FE.
FILE
A
PART
DO NOT RETAIN FILES AND PAPERS UNNECESSARILY
RETURN THEM TO REGISTRY FOR BU. OR PA.
STAMP
YEAR
1972
SECE
NB
UP 3
(NB. The gang of ther jacket wont be the same as that of the highest gradad
donu. The aty
SECRET
H.M. DIPLOMATIC SERVICE
DEPT.
or POST
FAR
FILE NOFEH Hap
Lay
8c
427
LETBEN
TITLE: RELATIONS LET JEEN
Contents checked
for transfer to
(Sgd.)
Dale
DRO.
JR
EASTERN
(Part_Ĥ__)
5/9/14
HONG KONG & CHINA
REFER TO
REFER TO
NAME
(and dept, when necessary)
TO SEE:
DATE
NAME (and dept, when necessary)
TO
NAME
TO
DATE
DATE
SEE:
(and dept, when necessary) SEE:
FCO 21/1018
(N.B. The grading of the sochat must be the same as that of the highart gradut document contennad in 1). The appropriate wegrading ship must be affixed whenever necessary.)
SECRET
CLOSED UNTIL
20031
Registry Address
Room No....
King Charles Street.
2.
YEAR STAMP
1972
REFER TO
CONFIDENTIAL
CYPHER/CAT A
TOP COPY
FM F C 0 051815Z
CONFIDENTIAL
TO ROUTINE PEKING TELNO 299 OF 5 MAY,
明
30
KORGAN'S LETTER TO EVANS 3/56 OF 26 APRIL, CHINESE REPRESENTATION
INI HORS KONG,
WE SENT YOU A MEMORANDUM ON THE HISTORY OF THIS PROBLEM BY THE BAG VICH LEFT IRRE ON 3 MAY, YOU WILL NO DOUBT LET US KNOW IF YOU WOULD LIKE ANY ADDITIONAL MATERIAL.
DOUGLAS-HOKE
VILES
FED
FR WILFORD
CONFIDENTIAL
33
[
*
www
Miteve Mo Mi Davies
FERGY TO འ༢
J.
1. Sueling of The
24 safe.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London S.W.1
1972
14
P/S to Dr Roy li 2. Mr Wilferdew JiBcull-but- 3-FED
ઝાડ
$74.
Theme
of sme significance the Sits's attitude.
Mu.
R.E. 8/5.
sarily
1hh Ken Benous arge enti
enti have it
until we can tell in ea
with
In your letter of 27 April, you asked how the problem of Chinese representation in Hong Kong had arisen in its current form and what view was at present taken of the requests made by the Chinese Government.
The case has a long history. From 1945 until the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic in 1949 the Nationalist Government maintained a representative in Hong Kong. He gave the Hong Kong Government a great deal of trouble; e.g. by claiming a position superior to that of the Consular officers of other countries, based on the Chinese view (Nationalist and Communist) of the unequal nature of 19th Century treaties and hence that Hong Kong belonged to Claina.
In February 1956, the Chinese Government formally proposed the establishment in Hong Kong of an "Office of a Commissioner of Forelm Affairs of the People's Republic of Okinal Mr. Selwyn Lloyd decided that we ought not to accede to the Chinese request, but that it would be wiser not to refuse it outright. No reply was therefore sent to the Chinese.
Although the Chinese did not revert to the subject formally during the next two years, Chou En-lai mentioned it to a number of British visitors. This led to some publicity in the British press and there were questions in Parliament. Chou En-lai brought up the issue again with the Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Board of Trade (Mr. Erroll) when he visited China in 1957. It was therefore decided that a formi
reply to the Chinese request was necessary. In February 1950, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd told the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires that, given the climate of our relations at the time, we could not agree to the appointment of an official Chinese representative in Hong Kong.
The Chinese did not refer to the matter again until last year.
In March 1971. Chou En-lai brought it up during conversation with our Chargé d'Affaires. He spoke of "ONE" contradictory position" in maintaining a Consulate on Taiwan
/while
or Bridges,
10 Downing Street
Alt
5/5
SECRET
SECRET
while refusing to allow an official "Chinese relationship with Hong Kong". As it appeared to us that this comment did not amount to a formal request or proposal, it was decided that no response was called for.
The Chinese have recently mentioned the subject on two occasions. The first was when our Ambassador called on the Director of the West European Department at the Foreign Ministry on 27 March. The exchange which took place is reported in Peking telegram No. 245, of which I enclose a copy. Addis asked Chang Wen-chin what functions it was envisaged that any official Chinese representative in Hong 2ɔng would have and Chang undertook to make enquiries. The second occasion was when the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires broached the subject with a member of the Department at d recèption at the chinese Embassy here on 7 April.
Our Ambassador subsequently commented that he thought there was a case for considering whether the Chinese response contained the elements of a negotiable arrangement (Peking telegram No. 251, of which I also enclose a copy). But the Governor believes that the establishment of official Chinese Teprésentation in Hong Kong would compromise his own position and damage, rather than improve, relations between China and for. Kong. His arguments are set out in detail in Hong Kong telegram No. 31 to Peking. Sir Alec Douglas-Home agrees
with the Governor.
When the Chinese define the functions they would like an official Chinese representative in Hong Kong to have, as we must expect them to do before long, we shall have to give careful consideration to the terms of our response.
(Sgd) P. H. Grattan
SECRET
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London S.W. 1
R.C.5/5. (c) Mi Crampign: say, 1972
Hong thongs Deparîmeni
1 Cars 5/5
к
TEH 3/20.1in Rally 100
Работ The Harry
71575 Enter
R.E.5/5.
In your lecter of 27 April, you asked how the pro: lem of Chinese representation in Hong Kong had arisen in its current form and what view was at present taken of the
uests made by the Chinese Governmenć.
2. case nas a long history. From 1945 until the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic in 1949 the Nacionalist Government maintained a representative in Hong Kong. He gave the Hong Kong Government a great deal of trouble; e.g. by claiming a position superior to that of the Consular officers of other countrics, based on the Chinese view (Nationalist and Communist) of the unequal nature of 29 Century treaties and hence that hong Kong belonged to 2..iTA.
-
In February 1956, the Chinese Government formally vosed the establishment in Hong Kong of an "Office of Dhum ... 03-Onor of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic
.. Colwyn Lloyd decided that we ought noc co ton, to the Chinese request, but that it would be wiser 3. refuse it wutriót.
-
No reply was therefore sent to
T
Cainese.
c
Ahough the Cataese did not revert to the subjecc - during the next two years, Chou En-lai mentioned 1
uwer of Britis.. visitors. 1.4s led to some publicity ritish press and there were questions in Parlimen ou Melai brought up the issue in with the Parliament:
e-Succccary at the Board of War (Iir. Erroll) when ced China in 1957. I was therefore decided that a far al to the Chinese request was necessary. In February 2:36, Sel: Lloyd told the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires tim", res the climate of our relations at the time, we could no
to the appointment of an official Chinese representač.. - Mong Kong.
-
+
Anc Chinese did not refer to Le matter again unnal Labs year.
In March 1971, Chou in-in' brought it up suTIT * ... convmrunuion with our Chargé d'hifalves. He spoke of u soutradictory position" in maintaining a Consulate on Taivan
-I
axes,
.ming Street
/while
2
SECRET
.
while refusing to allow an official "Chinese relationship with Hong Kong". As it appeared to us that this comment did not amount to a formal request or proposal, it was decided that no response was called for.
The Chinese have recently mentioned the subject on two occasions. The first was when our Ambassador called on the Director of the West European Department at the Foreign Ministry on 27 March. The exchange which took place is reported in Peking telegram No. 245, of which I enclose a copy. Addis asked Chang Wen-chin what functions it was envisaged that any official Chinese representative in Hong Kong would have and Chang undertook to make enquiries. The second occasion was when the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires broached the subject with a member of the Department at a reception at the Chinese Embassy here on 7 April.
Our Ambassador subsequently commented that he thought there was a case for considering whether the Chinese response contained the elements of a negotiable arrangement (Peking telegram No. 251, of which I also enclose a copy). But the Governor believes that the establishment of official Chinese representation in Hong Kong would compromise his own position and damage, rather than improve, relations between China and Hong Kong. His arguments are set out in detail in Hong Kong telegram No. 31 to Peking. Sir Alec Douglas-Home agrees with the Governor.
When the Chinese define the functions they would like an official Chinese representative in Hong Kong to have, as we must expect them to do before long, we shall have to give careful consideration to the terms of our response.
SECRET
(Sed) P. H. Grattan
CYPHER CAT, A
+
KING 296145Z
SECRET
+
TO PRIORITY F C O TELNO 251 OF 29 MARCH INFO HONG KONG (PERCONAL FOR GOVERNOR).
P
CHINESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
1. 1 DISCUSSED THIS QUESTION WITH MACLEHOSE BEFORE HE LEFT LONDON AND AGAIN WHEN I PASSED THROUGH HONG KONG IN JANUARY AND TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS THE ONLY MATTER ON WHICH HE AND I HAD NOT SEEN EYE TO EYE. I HOPE HE WILL EXCUSE MY SETTING OUT IN THIS TELEGRAM, REPEATED ONLY TO HONG KONG, MY VIEW ON A QUESTION WHICH CONCERNS HIS RESPONSIBILITIES FAR MORE THAN MINE.
2. OUR FIRST CONSIDERATION MUST OF COURSE DE THE LONG-TERM
INTERESTS OF HONG KONG. IT IS AXIOMATIC THAT THE SITUATION THERE CANNOT EVOLVE SATISFACTORILY TOWARDS THE END OF THE LEASE WITHOUT THE ASSENT OF THE CHINESE COVERNMENT AT EACH STAGE. THE PRESENT POSITION, BY WHICH THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT'S BUSINESS IN HONG KONG IS CONDUCTED BY NCNA BELONGS TO THE PERIOD OF PARTIAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WHICH HAS NOW ENDED. CHANGE TO A MORE REGULAR ARRANGEMENT IN HONG KONG WOULD FOLLOW LOGICALLY ON NORMALISATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND WOULD SURELY CAUSE LESS OF A SHOCK TO MORALE AND CONFIDENCE IN HONG KONG NOW THAN AT ANY OTHER TIME. TRANSITION COULD BE MADE SMOOTHLY NOW BUT WOULD BE ALIKWARD IF MADE LATER UNDER PRESSURE. IN THE PRESENT CLIMATE OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS IT IS A REASONABLE HOPE THAT THE CHINESE MAY AGREE TO THE LIMITATIONS ON THE FUNCTIONS OF THEIR HONG KONG
REPRESENTATIVE WHICH THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT WOULD PROPERLY WISH
TO IMPOSE SERT COLON IN FACT THAT THE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE WOULD DO NO MORE THAN THE NONA DOES SEXI-OFFICIALLY AT PRESENT.
I WOULD NOT BE CONVINCED BY THE ARGUMENT THAT IF GIVEN OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG THE CHINESE WOULD USE THIS TO SUPPORT DISAFFECTION AND ORGANISE SUBVERSION IN HONG KONG, THEY WOULD DO THIS IN ANY CASE WHEN FOR OTHER REASONS THEY DECIDED TO DO SO, WHETHER OR NOT THEY HAD OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION THERE.
+
13.
SECRET
+
·
3.
THE APPOINTMENT OF A GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE ON ACCEPTABLE WHO WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE FOR US OF MARKING OFFICIALLY
THE CHINESE COVERNMENT'S ACQUIESCENCE IN THE STATUS QUO IN
LONG KONG.
IF WE WERE TO REJECT OUT OF HAND WHAT ON THE FACE OF IT SEEMED A NOT UNREASONABLE PROPOSAL (AND EQUALLY IF WE STALLED INDEFINITELY ON IT) THE EFFECT ON SIMO/BRITISH RELATIONS
GENERALLY WOULD BE BAD.
OF HONG KONG REQUIRED IT.
L
THAT COULD DE ENDURED IF THE INTERESTS
BUT CHINESE DISSATISFACTION MIGHT
BE TAKEN OUT ON THE ADMINISTRATION IN HONG KONG IN THE FIRST
PLACE, THAT IS A CONSEQUENCE WHICH WE SHOULD HAVE TO FACE.
5. I FEEL THAT THIS AWKWARD REQUEST PUTS US AT AN IMPORTANT CROSSROAD. IN ONE DIRECTION WE CAN TRY TO MOVE WITH CHINESE GOODWILL TOWARDS THE CHANGES IN HONG KONG WHICH WILL BE REQUIRED
AS THE END OF THE LEASE DRAWS NEAR AND THUS BE ABLE TO
SAFEGUARD MANY OF THE ESSENTIALS OF OUR POSITION THERE.
IN THE OTHER DIRECTION WE MAY DRIFT INTO A SITUATION OF INCREASING CONFRONTATION AND BY REFUSING A CONCESSION NOW MAY LOSE THE
GREATER PART OF OUR STAKE.
6. THE NEXT MOVE IS UP TO THE CHINESE. WE SHALL HAVE TO SEE
YOW THEY FRAME THEIR PROPOSAL AND WHAT FUNCTIONS THEY HAVE IN MIND TO SUGGEST. I HOPE THAT WE CAN CONSIDER CAREFULLY WHETHER
IT CONTAINS THE ELEMENTS OF A NEGOTIABLE ARRANGEMENT. WE MIGHT FOR EXAMPLE BE ABLE TO TAKE THE LINE IN GUR REPLY THAT THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT ARE CONTENT WITH PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS BUT WOULD BE WILLING TO FORMALISE THE EXISTING SEMI OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION AS PART OF THE PROCESS OF NORMALISATION. THEY WOULD, HOWEVER, HAVE TO BE SURE THAT THE CHANGE WOULD NOT LPSET THE EXISTING SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS OR INTRODUCE NEW COMPLICATIONS, AND WE WOULD HAVE TO HAVE FIRM ASSURANCES THAT THERE WOULD BE NO DANGER OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE BEING REGARDED AS A RIVAL AUTHORITY TO THE ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENT.
SECRET
+
17.
F IT WERE ARGUED THAT WHILE WE MIGHT GET SATISFACTORY ..SSURANCES NOW THESE WOULD DE WORTHLESS IF THERE WERE A CHANGE OF REGIME IN CHINA, OR IF THERE WERE ANOTHER CULTURAL REVOLUTION, I WOULD REPLY THAT IN THAT EVENTTHERE WOULD BE
A THREAT TO HONG KONG IN ANY CASE WHETHER OR KOT THERE WAS AN OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE THERE. ·
ADDIS
/REPEATED AS REWESTED//COPIES SENT TO PRIVATE SEG ROTARY
"NO. 10 DOWNING ET & TO SIR P
ADAMS, CABINET OFFICE/
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
FED
PROT & CONF D
AD
NAM.D.
POD
PSD
CONS D
IRD NEWS D
+
+
-3-
SECRET
+
+
1
J
CYPHER CAT. A
ING 280530Z
CUMFIDENTIAL
TO PRIORITY F C O TELEGRAM NO. 245 OF 28 MARCH INFO ROUTINE
HONG KONG AND WASHINGTON.
CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG,
DURING A DISCUSSION ON 27 MARCH ON THE DEVELOPMENT
OF SINO-BRITISH RELATIONS, THE DIRECTOR OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN DEPARTMENT REMINDED PE THAT PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI HAD RAISED THE QUESTION OF CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG WITH NDENSON IN MARCH LAST YEAR. HE SAID THAT THERE WERE MANY
QUESTIONS AFFECTING RELATIONS PETWEEN HONG KONG AND CHINA,
A
COPE OF WHICH WERE DEALT WITH BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WHILE OTHERS VERE HANDLED BY THE PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES IN CANTON. THIS
-
-+ | OF AFFAIRS WAS HOT CONVENIENT, THE PREMIER HAD ASKED WAITHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO SEND AN OFFICIAL CHINESE
| REPRESENTATIVE TO HONG KONG. WHAT WAS THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S
REACTION TO THE PREMIER'S PROPOSAL?. I REPLIED THAT I WOULD REPORT WHAT HE HAD SAID AND ENQUIRE. CHANG SAID THAT THIS WAS
OLD QUESTION BUT IT WAS NOW A MATTER TO BE TAKEN UP IN THE LIGHT OF OUR NEW RELATIONS. I ASKED CHANG WHAT FURCTIONS HE
:SAGED SUCH AN OFFICIAL HAVING, HE SAID THAT HIS RECOLLECTION WAS THAT THE ORIGINAL PROPOSAL HAD BEEN FOR THE CHINESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO HONG
AMS. HE WOULD HAVE TO FIND OUT EXACTLY WHAT FUNCTIONS WERE CNVISAGED..
ADDIS
11
#
MA
HKD
AM D
PS 10 FUS MIR VILJORD
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
CONFIDENTE.
P
-
風
Hervey
SECRET
Reference 113
Gj
My Evans
prchummary
ü
moiste
to see
these
verly
notes. The historical background
falling into place, but of with require
considerably more fitting together.
copies of the
mool mpstart popus
1
Quem
hawry
可如
taken which I
propose
пробе
to subtrant with
a exvering
mante. Some
Me are
still missing
and I have arkered
Deserttiden
them from Library Reference Room.
the 1956/57 pps show that:
Chargé
(c) the views of the then charge d'Afferen
The Add.
closely accorded with those I th
3) the views of the Governor were
strongly against.
(c) we headed not to reply to the Chinese an
without saying the best methird of refuring
10.
4) Chan En lai made the matter public in
Aar
interview subsequently carried by the "Daily Heralda"?
All there points are
exercise
M
and
certainly relevant to the current will have to properly taken into account.
Evans.
13/4
1
поре you
Invit
find
ме
Done
very good
2.
A+
regards
d. Hined
my
росре
Fuse 1
James has preciaciony job
que at in
ने
persmon
Так
1
ს.
тита would
DO M4639 140609 5000 771 GM 3643;
в
Те
followrig
and
бедна
а
с картониту
from
Ow
Спі люди
Ноу Когда
выйт
Consul - General
6)
верненадат не
1
Chriese
MFA
り
special
- бресов вернявате, у
ак
MFA wt HK.
а)
Representative of
The
CPR
the "
е)
бресет верни добие
Верхнедобие
те
CPR.
й
AK.
C.PR
Декадате 1
й
АК
Commissiones
НК
Chinese
ртретис
1
CRR
ал
likely
reverse
3
to
отде
ступает
have
4.
ијен
We
у мен
дистидин
слу
76)
'S
geen strongly
shol
q
ской
те
The
second holy of
i Jones Notes.
1 "good
behaving"
China
дет об от
morandum
H
стане, ѝ асу
repre semmature;
inose
ie RD.
1
X
1314
4
3/56
メ
RESTRICTED
BRITISH EMBASSY
FERING
26 April 1972
3-
Ext
33
Sec
+
E Evans Esq
Far Eastern Dept
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
London SW 1
Straw Richard,
Teim To Peking
Thi. He way to 515
Davies Erier.
CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATI N IN HONG KONG
R.E
575
1. When raising the question of Chinese representation in Hong Kong with the Ambassador last month Chang Wen-chin referred to it as an "old question". Those of us who have dealt with the question previously recollect something of its history and indeed the Ambassador himself has a recollection of its going back to Nationalist days. But we can find very little detail on file here.
2.
cince the question is clearly going to continue to raise its head from time to time we should like to be better primed on the background. Have you anything on file which you could copy to us, summarising the histories both of this problem and of the related question of China's view of the status of
Long Kong? If not, would it be possible for somebody in Research Department to prepare a background paper covering both subjects?
Your Eve
Mulo2l.
E r fiorgan
cc AF Maddocks Esq
Hong Kong
RESTRICTED
PRIORITY
CYPHER CAT A
RECEIVED IN -
REGISTRY ilo. 52
SECRET
TOP COPY
FM PEKING 850739Z
- 5 MAY 1972
SECRET
TEH 3
TO PRIORITY FCO TELEGRAM NO 401 OF 5 MAY INFO ROUTINE HONG KONG
PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR).
MY TELNO 28 TO HONG KONG: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG. 1. AT THE END OF MY MEETING WITH DIRECTOR OF WEST EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN DEPARTMENT, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, YESTERDAY, AFTER I HAD GONE THROUGH MY LIST OF POINTS TO PE RAISED, CHANG WEN-CHIN TURNED TO THE QUESTION OF CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG. HE DID THIS IN A RELAXED WAY WITHOUT CHANGING THE MOOD OF FRIENDLY AND COOPERATIVE DISCUSSION WITH WHICH WE HAD DEALT WITH THE PREVIOUS POINTS. THERE WAS NO HINT IN HIS MANNER THAT THIS COULD BE A DIFFICULT OR CONTENTIOUS ISSUE BETWEEN US. 2. HE SAID THAT AT OUR LAST MEETING HE HAD MENTIONED THAT
IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THE HANDLING OF QUESTIONS CONCERNING HONG KONG AND OF RELATIONS BETWEEN HONG KONG AND CHINA'' THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WOULD LIKE TO SEND A SPECIAL COMMISSIONER** TO HONG KONG. I HAD ASKED WHAT FUNCTIONS THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HAD IN MIND FOR SUCH AN OFFICIAL. HE HAD NOW LOOKED UP OLD FILES AND FOUND THAT IN FEBRUARY 1956 THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD MADE CONCRETE PROPOSALS ON THIS QUESTION. THE STATUS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE PROPOSED OFFICE WERE EXPLAINED QUITE CLEARLY IN THESE PROPOSALS. IN 1958 THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE
HAD REPLIED THAT IN THEIR VIEW THE ATMOSPHERE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WAS NOT RIGHT FOR SUCH A PROPOSAL. THE MATTER HAD THEREFORE BEEN SUSPENDED. THE SITUATION NOW WAS OF COURSE VERY DIFFERENT FROM THAT IN 1958. MOREOVER BEFORE 1949 DURING THE TIME OF THE KUOMINTANG GOVERNMENT, THERE HAD BEEN CHINESE DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG, IT WAS ONLY AFTER 1949 THAT IT HAD BEEN DISCONTINUED. PAST EXPERIENCE HAD THEREFORE SHOWN THAT THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH AN ORGAN OF REPRESENTATION** WAS TO THE BENIFIT OF BOTH SIDES, AND THAT THERE WAS A REAL NEED FOR SUCH A PRESENCE. HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER I WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE DETAILS OF THE 1956 PROPOSAL.
**
SECRET
✅HE HOPED
T
SECRET
HE HOPED THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD CONSIDER IT AGAIN.
I SAID THAT I WOULD HAVE TO FIND OUT ABOUT THIS PROPOSAL FROM LONDON AND WE COULD THEN DISCUSS IT IN MORE DETAIL AT A LATER DATE. WAS THE CHINESE VIEW THAT THE PROPOSAL MADE BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT IN 1956 SHOULD, IN BROAD ESSENTIALS, BE MADE AGAIN HOW? CHANG REPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE PROPOSAL MADE THEN WAS A CONSIDERED ONE THE IDEA WAS ONE WHICH OUGHT TO BE CONSIDERED. SINCE THE MATTER HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED IN DETAIL IN THE PAST HE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT THOUGHT APOUT
IT NOW. BASICALLY SPEAKING THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WISHED FOR SOME KIND OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
I REPLIED THAT I THOUGHT IT BETTER THAT I SHOULD NOT MAKE ANY COMMENT AT THIS STAGE UNTIL I HAD LOOKED UP THE 1956 PROPOSAL. WE COULD THEN MEET AGAIN AND HAVE ANOTHER DISCUSSION. WHAT
WE BOTH WANTED WAS AN ARRANGEMENT TO SUIT BOTH SIDES. CHANG AGREED AND SAID THAT AFTER I HAD STUDIED THE PROPOSAL WE COULD MEET AGAIN AND CONTINUE OUR DISCUSSION ON THE SAME EXPLORATORY BASIS AS BEFORE, WITHOUT COMMITMENT TO EITHER SIDE.
ADDIS
FILES
FED
[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING ST]
H K D
NORTH AMER DEPT
PRIVATE SECRETARY
PS/MR ROYLE
MR WILFORD
SIR L MONSON
-2-
SECRET
COPIES TO
SIR P ADAMS, CABINET OFFICE
PRIORITY
CYPHER CAT A
RESTRICTED R-CEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 52
PEKING 650645Z
- 5 MAY 1972
RESTRICTED
Fest 3 Sri!
TOE F
TO PRIORITY FCO TELEGRAM NO 399 OF 5 MAY INFO ROUTINE GOVERNOR HONG KONG (FOR BCARFE) DTI ( FOR CRE4 AND WATTS AIR 1(1) B). MY TELEGRAMS NOS 240 AND 243 (NOT TO ALL):
HONG KONG
1.
COMMUNICATIONS WITH
WHEN I CALLED ON THE DIRECTOR OF WEST EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN DEPARTMENT, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, YESTERDAY CHANG REFERRED WITHOUT PROMPTING TO OUR EARLIER DISCUSSION OF THE NEED FOR CIVIL AIR LINKS, TELECOMUNICATIONS, AND IMPROVEMENT CF EXISTING LAND COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN HONG YONG AND CANTON, HE SAID THAT THESE WERE UNDER CONSIDERATION BY THE CHINESE GOV- ERNMENT. THERE HAD BEEN A GREAT INCREASE OF TRAFFIC ON THE HONG KONG -CANTON ROUTE. THE NEED TO IMPROVE COMMUNICATIONS WAS THEREFORE IMPORTANT TO BOTH SIDES.
2. I MENTIONED THE QUESTION OF A HONG KONG/CANTON AIR SHUTTLE SERVICE AGAIN AT A SUBSEQUENT COURTESY CALL ON MA JEN-HUI, DEPUTY DIPECTOR OF THE CIVIL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION OF CHINA ( SFE MIFT). HE DID NOT REFER TO THIS IN HIS REPLY, BUT WAS CAREFUL NOT TO RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY
OF EXTENDING BOAC'S HONG KONG SERVICES TO PEKING.
ADDIS
FILES
FED
AND
HKD COMS D MR WILFORD HR TURPIN
/REPENTED AS REQUESTED/
COPIES SENT TO MEI/
RESTRICTED
28
L
SECRET
♫ M Addis Esq CMG PEKING
3 May 1972
سیا
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
1. You may find it useful to have a copy of a memorandum which we have prepared in the Department on the history of this problem.
2. I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to Arthur Maddocks. I hope that he will correct us if he spots any errors of fact. Are we right in saying that the Chinese did not mention the subject between 1958 and 1971?
Eno 1
SECRET
RH Evans
Far Eastern Department
SECRET
26
AB
MO
C
F
E
21
721
Mr ford
Mr Loganj
Private Secretary
Mr. Royle
thinks that the
last two sentences of the fine! deflinbatten paroprepḥ of peo Рафис орно one of ose in view of les last sentence of re
Itime to
draft letter
مها
paragraph and
would prefa finet key show be
omitted.
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
1.
Lord Bridges wrote to the Private Secretary on 27 April enquiring, in relation to Hong Kong telegram No 31 to Peking, how this problem had arisen in its current form and asking about our present view of the Chinese request.
0.60-3/5
2. The Secretary of State minuted on Hong Kong telegram No 31: "I agree with the Governor". Mr Royle commented: "I wholeheartedly agree with Sir Murray MacLehose's wise advice".
3. We are now waiting for the Chinese to define the functions they would like an official Chinese representative in Hong Kong to have. When they do, which will no doubt be before long, we shall have to give the most careful consideration to the terms of our response. In doing this 23 we shall give full weight to Sir Murray MacLehose's views.
Mr Addis has indicated (Peking telegram No 28 to Hong Kong) that he is content to rest on the arguments he set out in Peking telegram No 251 until we see how the Chinese frame their proposal.
4.
5.
I submit a draft reply to Lord Bridges's letter.
Hong Kong Department concur.
1 May 1972
cc Mr Laird
रिल
R.M. Erans
RM Evans
Far Eastern Department
سبا
wilfro
21v.
SECRET
PRIME
+
MINISTER
COR
ام.
HK Dept for adricepil.
u
FEAT
of Wilford
Patrick,
реть
Dear Patrick, 174
25
10 Downing Street Whitehall
27 April 1972
chinese went tic in Hong Kong
The Prime Minister has seen the recomendations made by Sir M. Maclehose in Hong Kong telegram No. 31 to Peking, on this subject.
The full background is not known to lir. Heath but he has commented that on the face of it, he is inclined to agree with the Governor's argument. As the Prime Minister has not recently considered this question, I should be grateful if the Department could explain how it has arisen in its current form, and what view is at present taken of the requests made by the Chinese
overnment.
3
your ere
Tom Bridges
P.H. Grattan, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
GEORET
olemonts, and tho Kowloon Walled City.
3. Cantnata between lene Kons and Chian
(a) Status of China's Rarquemntation in the Colony
!
My Chou In-lai hinted during his mooting with ir Penson on
2 March that the Chinose would like como fora of official
ropresentation in the Colony. Phoro have been one or two
oubsequent indications confirming thio. It has not been mentiunod
at any otago in our negotiations for the oxaliango of Ambassadore.
It would bo vory difficult for us to accopt. It would give tho
Chinese enhacod status and increased opportunities to exert
in?lucnco in tho affairs of the Colony. It to in our interact
to continue to use the presont channels for communication with
the Chinoso authorition Whose aro, for cortain local matters,
botwoan the Tolitical Advisor and the low China Nowa Agoney in
Hong Kong, and, for other questiono, botwoon Mr Donson und tho
Ministry of Foreign Afiniro in Poking. Wo should avoid tho ung
of indirect channole, since they involve the risk of distortion
and indisèretion. Wormal communicationo botwoon the rolitical Advisor and How China Fowa Agonoy ave writton or telephonio. the past there have been mootings on noutral cround, or in o
recoption zoon in the Coverament off100s. Rocently howevor tho Folitical Advisor recoivod the Now China Newa Agoncy representativo, at tho laŝtor'a request, in hie offic0,
(b) Confxantation Driponera
From the point of view of Sino-Britioh relations our aim is to romove this irritant as coon as possible,
In
Mio Chinone havo pado
it oloar that the quastion roaning a matter of major dundera, Thoy havo howover not mačo the relonse of the rounining prisonera a condition in the negotiations for an oxchange of Ambassadors.
-2. KEANIN
!
↓
:
:
i
I
1
¦
¦
J
+
|
loss of face are minimised consistent with the security
of the Colony.
7. I deal below briefly with the principal subjects which
have been brought to my attention during this period of
briefing.
8.
Chinese Representation in Hong Kong
Unless and until we are prepared to contemplate
changing the status of Hong Kong, the golden rule should
be to have the minimum of contact with the Chinese about
it which necessity requires.
9.
10.
Necessity requires:
(a)
arrangements about the practical local things
listed in Mr Wilford's minute. These are all
handled locally through tolerably well-established,
if diverse, channels. In so far as these channele
from time to time do not cope with specific problems,
it is usually the problems or the prevailing
Chinese mood which causes the trouble rather than
the channel. 80 far as I am aware, the Chinese
have never complained that their interests suffer
from the channels they are obliged to use;
(b) contacts with the Chinese Mission in London and
with the MFA in Peking about matters of principle
and policy or about local matters which local
Hong Kong channels are unable to deal with for
one reason or another.
This balancing of contacts between semi- or unofficial
/tuveaux
3.
CONFIDENTIAL
i
1
F
|
tuveaux in Hong Kong and official exchanges in London
and Peking is the traditional method. To work this system
most arrangements must be dealt with on the local Hong
Hong neta, both because this is common-sense, and because
otherwise our exchanges with the Chinese in London and
Peking would become over-loaded with Hong Kong affairs and
the latter would become too vulnerable to ephemeral
political pressures in China.
But
11.
The system just works enough to be supportable.
it does look very odd indeed, and it is hard to justify
logically our refusal to recognise an official Chinese
Representative in Hong Kong through whose office all this
business could pase. Particularly since in practice most
business already is conducted by offices in the Bank of
China building under the overall direction of Leung Wai-lam,
the holder of a diplomatic passport. I do, however, agree
with Mr Morgan that this is something which we must resist.
12. A Chinese Representative in Hong Kong night just be
acceptable if the relationship between Hong Kong and China
was defined and agreed. But without this there can be
no limit to what he could dlaim as his legitimate sphere of
activity, or to what his objections might be, or to what
Communiste would expect of him. It would be intolerable
for a Chinese Representative in Hong Kong to adopt a low
posture and, in any case, the Communist cadres would not
/allow
4.
CONFIDENTIAL
[
Γ
!
On the other hand, if he adopted a
allow him to do so. On the other hand
high posture he would amount to an alternative governor
and sooner or later a trial of strength would `occur.
Incidentally he would be a sitting duck for any agent
provocateur with a gun or bomb.
13. So far the Chinese Government has never pressed for
an official representative though they have made
occasional references to the possibility.
The last one,
by Chou En-lai, in March, was typical. He did not ask
for an official representative in Hong Kong but in an
exchange about Taiwan said it was illogical for us to
maintain the Consulate in Tamsul when the Chinese did
not have a Representative in Hong Kong, But the local
Communists in Hong Kong have been encouraged to claim
in private that representation is now a major Chinese
objective.
14. For my part, I think it arguable that Peking i8
fully aware of the situation described in paragraph 8,
and will not push a demand for Representation to the
limit unless and until a decision has been taken gradually
to change the status of the Colony. In this case official
representation would be a logical first step.
15. So I think that so long as we see no advantage in
negotiating about the future of the Colony, we must stick
to the present system of contacts and communications and
/stand
5. CONFIDENTIAL
+
stand firm againet, or better still ignore, any half-
hearted moves by the Chinese to alter it. If the Chinese
started to press really hard we would have to reconsider
in the light of what we believed the implications of the
pressure were.
16. I have asked the Political Adviser in Hong Kong to be
ready to advise me, on my arrival, whether there is some
L
small gesture I could make to Leung Wai-lam, the Head of
NCNA, which would be seen as a concession but would not
advance his position to an extent that would alarm the
Hong Kong establishment. Unfortunately, he has the reputa-
tion of being an implacable enemy of the Hong Kong
Government and I fear that little would be gained, and
much might be lost, by opening up a personal if unofficial
dialogue with him.
Confrontation prisoners
17. Chou En-lai has picked this out as the major item of
interest to him in Hong Kong at present. In view of the
numbers released since he spoke to Mr Denson for the time
being we can point to a generous response.
But it appears
from Sir Hugh Norman-Walker's letter of 13 September that
no further releases are likely in 1972 under present criteria
or procedures. My present inclination is not to accept
this, as failure to maintain momentum on this issue might
prejudice my entire governorship with Peking with all that
this would imply.
18.
I realise the delicacy of this issue, particularly vis-
/a-vie
6. CONFIDENTIAL
יו
L
CYPHER CAT, A
FM PEKING 287653Z
SECRET
SECRET
TO ROUTINE HONG KONG (PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR) TELEGRAM NO. 26 CF 28 APRIL INFO F C G.
YOUR TEL NO.31:
1.
THANK YOU.
THE HAND WHEN THE
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
THIS WILL HELP YE I THIS WILL HELP YE IN KNOWING HOW TO PLAY
CHINESE REVERT TO THE SUBJECT,
"NOT OF COURSE REVIVE IT MYSELF.
I SHALL
2. OUR DIFFERENCE IS NOT OVER AIM BUT OVER ASSESSMENT AND YETHOD. THUS I WOULD ARGUE DIFFERENTLY ON SOME OF THE POINTS
IN YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. PUT FOR THE TIME BEING
I AM CONTENT TO REST ON THE STATEMENT OF THE CASE IN MY TEL
NO. 251 TO F CO WE CAN DISCUSS FURTHER WHEN WE SEE HOW
THE CHINESE PUT THEIR PROPOSAL. MY MAIN FEAR IS THAT
FY TRYING TO SIT TIGHT' WE MAY GET CURSELVES INTO AN IMPASSE
WHICH WE COULD AVOID BY MAKING TIMELY ADJUSTMENTS TO MEET
AN EVOLVING SITUATION.
ADDIS
/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/ /COPIES SENT TO XO 10 DOWNING STREET/
FILES
FED
FAD
X AM D
PS
PS TO MR ROYLE
MR WILFORD
COPIES TO
SIR P ADAMS
CABINET OFFICE
4
Mr. Evans (FED)
SECRET
1.
Mr. Royle has seen Hong Kong telegram No. 31 to Peking about Chinese representation in Hong Kong and has commented:-
"I wholeheartedly agree with Sir M. MacLehose's wise advice."
Copied to: Sir L. Monson
Mr. Wilford
Mr. Laird
Mail Voral
M. F. Forrester 26 April, 1972
SECRET
231
24
1
SECRET
YEHER CAT.
FM PEKING 297653Z
SECRET
RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 52
- 1 MAY 1972
FEH 3/301/2
TO ROUTINE HONG KONG
(PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR) TELEGRAM NO. 28
CF 23 APRIL INFO F C C.
a) YOUR TEL 0.31:
Q
1.
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
THANK YOU. THIS WILL HELP YE IN KNOWING HOW TO PLAY THE HAND WHEN THE CHINESE REVERT TO THE SUBJECT, I SHALL NOT OF COURSE REVIVE IT MYSELF.
2. OUR DIFFERENCE IS NOT OVER AIM BUT OVER ASSESSMENT AND
METHOD. THUS I WOULD ARGUE DIFFERENTLY ON SOME OF THE POINTS
IN YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. BUT FOR THE TIME BEING
| AP CONTENT TO REST ON THE STATEMENT OF THE CASE IN MY TEL
NO. 251 TO F CO. WE CAN DISCUSS FURTHER WHEN WE SEE HOW
THE CHINESE PUT THEIR PROPOSAL. MY MAIN FEAR IS THAT
J
EY TRYING TO SIT TIGHT' WE MAY GET OURSELVES INTO AN IMPASSE
WHICH WE COULD AVOID BY MAKING TIMELY ADJUSTMENTS TO MEET
AN EVOLVING SITUATION.
ADDIS
/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/
/COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET/
FILES
FED
HKD
NAM D
PS
PS TO MR ROYLE
MR WILFORD
:
FFFFF
COPIES TO SIR P ADAMS
CABINET OFFICE
SECRET
63
+
L
MR RØYLE
SECRET
To su telur wedd
2
MiHeyes
не четны
Enie.
R.E. 15.
Following our talk yesterday morning I attach a draft telegram to the Governor of Hong Kong. I have discussed it with Mr Wilford and taken into account our telegram to Peking
No. 271 which I had not seen at the time of our discussion.
Ламбрин
(L Monson)
28 April 1972
Copy to: Mr. Wilford
SECRET
мигам
My Revans
22
cb
PRIORITY
CYPHER/CAT A
FM F C O 2812257
SECRET AND PERSONAL
SECRET
RELAND: IN
R.GETRY No.50
- 1 bal 1972
FEH 3/301/2
(FE)
TO PRIORITY GOVERNOR HONG KONG TELKO 330 OF 28 APRIL.
FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR FROM HR ROYLE.
21) YOUR TELEGRAM TO PEKING NO 31: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
1. LESLIE MONSON HAS TOLD ME OF HIS TALK WITH YOU AND YOUR ADVISERS AND I AM GRATEFUL FOR THE FURTHER ANALYSIS SET OUR 1
YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE,
7. I SHOULD LIKE YOU TO KNOW THAT BOTH THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND HYSELF FULLY SHARE YOUR VIEW OF THE POSITION THOUGH AS YOU WILL APPRECIATE WE MUST AWAIT AUY FURTHER COMMENT FROM ADDIS BEFORE WE FORMALLY GIVE OUR POLICY DECISION. THEREAFTER WE MUST ALL STICK FIRMLY TO THE LINE, INCLUDING OF COURSE MYSELF IN PEKING.
3. AN AT PRESENT EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF TRAVELLING TO PEKING BY RAF COHET BUT THIS IS SUBJECT TO FINAL AGREEMENT HERE AND FROM PEKING. I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU THINK IT GENERALLY UNDESIRABLE FOR A MINISTER TO GO INTO CHINA VIA HONG KONG BUT WOULD YOU SEE OBJECTION TO MY RETURNING FROM CHINA VIA HONG KONG? I WOULD ONLY STOP FOR A SHORT TIME IN HONG KONG BUT I WOULD MUCH LIKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS MY VISIT TO PEKING. I SHOULD HAVE TO HOLD A PRESS COMFERENCE IN HONG KONG OF COURSE BUT I THINK THAT THIS MIGHT BE USEFUL AND I WOULD DISCUSS IT WITH YOU BEFORE HAND,
4. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD LET ME KNOW IF YOU THINK THIS 1 DEA MAKES SENSE,
DOUGLAS-HOME
PILES
FED
HKD
PS
PS TO MR ROYLE
SIR L MONSON
MR WILFORD
FFFFF
SECRET
IMMEDIATE
CYPHER/CAT A
+
REGLED IN
REGISTRY No. 52
TUP COPY
FM HONG KONG 260635Z
26 APR 1972
که
باران
SECRET
TO IMMEDIATE PEKING TELEGRAM NUMBER 31 OF 26 APRIL 1972. INFO
ROUTINE F C 0.
PEKING TELEGRAM NUMBER 251 TO FC0.
J
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG,
OUR CURRENT ANALYSIS WAS OUTLINED TO SIR LESLIE MONSON, I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THIS WITH YOUDE NEXT WEEK-END, AND HOPE YOU WILL DEVELOP YOUR OWN THESIS TO HIM. THE FOLLOWING STATES MY OWN, AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION. I APOLOGISE FOR LENGTH, BUT THERE IS NO TIME FOR A DESPATCH.
2. MY VIEW STILL IS AS SET OUT IN THE GUIDELINES AGREED WITH THE FCO BEFORE MY DEPARTURE. LOCAL ADVICE CONFIRMS THE PROBLEMS THEREIN FORESEEN IN SUCH AN APPOINTMENT, AND THE LIKELIHOOD OR EVEN INEVITABILITY OF THEIR LEADING TO A CONFRONTATION WITH THE CPG RATHER THAN TO EASIER RELATIONS, UNLESS OF COURSE WE CONCEDE A MACAU-LIKE SITUATION.
3. COMING AFTER THE ROUND OF SUCCESSES OF THE CPG AS SEEN BY THE PUBLIC HERE (UN, NIXON, BRITISH CONCESSION ON TAIWAN) AND CHINA'S LETTER TO THE COMMITTEE OF 24, THEY WOULD CONCLUDE THAT THE EAST WIND PREVAILED AND THE DAYS OF BRITISH CONTROL HERE WERE NUMBERED AND ADJUST ACCORDINGLY. FEAR THEREFORE THAT SUCH A TRANSITION WOULD CREATE MORE RATHER THAN LESS APPREHENSION AT THIS POINT IN TIME. (PARA 2 OF YOUR TEL)
/4. MY
SECRET
SECRET
MY ADVISERS NATURALLY VIEW THIS PROPOSAL AGAINST THE
BACKGROUND:
A)
B)
5.
THAT WE CAN SEE NORACTICAL REQUIREMENT FOR IT (AND YOU WILL NOTE IT WAS PUT FORWARD ON PRACTICAL GROUNDS). IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER THE CPG IS NOT UNDER BUT OVER REPRESENTED HERE. ALREADY. OF THE 25 MEMBERS OF THE CPG WORKING COMMITTEE THAT CONTROLS CPG ORGANISATIONS HERE UNDER THE PRESIDENCY OF LEUNG WAI LAM, DIRECTOR OF THE NONA, ALL ARE SPECIALLY SENT FROM CHINA AS ARE 50% OF THE 160 SENIOR OFFICIALS WHO WORK TO THIS COMMITTEE. THE LATTER ARE SUPPORTED BY A LEGION OF SMALL FRY. THIS IS A FAR LARGER SET-UP THAN WE NOW HAVE IN WASHINGTON. THE ADVANTAGE PROPOSED WOULD THEREFORE BE CONFINED TO POLITICAL STATUS AND INFLUENCE.
CURRENT CHINESE POLICY TO HONGKONG,
THIS IS TO RETAIN FOR THE CPG FOR THE TIME BEING THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BENEFITS OF CONTINUED BRITISH STATUS WHILE WORKING TO ESTABLISH EFFECTIVE CPG CONTROL IN ALL FIELDS AS ACHIEVED IN MACAU BY THE RIOTS OF $67. OF SUCH A POLICY THERE IS AMPLE PROOF AS YOU KNOW. THIS POLICY HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULLY CONTAINED BECAUSE OF THE PUBLIC'S BELIEF THAT GOVERNMENT WOULD STAND FIRM AGAINST ENCROACHMENT. HENCE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PROPOSED APPOINTMENT WHICH WOULD LOOK TO THE PUBLIC LIKE A TURNING POINT, AND WOULD BE SO INTERPRETED BY COMMUNIST ORGANIS AND CADRES.
YOU ENVISAGE AN AGREEMENT WITH THE CHINESE TO LIMIT THE FUNCTIONS OF SUCH AN APPOINTEE. BUT I THINK SUCH AN AGREEMENT, EVEN IF ACHIEVED, WOULD BE MEANINGLESS. EACH SIDE WOULD READ A QUIET DIFFERENT SENSE INTO IT. MOREOVER WITH THE BEST WILL IN THE WORLD THE REPRESENTATIVE'S POSITION WOULD BE HOPELESS IF NOT SHOT BY A KUOMINTANG AGENT PROVOCATEUR, HE WOULD BE HEMMED IN BETWEEN HIS INSTRUCTIONS FROM PEKING, WHATEVER THEY WERE, THE EXPECTATIONS AND CRITICISMS OF LOCAL CADRES, THE REQUESTS . FOR INTERVENTION BY ANYONE WHO DID NOT EGET WHAT HE WANTED FROM ME, AND THE HIGHLY COLOURED BLOW BY BLOW ACCOUNT OF HIS ACTIONS AND OBITER DICTA BY THE LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIA.
-2-
SECRET
/6. ALL
SECRET
ALL THIS IS OF COURSE THE ORTHODOX PRE-EXCHANGE-OF-AMBASSADORS VIEW. THE QUESTION ARISES WHETHER THE LATTER HAS CREATED A NEW SITUATION IN WHICH CHINESE POLICY HAS CHANGED AND THE OLD
FEARS ARE UNREAL. MY COMMENTS ON THIS ARE:
A)
B}
1)
THE CASE REMAINS TO BE PROVED.
THE RELEASE OF MRS. YANG IS SCARCELY RELEVANT, AND THE FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF CHANG WEN-CHIN ON SUCH THINGS AS THE CANTON AIR LINK MAY BE RATIONAL (BECAUSE IT IS VERY MUCH TO CRINA'S ADVANTAGE) BUT DOES NOT TAKE US VERY FAR. NOR DOES THE MUCH PLEASANTER ATMOSPHERE IN PEKING.
RECENT HISTORY IS NOT REASSURING.
E.G.
THE WAY IN WHICH THE CPG STEADILY RAISED THEIR DEMANDS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS:
THE WAY CHOU EN-LAI'S ORIGINAL REMARKS TO DENSON WERE TWISTED BY CHANG WEN-CHIN (YOUR TEL 245) AS A LEAD-IN ON REPRESENTATION : ITI) THE WAY THE HALF ASSURANCES GIVEN BY CHOU EN-LA! ON HONG KONG
TO MALCOLM MACDONALD HAVE BEEN FOLLOWED, IMMEDIATELY WE HAD GIVEN THE CPG WHAT THEY WANTED, BY THESE PROBES ON HONG KONG.
C) THE YEARS OF THE PRESENT LEADERS ARE NUMBERED AND WHAT AND WHO
WILL FOLLOW THEM WE DO NOT KNOW. THIS IS THEREFORE A TIME TO SIT TIGHT ON ANYTHING AFFECTING HONG KONG'S LONG-TERM FUTURE.
7.
IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT CPG OFFICIALS IN PEKING AND LONDON
SHOULD NOW BE TRYING TO SEE WHETHER THERE ARE ANY QUICK
POLITICAL TRICKS TO TAKE ON HONG KONG, BUT AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND
THE CASE FOR GIVING THEM REMAINS TO BE PROVED. I SUGGEST OUR IMMEDIATE OBJECT IN HONG KONG/CHINESE RELATIONS SHOULD BE
IMPROVEMENT IN PRACTICAL, NON-POLITICAL THINGS WHOSE RESULTS AND BALANCE OF ADVANTAGE CAN BE CLEARLY ASSESSED. HENCE, FOR INSTANCE, MY PROPOSAL FOR A DIRECT HONG KONG/CANTON AIR LINK.
-3- SECRET
/8. SINCE
SECRET
3. SINCE I THINK THAT THE APPOINTMENT PROPOSED IS LIKELY TO EXACER BATE RATHER THAN IMPORVE RELATIONS I AM NOT DETERRED BY THE ARGUMENT
THAT IT WILL ONLY BE THE WORSE FOR HONG KONG LATER IF WE RESIST NOW (SEE ALSO PARA 6 (C) ABOVE). ON THE CONTRARY I THINK THAT THE CHINESE ARE UNLIKELY TO PRESS THIS PROPOSAL TO THE LIMIT,,
AND THAT PROVIDED WE STEER THEM OFF QUICKLY AND FIRMLY THEY ARE
LIKELY TO CONFINE THEMSELVES TO GRUMBLES. BUT THERE COULD BE
REAL DANGER IN ALLOWING THE PROPOSAL TO GAIN MOMENTUM.
MACLEHOSE
[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING ST AND TO
SIR P ADAMS, CABINET OFFICE]
FILES
F.E.D.
H.K.D.
NORTH AMER DEPT
PRIVATE SECRETARY
P.S./MR ROYLE
MR WILFORD
SR & Massond
L
+
-4-
SECRET
J
3
1
ᅥ
7
IMMEDIATE
I think we are all pretty well
аджет.
CYPHER/CAT A
FM HONG KONG 268635Z
SECRET
Mi
리
21
SECRET
Myselfund .! FESD.
the Govenor.
ATRE-
TO IMMEDIATE PEKING TELEGRAM NUMBER 31 OF 26 APRIL 1972. INFO
ROUTINE F C 0.
PEKING TELEGRAM NUMBER 251 TO FCO.
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
10
26/4
OUR CURRENT ANALYSIS WAS OUTLINED TO SIR LESLIE MONSON. I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THIS WITH YOUDE NEXT WEEK-END, AND HOPE YOU WILL DEVELOP YOUR OWN THESIS TO HIM. THE FOLLOWING STATES MY OWN, AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION. I APOLOGISE FOR LENGTH, BUT THERE IS NO TIME FOR A DESPATCH,
2. MY VIEW STILL IS AS SET OUT IN THE GUIDELINES AGREED WITH THE FCO BEFORE MY DEPARTURE. LOCAL ADVICE CONFIRMS THE PROBLEMS THERE IN FORESEEN IN SUCH AN APPOINTMENT, AND THE LIKELIHOOD OR EVEN INEVITABILITY OF THEIR LEADING TO A CONFRONTATION WITH THE CPG RATHER THAN TO EASIER RELATIONS, UNLESS OF COURSE WE CONCEDE A MACAU-LIKE SITUATION.
3. COMING AFTER THE ROUND OF SUCCESSES OF THE CPG AS SEEN BY THE PUBLIC HERE (UN, NIXON, BRITISH CONCESSION ON TAIWAN) AND CHINA'S LETTER TO THE COMMITTEE OF 24, THEY WOULD CONCLUDE THAT THE EAST WIND PREVAILED AND THE DAYS OF BRITISH CONTROL HERE WERE NUMBERED AND ADJUST ACCORDINGLY, I FEAR THEREFORE THAT SUCH A TRANSITION WOULD CREATE MORE RATHER THAN LESS APPREHENSION AT THIS POINT IN TIME. (PARA 2 OF YOUR TEL)
SECRET
/4. MY
SECRET
I
L
E
MY ADVISERS NATURALLY VIEW THIS PROPOSAL AGAINST THE BACKGROUND:
4.
A)
}
THAT WE CAN SEE NO ·RACTICAL REQUIREMENT FOR IT (AND YOU WILL NOTE IT WAS PUT FORWARD ON PRACTICAL GROUNDS). IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER THE CPG IS NOT UNDER BUT OVER REPRESENTED HERE. ALREADY. OF THE 25 MEMBERS OF THE CPG WORKING COMMITTEE THAT CONTROLS CPG ORGANISATIONS HERE UNDER THE PRESIDENCY OF LEUNG WAI LAM, DIRECTOR OF THE NONA, ALL ARE SPECIALLY SENT FROM CHINA AS ARE 50% OF THE 160 SENIOR OFFICIALS WHO WORK TO THIS COMMITTEE. THE LATTER ARE SUPPORTED BY A LEGION OF SMALL FRY. THIS IS A FAR LARGER SET-UP THAR WE NOW HAVE IN WASHINGTON. THE ADVANTAGE PROPOSED WOULD THEREFORE BE CONFINED TO POLITICAL STATUS AND INFLUENCE.
. B) CURRENT CHINESE POLICY TO HONGKONG.
5.
THIS IS TO RETAIN FOR THE CPG FOR THE TIME BEING THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BENEFITS OF CONTINUED BRITISH STATUS WHILE WORKING TO ESTABLISH EFFECTIVE CPG CONTROL IN ALL FIELDS AS ACHIEVED IN MACAU BY THE RIOTS OF '67. OF SUCH A POLICY THERE IS AMPLE PROOF AS YOU KNOW. THIS POLICY HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULLY CONTAINED BECAUSE OF THE PUBLIC'S BELJE THAT GOVERNMENT WOULD STAND FIRM AGAINST ENCROACHMENT. HENCE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PROPOSED APPOINTMENT WHICH WOULD LOOK TO THE PUBLIC LIKE A TURNING POINT, AND WOULD BE SO INTERPRETED BY COMMUNIST ORGANIS AND CADRES.
YOU ENVISAGE AN AGREEMENT WITH THE CHINESE TO LIMIT THE FUNCTIONS OF SUCH AN APPOINTEE. BUT I THINK SUCH AN AGREEMENT, EVEN IF ACHIEVED, WOULD BE MEANINGLESS. EACH SIDE WOULD READ A QUIET DIFFERENT SENSE INTO IT. MOREOVER WITH THE BEST WILL IN THE WORLD THE REPRESENTATIVE'S POSITION WOULD BE HOPELESS IF NOT SHOT BY A KUOMINTANG AGENT PROVOCATEUR, HE WOULD BE HEMMED IN BETWEEN HIS INSTRUCTIONS FROM PEKING, WHATEVER THEY WERE, THE EXPECTATIONS AND CRITICISMS OF LOCAL CADRES, THE REQUESTS. FOR INTERVENTION BY ANYONE WHO DID NOT EGET WHAT HE WANTED FROM ME, AND THE HIGHLY COLOURED BLOW BY BLOW ACCOUNT OF HIS ACTIONS AND OBITER DICTA BY THE LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIA.
-2-
SECRET
/6. ALL
SECRET
ALL THIS IS OF COURSE THE ORTHODOX PRE-EXCHANGE-OF-AMBASSADORS VIEW, THE QUESTION ARISES WHETHER THE LATTER HAS CREATED A NEW SITUATION IN WHICH CHINESE POLICY HAS CHANGED AND THE OLD
FEARS ARE UNREAL. MY COMMENTS ON THIS ARE:
A)
THE CASE REMAINS TO BE PROVED.
THE RELEASE OF MRS. YANG IS SCARCELY RELEVANT, AND THE FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF CHANG WEN-CHIN ON SUCH THINGS AS THE CANTON AIR LINK MAY BE RATIONAL (BECAUSE IT IS VERY MUCH TO CHINA'S ADVANTAGE) BUT DOES NOT TAKE US VERY FAR. NOR DOES THE MUCH PLEASANTER ATMOSPHERE IN PEKING. B) RECENT HISTORY IS NOT REASSURING,
E.G.
1) THE WAY IN WHICH THE CPG STEADILY RAISED THEIR DEMANDS IN
THE NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS:
II) THE WAY CHOU EN-LAI'S ORIGINAL REMARKS TO DENSON WERE TWISTED
BY CHANG WEN-CHIN (YOUR TEL 245) AS A LEAD-IN ON REPRESENTATION : 111) THE WAY THE HALF ASSURANCES GIVEN BY CHOU EN-LAI ON HONG KONG
TO MALCOLM MACDONALD HAVE BEEN FOLLOWED, IMMEDIATELY WE HAD GIVER THE CPG WHAT THEY WANTED, BY THESE PROBES ON HONG KONG.
C) THE YEARS OF THE PRESENT LEADERS ARE NUMBERED AND WHAT AND WHO
WILL FOLLOW THEM WE DO NOT KNOW. THIS IS THEREFORE A TIME TO SIT TIGHT ON ANYTHING AFFECTING HONG KONG'S LONG-TERM FUTURE.
7.
IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT CPG OFFICIALS IN PEKING AND LONDON
SHOULD NOW BE TRYING TO SEE WHETHER THERE ARE ANY QUICK POLITICAL TRICKS TO TAKE ON HONG KONG, BUT AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND THE CASE FOR GIVING THEM REMAINS TO BE PROVED. I SUGGEST
OUR IMMEDIATE OBJECT IN HONG KONG/CHINESE RELATIONS SHOULD BE IMPROVEMENT IN PRACTICAL, NON-POLITICAL THINGS WHOSE RESULTS AND BALANCE OF ADVANTAGE CAN BE CLEARLY ASSESSED, HENCE, FOR INSTANCE, MY PROPOSAL FOR A DIRECT HONG KONG/CANTON AIR LINK.
-3- SECRET
/8. SINCE
7
SECRET
8. SINCE I THINK THAT THE APPOINTMENT PROPOSED IS LIKELY TO EXACER- BATE RATHER THAN IMPORVE RELATIONS I AM NOT DETERRED BY THE ARGUMENT THAT IT WILL ONLY BE THE WORSE FOR HONG KONG LATER IF WE RESIST NOW (SEE ALSO PARA 6 (C) ABOVE). ON THE CONTRARY I THINK THAT THE CHINESE ARE UNLIKELY TO PRESS THIS PROPOSAL TO THE LIMIT, AND THAT PROVIDED WE STEER THEM OFF QUICKLY AND FIRMLY THEY ARE
LIKELY TO CONFINE THEMSELVES TO GRUMBLES, BUT THERE COULD BE
REAL DANGER IN ALLOWING THE PROPOSAL TO GAIN MOMENTUM.
MACLEHOSE
[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING ST AND TO
SIR P ADAMS, CABINET OFFICE /
FILES
F.E.D.
H.K.D.
NORTH AMER DEPT
PRIVATE SECRETARY
P.S./MR ROYLE
MR WILFORD
+
-4-
SECRET
!
SECRET
MEMORANDUM
CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
FEA 3'2!
(E)
(J)
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
1.
It
Research Department's minute of March 1956 provides a
summary which I shall not attempt to duplicate of the historical
background until the establishment of the People's Republic.
is clear that after the War and until 1949 the then Chinese
Government maintained a representative in Hong Kong, agreement
on this point having been reached in 1945. Hong Kong telegram
No 460 Saving of 1956 states that this representative held the
title of "Special Commissioner of the Chinese Ministry for
Foreign Affairs", and that he could be troublesome on occasion,
eg in interesting himself in cases of individual Chinese residents
and in claiming a position superior to that of a normal consular
officer. The man in question was concurrently "Special Delegate
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kwangtung and Kwangsi".
In this connection it is interesting that Chou En-lai claimed in
1957 that the PRC was "more moderate" than Chiang Kai-shek. Chou
claimed that when Chiang was in power in China he declared that
the Chinese Governor in Canton was also his representative for
Hong Kong This was as good as claiming that Hong Kong came
under his jurisdiction.
*
11
All we ask for is an official
representative in Hong Kong
2.
+
The matter was not apparently formally raised by the
Government of the People's Republic until 1956. It seems from
references however that Chou En-lai may have raised it informally
SECRET
/on a number
SECRET
(N)
B
12
on a number of previous occasions, in particular during his
discussions with the Governor of Hong Kong during the latter's
visit to Feking in 1955.
3.
On 25 February 1956 a Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs
summoned the British Chargé d'Affaires (Mr O'Neill) and informed
him that China wished to establish "an Office of a Commissioner
of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China" in Hong
Kong (Peking telegram No 132 of 1956), The Office would
consist of a Commissioner together with diplomatic and other
staff. The question was given full and careful consideration
in London. Mr O'Neill was in favour of accepting the proposal
C and D (Peking telegrams Nos 135 and 190 of 1956). The Governor,
however, was strongly against it. (Hong Kong telegrams No 460
Saving and 278 of 1956) The Secretary of State agreed with
tir Crowe's submission of 11 April 1956 that we should support
the Governor'a views. It was decided that we should take "#
leaf from the Communist book" and send no reply at all for the
time being. If the Chinese reverted to the matter we should reply
that it raised complicated issues and was still under considera-
tion. If a substantive reply were unduly delayed the Chinese
would clearly realise that we had rejected the proposal,
Instructions on these lines were sent to Peking (FCO telegram
No 41 Saving of 1956.)
F
G
H
2
SECRET
14.
J
SECRET
H
J
K
4.
It seems from the papers that the Chinese did not revert
to the subject formally with the Chargé d'Affaires. But in
June 1956 Chou En-lai gave an interview to the Reuter's
correspondent in Peking in which he cited our failure to give
a reply to the Chinese wish "to enter into relations" with the
Hong Kong Government as one of two examples to show that the
British Government's approach was not the same as the Chinese.
The Reuters report inspired a Parliamentary Question on the
subject. The Foreign Secretary replied to the question by
acknowledging that the Chinese had made an approach in February,
but saying that it raised a number of issues which were still
under consideration.
5.
During 1957 Chou En-lai referred to the matter twice.
The first occasion was in an interview with a Labour MP, Mr Warbey,
which was subsequently published in the "Daily Herald" on
19 June 1957.
The second occasion was when Chou met the
Parliamentary Under Secretary at the Board of Trade, Mr Erroll,
who visited Peking in October 1957 (Peking telegram No 526).
In commenting on this the Chargé d'Affaires pointed out that the
Chinese had no intention of dropping the question and that it
had been raised on other occasions "in recent days", for instance
in discussion with the Chargé by the Mayor of Peking. He then
commented in his telegram No 535 that he hoped that the possibility
of giving a more positive answer to the Chinese would now be very
/seriously
3
SECRET
SECRET
M
seriously considered.
N
The Governor, in his telegram No 265,
strongly reiterated his views that we should not agree to the
Chinese proposal.
6.
In 1958 Chou En-lai again took the question up with
two further British visitors, a Colonel Cantlie on 30 January
and Mr Harold Wilson on 25 February. There were some discrep-
ancies between his statements on the subject on these two
occasions. Col Cantlie claimed that Chou had spoken of a
Chinese "Consul" in Hong Kong; Mr wilson said that Chou said
specifically that the Chinese representative should not be a
Consul. Chou also drew some parallels with our representation
in Shanghai. To Mr Erroll in October 1957 he seemed to have
mentioned this simply as a general justification for some kind
of Chinese representation in Hong Kong, but in speaking to
Mr Wilson he apparently went further and pressed for representation
in Hong Kong parallel to ours in Shanghai. In commenting on
this, Far Eastern Department thought that the proposal presumably
envisaged a Counsellor from the Chinese mission in London
detached for duty in Hong Kong and nominally reporting to the
mission in London. The Governor of Hong Kong indicated however,
that even this proposal was unacceptable to hip. The approved
record of Kr wilson's talks with Chou En-lai subsequently became
available to us and it became clear that Chou had made no specific
suggestion of parallelism. (I have included these details,
therefore, merely to show the lines along which our thinking was going)
4.
SECRET
17.
SECRET
7.
On 27 February 1958 the Foreign Secretary summoned the
Chinese Chargé d'Affaires. In the course of a lengthy exchange
in which the Secretary of State covered a number of points on
Sino-British relations and on general international issues, he
told the Chargé d'Affaires that the British Government could not
agree to the appointment of a Chinese representative in Hong
Kong in the present climate of relations. The Chargé d'Affaires
replied that he thought Chinese representation in Hong Kong
could be beneficial and not the reverse. There the matter
apparently rested. The Chinese do not appear to have reverted
to it formally again.
In his Review for 1958 the Governor of
Hong Kong expressed pleasure that we had continued to refuse to
accept the Chinese proposal.
8.
The matter came up again during Mr Denson's call on
Chou En-lai on 2 riarch 1971. We know that the Chinese version
of what Chou En-lai said to Mr Denson differs from our own
version.
According to Mr Denson's account, Chou raised the matter
at the end of his talk in a roundabout fashion. Mr Denson's
record is as follows:
"Chou said that there was one more question relating
Should the authorities in Hong Kong
to Hong Kong.
contact the Kwangtung provincial authorities or the
authorities in Peking? Sometimes contact was made with
the Kwangtung authorities and sometimes with the Peking
authorities via the office of the Chargé d'Affaires.
But there was no official relationship with Hong Kong.
Yet we maintain that we must have an official office
5
SECRET
/in the
SECRET
9.
in the province of Taiwan.
contradictory position.
This was a
"The Chargé said that he was not very familiar
he believed that this
with this problem
matter had been discussed with Mr O'Neill when
he had been Chargé.
"Chou said that he thought it was with Mr Trevelyan.
The Chinese found Mr Trevelyan easier to talk to
than Mr O'Neill .."
The Chinese version (as distributed to Communists in
Hong Kong) accorded much more prominence to this exchange,
which appeared in their version, for one thing, to have
taken place much earlier in the interview. Presumably
Chang Wen-chin was relying on the same version when he
raised the matter with Mr Addis on 27 March.
that Premier Chou En-lai "had raised the old question that
among the many affairs which involved the Hong Kong
authorities and China some were taken up with the central
government and some with the local authorities. This
state of affairs was not convenient.
Chang said
Premier Chou had
asked whether it would be possible to send an official
representative to Hong Kong. What was the British reaction?"
10. The discrepancy is now of little consequence since the
Chinese have made clear both to Mr Addis on 27 March and to
Mr Wilford on 7 April that they regard what Chou said last
year as a renewal of the long-standing Chinese proposal to
send an official representative to Hong Kong.
FAR EASTERN DEPARTMENT
17 April 1972
6
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
FC 1051/21
Foreign Office and Whitehall Distribution
+
CHINA
March 4, 1958
Section I
CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE CHINESE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES ON FEBRUARY 27, 1958
Mr. Selwyn Lloyd to Mr. Wilson (Peking)
(No. 19. Confidential)
Foreign Office,
(47)
Sir,
March 4, 1958. The Chinese Chargé d'Affaires called on me at my request on the 27th of February.
2. told Mr. Huan Hsiang that I had asked him to come to see me in order that I might explain to him the views of Her Majesty's Government on a number of matters affecting Anglo-Chinese relations with particular reference to the remarks made by Mr. Chou En-lai to Mr. Erroll in Peking on the 29th of October of last year (your telegram No. 526 of the 31st of October). I then spoke on the lines of the enclosed aide-mémoire, a copy of which was given to Mr. Huan at the end of the interview.
3. At the end of my remarks, Mr. Huan thanked me for having given him our views. He said that he could not at once comment on all the points made in such a comprehensive statement but that he would like to take up one or two of them. He believed that there were no questions between our two countries that could not be settled and he was glad to note our expressed desire for an improvement in our relations. He agreed that these were at present unsatisfactory. He had noted my statement of complaints against his Government but felt bound to say that the Chinese Government for their part were very dissatisfied with various aspects of our behaviour, particularly over Formosa and Hong Kong.
L
4. As regards Formosa, Mr. Huan maintained that there had been a marked increase recently in contacts between this country and the Nationalist authorities and it seemed to the Chinese that we were following the Americans in supporting a "Two Chinas" policy. There were four attitudes that Governments could take over the question of their relations with Formosa. They could fully support the Chinese Government, they could fully support Chiang Kai-shek, they could abstain or they could support the Chinese Government de jure while recognising and dealing with the Nationalists de facto. The last, in the Chinese view, was a double-faced" attitude and perhaps the worst of the four. Unfortunately, it was this attitude that seemed to be adopted by the United Kingdom. Mr. Huan then rehearsed the familiar evidence" that this was our attitude, citing in particular the appearance in London last year of a theatrical group from Formosa, the alleged "many" official visitors to this country from Formosa and the encouragement given by Her Majesty's Consul at Tamsui to increase contacts between the United Kingdom and the Nationalist authorities.
5. Both Mr. Erroll, whom I had invited to be present at the interview, and I told Mr. Huan that cultural activities such as the appearance of the theatrical group, had no political significance in this country, that such officials from Formosa as might have come here in a private capacity (and they were certainly not many" had received no official cognisance from Her Majesty's Government and that, as I had previously said, trade relations with Formosa did not imply recognition. In New York we had the minimum of contact necessary with the Nationalist representative at the United Nations but otherwise did not give the Nationalists or their representatives any recognition whatever. Mr. Huan remained unconvinced.
6. As regards Hong Kong, Mr. Huan said that the Chinese were very dissatisfied with the attitude of the Hong Kong Government towards themselves
19026-34 232-14
CONFIDENTIAL
は
la-
L
i
4
2
CONFIDENTIAL
and cited the " Kashmir Princess "case, the riots of 1956 and the alleged "official reception" given by Sir A. Grantham to Nationalist delegations. He said that the Chinese Government were anxious to "co-exist" with Hong Kong and to improve relations with the Hong Kong authorities and to this end wanted a through train service between Hong Kong and Canton (for which he alleged that his Government had made further proposals to the Hong Kong authorities) and representation in Hong Kong. They believed that the latter would be beneficial and not the reverse.
7. I said that I should be grateful if Mr. Huan would inform his Government that, despite the differences between us, we sincerely wished to improve relations. Despite the difference of our political systems there were many potential points of sympathy between this country and China. Onu must, however, be patient and proceed slowly. It was important to recognise the mutual desire for improvement. 8. Mr. Huan replied that the Chinese Government also certainly wished to improve relations. But the question of responsibility cut both ways. He had been very disappointed during his stay in this country (and he followed the English Press and proceedings in Parliament fairly closely) to find that China was almost universally regarded as a potential aggressor or some sort of bogey-man. It was up to us also to reduce recriminations.
9. Mr. Huan agreed, however, that greater use could profitably be made of contact through official channels.
10. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washington, the Commissioner-General for the United Kingdom in South-East Asia at Singapore. Her Majesty's Consul at Tamsui and the Secretary of State for the Colonies (for transmission to the Governor of Hong Kong).
I am, &c.
SELWYN LLOYD.
AIDE-MÉMOIRE
The statement on Anglo-Chinese relations made by Mr. Chou En-lai to Mr. Erroll has been given careful consideration by Her Majesty's Government. It is apparent from that and other statements, such as that made to the retiring Indian Ambassador at Peking, that the Chinese Government are under some misapprehension regarding Her Majesty's Government's policies in certain respects, and even in one or two cases misinformal on matters of fact. Moreover, from the point of view of Her Majesty's Government the attitude of the Chinese Government towards the United Kingdom has in some respects been far from satisfactory. I agree with Mr. Chou Enlai that frank discussion is the only way of removing misunderstandings and therefore welcome the opportunity of explaining Her Majesty's Government's point of view to the Chargé d'Affaires, with the request that he should convey the substance of my remarks both to Mr. Chen Yi and to Mr. Chou En-lai himself. Indeed it is a matter of regret to Her Majesty's Government that the Chinese Government make so little use of the normal diplomatic channels provided by the Charge's own Mission in London and the Office of the British Chargé d'Affaires in Peking. The officials concerned on both sides are specially qualified for such exchanges, and more contacts between them and the Governments to which they are accredited might help to clear up misunderstandings at an early stage.
2. The suggestion that Her Majesty's Government favour a "Two Chinas " policy is one of a number of views apparently held by the Chinese Government but based on a misapprehension.
Her Majesty's Government recognise only the Government of the People's Republic as the Government of China. They do not recognise the Nationalist authorities as a Government nor do they have any diplomatic relations with them. They accept that the Cairo Declaration of November 1943, was a statement of intention that Formosa was to be "restored to the Republic of China " after the war. Since that declaration, however, there has been a civil war in China and, rightly or wrongly, the world is still deeply divided in its views as to the legitimate Government of China. To attempt to precipitate a solution of the question in
CONFIDENTIAL
1
CONFIDENTIAL
3
such circumstances seems to Her Majesty's Government to be both premature and dangerous. For the time being, therefore, they favour a détente and reduction of tension in the area.
This is not a "Two Chinas" policy. Nor have Her Majesty's Government changed their policy. This was their attitude in 1950 and it is their attitude now. They do not officially refer to the "Nationalist Government. or the "Formosan Government "but to the "Nationalist authorities," as the authorities who are in practice administering the territory for the time being. The maintenance of a Consulate in Formosa does not mean that diplomatic relations exist. Consuls are not diplomatic representatives. In Tamsui, as at every other consular post, the Consul must necessarily be in communication with the local authorities in order to discharge his functions of protecting British interests in the area. It is well-known in international practice that the presence of a Consul in an area where the authorities are not recognised as a Government does not of itself imply recognition as such of these authorities.
It is not the British practice to interfere with the movements or activities of private individuals. Ordinary Members of Parliament are private individuals and, if they choose to visit Formosa, that is their affair and does not imply that Her Majesty's Government recognise the authorities in Formosa as a Government. Nor do trade relations with Formosa imply recognition. The mere fact that a territory is not recognised by Her Majesty's Government as a State does not, of itself, prevent United Kingdom nationals from trading with persons or companies in that territory. As has already been explained, cultural activities, such as the appearance in London of a theatrical group from Formosa, also, in British eyes, carry no political significance. The Chargé d'Affaires is in a position to confirni this through his own knowledge of this country.
There is, therefore, no foundation for Mr. Chou En-lai's statement on February 10 to the National People's Congress that the "flirtation" between Her Majesty's Government and the Nationalist authorities has markedly increased.
3. It can be understood that from the Chinese point of view it must seem anomalous that, having recognised the Chinese People's Government, Her Majesty's Government do not positively support the seating of their representatives at the United Nations. They would, however, ask the Chinese Government to understand that they have to view this matter in the general context of world affairs. They have never said that the Chinese People's Republic should never be admitted. li his statements in the General Committee and Plenary Sessions of the Assembly in September last Sir Pierson Dixon said that this was a matter which the General Assembly would one day have to consider. But China's intervention in the Korean hostilities and her unwillingness over the years to contemplate a settlement of the Korean question on the basis approved by the United Nations have influenced the views of members of the United Nations. In this connection Her Majesty's Government have noted with satisfaction the recent Chinese announcement on the withdrawal of their forces in Korea. But the fact remains that over half of the...members of the United Nations are at present opposed to seating the representatives of the Chinese People's Republic. In these circumstances, to prese the question of representation of the Chinese People's Republic would only raise bitter controversy, would not contribute towards a solution and would not, în Her Majesty's Government's view, be in the best interests of the organisation itseif. Her Majesty's Government have, therefore, so far thought it in the general interest to avoid such controversy and for this reason have voted for the moratorium resolutions. They cannot say for how much longer they may think it right to do so. The state of feeling in the United Nations and the state of the relations and tensions between countries concerned must necessarily influence their views. To the Chinese Government this may not appear to be a very satisfactory attitude. For Her Majesty's Government's part, however, it is a considered one and not taken lightly.
LL
+4
4. Her Majesty's Government consider that Hong Kong provides an excellent opportunity for demonstrating the reality of co-existence. They regard their functions in Hong Kong as being to administer the territory in the interests of the inhabitants, the promotion of their well-being and the preservation of law and order. They have no intention of allowing Hong Kong to be used as a base for hostile activities against China.. Subversive activities from whatever source are resolutely put down whenever they are found and the Hong Kong Police exercise complete impartiality in action against any persons attempting to create disorder. The basis of the administration is the rule of law, before which all parties are equal,
7
I
4
CONFIDENTIAL
applied on the basis of established evidence and true facts. The Chinese Government, however, do not seem to recognise this position. They present demands "without waiting, or apparently even trying, to establish facts: as, for instance, in the matter of resettlement at Wong Tai Sin. The Hong Kong Government's resettlement programme is a humanitarian endeavour on a large scale for the benefit of people.who have come from China to live in Hong Kong. The Chinese Government's misrepresentation of this problem suggests either that they are deliberately distorting the truth for some hostile motive, or that they do not attempt to verify reports which reach them. Whatever the real intention, such action has the effect of fostering ill-feeling against the Hong Kong Government.
5. Mr. Chou En-lai referred specifically to the case of the through train. If the Chinese Government have received accurate reports from their negotiators in Canton, they must know that agreement on all practical points was reached long ago and that the signature of an agreement has been made impossible only because the Chinese have been unwilling to accept the proposals of the Hong Kong Government for normal immigration control. The Hong Kong Government have consistently maintained their readiness to resume discussion of a through train service, if the Chinese Government are able to put forward satisfactory alternative suggestions to meet the Hong Kong Government's only too obvious need to control the number of passengers bound for Hong Kong and to respect that Government's refusal of admittance to any individual to whom they may take exception. It is a distortion of the facts to blame the Hong Kong Government for the breakdown of negotiations which could be restarted at any time on the above basis.
6. Her Majesty's Government have reluctantly come to the conclusion that the Chinese Government are not at present prepared to acknowledge the legitimate point of view of the Hong Kong Government so as to co-operate with that Government on the problems arising between them. It is in the light of this unwelcome conclusion that, while they have given careful consideration to the Chinese Government's suggestion for the appointment of a representative in Hong Kong, they regret that the present climate of relations does not appear to be suitable for such an appointment,
7. As already mentioned, Her Majesty's Government are disappointed that the Chinese Government so often seem to prefer distorted or false propaganda to the truth. In the case of the Hong Kong dockyard, for example, a series of reports in the New China News Agency English-language service (notably those published on November 30 and January 3) have distorted official statements by the Hong Kong authorities and have omitted any mention of the efforts that the latter are making to assist in finding employment for discharged workers. This could be construed as incitement to the dockyard workers not to accept the opportunities available to them for finding new employment, to the detriment of their wellare and that of their families.
8. On wider international questions, such, for example, as disarmament, Her Majesty's Government regret that their and Western policies generally are so consistently misrepresented on the Chinese side and that the Chinese Government, again without any apparent attempt to establish the facts, so readily support the claims and statements made by others against Her Majesty's Government, as recently, for example, in the case of the Yemen. Such an attitude, so consistently adopted, can only lead Her Majesty's Government to conclude that the Chinese Government are less than sincere in their expressed desire for improved relations.
9. For their part Her Majesty's Government heartily endorse the principic of peaceful co-existence. They consider, however, that, to develop as they hope. the concept must be given a positive meaning. It must include not only the absence of war, vital as this is, but also a genuine attempt at mutual understanding. It is this that unfortunately seems to them to be lacking on the Chinese side, and it is against this background that the settlement of Anglo-Chinese problems and of some of the major international questions which concern China have become so difficult. Her Majesty's Government earnestly hope that it will be possible to promote better understanding. They welcome the development of commercial relations and hope the increasing contacts between the two countries will also play a useful part. They trust that the Chinese Government for their part will seek more opportunities for establishing facts and for frank discussion through official channels.
CONFIDENTIAL
}
I
I
EXTRACT OF RELORD * MR HAROLD WILSON'S TALK WITH CHOU EN-LAI
2
25 FER 1958
It is today still inconvenient for the United States to come out in the open and do it officially, so the way it adopts is to create "two Chinas" by manipulating behind the screon ccrtain people in the British and the Japanese Governments who appear in the foreground to create such a situation. Not only the Government and the people of new China are against "wo Chinas," the poople of Taiwan and Chiang Kai-shek/are also against it. It is the aim of the United States to establish first a situation of "two Chinas" ghd ask us to accept it. If we accept it, the United States would then be able to compel Chiang Kai-shek to accept it too. I wish to tell our British friends, if Britain should help the United States in creating "two/Chinas" it would hurt the feelings of the Chinese people. We absolutely cernot agree to have China enter the Security Council, with Chiang Kai-shek romaining in the United Natiors. Wo will not participate in an international organization or conference if hiang Kai-shek's representatives are there. We did not go to the 1956 01ympic Games because Chiang Kai-shek's representatives were there,
Last year
ve withdrew from the International Red Cross Conference on the last day of the session when Chiang Kai-shok's representatives came/in. Wo shoolutely cannot allow such a situation to arisé. If we do, it would be tantamount to legalizing United States occupation of Taiwan. Any government treating us in this way is unfriendly, for that means to sráit China, just like to separate Wales from Britain. Honce I should like to express the hope that Britain will not follow the United States in creating "two Chinas". Otherwise, it will hurt the feelings of the Chinese peoplo. We are convinced that Taiwan will certainly come back to China one day.
Kestoration
(3) The question of Hong Kong. I received Sir Grantham, former Governor of Hong Kông, when he visited Peking, Mr. Trevelyan, then British Charge d'Affaires, was also present. I expressed the hope for improving the relations between the mainland and Hong Kong, and 8ir Granthan agrecd.
I put forth several proposals: (A) Restoration of through traffic between Canton and Kouloon. Agreement has now been reached on all technical matters and the question of controlling the number of persons travelling both ways can also be solved by a gentlemen's agreement. But still the Hong Kong authorities do not agree to restore through traffic. (B) Appointment of à Chinese government representative in Hong Kong. China has state enterprises, banks and other
1
-3-
properties in Hong Kong, with nearly 1,000 employees, let alone the fact that over 90 per cent of the Hong Kong population is Chinese. Wo have many business mattera on which contacts have to be made with the Hong Kong authorities. It is reasonable that there should be a Chinose Government representative thero. Thore are only 1,000 Americans in Hong Kong, and the United States has à consulate with a staff of more than 100. Yet we are only represented by reportera of the Hoinhua News Agency. this ridiculous ?
Ian't
Britain has a factory, a number of shops and several scores of British nationala in Shanghai, and with our approval there is a representative of the Office of the British Charge d'Affaires thora. China has so many enterprises in Hong Kong with the number of employecs alone maning up to 1,000 and yet we have no reprosen- tative there. We have sent diplomatic documents on this mattor to the British Government, but no reply has boen received in the past two years and more. This is something unusual in the history of British diplomacy.
We wish to improve relations with Hong Kong. But under the pressure of the United States, the Hong Kong authorities and the British Government have not agrecd to do so.
(4) the question of trade embargo, Sino-British trado has a long history, and it should now be placed on a new basis of equality and mutual benefit. But if the embargo is not wholly lifted, equality and mutual benefit will be out of the question. For instance, Britain sells us motor care and tractors, but pot gasoline and dicsol 011. Then what is the use of buying these vehicles ↑ Again, wo want to buy ships, but ships are on the embargo 11at. Not long ago, when the Chinese Economic and Technical Mission visited Britain, they saw some machinery we wished to buy, but 95 per cent of them are on the embargo list. It should be pointed but that the embargo cannot prevont the construction 92 China. What we cannot buy from Japan, Britain and West Gerzy, can be bought from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, Morcover, we are now gradually able to produce ourselves some of the articles. The process may be somewhat slow, but we will catch up.
Prade is beneficial to both sides. We stand for peaceful coexistence, friendly intercourse, and trade
dotut
GA, 4
Ix100-2/26-A1493)
Filc Nof. TS. 2/1126/50
SAVINGRAM
To the Secretary of State for the Colonies.
www.
Com. Gen, Sing-pore./// Washington.
39
CHIES REGISTRAR'S OFFICE
From the Governor, Hong Kong.
Date
19th Hoverbor, 1957.
22 NOV 1957
STRY:
No. 2065
a Hot 1957
J
VAL OFFICES & CAB
F190316
My telegram No. 986 (âct repeated to other addresses); Chinese Representation in Houg Kong.
F1903/6
II.1. Charge d'affaires baking's telogram Ko. 535 to the Foreign Office does not cur to raise any fresh arguments in favour of the acceptance of a reprosentative of the Chinese liinistry of Foreign Affairs in Helg Kong other then is termes improvement such an act on to art of llor Majesty's Governs in the United Kingdow night bring to Anglo-Chinese relations til oxouse which might be offered, if the reprosentative should quently prove objectionabio, for postponing a settlement of the major problem of Anglo-Chinoso diplomatic relations.
2.
The basic position stated in ry savingrem No. 400 of 1770 romains unchangod. Hy stron: opposition to a rosidont re, Pusentativ may be summarised as follows:-
Fr1044/1
(a) Frosh impetus would be given to United Front activity in the
Colony. I have reatedly (most recently in my dogpatch 1.0. 1672 of September 16tii) stated that the policy of the ChinesO Govornment towards H...... in recent years is to build up an United Front allying innocuous non-Communist olor:ents in tho Colony with pro-Corist clononts, who would thus be lont aura of respectability. 114 the samo timo the Chinees Goval. appear to have hope of achieving a state of affairs in vlich Hong Kong Govornmant will bo sufficiently intimidated to rein. from action unwelcome to 1's Chinese Govorm:ont. Both of OS. moasures appear directly designed to facilitate the ultimate objective of the Chinese Government, which is to ro-incorpora- tion of Hong Kong with China, The appointment of a quesi diplomatic representative could help the Chinese to preparo tho ground for this devolor Car Lottor than the presont repre- sontatives of moro specialized Chinose Government 2gencies or their local follow-tiavolling allics are able to do,
.L
(b) It would have a deplorable effect upon the morale of the grout majority of Chineso in iho Colony, who would be given tho impression that Grout Britain was making & first 120vo in thic direction of selling them out. Local Chinese would regard it as evidence that il,.G. in the United Kingdom wore unable or unwilling to resist pressure from Cornist China. fonoo-sitters would fool that the tino hud colo to throw their lot with the Communists; and local pressure promis, which the Communist have tried to creat in order to stir up agitution against the Government in matters of domestic policy, would be given fresh encourtigoment.
(0)
·
Many moro
It would convey the improɛ ion to the United States Government and to Commonwealth and ot friendly countrics that we were on the road to retrout from Hong Kong. In matters of defence policy this might well tum the scale against any fira quarentce of military support.
(d) Thore would bo no end to tie claims of the roprosentative to what constituted his functions. Even if, na hr, hilson ivyliez intorrorunco by the roprusinitivo in intovnal matters word to hu used as a pretext for declining any further political concessita to the Chinese, ity well be the case that the stato of tena.. would become such ::. tote it necessary for my Buccussor 29 oxpel the Chinese representativo if he attempted to interfuro, goll ho might, in solico - Jejal mattors involving Chines
ket wit Bríkum sågsels. An expelled jestatične would stotaing bee
intial refusal t
·
D
SAVINGRAM
STCRET
To the Secretary of State for the Colonies.
H
+
From the Governor, Hong Kong.
Date
No.
to admit a feprosenttservo,
(o) Th:o representative would become a prins targot for K., T. and other anti-
Communist activitios in the Colony, It would for examplo be impossiblo to allow him to soo for himself that the Chinese Government had got their facts wrong in a dispute, c.g. about rosettlement, without risking a serious disturbance. The security of the representativo's porson would be a constant worry and responsibility.
+- 1963/6
I.L
3.
Far
For all these reasons the establishment of a representative in Hong Kong would be calculated to increase rather than to diminish tension between the United Kingdom and China over liong Kong questions. from lessening the source of friction, the friction- creating bodies would be brought into closer contact. Matters which can now be confined to diplomatic and propaganda exchanges in Peking and London would becoLIC conflicts taking place within this Colony, in addition to providing still more serious grounds for diplomatic and propaganda exchanges.
As
4.
I am not impressed by the argument that trade between the United Kingdom and China might in some way be increased by the concession of accepting a represent- utive here. Mir, hilson admits that the Chinese will probably buy from the United Kingdom anything that they really must buy whatever the political atmosphere. I have already argued, it would by no means necessarily follow that the political atmosphere would be improved. It would be a strange irony if Great Britain, having acquired Hong Kong for the purpose of facilitating trade with China, were after all these years to begin the process of handing liong Kong back in the hope that it might bring to British Merchants a few extra contracts.
5.
There remains the question of whether a reply
As the should be given and what that reply should be, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs pointed out in reply to Mr. Younger's supplementary question on June 6th "it was about four years after the Labour Government recognised them that the Chinese Government decided to But if we do not send a Charge d'Affaires to London". wish to follow Chinese precedents in this respect, I would suggest that there is an alternative reply to the negative suggested in paragraph 2 of Lir. Wilson's telegram 19.535. That would be to link the question of Chinese representation in Hong Kong with the whole question of the exchange of Abassudors and Chinese membership of the United Nations, If we can at least secure a post- ponement until such time as China has become internationally accepted, then I think that we will have postponed our retreat until it has become much less easy to resist,
The position of the than it would appear to be today. United States in regard to China is of course the crux of the matter. I would, however, recommend that if this alternative suggestion were to be accepted by lier Majesty's Government, it would be so vorded as not to imply a definite commitment contingent upon the exchange of Ambassadors, but rather that the Chinese request could not be accepted at present and that it would be given fresh consideration when relations between our two countrics have been nommlized.
+ -
1
Cypher/OTP
Mr. Wilson
No. 535
November 2, 1957
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
1908/6 F
FROM PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
JF
FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION
R.
D. 12.20 p.m. November 2,1957 4.59 p.m. November 2,1957
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 535 of November 2, Repeated for information to Hong Kong
and Saving to
Singapore and Washington
✓ Flag H
My telegram No. 526 paragraph 6: Chinese Representation at Hong Kong.
In the light of Chou En-lai's strong representations it would seem very difficult to Jelay some definite reply much longer.
If we do so we are likely to be faced with publicity from the Chinese side designed to force an answer out of us and you will, no doubt, wish to bear in mind the terms of your reply to a Parliamentary Question on this subject by Mr. Younger of June 6, 1956 (your telegram No. 443, 1956 to Peking).
FC
Plagi
100/76.2
fensifiya
t
+
2. If we give a negative reply to the Chinese, it will equally seen difficult to conceal our true reason for refusing to take what they regard as a normal step to meet their reasonable wishes. If it were not for their general hostility we could surely not deny them official representation in a place where other Powers are officially represented and they themselves have such special legitimate interests. Chou En-lai has asked for a frank answer and we might say frankly that the necessary political confidence for this further step does not exist, basing ourselves on general Chinese propaganda about United Kingdom policies and on the nature of their communications with us about Hong Kong affairs which has been very far from helpful (ny telegram No. 533).
Rag M
3. I hope, however, that the possibility of giving a more positive answer to the Chinese will be very seriously considered. The situation has considerably changed since the matter was last 'considered (your telegram to Peking No. 41 Saving of 1956 is the last word on the subject). In brief, while trade relations show signs of improvement and are of more interest to us than to China, political relations, which are of more interest to China than to us, are stagnating. I do not wish to argue here the casc for taking what steps lie within our power for improving political relations /with
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Poking telegram No. 535 to For.ign Office
2.
with China, though I think it a powerful one. If we do not take any such steps I do not anticipate disastrous results in the political field, c.g. major trouble from the Chinese Government in Hong Kong itself. If, however, we stand pat on our present position about Chinese representation in Hong Kong, I think that the Chinese Govern-
In his ment may quite possibly react in the sphere of trado. interview with Mr. Erroll, Chou En-lai linked the possibilities of trade progress with the improvement of our political relations. In the present, and for some time in the future, it seems that it is we who are anxious to sell, rather than the Chinese who are anxious or able to buy in any large quantity, and that there are plenty of competitors from Western Europe for the limited Chinese market. Admittedly, the Chinese are realists who will probably buy anything that they really must buy from us whatever the political atmosphere. If, however, we can make no political response to Chou En-lai's exposition, the Chinese Government would, I think, discriminato against British suppliers in all lines not essential to them and would be ready openly anu with some apparent reasons to blame us for the lack of progress in trade devolopment.
4.
I realise with regret the difficulties which the admission of a Chinese representative might cause to the Governor of Hong Kong and he will, no doubt, comment about the effect of such admission on Hong Kong morale. I would, however, like to put forward certain considerations additional to those advanced by my predecessor in this
Fe143/connexion (Peking telegrams Nos. 135 and 190 of 1956).
It is, I
think, admitted that the Chinese will chose their own time for heating up Hong Kong issues to boiling point; that this time is probably not yet; and that they now have plenty of means, even without a special representative, of stirring up everything short of major trouble. It is, I think, also fair to say that, in the light of their constant agricultural difficulties and the repressive aspects of the rectification campaign, Communist China is probably a less attractive magnet to overseas Chinese at the moment than it has bean for some time. If a Chinese Commissioner were seen to settle down in Hong Kong without doing much substantial harm, might not the Chinese bogy lose some of its terrors and might not moralc recover from the initial blow of his appointment to at least its previous level? Finally, if a Chinese Commissioner were obviously to cause serious additional trouble in Hong Kong, this would provide us
/with
CONFIDENTIAL
+
CONFIDENTIAL
Pcking telegram No. 535 to Foreign Office
- 3 -
with ready reasons, if these were thought necessary, for not going further towards meeting the political demands of the Chinese Government.
5. I hope that, in these circumstances, it may be thought advantageous to meet the Chinese half way and in our own time on this admittedly difficult question.
Foreign Office pass to Hong Kong as my telegram No. 222 and to Singapore and Washington as my telegrams Nos. 44 and 163 Saving.
[Repeated Saving to Singapore and Washington and copy sent to Telegraph Section 0.0. for repetition to Hong Kong.]
HEICHH
CONFIDENTIAL
+
+
J
Cypher/OTP
Mr. Wilson
30: 526
October 31, 1957.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONSONANTS I
+
FROM PEKING TO FORLIGE OFFICE
C151
151/143
FOREIGN OFFICE DIN
WHITEHALL, DISTRIBUZION
D: 11.55 a.. October 31, 1957. R: 6.03 p.m. October 31, 1957.
| Pangraphs
Addressed to Foreim Offico tolegren No. 525 of Cotcher 31, Repeated for information to Hong Kong,
Washington,
Singapore.
Ky telegram Ko. 520:
Visit of Ir. Erroll,
Mr. Exroll and I were summoned at a few hour's notice to see the Prime Minister on October 29. During the interview, which lasted two-and-a-half hours, and was also attended by the Minister of Foreign Trade, Chou Er-lai gave a full-socle rewiow
A full of Anglo-Chinese relations, both political and economic. record will be sent by the next bag. The main political points are summarized below, and economic matters are dealt with in ny telegram No. 523.
2.
The Two Chinos" Policy.
After opening roforencos to the embargo, for which please seo my telegram No. 528, the Prime Minister, despite Hir, Erroll's reminder that he had come to China chiefly to discuss questions of trade, said that he would like a fran: talk on Sino-British relations, as a whole, When he had met Hr. Eden at Geneva în 1954, he had expressed the hope that they would gradually develop, Unfortunately, that had not happened, Unnecessary difficulties had occurred over recognition. There had boon now developments The British Govermont were
As he understood
in the British attitude to Taiwan, coming to recognize two Chinas simultaneously. it, thoir intention was to establish Taiwan as a second China with the aim of facilitating American recognition of the now China,
3. The Prime Minister then solemnly asked lir. Erroll to convoy China's views on this matter to Her Majesty's Governmont: Recognition was a problem that was already solved.
It did not matter to China China could not be overthro./n,
The new
It was
whether American recognition ocme carly or late. impossible for Britain to recognize Formosa, and from this basis to persuade the Americans to recognize Communist China as one of
CONFIDENTTAL
/two Chinas.
CONFIUMENTAL
Peking telegram No: 526 to foreden Office.
two Chinas.
-2-
Taiwan's "independence" was simply a matter of American occupation and China could not accept Taiwan as an
China could not independent entity under any name whatsoever.
take part in cny international function inside or outside the United Nations in which there were representatives of two Chinas. China was not like the two Koreas or to Germonies, which had It was one country, and been split as a result of tho war.
The American,
Faiwan would eventually return to China. occupation of Taiwan did not affect the devoloyment of friendly Sino-British relations but that would be affected if Britain helpod Azerica to favour two Chinas.
Chou in-lai
Ir. Erroll emphasized that it was no part of Her Majesty's Government's policy to create thro Chines. He would nevertheless convey the Prine Minister's views to his Goverment. took Lote of this, but acted Kr. Erroll to remind Her Majesty's Government that the Chinoso Goverment regarded the British use of the term "Formosa Government" in reference to the Taiwan authorities, as a means of "fabricating two Chinas."
Exchonse of Ambassadors enë këmission to the United Nations.
The United States It was not even a for India had put
5. The Prino Minister argued that it was mercly because of the lack of agreement over the United Nations that Ambassadors had
Britain was in the embarrassing position of not been exchanged. being the only Power which recognized the new China in Peking and
Could not Britain, like the old China at the United NationS, Horway and Denmark, also nambers of N.A.T.0., vote against the United States on the question of admission? had, after all, opposed Britain over Suez. .question of voting for a Soviet rasolution, forward the latest resolution on Chinose aâmission. said that this was a more difficult question than the Prize Hinistor had represented, and that such an action on Britain's part would cause great difficulties at the United Nations. Kinister said that in that case Britain and China would have to be content with Chargés d'Affaires.
For Yout.
Mr. Erroll
The Prizo
The Prime Minister asserted that in the past for years
He had had a long China had often tried to improve relations, talk two years ago with the Governor of Hong Kong in the hope of
6.
+
CONFIDENTIAL,
/doing co.
J
CONTEDENNIAL
Peking telegram No: 526 to Foreign Office.
doing so. But the question of through trains on the Canton- Ka/loɔn lize, which he had then ruisod, had still not been solved. Again, he had proposed in 1955 that the Chinese Government should send a roprosentative to Hong Kong to havo direct contact with the cathorities there, "just as the British kupi a man in Shanghai." But he had had no answer. In the whole of British diplomatic history there could be very few examples of such a dolay, Exitein ought to say that she meant
and give russons,
7.
The Prime Minister then turned to the case of the "Kashmir Princess", saying that the Hong Long Government had never published a full account of the accidout and had always given indefinite replies to the Chineso, Sinco Chizase delegations were continually tunvolling through Hong Kong, the Chineso wanted to maintain prɔNS relations with the Hong Kong authorities on such matters. ic trc reformed, in familier terms to the Sabre-Jet fighter which had roided China and then landed at Hong Kong, and the "Pak Tang" (zy telegram No. 192 of October 12). All had involved unfriendly behaviom' by the Hong Kong authorities. I intervened to say that all these matters had been the subject of detailed correspondence between my office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The communications from the latter gave the impression that they were not arguing in any very factual spirit and that they would be certain to opposз whatever arguments were put forward from our side. The Prize Minister retcrted that the cases he had quoted wore all examples of unfriendly action iritiated from the British side, and that China had never been the first to be udendly. As far as Sino-British relations were concerned, there was room for good work and improvemont.
8. The Primo Minister finally asked Mr. Enroll if he believed in forceful co-existance, Mr. Ervoll raplied that he certainly did so, but that both sides must renaber the foolings and interests of the other sião. Who Primo Minister then romarked that China wanted peaceful development, but equally was not afraid of war end would 21ght 12 the United States wanted.
9. The interview endod with scao quite friendly sparring on the [eneral political fate of the rightists in China, While Chou Er-lai spoke seriously, especially on Hong Kong, he was never discoutoous and wes ready to break up factual discussion periodically with joking interludes.
CONSTENNIAL,
/10.
During the
1
:
CONFIDSÆTAL
Peking teloftya No: 526 to Foreim Office.
10.
During the farewells the Prime Minister enquired with consern after the health of Sir A. Eden and asked lir. Erroll to convey his good wishes to Mr. Necmillan and to you, Sir.
Foreign Office plocso pass to Hong Kong, Washington and Singapore as my telegrams Nos. 215, 38 and 162 respectively.
[Repeated to Washington and Singapore. Copy sent
sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office, for repetition to Hong Kong.]
IXXXX
CONFIDEIAL
CHINA (RELATIONS WITH
HONG KONG)
42. Mr. Younger asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what request he has received from the Government of the People's Republic of China for the establishment of relations with the Gov ernment of Hong Kong: and what answer has been returned.
Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: On 25th February the Chinese Government informed Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Peking that they would like to establish in Hong Kong an office of a Commissioner of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China with diplomatic and other staff. This proposal raises a number of issues which are still under consideration.
Mr. Younger: Is the Foreign Secretary aware that in a recent public statement Mr. Chou En-lai said that this was one of a number of matters which made an improvement in relations between the two countries difficult? Since this request apparently came in February, is it not about time that Her Majesty's Govern- ment made up their minds about what seems to be a quite normal proposal between States which recognise cach other diplomatically?
Mr. Lloyd: I think that upon reflection the right hon. Member will realise that this question does raise a number of points. I do not think that real complaint can be taken about the time which wo have so far taken to consider the matter. After all, it was about four years after the Labour Government recognised them that the Chinese Government decided to send a chargé d'affaires to London. These matters want consideration, and we will consider them.
- 3 JUN 1950
+
+
4
!
+
r
I
1903/4G Daily 110-
WHAT CHINA
Y first question to Mfr. Chou Ba-la about the relations between our two -countries provoked a blunt reply.
MA
* Stno-British reinliaria are at a standst115," he said. * In fact, during the past two yesta they have got worse rather than baller."
I recalled that severni yetu had passed sizes the Bestiah Government, with Best Berto sa Forsign Minuter, had decided to reward full recogaltion. to the new Poodle's Government of CHILL
Tel to the day there was at ANY a Breach Charge
aadates in Péking and a Chinese Charge d'apare tu London.
Much hat happened arter then; Forex, the jerkte të arent__The_TESTOMERIZIN of Postra China to the United Nations, the embargo on their IELA, CAUNE .. and analy?" † amid, "tha thie des come when me CRL bary the past and beem to build up new and better
Chat Kalach slogent Mack
and mouth spread foto ndy gria. Wilkes always desired good. tlong with Britala,
• Ma bollera that the people
of Chiụa and Melinda can ret en very well together, provided
that there be no outside later
Beteken."
Baked him what be muht
ELAMA 13,
A
1957.
engaged in iONALAS CAL propaganda and mollerling in dignita in formation for 14ko againNT GA
- We cannot astept the idea that sinig Kong should be used at AD AITAKOJ outpost of the Amentia propuganda and inteligence service"
H
British Government restrictiol China have been sand-despës T approval.
With
78
There was no threat in LIC W In the tone of voler, BONITATEA
clearly left to make Die
aan
ER
On all these gennaioru, 201 the questing of the aIE. J., Popkea Cluna id be 12, 18 N
Does that mean closer and better Britain and China? NO. TRADE LESS IMPORTANT LATIONSHIP,
FACTORS
Who said so? CHOU EN-DAI, CH AND FOREIGN MINISTER,
He said it in a frank, personu William Werbey, Labour MP, who' from China. Høre is-
WILLIAM WARI YI 'EXCLUSIVE REPORI
poter la to aPTURE THOUGUIN NË
has become politically mong de two Chinku. Che People's Repok pending on the Dhire dates. Be and Tuma. Both of them. the AbstricaDE MELEE could have a seat in the Unked
* We can never norwać tkka pulley, Talmas ja an Integr part of Chowk, 21 eira Count kajaka kay Miks mALE.
BAD AS A PANTO
G
The Americans had been) ha, quite content to let antais
i
bestes they know that the Adventure would feel and "LIKATIONAS Dould then step in and take over Britain's position to the middle butt.
--
批
Jented wonki Stand Ak dan palegt--
LI
-
when Alle Ainerieknu are when s I am quite sure that tuang other brountries will follow your ex+ You will mÍA MAY Keskia moveat the enacter. Low Ta peoples of Asia and Africa
"In the end the haienez TEA 10 than will be lolated, and they wai be wakiok be able to roast the pro Jeshurerjours of world opinion. They will jane ofhave to change thete WTONE
н
Himi
-
ficial
there
+
יז!
A
·
- 10
T
Ve...
A
TWO OBSTACLES
H
The eyebrows sel ators Brely.
Turen
Conc
and the prin disappeared. (ing won fi montate
"There are tie usein Obacacia
The United Nations and the
trade cokerys, I thought I wa * 1
=
DOG TARAN suchen A
"A Bosna segatud,
"The del obataclą" kald ile 30% das Vindi, Tewath Choo Berlas,
[Farmosa) and the second ont
ceros Hong Kong
The Albericaža are develop
new polley regarding
Ta re thật cao Karabek le a ipant bars. They know that full recognition B
bloem People's Repubža
come before long
عطا
* But they want to retain their Geschaal on Taiwan, so thau DEN
Kath ther Ponta an take a
With good-berritzed toler aher, broken nomadicals by nà
sketched out bus view.
Sumor the bus Bros. Detal
NO HURRY
UINYTT
Í naked the Premier whether) he nonsidered that the slanou- ing of American, mekete in Fest Mesa Made A aoliben of the problema nawe ungrat
* We are used on a horr," bel replied. "We shall routing A Jerk a pearvoal jabaliem
*In any case. Dieser tørketa AYA HAI 1 seriosa threat to TRUE TI I Ching Kalabark when mani bank sati, nad on. Tha rockets make his position sener Insceste. If he were wemalble he would cama ja terma NICH
H
* We are quite peady for that, 4 pornded than in Tesult
A Taiwan being resotted with the Chinase People's Republik "
Pros Porkom. 197. Chou Bo fal switched to Hong Kong
"We have naked för an effeá Chimese representatiY
+
DIPLOMACY
TWIT
Au I walked away fo
monicas Premier's readener, I rout
Chas the man I bat du k
+
29 Uke any a suka mbolache la
Expanding
H
Ba
their economy have been well AN Lewly Did they will seri, Tom 13 and allies wherever thera get them: Inda, Boula-Sant Asra, Intan and France, Bud, above all, the Dorset Union mad the "People's Demoteke
That lɛ why, however much PUMA Buda they may diviège ideologieatti during the evening years, that will be no publie disagreement betwema Pekung and Meacon und the day when peaceful car escoleure bronales The Dong reality of International VESA barva, and pot just a slipen
zu dem W and be world sudo make borer,
-411
use every d ploc
I
Da break
La Baul Mant
When that day dawnt tha Will BARS Out her clatin; le world. Lenderahig in the desendly rivalry of the natinus 10 onsstruei new
Amy
1,
CANAL
Beri bu posen te budil tret
: 14
L.
panel Lowanie i Mocialin, incurly,
1
+
LOLH
Dan Dim valid the ValER
Wrt
1
L
they
MIRACLE
M
KI
+
+
1
1
L
SECRET
OUTWARD SAVING MELDGRAN
FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO PEKING
By Bag
No. 41 Saving
May 7, 1956.
SECREN
DEPARTMENTAL. DISERTEUTION
Addressed to Peling telegram No. 41 Saving of Key L Repeated for information Saving to long Hong
Singaporo No. 187 Washington No. 2075
Your telegran No. 190 [of March 26: Chinese representation in Hong Kong]
After careful consideration the conclusion has been reached that the Chinese proposal cannot be accepted. I do not agrco that it indicates any readiness on the part of the Chinese to accept the status quo, but would regard it rather as a deliberate move by them in the campaign of encroachment on our position. As the Governor of Hong Kong rightly pointed out in his Saving telegran No. 460 [of March 13] it must be judged in the general context of various recent Chinese efforts (which have already caused us con- cern) to bring the people of Hong Kong into closer relationship with the mainland. A Chinese official representative would be bound to maintain that he had a right to be consulted about all measures in Hong Kong likely to affect Chinese Nationals. He might insist on being represented at all court cases affecting people of Chinese race, and he night claim to exercise jurisdiction over the Kowloon Walled City. His presence could hardly fail to place the Governor in an embarrassing position. Koreover his activitios would make it increasingly difficult for the Hong Kong authorities to follow a policy of impartiality in dealing with all persons of Chinese race in Hong Kong.
2. You were of course right to refer to the Chinese capacity for mischief in Hong Kong. It is no doubt true that China intends to recover the Colony in the end, but the timing of the operation will perhaps depend very largely on what happens in Formosa. long as the Nationalists remain in Formosa mder United States protection the Chinese are likely to be impressed with the risks
/ of
As
-
L
SEORIT
Forel Office telegram No. 41 Saving to Peking
-2-
of trying to force the issue in Hong Kong. Even if they did increase pressure by neang short of armed attack, much would still depend on local morale. We can best unintain morale by making it clear that we are not going to give way to gra- dual Communist encroachment in Hong Kong and that there is therefore no immediate need to reinsure with the Communists.
3. I agree, however, that it would be difficult to give an outright refusal to this secmingly friendly proposal. I would profer therefore to make no reply at all for the time being. If the Chinese revert to it, you should say that you will ascertain the prosent position. Thereafter you would be instructed to say that the proposal raised nany complicated issues which were still under consideration by Her Majesty's Government. If a substantive reply were unduly delayed it would of course be clear to the Chinese that we had in fact rejected their proposal; but this tactic would make it more difficult for them to accuse us of open unfriendliness.
Live The Chinese will certainly be angry at or failure to take up their offer. They may conclude that their scoringly friendly policy has failed and adjust their plans accordingly But it is difficult to say whether they would decide to accept the situation for the time being, or try to increase our dif- ficulties in Hong Kong. They should be aware, however, that a more actively hostile policy towards Hong Kong would only drive us into the arms of the Arcricans. Since they have been at great pains to divide us, they may well prefer not to jeopar dise this objective.
DISTRIBUTED M:-
Far Eastern Department South East Asia Department
EHEJE
1
+
950.92
Flag A
C114316 €
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
Problem
F
On February 25 the Chinese Government informed Her
Kajesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Peking that in view of increasing business relations between Hong Kong and the interior" and to facilitate negotiations of common interest,
they would like to establish in Hong Kong an office of a Commissioner of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China with diplomatic and other staff (Peking telegram no.132).
FC1143/4 Discussion
Flag B
Flag C
-14
2.
The problem of Chinese representation in Hong Kong has a long history. The question of the appointment of a Chinese Consul-General in Hong Kong was first raised as long ago as 1869 and the Chinese renewed their efforts for representation 1a 1940. In 1945 on our re-occupation of the Colony the Nationalists with our approval appointed a Mr. T.. Kwok aa Special Delegate in Hong Kong. Mr. Kwok faded away in 1949
on the approach of the Communists. (A note by the Research
Department is attached).
3.
Her Majesty'a Chargé d'Affaires in Peking is in favour
of accepting the present Chinese proposal. In Peking telegram
no. 135 he argued that:
(a)
The proposal amounts in effect to Chinese
recognition of the status quo in Hong Kong
at any rate in the immediate future; (b) It would provide an official channel for
conducting business, and relieve
organisations such as the New China News
Agenoy and the China Travel Service of the
quasi-consuler functions which they now
perform;
/(0)
+
+
+
(c) It might contribute to an increase in the
proportion of traâs with China channelled
through Hong Kong.
Although the Governor of Hong Kong has set out his opposition
to the proposal (see paragraph 4 below) Kr. O'Neill has
returned to the charge. He argues that although the present
Chinese Government may find it of advantage to accept our
presence in Hong Kong now and possibly for some time to come,
they do not intend to accept it indefinitely. Therefore,
though at present they may have no intention of pushing
matters to extremes, their policy is not entirely passive,
and if we reject their present proposal they may feel it
necessary to accelerate their programme for taking over the
Colony, choosing means much more embarrassing than the
present proposal to create difficulties for us in Hong Kong.
He adds that in any case it would be difficult to find
grounds to explain our rejection of the proposal (Peking
telegram no. 19).
4.
The Governor of Hong Kong'a arguments against
accepting the Chinese proposal are cogently set out in Hong
Kong savingram no. 460. They are:
(a) Any Chinese representative in Hong Kong
would be bound to interest himself in
matters which were in our view beyond his
competence e.g. immigration controls and
court cases involving China's "sovereign
immunity", and would certainly, as the
representative of "the motherland", I
participate in the many left-wing
activities in the Colony.
/(b)
Flag D
Flag E
-14
Flag F
76.
5.
(b) The present informal and low level
contacts with the Hong Kong offices
of Chinese official bodies suit our
purposes since they can to a large
extent be used or ignored as we please.
(e) The existing Chinese Communist
commercial organisations in Hong Kong
are well able to facilitate any increase
in trade.
(a) The appointment would have a bad effect
on the local inhabitants who would
regard it as a first step in the
Chinese take-over and as evidence
that we were unable to resist pressure
from the Communista.
The Colonial Secretary bas informed us that he finds the
Governor's arguments quite conclusive, and adds that if the
acceptance of a Chinese representative in Hong Kong gave the
Chinese Government the slightest grounds to press for
representation elsewhere in our territories, for example, in
Singapore, it should be resisted on that ground alone,
6.
We too are impressed by the Governor's argumente.
We cannot agree with Mr. O'Neill that the proposal indicates
any readiness on the part of the Chinese to accept the status
quo in Hong Kong. We would regard it rather as a further and
dangerous step in Chipese efforts to undermine our position
there. As the Governor rightly pointa out, it must be judged
in the general context of various recent Chinese efforts (which
have already caused us concern) to bring the people of Hong
Kong into ever closer relationship with the mainland, and to
suggest that Hong Kong is part of mainland China. They are,
for instance, busily trying to promote cultural exchanges,
unrestricted travel over the border and visits to exhibitions
/and
congresses in Canton. A Chinese official representative would
be bound to maintain that he had a right to be consulted about
ell measures in Hong Kong likely to affect Chinese nationals.
He might insist on being represented at all court cases affecting
people of Chinese race and he might claim to exercise jurisdiction
over Kowloon Walled City. His presence could hardly fail to place
the Governor in a most embarrassing position particularly since he
would no doubt try to get himself regarded as "gauleiter" designate
ready to take over from the Governor when Hong Kong should rovert
to China. Although we recognise the Communist Government, the
Hong Kong authorities have tried to take a strictly neutral
line between the Communists and Nationalists in Hong Kong and
have been prepared to treat all persons of Chinese race on a
basis of equality provided they behave themselves in the Colony.
If we accepted a Chinese Communist official representative it
would be increasingly difficult to follov such a policy,
particularly since the latter could be expected to exploit bis influence to the detriment of Chinese of non-Communist sympathies.
Mr. O'Neill is of course right to remind us that the
Chinese if they so desire have great capacity for mischier in
Hong Kong By withholding food supplies from the mainland or
by stirring up labour troubles, particularly in the public
utilities, they could indeed make our position very difficult.
But we must look at the situation in its international context.
It is no doubt true that China intends to recover Hong Kong in
the end but the timing of the operation will depend vary
largely on what happens in Formosa. As long as the Nationalists
remain in Formosa under United States protection the Chinese are
likely to be impressed with the risks of trying to force the
issue in Hong Kong. Even if they did increase the pressure on
Hong Kong by means short of armed attack, much would still
depend on the local morale. It is important therefore that we
7.
/should
+
+
Americans, but they have been at great pains to divide us from
the Americans and they may well prefer not to jeopardise this
objective.
Recomendations
11.
It is recommended that:
(a) We should not agree to Chinese representation
in Hong Kong.
(b) We should not reply to the Chinese communication
for the present but when the Chinese remind us,
should give a temporizing reply.
(a) The Colonial Secretary should be informed of
our views on the lines of the attached draft.
(d) Her Majesty'a Chargé d'Affaires in Peking
should be informed of our decisions in due
course.
-
C.F. Crove April 11, 1956.
Flag G
+
Since the above was typed we have received further comments from Hong Kong, prompted by Peking's telegram no. 190 discussed in paragraph 2 above. The Governor is evidently afraid that we may accept the proposal and is searching for ways to impose delay and to make it as little harmful as possible. He accordingly suggests that, if we do accept, we make the appointment conditional on the prior exchange of Ambassadors. This does not seem either feasible or desirable. We do not
want to exchange Ambassadors at this stage and even if we did the initiative should come from the Chinese. All proposals for an exchange bave in the past come from us and we do not want to appear to be running after the Chinese any more on this. Moreover, it seems doubtful whether the appointment of
16.
/a
should maintain that morale.
We can best do this by
making it clear that we intend to remain in Hong Kong,
that we are not going to give way to gradual Communist
encroachment, and that there is therefore no immediate
need to re-ipsure with the Communista.
8.
We have examined whether we might not overcome
some of the dangers of the present proposal by agreeing to
the appointment of a Trade Commissioner with strictly limited
functione. We doubt if there would be advantage in this.
The Chinese are unlikely to accept it; and ip any case whatever
the official was called, the embarrassments from his presence
are likely to be much the same,
9.
We
As Mr. O'Neill points out, it will be difficult to give
an outright refusal to this seemingly friendly proposal.
might on this occasion therefore take a leaf from the
Communist book and make no reply at all for the time being.
When the Chinese revert to it, Mr. O'Neill might after
consulting us be instructed to say that the proposal raised
many complicated issues which were still under consideration.
If a substantive reply wore unduly @layed, it would of course
be clear to the Chinese that we had in fact rejected their
proposel; but this tactic would make it more difficult for
them to accuse us of open unfriendliness.
10%.
The Chinese will certainly be angry at our failure to
take up their offer. Coming after the Nationalist sircraft
incident and the refusal to send a Parliamentary delegation
they may conclude that their seemingly friendly policy has failed and adjust their plans accordingly.
But it is difficult
to say whether they would decide to accept the situation for the
time being or try to increase our difficulties in Hong Kong.
They should be aware however that a more actively bostile policy
towards Hong Kong would only drive us into the arms of the
/Americana
+
4
a Chinese representative after an exchange of Ambassadors
would in fact have a lesa harmful effect on morale in Hong
Kong, and it would in no way remove the other dangers to
which we have drawo attention in paragraph 6.
In the circumstances I do not wish to alter our
recommendations. There seems little doubt that they will
be acceptable to the Governor since he still clearly dislikes
the proposal intensoly.
I bave amended the draft to the Colonial Secretary
to take account of this telegram.
Y
18. M.
стать #/
I agree with these recommendations
Jagree
and the draft letter to the Colonial Secretary.
Sic 1. Kirkpatrick
Dallm. "14.
Lord Reaching
See. of siali
I Mishpahish
I think this is right.
3
LAY
11.4.
we pas hedly the tess, which
weary, Simpsport
GE
KOSI
wah úe dua-duan
Работен
P
|~ 13/4
E
ECRET ·
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES
FROM HONG KONG (Sir A. Grantham)
Simplex
D. 7th April, 1956.
R. 7th
SECRET AND GUARD
No. 278.
13.00 hrs.
с-рос
Addressed to S. of S.
FC 1143/619/
Repeated to Peking, No. 105, and by saving to
Washington, No. 26, and
Commissioner-General, South East
Asia, No. 36.
(S. of S. please pass to Peking
and Washington).
Peking telegram No. 150 to Foreign Office and your
telegram No. 275 to me.
Chinese Representation in Hong Kong.
While I still dislike the proposal intensly, I realise that it may be difficult to reject it and that to do so might create other difficulties. If, however, the appointment were made after Her Majesty's Government and the Chinese Government had exchanged Ambassadors, the effect on local moral would not initially be anything like so bad as if it were made in advance of this.
If it were made after such an exchange it would be accepted here as the next logical step in the normalising of relations between Her Majesty's Government and Hong Kong on the one hand and the Chinese Government on the other. If, however, it were made in advance it would be regarded as evidence that we were unable to resist pressure from Peking. I am sure that you will appreciate the importance of local moral, particularly at this juncture when Hong Kong is being subjected to a cultural offensive (see David's letter to Johnston of 29th March).
2=
I therefore strongly urge that the matter be played in this way, i.e. that the Chinese should be told that we are not prepared to discuss the appointment of further representatives of the two Governments in each other's territories until relations have been normalised by the exchange of Ambassadors.
3. Moreover, if Ambassadors were exchanged there would no longer be the same advantage from the Hong Kong point of view in obtaining agreement to the appointment of a Consular Officer in Canton, to which I understand the Commissioner- General for South East Asia sees objection since it might lead to a request from the Chinese for the appointment of Consuls in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur.
4. I agree that if the appointment had to be accepted it would not be practicable to define closely the
/Commissioner's
[
E
+
I
ནི་མི་
Commissioner's functions. It should, however, be laid down that he should not concern himself with the internal affairs of the Colony or with matters of policy, which latter are for Her Majesty's Government and the Chinese Government to discuss in London or Peking.
5. I would also suggest that if in due course we decided that we must accept the proposal we should also prepare the ground in advance with the Americans, to whom I presume such an appointment would be most unpalatable, with the possible effects for the Colony suggested in paragraph 5 of my savingram No. 460. should therefore like to tip off in advance the American Consul General here.
I
:
(Copies sent to. Foreign Office for repetition
to Peking and to Foreign Office Bag Room for despatch to Washington).
+
+
F
Cypher/UTP
Mr. O'Neill
No: 190
Larch 26, 1956
FROM PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
D'PARTEITI, DISTRIBITION
D. 7.10 c.p. larch 26, 1956. R. 12.14 p.. March 26, 1955.
PAJORITY
L&C 1143/5.
fdressed to Foreign Office telemi a
Repeated for information to:
Hong Kong,
Singapore,
And Saving to: Washington.
J.
Hy telegram No. 135: Chinese Representation in Hong Kong.
1143/4
I have now seen Hong Kong toleran No. 460 Saving to tho Colonial Office. In spite of its argments, I still consider that we ought to accept the Chineso Govoricent's proposaï.
2. I fully agree that it raises Amazontal issues on ou position in Hong Kong. No doubt the Chinese were well aware of this when they made it. Nor do I doubt that the Chinese Commissioner's presence would frequently create awkward problems.
But I still believe the appointment would have some countervailing advantages from our point of view of the kind suggested in ny telegram under reference,
3. It is, I think, agreed that the present Chinese Govarmat does not intend to accept our possession of Hong Kong indefinitely. Their present acceptance of it is due largely to the fact that the independence of Hong Kong is, at the moment, of advantage to them. It may continua to be so far same timo, But læp undeo. ? the situation] is evolving; and though at presont the Chinese Goverment has no intention of pushing matters to extremes, their policy in relation to Hong Kong is not entirely passivo, as this proposal shovs. It may bè, as the Governm says, that we were able to coexist nare easily in Hong Kong in the past few years "I? grp omitted] cool aloofness", but that does not make it any easier to reject a proposal which is, on 1955 the face of it, forthcoming and friendly. For the absence of
Chinese Goverment representative in liong Kong could now be
/regarica
IK
MKA
A
48
SPOR VI
Peking taleman No. 190 de creign Office,
2
regarded as an anozaly which it is reasonable to correct. At this stage I believe it to ts in our interests to make the best of this particularly bad job.
2. It would certainly be difficult to find grounds to explain our rejection of this proposal. And I believe that if ve ủo reject it, we shall run greater risks then wo should incw by accepting it. The Chinese might then feel it necessary to accelerate the programme they have presumably established in relation to liong Kong, choosing means that would be more cabarrassing to us than the passence of their Commissioner in the colony; and when the Chinese decide to attempt to make the position of Hong Kong untenable, tho presence or absence of a Commissioner will scarcely affect their ability to do so. But to reject this proposal night advance the date of such a decision.
5. If we do accept this proposal, I doubt whether it would be wise to seek an agreed definition of the Chinese Commissioner's functions because
(1) it would be hard to reach
(11) it would be hard to hold him to it if we did reach it,
and
(111) vo shall probably not get one more harmless on the
-12
surface than what ve already have (my telegan No. 132).
Foreign Office pass Hong Korg, Singapore and Washington as ny telegrans 113, 17 and 66 Saving.
[Repeated to Singapore and saving to Washington.
Copy sent to Telegraph Section C.0. for repetition to Hong Kong).
DISTRIBUND 40:
Far Eastern Department
South-East Asia Department
Economic Relations Department
Kutual Aid Department
Hews Department
X X X X X
i
Secretariat 2/1126/50.
SAVINGRAH
To the Secretary of State for the Colonies
From the Governor, Hong Kong
Dato..!!
No.
March, 1956
·
+
Rptd:-
PEKING
WASHINGTON 22
Com.-Gen.
SINGAPORE,
19 MAN 1955
GUARD
ן -
+
A
Peking telegram No. 185 to Foreign Office.
Chinese representation in Hong Kong.
From Hong Kong's point of view this is a most embarrassing request. I agree that it amounts to recognition of the status quo in the short term but the ultimate aim of incorporation of Hong Kong in Kwangtung would presumably remain unaffected and such an appointment might indeed be only a hastening step in that direction.
2.
The last Nationalist representative here (T.W. Kwok), who held the title of "Special Commissioner of the Chinese Ministry for Foreign Affairs", although in the circumstances of the time generally friendly, could be troublesome on occasions, e.g. in interesting himself in cases of individual Chinese residents and in claiming a position superior to that of a normal consular officer. There is, I fear, litt. doubt that any officer of the present Chinese Government, whatever his title, would set himself up as the Chinese representative in Hong Kong and would interest himself, to our embarrassment, not only in the recurring points of friction between this Government and the Chinese (immigration controls, the "Kashmir Princess", the Nationalist sabrojot, the introduction of Chinese "culture" into the Colony and Court cases involving China's "sovereign immunity" are instances which come to mind), but also, as the representative of the "motherland", in the many loft- wing activities in the Colony (trade unions, schools, etc.). In the former, this friction is, at present, to some extent cushioned by distance and by the channel of approach through H... Chargé d'Affaires at Peking. Continual representations locally by a Chinese represent- ative would serve only to increase the friation without removing mis- understandings. In the long run I am not sure that this would not even make things more difficult for H.M, Chargé d'Affaires, since such representations here might only make necessary yet further represent- ations and explanations in Peking. As regards local left-vity; activities, the representative would, no doubt, take these generally under his wing, attending banquets, making speeches and organising shows on overy possible occasion. He could also easily become a "Court of Appeal" for Chinese residents in their relations with local authorities.
5.
I am not impressed by the suggestion that such an appointment would facilitate trade. The Bank of China and the China Resourcus Company already have offices here capable of handling financial and trade matters and there are four other Chinese State or Semi-State owned organisations and at least a hundred private concerns handling the Chinese import and export trade.
4.
It is true that an official representative would, no doubt, absorb some of the present unofficial functions of the New China Nows Agency and the China Travel Service. I do not, however, consider that this would be to our advantage. Such contacts as we have with those organisations are, at present, informal and at a low level and, to a
/large
SEORET
GUARD
2.
}
large extent, we can use them or ignore them as we please, just as wo can ignore the Percy Chens and the Ko Cheuk Hungs. Nor am I suro that an official representative would become the central point for Chinese clandestine activities. I think it more likely that the present organisations would continue to act independently, each in its own sphere, as they appear to do at present, under direction from Canton, and I do not think that the presence of an official representative would make this aspect of the situation either better or worse, except perhaps in so far as he might claim immunity for his staff, his promises and his correspondence. Whether or not immunity were recognised, it would be most embarrassing if Chinese wanted by the Police were to seek asylum in his premises.
5.
Such an appointment would, I fear, almost certainly have a bad effect on local morale, since it would be regarded as evidence that ! we were unable to resist pressure from the Communist regime. Neutralists and "fence-sitters" would then be the more inclined to throw in their lot with the Communists. This might to some extent be mitigated if we obtained some reciprocal facility, such as the reappointment of a Consul (under whatever title) in Canton. But I fear that a strong impression would remain that this was but a first step in the Chinese "take-over". (On the basis of a remark made to me by Ko Cheuk Hung, after his return from Peking, I mentioned the possibility of such a request at a recent Executive Council meeting. The reaction of the Chinese members was that such an appointment would have a bad effect), The Americans might also read it, and developments arising from it, as a first step in our surrender of Hong Kong and be the core inclined to regard the Colony as "expendable". It is possible that some people, particularly in the long term, might interpret the move as a belated recognition by the Chinese authorities of Hong Kong's status and a normalising of our relations with China. This could have a beneficial effect an morale, but I do not think this would outweigh the immediately adverse effect.
The
6.
As regards the title, I agree that that suggested by the Chinese would probably be least offensive from our point of view. title of Consul-General (which I agree the Chinese would, in any case, be unlikely to accept) would, unless otherwise specified, carry with it the right to protect Chinese nationals, i.e. to interfere in every case involving most of the population, while that of "Special Commissioner" would imply some sort of priority over other Commissioners, such as those from the Commonwealth, I fear, however, that, whatever the title (except perhaps that of "Trade Commissioner", which I imagine the Chinese would not accept), we should have great difficulty in defining, or confining, the representative's functions. If we were to avoid constant friction it would be important to have his functionS clearly defined; on the other hand, apart perhaps from trade promotion, it is difficult to see what they would be and it is most unlikely that we and the Chinese authorities could agree on a definition. T.W. Kwok'a functions were never defined. We would, I prosume, refuse to discuss with him matters of policy on the grounds that these were for H.. G. in the United Kingdom and the Chinese Government to discuss with the accredited diplomatic representatives in London and Poking. But the borderline, e.g. in such matters as Immigration Controls or the running of a through train to Canton might be difficult to define. We should like to lay it down that he should not interfere in the internal affairs of the Colony (such a condition was apparently envisaged in the agreement reached for appointment of a Consul-General in 1941 - Sir Mark Young's despatch of 29th July, 1946, copied to H., Ambassador at Nanking under cover of Hong Kong despatch No. 10 refera); but this again might bo difficult to define (or to get the Chinese to accept) and, in any case, I fear that he would so interfere. We might then have to declare him persona non grata and ask for his removal. Finally, we must regard this proposal in the general context of the current prossure to bring
THE
L
/the
PGFD/guh
SECRET
3.
GUARD
the people of Hong Kong into ever closer relationship with their compatriots on the mainland. The campaign, which will no doubt increase, for cultural exchanges, unrestricted travel over the border, visits to exhibitions in Canton, etc., are all designed to draw the population of Hong Kong more and more into the orbit of the People's Government. This type of insidious pressure is going to be far more difficult to meet and counter than overt hostility; it will be doubly so if it is openly
organised and directed by an accredited representative in our midst.
7.
As seen from here, the whole proposal bristles with difficulty and embarrassment. The Chinese will, of course, represent it as a manifestation of their desire for "peaceful coexistence". I am not sure, however, that we did not "coexist" more easily in the past few years of "cool aloofness" than we do now in an atmosphere of blandishment ani pressure. For the reasons given above, I doubt whether the appointment of a Chinese Representative would improve this situation.
י
+
+
Cypher/OMP
Hr. O'Neill
No. 135
F
CONFI DENTI, AL
FROM PIKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
€1143/2
DEPARTMENTAL
DISTRIBUTION
D.8.25 a.m. February 27,1956
R.9.54 a.a. February 27,1955
February 27,1956
CONTIDENTIAL
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 135 of February 27 Repeated for information to:- Hong Kong
and Saving to
Washington Singapore
FC114211
Hy telegram No. 132: Chinese representations in
nong Kong.
As seen from here this proposal appears acceptable and indeed welcome.
FED
2. My reasons for this view are
(a)
it amounts in effect to Chinese recognition of the status quo in Hong Kong and, as such, can perhaps be taken as an indication of the Chinese Government's intention to respect that status at all events for the immediate future. Title of Commissioner has been chosen to avoid the admission (which would follow from the title of Consul General) that Hong Kong is foreign territory; but I understand that the Chinese Government's representative in Hong Kong before 1949 was likewise known as a Special Commissioner. It is clear from the present proposal that the Commissioner would represent the Chinese Kinistry of Foreign Affairs and not some other departuent or the Chinese Government as a whole;
(b) though this is rather for the Governor of Hong
Kong than ayself to judge, it seems from here that the establishment of such an office would be convenient in several respects. It would provide an official channel for conducting business and
/relieve...
IA
CONFIDENTIA,
Ne
Poking telegram No. 135 to Foreign Office
-2-
relieve organizations, such as the New China News Agency and the China Travel Service, of the functions they now exercise in Hong Kong. Chinese Government already no doubt have
The
numerous agents of various kinds in Hong Kong and it is perhaps as well that there should be one central point;
(c) the proposal may indicate Chinese intentions to
increase the proportion of Chinese imports and exports channelled through Hong Kong.
3. You and the Governor of Hong Kong will, no doubt, consider whether, if we wish to accept this proposal, the opportunity should be used to ask for any reciprocal concessions in China e.g. in Canton.
Foreign Office pass to Hong Kong and Saving to Washington and Singapore as ay telegrams Nos. 72,4 and 24.
[Repeated Saving to Washington and Singapore and copy
sent to Telegraph Section C.0. for repetition to Hong Kong].
DISTRIBUTED TO:-
Far Eastern Department
South East Asia Department Economic Relations Departaent Hutual Ald Department
News Department
+
Cypher/OTP.
Mr. O'Neill
No: 132
CONFIDENTIAL
FROM PEKING 20 FOREIGN OFFICE
DEPARTAFNTAL DISTRIBIETOE
D: 6.14 a.m. February 25, 1956. R: 8.52 a.m. February 25, 1956.
February 25, 1956.
CONFIDENTIAL
C143
Addressed to Foreign Office telerran No: 132 of February 25 Repeated for information to:
Hong Kong.
and Saving to:
Washington.
Singapore.
Hong Kong.
The Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to call this morning. Reading from a prepared text he said that in view of increasing business relations between Hong Kong and the Interior and in order to facilitate negotiations of common interest and discussion of commercial questions, the Chinese Government would like to establish in Hong Kong an office of a Commissioner of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. The office would consist of a Commissioner together with diplomatic and other staff. He asked me to convey this to you and said that the Chinese Government would like to learn the views of Her Majesty's Government.
2. I will telegraph my comments Monday.
Foreign Office pass Washington and Singapore as my Saving telegrams Nos: 39 and 21.
[Repeated Saving to Washington and Singapore]
DISTRIBUTED TO:
For Eastern Department,
South-East Asia Department.
Economic Relations Department. Mutual Aid Department.
JJJJJ
25
FED
1903
AN
MIMISE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION AT HONG KONG
Loth theso papers were written sa historical minutos for the information of Par Jastern Department and it is not intended that they shall have eny further aistribution. Their inclusion in the list of Resoorch Papers was inadvertent.
+
F.O.R.D.
China section April 12, 1956.
9062/237/10
1941.
CHIEBE CHICIAL REPR BENTATION AT HONG FORU
The quertion of the appointment of a Chinoro Conrul- vôneral at Hong Kong was fir:t raised in 1869 and was r.polutely opposed by the Hong Yong morcontile community, who Jure ofraid that the prosunce in the Colony of such en Officer would create a contro of intrigue and that ho woulo insist on putting his finger in the pie concerning mattera offectin, anyone of chinos3 ruco - born or of chinose notionelity - a question which was Rodo
whother Hun, Zong the Lore complicɛ ted by the oxistence of dual nationality.
The Chinoso request was refused and wetter romainuŭ quiescent, but nimwring only jugt below the surface, until the autumn of 1940, when the Chinese Government once more returned to the charge.
The Hong Kong Government recom...onded that the appointment be a reed upon, subject to two conditions:
+
(a) "That it would be clearly understood by both sidos that
this functionary would not be privileged to reprosent the views of kriti. h citizeno of chinese race or of Chincse citizons domiciled in Hun。 Kon, on questions relating to the domestic affairs of the colony and
(b) that he would not be a party to any attempt to invado
Iritish sovereignty in this Colony"
Those conditions were questioned by the Chinese Government, who wished it clearly understood that they would not ocbar the Consul Gonorel from performing all the normal functions of a consular representativo,
And, on re-consideration, it was not thought advisable to insist too strictly on the unreserved acceptance by the 41750/207/10 Chinese Government of stipulation (a), especially in respect of Chinona citizens who were not also Eritich subjects.
1942
T
In agreement with the Coloniel authorities, therefore, 1...'‚Ambassador at Chungking was instructed to inform the Chinese Government that:
P.150,4/287/10
1541
4/02/15/
1946
"the consul-venerol will cortainly be permitted to
perform all the normal r'unctions of a consular roprenentative gant from one country to another which oro generally recognised by international los and usage provided that it is cloorly under- atood that we expect him to cenform to tho stipulatione previously laid down.
Owing to the outbreak of war with Japan, howovor, this royly does not appocr cvor to have boon sunt to the chinese Haniator for Foreign Affairs.
At the timo of negotiating the re-opening of major ritish consuler posto in chine in 1940, the offer to accept
1
-
the point...nt of a Chinoso Consul-enorol in long Fon, wES Ponovou. Who Chinero appear to avo boun takan aback at
this offer. They Lode a va uo roforonco to it in conversation, but never replied to the official communication.
In augtember, 1945, the officer Administering the Govern...unt of ton, Fon au_estod to ... Ambassador ot Chun,- king th: t il Chinuse Government to invited to necrodit a .7/10 Liaison Officer to Hong Kong, "pendin ̧ consideration of the
appointment of a Chinose Consul-jon÷ről,"
+
10
2075/1957/10
1549
+
A note from the chinese inistry of "oreign Affairs _r.od in principle to the "atetioning by the Chinong overnment of on of icin in on Yon, in orace to koop compot in political end aconomical spheros" and nominated a
1.INOK, Special Lulo_ato of the Kinistry of Forei_n
cire in Tuan,tung and Hwan si, to act temporarily and "concurrently with his other dutics"
11. TWO duly arrived in lien, Kon, in lovonber, 1945, but Bo GoOs not appear to have presentad any credentials, nor does it seam that seny officiel intimation of his official decignation ever reached the liong Kon, Govern.ont.
In Doculber, 1949, ur. Fyor pakod for advance informa- tion concernin_ reco_nition of the Communists.
Ho was told that he could not have this informotion. His requoot was intorproted at the time as indicating a wish to meke his peace with the Communists end to stay on in Hong rong in has officiel capacity. There is nothing to chow if he did, in fact, opproach the Communists, but r. KWOK Booms to have quietly faded away.
Towards the end of December, 1945, there was a Lood dval of correspondence concernin, the title of the Chinung representative in Bong Kon ̧ after the chengo ovor. It wee finally egroud that the Chinoso representativo should not to a Concul-general, but at the som time it was not desirable that the title should be "special Commissioner" og this title has boun gonorally used for Chinose posts in China itsolf. The Governor of Hong Kon, Buggested that parhope it Light be possible to arrange for soms auch alternativo as "Rouresentative in Hon, Zon, of the Chinese Linistry of Porción Affairs" or other siciler title.
30 far as it is possible to trace, there the mattor hao rosted until the receipt of Peking Telogram Nos. 152 and 135 of 1956.
for Castorn repart...ont.
(A.S. Comple11)
1:3:56
China Soction. F.0.R.D.
(r. Symon).
P.S. From a momorandum propored in Hong Kong in 1949 and untered in 7.16732/1909/10, attached, it would appear that in 1:57, tho Chinose Government appointed a "Special Comissioner for Foreign Affairs for "wongtung and Kwangol", ke oppoare to have bean a refugee frol, Cinton end it is not stated if he was recognised as e chinoco officiel in the colony by the Hong Kon ̧ Government, or merely allowed to carry on whatever his Chinese Government functions were and no questiona eskod by the on, Fon, authoritios.
Howhere can I find it statod what Kr. "wok'e official functions were when he returned to Hon, Fon, in Novu...ber 1945, Lat I have an id.e that he was chiefly concerned with chinese pasaport.. Pare. 9 of the Hong Kong monorandum in .16732 statoa that a Chinese Consuler Invoico office was opuned in 1954 "thus partly establishin, a precedent for openings a Consulatu."
[
1906)
יז
ST. DER KLEMATION IN HONG-KONG
hin vory complicated quortion is not coped by the fret that normal diplo..ntic relations Latween the U.7. (nd Chẳng hrvo not yet boon ontabilched. The position of the krit.ch consulato-Gonoral in gh nühel on an office of the Chrup d'affaires and not a consuleto odos ctron_th to the Chinesa request for the appointment of a special Comissioner rather tha: a consul-General in Hon Yung.
clearly, in recent years the Chinoru have deliberatoly ovoided Loking the appointment of a conruler ofiicer, undor that nolo, to lion on.... The reason bein, of course, that tic appointment of a consul or concul-General woule declero waforu the world, and Lore importent still to thy Chino.o public, China's reco"nition of Kong ron's foreign stɩ tua.
When, in ruptomber, 19hp, the Officer foministering the Govern ent of lion, rong supported that the chines0 Goverment occrcolt a Liaison Officer to Hon, Yon, "pending consideration of the appointment of a chinoco cuncul-Jeneral, the Chinono Pinistry of Porción Af.oirs were quick to a ̧rJo in principle to the stetioning of an officiɛl in fion, Yonj in order to keep contact in political and economic sphorus. No mention vos naue of any intention to appoint e concul- Juncr: 1. Dr. 7707, the Special polente of the Ministry of Povuijn Affairs in Tvantung and won_ci, was nominc tod to fill the post of Liaison Oficer in Hon, Yon, "concurrently
th his other dutios". Thur the Chinuco contention that nong Fon, was Chinoso territory was not contradicted.
L
·
In 1949 tha Hong Kong Govern, ont were worried ovo. tho question of Chinoso representation in the Colony after the rscomition of the People's Government. It was then Generelly @grood that the Chinone representative should not
06 Concul-Gunoral, and that it was not decireblo also that he should boar the title of "Opucir 1 Commiss_onor", a title gener:lly used for Chinoso posts in China itnolí. The Governor puglected that parh pa some such alternative Ra....3 DG "Represantetive in Hon, Yong of the Chinose Ministry of Toreign Affairs" might to scceptod.
י.
What the difference between "spacial Commission-1" and "peprosontativu in Heng Fon, of the chinose inirtry of Jorelyn Afisirs" is, or just what the objection woo to whot would see.. infinitely the more profertblo title of Consul-uner: 1, is not cicar. Fut it will be interestin to 800 what the Governor of Hong Kong's reactions or to the procent ruquest, which is, in effect, a requ at for the ecc...tance of a "Representative in Hon Xon of the Cuinese : inistry of Poreign Affairs". The title in chinuse would 1. likely "Chucn yuon" or "z'e p'si yuan" either colca to the sole thing.
Chinese
The orun of the question soome t mo to lie botw.on the appointment of a Chinese consul-conaral, thus vinifying Chineco rd...ittance that Hong Ton, is not Chinore territory, ona a Chinoco Goverment official residing in the colony under any other titlo bo it commissioner, Spocial Commissionur, or representativo susceptible of preserving the chinopy misrepresentation of ownership of the icland. The letvor is probably the chief reason for the desire to
/appoint
appoint an officially recognised reprosentativo at all; althou_h othor advants,os, vorticularly in connexion with the bringing to book of K.M.F. cgenta, may also be envisaged.
Prosume bly, internationel custom would prevent the suje. tion that a consul-General be appointed to Hon, Yong before diplomatic relations between the two countries have boca regularised. I cannot help feelin, however, that the safest answer to the Chinese request, at any reto in the first instance, would be that the Hong Kong vovernment are prepared to acquioace in a roquest, if formally prosented, for the immediate nomination of a spocial Liaison Officer, pending the appointment of a Chinese Consul-General on the resumption of formal diplomatic relations between tho U.F. and China.
The Chinese ore scarcely likely to eccopt the proviso, but it geoms to me worth attempting.
Per Seatern pepartment.
(A. R. Campbell)
F.O.K.D. (China Scetion)
13/3/56
+
!
FED, FCO.
12/4/70
मद
With the Compliments of the
R.C. 2014 M. Compton
jecive. Enter +
RECEIVED IN!
Political Adviser. Y
H
Đúng rồng
1
3
20
CR 51026/49
4
CABLE AND WIRELESS LIMITED
COURT ROOM
ADRACINIY HOCHG-TILEGUDALING ROAN JONDDON WO+VILLEPHONE OVEN KANS
Dear Sir,
20th March, 1972
We refer to our letter PED/52017JER
dated 28th January, particularly paragraph two.
Apart from airline private leases we have had expression of considerable interest from news agencies including 'AFP, AP, UPI and Reuters for leases from China to Hong Kong.
It may be possible to provide temporary.
arrangements. pending finalisation of your general plans.
+
We should like to be able to discuss this and the other, matters in our previous letter to which we hope a favourable reply will be forthcoming in the not too distant future.
We also understand that a request has been made for a small party of engineers and officials, some of whom may presumably be from your administration, to visit our satellite stations in Hong Kong.
Please be assured that such a visit is most welcome and we shall be delighted to afford all the facilities and hospitality at our disposal.
:
Yours faithfully,
to H
# Davies.
W. H. Davies Director
Mr. Chung Fu-hsiang,
Director of the General Administration
of Telecommunications,
Peking,
Peoples Republic of China.
c.c. Political Advisèr.
P.M.G.
THI
+
+
20
:
+
+
COPY TO:
+
Director,
Telecommunications Administration of Shanghai, 34 Nanking Road (Eastern),
Shanghai,
Peoples Republic of China
+
Commercial Counsellor's Office,
Office of the British Chargò d'Affaires,'
5 Kuang Hua Lu,
1
Chier Kuo Man Wai,
Peking.
Peoples Republic of China.
Commercial Counsellor
+
Office of the Chargé d'Affaires
of the Peoples Republic of China,
G Gloucester Gate,
Regents Park,
London, N.W.1.
י
Mr. Wilfred Moore,
F. & C.O...
67B 1st Floor,
Gt. George Street,
London SW1A 2AH
The Secretary,
Sino British Trade Council
25 Queen Anne's Gate,
London, S.W.1.
The General Manager, Cable & Wireless Ltd.,. г.0. Box 597,
llong Kong
+
}
r
Γ
T
ן
+
=
Sir L Han O ON
CONFIDENTIAL
FE Regu
19
BRIEFS ON HONG KONG/CHINA RELATIONS
DRIKFO
I attach three briefu prepared by Far Eastern
1. They ar91-
ON FEN 14
17
2.
Brief He 10
Brief He 115
Confrontation Prisonera
Chinese Government Representatio in Hong Kong
Brief Me 121 Hong Kong/China Oo mimisationa
(Background)
draft. Hong Ious Department approved the briefe in
11 April 1972
se Mr Vilford (with enclosures)
Er Lairi
CONFIDENTIAL
11 Ivana
Far Eastern Department
SECRET
18A
Far Eastern Department
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
1. At his reception on 7 April the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires spoke to me about Mr Addis' talk with Chang Wen-chin on 27 March. He asked if we were giving consideration to the point which had been made on an earlier occasion by Chou En-lai to Mr Denson. I said that when Chang had raised the matter H M Ambassador had asked what exactly such a representative would be expected to do. Chang had replied that he did not know and I said that so far as we were concerned we should have to wait for further clarification. TO this Mr Pei said that there were unofficial representatives of China in several places in Hong Kong he mentioned Li Choh-chik in the Bank of China, whom he knows I know, and the NCNA - and said that he thought it would be more convenient if the Chinese Government could work through one official representative. Such a representative would be from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I said that it was interesting to have his ideas on what would be the task of the representative for whom the Chinese Government had asked, but that we must await the considered response of the MFA to Mr Addis question to Chang Wen-chin.
-
-
2. I thought it interesting that Mr Pei should have mentioned the representative as being an MFA man and his idea of the man's duties are clearly that he would in effect be a sort of Consul General. This, if we should in the fulness of time find ourselves forced to accept a representative, would at least limit his ability to damage Hong Kong's or our interest by becoming a focus for the Chinese people there or at least for the more militant elements. It also suggests that if we have eventually to have a representative if we were to insist on his calling himself Consul General we could equally try to ensure that he was assimilated as closely as possible to other Consuls General (and his "foreigmees" would be emphasised far more than if he were to use the title by which the MFA representative is known in other cities of China, eg Shanghai),
3. I do not think this conversation alters the way we are setting about considering this question. I would still like Mr Evans to review carefully the past history of this subject, including the point raised by Sir M MacLehose about a discrepancy in the record of Mr Denson's talk with Chou En-lai and the guide lines drafted for the Governor before he took up office. If this study is concluded before the Chinese revert to the question with Mr Addis and give us details of what they want their man to do, we can then put the matter to the Governor as we see it and ask for his considered reactions which we do not yet have. We might then discuss the matter with him when he comes home in May Sir L Mon son will also have a chance to talk informally to him in Hong Kong next week.
4. If the Chinese do come back to us with a "job specification" I would expect any negotiation of it to be detailed, complicated
SECRET
/and
SECRET
The
and lengthy (cf how long the exchange of Ambassadors took). Chinese have, of course, in the case of Hong Kong where they are the demandeurs means of putting pressure on us which were not open to us in the earlier negotiation,
5. Incidentally Mr Pei made no mention of the confrontation prisoners in his talk with me.
10 April 1972.
c.c. HKD
Sir L Monson
FS to Mr Royle PS
Mr Daunt
SECRET
हु
KM Wilford
CONFIDENTIAL
Brief No 12
BIR L MONSCA'S VISIT TO HONG KONG 14-22 APRIL
HONG KON//CHIFA O
HÒNG KON//CHINA COMMUNICATIONS (BACKGROUND)
1.
ree ways of improving communications between Hong Kong
and C ́áton are under consideration:
(1) The establishment of an improved telecommunication
link:
(11)
The rescheduling of train services,¿bo reduce present delays at the frontier; and
(iii)
The establishment of a direct air service between
Hong Kong and Canton.
(718)
Telecommunications link
2.
A telecommunications link (consisting of a 12-channel VHF At the times of the Spring and telephone link) already exists.
Autumn Canton Fairs this link is inadequate to cope with the traffic. Cable and Wirless have been pressing for some time for
The Chinese made it clear the establishment of a telex link.
last year that they were not prepared to discuss the catter in advance of an exchange of Ambassadors.
Mr Addis brosched the subjec
with the Chinese Foreign Ministry on 27 March.
He pointed out
that communications personnel in Hong Kong had already been in touch with the Chinese authorities and that discussions should be started between the people concerned in Hong Kong and Canton. The Foreign Ministry official undertook to have the matter looked into. It is quite possible that the Chinese may now respond
/positively.
CONFIDENTIAL
A
SECRET
3.
"he Governor's views remain as he expressed them in
paragraphs 8-16 of the paper on "Guidelines for the Governor-
Designate of Hong Kong" which he prepared before he left for Hong
Kong last Uctober (Hong Kong tel No 272). We have told him
f (PCO tel No 265 to Hong Kong) that his assessment of the implications
for Hong Kong of such representation remains the over-riding
consideration.
Our inclination is to play things long with the
Chinese; ie not to bring the subject up with them and to say if
they revert to it with us that we cannot respond until we know
what functions the Chinese would like an official representative
to have.
Line to Take
4.
Toss the Governor think that these are the right tactics?
What are his views on how we should play our hand when, as we must
assume they will, the Chinese define the functions they have in
mind?
Far Eastern Department
11 April 1972
SECRET
SECRET
BIR L MONGON'S VISIT TO HONG KONG 14-22 AFRIL
Brief No 11
CHINESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
Background
1.
During Mr Addis's call on the Head of the Western European and American Department on 27 March, the latter brought up the subject of official Chinese representation in Hong Kong (Feking
He reminded Mr Addi a
A, tel No 245 and paragraph 19 of the record).
C
that Chou En-lai had raised the subject with Mr Denson in March
1971. On that occasion (according to Chang Wen-chin), Chou En-lai
had asked whether it would be possible to send an official Chinese
representative to Hong Kong. What was the British Government's
reaction to Chou En-lai's proposals? In response to a question
from Mr Addis Chang said he would have to find out what functions
it was envisaged that an official representative should have.
2.
According to Mr Denson's record of his conversation with
Chou En-lai, Chou merely spoke of the illogic of our position in
maintaining a Consulate in Taiwan when the Chinese Government had
no official representative in Hong Kong. However, the account of
the interview distributed by the Chinese to leading Communists in
Hong Kong fave much greater prominence to the subject. Mr Addis'
views are set out in Feking tel No 251. Mr Addis recognises that
the next move is up to the Chinese, but expresses the hope that we can consider carefully whether the eventual response from Peking
contains the elements of a negotiable arrangement.
SECRET
13.
'
CONFIDENTIAL
positively.
(There has already been on significant development: -
a through telephone link between Hong Kong and Peking was opened
in mid February.)
Train Services
3. On the Hong Kong side there already exists a regular (roughly
hourly) service to the frontier. The present schedule on the
Chinese side is thoroughly inconvenient to passengers, There is
usually only one daily passenger service each way. The Embassy
in Peking may wish to raise, at some stage, the possibility of an
improvement in this service. There is no urgency about this.
The Governog, has suggested that, if and when the subject is taken
up, it should be discussed on a technical basis between the railway
managers on the two sides.
Air Link
4.
The Governor believes that a Hong Kong/Cgaton air service
would be of much greater potential convenience to both Hong Kong
and China than any improvement in the train service. Mr Addis
discussed the idea with the Chinese Foreign Ministry on 27 March.
The Chinese official responded positively to the suggestion, implying
that the exchange of Ambassadors had changed the situation. Previous
proposals for a link, he said, could not be seriously considered
because of political obstacles. The Embassy will pursue the subject
with the Chinese airline authorities. The Hong Kong sir authorities
will obviously have to be involved in any discussions,
Far Eastern Department
11 April 1972
CONFIDENTIAL
1
DIS' THEETING
EXTRACT FROM RECORD OF TIR ADDIS
DITH
THE DIRECTOR OF WEST EUROPEAN AND ATTERICAN DEPARTMENT
"
27 MARCH
direat nir link could be set up it would greatly freilit te trovel for vi iborn. How long would it toko t: fly tho distance? fíe Adis said that they thought about half-an-hour and that he would follow Chis question ur. La Obang said that he would have it followed up too.
19. A related question, Mr Chang said, erose from when in Korch 1971 frnier Chou in-lai had received Ir Denon end discussed r:lations between their two acumtrier. He had rrised the old question that o cọng the meny affairs which involved the llong Kong; authoritis in Shin Bone wore tken up with the centrel Government and some with the local authorities. This atote of affairs was nol convenient Ironier Chou had roked whether it would be possible to nond on official representative to llong, Kong. What was the Nitish relation? Nr. 2Judo ooi' that he would have 10 find cut. Jie would be glad to mako enquiries. Chong neil that this was an old question but a malter now la b boken up in the light of the now relations. betw on the two coun rien, which were now moving forward. US Aig naked whet Junations for the official the Chinese Gaveînions ned in Lind in making this proposal. lin Cheng replied but his inpression who that the original proposal wun for the 0. ingoo Ministry of for...ága A frizo to send a representative to long Kong. He would love to find out vhnt Auctions it was envionged that he should hove,
+
ח
7
20. lip Adia onid that he had ono other polul to raise. The ans87 would quite odun by sending a note to the Mill try of Foreign Aff ira about claim orising from Gov ennent mi eserci ̈1 property teken over in reenɩ geyre by th: Gaineso authori`ies. › 21 la kro puzz to plnue the British Government's position on rocord. Bo did not think that there would be any need for di cunsiong âu dotnil.
21.
Hr Addis enid he bed now come to the end of his list. Chu orid that he had rai.cd quite a large number of questions. All 1-10 #11 good ones and there Wers gf und3 for onsideřetion in 11 of them. They would orch bo dooll with and bat'led onɑ by ona.
ir A In said Uhrk bo thou, ht it was an excellon' ide to discuss suci. problems in e giural way and then follow than up in d.tail later. Orde agr ed aud nai that some of them clearly nooded to bo di cu sen vltà the Departaɛnto conc road. If obstacles arose in such discu elong họ and the Albanador could meet again to review thu me
!
CONFIDENTIAL
D
loss of face are minimised
of the Colony.
-
consistent with the security
7. I deal below briefly with the principal subjects which
have been brought to my attention during this period of
briefing.
8.
Chinese Representation in Hong Kong
Unless and until we are prepared to contemplate
changing the status of Hong Kong, the golden rule should
be to have the minimum of contact with the Chinese about
it which necessity requires.
9.
Necessity requires:
(a) arrangements about the practical local things
listed in Mr Wilford's minute. These are all
handled locally through tolerably well-established,
if diverse, channels. In so far as these channels
from time to time do not cope with specific problems,
it is usually the problems or the prevailing
Chinese mood which causes the trouble rather than
the channel. So far as I am aware, the Chinese
have never complained that their interests suffer
from the channels they are obliged to use;
(b) contacts with the Chinese Mission in London and
with the MFA in Peking about matters of principle
and policy or about local matters which local
Hong Kong channels are unable to deal with for
one reason or another.
10. This balancing of contacte between semi- or unofficial
/tuveaux
3. CONFIDENTIAL
+
1
T
I
tuveaux in Hong Kong and official exchanges. in London
and Peking is the traditional method. To work this system
most arrangements must be dealt with on the local Hong
Hong nets, both because this is common-sense, and because
otherwise our exchanges with the Chinese in London and
Peking would become over-loaded with Hong Kong affairs and
the latter would become too vulnerable to ephemeral:
political pressures in China.
But
11. The system just works enough to be supportable.
it does look very odd indeed, and it is hard to justify
logically our refusal to recognise an official Chinese
Representative in Hong Kong through whose office all this
business could pass. Particularly since in practice most
business already is conducted by offices in the Bank of
China building under the overall direction of Leung Wai-lam,
the holder of a diplomatic passport. I do, however, agree
with Mr Morgan that this is something which we must resist.
12. A Chinese Representative in Hong Kong might just be
acceptable if the relationship between Hong Kong and China
was defined and agreed. But without this there can be
no limit to what he could dlaim as his legitimate sphere of
activity, or to what his objectives might be, or to what
Communists would expect of him. It would be intolerable
for a Chinese Representative in Hong Kong to adopt a low
posture and, in any case, the Communist cadrea would not
/allow
L
4.
CONFIDENTIAL
..
:
+
allow him to do so, On the other hand, if he adopted a
high posture he would amount to an alternative governor
and sooner or later a trial of strength would occur.
Incidentally he would be a sitting duck for any agent
provocateur with a gun or bomb.
13. So far the Chinese Government has never pressed for
an official representative though they have made
occasional references to the possibility. The last one,
by Chou En-lai, in March, was typical. He did not ask
for an official representative in Hong Kong but in an
exchange about Taiwan said it was illogical for us to
maintain the Consulate in Tamsui when the Chinese did
not have a Representative in Hong Kong. But the local
Communists in Hong Kong have been encouraged to claim
in private that representation is now a major Chinese
objective.
14. For my part, I think it arguable that Peking is
fully aware of the situation described in paragraph 8,
and will not push a demand for Representation to the
limit unless and until a decision has been taken gradually
to change the status of the Colony. In this case official
representation would be a logical first step.
15. So I think that so long as we see no advantage in negotiating about the future of the Colony, we must stick to the present system of contacts and communications and
1
1
5.
CONFIDENTIAL
!
/stand
I
1
·
T.
1
stand firm against, or better still ignore, any half-
hearted moves by the Chinese to alter it. If the Chinese
started to press really hard we would have to reconsider
in the light of what we believed the implications of the
pressure were.
16. I have asked the Political Adviser in Hong Kong to be
ready to advise me, on my arrival, whether there is some
small gesture I could make to Leung Wai-lam, the Head of
NONA, which would be seen as a concession but would not
advance his position to an extent that would alarm the
Hong Kong establishment. Unfortunately, he has the reputa-
tion of being an implacable enemy of the Hong Kong
Government and I fear that little would be gained, and
much might be lost, by opening up a personal if unofficial
dialogue with him.
Confrontation prisoners
17. Chou En-lai has picked this out as the major item of
interest to him in Hong Kong at present. In view of the
numbers released since he spoke to Mr Denson for the time
being we can point to a generous response. But it appears
from Sir Hugh Norman-Walker's letter of 13 September that
no further releases are likely in 1972 under present criteria
or procedures. My present inclination is not to accept
thie
as failure to maintain momentum on this issue might
prejudice my entire governorship with Peking with all that
this would imply.
18. I realise the delicacy of this issue, particularly vis-
/a-vie
6.
CONFIDENTIAL
F
Mr. Evans
(FED)
SECRET
16
1. Mr. Royle has seen Peking telegram No. 251- of 29 March on the subject of Chinese Government representation in Hong Kong. He has commented:-
"I believe it would be very dangerous to allow official Chinese representation in Hong Kong. No-one can foretell the future and a Chinese representative might well become a focus for anti-British feeling and in times of trouble become a rival to the Governor. He will inevitably emerge as a powerful and influential figure.
"I cannot agree with paras. 4 and 7. I doubt if a refusal would have a bad effect on Sino-British relations. If a Chinese representative had been in Hong Kong during the '67' troubles the position of the
10
Colonial Government might have become untenable. I note that Sir Murray MacLehose also does not appear to accept the Ambassador's views."
Copied to:
Mr. Laird Mr. Wilford
Much Fans
M. F. Forrester 4 April, 1972
SECRET
CYPHER/CAT A
SECRET
if
FM HONG KONG 328438Z
PECRET
FER 3/2.2
TO ROUTINE FCC TELNO 272 OF 30 MARCH INFO| PEKING.
PEKING TELNO 251 TO YOU.
12
OP COPY
CHINESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
MY VIEWS WERE SET OUT IN PARAGRAPHS 8 TO 16 OF PAPER QUOTE C UNQUOTE IN THE QUOTE GUIDELINES FOR THE GOVERNOR DESIGNATE
UNQUOTE DRAWN UP BEFORE I LEFT LONDON. I WOULD PREFER TO DEFER FURTHER COMMENT UNTIL I SEE YOUR OWN REACTIONS.
2. 1 WOULD ALSO LIKE TO SEE THE FULL RECORD AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES
IN WHICH THE ISSUE WAS RAISED. THERE IS A CURIOUS DISCREPANCY
BETWEEN THE MFA'S VERSION OF WHAT CHOU SAID AND JOHN DENSON'S RECORD. AS RECORDED CHOU'S POINT WAS ONLY OUR ILLOGIC IN WISHING TO RETAIN A CONSULATE IN TAIWAN WHEN THE C.P.G. HAD NO REPRESENTATIVE IN HONG KONG, IF DENSON'S RECOLLECTION IS CORRECT
THE DISCREPANCY IS OF SOME SIGNIFICANCE.
3. I PRESUME IT IS REALISED BY ALL CONCERNED THAT IF THIS PROPOSAL
WERE LEAKED DELIBERATELY OR INADVERTENTLY IT WOULD HAVE THE MOST
SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS HERE. I DO TRUST THEREFORE THAT SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE MADE TO SECURE THE INFORMATION THAT THIS
APPROACH HAS BEEN MADE.
MACLEHOSE
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST &
SIR P ADAMS CABINET OFFICE]
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
FED
HKD
PCD
لأمن
N AM D POD PSD CONS D IRD NEWS D
SECRET
.
CYPHER CAT. A
IKING 20053eZ
CONFIDENTIAL
TO PRIORITY F C O TELEGRAM NO. 245 OF 28 MARCH INFO ROUTINE HONG KONG AND WASHINGTON.
CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG,
1. DURING A DISCUSSION ON 27 MARCH ON THE DEVELOPMENT
OF SIFO-BRITISH RELATIONS, THE DIRECTOR OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN DEPARTMENT REMINDED ME THAT PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI HAD RAISED THE QUESTION OF CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG WITH DENSON 14 MARCH LAST YEAR. HE SAID THAT THERE WERE MANY QUESTIONS AFFECTING RELATIONS PETWEEN HONG KONG AND CHINA,
SOME OF WHICH WERE DEALT WITH BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WHILE OTHERS VERE HANDLED BY THE PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES IN CANTON. THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS WAS NOT CONVENIENT. THE PREMIER HAD ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO SEND AN OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE TO HONG KONG. WHAT WAS THE BRITISH GOVERNMERT'S REACTION TO THE PREMIER'S PROPOSAL?. ! REPLIED THAT I WOULD REPORT WHAT HE HAD SAID AND ENQUIRE. CHANG SAID THAT THIS WAS AN OLD QUESTION BUT IT WAS NOW A MATTER TO BE TAKEN UP IN THE LIGHT OF OUR NEW RELATIONS. I ASKED CHANG WHAT FUNCTIONS HE ENVISAGED SUCH AN OFFICIAL HAVING. HE SAID THAT HIS RECOLLECTION WAS THAT THE ORIGINAL PROPOSAL HAD BEEN FOR THE CHINESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO HỌNG KONG. HE WOULD HAVE TO FIND OUT EXACTLY WHAT FUNCTIONS WERE ENVISAGED.
ADDIS
FIL
LES
FED
HKD
P & C D
X AX D
PS
PS TO FUS
YR WILFORD
(REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
CONFIDENTIAL
ה
·
CYPHER CAT. A
+
C
LKING 293145Z
1
SECRET
OF
TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 251 03 29 MARCH INFO HONG KONG (PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR).
CHINESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
1. I DISCUSSED THIS QUESTION WITH MACLEHOSE BEFORE HE LEFT LONDON AND AGAIN WHEN I PASSED THROUGH HONG KONG IN JANUARY AND TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS THE ONLY MATTER ON WHICH HE AND I HAD NOT SEEN EYE TO EYE. 1 HOPE HE WILL EXCUSE MY SETTING OUT IN THIS TELEGRAM, REPEATED ONLY TO HONG KONG, MY VIEW ON A QUESTION WHICH CONCERNS HIS RESPONSIBILITIES FAR MORE THAN MINE.
2. OUR FIRST CONSIDERATION MUST OF COURSE BE THE LONG-TERM INTERESTS OF HONG KONG. IT IS AXIOMATIC THAT THE SITUATION THERE CANNOT EVOLVE SATISFACTORILY TOWARDS THE END OF THE LEASE WITHOUT THE ASSENT OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT_AT_EACH_STAGE. THE PRESENT POSITION, BY WHICH THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT'S BUSINESS IN HONG KONG IS CONDUCTED BY NCNA BELONGS TO THE PERIOD OF PARTIAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WHICH HAS NOW ENDED. CHANGE TO A MORE REGULAR ARRANGEMENT IN HONG KONG WOULD FOLLOW LOGICALLY ON NORMALISATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND WOULD SURELY CAUSE LESS OF A SHOCK TO MORALE AND CONFIDENCE IN HONG KONG HOW THAN AT ANY OTHER TIME. TRANSITION COULD BE MADE SMOOTHLY NOW BUT WOULD DE MIKWARD IF MADE LATER UNDER PRESSURE. IN THE PRESENT CLIMATE OF OUR SILATERAL RELATIONS IT IS A REASONABLE HOPE THAT THE CHINESE MAY AGREE TO THE LIMITATIONS ON THE FUNCTIONS OF THEIR HONG KONG REPRESENTATIVE WHICH THE HONG KONG COVERNMENT WOULD PROPERLY WISH TO IMPOSE SENI COLON IN FACT THAT THE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE WOULD DO NO MORE THAN THE NCNA DOES SEMI-OFFICIALLY AT PRESENT.
I WOULD NOT BE CONVINCED BY THE ARGUMENT THAT IF GIVEN OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG THE CHINESE WOULD USE THIS TO SUPPORT DISAFFECTION AND ORGANISE SUBVERSION IN HONG KONG, THEY WOULD DO THIS IN ANY CASE WHEN FOR OTHER REASONS THEY DECIDED TO DO SO, WHETHER OR NOT THEY HAD OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION THERE.
י
4
13.
:
SECRETA
I
+
1
3.
THE APPOINTMENT OF A GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE ON ACCEPTABLE
WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE FOR US OF MARKING OFFICIALLY
r
THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT'S ACQUIESCENCE IN THE STATUS QUO IN
RING KONG.
4. IF WE WERE TO REJECT OUT OF HAND WHAT ON THE FACE OF IT SEEMED A MOT UNREASONABLE PROPOSAL (AND EQUALLY IF WE STALLED
INDEFINITELY ON IT) THE EFFECT ON SIRO/BRITISH RELATIONS
GENERALLY WOULD BE BAD.
+
THAT COULD DE ENDURED IF THE INTERESTS
OF HONG KONG REQUIRED IT. BUT CHINESE DISSATISFACTION MIGHT BE TAKEN OUT ON THE ADMINISTRATION IN HONG KONG IN THE FIRST FLACE, THAT IS A CONSEQUENCE WHICH WE SHOULD HAVE TO FACE.
5. I FEEL THAT THIS AWKWARD REQUEST PUTS US AT AN IMPORTANT CROSSROAD. IN ONE DIRECTION WE CAN TRY TO MOVE WITH CHINESE GOODWILL TOWARDS THE CHANGES IN HONG KONG WHICH WILL BE REQUIRED AS THE END OF THE LEASE DRAWS NEAR AND THUS BE ABLE TO SAFEGUARD MANY OF THE ESSENTIALS OF OUR POSITION THERE.
IN THE OTHER DIRECTION WE MAY DRIFT INTO A SITUATION OF INCREASING CONFRONTATION AND BY REFUSING A CONCESSION NOW MAY LOSE THE
GREATER PART OF OUR STAKE.
-
6. THE NEXT MOVE IS UP TO THE CHINESE. WE SHALL HAVE TO SEE HOW THEY FRAME THEIR PROPOSAL AND WHAT FUNCTIONS THEY HAVE IN MIND TO SUGGEST. I HOPE THAT WE CAN CONSIDER CAREFULLY WHETHER IT CONTAINS THE ELEMENTS OF A NEGOTIABLE ARRANGEMENT.
·
WE
MIGHT FOR EXAMPLE BE ABLE TO TAKE THE LINE IN OUR REPLY THAT THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT ARE CONTENT WITH PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS BUT WOULD BE WILLING TO FORMALISE THE EXISTING SEMI OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION AS PART OF THE PROCESS OF NORMALISATION. THEY WOULD, HOWEVER, HAVE TO BE SURE THAT THE CHANGE WOULD NOT UPSET THE EXISTING SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS OR INTRODUCE HEW COMPLICATIONS, AND WE WOULD HAVE TO HAVE FIRM ASSURANCES THAT THERE WOULD BE NO DANGER OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE BEING REGARDED AS A RIVAL AUTHORITY TO THE
ESTABLISHED COVERNMENT.
י.
-
5
-2- SECRET
17.
+
+
IF IT WERE ARGUED THAT WHILE WE MIGHT GET SATISFACTORY .SSURANCES NOW, THESE WOULD BE WORTHLESS IF THERE WERE A CHANGE OF REGIME IN CHINA, OR IF THERE WERE AKOTHER CULTURAL REVOLUTION, I WOULD REPLY THAT IN THAT EVEN THERE WOULD BE A THREAT TO HONG KONG IN ANY CASE WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS AN OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE THERE.
ADDIS
/REPEATED AS RE JUESTED//COPIES SENT TO PRIVATE SECRETARY
NO. 10 DOWNING ST & TO SIR P ADAMS, CABINET OFFICE/
DEPARKMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
FED
PROT & CONF D
H
AD
:
NAM.D.
TOD
PSD
CONS D
IRD NEWS D
ļ
+
-3-
SECRET
L
·
+
13*
SECRET
CYPHER/CAT A
FM F C 0 3812357
SECRET.
(FED) |
+
山小
¡OP COFT
Asle
TO ROUTINE GOVERNOR HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO. 265 OF 39 MARCH INFO
PEXING,
YOUR TELNO 272: CHINESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
1. OUR UNDERSTANDING IS THAT THE BALL IS NOW IN THE CHINESE COURT TO LET US KNOW EXACTLY WHAT FUNCTIONS THEY ENVISAGE FOR THEIR REPRESENTATION (PEKING TELNO 245). WE WOULD NOT INTEND RAISING THIS MATTER WITH THEM AND SHOULD DEFER DETAILED CONSIDERATION UNTIL WE HAVE A BETTER IDEA OF WHAT THEY HAVE IN MIND,
2. OUR PRELIMINARY REACTION IS THAT THE STRIKINGLY MORE FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE IN GENERAL OF THE CHINESE WITH MR ADDIS ON 27 MARCH HAS CREATED A NEW SITUATION. NEVERTHELESS, THE PRIMARY, AND INDEED OVER-RIDING, CONSIDERATION IN THIS MATTER MUST REMAIN YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH REPRESENTATION IN THE COLONY (PARA 3 OF YOUR TEL UNDER REFERENCE).
DOUGLAS-HOME
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
FED
HKD
SECRET
12
}
IKMEDIATE CYPHER/CAT A
FM F C O 331855Z
CONFIDENTIAL.
CONFIDENTIAL
(FE)H
3/2/2
TO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG TELNO 263 OF 30 MARCH INFO PEKING AND WASHINGTON.
☺
HONG KONG TELNO 271: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
1. WE THINK IT POST UNLIKELY THAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WILL MAKE PUBLIC THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE RAISED THIS QUESTION.
si &
2. SHOULD THEY DO SO WE TOO WOULD SPEAK ON THE LINES OF YOUR PARA WE SUGGEST HOWEVER THAT THE WORDS 'MEDIUM RANK'* BE OMITTED.
2*
DOUGLAS-KOME
FILES
FED
HKD
NEWS D
HR WILFORD
CONFIDENTIAL
L
+
:
PRIORITY
CYPHER/CAT A
FM HONG KONG 300300Z
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
TOP COPY
FEA 3/29/2
TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 271 OF 30 MARCH INFO PEKING WASHINGTON.
རྒྱ་
PEKING TELNO 245 TO YOU: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR VIEWS WHETHER THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT
ARE LIKELY TO MAKE PUBLIC THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE RAISED THIS
QUESTION AND IF THEY DO WHAT YOU WOULD PROPOSE TO SAY.
2. IF IT IS LEAKED WE WOULD PROPOSE SIMPLY TO CONFIRM THAT THE
MATTER DID COME UP IN A GENERAL CONVERSATION WHICH MR ADDIS HAD
WITH A MEDIUM RANK OFFICIAL IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
MACLEHOSE
!
FILES
FED
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
HKD
P & C D
N AM D PS TS/TUS
MR WILFORD
CONFIDENTIAL
L
TRIOTITY
CYPHER CAT. A
SECRET
Mi Davies-
то
бе
FM KING 290145Z telponnice si Murray Maaleh sve
SECRET
F.E. Deft. Wo
sends his furke, ses
Jurkeview.
in
Issoume
tô
You
have to DOP.
3063.
will be submitti this question which
we to go
(Hong Kong rein are grey might, I suffuse Team No. 359).
R.E. 1/5.
TO PRIORITY F C O TEINO 251 OF 29 MARCH INFO HONG KONG (PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR).
CHINESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG,
1.
} DISCUSSED THIS QUESTION WITH MACLEHOSE BEFORE HE LEFT
LONDON AND AGAIN WHEN I PASSED THROUGH HONG KONG IN JANUARY AND
TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS THE ONLY MATTER ON WHICH HE AND I HAD NOT SEEN EYE TO EYE. I HOPE HE WILL EXCUSE MY SETTING OUT IN THIS TELEGRAM, REPEATED ONLY TO HONG KONG, MY VIEW ON A QUESTION WHICH CONCERNS HIS RESPONSIBILITIES FAR MORE THAN MINE.
2. OUR FIRST CONSIDERATION MUST OF COURSE BE THE LONG-TERM
INTERESTS OF HONG KONG. IT IS AXIOMATIC THAT THE SITUATION
THERE CANNOT EVOLVE SATISFACTORILY TOWARDS THE END OF THE LEASE WITHOUT THE ASSENT OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT AT EACH STAGE. THE PRESENT POSITION, BY WHICH THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT'S BUSINESS
IN HONG KONG IS CONDUCTED BY NCNA BELONGS TO THE PERIOD OF PARTIAL
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WHICH HAS NOW ENDED. CHANGE TO A MORE
REGULAR ARRANGEMENT IN HONG KONG WOULD FOLLOW LOGICALLY ON
FORMALISATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND WOULD SURELY CAUSE LESS OF A SHOCK TO MORALE AND CONFIDENCE IN HONG KONG NOW THAN AT ANY OTHER TIME. TRANSITION COULD BE MADE SMOOTHLY NOW BUT WOULD BE AWKWARD IF MADE LATER UNDER PRESSURE. IN THE PRESENT CLIMATE OF
OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS IT IS A REASONABLE HOPE THAT THE CHINESE MAY AGREE TO THE LIMITATIONS ON THE FUNCTIONS OF THEIR HONG KONG
REPRESENTATIVE WHICH THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT WOULD PROPERLY WISH
TO IMPOSE SEMI COLON IN FACT THAT THE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE WOULD DO NO MORE THAN THE NCNA DOES SEMI-OFFICIALLY AT PRESENT.
I WOULD NOT BE CONVINCED BY THE ARGUMENT THAT IF GIVEN
OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG THE CHINESE WOULD USE THIS
TO SUPPORT DISAFFECTION AND ORGANISE SUBVERSION IN HONG KONG.
THEY WOULD DO THIS IN ANY CASE WHEN FOR OTHER REASONS THEY DECIDED
TO DO SO, WHETHER OR NOT THEY HAD OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION THERE.
13.
SECRET
SECRET
3. THE APPOINTMENT OF A GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE ON ACCEPTABL
TERMS WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE FOR US OF MARKING OFFICIALLY
THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT'S ACQUIESCENCE IN THE STATUS QUO IN
HONG KONG.
4.
IF WE WERE TO REJECT OUT OF HAND WHAT ON THE FACE OF IT SEEMED A NOT UNREASONABLE PROPOSAL (AND EQUALLY IF WE STALLED INDEFINITELY ON IT) THE EFFECT ON SINO/BRITISH RELATIONS
GENERALLY WOULD BE BAD.
OF HONG KONG REQUIRED IT.
THAT COULD BE ENDURED IF THE INTERESTS
BUT CHINESE DISSATISFACTION MIGHT
BE TAKEN OUT ON THE ADMINISTRATION IN HONG KONG IN THE FIRST PLACE, THAT IS A CONSEQUENCE WHICH WE SHOULD HAVE TO FACE.
5. I FEEL THAT THIS AWKWARD REQUEST PUTS US AT AN IMPORTANT CROSSROAD. IN ONE DIRECTION WE CAN TRY TO MOVE WITH CHINESE GOODWILL TOWARDS THE CHANGES IN HONG KONG WHICH WILL BE REQUIRED AS THE END OF THE LEASE DRAWS NEAR AND THUS BE ABLE TO SAFEGUARD MANY OF THE ESSENTIALS OF OUR POSITION THERE.
IN THE OTHER DIRECTION WE MAY DRIFT INTO A SITUATION OF INCREASING CONFRONTATION AND BY REFUSING A CONCESSION NOW MAY LOSE THE
GREATER PART OF OUR STAKE.
6. THE NEXT MOVE IS UP TO THE CHINESE, WE SHALL HAVE TO SEE HOW THEY FRAME THEIR PROPOSAL AND WHAT FUNCTIONS THEY HAVE IN MIND TO SUGGEST. I HOPE THAT WE CAN CONSIDER CAREFULLY WHETHER
IT CONTAINS THE ELEMENTS OF A NEGOTIABLE ARRANGEMENT. WE
MIGHT FOR EXAMPLE BE ABLE TO TAKE THE LINE IN OUR REPLY THAT
THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT ARE CONTENT WITH PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS BUT WOULD BE WILLING TO FORMALISE THE EXISTING SEMI OFFICIAL
REPRESENTATION AS PART OF THE PROCESS OF NORMALISATION. THEY WOULD, HOWEVER, HAVE TO BE SURE THAT THE CHANGE WOULD NOT UPSET THE EXISTING SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS OR INTRODUCE NEW COMPLICATIONS, AND WE WOULD HAVE TO HAVE FIRM ASSURANCES THAT THERE WOULD BE NO DANGER OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE BEING REGARDED AS A RIVAL AUTHORITY TO THE
ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENT.
-2- SECRET
17.
SECRET
L
7. IF IT WERE ARGUED THAT WHILE WE MIGHT GET SATISFACTORY ASSURANCES NOW, THESE WOULD BE WORTHLESS IF THERE WERE A CHANGE OF REGIME IN CHINA, OR IF THERE WERE ANOTHER CULTURAL REVOLUTION, I WOULD REFLY THAT IN THAT EVEN THERE WOULD BE A THREAT TO HONG KONG IN ANY CASE WHETHER OR NOT THERE
WAS AN OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE THERE.
ADDIS
/REPEATED AS RE WESTED//COPIES SENT TO PRIVATE SECRETARY
NO. 10 DOVNING ST & TO SIR P ADAMS, CABINET OFFICE/
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
FED
PROT & CONF D
TPD
N AM D
POD
PSD
CONS D
IRD
NEWS D
-3-
SECRET
+
+
+
NOVINY
CYPHER CAT. A
SECRET
RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 52
PEKING 2901457
30 MAR 1972
SECRET
FEAT 3/2151
TO PRIORITY F C O TELNO 251 OF 29 MARCH INFO HONG KONG (PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR).
CHINESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
1. I DISCUSSED THIS QUESTION WITH MACLEHOSE BEFORE HE LEFT
LONDON AND AGAIN WHEN I PASSED THROUGH HONG KONG IN JANUARY AND
TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS THE ONLY MATTER ON WHICH HE AND I HAD NOT
SEEN EYE TO EYE. I HOPE HE WILL EXCUSE MY SETTING OUT IN THIS TELEGRAM, REPEATED ONLY TO HONG KONG, MY VIEW ON A QUESTION WHICH CONCERNS HIS RESPONSIBILITIES FAR MORE THAN MINE.
2. OUR FIRST CONSIDERATION MUST OF COURSE BE THE LONG-TERM
INTERESTS OF HONG KONG. IT IS AXIOMATIC THAT THE SITUATION
THERE CANNOT EVOLVE SATISFACTORILY TOWARDS THE END OF THE
LEASE WITHOUT THE ASSENT OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT AT EACH STAGE. THE PRESENT POSITION, BY WHICH THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT'S BUSINESS IN HONG KONG IS CONDUCTED BY NCNA BELONGS TO THE PERIOD OF PARTIAL
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WHICH HAS NOW ENDED. CHANGE TO A MORE REGULAR ARRANGEMENT IN HONG KONG WOULD FOLLOW LOGICALLY ON
FORMALISATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND WOULD SURELY CAUSE LESS OF A SHOCK TO MORALE AND CONFIDENCE IN HONG KONG NOW THAN AT ANY OTHER TIME. TRANSITION COULD BE MADE SMOOTHLY NOW BUT WOULD BE AWKWARD IF MADE LATER UNDER PRESSURE. IN THE PRESENT CLIMATE OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS IT IS A REASONABLE HOPE THAT THE CHINESE MAY AGREE TO THE LIMITATIONS ON THE FUNCTIONS OF THEIR HONG KONG REPRESENTATIVE WHICH THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT WOULD PROPERLY WISH
TO IMPOSE SEMI COLON IN FACT THAT THE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE WOULD DO NO MORE THAN THE NGNA DOES SEMI-OFFICIALLY AT PRESENT.
I WOULD NOT BE CONVINCED BY THE ARGUMENT THAT IF GIVEN
OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG THE CHINESE WOULD USE THIS
TO SUPPORT DISAFFECTION AND ORGANISE SUBVERSION IN HONG KONG. THEY WOULD DO THIS IN ANY CASE WHEN FOR OTHER REASONS THEY DECIDED
TO DO SO, WHETHER OR NOT THEY HAD OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION THERE.
13.
SECRET
to
[
SECRET
1
1
3. THE APPOINTMENT OF A GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE ON ACCEPTABLE TERMS WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE FOR US OF MARKING OFFICIALLY
THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT'S ACQUIESCENCE IN THE STATUS QUO IN
HONG KONG.
T
4. IF WE WERE TO REJECT OUT OF HAND WHAT ON THE FACE OF IT SEEMED A NOT UNREASONABLE PROPOSAL (AND EQUALLY IF WE STALLED INDEFINITELY ON IT) THE EFFECT ON SINO/BRITISH RELATIONS GENERALLY WOULD BE BAD.
THAT COULD BE ENDURED IF THE INTERESTS
OF HONG KONG REQUIRED IT. BUT CHINESE DISSATISFACTION MIGHT BE TAKEN OUT ON THE ADMINISTRATION IN HONG KONG IN THE FIRST PLACE, THAT IS A CONSEQUENCE WHICH WE SHOULD HAVE TO FACE.
5. I FEEL THAT THIS AWKWARD REQUEST PUTS US AT AN IMPORTANT CROSSROAD. IN ONE DIRECTION WE CAN TRY TO MOVE WITH CHINESE GOODWILL TOWARDS THE CHANGES IN HONG KONG WHICH WILL BE REQUIRED AS THE END OF THE LEASE DRAWS NEAR AND THUS BE ABLE TO SAFEGUARD MANY OF THE ESSENTIALS OF OUR POSITION THERE.
IN THE OTHER DIRECTION WE MAY DRIFT INTO A SITUATION OF INCREASING CONFRONTATION AND BY REFUSING A CONCESSION NOW MAY LOSE THE GREATER PART OF OUR STAKE.
6. THE NEXT MOVE IS UP TO THE CHINESE. WE SHALL HAVE TO SEE HOW THEY FRAME THEIR PROPOSAL AND WHAT FUNCTIONS THEY HAVE IN MIND TO SUGGEST. I HOPE THAT WE CAN CONSIDER CAREFULLY WHETHER IT CONTAINS THE ELEMENTS OF A NEGOTIABLE ARRANGEMENT. WE MIGHT FOR EXAMPLE BE ABLE TO TAKE THE LINE IN OUR REPLY THAT THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT ARE CONTENT WITH PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS BUT WOULD BE WILLING TO FORMALISE THE EXISTING SEMI OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION AS PART OF THE PROCESS OF NORMALISATION. THEY WOULD, HOWEVER, HAVE TO BE SURE THAT THE CHANGE WOULD NOT UPSET THE EXISTING SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS OR INTRODUCE LEW COMPLICATIONS, AND WE WOULD HAVE TO HAVE FIRM ASSURANCES THAT THERE WOULD BE NO DANGER OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE BEING REGARDED AS A RIVAL AUTHORITY TO THE ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENT.
-2- SECRET
17.
SECRET
IF IT WERE ARGUED THAT WHILE WE MIGHT GET SATISFACTORY ASSURANCES NOW, THESE WOULD BE WORTHLESS IF THERE WERE A CHANGE OF REGIME IN CHINA, OR IF THERE WERE ANOTHER CULTURAL REVOLUTION, I WOULD REPLY THAT IN THAT EVEN THERE WOULD BE A THREAT TO HONG KONG IN ANY CASE WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS AN OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE THERE.
ADDIS
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED//COPIES SENT TO PRIVATE SECRETARY
NO. 10 DOWNING ST & TO SIR P ADAMS, CABINET OFFICE/
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
FED
PROP & CONF D
SIKOR
IPD
N AM D
POD
PSD
CONS D
IRD
NEWS D
-3-
SECRET
PRIORITY
CYPHER CAT. A
+
CONFIDENTIAL
FM PEKING 28/53*Z
29 MAR 1972
CONFIDENTIAL
TOP COPY
TO PRIORITY F C O TELEGRAM NO. 245 OF 28 MARCH INFO ROUTINE
HONG KONG AND WASHINGTON.
CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
1. DURING A DISCUSSION ON 27 MARCH ON THE DEVELOPMENT
OF SIKO-BRITISH RELATIONS, THE DIRECTOR OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN DEPARTMENT REMINDED ME THAT PREMIER CHOU EX-LAI HAD RAISED THE QUESTION OF CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG WITH DENSON IN MARCH LAST YEAR. HE SAID THAT THERE WERE MANY QUESTIONS AFFECTING RELATIONS PETWEEN HONG KONG AND CHINA,
SOME OF WHICH WERE DEALT WITH BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WHILE OTHERS VERE HANDLED BY THE PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES IN CANTON. THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS WAS NOT CONVENIENT. THE PREMIER HAD ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO SEND AN OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE TO HONG KONG. WHAT WAS THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S REACTION TO THE PREMIER'S PROPOSAL?. I REPLIED THAT I WOULD REPORT WHAT HE HAD SAID AND ENQUIRE. CHANG SAID THAT THIS WAS AN OLD QUESTION BUT IT WAS NOW A MATTER TO RE TAKEN UP IN THE LIGHT OF OUR NEW RELATIONS. I ASKED CHANG WHAT FUNCTIONS HE ENVISAGED SUCH AN OFFICIAL HAVING. HE SAID THAT HIS RECOLLECTION WAS THAT THE ORIGINAL PROPOSAL HAD BEEN FOR THE CHINESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO HONG
KONG. HE WOULD HAVE TO FIND OUT EXACTLY WHAT FUNCTIONS WERE
ENVISAGED.
ADDIS
FILES
FED HKD
P & C D
N AM D PS
PS TO PUS
MR WILFORD
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
CONFIDENTIAL
+
A.
1
cr
RECEIVED IN
TRY No. 52
RIORITY
CYPHER CAT A.
FY PEKING 2208547.
CONFIDENTIAL.
! 29 MAR 1972
CONFIDENTIAL
(OP COPY
TO PRIORITY FCO TELO 243 OF 28/3 INFO HONG KONG AND WASHINGTON. HONG KONG/CANTON AIR LINK.
1. DUPING MY CALL ON THE DIRECTOR OF VESTERN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN DEPARTMENT ON 27 MARCH I ASKED HIM WHETHER IT WOULD BE USEFUL
+
TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF A DIRECT AIR LINK BETWEEN HONG KONG AND CANTON. CHANG REPLIED THAT THIS QUESTION HAD BEEN PAISED BY MANY VISITORS TO CHINA, BUT BECAUSE OF THE OF STACLES IN OUR RELATIONS BEFORE WE AGREED TO EXCHANGE AMBASSADORS IT HAD NOT BEEN POSSIPLE TO GIVE THE QUESTION SERIOUS CONSIDERATION. HE THOUGHT THAT THE SETTING UP OF A DIRECT AIR LINK WOULD GREATLY FACILITATE TRAVEL FOR VISITORS. PE ASKED HOW LONG SUCH A FLIGHT WOULD TAKE. I SAID I THOUGHT ABOUT HALF AN HOUR, BUT
THAT WE WOULD FOLLOW THE MATTER UP AND HAVE FURTHER
DISCUSSIONS IN DETAIL WITH THE APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES, "
ADDIS
ADDIS
FILES
FED
HONG KONG DEPT:
A.T.D.
NORTH AMERICAN DEPT:
MR WILFORD
MR TURPIN
i
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
FRIORITY
COMPIL
ITA
YPHER CAT. A
FM PEKING 280831 29 MAR 1972
RECEIVED IN
RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 52
REGISTRY No B 26MAR1/2
YOR COM
CONFIDENTIAL
En 3/201
XUT3130N
TO PRIORITY F C O TELEGRAM NO. 249 OF 28 MARCH INFO ROUTINE
HONG KONG AND WASHINGTON,
COMMUNICATIONS WITH HONG KONG.
DURING MY CALL ON THE DIRECTOR OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN DEPARTMENT YESTERDAY, I RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE PROPOSED TELEX LINK BETWEEN HONG KONG AND CANTON AND SAID HOW USEFUL THIS WOULD BE, PARTICULARLY DURING THE PERIOD OF THE SPRING AND AUTUMN CANTON
FAIRS.
I REPLIED THAT I WAS NOT AN EXPERT IN SUCH MATTERS BUT THAT THE MAIN THING WAS TO GET DISCUSSIONS GOING BETWEEN THE PEOPLE CONCERNED IN HONG KONG AND THE AUTHORITIES IN CANTON. I BELIEVED THAT COMMUNICATIONS PERSONNEL IN HONG KONG HAD ALREADY BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE CHINESE AUTHORITIES ON THIS MATTER. CHANG SAID THAT HE WOULD HAVE THE MATTER LOOKED INTO.
ADDIS
FILES
COMMS DEPT
DWS
FED
HKD
N AM D
MR WILFORD
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
CONFIDENTIAL
+
RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No.52
22 MAR 1972
Kar
PRIORITY
CYPHER/CAT A
FA HONG KONG 221442Z
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CUFT
1
TO PRIORITY F C O TELEGRAM NUMBER 248 OF 22ND MARCH 1972. INFO
ROUTINE PEKING.
-
YOUR TELEGRAM MUMBER 237: HONG KONG CHINA COMMUNICATIONS.
WE AGREE THAT CPA ARE PROBABLY UNACCEPTABLE TO CHINA BECAUSE OF TAIWAN. WE DO NOT KNOW HOW BOAC FEEL ABOUT A FEEDER SERVICE AS OPPOSED TO AN EXTENSION INTO CHINA OF THEIR EXISTING SERVICE TO HONG KONG BUT KESWICK SEEMED TO THINK AND HE AGREE THAT THE SOLUTION MOST LIKELY TO GET CHINESE ACCEPTANCE WOULD BE A NEW COMPANY
IN HONG KONG FOR THIS PURPOSE, THERE IS ALSO THE POSSIBILITY THAT CHINA WOULD WANT TO SUPPLY HALF THE SERVICE. ALL THIS MUST BE SPECULATIVE UNTIL CHINA HAS BEEN SOUNDED OUT.
FCO PASS COPY TO HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICE LONDON.
RACLEHOSE
FILES
PED
COPIES TO:
HONG KONG GOVERMENT OFFICE,
54 PALL MALL
HKD
ATD
MR WILFORD
CONFIDENTIAL
1
I
+
+
:
•
+
1
6
PRIORITY
CYPHER/CAT A
FM FCO 211500Z
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBỶ 223108Z
CONFIDENTIAL
L
(FEC)
spridz
-
TO PRIORITY HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO. 237 OF 21 MARCH INFO PRIORITY PEKING.
YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 14 TO PEKING: HONG KONG
CHINA COMMUNICATIONS.
1. WE AGREE IN GENERAL WITH THE PRIORITIES SET OUT IN YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE BUT ARE NOT CLEAR HOW THE AIRLINE SERVICE SUGGESTED IN PARAGRAPH 4 WOULD OPERATE, IN SUGGESTING A FEEDER SERVICE RUN WITH MEDIUM-SHORT HAUL AIRCRAFT, DO YOU ENVISAGE THAT BOAC WOULD PROVIDE THE AIRCRAFT REQUIRED FOR SUCH A SERVICE OR THAT CPA SHOULD OPERATE IT? THE LATTER ARE UNLIKELY TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE CHINESE AS LONG AS THEY CONTINUE TO OPERATE SERVICES TO TAIWAN.
DOUGLAS HOME
FILES
FED
HKO
ATO
MR WILFORD
CONFIDENTIAL
NNNIN
1
CYPHER/CAT A
}
RECEIVED IN CONFIDENTIAL
REGISTRY N..52
21 MAR 1972
TOP COF
For 3/34/2
FM HONG KONG 291138Z
CONFIDENTIAL
TO PRIORITY PEKING TELEGRAM NUMBER 14 OF 20 MARCH 1972. INFO ROUTINE F C 0.
1
YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 15% HONG KONG CHINA COMMUNICATIONS.
1. GENERALLY SPEAKING I WOULD HOPE THAT HONG KONG WAS KEPT WELL TO THE BACKGROUND IN YOUR INITIAL TALKS. WE HAVE NO REQUIREMENT OF ANY REAL IMPORTANCE TO ASK FROM THE CHINESE, AND IN CONSEQUENCE ARE MORE CONCERNED AT THE MOMENT TO AVOID THE CHINESE REQUIRING ANYTHING FROM HONG KONG.
2. AS WE SEE IT RAIL PASSENGER LINKS BETWEEN CANTON AND HONG KONG ARE THE LEAST IMPORTANT OF OUR COMMUNICATIONS BUT THE PRESENT SCHEDULE BETWEEN CANTON AND SHUM CHUN IS RIDICULOUSLY INCONVENIENT TO PASSENGERS. WE AGREED WITH DENSON (MADDOCKS LETTER OF 18 MAY TO MORGAN) THAT THE MISSION WOULD SUGGEST WIEN POSSIBLE AN IMPROVEMENT ON A PERSONAL INFORMAL BASIS. THE ITEM DOES NOT APPEAR IN THE LIST OF MATTERS TO BE TAKEN UP AFTER THE EXCHANGE OF ADASSADORS (MORGAN'S LETTER OF 26 NOVEMBER 1971 TO SAMUEL) AND WE SUGGEST THAT IN VIEW OF ITS UNIMPORTANCE IT SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN UP THIS WEEK, A RESCHEDULING ON THE CHINESE SIDE WOULD HOT INCONVENIENCE US BECAUSE WE RUN A REGULAR, ROUCHLY HOURLY SERVICE LO WU KOWLOOIT. IN ANY CASE IT WOULD BE BETTER TO START THIS OFF, IF WE DO, ON A TECHNICAL DASIS BETWEEN THE TWO RAILWAY MANAGERS. IN ANY CASE THE REAL ANSWER LIES IN
-
CONFIDENTIAL
PARA 4.
13. OF
+
CONFIDENTIAL
}
3. OF THE THREE ITEMS THAT DIRECTLY CONCERN HONG KONG IN THE LIST IN MORGAN'S LETTER UNDER REFERENCE THE CABLE AND WIRELESS REQUEST FOR A HONG KONG CANTON TELEX LINK HAS BEEN EXPANDED TO INCLUDE OTHER POINTS IN A LETTER OF 28 JANUARY FROM DAVIES OF CABLE AND WIRELESS, LONDON TO CHUNG FUCHSIANG (COPIED TO MARCH). I RECARD TELECOMMUNICATIONS AS MORE IMPORTANT TO HONG KONG THAN THE MACAO HELICOPTER SERVICE. THE CLOSING OF THE HONG KONG PANK IN SHANGHAI IS THE LEAST IMPORTANT OF THE THREE. BUT ALL THREE OF THE INTERESTS CONCEPPED WILL NO DOUBT BE BADGERING US FOR INFORMATION AND
I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD FIND AN OPENING TO MENTION ALL THREE SOMETIRE - NOT NECESSARILY THIS WEEK.
4. OF MUCH MORE POTENTIAL CONVENIENCE TO BOTH HONG KONG AND CHINA, AID OF MORE SIGNIFICANCE IN NORMALISATION, WOULD BE AN AIR SERVICE HONG KONG - CANTON WHICH I KNOW KESWICK HAS IT IN HIND TO SUGGEST TO THE CHINESE. SUBJECT TO HIS VIEWS AND THE FCO'S YOU MIGHT TRY TO SOUND OUT THE MINISTRY ON THAT POSSIBILITY. AN EXTENSION OF EXISTING ROAD SERVICES TO CANTON WOULD HOT SERVE HONG KONG AS WELL AS A FEEDER SERVICE RUN WITH MEDIUM SHORT HAUL AIRCRAFT ON A YORE FREQUENT BASIS- THIS IS WHAT KESWICK HAS IN HIND.
FCO PASS COPY HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICE LONDON.
MACLEHOSE
*
FILES FOD
HN WILFORD
REPEATED AS REQUESTED/
COPIES TO
HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICE LONDON
2
CONFIDENTIAL
[
C
+
L
FOX 3/201/1
PRIORITY
CYPHER/CAT A
FM PEKING 180450Z
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
RECEFC IN
REGISTRY No. 52
20 MAR 1972
FEH 3/301
TO PRIORITY HONG KONG TELNO 15 OF 18 MARCH,
1..
PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR.
HONG KONG-CHINA COMMUNICATIONS.
↑ SHALL BE SEEKING AN APPOINTMENT NEXT WEEK WITH THE
DIRECTOR OF WEST EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN DEPARTMENT TO
DISCUSS BILATERAL MATTERS WHICH HAVE REMAINED IN SUSPENSE
DURING THE AMBASSADORIAL NEGOTIATIONS. NOW THAT THEY HAVE DEEN
SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDED I HOPE WE SHALL BE ABLE TO MAKE PROGRESS
ON AS MANY OF THEM AS POSSIBLE.
2..
IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO KNOW, IN ORDER OF PRIORITY, WHICH
YOU REGARD AS THE MOST URGENT PROBLEMS FROM THE HONG KONG
POINT OF VIEW. COMMUNICATIONS WITH CANTON ARE PRESUMABLY
AMONGST THEM, THOUGH I AM AWARE OF THE NEED NOT TO INVITE
COUNTER-DEMANDS ON GROUNDS OF RECIPROCITY (POLITCICAL ADVISER'S LETTER CR 14/2221/50 OF 1P MAY). AM I RIGHT IN THINKING THAT
THERE WOULD BE NO DIFFICULTY IN REARRANGING TRAIN LINKS BETWEEN
KOWLOON AND LOWU TO FIT IN WITH RESCHEDULED SERVICES PETWEEN
CANTON AND SHUM CHUN, ASSUMING THE CHINESE CAN BE PREVAILED
UPON TO AGREE?
ADDIS
FILES
TED
HKD
ÞA WILFORD
FFFFF
CONFIDENTIAL
+
1
CS. 41A
15,800-4/71-345403
CONFIDENTIAL
REF.
SCR 2/2/4841/66 II
1
JAL Morgan Esq
FED
F CO
Dear John,
SIR SIK NIN CHAU
F1
COLONIAL SECRETARIAT
LOWER ALBERT ROAD
HONG KONG
21 February, 1972
настик
th5
ヒ
Pro 373
M. Henny Po
O Mile 29.2 see ☹} 3/m
Thank you for your letter of 4 February. The Governor agrees that the advice indicated in paragraph 3 would be appropriate. If Sir Sik-nin raises the subject he will speak on those lines but he would not propose to take the initiative in raising the subject, partly because he would not want to imply that he was positively encouraging Sir Sik-nin to go
to China.
eve
You
Auther
(A F Maddocks)
cc
B Hitch Esq TOKYO
RC Samuel Esq PEKING
JDI Boyd Esq
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
A P Maddocks Enq
BONO KON
CONFIDENTIAL
izspatches
A.J. 4/2
4 February 1972
SIR SIK WIN CHAU
John Keswick recently invited Mr Royle to dinner with Sir Sik Xin Chan.
2. In the course of the evening Bir Bik Xin gave Mr Royle the attached piece of paper. He alleged that it had been given him by a friend in Mr Fukuda's office and that it constituted an agreement which had been reached between the Japanese and the Americans before Mr Kissinger's visit to Peking. It all seens pretty dubious to me.
3.
Bir Sik Nin also told Mr Royle that he had been invited to visit China. He was nevertheless wary about his personal safety and would only agree to go if he received a personal invitation signed by Chou En-lal. Mr Royle wondered whether the Governor might think it appropriate to reassure Sir Sik Nin that, if a visa vere forthcoming, he would be well looked after. Moreover, Cheu En-lai would be most unlikely to send an invitation of this kind to someone other than a protecol equal.
ec B Hitch Esq
TOKYO
RO Samuel Esq PEXING
JD I Boyd Esq WASHINGTON
J A L Morgan
Far Eastern Department
CONFIDENTIAL
+
.
FIVE-FIVE-FIVE-TURDE PROVISIONS
1
A.
FIYE TERMS TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
1.
INSTRUCTIONS FROM PEKING
7320
५०
密
THE UNITED STATES, to agree on the admittance of the Peoples Republic of China into the United Nations.
2.
THE UNITED STATES, to give approval to the Peoples' Republic of China the scat on the United Nations Security Council.
3.
THE UNITED STATES, to abrogate the U.S. Defence Treaty with Taiwan.
4.
THE UNITED STATES, to withdraw American Forces stationed on Taiwan.
5.
THE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF CHINA, to cooperate with the U.S.A. on the settlement of Viet Nam problems, simultaneously with helping casc the U.S.A. evacuate all of its forces safely from the Southeast Asian Countries.
Should the above-mentioned terms turn out agreeable, the relationship between China and the United States will be stabilized.
B.
FIVE TERMS TO TAIWAN
1.
TAIWAN, to recognize itself as one of the provinces of China.
2.
TAIWAN, to be recognized the autonomy of its Province.
3.
TAIWAN, to denounce the Treaty with the United States.
4.
TAIWAN, to dissolve the Treaty with Japan.
5.
TAIWAN, to be understood that Chiang Kai-shek, the generalissimo, retire his position after his full term, and Chiang Ching-kuo being appointed as the Covernor of Taiwan Province of the Peoples' Republic of China.
Should the above-stated five terms turn out agreeable, the Peoples' Republic of China will take such a step that exempt from the ruling taxations for the period of three years for the purpose of improving the daily life of the Taiwanese People.
C. FIVE TERMS TO JAPAN
1.
2.
JAPAN, to agree on the Peoples' Republic of China's admission to the United Nations as well as taking the seat on the Security Council.
JAPAN, to relinquish the Treaty with Taiwan, at the same time ceasing the calling në "One China, One Taiwan".
3.
JAPAN,
to arrest such a plot as calling "Dual China".
4.
5.
JAPAN, to be opposed the revival of Japan's Militarism.
JAPAN, to conclude on the spot Peach Treaty with the Peoples' Republic of China.
[
FINAL THREE TERMS
2
1.
2.
3.
Should the aforementioned terms be accepted in all respects, the Peoples' Republic of China shall guarantee an amicable settlement of all problems having remained unsettled between China and Japan since China-Japan Wars.
To conclude the Mutual Non-Aggression Pact.
To be afforded Most Favored Nation Treatment.
+