

bufargrand to be golag lato attern in November and vil result in a denden te production

IA daelewan Brune

100 will cocaiESE,

gel Kimber of verk-

and the compag bat

decided yet.

Lives

dained hey had been working for Be ab pany for most of metr ilms.

ver the cosparg

in differity 175 not

Right now w

20. Mig pent at Kesh by Sle torny,

van a felloper shear him in Parcoust Read viare la van prdened up by me and MELA Government Betge for de Haucking break-

Smile

My Roja mamaped a front auta for valEN

- kot da dentara vit be allowed returns from Petty test week.

natteted me is meant emmets with Pate sudoričen ben, MI TEU SA

At prostat, som et ta m

KON A 127:1920STE O

וד

رانت

4--1

AYB

212 CYD

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

FM HONGKONG 1809102

SUNFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

тор соли

SIVII

[ IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 423 CE 18 MAY INFO PEKING.TRY'

PEKING TELEGRAM 450 TO FCO: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG

KONG.

ген з

3/20/2

I DO NOT WANT TO ADD MUCH TO THE ARGUMENTS IN MY PREVIOUS

DESPATCH AND TELMOS 31 TO PEKING AND 398 TO FCO THE SHAG IN

HM AMBASSADOR'S PROPOSAL LIES IN CHOU EN-LAI'S PHRASE TO MR WILSON

QUOTE LET ALONE THE FACT THAT OVER 92 PER CENT OF THE HONG KONG

POPULATION IS CHINESE UNQUOTE. IT IS OVER THE RIGHTS AND ACTIVITIES

OF THE REPRESENTATIVE HI CONNECTION WITH THIS BASICALLY REFUGEE OR HONG KONG BORN POPULATION WHOSE CONFIDENCE WE HAVE TO RETAIN, THAT ALL THE TROUBLE WOULD ARISE.

2. THOUGH IN THEORY THE CPG MIGHT GIVE US ASSURANCES OF NON-

INTERVENTION QUOTE IN MATTERS WHICH ARE THE PROPER PREROGATIVE

OF THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT UNQUOTE (TO QUOTE HM AMBASSADOR)

SOONER OR LATER WE WOULD FIND THAT THEIR VIEW OF WHAT WAS PROPER

FOR THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT AND THE REPRESENTATIVE RESPECTIVELY

WAS QUITE DIFFERENT TO OURS.

3. EVEN IF A SATISFACTORY DEFINITION COULD BE DRAWN UP IN GOOD

FAITH IN ADVANCE, WHICH I BELIEVE IMPOSSIBLE, NO OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE COULD RESIST INDEFINITELY LOCAL PRESSURÉS TO

BECOME INVOLVED IN HONG KONG'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

4. NOR IS IT REALISTIC TO ENVISAGE THAT A SITUATION THAT HAD GONE

WRONG COULD BE RIGHTED BY THE EXPULSION OF A CPG REPRESENTATIVE. APART FROM THE PHYSICAL PROBLEM INVOLVED IN 1967 THE BANK OF

CHINA BUILDING WAS VIRTUALLY A FORTRESS - SUCH ACTION WOULD PRECIPITATE THE CONFRONTATION WITH CHINA WHICH WE WANT TO AVOID.

MACLEHOSE

FILES

F.E.D.

| COPIES SENT TO NO 10]

DOWNING SÅ.

COPIES TO:-

SIR P ADAMS, CABINET CFFICE

[

HKIOD

N. AM DEPT:

P.S.

PS TO MR ROYLE

MA WILFORD

SER L KONSON

CONFIDENTIAL

213

SECRET

(FED)

TOP COPY

IMMEDIATE ~CYPHER/CAT A

FM FC 0 1716102

SECRET

TO IMEDIATE HONG KONG TELEGRAM HUMBER 391 OF 17 MAY INFO PRIORITY

PEKING.

PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR.

PEKING TELEGRAM NO 452: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.

WE ARE ABOUT TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO MINISTERS ON THIS SUBJECT. WE THINK IT IMPORTANT TO REACH DECISIONS BOTH ABOUT THE SUBSTANCE OF OUR REPLY TO THE CHINESE AND ABOUT OUR TACTICS

BEFORE MR ROYLE VISITS CHINA.

2. IF YOU HAVE ANY CONTENTS ON THE TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE WE

SHOULD BE GRATEFUL TO RECEIVE THESE BY 191277Z.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES

FED

HKLOD NAV D

PS TO MR ROYLE SIP L MONSON

ILFORD

COPIES TO:

SIR P ADAMS CABINET OFFICE

SECRET

■

ZIA

PRIORITY CYPHER CAT A

S E. CR ET

F PEKING 170712Z

SECRET

CRIVED IN

A 50

Fax

TO PRIORITY FCO TELEGRAM NO 450 OF 17 MAY INFO ROUTINE GOVERNOR

HONG KONG

HONG KONG TELNO 398:

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.

1. KEY ISSUE IS WHETHER THERE IS ANY CHANCE OF SECURING TERMS FOR CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG WHICH WOULD WORK OUT ACCEPTABLY FOR US, IF THERE IS SUCH A CHANCE THEN IT IS WORTH WHILE TAKING CHANG WEN-CHIN UP ON HIS OFFER OF FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON AN EXPLORATORY BASIS WITHOUT COMMITMENT, IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, YOUR DECISION IS THAT THERE IS NO CHANCE AT ALL OF GETTING ' THE CHINESE TO AGREE TO AND ABIDE BY ACCEPTABLE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THEIR REPRESENTATIVE IN HONG KONG THEN IT IS BETTER THAT WE SHOULD GIVE THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT A FIRMLY NEGATIVE ANSWER SOON AND STICK BY IT.

PARAGRAPH 15 OF HONG KONG DESPATCH OF 5 MAY STATES IF THE CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE WERE TO CONDUCT HIMSELF LIKE ANY OTHER REPRESENTATIVE HERE, KEEP OUT OF LOCAL AFFAIRS, REFRAIN FROM MANIPULATING THE LEVERS OF CPG INFLUENCE AND FROM DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CHALLENGING THE POSITION OF THE HONG KONG GOVERN- MENT, HE WOULD BE A POSITIVE ASSET IN MANY PRACTICAL AND POLIT- ICAL WAYS''. MY RECOMMENDATION FROM THIS POST MUST BE THAT IT IS WORTH OUR WHILE TO SEEK THE AGREEMENT OF THE CHINESE GOVERN- MENT TO REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG ON PRECISELY SUCH RESTRICTED LINES. I SUGGEST I SHOULD SPEAK TO CHAN GWEN-CHIN ON THE LINES OF THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH.

3. I HAVE NOW LOOKED UP THE EARLIER FILES TO WHICH HE REFERRED AT OUR LAST MEETING, NEITHER THE ORIGINAL PROPOSAL OF FEBRUARY 1956 NOR ITS REPETITION TO MR ERROLL IN OCTOBER 1957 ( PEKING TELEGRAMS NOS 132 OF 25 FEBRUARY 1956 AND NO526 OF 31 OCTOBER 1957) GIVE A PRECISE IDEA OF WHAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HAD IN MIND. SPEAKING TO MR HAROLD WILSON ON 25 FEBRUARY 1958, HOWEVER, CHOU EN-LAI WAS MORE EXPLICIT CHINA HAS STATE ENTERPRISES, BANKS AND OTHER PROPERTIES IN HONG KONG, WITH NEARLY 1,000 EMPLOYEES, LET ALONE THE FACT THAT OVER 90 PERCENT OF THE HONG KONG POLULATION IS CHINESE. WE HAVE MANY BUSINESS MATTERS ON WHICH CONTACTS HAVE TO BE MADE WITH THE HONG KONG AUTHORITIES. IT IS

SECRET

215

SECRET

IT IS REASONABLE THAT THERE SHOULD BE A CHINESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE THERE.'' WE SHOULD BE READY TO AGREE THAT CHINESE REPRESENTATION ON SUCH A BASIS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. WE SHOULD FIRST, HOWEVER, HAVE TO BE SATISIFIED THAT THE CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE WOULD NOT IN PRACTICE EXCEED THE DEFINITION OF HIS FUNCTIONS GIVEN BY

PREMIER CHOU TO MR WILSON: AND THIS LIMITATION OF HIS FUNCTIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE CLEAR TO THE INHABITANTS OF HONG KONG FROM THE OUTSET. WE SHOULD LOOK TO THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT TO COOPERATE WITH US IN MAKING THIS CLEAR THROUGH THEIR OWN CHANNELS ALSO. IT MUST BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD BETWEEN US AT THIS STAGE THAT IF AT ANY TIME THE CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE WERE TO EXCEED THESE FUNCTIONS AND INTERVENE IN MATTERS WHICH ARE THE PROPER PREROGATIVE OF THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT, WE SHOULD AT ONCE HAVE TO STOP DEALING WITH HIM AND ASK THE CHINESE GOVERN- MENT TO WITHDRAW HIM. I COULD SUPPORT MY ARGUMENTS BY DRAWING AS APPROPRIATE ON HONG KONG TELNO 398.

4. IF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT FAIL TO GIVE US COMPLETE SATISFACTION ON THESE TERMS WE SHOULD THEN INFORM THEM THAT THEIR PROPOSAL IS NOT ACCEPTABLE AND WE SHOULD STAND BY THIS POSITION, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT FURTHER ARGUMENT WOULD BE USELESS, I THINK A CLEAR-CUT REFUSAL WOULD BE BETTER BOTH FOR SINO/BRITISH RELATIONS AND FOR THE POSITION OF HONG KONG THAN A LONG DRAWN OUT AND

INCONCLUSIVE DIALOGUE.

ADDI S

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

¿COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET/

FILES

FEQ HKIOD

N AV D P/S

P/S TO WR ROYLE

MR WILFORD SIR L MONSON

NNUNN

COPIES TO:

SIR P ADAMS CABINET OFFICE

SECRET

216

Mr Logan

CONFIDENTIAL COVERING TOP SECRET

B (file

attached)

C D E F

J K

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

吓

You will no doubt wish to show Mr Royle the most important papers on this subject before he holds his meeting at 4.30 pa today. The file has become pretty thick. But I think that the papers which matter most are the following:-

(a)

(b)

(c)

Peking telegram No 132 of 1956 (This telegram describes the original Chinese proposal, which has now been revived);

"Guide lines for the Governor Designate of Hong Kong Paper C" (paragraphs 8 to 16 deal with the subject of Chinese representation);

Peking telegrams No 245, No 251, No 28 to Hong Kong, and No 401 (these telegrams describe the exchanges which Mr Addis has recently had with the Head of the West European Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and give his own views);

Hong Kong telegrams No 272, No 31 to Peking and No 398 (these telegrams set out the Governor's +view);

FCO telegrams No 265 to Hong Kong and No 338 to Hong Kong (these telegrams set out our own views);

Mr Grattan's letter to Lord Bridges of ↳ May, which reviews the history of the case.

It seems to me that the courses open to us are:-

Effectively to reject this proposal now;

To say nothing to the Chinese until we are pressed, but then to reject their proposal;

To accept the Chinese proposal;

(a) To make a counter proposal to the Chinese.

I see little point in our playing for time if we do not intend in due course to reject the Chinese proposal.

CONFIDENTIAL COVERING TOP SECRET

13.

217

CONFIDENTIAL COVERING TOP SECRET

(a) •

3. The Governor favours course (a). Mr Addis favours something approximating to course (a) (ie considering whether the Chinese request contains the elements of a negotiable arrangement). It seems to me that course (a) is better than course (b) if we are to reject the Chinese proposal. It also seems to me that course (c) is better than course (d) if we are to accept it; what the Chinese want in Hong Kong is "A Commissioner of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China" (a title which implies that the Chinese acknowledge that Hong Kong has a status which differs from that of the rest of mainland China). If we are to regard the Governor's assessment of the implications of the Chinese proposal as the over-riding consideration (FC0 telegram No 265 to Hong Kong), it follows that we must plump for course (a).

11 May 1972

R.M. Evans

RM Evans

Far Eastern Department

Sir Leslie Monson

Mr Wilford

Mr Laird

without attachments

P.S.

Mr Hervey

Mr Davies

I also attach a copy of the Governor's despatch of 5 May, which reached the Department this morning. I am sending copies to all recipients of this minute.

2 -

CONFIDENTIAL COVERING TOP SECRET

218

Cypher/OTP.

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM PEKING WO FOREIGN OFFICE

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUNION

Mr. O'Neill

No: 132

February 25, 1956.

CONFIDENTIAL

D: 6.14 a.m. February 25, 1956.

R: 8.52 a.m. February 25, 1956.

1. C 1143/1 ||FC

Addressed to Forsign Office telerren No: 132 of February 25. Repeated for information to:

Hong Kong.

and Saving to:

Hong Kong.

Vashington.

Singapore.

The Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to call this morning. Reading from a prepared text he said that in view of increasing business relations between Hong Kong and the Interior and in order to facilitate negotiations of common interest and discussion of commercial questions, the Chinese Government would like to establish in Hong Kong an office of a Commissioner of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. The office would consist of a Commissioner together with diplomatic and other staff. He asked me to convey this to you and said that the Chinese Government would like to learn the views of Her Majesty's Government.

2. I will telegraph my comments Monday.

Foreign Office pass Washington and Singapore as my Saving telegrams Nos: 39 and 21.

[Repeated Saving to Washington and Singapore]

DISTRIBUTED TO:

Far Eastern Department.

South-East Asia Department.

Economic Relations Department. Mutual Aid Department.

JJJJJ

FED

1903

*IA TID

ΠΑ

CYPHER CAT.

EHC KING 280534Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY F C O TELEGRAM NO. 245 OF 28 MARCH INFO ROUTINE

HONG KONG AND WASHINGTON.

CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.

DURING A DISCUSSION ON 27 MARCH ON THE DEVELOPMENT

OF SIPO-BRITISH RELATIONS, THE DIRECTOR OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN AND

| AMERICAN DEPARTMENT REMINDED ME THAT PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI HAD RAISED

THE QUESTION OF CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG WITH

DENSON IN MARCH LAST YEAR. HE SAID THAT THERE WERE MANY

QUESTIONS AFFECTING RELATIONS PETWEEN HONG KONG AND CHINA,

SOME OF WHICH WERE DEALT WITH BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WHILE OTHERS

VERE HANDLED BY THE PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES IN CANTON. THIS

STATE OF AFFAIRS WAS NOT CONVENIENT. THE PREMIER HAD ASKED

WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO SEND AN OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE TO HONG KONG. WHAT WAS THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S

REACTION TO THE PREMIER'S PROPOSAL?. ↑ REPLIED THAT I WOULD REPORT WHAT HE HAD SAID AND ENQUIRE. CHANG SAID THAT THIS WAS

AK OLD QUESTION BUT IT WAS NOW A MATTER TO BE TAKEN UP IN THE

LIGHT OF OUR NEW RELATIONS, ¦ ASKED CHANG WHAT FUNCTIONS HE

VISAGED SUCH AN OFFICIAL HAVING. HE SAID THAT HIS RECOLLECTION WAS THAT THE ORIGINAL PROPOSAL HAD BEEN FOR THE CHINESE

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO HONG KONG, HE WOULD HAVE TO FIND OUT EXACTLY WHAT FUNCTIONS WERE ENVISAGED..

ADDIS

FILES

FED HAD

P & C D NAM D

PS TO PUS MR WILFORD

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

CONFIDENTIAL

- CYPHER CAT. A

CKING 2981452

SECRET

---

TO PRIORITY FCO TEINO 251 OF 29 MARCH INFO HONG KONG (PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR).

CHINESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.

1. I DISCUSSED THIS QUESTION WITH MACLEROSE BEFORE HE LEFT

LONDON AND AGAIN WHEN I PASSED THROUGH HONG KONG IN JANUARY AND TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS THE ONLY MATTER ON WHICH HE AND I HAD NOT

SEEN EYE TO EYE. I HOPE HE WILL EXCUSE MY SETTING OUT IN THIS TELEGRAM, REPEATED ONLY TO HONG KONG, MY VIEW ON A QUESTION WHICH CONCERNS HIS RESPONSIBILITIES FAR MORE THAN MINE.

2. OUR FIRST CONSIDERATION MUST OF COURSE BE THE LONG-TERM

INTERESTS OF HONG KONG. IT IS AXIOMATIC THAT THE SITUATION THERE CAMMOT EVOLVE SATISFACTORILY TOWARDS THE END OF THE LEASE WITHOUT THE ASSENT OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT AT EẠCH STAGE. THE PRESENT POSITION, BY WHICH THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT'S BUSINESS

IN HONG KONG IS CONDUCTED BY NČNA BELONGS TO THE PERIOD OF PARTIAL

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WHICH HAS NOW ENDED. CHANGE TO A MORE

REGULAR ARRANGEMENT IN HONG KONG WOULD FOLLOW LOGICALLY ON NORMALISATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND WOULD SURELY CAUSE LESS

A SHOCK TO MORALE AND CONFIDENCE IN HONG KONG NOW THAN AT ANY OTHER TIME, TRANSITION COULD BE MADE SMOOTHLY NOW BUT WOULD BE MIKWARD IF MADE LATER UNDER PRESSURE. IN THE PRESENT CLIMATE OF

OUR SILATERAL RELATIONS IT IS A REASONABLE HOPE THAT THE CHINESE MÀY AGREE TO THE LIMITATIONS ON THE FUNCTIONS OF THEIR HONG KONG REPRESENTATIVE WHICH THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT WOULD PROPERLY WISH

TO IMPOSE SEMI COLON IN FACT THAT THE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE WOULD DO NO MORE THAN THE NONA DOES SEMI-OFFICIALLY AT PRESENT.

I WOULD NOT BE CONVINCED BY THE ARGUMENT THAT IF GIVEN

OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG THE CHINESE WOULD USE THIS TO SUPPORT DISAFFECTION AND ORGANISE SUBVERSION IN HONG KONG. THEY WOULD DO THIS IN ANY CASE WHEN FOR OTHER REASONS THEY DECIDED TO DO SO, WHETHER OR NOT THEY HAD OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION THERE.

13.

SECRET

ウ

را

THE APPOINTMENT OF A GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE ON ACCEPTABLE

"RMS WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE FOR US OF MARKING OFFICIALLY

THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT'S ACQUIESCENCE IN THE STATUS QUO IN

FING KONG

IF WE WERE TO REJECT OUT OF HAND WHAT ON THE FACE OF IT SEEMED

A MOT UNREASONABLE PROPOSAL (AND EQUALLY IF WE STALLED

INDEFINITELY ON IT) THE EFFECT ON SIRO/BRITISH RELATIONS

GENERALLY WOULD BE BAD.

OF HONG KONG REQUIRED IT.

THAT COULD DE ENDURED IF THE INTERESTS

DUT CHINESE DISSATISFACTION MIGHT

BE TAKEN OUT ON THE ADMINISTRATION IN HONG KONG IN THE FIRST PLACE, THAT IS A CONSEQUENCE WHICH WE SHOULD HAVE TO FACE.

5. I FEEL THAT THIS AWKWARD REQUEST PUTS US AT AN IMPORTANT CROSSROAD. IN ONE DIRECTION WE CAN TRY TO MOVE WITH CHINESE

COODWILL TOWARDS THE CHANGES IN HONG KONG WHICH WILL BE REQUIRED

AS THE END OF THE LEASE DRAWS NEAR AND THUS BE ABLE TO

SAFEGUARD MANY OF THE ESSENTIALS OF OUR POSITION THERE.

IN THE OTHER DIRECTION WE MAY DRIFT INTO A SITUATION OF INCREASING

CONFRONTATION AND BY REFUSING A CONCESSION NOW MAY LOSE THE GREATER PART OF OUR STAKE.

THE NEXT MOVE IS UP TO THE CHINESE. WE SHALL HAVE TO SEE

HOW THEY FRAME THEIR PROPOSAL AND WHAT FUNCTIONS THEY HAVE IN MIND TO SUGGEST. I HOPE THAT WE CAN CONSIDER CAREFULLY WHETHIER IT CONTAINS THE ELEMENTS OF A NECOTIABLE ARRANGEMENT. WE HIGHT FOR EXAMPLE DE ABLE TO TAKE THE LINE IN OUR REPLY THAT

THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT ARE CONTENT WITH PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS

BUT WOULD BE WILLING TO FORMALISE THE EXISTING SEMI OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION AS PART OF THE PROCESS OF NORMALISATION. THEY WOULD, HOWEVER, HAVE TO BE SURE THAT THE CHANGE WOULD NOT UPSET THE EXISTING SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS OR INTRODUCE

REW COMPLICATIONS, AND WE WOULD HAVE TO HAVE FIRM ASSURANCES THAT THERE WOULD DE NO DANGER OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE DEING REGARDED AS A RIVAL AUTHORITY TO THE ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENT.

•

-2- SECRET

17.

(IF IT WERE ARGUED THAT, WHILE WE MIGHT GET SATISFACTORY ..SSURANCES NOW, THESE WOULD BE WORTHLESS IF THERE WERE A CHANGE OF REGIME IN CHINA, OR IF THERE WERE ANOTHER CULTURAL REVOLUTION, I WOULD REPLY THAT IN THAT EVEN THERE WOULD BE A THREAT TO HONG KONG IN ANY CASE WHETHER OR KOT THERE WAS AN OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE THERE.

ADDIS

[REPEATED AS RE WESTED//COPIES SENT TO PRIVATE SECRETARY

"NO. 10 DOWNING ST & TO SIR P

ADAMS, CABINET OFTICE/

DEPARKMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

FED

PROT & CONF D

WPD

N M.D.

TOD

FSD

CONS D

IRD NEWS D

-3-

SEORE T

CYPHER CAT. A

FK PEKING PAP653Z

SECRET

SEORET

RECEIVED IN

REGISTRY No. 52

- 1 MAY 1972

FEH 3/301/2

TO ROUTINE HONG KONG (PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR) TELEGRAM NO. 28 CF 24 APRIL INFO F C C.

a) YOUR TEL NO.31:

CHINEGE FEPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.

THANK YOU. THIS WILL HELP ME IN KNOWING HOW TO PLAY

THE HAND WHEN THE CHINESE REVERT TO THE SUBJECT. 1 SHALL

NOT OF COURSE REVIVE IT MYSELF.

2. OUR DIFFERENCE IS NOT OVER AIM BUT OVER ASSESSMENT AND

NETHOD. THUS I WOULD ARGUE DIFFERENTLY ON SOME OF THE POINTS

IN YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. BUT FOR THE TIME DE ING

I AM CONTENT TO REST ON THE STATEMENT OF THE CASE IN MY TEL

NO. 251 TO F CO. WE CAN DISCUSS FURTHER WHEN WE SEE HOW

THE CHINESE PUT THEIR PROPOSAL. MY MAIN FEAR IS THAT

BY TRYING TO ''SIT TIGHT** WE MAY GET OURSELVES INTO AN IMPASSE

WHICH WE COULD AVOID BY MAKING TIMELY ADJUSTMENTS TO MEET

AN EVOLVING SITUATION.

ADDIS

FILES

FED

SKD

NAM D

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

/COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET/

PS TO MR ROYLE MR WILFORD

FFFFF

COPIES TO SIR P ADAMS CABINET OFFICE

SECRET

PRIORITY

CYPHER CAT A

RECEIVED IN

REGISTRY No. 52

SECRET

YOP COPY

FM PEKING #52738Z

- 5 MAY 1972

SECRET

FEH 3 태

باشه

TO PRIORITY FCO TELEGRAM NO 401 OF 5 MAY INFO ROUTINE HONG KONG PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR).

MY TELNO 28 TO HONG KONG: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG. 1. AT THE END OF MY MEETING WITH DIRECTOR OF WEST EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN DEPARTMENT, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, YESTERDAY, AFTER I HAD GONE THROUGH MY LIST OF POINTS TO PE RAISED, CHANG WEK-CHIN TURNED TO THE QUESTION OF CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG. HE DID THIS IN A RELAXED WAY WITHOUT CHANGING THE MOOD OF FRIENDLY AND COOPERATIVE DISCUSSION WITH WHICH WE HAD DEALT WITH THE PREVIOUS POINTS. THERE WAS NO HINT IN HIS MANNER THAT THIS COULD BE A DIFFICULT OR CONTENTIOUS ISSUE BETWEEN US. 2. HE SAID THAT AT OUR LAST MEETING HE HAD MENTIONED THAT

IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THE HANDLING OF QUESTIONS CONCERNING HONG KONG AND OF RELATIONS BETWEEN HONG KONG AND CHINA THE CHINESE GOVERNMENTWOULD LIKE TO SEND A SPECIAL COMMISSIONER'' TO HONG KONG. I HAD ASKED WHAT FUNCTIONS THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HAD IN MIND FOR SUCH AN OFFICIAL. HE HAD NOW LOOKED UP OLD FILES AND FOUND THAT IN FEBRUARY 1956 THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD MADE CONCRETE PROPOSALS ON THIS QUESTION, THE STATUS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE PROPOSED OFFICE WERE EXPLAINED QUITE CLEARLY IN THESE PROPOSALS. IN 1958 THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE HAD REPLIED THAT IN THEIR VIEW THE ATMOSPHERE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WAS NOT RIGHT FOR SUCH A PROPOSAL. THE MATTER HAD THEREFORE BEEN SUSPENDED. THE SITUATION NOW WAS OF COURSE VERY DIFFERENT FROM THAT IN 1958. MOREOVER PEFORE 1949 DURING THE TIME OF THE KUOMINTANG GOVERNMENT, THERE HAD BEEN CHINESE DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG. IT WAS ONLY AFTER 1949 THAT IT HAD BEEN DISCONTINUED. PAST EXPERIENCE HAD THEREFORE SHOWN THAT THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH AN • ORGAN OF REPRESENTATION

WAS TO THE BENIFIT OF BOTH SIDES, AND THAT THERE WAS A REAL NEED FOR SUCH A PRESENCE. HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER I WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE DETAILS OF THE 1956 PROPOSAL.

SECRET

//HE HOPED

SECRET

E HOPED THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD CONSIDER IT AGAIN.

I SAID THAT I WOULD HAVE TO FIND OUT ABOUT THIS PROPOSAL FROM LONDON AND WE COULD THEN DISCUSS IT IN MORE DETAIL AT A LATER DATE. WAS THE CHINESE VIEW THAT THE PROPOSAL MADE BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT IN 1956 SHOULD, IN BROAD ESSENTIALS, BE MADE AGAIN NOW? CHANG REPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE PROPOSAL MADE THEN WAS A CONSIDERED ONE: THE IDEA WAS ONE WHICH OUGHT TO BE CONSIDERED. SINCE THE MATTER HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED IN DETAIL IN THE PAST HE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT THOUGHT APOUT

IT NOW. BASICALLY SPEAKING THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WISHED FOR SOME KIND OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.

1 REPLIED THAT I THOUGHT IT BETTER THAT I SHOULD NOT MAKE ANY COMMENT AT THIS STAGE UNTIL I HAD LOOKED UP THE 1954 PROPOSAL. WE COULD THEN MEET AGAIN AND HAVE ANOTHER DISCUSSION, WHAT

WE BOTH WANTED WAS AN ARRANGEMENT TO SUIT BOTH SIDES. CHANG AGREED AND SAID THAT AFTER HAD STUDIED THE PROPOSAL WE COULD MEET AGAIN AND CONTINUE OUR DISCUSSION ON THE SAME EXPLORATORY BASIS AS BEFORE, WITHOUT COMMITMENT TO EITHER SIDE.

ADDIS

FILES

[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING ST]

FED

KK D

NORTH AMER DEPT

PRIVATE SECRETARY

PS/MR ROYLE

MR WILFORD

SIR L MONSON

-2-

SECRET

COPIES TO

SIR P ADAMS, CABINET OFFICE

•

CYPHER/CAT A

OLANDI

FM HONG KONG 300488Z

SECRET

TEH 3/22

TO ROUTINE FCC TELNO 272 OF 36LMARCH INFOI PEKING.

PEKING TELNO 251 TO YOU.

וד

じ

OP COF

CHINESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG,

MY VICWS WERE SET OUT IN PARAGRAPHS 8 TO 16 OF PAPER QUOTE

C UNQUOTE IN THE QUOTE GUIDELINES FOR THE GOVERNOR DESIGNATE

UNQUOTE DRAWN UP BEFORE I LEFT LONDON. I WOULD PREFER TO DEFER FURTHER COMMENT UNTIL I SEE YOUR OWN REACTIONS.

2. I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO SEE THE FULL RECORD AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES

IN WHICH THE ISSUE WAS RAISED, THERE IS A CURIOUS DISCREPANCY

BETWEEN THE MFA'S VERSION OF WHAT CHOU SAID AND JOHN DENSON'S RECORD. AS RECORDED CHOU'S POINT WAS ONLY OUR ILLOGIC IN WISHING TO RETAIN A CONSULATE IN TAIYAN WHEN THE C.P.G. HAD NO REPRESENTATIVE IN HONG KONG. IF DENSON'S RECOLLECTION IS CORRECT THE DISCREPANCY IS OF SOME SIGNIFICANCE,

3. 1 PRESUME IT IS REALISED BY ALL CONCERNED THAT IF THIS PROPOSAL

WERE LEAKED DELIBERATELY OR INADVERTENTLY IT WOULD HAVE THE MOST

SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS HERE. I DO TRUST THEREFORE THAT SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE MADE TO SECURE THE INFORMATION THAT THIS

APPROACH HAS BEEN MADE.

MACLEHOSE

[REPEATED AS NEX;UESTED]

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST &

SIR P ADAMS CABINET OFFICE]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

FED

HKD

PCD

Trb

NAM D

POD

PSD

CONS D

IND

NEWS D

SECRET

IMMEDIATE CYPHER/CAT A

RECEIVED IN

REGISTRY Nɔ.52

TOP COPY

FM HONG KONG 268635Z

26 APR 1972

SECRET

TO IMMEDIATE PEKING TELEGRAM NUMBER 31 OF 26 APRIL 1972. INFO

ROUTINE F C 0.

PEKING TELEGRAM NUMBER 251 TO FCO.

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.

OUR CURRENT ANALYSIS WAS OUTLINED TO SIR LESLIE MONSON. I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THIS WITH YOUDE NEXT WEEK-END, AND HOPE YOU WILL DEVELOP YOUR OWN THESIS TO HIM, THE FOLLOWING STATES MY OWN, AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION. I APOLOGISE FOR LENGTH, BUT THERE IS NO TIME FOR A DESPATCH,

2. MY VIEW STILL IS AS SET OUT IN THE GUIDELINES AGREED WITH THE FCO BEFORE MY DEPARTURE. LOCAL ADVICE CONFIRKS THE PROBLEMS THERE IN FORESEEN IN SUCH AN APPOINTMENT, AND THE LIKELIHOOD OR EVEN INEVITABILITY OF THEIR LEADING TO A CONFRONTATION WITH THE CPG RATHER THAN TO EASIER RELATIONS, UNLESS OF COURSE WE CONCEDE A MACAU-LIKE SITUATION.

3. COMING AFTER THE ROUND OF SUCCESSES OF THE CPG AS SEEN BY THE PUBLIC HERE (UN, NIXON, BRITISH CONCESSION ON TAIWAN) AND CHINA'S LETTER TO THE COMMITTEE OF 24, THEY WOULD CONCLUDE THAT THE EAST WIND PREVAILED AND THE DAYS OF BRITISH CONTROL HERE WERE MUMBERED AND ADJUST ACCORDINGLY, I FEAR THEREFORE THAT SUCH A TRANSITION WOULD CREATE MORE RATHER THAN LESS APPREHENSION AT THIS POINT IN TIME. (PARA 2 OF YOUR TEL)

SECRET

/4. MY

SECRET

MY ADVISERS NATURALLY VIEW THIS PROPOSAL AGAINST THE

BACKGROUND:

THAT WE CAN SEE NO PRACTICAL REQUIREMENT FOR IT (AND YOU WILL NOTE IT WAS PUT FORWARD ON PRACTICAL GROUNDS). IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER THE CPG IS NOT UNDER BUT OVER REPRESENTED HERE. ALREADY. OF THE 25 MEMBERS OF THE CPG WORKING COMMITTEE THAT CONTROLS CPG ORGANISATIONS HERE UNDER THE PRESIDENCY OF LEUNG WAI LAM, DIRECTOR OF THE NCNA, ALL ARE SPECIALLY SENT FROM CHINA AS ARE 50% OF THE 160 SENIOR OFFICIALS WHO WORK TO THIS COMMITTEE. THE LATTER ARE SUPPORTED BY A LEGION OF SMALL FRY. THIS IS A FAR LARGER SET-UP THAN VE NOW HAVE IN WASHINGTON. THE ADVANTAGE PROPOSED WOULD THEREFORE BE CONFINED TO POLITICAL STATUS AND INFLUENCE.

B) CURRENT CHINESE POLICY TO HONGKONG,

THIS IS TO RETAIN FOR THE CPG FOR THE TIME BEING THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BENEFITS OF CONTINUED BRITISH STATUS WHILE WORKING TO ESTABLISH EFFECTIVE CPG CONTROL IN ALL FIELDS AS ACHIEVED IN MACAU BY THE RIOTS OF 67. OF SUCH A POLICY THERE IS AMPLE PROOF AS YOU KNOW. THIS POLICY HAS BEE!! SUCCESSFULLY CONTAINED BECAUSE OF THE PUBLIC'S BELIEF THAT GOVERNMENT WOULD STAND FIRM AGAINST ENCROACHMENT, HENCE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PROPOSED APPOINTMENT WHICH WOULD LOOK TO THE PUBLIC LIKE A TURNING POINT, AND WOULD BE SO INTERPRETED BY COMMUNIST ORGANIS AND CADRES.

YOU ENVISAGE AN AGREEMENT WITH THE CHINESE TO LIMIT THE FUNCTIONS OF SUCH AN APPOINTEE. BUT I THINK SUCH AN AGREEMENT, EVEN IF ACHIEVED, WOULD BE MEANINGLESS. EACH SIDE WOULD READ A QUIET DIFFERENT SENSE INTO IT. MOREOVER WITH THE BEST WILL IN THE WORLD THE REPRESENTATIVE'S POSITION WOULD BE HOPELESS IF NOT SHOT BY A KUOMINTANG AGENT PROVOCATEUR, HE WOULD BE HEMMED IN BETWEEN HIS INSTRUCTIONS FROM PEKING, WHATEVER THEY WERE, THE EXPECTATIONS AND CRITICISMS OF LOCAL CADRES, THE REQUESTS. FOR INTERVENTION BY ANYONE WHO DID NOT EGET WHAT HE WANTED FROM MC, AND THE HIGHLY COLOURED BLOW BY BLOW ACCOUNT OF HIS ACTIONS AND OBITER DICTA BY THE LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIA.

-2-

SECRET

/6. ALL

SECRET

ALL THIS IS OF COURSE THE ORTHODOX PRE-EXCHANGE-OF-AMBASSADORS

VIEW. THE QUESTION ARISES WHETHER THE LATTER HAS CREATED A NEW

SITUATION IN WHICH CHINESE POLICY HAS CHANGED AND THE OLD

FEARS ARE UNREAL. MY COMMENTS ON THIS ARE:

THE CASE REMAINS TO BE PROVED.

THE RELEASE OF MRS. YANG IS SCARCELY RELEVANT, AND THE FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF CHANG WEN-CHIN ON SUCH THINGS AS THE CANTON AIR LINK MAY BE RATIONAL (BECAUSE IT IS VERY MUCH TO CHINA'S ADVANTAGE) BUT DOES NOT TAKE US VERY

FAR. NOR DOES THE MUCH PLEASANTER ATMOSPHERE IN PEKING.

RECENT HISTORY IS NOT REASSURING,

E.G.

THE WAY IN WHICH THE CPG STEADILY RAISED THEIR DEMANDS IN

THE NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS:

THE WAY CHOU EN-LAI'S ORIGINAL REMARKS TO DENSON WERE TWISTED BY CHANG WEN-CHIN (YOUR TEL 245) AS A LEAD-IN ON REPRESENTATION : ITI) THE WAY THE HALF ASSURANCES GIVEN BY CHOU EN-LA ON HONG KONG

TO MALCOLM MACDONALD HAVE BEEN FOLLOWED, IMMEDIATELY WE HAD GIVEN THE CPG WHAT THEY WANTED, BY THESE PROBES ON HONG KONG.

THE YEARS OF THE PRESENT LEADERS ARE NUMBERED AND WHAT AND WHO

WILL FOLLOW THEM WE DO NOT KNOW. THIS IS THEREFORE A TIME TO

SIT TIGHT ON ANYTHING AFFECTING HONG KONG'S LONG-TERM FUTURE.

IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT CPG OFFICIALS IN PEKING AND LONDON SHOULD NOW BE TRYING TO SEE WHETHER THERE ARE ANY QUICK. POLITICAL TRICKS TO TAKE ON HONG KONG, BUT AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND THE CASE FOR GIVING THEM REMAINS TO BE PROVED. I SUGGEST

OUR IMMEDIATE OBJECT IN HONG KONG/CHINESE RELATIONS SHOULD BE IMPROVEMENT IN PRACTICAL, NON-POLITICAL THINGS WHOSE RESULTS AND BALANCE OF ADVANTAGE CAN BE CLEARLY ASSESSED. HENCE, FOR INSTANCE, MY PROPOSAL FOR A DIRECT HONG KONG/CANTON AIR LINK.

-3- SECRET

/8. SINCE

SECRET

8. SINCE THINK THAT THE APPOINTMENT PROPOSED IS LIKELY TO EXACER- BATE RATHER THAN IMPORVE RELATIONS I AM NOT DETERRED BY THE ARGUMENT THAT IT WILL ONLY BE THE WORSE FOR HONG KONG LATER IF WE RESIST NOW (SEE ALSO PARA 6 (C) ABOVE). ON THE CONTRARY I THINK THAT THE CHINESE ARE UNLIKELY TO PRESS THIS PROPOSAL TO THE LIMIT., AND THAT PROVIDED WE STEER THEM OFF QUICKLY AND FIRMLY THEY ARE LIKELY TO CONFINE THEMSELVES TO GRUMBLES. BUT THERE COULD BE REAL DANGER IN ALLOWING THE PROPOSAL TO GAIN MOMENTUM.

MACLEHOSE

(COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING ST AND TO

SIR P ADAMS, CABINET OFFICE

FILES

F.E.D.

H.K.D.

NORTH AMER DEPT

PRIVATE SECRETARY

P.S./MR ROYLE

MR WILFORD

SR & mors

-4-

SECRET

}

PRIORITY

CYPHER/CAT A

F HONG KONG 0994252

SECRET

TO PRIORITY F C O TELNO 393 OF 9TH BAY 1972. INFO ROUTINE

PEKING.

FCO

PEKING TELNO 461: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.

I AM AFRAID THAT WITH OUT INITIAL RESPONSE OF REQUESTING DETAILS AND NOW WITH OUR OFFER TO EXPLORE FURTHER WITHOUT COMITMENT, THE CHIRESE MAY BELIEVE (QUITE WRONGLY OF COURSE) THAT THEIR PROP- OSAL IS GATHERING WAY, VERY SOON WE MUST FIRE A SHOT ACROSS THEIR BOWS, OR BE PREPARED TO LET THEM SAIL OVER US.

FOR REASONS GIVEN IN MY TELEGRAM NO. 31 TO PEKING AND DESP- ATCIL OF 5 MAY I HOPE THE DECISION VILL RE FOR THE FOPHER COURSE, AND IF SO WE HAVE TO DECIDE WHAT TO SAY. ON THIS PERHAPS HER MAJESTY'S AYDASSADOR, PEKING, COULD BEST ADVISE. BUT FOR MY PART I SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING POINTS MIGHT BE MADE :-

(A)

(B)

(C)

WE ARE SORRY THE CHINESE HAVE RAISED THIS OLD ISSUE AT THIS TIME. OUR DESIRE IS FOR BETTER RELATIONS AS WE BELIEVE IS THEIRS, BUT THIS PROPOSAL IS LIKELY TO ACHIEVE THE REVERSE. WE THEREFORE FEEL OFLICED TO SPEAK FRANKLY. MR. CHANG'S INFORMATION ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF NR. KWOK, THE KUOMISTANG COMMISSIONER, AND HIS OFFICE FROM 1945 TO 1949 IS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM OUR OWN. THIS ''ORGAN'' FAR FROM BEING BENEFICIAL TO BOTH SIDES, OR DEMONSTRATING THE NEED FOR ITS EXISTENCE, CONTRIBUTED TO AN EXACERBATION OF RELATIONS WHICH HMG HAS HO DESIRE TO SEE REPEATED,

A LOT HAS HAPPENED SINCE THE PREVIOUS PROPOSALS WERE MADE. IN 1956 WE HAD AN OFFICE IN SHANGHAI, BUT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HAD HONE ON BRITISH TERRITORY EXCEPT IN LONDON, AND THE POSITION WAS THUS UNEQUAL. SIMILARLY WHEN CHOU EN-LAI MENTIONED REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG TO MR. DEMSON

HE DID SO TO EMPHASISE THE ILLOGICALITY OF OUR RELUCTANCE TO WITHDRAW THE BRITISH CONSULATE FROM TAIWAN WHEN THERE WAS NO CHINESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG. NOW THESE OFFICES HAVE BOTH DEEN CLOSED, AND THERE ARE ONLY EMBASSIES IN OUR RESPECTIVE CAPITALS. THIS SEEMS A SATIS- FACTORY AND MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS SITUATION.

DECRET

/(1))

(D)

(E)

SECRET

HR. CHANG HAS INDICATED THE PROPOSAL WAS MADE ON PRACTICAL

GROUNDS. BUT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT ALREADY HAVE A VERY

LARGE NUMBER OF OFFICIALS IN THE COLONY WHO DEAL WITH ALL PRACTICAL QUESTIONS OF COMMERCE, FINANCE, CULTURE, INFORMATION TRAVEL, TRANSPORT AND OTHER MATTESS. THEY ARE NOT HINDERED IN THEIR DEALINGS IN ANY MAY, AND THEY ARE FREE TO TRAVEL WHERE THEY WISH WITHOUT PERMISSION, AND MEET VION THEY LIKE AND ENTER AND LEAVE THE COLONY AT WILL. SOME OF THEM. HAVE DEALINGS WITH MY OFFICIALS AS OCCASION REQUIRES AND VICE VERSA. THERE IS THEREFORE NO PRACTICAL NEED FOR FURTHER

REPRESENTATION.

THE SITUATION IN HONG KONG IS ONE OF SOME DELICACY FOR BOTH THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT AND OURSELVES, HITHERTO A BALANCE

HAS REEN MAINTAINED THAT IS WELL UNDERSTOOD IN THE COLONY. THE PROPOSED APPOINTMENT NIGHT DISTURB THAT BALANCE.

ANY SUCH DISTURBANCE WOULD HAVE AN IMMEDIATELY ADVERSE

EFFECT IN THE COLONY AND THUS ON MIGLO-CHINESE RELATIONS.

SINCE. THE CHANGE PROPOSED WOULD BE OF NO PRACTICAL BENEFIT

TO EITHER THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT OR OURSELVES, WE DO NOT WISH TO RISK THE ADVERSE EFFECT IT WOULD HAVE ON OUR

RELATIONS.

I AM ALSO MOST CONCERNED TO DAMP OFF THE CHINESE BEFORE THEY HAVE BEEN GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO FORMULATE THEIR PROPOSALS TO US IN DETAIL, ONCE THEY HAVE DONE THIS IT WILL PE MUCH HARDER FOR THEM TO WITHDRAW. I THEREFORE HOPE THAT UNTIL HEV MISTRU- CTIONS ARE SENT IN THE LIGHT OF CHANG'S DEMARCHE HIM, APBASSADOR VILL FEEL ABLE 10 SAY, IF TACNLED, THAT PERCING I.STRUCTIGNS YE ;}

CANNOT DISCUSS THE MATTER "JRTHCK.

务

SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A

FM F C O 361235Z

SECRET.

(FED) |

小小

TOP COPY

Ask

TO ROUTINE GOVERNOR HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO. 265 OF 39-MARCH INFO

PEKING,

(

YOUR TELHO 272: CHINESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.

1. OUR UNDERSTANDING IS THAT THE BALL IS NOW IN THE CHINESE COURT TO LET US KNOW EXACTLY WHAT FUNCTIONS THEY ENVISAGE FOR THEIR 4 REPRESENTATION (PEKING TELNO 245). WE WOULD NOT INTEND RAISING

RE THIS MATTER WITH THEM AND SHOULD DEFER DETAILED CONSIDERATION UNTIL WE HAVE A BETTER IDEA OF WHAT THEY HAVE IN MIND.

2. OUR PRELIMINARY REACTION IS THAT THE STRIKINGLY MORE FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE IN GENERAL OF THE CHINESE WITH AR ADDIS ON 27 MARCH HAS CREATED A NEW SITUATION. NEVERTHELESS, THE PRIMARY, AND INDEED OVER-RIDING, CONSIDERATION IN THIS HATTER MUST REMAIN YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH REPRESENTATION IN THE COLONY (PARA 3 OF YOUR TEL UNDER REFERENCE).

DOUGLAS-HOME

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

FED

HKD

SECRET

อ!

PRIORITY

CYPHER/CAT A

FM F C 0 2812257

SECRET AND PERSONAL

SECRET

R. GETRY NS5.50

W/2

FEH3/301/2

(FE)

TO PRIORITY GOVERNOR HONG KONG TELMO 338 OF 28 APRIL.

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR FPON MR ROYLE.

YOUR TELEGRAM TO PEKING NO 31: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG. 1. LESLIE PONSON HAS TOLD ME OF HIS TALK WITH YOU AND YOUR

ADVISERS AND I AM GRATEFUL FOR THE FURTHER ANALYSIS SET OUR IN

YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE,

2. 1 SROULD LIKE YOU TO KNOW THAT BOTH THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND ¡YSELF FULLY SHARE YOUR VIEW OF THE POSITION THOUGH AS YOU WILL APPRECIATE VE RUST AWAIT ACY FURTHER COMMENT FROM ADDIS BEFORE WE FORMALLY GIVE OUR POLICY DECISION, THEREAFTER WE MUST ALL STICK FIRMLY TO THE LINE, INCLUDING OF COURSE MYSELF IN PEKING.

3. I AM AT PRESENT EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF TRAVELLING TO PEKING BY RAF COUCT BUT THIS IS SUBJECT TO FINAL AGREEMENT HERE AND FROM PEKING. 1. UNDERSTAND THAT YOU THINK IT GENERALLY UNDESIRABLE FOR A MINISTER TO GO INTO CHUA VIA HONG KONG BUT WOULD YOU SEE OBJECTION TO MY RETURHING FROM CHIHA VIA HONG KONG7 | KOULD ONLY STOP FOR A SHORT TIME JI HONG KONG BUT I WOULD MUCH LIKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS MY VISIT TO, PEKING, I SHOULD HAVE TO HOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE IN HONG KONG OF COURSE BUT I THUK THAT THIS MIGHT BE USEFUL AND I WOULD DISCUSS IT WITH YOU BEFORE HAND, 4. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD LET ME KNOW IF YOU THINK THIS I DEA NAKES SENSE.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES

FED HKD

PS TO MR ROYLE

SIR L MONSON MR WILFORD

FFFFF

SECRET

ソー

2.) hafa,.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

P/S to for Ringly, 1972

Mitterway Anno 2. Mr wither dow of difficult-but-

Mi Davies.

FERGY Die plus. તોફ

of Enne significence to Sast muhitud

rescriby

Ms.

R.E. 8.

8/5.

Thoma

TEE lei Gormori Arganti have it" anlitt we can Fath

which as

In your letter of 27 April, you asked how the problem of Chinese representation in Hong Kong had arisen in its current form and what view was at present taken of the requests made by the Chinese Government.

The case has a long history. From 1945 until the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic in 1949 the Nationalist Government maintained a representative in Hong Kong. lle gave the Hong Kong Government a great deal of trouble; e.g. by claiming a position superior to that of the Consular officers of other countries, based on the Chinese view (Nationalist and Communist) of the unequal nature of 19th Century treaties and hence that liong Kong belonged to Cuina.

In February 1956, the Chinese Government formally proposed the estɛDiishment in Hong Hont of an "Orrice of d Commissioner of Forel,". Arrkira of Che People's Republic of China, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd decidcu that we ought not to accede to the Chinese request, but that it would be wiser not to refuse it outright. No reply was therefore sent to the Chinese.

1though the Chinese did not revert to the subjcct Formally during the next two years, Chou In-lai mentioned it co a number of British visitors. This led to some publicity in the British press and there were questions in Parliament. Chou En-lai brought up the issue again with the Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Board of Trade (Mr. Erroll) when he visited China in 1957. It was therefore decided that a fox! reply to the Chinese request was necessary. In February 1958,

ir. Selwyn Lloyd told the Chinese Clergé d'Affaires that, given the climate of our relations at the time, we could not agree to the appointment of an official Chinese representative In Hong Kong.

The Chinese did not refer to the matter again until last year.

In March 1971. Chou En-lai brought it up during 4 conversation with our Chargé d'Affaires. He spoke of "an CONETECTctory position' in maintaining a Consulate on Taiwan

/while

Alt

5/5

Lord "ridges,

10 Downing Street

יז

while refusing to allow an official "Chinese relationship wich Hong Kong". As it appeared to us that this comment did not amount to a formal request or proposal, it was decided that no response was called for.

The Chinese have recently mentioned the subject on two occasions. The first was when ow Mbassador called on the Director of the West European Department at the Foreign Ministry on 27 March. The exchange which took place is reported in Peking telegram No. 245, of which I enclose a copy. Addis asked Chang Wen-chin what functions it was envisaged that any official Chinese representative in Rong, Row: would have and Ohang underseas to pakko encui-ics. The_second_occasion was when the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires broached the subject with a member of the Department at á reception at the Chinese Embassy here on 7 April.

What

Our Ambassador subsequently commenced that he thought there was a case for considering whether the Chinese responsa contained the elements of a negotiable arrangement (Peking telegram No. 251, of which I also enclose a copy). Governor believes that the establishment of official Chinese Teprésentation in Hong Kong would compromise his own position cud damage, rather than improve, velations between Chiba and Tong Kong. his arguments are set ont in detail in Keng Kong telegram No. 31 to Peking. Sir lec Douglas-Home agrees with the Governor.

When the Chinese define the functions they would like an official Chinese representative in liong Kong to have, as we wust expect them to do before long, we shall have to give careful consideration to the tenus of our responsc.

(Sμd) P. 14. Grattan

SEORIE

SPORDI

لالة المحامة

GOVERNMENT HOUSE

HÙNG HỒNG

5th May 1972

Hong Kong in the new Sino/British dialogue

Summary

We will have to negotiate with China

about the future of Hong Kong probably sometime

in the 1980's.

But we should wait till then both

to see what post-Mao/Chou China is like as a

negotiator, and also to give Hong Kong time to put

its house in order.

If both these factors are

favourable we might obtain some continuing special

status (1-5).

The present Chinese leadership seems

to wish to avoid a confrontation with us over Hong

Kong and preserve its status for the time being

because this is of advantage to China.

This

gives us a bargaining position of a sort in the

present dialogue (6-8).

Chinese policy in Hong Kong, and

its lack of success (9-10).

China's new international status may

make her feel entitled to a new status and gives her

The her

more liberty of action in Hong A...,

chip

10.

China has asked for the release of

confrontation prisoners in Hong Kong and the

appointment of an official representative there (12).

Confrontation prisoners can be conceded,

but at the time of our choosing (13).

Chinese representation could precipitate

a show-down with China on Hong Kong and

consequently threaten Anglo-Chinese relations (14 & 15).

The reasons why the Chinese may have

made this proposal and their implications (16).

In view of the dangers of conceding what

is asked, the unlikelihood of the Chinese pushing

this request quickly to dangerous extremes, and the

possibility that they may not feel committed to it,

we should play it long and start with a polite

brush-off (17).

We should look for some small and safe

concession that would take account of their enhanced

status; not easy to find (18).

SECRET

ECLIPSE

Sir.

Hong Kong, 5th May 1972

With Ambassadors exchanged and ministerial

visits to follow we are committed to a dialogue with

the Chinese leaders on outstanding problems.

these Hong Kong bulks large. This despatch suggests

a long term strategy, as well as short term tactics

for handling Hong Kong in this dialogue,

Inevitably

it takes one far into territory at least common

to H.M. Ambassador, Peking, and if I have in fact

trespassed in his territory, as I fear I have, I hope

he will accept my apology he knows he is welcome

in mine.

Strategy for Hong Kong

Sometime, probably in the decade of the

1980's, the shadow of the end of the lease in 1997

will force us to negotiate with the Chinese People's

Government over the future of Hong Kong. Obviously

we must be careful not to miss any opportunity to do

so that presents itself and would produce the right

result. But we can afford no false step because once

we offer to negotiate and it becomes known, confidence

in the Colony would collapse and our bargaining position

would evaporate, and I think it is in fact agreed policy

not to negotiate meanwhile because:

a) it is moSL

misese

SECRET

ECLIPSE

If on these grounds our strategy

were to be to play for time e.g. about 10 or

15 years

envisage should be the domestic strategy for Hong

Kong. This is to tackle the domestic problems

of the Colony so vigorously during the next 10

years that they would be eliminated to a point at

which by Western standards there was nothing to

be ashamed of anywhere, and by Chinese standards

much to spur civic pride and a sense of achievement

everywhere. What has already been achieved

and planned gives an excellent point of take-off for

such a policy. In terms of programmes for housing

and urban renewal, secondary and higher education,

transport, social services, cultural development

and improvement of urban and rural environment, I

believe it could be done

it would fit in well with what I

always provided world

trade keeps up and Hong Kong is not shut out from

a fair share of its benefits.

Such a policy is worth pursuing for

its own sake. But I believe it also holds out the

best prospect for the least unsatisfactory arrange-

ment with China on the long term future of the Colony.

Of course in certain Chinese moods nothing will

count except the urge to end completely this

colonial blot on the national honour. But we do not

know what the state of China will be in 10 or 15

years time, or who the people will be who run it,

or what their policies or priorities will be.

SECRET ECLIPSE

They might see merit in some continuing arrangement for Hong Kong whereby a special regime was established that nominally removed the colonial stigma, but preserved for China some of the economic and other material and political benefits of the present status, saved them from having to absorb a population with such different standards of living and attitudes of mind, and on the other hand preserved for foreigners a tolerable trading base, some security for investment and acceptable living

conditions while concentrating them in a single area

where they did not affect life in the rest of China. could perform the service which Shanghai might have done

if the CPG in the early days of their power had not squeezed the foreigners out, and it could avoid the problems the CPG experienced in absorbing that cosmo-

politan and volatile population. I believe that the more

undeveloped and discontented Hong Kong is the less likelihood there would be of this or a similar concept

being adopted, and conversely the more evolue the colony

the more attractive such a half-way house might appear

to the Chinese leadership, assuming it was prepared to compromise at all. At best there may only be a 50/50

chance though these are not bad odds in human affairs

and there are other factors which might affect the

attitude of the CPG too numerous to mention. But I think

that this is the best contribution the Hong Kong

Government can make to achieving a satisfactory

settlement, and for this it would need about 10 years.

I agree.

SECKET

ACLIPSE

So I suggest our strategy should be

to delay definitive negotiations on Hong Kong's

future because:

a) we are not likely to get a worse answer

in 10 or 15 years time than now and we

might get a better one; and

b) Hong Kong can be developed meanwhile

up to standards that will give it a better

chance of retaining a continuing special

status in China and so preserve the British

stake, discharge our obligations to the

inhabitants, and avoid the humiliation

of an unsatisfactory withdrawal.

So much for long term strategy, and I now turn

to tactics over Hong Kong in the present dialogue.

Bargaining position on Hong Kong

We obviously must have some bargaining

position or the colony would not still exist.

have ample evidence of instructions from Peking

to the Hong Kong communist hierarchy to avoid

confrontation with the government both in general

and also in specific issues. Moreover it is a

reasonable deduction that the principal reason the

CPG have not taken over Macau is reluctance to

force a confrontation over Hong Kong or check

confidence in it.

So we can take it that the CPG believes

it to be to its advantage to retain the status

Chou-En-

of the colony in the immediate future

lai even hinted to Malcolm Macdonald that this would

hold until the lease ran out. For the purpose

of this despatch it is not necessary to spell out what this advantage is but merely to note that

the present leadership of the CPG believes it to

exist. It is probably principally commercial and

financial, but economic factors have never been

conclusive for the CPG - even 1/3 of their foreign

exchange earnings and we should bear in mind

that we do not really know what the Chinese

reasoning is, and that there might be other factors.

These might include such ideas the CPG has about the

role Great Britain should play in China's external

policy, and the deterrent effect still exercised

by the CPG's view of the Anglo/US relationship.

So I think we can assume that, other

things being equal, (i.e. that we do not in some

way outrage Chinese national pride or interests),

the CPG would wish to change a course that was

bringing them into collision with us over Hong Kong, and that this is because in the final analysis

at present they wish to preserve the status quo.

This gives us a card, particularly if we play 2.

with Finesse.

SECHEL ECLIPSE

Chinese policy in Hong Kong and the counter to it

There is ample evidence that Chinese

policy towards Hong Kong is to produce a Macau-like

situation. This is a tacit understanding that in

exchange for continuing sovereignty, peace and

quiet and the exercise of administrative functions,

the CPG has the right to veto administrative

actions which are unfavourable to the CPG or the ir

supporters, and to pursue the organisation of an

unchallengeable power-base in the trades unions,

schools, trading organisations, etc., while

drawing full financial and other benefits from the

Colony's British status. This is an old and

perfectly comprehensible policy, and of course

carries with it an option on a more or less

peaceful take-over at any time. It has had

little success in Hong Kong so far. Its failure

has depended on the public s confidence in

Government's determination to resist encroachment.

The Hong Kong Government s sense of success (and

HMG's steady backing has of course contributed

to this success) has produced a well-tried and

rather Berlin-like policy of viewing all concessions

with the gravest misgiving. Whatever one's views

―

on the merits of this and I personally think them

considerable,

one has to remember that the

population of Hong Kong, including the communi.

bigrarchy, have. gro... ́

che sale

200

of vau, pocink

FLOW

SECRET ECLIPSE

The new situation

10.

The policy may be old and well-tried,

but the present situation is new in two main respects:-

a) the CPG's new status in the world

b) the CPG's new relationship with the UK.

The new relationship between the US and the CPG has greatly altered its international standing.

Mr.

Dulles put the black spot on the CPG and it stuck. now the CPG is respectable and wooed, a member of the Security Council, treated on more or less equal terms,

whether as friend or enemy, by both Super-powers.

This is a new situation in which the CPG may feel entitled to a new status and new and more normal and

direct channels of communication everywhere.

It is

also a situation in which the old deterrent of US

But

power operatés, if at all in respect of Hong Kong, to a

The CPG must feel significantly lesser extent.

that if it wanted to it could get away with doing a

Pondicherry on Hong Kong, if not perhaps a Goa.

11.

The new relationship with the UK does

not in theory alter much of substance, though the CPG may (or ought to) feel they owe us a good turn

for our new formula on Taiwan. But in exchanging

Ambassadors we accepted the opening of a dialogue

to settle outstanding problems, and both sides are blowing the dust from old files id quoting from their

cont

· ·

SECRET

ECLIPSE

normalcy which has grown up over the last 6 months

or year in Peking, Hong Kong and London and which is

highly desirable. But while on the one hand this

spirit must not lightly be lost through sounding a

ülaçã

needlessly sour note, on the other it is too early to say.

what real prospect it offers of settling outstanding

issues by give and take and not just by give on our

part.

12.

So far as China is concerned Hong Kong

is the issue outstanding which looms largest in form,

if perhaps not in practice, and in the initial stage

of the dialogue China has asked for both the release

of confrontation prisoners in Hong Kong, and the

appointment of an official Chinese representative.

I assume that our objective should be as in para. 5,

to gain 10 or 15 years in which Hong Kong can have

time to grow and prosper in confidence, suppress its

warts and wrinkles, and become as hard for China to

absorb as possible, and in which post Mao/Chou China

can emerge and show its credentials as a negotiating

partner. The problem therefore is how to respond

to the demands already made about Hong Kong, and to

anything more that comes up, in a way that will help and not hinder us in our objective of gaining time.

Confrontation Prisoners.

13.

The confrontation prisoners are nos

a small problem to thec od và the $73. Provi

the Chinese are pro

the border they

that we can make

t th hard core

نمد

changes the mood of the Prisons Board of Review.

The question is only how or when to make the

concession.

I consider we should decide this not

in isolation, but in relation to what we decide to do

about Chinese Representation, and indeed to the

totality of the situation as it is eventually disclosed.

For the time being therefore this is a card we should

hold in our hand.

Chinese Representation

14.

On Chinese Representation in Hong Kong

I will not set out again here the difficulties we

believe such a representative would produce

they

were described in the 'Guidelines for the Governor-

designate' agreed in the Department, and in my

telegram No. 31 to Peking on 26th April. The main point

is that with the best will in the world (and I doubt

if we could count on that such an appointment would

be more likely to precipitate a loss of confidence

in the colony and a confrontation with the CPG and

consequently to a worsening of Anglo/Chinese relations,

than to buy for us long goodwill, prosperity, confidence

and time.

15.

Of course if the Chinese Representative

were to conduct himself like any other representative here, keep out of local affairs, refrain froE

anipulating the levers wi Ch 1.^' ozca ..

€ 30

111

SECRET

ECLIPSE

10.

Hong Kong Government, he would be a positive asset in many

practical and political ways.

But I don't see how he

possible could. So long as the official position of the CPG is that Hong Kong is Chinese territory and its Chinese residents are 'compatriots' in whom they have a special interest, there would be virtually no limit to the field in which a representative could claim competence, or in which he could refuse to respond to appeals for help . It might work out for a year or two, but sooner or later the crunch would come. We might try to present such an appointment as CPG recognition of the status quo, but it would be in fact the first step in re-assertion of Chinese control. population, investors, and industrialists alike would know this and would conclude that the appointment signalled the beginning of the last act. This is a situation in which agreement is likely to lose so much that the dangers of refusal must be very clear and immediate to be worth considering.

16.

There appear to me to be three possible

groups of scenarios for this proposal having been made in this way at this stage which is all the more baffling because not yet defined:-

a) It is made for the record and invites

or expects a refusal which will be accepted

(with a good or bad grace).

b) Peking is either unaware of the

difficult.cs, or is aware

as faving

The

SECRET ECLIPSE

11.

17.

a new position in Hong Kong, but in any

of these events does not consider the

objective of sufficient immediate importance

to be worth a confrontation that risked

whatever advantage she sees in the status

quo

c) For one reason or another Peking is

determined to establish official representation

in Hong Kong and assert a new position in the

Colony at the risk even of upsetting the

status quo. If so they have started off

But if there very gently indeed.

really is a mailed fist behind the velvet

it is most unlikely in present circumstances

that it would be abruptly flourished in our

faces. If and when we suspect its existence

room for we could reconsider and use such/manoeuvre

BS we have though as I have already

indicated such a situation would leave us

precious little.

So as I see it, the dangers of making

the concession proposed are so obvious, the advantages so speculative, the degree of Chinese interest in it

still so uncertain, the possibility of the Chinese

changing their policy to Hong Kong abruptly in the

immediate future so remote, that at the very leas.

.) sho..la pony

OF CLAS

12.

18.

Nevertheless I am conscious of the

desirability in the circumstances described in paras.

10 & 1 of making some small change in local

practice or arrangements which would not disturb

either the balance of power in the Colony or public

confidence, but would represent a genuflexion in

the direction of the CPG's new status and allow

Peking to drop the proposal with a good grace.

Desirable as such a tactic would be, I must confess

that ever since I was appointed I have racked

my brains to think of something that would fit this

bill, but so far without success. If and when the

Chinese show more of their hand it may suggest to us

some safe but significant action that could be taken

here which would get us off the hook without

precipitating a slide to confrontation and loss of

confidence. I do not know if something of this

sort will prove either necessary or possible, but

I do not think in any case it could have the desired

effect if we attempted to negotiate it in Peking

or London, If raised in principle it would be bound to

fail. I envisage it rather as some change in our manner of dealing with the local hierarchy that might be introduced unilaterally and without explanation to sweeten very slightly a refusal of the principal

proposal.

19.

2a sendin

this desth

DELALI

ECLIPSE

13.

the first instance only to H.M. Ambassador Peking.

Since any leakage of its contents could be

damaging, perhaps the Department would itself

consider what further distribution should be given.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

Mr... Ma Schn

GOVERNOR

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

SIR ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME, K.T., M.P.

RIORITY

TR/OAT A

HONG KONG 090425Z

SECRET

R-CEIVED IN R-CEIVERSCHIED

REGISTRY No. 12

- 9 MAY 1972

FEAT 3/1

TOP COPY

TO FRIORITY F C O TELNO 398 OF 9TH MAY 1972. INFO ROUTINE

PEKING.

PEKING TELNO 4011 CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.

I'M AFRAID THAT WITH OUT INITIAL RESPONSE OF REQUESTING DETAILS AND NOW WITH OUR OFFER TO EXPLORE FURTHER WITHOUT COMMITMENT, THE CHINESE MAY BELIEVE (QUITE WRONGLY OF COURSE) THAT THEIR PROP- OSAL IS CATHERING WAY. VERY SOON WE MUST FIRE A SHOT ACROSS THEIR BOWS, OR DE PREPARED TO LET THEM SAIL OVER US.

FOR REASONS CIVEN IN MY TELEGRAM NO. 31 TO PEXING AND DESP- 4TCH OF 5 MAY I HOPE THE DECISION VILL PE FOR THE FORMER COURSE, AND IF SO WE HAVE TO DECIDE WHAT TO SAY, ON THIS PERHAPS HER MAJESTY'S AIBASSADOR, PEKING, COULD BEST ADVISE. BUT FOR MY PART 1 SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING POINTS MIGHT BE MADE :-

(A) WE ARE SORRY THE CHINESE HAVE RAISED THIS OLD ISSUE AT THIS

TIME. OUR DESISE IS. FOR BETTER RELATIONS AS WE BELIEVE

IS THEIRS, BUT THIS PROPOSAL IS LIKELY TO ACHIEVE THE REVERSE. WE THEREFORE FEEL OBLIGED TO SPEAK FRANKLY.

(B) MR. CHANG'S INFORMATION ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF MR, KWOK,

THE KUOMINTANG COMMISSIONER, AND HIS OFFICE FPO" 1945 TO 1949 IS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM OUR OWN. THIS ''ORGAR'' FAR FROM BEING BENEFICIAL TO BOTH SIDES, OR DEHOUSTRATING THE HEED FOR ITS EXISTENCE, CONTRIBUTED TO AY EXACERBATION OF RELATIONS WHICH HMG HAS NO DESIRE TO SEE REPEATED.

(C)

A LOT HAS HAPPENED SINCE THE PREVIOUS PROPOSALS WERE MADE. IN 1956 WE HAD AN OFFICE IN SHANCHAI, BUT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HAD NONE ON BRITISH TERRITORY EXCEPT IN LONDON, AND THE POSITION WAS THUS UNEQUAL. SIMILARLY WHEN CHOU E:-LAI MENTIONED REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG TO MR. DENSON

HE DID SO TO EMPHASISE THE ILLOGICALITY OF OUR RELUCTANCE TO WITHDRAW THE BRITISH CONSULATE FROM TAIWAN WIEN THERE WAS NO CHINESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG. ́NOW THESE OFFICES HAVE BOTH DEEN CLOSED, AND THERE ARE ONLY EMBASSIES IN OUR RESPECTIVE CAPITALS. THIS SEEMS A SATIS- FACTORY AND MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS SITUATION.

SECRET

/(D)

SECRET

(D)

(E)

MR. CHANG HAS INDICATED THE PROPOSAL WAS MADE ON PRACTIC GROUNDS. BUT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT ALREADY HAVE A VERY LARGE NUMBER OF OFFICIALS IN THE COLONY WHO DEAL WITH ALL PRACTICAL QUESTIONS OF COMMERCE, FINANCE, CULTURE, INFORMATION TRAVEL, TRANSPORT AND OTHER MATTERS. THEY ARE NOT HINDERED IN THEIR DEALINGS IN ANY WAY, AND THEY ARE FREE TO TRAVEL WHERE THEY WISH WITHOUT PERMISSION, AND MEET WHOM THEY LIKE AND ENTER AND LEAVE THE COLONY AT WILL. SOME OF THEM HAVE DEALINGS WITH MY OFFICIALS AS OCCASION REQUIRES AND VICE VERSA, THERE IS THEREFORE NO PRACTICAL NEED FOR FURTHER

REPRESENTATION.

THE SITUATION IN HONG KONG IS ONE OF SOME DELICACY FOR BOTH THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT AND OURSELVES. HITHERTO A BALANCE. HAS BEEN MAINTAINED THAT IS WELL UNDERSTOOD IN THE COLOGY. THE PROPOSED APPOINTMENT MIGHT DISTURB THAT BALANCE. AVY SUCH DISTURBANCE WOULD HAVE AN IMMEDIATELY ADVERSE EFFECT IN THE COLONY AND THUS ON ANGLO-CHINESE RELATIONS. SINCE THE CHANGE PROPOSED WOULD BE OF MO PRACTICAL BENEFIT TO EITHER THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT OR OURSELVES, WE DO NOT WISH TO RISK THE ADVERSE EFFECT IT WOULD HAVE ON OUR

RELATIONS.

IT IS NOT FOR ME TO ADVISE ON WHETHER ALL OF THIS COULD PROPERLY BE SAID, BUT I DO BELIEVE THAT AT THIS POINT, WHATEVER

I CHINESE INTENTIONS TURN OUT TO BE, WE HAVE MUCH TO GAIN BY CLARITY AND MUCH TO LOSE BY RISKING MISUNDERSTANDING THROUGH RELUCTANCE TO MAKE OUR OBJECTION CLEAR.

I AM ALSO MOST CONCERNED TO DAMP OFF THE CHINESE BEFORE THEY HAVE BEEN GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO FORMULATE THEIR PROPOSALS TO US IN DETAIL. ONCE THEY HAVE DONE THIS IT WILL BE MUCH HARDER FOR THEM TO WITHDRAW. I THEREFORE HOPE THAT UNTIL NEW INSTRU- CTIONS ARE SENT IN THE LIGHT OF CHANG'S DEMARCHE H.M. AMBASSADOR WILL FEEL ABLE TO SAY, IF TACKLED, THAT PENDING INSTRUCTIONS HE CANNOT DISCUSS THE MATTER FURTHER.

MACLEHOSE

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

| COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST)

FILES

FED

HAIOD NAM D

PS/MR ROYLE MR WILFORD

SIR L MONSON

COPIES TO:

SIR P ADAMS CABINET OFFICE

-2- SECRET