港史文本 - HK In Texts: Wu Tingfang (1842-1922) - Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History | Linda Pomerantz-Zhang

Wu Tingfang (1842-1922)

Reform and

Modernization in

Modern Chinese

History

Linda Pomerantz-Zhang

ભારતી

Wu Tingfang (1842-1922)

Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Linda Pomerantz-Zhang California State University

Dominguez Hills

WPIENTIA

T-VIRT

Hong Kong University Press

香港大學出版社

Wu Tingfang (1842-1922)

Reform and

Modernization in

Modern Chinese

History

Linda Pomerantz-Zhang

ભારતી

Wu Tingfang (1842-1922)

Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Linda Pomerantz-Zhang California State University

Dominguez Hills

WPIENTIA

T-VIRT

Hong Kong University Press

香港大學出版社

Wu Tingfang (1842-1922)

Reform and

Modernization in

Modern Chinese

History

Linda Pomerantz-Zhang

ભારતી

Hong Kong University Press

139 Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong

Hong Kong University Press 1992

ISBN 962 209 287 X

All rights reserved. No portion of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publisher, Hong Kong University Press.

Cover photo reproduced by permission of the Urban Council of Hong Kong from the collection of the Hong Kong Museum of History.

Printed in Hong Kong by Calay Printing Co. Ltd.

This book is dedicated to my father, Samuel Pomerantz,

and to the memory of my mother,

Clara Sarfaty Pomerantz (1911–1980)

Contents

Preface

Acknowledgements

vii

viii

Introduction

Chapter 1

The Colonial Matrix 1842-1877

Chapter 2

Hong Kong Barrister 1877-1882

Chapter 3

With Li Hongzhang 1882–1896

Chapter 4

Promise and Disappointment in America 1897-1902

103

Chapter 5

Wu Tingfang and the New Nationalism 1902-1905

137

Chapter 6

Towards a New Era 1905-1911

171

Chapter 7

Wu Tingfang and the 1911 Revolution

193

Chapter 8

Elder Statesman 1912-1922

231

Conclusion

287

Glossary

295

Bibliography

297

Index

313

Preface

My interest in Wu Tingfang began in the early 1960s when, as a graduate student, I began exploring the history of Chinese immigration to the United States. Wu's striking personality, articulate command of the English language, and effectiveness as a diplomat and public figure all combined to make him an intriguing-even unique-figure, and I was curious to find out more about him. There were at that time almost no scholarly political biographies in modern Chinese history, and I thought that a scholarly biography of such a person―an overseas Chinese educated abroad, a practicing barrister turned railway administrator, diplomat, official and political figure of the late Qing and early Republican period-would be a valuable addition to the field of modern Chinese history.

Originally I hoped to use unpublished papers in the possession of Wu Tingfang's descendants, as preliminary discussions with Wu family members in Los Angles led me to believe that some of Wu's personal papers were held by the family in Hong Kong. Thus, based on my preliminary research and armed with this information, I began my Ph.D. dissertation research on Wu Tingfang's life.

Only later, after a great deal of research had been completed, did I ascertain that the Wu family in Hong Kong had none of Wu Tingfang's private papers, and that, moreover, these papers were most likely all destroyed in a fire that swept the Governor's yamen in Guangzhou in 1922, soon before Wu Tingfang's death.

This study of Wu Tingfang's life by necessity, then, has been researched from Wu's public papers, as assembled from a wide variety of documentary sources, and supplemented by the works of many of the figures with whom Wu was associated during his long life. The result is a political biography of Wu Tingfang as a public figure. It focuses on what he did and thought, as revealed in the documentary sources, and less on his private life and emotions. As such, this biography makes a contribution to the political history of modern China by detailing, as much as is possible from the sources, the emergence in modern Chinese political life of a talented man of overseas mercantile family background with cultural interests and educational training shared by very few of his generation. It seeks to demonstrate the problems as well as opportunities experienced by Wu and others like Wu in the last decades of the Qing Dynasty. Finally, this work indicates the insurmountable problems Wu and his circle encountered in proposing solutions to China's problems in the early Republican period.

vii

Acknowledgements

I am deeply indebted to many friends, colleagues and institutions for their assistance in seeing this study through to publication. This project began as a Ph.D. dissertation at UCLA under the direction of Professors Han Yu-shan, David M. Farquhar (both now deceased), Richard C. Rudolph, John Caughey, and Roger Daniels.

A number of people read all or parts of the manuscript and offered useful suggestions, including Ming Chan, Paul A. Cohen, Britten Dean, Joseph Esherick, Norma Farquhar, Stephen R. MacKinnon, Robert Marks, Ed Rhoads, Art Rosenbaum, John Schrecker, and anonmyous reviewers. John K. Fairbank was especially encouraging and helpful to me at various stages in the revision of this work. I alone am responsible for any errors of fact or interpretation.

The research for this study was undertaken with assistance provided by a Fulbright Fellowship to Taiwan, National Defense Foreign Language fellowships, and a travel grant provided by the UCLA Academic Senate. Postdoctoral assistance has been provided by the California State University Dominguez Hills, Social and Behavioral Sciences Research Award and CSUDH Professional and Institutional Development grants. Additional support for the book's publication has been provided by the CSUDH Foundation.

Staff members of many libraries in the United States, Hong Kong, Taiwan and England were indispensable allies, without whom this work could not have been completed.

In particular, I wish to express my thanks to Charlotte Furth for many years of friendship and support. She, as well as Susan Ko, Sucheta Mazumdar and Honming Yip, have provided constant encouragement. My colleagues at California State University Dominguez Hills have provided collegiality and friendship for the past twenty years, and my husband Dawei Zhang and children Jacob and William deserve my heartfelt thanks for their support and patience.

viii

Introduction

Wu Tingfang's eighty-year life spanned a momentous phase of China's history. Born in 1842 as the Qing Dynasty suffered its first major defeat at the hands of Great Britain, Wu came of age and maturity in a period which saw the decline and eventual disappearance of the Qing Dynasty, in spite of the efforts of Wu and many others to reform and shore up its existing structures. His later years were marked by frustrating, futile efforts to create a modern national political system, but he died in 1922 before these efforts achieved success. His achievements, aspirations and frustrations all reflect China's social and political condition in the modern world, in which the drama of its struggle to maintain its national autonomy while transforming itself into a modern nation unfolds over the counterpoint of the perpetually unresolved debate over cultural identity.

Wu Tingfang was a product of the British colonial venture in Asia. Born to a merchant family in Singapore and raised in Guangzhou and Hong Kong, Wu was educated in missionary schools before going abroad to Great Britain for professional legal training. A pioneer in modern journalism, Wu was the first Chinese to receive British training as a barrister, the first Chinese to practice as a barrister in Hong Kong, and the first Chinese to serve as a member of Hong Kong's Legislative Council. He was thus an example of a new social group that emerged in the Chinese urban littoral in the latter part of the nineteenth century, a group often defined in a non-Chinese colonial context as "colonial intelligentsia."

Along with other intellectuals of the littoral, such as his brother-in-law He Qi (Ho Kai, 1859-1914), Wang Tao (1828–97) and Zheng Guanying (1842– 1923), Wu was an early advocate of institutional reforms. His views reflected a nationalist perspective on China's situation as well as an undisguised admiration for British political institutions, both of which were specific products of the colonial environment in which he functioned, and which is described in some detail in Chapter 1.

From 1877 to 1882 Wu was a key figure in the reform administration of Sir John Pope Hennessy, the Irish-born colonial governor whose program in Hong Kong served as a trial run for his later policies of Home Rule in Ireland. Wu's rise to a position of influence took place in the context of the growth of Chinese economic power in Hong Kong and the continued, often bitter, economic competition between Chinese and western business interests. The propertied Chinese elite of Hong Kong functioned vis-à-vis the colonial authorities much as the gentry-merchant elite inside China did in relation to

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Imperial authorities. Wu's political strength derived from his unique capability, by virtue of his standing as an English barrister, to serve as a go-between between the propertied Chinese and the colonial authorities in a setting in which an expanded consultative role, rather than parliamentary reform, was seen as most productive for Chinese interests.

The most contentious issues were racial segregation and a number of discriminatory measures against Chinese, particularly those that were perceived as harmful to Chinese business and commercial interests. As described in Chapter 2, Wu's experiences in promoting Chinese interests were mixed. His successes were largely due to his ability to influence Hennessy, who was already disposed to accept reforms proposed by the Chinese. But when Hennessy's political position weakened, leading to his removal from Hong Kong, the marginality of Wu's position was painfully revealed. When Hennessy left Hong Kong in 1882, Wu chose to leave the Colony as well.

In 1882 Wu moved to Tianjin and began an association with Li Hongzhang (1823-1901) that lasted until the latter's death in 1901. Wu was one of three foreign-trained men who were the key figures in Li's modernization efforts. Wu was centrally involved in the development of the Kaiping mines and railway system, specifically in charge of raising capital and managing construction for the first major railway system in China. These activities placed him squarely at the center of the Self-Strengthening (or Westernization) Movement.

In light of China's subsequent defeat at Japan's hands in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, Li Hongzhang's modernizing efforts are generally acknowledged to have been failures, but there remains considerable scholarly controversy over the character of the modernization program and the reasons for its failure.

Wu's experiences under Li as explored in Chapter 3 suggest that although the mufu ("tent government”) innovation provided some measure of flexibility in a rigid and increasingly outmoded bureaucratic structure, it nonetheless relegated unorthodox officials such as Wu Tingfang to positions of relative marginality and dependence upon powerful patrons like Li Hongzhang. Similarly, Wu's experiences in the railway administration show that although the guandu shangban (official supervised-merchant managed) system under which Li Hongzhang's enterprises functioned provided a setting for the utilization of new domestic sources of capital, it ultimately thwarted the success of modernizing ventures because of the parasitic, anti-capitalist values and behaviors associated with the bureaucratic structures in which they operated. Wu's efforts during this period to modernize China's conduct of foreign relations similarly resulted in frustrating limitations. Wu's project to develop a code of commercial law that might eventually result in the abolition of extraterritoriality died for lack of official support, and his efforts to negotiate with Japan in 1886 on the basis of equality met with Li Hongzhang's capitulation in the face of Japan's threats.

Equality was out of the question in the negotiations that took place following Japan's victory over China in 1895. China's disastrous defeat led to widespread

Introduction

recriminations against Li Hongzhang, and as Wu was Li's principal assistant in these talks, which led to further loss of sovereignty for China, Wu's reputation and prospects suffered as a result of Li's disgrace.

Wu's career with Li Hongzhang suggests that the move from colonial littoral to a position of rank and prestige inside China was not difficult for a man of Wu's credentials and training, but that as in Hong Kong, this position carried little policy-making power and depended upon the patronage of a powerful sponsor.

In 1896 Wu was appointed China's Minister to the United States, Spain and Peru, a post he took up the following year and kept through the upheavals that started with the abortive reform movement of 1898 and culminated in the Boxer Uprising and subsequent foreign occupation of the Chinese capital in 1900-1901. Chapter 4 deals with Wu's diplomatic activities during this period. Wu was an advocate of a foreign policy tilt towards England and the U.S. at a time when the dominant trend in Beijing was to seek alliance with Russia. Wu hoped to have China take the initiative in proposing an “open door" in trade relations as a means of undercutting extraterritoriality and bolstering Chinese sovereignty, but these views did not prevail at the time.

As the first Chinese Minister with credentials as a “western expert" to serve in Washington, D.C., Wu proved adroit in his ability to reach U.S. public opinion in his effort to influence policy formation with regards to China. His greatest efforts were expended in an effort to redress injustices in U.S. immigration policy towards China, and although he ultimately proved unsuccessful in his efforts to prevent the Chinese Exclusion Laws from being extended to Hawaii and the Philippines, he did succeed in forcing reforms in the implementation of the laws in the continental U.S., and more particularly he succeeded in promoting a national debate on the topic.

Wu's popularity with the U.S. public and familiarity with U.S. policy makers was helpful in the crisis of 1900, in which the U.S. joined the allied expeditionary force and participated in the peace negotiations that followed the occupation of the Chinese capital. Wu sought to influence the U.S. by presenting the Chinese "case" against the destabilizing activities of foreign missionaries; at the same time he hoped to use the U.S. as ally against the reactionary elements in the Qing court.

Intellectually, Wu's sojourn in the U.S. appears to have marked a turning point in his attitudes towards China and the West. Although he had long decried the harmful effects of western missionaries in China, he had formerly held a more optimistic view of the prospects for positive western influences in China's development. Exposure to virulent anti-Chinese prejudice and xenophobic reactions to the Boxers on the part of the American public, however, tempered Wu's earlier admiration for Anglo-American civilization and led to a more pessimistic view of the West's role in China. At the same time he began to develop a positive reevaluation of aspects of Chinese civilization, particularly those he associated with Confucian social and political values. He sought intellectual companionship with American social purity reformers, cultural conservatives whose critical views of deteriorating moral

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

and social standards in the U.S. and espousal of abstinence from alcohol, sex and in some cases, flesh eating, appealed to Wu.

Wu's more critical perspective on contemporary American society and newly softened stance towards Chinese culture was reflected in his rejection of radical political alternatives for China. The anti-monarchical revolutionary movement began in 1895 with Sun Yixian (Sun Yat-sen) as its principal initial organizer. In 1896 Wu and his brother-in-law He Qi split over the issue of reform, with He Qi declaring that official corruption and incompetence made genuine reform an impossibility under the Qing. He Qi subsequently became a sometime patron of Sun, but Wu Tingfang apparently disdained any contact with the revolutionaries and moreover was indirectly responsible for their persecution abroad when he was Minister to the United States, Spain and Peru.

Wu was also not associated with the outlawed reform organization whose principal figures were Kang Youwei (1858–1927) and Liang Qichao(1873– 1929). Wu admired Kang and Liang; it is doubtful that his admiration was reciprocated. Rather Wu was one of a fairly large number of late Qing officials in the post-Boxer period who functioned within the existing structures in an effort to make them viable conduits for a moderate nationalist program of reform and modernization.

Wu was thus an active participant in the late Qing reform movement. From 1902 to 1906 he held substantive posts in the Board of Commerce, Board of Foreign Affairs, and Board of Punishments. His main contributions to the reform effort were in the areas of foreign policy and law, but in both areas he experienced frustrations as well as achievements.

In foreign policy, Wu sought to utilize the new nationalist organs of public opinion emerging in China's major cities in support of an assertive foreign policy to protect China's sovereignty. He clashed with Britain over China's position in Tibet, and with the United States both over its discriminatory immigration policies and its insistence on Chinese neutrality in the Russo- Japanese War. He clashed both with Britain and America over their railway and mining concessions.

These clashes occurred in a context in which Wu miscalculated the degree to which the Anglo-Saxon nations were prepared to accept China's new nationalism, and the resulting hostile reaction of British and American officials to his activities reduced his effectiveness, in the eyes of the Court, as a foreign affairs official. This perceived weakness, in turn, opened the door to bureaucratic factional intrigues against him which further undermined his position. While Wu's initial appointments into the central government in 1902 had reflected Yuan Shikai's patronage, Wu was not part of Yuan's inner circle and moreover did not have powerful supporters during the post-Boxer period. Wu's frustrations led him to consider resigning in 1904 and again in 1905 when it was clear that his ability to function effectively as a foreign affairs official was impaired. He persisted, however, in the end, because of his desire to complete the massive law reform project that engaged his energies from 1904 to 1906, even as he knew that its prospects for success were in doubt.

Introduction

Wu's draft commercial code, issued in 1904, met with only limited success, and was followed by Wu and Shen Jiaben's (1837-1910) proposed judicial reforms humanizing judicial proceedings. These reforms received Imperial support in 1905–6, but were nonetheless largely ignored by local magistrates who continued to use torture to extract confessions and in other ways violate the letter and spirit of the reforms. Finally, Wu and Shen's draft procedural code of 1906, which granted sweeping civil liberties to all Chinese subjects and limited the powers of officials in criminal proceedings, was roundly denounced by most high-level officials as departing too radically from Chinese political traditions; it was never accorded Imperial approval.

Wu resigned from his posts one week after submitting the draft procedural code for Imperial approval, but accepted a new mandate the following year, 1907, to serve a second term as China's Minister to the United States, etc. Shut out by U.S. officials and then by the Beijing Government after the deaths of the Empress Dowager (Cixi) and the Guangxu Emperor (Dezong) in 1908, Wu was recalled in 1909 just as he was negotiating with the Peruvian Government for a treaty guaranteeing protection to Chinese living in Peru. At this point, Wu declined further positions under the Qing Government.

Although Wu was seventy years old, his role in the revolution of 1911 was probably the most important in his life. He was a key figure in the revolutionary take-over of Shanghai and served the revolutionaries as foreign affairs representative, chief Republican delegate to the North-South peace talks, and finally as Minister of Justice in the first cabinet headed by Sun Yixian. Wu led an active, relatively effective campaign to win foreign neutrality and non-intervention in China, and succeeded in mobilizing considerable foreign opinion on behalf of the Republican agenda.

Throughout this period Wu was associated with the Jiangsu constitutionalists led by Zhang Jian, joining them in supporting Yuan Shikai's rise to power. Wu thus used his position in the North-South negotiations to further Yuan's cause in the belief that Yuan's leadership constituted the most stable course for China in the immediate post-revolutionary period. Wu also clashed repeatedly with Chen Qimei(1877-1916), the head of Shanghai's revolutionary government, and sought to temper the new government's radicalism.

In supporting Yuan Shikai nationally and a moderate Shanghai government locally, Wu was motivated both by the desire to avoid any pretext for foreign intervention, as well as by his distrust of the revolutionaries to adequately represent the interests of China's new urban propertied classes. Leadership and political alliance were far more important than the form of government in the short run, but Wu also believed that Yuan's leadership might provide a better guarantee for liberalism in China. As Wu saw it, respect for property and due process in legal proceedings had a better chance of success under Yuan than under the revolutionaries.

In these hopes, however, Wu was soon disappointed. One of his most publicized initiatives was to make two criminal trials with political overtones held early in 1912 into models of liberal jurisprudence. But his enthusiasm for British judicial procedures was not shared by Yuan or other powerful

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

figures of the early Republican period, and his initiatives were not pursued further.

Wu went into retirement in 1912 but was loosely associated with Yuan Shikai. He refrained from any public criticism of Yuan in the latter's moves against the Guomindang, while Wu's son Wu Chaoshu (C. C. Wu, 1886- 1934) served Yuan in a variety of advisory roles during this time. With the announcement of Yuan's monarchical plans in 1916, however, Wu belatedly joined the anti-Yuan movement by publicly calling upon Yuan to resign the

presidency.

Following Yuan's death in 1916, Wu agreed to serve as Foreign Minister in the government formed under Li Yuanhong as President. This government was marked by severe factional struggle between Li and the Prime Minister Duan Qirui. Wu supported Li in this struggle and was appointed Acting Premier when Li forced Duan out of his government in 1917. In one of the many ironic twists characterizing factional politics of the early Republican period, Li then ordered Wu to dismiss the Parliament so as to obtain the support of the monarchist general Zhang Xun. Wu's refusal to dismiss Parliament in spite of enormous pressure and personal threats against his life made him the hero of the moment and greatly added to his stature.

Escaping from Beijing, Wu eventually linked up with the coalition of Guomindang politicians and southern militarists who had established a rump government in Guangzhou under the rubric "Protect the Constitution." Chapter 8 details the complex internal factional politics that dominated the Guangzhou Governments that Wu participated in from 1917 until his death in 1922 and describes the role of the southern governments' key figures in national politics. From his initial position as a possible mediator and peace- maker between the Guangzhou Governments, dominated by Guangxi militarists, and the Zhili militarists in the North, Wu moved gradually towards alliance with Sun Yixian. In 1920 Wu broke with the Guangxi military and civilian factions and formally aligned himself with Sun, remaining the latter's strong supporter in his drive to unify China under Guomindang rule. Wu died, however, one week after civil war erupted between Sun Yixian's forces and those of his chief military supporter, Chen Jiongming.

His stature assured by virtue of his age and reputation as an elder statesman, Wu Tingfang's last years were nonetheless spent in a political environment marked by political factionalism that increased in intensity as the prospects for establishing a viable national government declined. Maneuvering in this futile and demeaning political milieu, Wu Tingfang died at the age of eighty without seeing any genuine prospects either for the unification of the Chinese polity or the modernization of its society.

The Colonial Matrix 1842-1877

The Colonial Impact

Wu Tingfang's life was decisively shaped by Great Britain's colonial enterprise in Asia. Wu was born in one British colony, Singapore, and came of age

in another, Hong Kong. In the latter he received much of his education, found his first employment and developed the skills that made his future career possible. In all major respects his career choices reflected his colonial origins, and even though he left Hong Kong permanently at the age of forty, he kept close ties to family and associates in Hong Kong throughout his life.

Several developments in Hong Kong's nineteenth century history made possible the emergence of a person such as Wu Tingfang. Seized by Great Britain during the Opium War of 1840-42 and formally established as a Crown Colony in 1843, Hong Kong's particular circumstances lent themselves to the development of a large and powerful Chinese merchant class that came to play an important role both in Hong Kong and in China. Wu Tingfang was a product of this merchant class, more specifically of its offshoot, the modern colonial intelligentsia of Hong Kong. This colonial intelligentsia was composed of people educated in the British mode who often served as clerks, translators and lower-ranked bureaucrats in the colonial government, although a very small number of them were also trained in western professions such as law, medicine and journalism. Wu was one of a tiny minority of nineteenth century Hong Kong Chinese who had been so trained.

Although this group of professionally trained intellectuals was extremely small, it had an important impact on modern Chinese history. Wu Tingfang and others of this group transferred their newly-acquired skills to a variety of modernizing projects in China and in particular came to dominate the newly emerging foreign affairs bureaucracy of the late Qing. Moreover, Wu and others of his milieu were a critical element in developing and popularizing modern nationalist concepts-themselves a product of the specific Hong Kong colonial environment—in nineteenth century China. These concepts contributed to the emerging reform and revolutionary movements of the late Qing and early Republican period of Chinese history.

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

The Rise of the Hong Kong Chinese Bourgeoisie

From the start Hong Kong differed from many other British colonizing ventures in that its prime function was as entrepôt for the Anglo-Chinese trade, but in spite of this, historical circumstances led to Hong Kong's emergence as a major Chinese city by the late 1850s. Whereas in 1840 the island of Victoria had perhaps 5,000 to 7,000 Chinese residents, mostly fishermen, by 1858 there were over 85,000 Chinese residents, vastly outnumbering the European population estimated to be 1,611. By 1870 there were over 115,000 Chinese in Hong Kong (including Kowloon), and 8,754 Europeans, for a total population of 124,198.1

There were few Chinese families. At least three-quarters of the Chinese in Hong Kong were single male laborers engaged in manual work as seamen, longshoremen, freight haulers, "coolies" of various sorts, carpenters, masons and other construction workers, and servants in the homes of the wealthy. Most of these men lived in the many lodging houses that dotted the city. There were also many fishermen and a marginal population of floaters who engaged in theft and piracy, which was so prevalent as to be a major cause of concern to European and Chinese alike.2

The dramatic rise in Hong Kong's Chinese population occurred in the context of widespread disorder in the Pearl River Delta region throughout the 1850s, caused in part by the activities of the Taiping and other sectarian rebels, and partly by the large-scale inter-ethnic warfare between Hakka and "Punti." In particular, when the Taiping rebels seized the important city of Foshan (Fatshan) in 1854, many wealthy people in Guangzhou apparently panicked and fled to Hong Kong, joined by large numbers of refugees.3

This exodus was encouraged, perhaps inadvertently so, when the British decreed that Chinese living in Hong Kong might register their ships as British, thereby granting them the same degree of protection that European shipping enjoyed. In the Anglo-French War with China (1856-60), the British fought in part to protect the rights of Chinese ships of British registry, thereby strengthening the basis for Hong Kong's ascendancy over Guangzhou as the center of commerce for South China.1

Hong Kong's commercial ascendance over Guangzhou was unsuccessfully challenged by Qing authorities in the 1860s. In 1867 the Cotton Dealers'

1. Hong Kong, Historical and Statistical Abstract of the Colony of Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Noronha, 1907); G. B. Endacott, A History of Hong Kong, 2d ed. (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 65, 85, 98, 116; E. J. Eitel, Europe in China: The History of Hongkong from the Beginning to the Year 1882 (London: Luzac, 1895; reprint, Taipei, 1968), pp. 371, 463, 485.

2. A repeated cause for lamentation by colonial officials who hoped for a more stable Chinese population. See, e.g., Gt. Brit., Sessional Papers, 1857, no. 12: 607.

3. Frederick Wakeman, Jr., Strangers at the Gate: Social Disorder in South China, 1839-1861 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965).

4. Eitel, Europe in China, p. 302; “Correspondence Relating to the Registration of Colonial Vessels," Gt. Brit. Colonial Office, Sessional Papers, 1857, 1st sess., no. 12: 79–592.

The Colonial Matrix 1842-1877

Guild of Guangzhou attempted to fine Hong Kong Chinese merchants involved in the cotton piece-goods trade, but the Guild was forced to desist when the British Government issued a strong protest. In the same year the so-called "customs blockade" was organized by the Qing authorities in an effort to subject imports from Hong Kong to an internal transit tax or lijin (li-kin). These attempts, however, were unsuccessful.5

Thus the Chinese merchant community of Hong Kong flourished in spite of Qing efforts, and also in spite of the numerous anti-Chinese measures undertaken by British authorities in the 1850s and 1860s. These measures included registration, imposition of pass laws, and the branding and deportation of criminals. This latter was undertaken in the aftermath of the anti-Chinese hysteria which swept the European residents in 1857, when a Chinese baker was accused of the attempted poisoning of the European population.

Mercantile interests continued to be strengthened by a series of measures undertaken by the Hong Kong authorities in the 1860s. Chinese wills were ruled valid in Hong Kong, and soon thereafter, the Governor ruled that salt, a government monopoly in China, would not be subject to taxation in Hong Kong. This last gave rise to a brisk trade in salt smuggling."

All of this combined to result in the rapid rise in the so-called “junk trade" between Hong Kong and various South China ports, all of which operated outside of the control of Qing authorities in Guangzhou. This junk trade consisted of imported cotton piece goods and opium from England and India, and exports of rice, tea, silk, salt and foodstuffs from China.

Another important factor in the growth of Chinese mercantile interests in Hong Kong was its emergence as a center in the network of overseas Chinese commerce. While the overseas exodus began much earlier, it took a new turn around 1850 as the result of the discovery of gold in California in 1849, which had led to an influx of Chinese miners and workers to the American West. Also the 1850s saw the rapid rise of Singapore's population and a general expansion of Chinese communities throughout Southeast Asia. The transporting of Chinese workers abroad and their provisioning became a flourishing enterprise. While the actual transporting of workers was soon shifted to Macau, the Hong Kong Chinese merchants retained their control over an expanding network of commerce with overseas Chinese communities, the details of which are not yet fully documented but which appears to have been extensive and increasingly valuable.R

5. Eitel, Europe in China, pp. 415–19.

6. Ibid.; "Papers Connected with the Confinement of Chinese Prisoners at Hong Kong, and with the Trial of a Baker and Others on the Charge of Poisoning," Gt. Brit., Sessional Papers, 1857, 2d sess., no. 43: 169ff.

7. Eitel, Europe in China, pp. 332, 336.

8. See, e.g., Linda Pomerantz, "The Chinese Bourgeoisie and the Anti-Chinese Movement in the United States, 1850–1905,” Amerasia Journal 11, no. 1 (Fall 1984): 1–30; Edgar Wickberg, The Chinese in Philippine Life, 1850–1898 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 60.

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

The growth of Chinese mercantile interests in Hong Kong may be seen in Table 1, indicating the composition of the Hong Kong mercantile bourgeoisie in 1876. Whereas in 1846 there were 388 Chinese traders and two compradors operating in Hong Kong, by 1876 there were 1,557 Chinese mercantile firms in the Colony. The upper stratum, composed of less than 100 individuals or firms, consisted of compradors for foreign firms, large import-export merchants, and large opium merchants, as well as shippers and bankers. The much larger lower stratum was composed of small traders, shopkeepers, and owners of small handicraft workshops. Other enterprises included money lending, tax and opium "farming" or concessions, and especially investing in urban real estate, which was both lucrative and prestigious.9

The pre-eminent position of mercantile activities is underscored by the relative underdevelopment of manufacturing in Hong Kong in the 1870s. Table 2 lists 1,920 manufacturing enterprises in Hong Kong in 1876. These were largely traditional handicraft operations, rattan workers occupying the largest category (596), with gold beaters (111), vermillion manufacturers and dealers (111), opium processors (108), and sail and rope makers (100) being the most important enterprises. There was also a small "modern" sector of enterprises that either served a foreign clientele or reflected its influence, such as cigar makers (21), image makers (photographers, 10), lemonade and soda-water makers (28) and sugar refining (25).10

The Hong Kong bourgeoisie, then, was overwhelmingly mercantile in nature, as befitting Hong Kong's growth as trading center. It also appears that the Hong Kong merchants had particularly close ties with their counterparts in Guangzhou. In Hong Kong's early days, many merchants maintained their primary residence in Guangzhou, and in the 1860s, many

9. Detailed information about the financial dealings of the Hong Kong bourgeoisie may be found in Carl T. Smith, "The Emergence of a Chinese Elite in Hong Kong," Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 11 (1971): 74–115. See also Marjorie Topley, "The Role of Savings and Wealth Among Hong Kong Chinese,” in Hong Kong: A Society in Transition, ed. Ian C. Jarvie and Joseph Agassi (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 196, 210. On opium “farms” or monopolies see also "Papers Relating to Hong Kong,” Gt. Brit., Sessional Papers, 1860, no. 48. See also The Hong Kong Almanack and Directory for 1846, as cited in Henry Lethbridge, “A Chinese Association in Hong Kong: The Tung Wah,” in his Hong Kong: Stability and Change: A Collection of Essays (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 56; Gt. Brit., Sessional Papers, 1881, no. 65: 824.

10. Gt. Brit., Sessional Papers, 1881, no. 65: 824. It would appear that manufacturing was an offshoot from mercantile pursuits. This is suggested by the fact that when the Hong Kong bourgeoisie underwent a major expansion in the late 1870s, the mercantile sector proliferated threefold while the “industrial” sector showed little increase. The careers of Kwok A-cheong and Ho A-mei, two of the wealthiest Chinese in Hong Kong by the early 1870s, also illustrate this phenomenon. Kwok started his career as a comprador and soon engaged in a variety of mercantile- related economic ventures. Shortly before his death in 1880 Governor Sir John Pope Hennessy encouraged him and a few other wealthy Chinese to start a factory to make ketchup, soy sauce and preserved fruit for the European market. On Kwok see Smith, “Emergence of a Chinese Elite,” pp. 97-98. Ho A-mei was educated in a mission school in Hong Kong and had many economic ventures, including transport of Chinese workers to Australia and New Zealand, the formation of the Canton and Hong Kong Telegraph Company, the On Tai Insurance Company, and mining ventures in Hong Kong and Guangdong. See Smith, "Emergence of a Chinese Elite," p. 104.

The Colonial Matrix 1842–1877

Table 1

The Chinese Mercantile Bourgeoisie of Hong Kong, 1876

Type of business

Trading hongs*

215

Traders

Shroffs

Brokers

287

142

Money changers

111

Bullion dealers

Bankers

Piece goods dealers

Cotton and yarn dealers

Tea merchants

Rice dealers

Coal dealers

Fire arms dealers

Timber dealers

Drapers

101

Foreign goods dealers

167

Compradors

Ship compradors

Ship charterers

Bird's nest sellers

Shark's fin dealers

Jade dealers

Cinnamon dealers

Sesame oil dealers

Ginseng dealers

Total

Source: Gt. Brit. SP. 1881:824.

1,557

*Defined by Hennessy as “Nampak hongs and other wealthy merchants in the England-China trade."

Hong Kong firms were branches of older Guangzhou firms.11 There are some indications of conflicts with Guangzhou interests, as the Cotton Dealers' Guild of Guangzhou's unsuccessful attempt to fine Chinese merchants who dealt in the Hong Kong cotton piece-goods trade in 1867.12 But in spite of this example, most indications suggest a close and harmonious relationship between the Hong Kong merchants and their counterparts in Guangzhou. Many prominent Hong Kong Chinese maintained offices in Guangzhou and kept in close contact with merchant organizations there, while investing heavily in land and various enterprises in Guangdong Province.13

11. Smith, “Emergence of a Chinese Elite,” pp. 84–85 passim.

12. Eitel, Europe in China, p. 415.

13. Lethbridge, "The District Watch Committee: The Chinese Executive Council of Hong Kong?" in his Hong Kong: Stability and Change, p. 128.

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Table 2

Manufacturing Industries in Hong Kong, 1876

Type of Industry

Bamboo workers

Beancurd dealers

Boat builders Carvers

Cigar makers Engineers

Gold beaters

Glass manufacturers

Image makers

111

Lantern makers

Leather box makers

Lemonade and soda-water makers

Oar makers

Opium dealers*

108

Paper box makers

Rattan workers

596

Sail and rope makers

100

Sandalwood dealers and workers

Sapanwood dealers and workers

Sauce manufacturers

Soap manufacturers

Sugar refineries

Tanners

Tobacco manufacturers

Tooth powder manufacturers

Umbrella makers

Vermillion manufacturers and dealers

111

Watch makers

Weavers

Total

1,920

Source: Gt. Brit. SP. 1881:824.

*Processors of raw opium.

Recent research by Ming Chan indicates that by the early 1870s Hong Kong and Guangzhou were closely linked economically and were mutually interdependent. He describes the relationship in this way:

Hong Kong could be considered South China's foreign trade department. It was taking foreign orders, was in charge of shipping, insurance, banking, and accounting, while Canton became the domestic collecting station, a centralized marketplace for the South China export as well as domestic trade. There was a resultant division of labor between the Inland River Port and the Outer Harbor on the oceanfront, somewhat parallel to the relation in Germany between Bremerhaven and Bremer.

The Colonial Matrix 1842-1877

In functional terms, Canton and Hong Kong could, in the pre-1949 period, almost be considered as two parts of a single port city.

The Hong Kong Chinese bourgeoisie also played an important role in Shanghai's development as a center for foreign interests in China. In the 1850s and 1860s almost all of the major compradors for foreign firms in Shanghai had Hong Kong origins or close connections. This "Hong Kong- Shanghai corridor,” to use Paul A. Cohen's term, was dominated initially by the Hong Kong mercantile bourgeoisie, although by the end of the century, the Ningbo group of merchants from neighboring Zhejiang Province had reestablished much of its former power and influence in Shanghai.15

In summary, a large and powerful mercantile bourgeoisie emerged in Hong Kong in the 1850s and 1860s, its growth primarily linked to the expansion of foreign commercial interests in China and secondarily to the migration of Chinese abroad. As in other nineteenth century colonial settings, this bourgeoisie functioned as economic middlemen in the emerging pattern of trade relations, and its fate was closely connected to the expansion of those relations.

The "Colonial Situation"

Although Hong Kong retained special features reflecting its strategic functions as Great Britain's China entrepôt, it nonetheless came to be governed in conformity with British colonial practices and to develop features in common with other British colonies. Along with them, it shared the structural inequalities endemic to the “colonial situation." The term "colonial situation" describes the massive and fundamental inequalities between colonizers and colonized that is the principal characteristic of nineteenth century colonialism.16

Pioneer anthropologist Raymond Kennedy ascribed the following characteristics to the "colonial situation": a true caste division based on color; political and economic subordination of the colonized to the colonizers; inadequate social services, especially educational facilities, for the colonized;

14. Ming Chan, summary of “A Tale of Two Cities: Canton and Hong Kong," in The Rise and Growth of the Colonial Port Cities in Asia, ed. Dilip K. Basu (Santa Cruz, Calif.: Center for South Pacific Studies, University of California, Santa Cruz, 1979), p. 150.

15. Paul A. Cohen, Between Tradition and Modernity: Wang T'ao and Reform in Late Ch'ing China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974); Susan Mann, "The Ningpo Pang and Financial Power at Shanghai,” in The Chinese City Between Two Worlds, ed. Mark Elvin and G. William Skinner (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974), pp. 73–96.

16. G. Balandier, "The Colonial Situation: A Theoretical Approach (1951),” in Social Change: The Colonial Situation, ed. Immanuel Wallerstein (New York: Wiley, 1966), pp. 34–61. For a different perspective on the colonial experience see Frank H. Tucker, The White Conscience (New York: Ungar, 1968); Hans Kohn, “Reflections on Colonialism,” in The Idea of Colonialism, ed. Robert Strausz- Hupe and Harry W. Hazard (New York: Praeger, 1958), pp. 2–16.

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

and finally, a social barrier that is "virtually impassable" between colonizers and colonized.1 Kennedy describes the latter as follows:

The groups are mutually exclusive to an almost total degree except in such formal relationships as those of employer and employee or master and servant, which are stamped with the mark of obvious inequality. The upper caste has its own clubs, recreational functions, friendship circles, and the like, from which natives are rigidly excluded. . . . The white person who associates freely with natives is sure to be regarded with suspicion and even scorn by his fellows; and marriage with a native brings outright ostracism.18

In Hong Kong there were sharp divisions within the population based largely on nationality, with the British and other Europeans constituting the elite. Miniscule in numbers compared to the Chinese population, they nonetheless dominated society. The British residents were mostly heads of large shipping and mercantile firms involved with the cotton, tea and opium trade, such as Jardine, Matheson and Company, Dent and Company, and Butterfield and Swire. These firms owned and managed the docks, river steamers, insurance companies, a major sugar refinery, a gas company and major banking institutions.1 These leading merchants had political influence in the colonial administration, frequently serving on the Governor's Executive Council or as his appointees to the Legislative Council. They could also, when necessary, appeal directly to the Governor's superiors in London.

In addition to the British merchants, the "European" community was primarily composed of merchants of other European nationalities, as well as Americans. Moreover, the European community included non-merchants such as missionaries, government officials, military troops, newspapermen, and a temporary population of seamen.20

A middle stratum was comprised of Portuguese, Indians and Eurasians. Portuguese residents were an important segment of the European community. Many had been residents of Macau, the Portuguese colony across the bay, many of whom migrated to Hong Kong in the 1850s, 1860s and later, especially when a large typhoon destroyed much of Macau in 1874. While the British considered the Portuguese as "European," there was nonetheless little social mixing, perhaps because many Portuguese were actually Eurasian. As many Portuguese often knew Cantonese, they proved useful to the British merchants

17. Raymond Kennedy, "The Colonial Crisis and the Future," in The Science of Man in the World Crisis, ed. Ralph Linton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), p. 311.

18 Kennedy, "The Colonial Crisis”, pp. 308-11.

19. Rhoads Murphey, The Outsiders: The Western Experience in India and China (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977).

20. Lethbridge, “Caste, Class, and Race in Hong Kong before the Japanese Occupation,” in his Hong Kong: Stability and Change, pp. 163–67; and “Condition of the European Working Class in Nineteenth Century Hong Kong," ibid., pp. 189–213.

The Colonial Matrix 1842–1877

and colonial administrators and soon constituted a middle stratum of clerks in government and business.21 Indian merchants (largely Parsi), police and soldiers (mostly Punjabi) should also be viewed as part of the middle stratum. Although some Indian merchants were among the early China traders and had amassed great fortunes, they were largely excluded from the elite of British merchants. Both Portuguese and Indians were “middlemen” minorities in Hong Kong, distinct from the Chinese below them but denied access to genuine power.22

A small Eurasian community existed in Hong Kong in the nineteenth century, and although its members included some of the richest of the mercantile bourgeoisie, the Eurasians were to some extent outcasts. Most cultivated a Chinese identity and eventually merged into the Chinese population, while nonetheless playing important roles as low-ranking clerks in Hong Kong's early days as a colony.23

There was a large social gulf between the Europeans and the vast majority of Chinese. Chinese were subject to laws and regulations that set them apart from Europeans, such as registration, and in the case of Chinese criminals, branding, deportation and flogging (see Chapter 2). The British had their own institutions, such as the Hong Kong Club, Amateur Dramatic Corps, Choral Society, Horticultural Society, etc., and their own activities, such as the annual yacht races, from which Chinese were excluded. In the words of one of Hong Kong's leading historians, there was no "social mixing. "24

The essential colonists' dilemma was succinctly expressed by Sir Hercules Robinson, Governor of Hong Kong from 1859 to 1865, as he fretted over the rapid increase in the Chinese population:

My constant thought has been how best to prevent a large Chinese population establishing themselves [sic] at Kowloon, and as some native population is indispensable, how best to keep them to themselves and preserve the European and American community from the injury and inconvenience of intermixture with them.2 25

Close association between Chinese and Europeans, especially social mixing as equals or through intermarriage, brought ostracism. This is illustrated in the case of R. D. Caldwell, who was the Colony's Registrar-General in 1859, and who was accused by the Attorney-General of being unsuited for office. The case against Caldwell consisted of the charge that he had associated with

21. Eitel, Europe in China, p. 281; Lethbridge, “Caste, Class, and Race,” pp. 178–79. 22. Lethbridge, “Caste, Class, and Race,” pp. 177–78.

23. Ibid., pp. 175-76; for a memoir of the most prominent Eurasian family, see also Irene Cheng, Clara Hó Tung: A Hong Kong Lady, Her Family and Her Times (Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1976).

24. Endacott, A History of Hong Kong, p. 70. See also Lethbridge, “Caste, Class, and Race,” pp. 7–9, 21, 179–85; Eitel, Europe in China, pp. 363–64.

25. Cited in Endacott, A History of Hong Kong, p. 122.

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Wong A-kee, also known as Ma Chow-wang, who was married to a Chinese woman and who was a Singaporean of mixed racial ancestry.26

Residential areas remained segregated throughout the nineteenth century, and certain areas (especially Victoria Peak) were excluded from Chinese settlement until well into the twentieth century.27 In the 1870s and 1880s Europeans fought to preserve certain areas of Central Victoria for their own businesses in the face of stiff competition from Chinese commercial interests. 28 The "colonial situation” also manifested itself in the realm of ideology, in the ways Europeans conceptualized their own superiority in relation to the Chinese. Most Europeans believed in the historic necessity of colonialism and in the superiority of their own culture and institutions to those Chinese. They stoutly maintained that the main pattern of history lay in the “due subordination of Asia to Europe. "29 In the words of E. J. Eitel, the famous chronicler of nineteenth century Hong Kong, the Colony was "the vantage point from which the Anglo-Saxon race has to work out its divine mission of promoting the civilization of Europe in the East, and establishing the rule of constitutional liberty on the continent of Asia and on the main of the Pacific."30

Chinese protestations were dismissed as “ethnocentrism,” which many Europeans viewed as a major stumbling block to the success of the colonizing venture in China. As Governor Sir John Bowring complained (in discussing the Chinese in Java):

Amalgamation with the races among whom they fix themselves, if ever to be accomplished, must be the work of ages; for, mean and poor though he be, it will not be easy to eradicate from the mind of a Chinaman [sic] his exalted notions of the greatness of his country, and the superiority of his country's learning, literature and institutions, to those of any portions of the outer world.31

To the colonizers, then, cultural intermediaries could be seen as an important adjunct to the colonizing venture, by helping to break down Chinese "ethnocentrism" and acquaint Chinese with the more positive aspects of the "outer world" in its effort to "civilize" Asia. The critical group in this process

26. Caldwell's activities financing and managing brothels were also cause for concern among some members of the colonial administration. See “Papers Relating to Hong Kong,” Gt. Brit., Sessional Papers, 1860, no. 48: 62ff.

27. Lethbridge, “Caste, Class, and Race,” pp. 172–75. As late as 1904 Edith Blake, wife of former Hong Kong Governor Sir Henry Blake wrote to G. E. Morrison, “Another bill which was passed in Hong Kong was forbidding any Chinese of whatever standing to have a residence on the Peak! A quite unnecessary insult as the Chinese have no desire to live on the Peak...." See G. E. Morrison, The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison, ed. Lo Hui-min (London: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 1:261.

28. On Chinese-Western business competition in Hong Kong in the 1870s and 1880s, see Chap. 2. 29. Eitel, Europe in China, p. 290.

30. Ibid.

31. "Correspondence with the Superintendent of British Trade in China, Upon the Subject of Emigration from that Country,” Gt. Brit., Sessional Papers, 1852–53, no. 63: 376.

The Colonial Matrix 1842-1877

was the Chinese intelligentsia of nineteenth century Hong Kong, whose development will be discussed below.

The Emergence of the Hong Kong Colonial Intelligentsia

From an early period wealthy Chinese merchants had assumed the political leadership of the entire Chinese community of Hong Kong, both in its dealings with nearby Qing authorities as well as with the British administrators in Hong Kong. This practice both reflected Chinese political traditions of indirect rule through local elites as well as British colonial practices of establishing indirect rule through indigenous elites whenever possible.

In nineteenth century China members of the scholar-gentry elite (civil service degree holders) usually served as intermediaries between the local people and governmental authorities. To the authorities, the local gentry was seen as representing local interests; to the common people the gentry's status and power derived from its link to the government. As genuine gentry members were scarce in early Hong Kong, the wealthy bourgeois Chinese emulated the practices of the Chinese local gentry. Almost all had purchased gentry status, official ranks, title or honors, and proudly displayed themselves in official robes for ceremonial occasions. This not only facilitated the conduct of trade in China, but also conferred status upon the merchants in terms of Chinese culture and social structure.32

As in China control of temples and charitable institutions became a function of the Hong Kong merchant elite. As early as 1851 the export merchants of the Nanbei (Nampak) Guild formed a committee to assume charge of the Wenwu Temple, following well-established Chinese traditions. The Wenwu Temple then became the Hong Kong Chinese elite's main organ. According to E. J. Eitel, the committee “. . . secretly controlled native [sic] affairs, acted as commercial arbitrators, arranged for the due reception of mandarins passing through the Colony, negotiated the sale of official titles, and formed an unofficial link between the Chinese residents of Hongkong and the Canton authorities."34 This is a fair summation of traditional roles assumed by the local elite in China proper.

32. On the Chinese elite see Hsiao Kung-ch'uan, Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1960); Zhang Zhongli [Chang Chung-li], The Chinese Gentry: Studies on Their Role in Nineteenth Century Chinese Society (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962), especially pp. 51–56; M. Freedman, “Colonial Law and Chinese Society,' Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 80 (1950): 97-98, 122. The numbers of literati are suggested by the following: the 1876 census listed 341 persons as “students," as distinct from "schoolboys." By 1881 their numbers had risen to 2,562. Gt. Brit., Sessional Papers, 1881: 824. On merchants displaying official garb, see, e.g., North China Herald (hereafter cited as NCH), 4 Apr. 1878, p. 340; Xianggang Donghua Sanyuan fazhan shi (1870–1960) (Hong Kong, 1960); Zhang Zhongli, The Income of the Chinese Gentry (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962), pp. 150–51.

33. On the Wenwu Temple, see Lethbridge, "The Evolution of a Chinese Voluntary Association in Hong Kong: The Po Leung Kuk,” in his Hong Kong: Stability and Change, p. 100. 34. Eitel, Europe in China, p. 282.

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Moreover, the wealthy Chinese also assumed the role of spokesmen for the entire Chinese community in dealing with the British authorities. In 1857, for example, when the baker Cheung A-lum was accused of attempting to poison the European population of Hong Kong, a deputation of wealthy Chinese led by the large landowner and construction contractor Tan A-choi successfully appealed to the Governor against the deportation of Cheung to Hainan.35 Eventually such delegations became more commonplace.

As the Hong Kong Chinese bourgeoisie became more powerful in the 1860s it looked to the establishment of a new structure to assert its interests. In 1867 a charitable institution or yici was formed to handle the treatment of dead and dying people. This evolved into the Tung Wah (Donghua) Hospital for Chinese, established in 1870 and funded in part by a government grant derived from the gambling monopoly. The Tung Wah Hospital was managed by a Chinese board of directors under the supervision of the Colonial Government. Upon its opening in 1872 it was supported largely through contributions, but also with an annual government grant.36 The Tung Wah Hospital became a main instrument in the structure of indirect political rule in Hong Kong well into the twentieth century.

Although both British and Chinese political traditions lent themselves to the establishment of indirect political rule through local elites, the structures functioned with only limited success in the decades of the 1850s through 1870s. This is because British administrators, and propertied Chinese each had somewhat different objectives in their dealings with each other. The principal concern of the colonial administrators was to maintain order through indirect rule. By contrast, a major interest of the wealthy Chinese was to seek political representation through the organs of indirect political rule. Neither was fully possible with the existing structures.

The colonial authorities were continually concerned with crime and the maintenance of public order. Robberies and piracy formed a constant motif of life in Hong Kong, and the European superstructure was unable to penetrate the Chinese community deeply enough to control it.37 Also troublesome were the spontaneous strikes and other forms of resistance to discriminatory regulations imposed on Chinese with the alleged aim of controlling criminal activities. In 1857 "mobs" in the streets protested the imposition of pass laws and registration ordinances. In 1860 a brief general

35. On Tan A-choi, see Smith, “Emergence of a Chinese Elite,” pp. 87–88. On the baker's case, see Gt. Brit., Sessional Papers, 1857, 2d sess., no. 43: 169–205; 1857-58, no. 43: 653-57.

36. Eitel, Europe in China, pp. 462–63; Xianggang Donghua Sanyuan; Lethbridge, “A Chinese Association in Hong Kong,” in his Hong Kong: Stability and Change, pp. 52-70.

37. The case of R. D. Caldwell illustrates this phenonemon. Through his Chinese (secret society?) connections he was able to receive information about thefts. Caldwell's main informant was Wong A-kee, who began his career by contolling the fish stalls at the Central Market and eventually became wealthy through a variety of activities, including landowning and labor brokering. With his assistance, Caldwell was able to prosecute many pirates, but when Wong was convicted of receiving stolen goods, Caldwell was severely hampered and arrests dropped considerably. Gt. Brit., Sessional Papers, 1861, encl. 3 in no. 9, app. 3.

The Colonial Matrix 1842-1877

strike protested new laws aimed at controlling pawnbrokers' activities and supervising cargo boat crews. In 1863 chair coolies led a three month general strike resisting an ordinance calling for the licensing and regulation of all public vehicles. In 1866 and 1867 a strike by boat owners in protest against new registration ordinances was narrowly averted, and in 1872, carrying coolies struck to protest a new tax levied on coolie lodging houses.38 British efforts to establish a Chinese police force and develop a “headman” (dibao) system to maintain order proved ineffective during this period, and by the early 1870s the British were more willing to look to the wealthy Chinese to maintain order in their own community.39

Starting in the 1850s delegations of propertied Chinese had requested political representation in the colonial government, but their requests were turned down. In 1856 the Governor proposed to the Colonial Office that, in accordance with the stated wishes of the wealthy Chinese, the Legislative Council be enlarged by the addition of elected "non-official" members, including Chinese. The Colonial Office, however, rejected this proposal for fear that an enlarged council with hostile British merchants on it might usurp financial control from the Governor, but also because the "proportion of Chinese and Foreign to British was conclusive against any big change." Moreover, in the Colonial Secretary's words:

The testimony of those best acquainted with them, represent the Chinese race as endowed with much intelligence, but as very deficient in the most essential elements of morality. The Chinese population of Hongkong is, with perhaps a few honourable exceptions, admitted to stand very low in this respect.

Although the Colonial Secretary felt that it was unlikely that education would improve the "moral culture" of the Hong Kong Chinese, he was nonetheless willing to concede that if any competent Chinese could be found who were "deserving of confidence," they might serve in the Colonial Administration, provided that British officials supervise them closely.*

In 1872 a delegation of directors of the Tung Wah Hospital met with Governor Sir Arthur Kennedy to make a major proposal concerning political representation. The Tung Wah directors wished to establish a separate governing structure for Chinese. This "Chinese Municipal Board" would be

38. These and other instances are discussed in detail in Tsai Jung-fang, "The 1884 Hong Kong Insurrection: Anti-Imperialist Popular Protest During the Sino-French War,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 16, no. 1 (Jan.-Mar. 1984): 2-5. See also Eitel, Europe in China, pp. 340, 364, 368–69, 461, 508.

39. Endacott, A History of Hong Kong, pp. 84–85; Lethbridge, “The District Watch Committee,” pp. 104-6.

40. Labouchere to Bowring, 29 July 1856, encl. 5 in Gt. Brit., Sessional Papers, 1857, 2d sess., no. 43: 101. See also Endacott, Government and People in Hong Kong, 1841-1962: A Constitutional History (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1964), pp. 35–38, 48, 51.

41. Labouchere to Bowring, 25 July 1856.

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

composed of two Chinese representing each district, and would advise the Registrar-General, upon whom the responsibility for Chinese matters had been placed in the Colonial Government. Kennedy, however, turned down this request.42

Clearly, the key to the solution for propertied Chinese was to find and identify Chinese who would be seen by the colonial authorities as “deserving of confidence.” In the context of the times, this meant western-trained Chinese who were relatively acculturated to British ways, in short, a new colonial intelligentsia, of which Wu Tingfang was the outstanding representative in nineteenth century Hong Kong.

As in other European colonies, missionary educational institutions were of key importance in the creation of a colonial intelligentsia, and this is particularly true of Hong Kong, where nineteenth century British and American missionaries viewed the Colony as the major base from which to launch the missionary enterprise on the Chinese mainland. Within a few years of Hong Kong's founding, American Baptists, English Catholics, the London Missionary Society, the Anglican Church, and the Evans Missionary Society of Basel had all established churches or missions in the Colony, and from these the earliest modern schools emerged.

The first such school was that founded by the Morrison Education Society when its school in Guangzhou was transferred to Hong Kong in 1843. Also in 1843 a Catholic seminary was established, and the London Missionary Society founded its Anglo-Chinese College under the supervision of the famous Sinologist James Legge. In 1851 the Anglican Church established St. Paul's College for Boys, which in the 1850s was the most prestigious of these new educational institutions. Government-sponsored schools had their start in 1860 with the establishment of Government Central School, later Queen's College.

St. Paul's College, which Wu Tingfang attended in the late 1850s, was established to train Chinese Anglican ministers. Baptism was required of the students, and thirteen of the first class of thirty students were dismissed when they refused to be baptized. The curriculum included English language and literature, science, "Divinity and Sacred History," and Chinese language and literature. But in spite of its religious intentions, St. Paul's never quite fulfilled the objectives of its founders, and instead became known simply as a good school where Chinese boys could learn English. Appropriately, many of St. Paul's graduates served as translators and interpreters for the Hong Kong

42. Eitel, Europe in China, p. 507.

43. Richard Lovett, The History of the London Missionary Society, 1795–1895 (London: Frowde, 1899), 2:449–57; Kenneth Scott Latourette, A History of Christian Missions in China (New York: Macmillan, 1929), pp. 217-–18; Liu Yuesheng, Xianggang Jidujiao huishi (Hong Kong, 1937), p. 158; Mai Meisheng, “Jidujiao zai Guangdong,” in Guangdong wenwu, ed. Guangdong wenwu zhanlan hui (Hong Kong: Zhongguo wenhua xiejin hui, 1941), 3:750ff.; Chen Zhao, “Xianggang de chuqi jiaoyu," in Xianggang bainian shi, ed. Li Jinwei (Hong Kong: Nanzhong bianyi, 1943).

44. Church Missionary Record 12:203–4; Church Missionary Society, Proceedings, 52nd year, p. 95; 53rd year, pp. 157–59; Gt. Brit. Colonial Office, Hongkong Government Gazette, 1876, CO 132/17.

The Colonial Matrix 1842-1877

Government or for western firms throughout the Chinese treaty ports. In recognition of this function St. Paul's received an annual grant of £250 from the British Foreign Office during the 1850s to enable it to serve this function.45

By the 1850s Hong Kong's missionary schools had produced a small number of Chinese graduates who began filling the ranks of lower-echelon posts both in the Colonial Government and in various western firms. Their links through family background or personal economic activities to the mercantile bourgeoisie is worthy of note and may be illustrated by briefly examining the careers of some of the more famous among them. These include Tang Tingshu and his brother Tang Maozhi, He Dong (Sir Robert Ho Tung), Wei Yu and He Qi.

1. Tang Tingshu (Tong King-sing or Tang Jie, 1832-92) and his brother Tang Maozhi (Tong Mow-chee, 1827-97) were famous compradors and outstanding representatives of the modern business class in nineteenth century China. Tang Tingshu had been a student at the Morrison Education Society School and probably St. Paul's College before becoming an interpreter in the Hong Kong Government. In 1858 he moved to Shanghai as Interpreter and Clerk in the Shanghai Maritime Customs Administration, later becoming head comprador for Jardine, Matheson and Company. He was one of the wealthiest compradors in China and enjoyed substantial investments in a broad variety of Chinese and western enterprises. He played a major role in developing the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company (CMSNC) and the Kaiping mines. His career has been written about extensively.46

Tang Maozhi's career paralleled that of his younger brother. He received a missionary education in Guangzhou and then served as an interpreter for the Hong Kong Registrar-General. From 1848 to 1861 he was a merchant in San Francisco, returning to China to serve as chief translator for the Shanghai Customs Service. In 1870 he managed the Indo-China Steamship Company for Jardine, Matheson and Company in Shanghai, and when his brother was appointed to manage the CMSNC, he succeeded him as head comprador for Jardine's, a position he held until his death in 1897. His son Tang Shaoyi (1860-1938) was an important figure in twentieth century Chinese politics, as described below in subsequent chapters.47

45. Arnold Wright, ed., Twentieth Century Impressions of Hongkong, Shanghai, and other Treaty Ports of China.... (London: Lloyd's, 1908), p. 327; N. B. Dennys, ed., The Treaty Ports of China and Japan. by William Frederick Mayers, N. B. Dennys, and Charles King (London: Truebner, 1867), p. 53; Gt. Brit. Colonial Office, Hongkong: Correspondence, Original, ser. 129/190 (hereafter cited as CO 129).

46. Very useful have been: Liu Kwang-ching, "Tang Tingshu zhi maiban shidai,” Qinghua xuebao, n.s., 2, no. 2 (June 1961): 143–80; Hao Yen-p'ing, The Comprador in Nineteenth Century China: Bridge Between East and West (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 140-41; Paul A. Cohen, Between Tradition and Modernity, pp. 247-48.

47. Hao Yen-p'ing, Comprador in Nineteenth Century China, p. 170 passim; obituary in NCH, 3 Sept. 1897, pp. 459-60. On Tang Shaoyi see Louis T. Sigel, “T’ang Shao-yi (1860–1938): The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1972); Stephen R. MacKinnon, Power and Politics in Late Imperial China: Yuan Shikai in Beijing and Tianjin, 1901–1908 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 67-68 passim.

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

2. He Dong (Sir Robert Ho Tung, 1862–1956) was a native of Hong Kong and a graduate of Government Central School. After serving two years on the staff of the Imperial Maritime Customs Service in Guangzhou from 1878 to 1880, he returned to Hong Kong and began his twenty year long association with Jardine, Matheson and Company, first as office assistant and then as manager of several of Jardine's subsidiaries. Through his many investments he became a millionaire in 1896 and was considered the wealthiest person in Hong Kong in the early twentieth century as well as its largest property owner. In 1898 he became chairman of the Tung Wah Hospital Board of Directors. In 1899 he was made Justice of the Peace, and in 1916 he was knighted.48

3. Wei Yu (Wei Yuk, Wei Baoshan, Sir Bosun Wei Yuk, 1849–1921) was born to a wealthy comprador's family. His father Wei Guang (Wei A-kwong) was the head comprador of the Chartered Mercantile Bank of India, London and China. Wei Yu received a classical Chinese education before being sent to Government Central School to learn English. He studied in England and Scotland from 1867 to 1872. Upon his return to Hong Kong, he joined his father at Chartered Mercantile Bank and succeeded him as chief comprador upon his father's death in 1879. He was chairman of the Tung Wah Hospital Board of Directors from 1881 to 1883, when he was appointed Justice of the Peace. In 1896 he was appointed member of the Legislative Council, and he was knighted in 1919. His brothers Wei An and Wei Pei had legal careers in Hong Kong, the former as a solicitor and the latter as barrister.49

(Wei Yu was connected through marriage to another prominent Hong Kong family, that of Huang Sheng (Wang Shing). Huang was an early Christian convert and one of three Chinese to be sent to the United States in 1847 for studies at Yale University. He was the first Chinese to be placed on the Hong Kong jury list and the second to serve in the Legislative Council, following Wu Tingfang.) 50

4. The family of He Qi (Ho Kai) was intimately connected to that of Wu Tingfang, as He was his brother-in-law.51 He Qi's father, He Jinshan (Futang,

48. Howard L. Boorman, ed., Biographical Dictionary of Republican China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967–71), 2:75–76; Hao Yen-p’ing, Comprador in Nineteenth Century China, p. 100; Woo Sing Lim [Wu Xinglian], Xianggang Huaren mingren shilue (Hong Kong: Five Continents Book Co., 1937), pp. 1–3.

49. On Wei Guang, see Carl T. Smith, “An Early Hong Kong Success Story: Wei Akwong, the Beggar Boy," Chung Chi Bulletin, no. 45 (Dec. 1968): 9–14. On Wei Yu, see Smith, “Emergence of a Chinese Elite," p. 110; Lethbridge, “Caste, Class, and Race,” pp. 169–70; Woo Sing Lim, Xianggang Huaren, pp. 3–4; Arnold Wright, Twentieth Century Impressions, p. 109.

50. On Huang Sheng, see Smith, "Emergence of a Chinese Elite,” pp. 108–9; Dennys, Treaty Ports, p. 76; Feng Ziyou, Geming yishi (Shanghai, 1946-47; reprint, Taibei: Shangwu, 1953), 1:6. 51. There were several connections between Wu and the He family. In addition to marrying He Miaoling, Wu's younger brother-in-law, Shenyou (Ho Yow) served under Wu as Consul-General in San Francisco during Wu's term of office as Minister to the United States. Wu's son Wu Chaoshu married He Qi's eldest daughter. Another of He Qi's daughters married Fu Bingchang (1895– 1934), who was Wu's secretary in the early Republican period. Several of He Qi's grandsons were

The Colonial Matrix 1842-1877

1818-71) was raised in Malacca, where he became a block cutter for the Anglo-Chinese College press and subsequently a student of the College's director, Dr. James Legge. In 1843 He Jinshan came to Guangdong Province with Legge, and in 1846 he was ordained as a pastor of the London Missionary Society church in Hong Kong. He maintained this position until his death in 1871. His missionary colleagues described him as a "capital English scholar," whose "manner of thought is more nearly allied to the English [than to the Chinese]." "52 He was also an astute businessman who left an estate rumored to be over $150,000, a large sum in those days. His widow was viewed as one of the wealthiest people in Hong Kong in the 1880s. According to G. H. Choa, the family's business interests included real estate holdings in Hong Kong as well as landowning and money lending in its native village of Xijiao in Nanhai district.5

He Qi himself was one of five brothers and six sisters. He attended Government Central School and was sent to England for studies in 1872 at the

age

of thirteen. He studied medicine at Aberdeen, and after qualifying there, entered Lincoln's Inn, where he was called to the Bar in 1882, five years after Wu Tingfang. He returned to Hong Kong with his English wife Alice Walkden, where he became a civic leader, was appointed to numerous commissions by the Hong Kong Government, served on the Legislative Council and engaged in many philanthropic activities, including the establishment of the Alice Memorial Hospital and the Hong Kong College of Medicine. He was made a CMG in 1902 and was knighted in 1912. A successful speculator in stocks, real estate and other enterprises, he was famous in China as well as in the Colony.

These short biographical sketches of the more famous members of Hong Kong's intelligentsia illustrate the close relationship between that group and the mercantile bourgeoisie during the latter part of the nineteenth century. The intelligentsia not only served as economic intermediaries between the worlds of Chinese and western commerce, and additionally as political

said to have placed themselves under Wu Tingfang's patronage. See G. H. Choa, The Life and Times of Sir Kai Ho Kai: A Prominent Figure in Nineteenth-Century Hong Kong (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1981), p. 21.

52. London Missionary Society, Report of the Directors, 1849, p. 22. See also ibid., 1851, p. 19; 1855, pp. 50–51; 1862, p. 79; 1863, p. 19; 1865, p. 17; 1874, p. 73; Mai Meisheng, “Jidujiao zai Guangdong," 3:747-48; Smith, “Emergence of a Chinese Elite,” pp. 104–6.

53. Choa, The Life and Times of Sir Kai Ho Kai, p. 11. NCH, 12 Feb. 1897, p. 224; Smith, "Emergence of a Chinese Elite," pp. 104-5.

54. The most complete account of He Qi's life is Choa, The Life and Times of Sir Kai Ho Kai. A new evaluation of He's thought is to be found in Tsai Jung-fang, "The Predicament of the Comprador Ideologists, He Qi (Ho Kai, 1859–1914) and Hu Liyuan (1847–1916),” Modern China 7, no. 2 (Apr. 1981): 191–225. Shorter accounts of He's life include: Woo Sing Lim, Xianggang Huaren, pp. 1–2; Paul A. Cohen, Between Tradition and Modernity, pp. 246–47; and his “Littoral and Hinterland in Nineteenth Century China: The ‘Christian' Reformer," in The Missionary Enterprise in China and America, ed. John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 201–2, 208–12; Lo Hsiang-lin, Hongkong and Western Cultures (Tokyo: Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies, 1963), pp. 135-36, Paul A. 145–46; Harold Z. Schiffrin, Sun Yat-sen and the Origins of the Chinese Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), pp. 20–22. See also Lethbridge, “The District Watch Committee," p. 125. On He Qi's being made a CMG, see London Times, 26 June 1902, p. 5.

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

intermediaries between the colonial authorities and the Chinese populace of the colony, but also in a more general sense as cultural intermediaries between China and the West.

A small number of the Hong Kong Chinese intelligentsia became essayists and journalists who are well known for advocating institutional reforms at a time when most Chinese officials and literati only envisaged a much more superficial program of reform. The most important members of this group of reformers were He Qi, whose career has been briefly described above, Wang Tao, Zheng Guanying and Wu Tingfang.

Modern journalism in China is associated with the Hong Kong-based reformers, as it became their innovation to develop newspapers as a venue to popularize their views. The first Chinese language newspaper, Zhongwai Xinbao (Chung Ngoi San Po, Chinese and foreign newspaper), was founded by Wu Tingfang in 1860, and the Huazi Ribao (Wah Tze Yat Po, Chinese language daily news), was founded by Wu's friend Chen Aiting (Chen Yan, d. 1905) in 1873 or 1874. Wang Tao's Xunhuan Ribao (Tsun Wan Yat Po) was soon added to the list. Wu's newspaper, which was representative of the others, contained a small section of news about Europe, mostly translations from Hong Kong's English language press, sandwiched in among the market and shipping notices and various advertisements. In this inauspicious way, merchants and traders began to receive newsworthy information about the western world.56

In spite of differences in emphasis among Wang Tao, Zheng Guanying, He Qi and others, they all shared the conviction that China needed to undergo reforms modeled on Great Britain-and in some respects Hong Kong itself. They felt that Chinese merchants should be given more power and prestige so as to function more effectively. The merchantry, while autonomous, should nonetheless be supported positively by the state. Merchant capital, profits from the Sino-Western trade, could be ploughed into development projects that would strengthen and enrich China. The active promotion of Chinese commerce-"commercial war" or shangzhan—would thus be an instrument

of China's modernization.57

55. The authoritative study of Wang Tao's life and thoughts is Paul A. Cohen, Between Tradition and Modernity. On Zheng's life and ideas see ibid., pp. 244–66; Hao Yen-p'ing, Comprador in Nineteenth Century China, pp. 196–97 passim; Chong Kay Ray, “Cheng Kuan-ying (1841-1920): A Source of Sun Yat-sen's Nationalist Ideology?” Journal of Asian Studies 28 (Feb. 1969): 247–67; Wang Xi, “Lun Zheng Guanying," Lishi yanjiu, 1982, no. 1: 18-38.

56. Huazi Ribao, ed., Huazi Ribao qishinian jinian kan (Hong Kong, 1934), p. 1; Lo Hsiang-lin, Hongkong and Western Cultures, pp. 58–59, 201; Roswell S. Britton, The Chinese Periodical Press, 1800– 1912 (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1935), pp. 38–47; Ge Gongzhen, Zhongguo baoxue shi (Shanghai: Shangwu, 1935), pp. 102–5. Britton and Ge are in error linking the Zhongwai Xinbao to the Daily Mail and the Huazi Ribao to the Daily Press. The reverse is correct. Cf. Frank H. H. King and Prescott Clarke, A Research Guide to China Coast Newspapers, 1822-1911 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 28. On Chen Aiting see Smith, "Emergence of a Chinese Elite,” p. 107.

57. Paul A. Cohen, Between Tradition and Modernity, pp. 185–208; Hao Yen-p’ing, Comprador in Nineteenth Century China, p. 204; Tsai Jung-fang, “Comprador Ideologists in Modern China: Ho Kai (Ho Ch'i, 1859–1914) and Hu Li-yuan (1847–1916)” (Ph.D. diss., UCLA, 1975), pp. 118–63, and his "Predicament."

The Colonial Matrix 1842-1877

Legal and judicial reforms were seen as essential to the new economic order. Merchants and others needed protection against the abuse of power. Unless the system were modified and made to function as it did in England, merchants could not be expected to have confidence in the state, and without such confidence, merchant capital would not be used to benefit China. To achieve a condition in which confidence was warranted, the reformers proposed institutional changes to broaden the basis of decision making. He Qi and his writing partner Hu Liyuan went so far as to propose the establishment of advisory organs, modeled after the Hong Kong Legislative Council, by which the propertied elements of Chinese society could make their views known.58

These changes were also contingent upon the revamping of the educational system and training of officials. All bemoaned the low caliber and inadequate training of Qing officials and saw corrupt official practices as undermining the core of their political program. But more than that was at stake: modern subjects such as sciences, technological subjects, and foreign languages were needed in the schools. Knowledge itself should be more widely disseminated, they maintained, in order to release the energies of the people. And the civil service examination system should be modified so as to permit people with western- style educations, such as themselves, to enter the exalted ranks of officialdom.59 This in short was the political program of the Hong Kong Chinese intelligentsia: major changes in the education, training and recruitment procedures of China's future political elite, a massive infusion of merchant capital with its accompanying political influence into the body politic, and institutional reforms facilitating China's transformation into a modern nation capable of holding its own in the face of western aggression.

Wu Tingfang was a product of the world that has been briefly described above, a world in which Chinese commercial interests emerged, competed and faced limitations in a setting in which they had been paradoxically nurtured by British culture and institutions. His was a world in which Chinese culture and institutions both accommodated and clashed with those of nineteenth century England in a fugue of great subtlety and complexity. As a product of this world Wu came to understand contemporary English society in a way far deeper than most Chinese of his generation could; he participated in British culture as he rebelled against the degraded status to which he had been relegated by the structures of the "colonial situation." He developed values and skills that could be shared by only a tiny minority of his countrymen, and he was given opportunities that few of them could even imagine attaining. It is to this story that we now turn.

58. He Qi and Hu Liyuan, Xinzheng zhenquan (n.p., 1909), reprinted in Wuxu Bianfa, ed. Zhongguo shixue hui (Shanghai: Shenzhou guoguang she, 1953), 1:187–216; Tsai Jung-fang, "Comprador Ideologists,” pp. 65–69; Paul A. Cohen, Between Tradition and Modernity, p. 220ff. 59. He Qi and Hu Liyuan, Xinzheng zhenquan, pp. 189–91; Paul A. Cohen, Between Tradition and Modernity, pp. 154–84, 211–15; Tsai Jung-fang, “Comprador Ideologists,” pp. 58–65, 122, 124.

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Childhood and Youth, 1842–1862

Wu Tingfang was born in 1842, the third son of a merchant from the Pearl River Delta district of Xinhui. Although some sources point to Batu Berendum, Malacca, as his birthplace, most indicate that he was born in Singapore, and that his origins were relatively humble. His mother was probably a Christian Hakka woman from Singapore named Lian E (although a few sources suggest that his mother was a Malay), and his father was a small merchant who most likely was a helper in a Christian mission.60 While the sources do not indicate the precise nature of the family business in Singapore, we may surmise that as the vast majority of Chinese in Singapore at that time were impoverished male sojourners, the fact that the Wus' were a family unit suggests a measure of affluence.61

In 1845 Wu's father, Wu Rongzhang, moved his family to Guangzhou, a move that suggests that the family's business was flourishing, for few Chinese in Singapore were able to accumulate enough savings to return to China. A few were so fabulously wealthy that they dared not leave. The Wus must have been somewhere between these two extremes. When Wu Rongzhang died in 1877, however, he left his son Tingfang a handsome inheritance.62

Upon returning to Guangzhou, the Wu family settled in Fangcun, a new suburb in the western, or mercantile, sector of the city.63 While living in Fangcun, there were two eventful episodes in Wu's life. The first was when he was kidnapped by bandits and held ransom for over a week until he was able to trick his captors and managed to escape.64

60. Toung Pao, 21 (1922): 365. On Wu's birthplace as Singapore see Wu Zhiyong boshi aisi lu (n.p., 1922), p. 1. On Batu Berendum, see Li Yiji, comp., Gu Gangzhou gujin shi (Hong Kong: Guangxin, 1975), 2:82–83. Carl T. Smith, using materials from the mission school in Guangzhou that Wu probably attended, states that Wu's mother was a Malay woman, but I have not verified this. See Smith, "Emergence of a Chinese Elite,” p. 107. Smith's assertion is based on reports by Andrew P. Happer, teacher at the Canton Mission School established by the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, concerning Ng A-fat. Smith believes that Ng A-fat was Wu Tingfang's elder brother, but I have examined the same materials and fail to see the link. See Happer to Walter Laurie, 27 Sept. 1852, no. 289 in Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. Board of Foreign Missions, Missions Correspondence, China, 1837–1911, Incoming Letters, 1837–1894. Some works erroneously assert that Wu was a member of the same family as Haoguan (Howqua) of the Gong Hang (Co- Hong), but Wu's family's ancestral home was Xinhui, Guangdong Province, and Haoguan was a Fukienese. See, e.g., Kenneth E. Folsom, Friends, Guests and Colleagues: A Study of the Mu-fu System in Late Ching China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), p. 141; Marianne Bastid-Bruguiere, "Currents of Social Change,” in The Cambridge History of China, vol. 11, Late Ch'ing, 1800–1911, Part 2, ed. John K. Fairbank and Liu Kwang-ching (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 548. 61. On the scarcity of Chinese women in Singapore in the 1830s see Sir Ong Siang Song, One Hundred Years of the Chinese in Singapore (London: Murray, 1923), p. 23; Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Malaya (London: Oxford University Press, 1948). See also Zhang Yunqiao, Wu Tingfang yu Qingmo zhengzhi gaige (Taibei, 1987), pp. 31–33.

62. On the economic status of Chinese in Singapore, see Purcell, The Chinese in Malaya, p. 86; Siah U Chin, "Numbers, Tribes and Avocations of the Chinese in Singapore," Logan's Journal 2 (1848) as cited in Song, One Hundred Years, p. 74. On Wu's inheritance, see Hennessy to CO, encl. 2, no. 4, CO 129/187.

63. Dennys, Treaty Ports, p. 195.

64. Chen Cisheng, Wu Tingfang yishi (Shanghai: Hongwen tushu, 1925), pp. 9–12.

The Colonial Matrix 1842-1877

The second development concerned Wu's education. He began his formal education studying the classics under the instruction of a local teacher. That he received a formal classical education suggests that his family believed this essential for success in later life. But young Wu, while fond of studying, was said to have been bored by the classics and frequently said that studying them was a waste of time. In time honored school-boy fashion he is said to have spent many pleasant hours reading forbidden novels and adventure tales inserted into his copy of the Analects while his teacher dozed.65

Something must have rubbed off, however, for Wu's early Confucian education left a lasting imprint upon his outlook. In spite of subsequent Christian education and baptism as a Christian, he was always far more attracted to the secular traditions of the western world than to its religions, and he maintained that Confucian social values provided a better basis for stability than Christianity.

Soon Wu began to attend a local mission school, probably following in the footsteps of his two elder brothers. This school was probably the one established by the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions in Guangzhou in 1830.66 After attending this school for six months, Wu received a letter of introduction from one of his teachers (probably Samuel Wells Williams) to help him enter St. Paul's College in Hong Kong. In 1855, at the age of fourteen, Wu moved to Hong Kong and entered St. Paul's College.67

Wu's parents' decision to have Tingfang attend a missionary school in Hong Kong was probably a reflection of the situation in Guangzhou in the early 1850s. As noted above, the Pearl River Delta region saw great disorder in the early 1850s. Wu Rongzhang apparently decided it would be more advantageous to the Wu family fortunes if the family relocated to Hong Kong and Tingfang entered St. Paul's.

In order to attend St. Paul's College, baptism was necessary, so presumably Wu complied with this regulation. St. Paul's provided Wu with a basic education in English and Chinese. During his four years at St. Paul's his English became quite proficient, providing the basis for his future career development.68

65. Ibid., pp. 2-3.

66. Ibid., p. 1. According to Chen, Wu often attended a mission in Guangzhou where an English missionary named Yanhuilinshen taught him English and then, six months later, gave him a letter of introduction to a missionary in Hong Kong named Buoli'an. This account is also to be found in Wu Tingguang, Wu Tingfang lishi (Shanghai: Guomin tushuju, 1922), p. 1. Yanhuilinshen might have been the American, Samuel Wells Williams, who was a teacher at the ABCFM's Guangzhou mission until 1853. Buoli’an might have been Dr. Dyer Ball, who had been a member of the ABCFM's staff in Guangzhou and who was in Hong Kong in 1856. My search through missionary materials has, however, failed to turn up documentary evidence of Wu's studies at this school. See Happer to Laurie, 9 Feb. 1854, and “List of Protestant Missionaries in China, 1856,” no. 414, Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. Board of Foreign Missions, Missions Correspondence, Incoming Letters; Missionary Herald at Home and Abroad 46 (1850): 186-87; American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, Report of the Forty-third Meeting, 1852 (Boston, 1852), pp. 119– 20; Chinese Repository 20 (1851): 522–23.

67. Wu Tingguang, Wu Tingfang lishi, p. 1.

68. Ibid. Wu Tingguang states that Wu transferred to Queen's College and graduated from the

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Next to his education at St. Paul's, most important for Wu Tingfang's career was his marriage in 1862 to He Miaoling (d. 1937), the second daughter of He Jinshan, whose career has been described above. The He family was wealthy and ambitious. In addition to He Jinshan's wealth, Wu's mother-in- law, née Li, was from a wealthy family with connections through relatives to the Qing Government.69 Not only did the He family finance Wu's studies abroad, but also those of He Qi and his younger brother Shenbao (Wyson Ho). The He family came to play a major role in all of the young Wu Tingfang's important career decisions.

The marriage appears to have been a satisfying one for Wu. He Miaoling was a devout Christian who contributed generously to philanthropic causes (perhaps as much as $200,000 before her death at the age of ninety-one). Her philanthropy included construction of the He Miaoling wing of the Tung Wah Hospital complex in Hong Kong, scholarships at the Ying Wah School and contributions to the Hop Yat Church building fund.7o One son was born to Wu many years after he and He Miaoling were married: Chaoshu (C. C. Wu) was born in Tianjin in 1886.71

On the subject of his marriage, many year later, Wu told an audience of an anti-footbinding society in Shanghai that he had waited three years to find a suitable bride with unbound feet, only to marry Miaoling rather than remain a bachelor.72 In fact, Wu had nothing but praise for the traditional system of arranged marriage, which may be seen as testimony to his own satisfaction.73

Thus by the age of twenty, Wu Tingfang was well established as a young man. He had completed an education at a prestigious Christian school in Hong Kong, was proficient in English, and had married well, into a rising and influential family of wealthy Hong Kong Chinese. He was in a most advantageous position for personal advancement.

latter. However, Wu graduated in 1859 or 1860, and Queen's College (Government Central School) was not founded until 1860. According to Professor Luo Xianglin of the University of Hong Kong, records from St. Paul's are no longer extant. Personal communication, 1966.

69. Fu Bingchang, Fu Bingchang xiansheng fangwen jilu (Nan'gang, Taiwan: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica), recorded 1959–60 and stored in the Oral History Project, Columbia University, p. 63b.

70. On Mrs. Wu, see Wu He Miaoling (Guangzhou: Wu family, 1937), a commemorative volume prepared by the Wu family upon Mrs. Wu's death. On Mrs. Wu's philanthropy, see G. H. Choa, The Life and Times of Sir Kai Ho Kai, pp. 12–13.

71. On Wu Chaoshu see Wu Tiyun boshi aisi lu (n.p., 1934). In 1911 W. W. Yen (Yan Huiqing, 1877-1950) told G. E. Morrison that Wu was a baptized Christian with two concubines. See Morrison, Correspondence 1:672; Cyril Pearl, Morrison of Peking (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1967), p. 234. On Wu's secondary wife or wives see Chap. 3.

72. NCH, 9 Apr. 1903, p. 684.

73. NCH, 17 July 1903, p. 237; Wu Tingfang, America Through the Spectacles of an Oriental Diplomat (New York: Stokes, 1914), pp. 120–23; and his Minguo tuzhi chuyi (Shanghai: Author, 1915), pp. 78– 79a.

The Colonial Matrix 1842-1877

Choosing a Career

Upon graduating from St. Paul's College in 1858, Wu got a job as translator for the Hong Kong Daily Press. This job developed into his own publishing enterprise, the Zhongwai Xinbao, as an offshoot of the Daily Press. In 1859 or 1860, the London Missionary Society commissioned the Daily Press to print a Chinese-English dictionary, and Wu arranged to lease the new Chinese press for a monthly fee in order to start up his newspaper. Known as the Daily Press's "Chinese issue," Wu's paper was at first composed of one small sheet of about 15,000 characters. Two-thirds of the paper was devoted to advertisements. The remainder was set aside for news, mainly shipping and market information, but with some translations of items from the English language newspapers. Wu worked on the Zhongwai Xinbao for ten years, and it remained under the management of his brother Wu Chen (Ng Chan) until the latter's death around 1890.74

Since apparently there are no extant issues of Wu's newspaper, it is difficult to assess fully the type of information that was translated into Chinese for the edification of its readership. Similarly, Wu's relationship with the publisher of the Daily Press remains unclear. Yorick Jones Murrow (1817-84), the publisher of the Daily Press, was a bellicose Welshman who had led his newspaper in the anti-Chinese hysteria of 1857. He readily used his newspaper as a vehicle for sensational news, and was frequently charged with libel and slander by outraged Europeans in Hong Kong. It cannot have been easy to work for a man like Murrow, especially if one were Chinese.75

Journalism was not a full time occupation for Wu. In 1861 he began work as clerk and interpreter in the Hong Kong Police Magistrate's Court. His starting salary of £112.10 made him among the best paid of the Chinese interpretation staff.76 One year later, he was transferred to the Supreme Court as Chinese Clerk in the newly established Court of Summary Jurisdiction. He held this position until 1866, when he was transferred back to the Police Magistrate's Court as First Chinese Interpreter, and his salary was raised to £150. In 1868 his salary was further raised to £175, at which level it remained for five years.7

The social inequalities discussed above as part of the "colonial situation" were reflected in Wu's job. Within the colonial administration, in most

74. Wu Zhiyong boshi aisi lu (n.p., 1922), p. 1. On Wu Chen, see Smith, “Emergence of a Chinese Elite," p. 106.

75. G. B. Endacott, A Biograhical Sketch-book of Early Hong Kong (Singapore: D. Moore for Eastern Universities Press, 1962), pp. 130–34; Wright, Twentieth Century Impressions, pp. 344-46; Dennys, Treaty Ports, pp. 85, 86, 88. Ge Gongzhen, Zhongguo baoxue shi, p. 105; Lo Hsiang-lin, Hongkong and Western Cultures, p. 201; and Britton, Chinese Periodical Press, p. 39 are in error in claiming that George M. Ryder was the publisher of the Daily Press. Ryder sold his interest to Murrow in 1857. See King and Clarke, Research Guide, p. 146.

76. Gt. Brit. Colonial Office, Bluebooks, Hongkong, 1861, p. 158 (CO 133/18).

77. Ibid.; 1862, p. 148 (CO 133/19); 1863, p. 115 (CO 133/20); 1864, p. 166 (CO 133/21); 1865, p. 172 (CO 133/22); 1866, p. 194 (CO 133/23); 1867, p. 194 (CO 133/24); 1871, p. 88 (CO 133/ 28); 1873, p. 92 (CO 133/30).

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

departments Chinese clerks handled the bulk of the routine work and even assumed considerable responsibility, but advancement into higher and better paying positions was largely barred from them. Upper echelon posts were staffed by British civil servants, and those just below them by civil servants of Portuguese descent, who as Europeans, held higher positions than Chinese civil servants.

In Wu's case, his superior during his years in the courts was R. A. Rozario, a Portuguese from Macau, whose annual salary of £350 was much higher than those of the Chinese interpreters. In later years Wu joined almost all of the public officials in the Colony in declaring that although Rozario was a conscientious public servant, he was incompetent as a court interpreter as he could only communicate in the Xiangshan or Macau patois of Cantonese. We can only speculate that it must have been galling for Wu and other interpreters to find themselves in a subordinate position to a man less competent than they were because of the inequalities inherent in colonial social structure.78

Wu and other Chinese who had reached the top of the scale for Chinese civil servants were unquestionably dissatisfied with the state of affairs, as illustrated by the case of Ng A-ts'un in 1870. Ng had been a clerk and interpreter in the Colonial Surveyor's office for six years. He developed tuberculosis and requested a two-week sick leave. This was granted but then he was dismissed from his job. He decided to apply for a twelve-month leave of absence in accordance with existing civil service regulations applying to British and European civil servants. The Governor, Sir Richard MacDonnell, refused to grant him the leave, which the governor viewed as a “ridiculous privilege for a Chinese civil servant,” and moreover held that the customary bonus of one month's pay every four years was "not quite applicable" to Chinese employees. Ng was dismissed with a bonus of $100 while the issue was referred to the Colonial Office.79

According to E. J. Eitel, the Austrian missionary chronicler of Hong Kong's history who was close to Wu Tingfang, the Chinese civil servants viewed the decision on the Ng case as an object lesson to them for having dared to consider themselves on the same level as British and European civil servants. According to Eitel, they felt that the only explanation for the difference in treatment between themselves and the Europeans was that of race distinction, as of course it was.'

A number of resignations followed the Ng A-ts'un affair. The most important of these occurred in 1871, when Wu's close friend and colleague Chen Aiting (Yan) resigned his post as Third Clerk in the Police Magistrate's

78. "Report by Mr. Ng Choy," encl. in Hennessy to Earl of Carnarvon, 7 Sept. 1877, no. 109, CO 129/179.

79. "Report by Dr. Eitel... on the Hong Kong Pension Scheme as Affecting the Chinese, and the Supply of Interpreters,” encl. in Hennessy to Earl of Kimberley, 31 Oct. 1880, no. 174, CO 129/190. 80. Ibid.

The Colonial Matrix 1842–1877

Court, which he had held since 1866, and soon began to publish the Huazi Ribao. In 1877, he declined an offer by Governor Sir John Pope Hennessy (1834-91) to reenter the colonial administration. Instead, upon Wang Tao's recommendation of him to Chen Lanbin, the newly appointed Qing Minister to the United States, Cuba and Peru, Chen Aiting was appointed Consul- General in Havana.81

That Chen and others had the option of alternative careers illustrates the differences between Hong Kong and many other British colonies in the nineteenth century. As new fields such as modern diplomacy became areas requiring staffing in the Qing Government, new opportunities became available for colonial intelligentsia such as Chen Aiting and Wu himself.

Meanwhile, Wu apparently had serious thoughts about a career shift as his thirtieth birthday came and went. Several possibilities were open to him. He could join his friend Chen Aiting and join the Qing diplomatic corps, where his proficiency in English would be most useful. Then too, he could develop his journalistic abilities. In fact, he aided Chen in founding the Huazi Ribao and then Wang Tao in founding the Xunhuan Ribao; but Wu chose not to place his full energies in this direction.8

Instead, Wu decided to study in England and become a barrister, a decision that changed his life. We do not know the full circumstances surrounding his decision, although we do know that his wife's family must have approved. He Jinshan had suffered a severe stroke in 1870 and died the following year. Soon after that, in 1872, the young He Qi went to Great Britain to begin his ten year long training in medicine and law. The following year, 1873, Mrs. He agreed to pay for her son-in-law's education abroad as well.83

Certainly the decision to seek legal training abroad made little sense in terms of China's indigenous culture or social structure. While officials in China were familiar with law and indeed sometimes specialized in it, the development of a legal profession as such was frowned upon; severe penalties were imposed on people who encouraged the undertaking of a suit or who profited from one. Conventionally, the study of Confucian mores was held to be an adequate basis for officials who had to administer the law, and the study of law for its own sake was tainted with the despised brush of Legalism, at least outwardly.84

81. On Chen, see Wu's eulogy in NCH, 11 Aug. 1905, p. 32; Paul A. Cohen, Between Tradition and Modernity, pp. 74-75; Smith, "Emergence of a Chinese Elite,” p. 107. See also Chen Lanbin, “Shi Mei jilue,” in Xiaofanghuzhai yudi congchao, comp. Wang Xiqi (Shanghai, 1877–97; reprint, Taibei: Guangwen, 1964), 12:57; Zhang Yinhuan, Sanzhou riji (n.p., ca. 1890), 1:26a.

82. Ge Gongzhen, Zhongguo baoxue shi, p. 77; Paul A. Cohen, Between Tradition and Modernity, p. 76. 83. Choa, The Life and Times of Sir Kai Ho Kai, pp. 10–12; Fu Bingchang, Fangwen jilu, p. 63b; Wu He Miaoling, p. 1.

84. Chang Yu-chuan, "The Legal Practitioner in China,” Chinese Social and Political Science Review 22, no. 2 (1938): 147; Sybille van der Sprenkel, Legal Institutions in Manchu China: A Sociological Analysis (London: Athlone Press, University of London, 1966), p. 69; Ch'u T’ung-tsu [Qu Tongzu], Local Government in China Under the Ch'ing (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 189.

122

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Only when viewed in the colonial context does Wu's decision make sense. For Englishmen at that time, the barristry was a glamorous and prestigious profession. Lincoln's Inn, which Wu decided to attend, was one of the four Inns of Court dating back to the late Middle Ages. Before the nineteenth century, the Inns of Court had been largely finishing schools for young aristocrats, and even when Wu attended, much of the aristocratic aura remained. Residence at an Inn was important to a young Englishman, not only for the formal education that he received, but also for the friendships he formed with the leading men of his generation. For this reason, as well as for the fact that the professions were considered "upper-class" in class conscious Victorian England, attendance at one of the Inns of Court brought one prestige. In British settler colonies, training at one of the Inns of Court had been a long established avenue of social mobility and a path to political power.

In a colonial outpost such as Hong Kong, where English aristocrats were scarce indeed, barristers were even more socially prominent than in England itself. Barristers, together with wealthy merchants and a smattering of other professional men, formed an elite that directed the affairs of the Colony under its various governors. Given the high status of barristers and Wu's knowledge of English law based on his long experience working in the Hong Kong courts, it is understandable that Wu should decide to train himself in this direction.

Not only did Wu's decision to attend Lincoln's Inn in part reflect dissatisfaction with the inherent limitations to advancement for Chinese interpreters in Hong Kong, but also a perception of himself as a potential leader of his community. Chinese in Hong Kong had long been subjected to abuse at the hands of unscrupulous lawyers and victimized in the courts because of their unfamiliarity with British legal institutions.86 On his return to Hong Kong in 1877, Wu told a San Francisco reporter that his years working in the Hong Kong courts had enabled him to "see the wrongs and outrages" to which Chinese were subjected, and he expressed his hope that he could serve his community by helping to ameliorate some of the abuses.87

Thus, Wu's decision to attend Lincoln's Inn suggests his ambition to achieve a position of leadership in Hong Kong. To the Europeans, he could qualify for elite status in terms of the society of the mother country; to the Chinese, he would seek reform of colonial social structure so as to improve the status of his countrymen. The implicit nationalism in his desire was not necessarily in conflict with his self-interest.

85. On the social status of barristers in England, see Alan Harding, A Social History of English Law (London: Penguin, 1965), pp. 170–79, 206–13, 285–91, 351, 432; S. G. Checkland, The Rise of Industrial Society in England, 1815–1885 (London: Longmans, 1964), pp. 284–88, 293–96. On the role of barristers in colonial North America, see Roscoe Pound, The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times.... (St. Paul, Minn.: West Pub. Co., 1953), p. 157; Anton-Hermann Chroust, The Rise of the Legal Profession in America (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1965), 1:33–37. 86. Endacott, A History of Hong Kong, pp. 38, 96; Eitel, Europe in China, p. 333.

87. San Francisco Post, 4 Mar. 1877.

The Colonial Matrix 1842-1877

European Sojourn, 1874–1877

Wu Tingfang's travels and studies abroad constituted a major turning point in his life. He lived in London for two and a half

years and spent considerable time traveling on the European continent and North America. He now had a firsthand understanding of western institutions of the sort not possible via the colonial experience alone.

To be called to the Bar, the student had to reside in Lincoln's Inn for twelve terms (three years), dine in its Hall for a prescribed number of meals, and

pass examinations in various fields of law. To enter Lincoln's Inn Wu and other students of his day had to post a bond with a surety. Once every three terms (or annually) each student was formally presented to the Bar table by the steward after dinner. The first and last time this ceremony was performed the student had to produce a certificate of introduction from a barrister who was a member of the Society of Lincoln's Inn, which constituted in effect a certificate of good character. The available records do not indicate who Wu's sponsor was. Upon being called to the Bar the student had to pay a sum that had been fixed in 1863 at £82. These various requirements must have contributed to the feeling that one was entering an elite group where birth and worth were subtly intertwined.

The course of study at Lincoln's Inn was loosely defined. The four main fields were jurisprudence, equity, real and personal property, and common law, and lectures were offered by eminent authorities twice weekly in each field, adding up to a total of eight lectures each week. The rest of the time the student was left on his own, “to pursue his studies,” noted a committee of the society in 1889, “as best as he can.

"89

Wu entered Lincoln's Inn in January 1874 and took his examinations in Trinity term 1876 after just two and one-half years. The exams took five days to complete, from 29 May to 2 June 1876, and covered the fields of real and personal property, equity, common law, the Institutes of Gaius and Justinian, Roman law and jurisprudence, and constitutional law and legal history.9

Having completed his exams early, Wu still had to complete the three years' residence requirement in order to be called to the Bar. In the interim, Wu spent his time in studies and travels through Britain and the Continent. In January 1877, Wu was finally called to the Bar, and prepared to return to Hong Kong.

Unfortunately, efforts to uncover further information about Wu's life in England have proved fruitless. It would be nice to know where he lived, who

88. Sir Ronald Roxburgh, ed., The Records of the Honourable Society of Lincoln's Inn (The Black Books) (London: Lincoln's Inn, 1968), 5:lix-lx.

89. Ibid., p. lviii.

90. See Lincoln's Inn, Legal Education Examination Papers, 1874–1877 for list of successful students and sample examination questions.

91. Ibid. Wu is listed herein as being called to the Bar on 31 January 1877.

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

his friends were, and what kind of life he had, but I have only been able to unearth small fragments. Wu certainly had contact with (and probably responsibility for) his brother-in-law He Qi, a teenager studying in Aberdeen while Wu was in London.

Also through He's and his friend Wang Tao's colleague Dr. James Legge, Wu became acquainted with members of the Anglo-Oriental Society for the Suppression of the Opium Trade. Wu addressed a gathering of the society on 19 January 1875. His address was so successful that it resulted in his writing an eloquent letter to The Times with a plea to the British Government to outlaw the opium traffic and the proposal that it subsidize opium growers in India until they were able to convert to different crops.9

Nonetheless, the only written reference that I have found from Wu about his stay in London suggests that it was a lonely experience for him. In his America Through the Spectacles of an Oriental Diplomat, published in 1914, Wu wrote that the British, while not exactly unsociable, "surround themselves with so much reserve that strangers are at first chilled and repulsed.” Using his own experience as an example; Wu said that he had sat opposite the same student at the Lincoln's Inn Library for months without exchanging a word. "I thought I was too formal and reserved, so I endeavored to improve matters by occasionally looking up at him as if about to address him, but every time I did so he looked down as though he did not wish to see me. Finally I gave up the attempt.

"93 Wu concluded:

This is the general habit with English gentlemen. They will not speak to a stranger without a proper introduction; but in the case I have mentioned surely the rule would have been more honored by a breach than by the observance. Seeing that we were fellow students, it might have been presumed that we were gentlemen and on an equal footing.94

Forty years later, when Wu wrote the book in which these quotations appear, this still rankled.

Another fragment of information about Wu's sojourn abroad comes from an interview he gave to a San Francisco reporter while passing through that city en route to Hong Kong in March 1877. The context was the severe outbreak of anti-Chinese violence in California, marked by massive rallies, vilification of the Zhonghua Huiguan (or the Chinese Six Companies), and calls for an end to Chinese immigration to the United States.

These events undoubtedly dismayed Wu. To the reporter, he defended Chinese against charges that they were "slaves" to the Zhonghua Huiguan. While he did not think Chinese would ever “assimilate” to American society,

92. Friend of China (London), 1 (Mar.-Oct. 1875), pp. 13–14. I am indebted to Louis T. Sigel for this reference.

93. Wu Tingfang, America Through the Spectacles, p. 113.

94. Ibid., pp. 114-15.

The Colonial Matrix 1842-1877

he thought that this should not be used to deny them the vote, since the vote had been given to "millions of illiterate blacks" to whom, in his opinion, the Chinese were "vastly superior." Wu also took this occasion to denounce missionaries and the Christian religion. "Our religion is as good as the Christian religion,” he said, “and why should we change? I think attempts to convert us are simply absurd, for to change would not better us, morally or intellectually. No Chinaman [sic], except for selfish motives, wants to become a Christian. "95

This statement is suggestive on many levels. Perhaps three years of sitting opposite stuffy and chilly Englishmen and then being inundated with anti- Chinese racism in the United States brought about a renewed sense of national identity for Wu. As he did not believe Chinese in the United States would "assimilate❞ to American society, perhaps he felt that he too could never "assimilate❞ into English society, nor would he accept the view that Christianity was superior to Chinese ethics.

The nationalist consciousness that was the product of colonialism in Hong Kong seems to have been reinforced by Wu's experiences abroad. In his case, nationalist identity took the form of the rejection of Christianity, and particularly the rejection of the missionary enterprise in China. In later years these views developed into a world view in which he linked Confucianism with the forces of progress in the world, and missionaries with the forces of reaction.

Chinese Alternatives

Wu's professional accomplishments in England opened up new career possibilities for him in the Qing Government. In the mid-1870s, the Qing Government was faced with an acute shortage of yangwu rencai, or talented men in foreign matters. They were needed to staff the new diplomatic posts and manage the new self-strengthening enterprises that called for a knowledge of western languages, technology and managerial techniques. As Li Hongzhang lamented to Guo Songtao (1818-91) in 1877, there were only about fifty people in all the Empire who were qualified to handle the new positions.96

Under these circumstances, officials faced with the immediate responsibility for staffing these new posts became interested in bourgeois Chinese from the treaty ports or overseas areas, many of Cantonese origin. As Li Hongzhang realistically noted in a letter to Ding Richang (1823-82), these people were "relatively close to the atmosphere of the West."97

Hence, Guo Songtao recommended a prosperous merchant from Singapore, Hu Xuanze (Hoo Ah Kay or Hu Ji, d. 1880) for the new post of

95. San Francisco Post, 4 Mar. 1877.

96. Li to Guo, 26 Aug. 1877 (GX 3/7/18), Li Hongzhang, Li Wenzhonggong quanji, ed. Wu Rulun (Nanjing, 1905; reprint, Taibei: Wenhai, 1965), "Pengliao han'gao," 17:18.

97. Li to Ding, 31 Mar. 1876 (GX 2/3/6), Li Hongzhang, Quanji, “Pengliao han’gao,” 16:7.

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Consul-General to that colony.98 Similarly, Chen Lanbin, Minister to the United States, Cuba and Peru, recruited Chen Aiting and other members of the Hong Kong and treaty port bourgeoisie to serve on his staff.99

Even relatively conservative officials came to see overseas Chinese as possible sources of talent. For example, Liu Kunyi (1830–1902) wrote on the special talents of Cantonese such as Wu:

Those who live near the mountains will be expert hunters; those near the sea will excel at fishing. The Cantonese have had many contacts with foreigners. Several million of them are born in foreign ports and not only speak and write western languages well, but also understand their laws, arts and skills. For example, Hu Xuanze, whom Guo Songtao recommended as Consul-General, Yu Shenxiang, the translator for the U.S. Consulate [in Guangzhou], and Wu Zhiyong [Tingfang] the English barrister, are all products of Guangdong. . . . The competence of the Cantonese in foreign matters can thus be seen.'

100

This was the context for Wu Tingfang's brief flirtation with Qing officialdom in 1877. Around the time that Wu was called to the Bar in London, the Chinese Legation there was established, with the progressive Guo Songtao and the more conservative Liu Xihong as Ministers. Quite naturally Wu paid a courtesy call upon the legation and chatted with the envoys. He reportedly told them:

The British Government is [both] monarchical and democratic. Each time legislation is proposed, the common people discuss its shortcomings. Hence the rule of the Queen and her ministers is more far-reaching [than in China]. Since no Chinese live here, when incidents arise [between Britain and China], [the British Government] bases itself upon what its merchants have said when it so outrageously complains and slanders [us]. Now that you envoys are stationed [here], our sincerity and feelings will become known. But to be properly effective, it is vital to find intelligent men who are skilled in foreign languages and station them abroad. Also, we should have our views published in newspapers and widely circulated. Only thus will the situation improve.1

101

This statement indicates that Wu had a good understanding of the dynamics of nationalism in Britain and the importance of public opinion in policy

98. Guo Songtao memorial, 3 Oct. 1877 (GX 3/8/27), Qingji waijiao shiliao, comp. Wang Liang (1935; reprint, Taibai: Zhonghua, 1964), 11:13–15; Michael R. Godley, Mandarin-Capitalists from Nanyang: Overseas Chinese in the Modernization of China, 1893–1911 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 67-69.

99. Chen Lanbin, “Shi Mei jilue."

100. Liu Kunyi, “Juanzi shengxi zhuyang yangwu rencai zhe," 29 Nov. 1877 (GX 3/10/25), Liu Kunyi yiji (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1959), 1:429–31.

101. Liu Xihong, “Yingzhao riji,” in Wang Xiqi, Xiaofanghuzhai 11:7b.

The Colonial Matrix 1842-1877

formation. In this statement we see a theme to be repeated many times in Wu's later career: the success of China's diplomacy rests in part on the ability to have access to the organs of public expression in the West. It is worth noting that this tactic suggests a certain confidence in the society and culture of the imperialist world. All that was needed was to publicize the wrong; surely the rationality and common sense of the public would demand a change. Also it is worth noting that Wu firmly believed that people like himself were needed to conduct propaganda on China's behalf.

It is difficult to know whether Wu's statement should have been construed as a hint that he would have liked such a job. In any case, Guo and Liu decided to offer him a post as interpreter in the London Legation, but Wu appears to have been indignant at the low level of the position offered. He declined. Guo and Liu then offered him the higher position of attaché, but Wu declined that as well. He said that he had already been offered the position of Consul-General in Lima, Peru (a post mostly due to Wang Tao's recommendation of Wu to Ding Richang), and that he had already replied to Chen Lanbin accepting it. Even so, he told Guo and Liu's representative, the position of attaché could not in any way compare to the prestige and salary of a barrister in Hong Kong. As a barrister he expected to earn the equivalent of 1,000 taels monthly, while an interpreter or attaché could not expect to receive more than 200 taels. A barrister's income, he explained to the Chinese envoys, could only be compared to that of vice-presidents in the metropolitan boards, high officials in the censorate and other officials of that caliber. 102

Wu appears to have entered into this somewhat unseemly haggling to impress Guo and Liu with the fact that his education constituted the western equivalent of China's elite civil service examination. Soon after this exchange, however, Wu received word that his father had died in Hong Kong, and in accord with proper Confucian behavior, he refused all offers and returned to his familial responsibilities in Hong Kong.

Guo and Liu tried to get Wu back to London by memorializing the Zongli Yamen for permission to hire him as secretary of legation, third grade, with a special salary. "Since he is so knowledgeable about English law," they wrote, "he is not content to perform menial tasks."103 Their request that Chen Lanbin release Wu from his obligation to serve in Lima was granted, but Wu was simply not interested in either post.

While his father's death (which in strictly orthodox terms would have called for three years' mourning) may have been a strong factor in his decision to decline these offers, the exchange nonetheless indicates something of the

102. Zhang Deyi, “Suishi riji,” ibid. 11:12b–13. While Wu was still in England, Wang Tao had written to Ding Richang, then on sick leave in Guangdong, to recommend Wu, Chen Aiting and Zhang Zongliang to him as useful persons knowledgeable about the West. See Wang Tao, Taoyuan chidu xuchao (Shanghai, 1889; Beijing: Zhonghua, 1959), 9:17. See also Paul A. Cohen, Between Tradition and Modernity, p. 291.

103. Guo and Liu memorial, 22 June 1877 (GX 3/5/12), Qingji waijiao shiliao 10:15–16.

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

disadvantages that bourgeois Chinese such as Wu faced vis-à-vis Qing officialdom. The Qing bureaucracy was linked to the civil service examination system, and outsiders such as Wu were not part of the structure. Overseas Chinese in addition suffered from their link with western imperialism. Both Guo and Liu emphasized Wu's refined and gentle demeanor in an effort to distinguish between a man of his caliber and the stereotypical “menial” of foreign firms towards whom traditional officials expressed contempt.104 Sensing these difficulties, Wu chose to return to Hong Kong.

Contact with Li Hongzhang

Wu's brief flirtation with Qing officialdom of 1877 still had a final act to be played. In October 1877, several months after having returned to Hong Kong, Wu paid a call upon Li Hongzhang in Tianjin. In his posts as Governor- General of Zhili Province and Superintendent of Trade for the Northern Ports, Li Hongzhang had by 1877 become the leading political figure of late nineteenth century China, directing under his control various modernization projects and supervising much of the Dynasty's foreign affairs.105

106

An introduction was arranged through Li Zhaotang, Customs Intendent at Tianjin, who was a relative of Wu's mother-in-law, Mrs. He, née Li.1

Li Hongzhang was very impressed with Wu and offered him a position as adviser for the specific purpose of drafting a code of commercial law for use by foreigners and Chinese in the treaty ports. In recommending Wu for this position, Li wrote to the Zongli Yamen that “although he has lived in Hong Kong and abroad for years, he is unpretentious and sincere, with the spirit of the scholar [ru] and absolutely no foreign mannerisms.” Again, Li was trying to break down the prejudice against foreign trained Chinese.107

The proposal for a commercial law code had been made by Guo Songtao as one of many inspired by his travel abroad. Guo's purpose was twofold: first, he hoped that a uniform law code would minimize friction between Chinese and foreigners and thereby prevent outbursts of the sort that had previously

104. Ibid.; Liu Xihong, “Yingzhao riji.”

105. Liu Kwang-ching, “Li Hung-chang in Chihli: The Emergence of a Policy, 1870-1875,” in Approaches to Modern Chinese History, by Albert Feuerwerker et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 68–104.

106. Fu Bingchang in Fangwen jilu, p. 63b recalled that Mrs. He's relative was named Zeng, but her surname was the same Li as that of Li Zhaotang. Li Zhaotang (Chaomin) was a native of Guangdong Province and a jinshi of 1856. He was secretary in the Zongli Yamen, where he was strongly recommended by Prince Gong for his achievements. In 1863 he was appointed to assist Shen Baozhen, Governor of Jiangsu. In 1874 he was transferred to Tianjin as Customs Daotai. In 1878 he was appointed Judicial Commissioner of Zhili Province. F. S. A. Bourne, "Historical Table of High Officials Composing the Central and Provincial Governments of China,” China Review 7, no. 5 (1878–79): 321. In 1879 he was granted sick leave; in 1882 he was posted to the Guanglu Si, Court of Banqueting, and in the following year he was relieved. Wei Xiumei, ed., Qingji zhiguan biao (fu: Renwn lu) (Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan, Jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1977), 2:78. 107. Li to Zongli Yamen, 7 Oct. 1877 (GX 3/9/1), Qingji waijiao shiliao 10:15–16.

The Colonial Matrix 1842-1877

led to retaliatory expeditions. Second, he viewed the code as the first step towards the establishment of full Chinese sovereignty in the treaty ports.

108

Guo proposed that the Zongli Yamen undertake a study of the various legal systems in the western nations and compile a composite code embodying the best features of each. It would then be subject to revisions by a special committee composed of top-level officials in consultation with Sir Robert Hart (1835-1911), Inspector-General of the Imperial Maritime Customs, Li Hongzhang and Shen Baozhen, the latter Superintendent of Trade for the Southern Ports. Guo proposed that the new code be widely distributed among the various foreign diplomats in China to facilitate its acceptance.

Wu accepted Li's proposal that he supervise the translations from western law codes, in accord with Guo's recommendations. With some haggling over Wu's salary, Li finally agreed to meet his request for the unusually high salary of 6,000 taels a year, making arrangements for the salary to be shared between the Northern and Southern Trade Superintendencies.11o

That Li was most eager to obtain Wu's services is clear. In writing to Guo Songtao to inform him that Wu would stay in Tianjin rather than in the London Legation, Li concluded:

[You] shouldn't try to grab him up when he can better serve [here]; also he isn't willing to go abroad. One can but measure talent and use it, and if we do not use him, he will remain a captive of the foreigners in Hong Kong for some time to come.'

111

Wu's motives suggest a mixture of self-interest and nationalism. The former is suggested by his concern for his salary. That Li was willing to find funds to pay him a salary some twenty times the regular official pay was a measure of confidence in Wu and an indication that his work would be highly valued.

The nationalism implicit in Wu's interest should not, however, be overlooked. The law reform project reflects Guo's (and Li's) concern for China's sovereignty, a fundamental concern of Chinese nationalists. Here was an opportunity for Wu to provide a service to China and transform his feelings of indignation into something constructive.

Sadly, however, the project did not come to fruition at that time. In fall 1877, Guo Songtao's diary of his trip abroad, in which he had expressed admiration for some western institutions, was published and produced a strong conservative reaction among many officials and literati. The climate of opinion underwent a radical change.112

Li Hongzhang's memorial on the project was approved by the Zongli Yamen,

108. Guo, “Qing zuancheng tongshang celi,” 3 Oct. 1877 (GX 3/8/27), ibid. 11:10–13.

109. Ibid.

110. Li Hongzhang to Shen Baozhen, 22 Oct. 1877 (GX 3/9/16), Li, Quanji, “Pengliao han'gao," 17:24-25.

111. Li to Guo, 8 Nov. 1877 (GX 3/10/4), ibid. 17:28–29.

112. Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, China's Entrance into the Family of Nations: The Diplomatic Phase, 1858– 1880 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 186-99.

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

but with considerable reluctance. The Yamen noted that students in its translation bureau were already involved in a large, as yet uncompleted, translation project of French legal works. The ministers of the Yamen were also concerned with the inherent difficulties arising from the effort to standardize judicial practices so as to conform to those of the West. In general, Chinese law demanded punishments of greater severity than those of the West, and the Yamen's officials expressed concern that leniency might result in social disorder. Thus the entire project seemed dubious to the Zongli Yamen.113

We may

surmise that this lukewarm endorsement was not encouraging to Wu. As the condemnation of Guo Songtao gained momentum late in 1877, there was increasing unwillingness to support any of his projects. Guo's recommendation of Hu Xuanze was heatedly attacked and the policy of recruiting overseas Chinese into the bureaucracy harshly scrutinized. Soon after he had written approvingly of Cantonese such as Wu, Liu Kunyi changed his mind and wrote of the dire consequences that could follow from the recruitment of overseas Chinese. Echoing what was probably a widespread sentiment, he said:

I deeply respect my tongxiang's [i.e., Guo Songtao's] learning, but I fear that he is not at his best in these matters. It is commonly rumored that many former compradors and menials in western firms have been accompanying our ministers abroad simply because they know something of foreign languages, but I cannot yet judge whether or not that is true. Our generation's task is to plan for the future without losing sight of the fundamentals. If we accept imposters as consuls, we shall only become the object of the foreigners' ridicule and contempt.114

Members of the colonial and treaty port bourgeoisie who entered the Qing bureaucracy had to contend with this type of widespread prejudice. For some, the prestige of service in the Qing civil service, combined with their displeasure at their limited prospects in the colonial situation, was enough to overcome whatever qualms they might have felt about the lowly place assigned to them in the traditional scheme of things. But for a man like Wu, who had just spent three years at considerable cost and sacrifice to attain the very symbol of British elitedom as he saw it, it was not. As he watched the reaction against Guo grow, Wu settled into his law practice in Hong Kong rather than risk the uncertainty of life in Tianjin. Having examined the Chinese alternatives and judging them inadequate for his ambitions, he turned again to the colonial alternatives.

At the age of thirty-five, Wu Tingfang thus returned to Hong Kong to develop his career as a barrister, the first Chinese from the Colony to do so. In the next five years he was given ample opportunity to test both the possibilities as well as limitations that his new status as a British-trained professional could provide for him.

113. Zongli Yamen memorial, 31 Oct. 1877 (GX 3/9/25), Qingji waijiao shiliao 11:26–30. 114. Liu Kunyi to Shen Guifen, 5 Jan. 1878 (GX 3/12/3), Yiji 4:1833–34.

Hong Kong Barrister 1877-1882

Wu Tingfang and the Chinese Bourgeoisie of Hong Kong

During his years as a barrister in Hong Kong, Wu Tingfang (or Ng Choy [Wu Cai], Ng A Choy as he was then known) became the key figure in a three-way conflict that broke out involving the Chinese bourgeoisie, the British merchants and the Governor, Sir John Pope Hennessy. Underlying the political turbulence was the extremely fierce trade competition between the Chinese bourgeoisie and the British trading and shipping interests based in Hong Kong.

In the 1870s, Hong Kong underwent a process of unprecedented economic expansion, largely due to the growth of trade with China. From 1871 to 1884 the portion of China's foreign trade with Hong Kong increased from 24.4% to 33.8%, and by 1893 it constituted 48%. After this point Shanghai gradually began to supersede Hong Kong's importance as the dominant trading center.' The expansion of the China trade was marked by stiff competition between Chinese and European merchants and shippers. In 1868 the British Consul- General at Guangzhou noted with dismay that Chinese traders were giving Westerners severe competition. The import trade at Guangzhou, he reported, was "entirely in the hands of Chinese." In 1873 he lamented:

There can be no question that the days of European supremacy in trade here passed away forever in this country and the foreign merchant finds his field of action being gradually circumscribed and limited by those who but a few years ago kowtowed to him for his patronage.2

There are several indications of the growing power of Chinese merchant and shipping interests in Hong Kong. During the decade 1867–77, the volume of shipping in Hong Kong nearly doubled, but western shipping suffered a decline in proportion to junk shipping after the world-wide depression of

1. C. F. Remer, The Foreign Trade of China (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1926), pp. 53-57.

2. Enclosure, Alcock to Hammond, 28 June 1868, FO 17/504, cited in Nathan A. Pelcovits, Old China Hands and the Foreign Office (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1948), pp. 34–35.

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

1873-74. By 1877, about 60% of the Colony's shipping was in junks, and only about 40% in western bottoms (and some of these were Chinese-owned). These trends are illustrated in Table 3:

Table 3

Tonnage Entered at Hong Kong, 1867-1877

Tons

1867

1868

1869

1870

1871

1872

1873

1874

1875

1876

1877

Tons

4,500,000

4,400,000

4,300,000

4,200,000

4,100,000

4,000,000

3,900,000

3,800,000

3,700,000

3,600,000

3,500,000

3,400,000

3,300,000

3,200,000

3,100,000

3,000,000

2,900,000

2,800,000

2,700,000

2,600,000

2,500,000

2,400,000

2,300,000

2,200,000

2,100,000

2,000,000

1,900,000

1,800,000

1,700,000

1,600,000

1,500,000

1,400,000

1,300,000

1,200,000

1,100,000

1,000,000

Junk Tonnage

Foreign Shipping Tonnage

Combined

Source: Gt. Brit. CO 133:34(1877).

Hong Kong Barrister 1877-1882

During the years 1876-81, over 20,000 Chinese emigrated to Hong Kong, bringing a total population of 160,402, of whom 150,690 were Chinese.3 A good proportion of them were members of the bourgeoisie. During the years 1877-81, the number of Chinese mercantile firms and individuals expanded threefold, from 1,557 to 4,808. The largest area of growth was that of medium- size traders, although there was also an expansion in large-size trading firms. Chinese banking developed, as indicated by the emergence of 55 bankers and a rise in the number of shroffs, or banking clerks. The number of Chinese ship charterers rose nearly six times, while the bourgeoisie in almost every area registered expansion. These trends are illustrated by Table 4:

Table 4

Growth of the Chinese Mercantile Bourgeoisie in Hong Kong, 1876–1881

Type of business

Trading hongs*

Traders

1876

1881

215

395

287

2,377

Shroffs

208

Brokers

Money changers

142

455

111

Bullion dealers

Bankers

Piece goods dealers

109

Cotton and

yarn dealers

Tea merchants

Rice dealers

128

Coal dealers

Fire arms dealers

Timber dealers

107

Drapers

101

156

Foreign goods dealers

167

191

Compradors

Ship compradors

113

Ship charterers

Bird's nest sellers

Shark's fin dealers

Jade dealers

Cinnamon dealers

Sesame oil dealers

Ginseng dealers

Total

1,557

4,808

Source: Gt. Brit. SP. 1881:824.

*Defined by Hennessy as “Nampak hongs and other wealthy

merchants in the England-China trade.”

3. Hong Kong, Historical and Statistical Abstract.

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Manufacturing industries did not register the same phenomenal growth during the same period as did mercantile interests, and in some cases they registered declines (e.g., gold beating, rattan making, sapanwood working and sugar refining). This suggests, as noted above in Chapter 1, that the real strength of the Chinese bourgeoisie in Hong Kong lay in commercial or mercantile sectors, not in industrial fields. Table 5 illustrates this phenomenon:

Table 5

Growth of Chinese Manufacturing Industries in Hong Kong, 1876–1881

Type of industry

Bamboo workers

Beancurd dealers

1876

1881

121

107

Boat builders

Carvers

Cigar makers

Engineers

Gold beaters

Glass manufacturers

Image makers

110

121

111

Lantern makers

Leather box makers

Lemonade and soda-water makers

Oar makers

Opium dealers

108

103

Paper box makers

Rattan workers

596

448

Sail and rope makers

100

141

Sandalwood dealers and workers

Sapanwood dealers and workers

Sauce manufacturers

Soap manufacturers

Sugar refineries

Tanners

Tobacco manufacturers

Tooth Powder manufacturers

Umbrella makers

3715

169

Vermillion manufacturers and dealers

111

123

Watch makers

Weavers

Total

1,920

2,166

Source: Gt. Brit. SP. 1881:824.

* Processors of raw opium.

The influx of Chinese in the late 1870s and in particular, of Chinese mercantile interests, when combined with the severe trade competition between Chinese and western interests, created near panic on the part of the

Hong Kong Barrister 1877–1882

European merchants and shippers. In the late 1870s and early 1880s Chinese began accelerated investments in properties in the Colony as residences or sites for businesses. As early as 1877, the Daily Press observed that wealthy Chinese were paying large sums of cash to purchase land and residences, while the China Mail noted that 'the Chinese will eventually buy us up, stock, lock and barrel' is the most casual observation now made amongst Hong Kong residents."4 In 1880 Hennessy's decision to open large areas of government-owned land for purchase by Chinese residents led to a great flurry of land transactions and a speculative wave among Chinese investors, as discussed below. By 1881, the Colony's top ratepayers were mostly Chinese, whereas in 1876 they had been mostly European, as indicated by Table 6:

Table 6

Names of the 20 Ratepayers Paying the Largest Amount of Rates for the Years 1876 and 1881

1876

Amount

1881

Amount

Douglas, Lepraik and Co.

$11,108.92

Wo Hang

$11,398.00

2. Jardine, Matheson

8,453.40 2. 'Ng Sang

10,240.00

and Co.

Kwok A-cheong

6,906.36 3. Jardine, Matheson

7,544.60

and Co.

T.G. Linstead

6,527.52

Yeong Shu-lum

6,876.60

Siemssen and Co.

6,305.44

Lum Sow

6,003.90

Turner and Co.

5,913.72

Ho Lai Shi*

5,863.39

77.

D. Sassoon, Sons and Co. 5,499.00

Kwok Ying Kai

5,748.00

8. J.J. Dos Remedios

4,972.80

Ching Sing Yeong

5,730.30

and Co.

9. Lum Sow

4,475.08

Lo Shing

5,624.00

10. Hong Kong and Shang- 3,938.40

10. 'Ng Cheong

5,363.00

hai Banking Corp.

11. Wo Hang

3,372.48

11. Yeong Amow

4,968.00

12. Lee Shing

3,154.80

12. Tang Leek

4,748.00

13. Choy Chan

2,988.00

13. Kwok Ying Shew

4,700.25

14. Coore Lind and Co.

2.965.08

14. Low Cheong

4,690.46

15. Chao Ying Yoong

2,585.40 15. Koo Mun Wa

4,596.70

16. 'Ng Sang

2,572.80

16. Ip Ching Chuen

4,516.00

17. W. Curtis

2,467.44

17. Douglas Lepraik

4,472.63

and Co.

18. J. Gerrard

2,261.28

18. Choy Chan

4,048.77

19. Yeong Shu-lum

2,212.20

19. D. Sassoon, Sons

4,020.89

and Co.

20. Gibb, Livingston and Co. 2,110.80

20. Fung Wing

3,996.39

Source: Gt. Brit. SP. 1882(44):287.

*Ho Lai Shi [Mrs. He, née Li] was Wu Tingang's mother-in-law.

4. NCH, 21 Apr. 1877.

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

The high visibility of Chinese mercantile interests in Hong Kong, marked by the rapid influx of people and the number of land purchases, was also seen in the inroads made in the steam shipping business by Chinese interests, including the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company. Whereas in 1876, 67,417 tons of goods entered Hong Kong on Chinese ships (in addition to those entered on Chinese junks), by 1882 this figure had almost doubled to 121,872 tons.5

In spite of the high visibility of the Chinese mercantile interests and the panicked reaction of European merchants, the reality was that the Chinese encountered stubborn resistance from the Europeans. The latter actually held their own quite successfully in shipping in the China trade, and by 1882, the Chinese shipping interests had actually declined somewhat in relation to the Europeans. Thus of tonnage leaving Hong Kong for China, Chinese junks and ships carried 37% in 1876 and 36% in 1882, after having risen to carry 42% of it in 1880, while in goods entering Hong Kong from China, the Chinese portion declined from 44% in 1876 to 38% in 1882, as illustrated by Table 7:

Table 7

Percentage of Hong Kong-China Trade

Carried on Chinese Ships and Junks, 1877–1882

Entered

Cleared

1877

44%

37%

1878

41%

1879

41%

1880

42%

1881

37%

38%

1882

38%

36%

Source: Based on Gt. Brit. CO 133/34–39. 1877:152-53; 1878:154-59; 1879–82:52–56.

Thus the period 1877-82 was marked by severe trade competition between Chinese and western mercantile interests. By the late 1870s, Hong Kong's economic expansion had created a small class of extremely wealthy Chinese traders, shippers, opium merchants and compradors. Although their economic activities were of great importance to the Colony's prosperity, they were virtually excluded from participation in its administration and had no guarantee that their interests would be represented in policy-making decisions. While the British merchants had at least limited access to the government through the appointment of unofficial members of the Governor's Legislative

5. Gt. Brit. Colonial Office, Bluebooks, Hongkong, 1877, pp. 152–53, CO 133/34; 1878, pp. 154–59, CO 133/35; 1879-82, pp. 52–56, CO 133/36-39.

Hong Kong Barrister 1877–1882

Council, the Chinese as colonial subjects were not expected to participate in their own legislation at all.

This situation became more and more intolerable to the wealthy Chinese, especially as the stakes became higher and the competition more intense. Partly for this reason, the period of the 1870s and 1880s saw concerted efforts by the wealthy Chinese to assert themselves politically.

Wu Tingfang became a valuable ally to the wealthy Chinese and their main organ, the Tung Wah Hospital Committee, in their struggle to achieve political representation. Wu had close ties to the wealthy bourgeois Chinese through his own class background and that of his in-laws, the He family. His law practice, moreover, was closely tied to them as many of the cases he handled upon returning to the Colony were business disputes often complicated by the differences between Chinese business practices and English law. He was also associated with some of them in business ventures.7

As the first Chinese barrister in Hong Kong, Wu was the ideal person to serve as go-between for the Chinese with the colonial administration. He was well known to the British residents and stood apart in their eyes from other Chinese, even the wealthy Chinese merchants of the Tung Wah Hospital Committee. Wu's fame enabled him to enjoy privileges denied to other Chinese, such as being served first-class tiffin on board the Hong Kong- Guangzhou steamers.

His special status may be seen in the formal speeches marking his admission to practice before the Hong Kong Supreme Court on 18 May 1877. The Chief Justice, Sir John Smale, said:

I have looked through these affidavits as it was my duty to do, and I see that they are all in form. They were not so absolutely necessary in the case of Mr. Ng Choy, because he is well known here, and it is so very notorious that he has been made a barrister.... I am glad to see a Chinaman running in the race most highly intellectual in the world.... In England every office becomes open to talent without favor or affection. A distinguished [Jewish] American statesman [Judah P. Benjamin] has become, and is now an ornament of the English Bar, and all the Bar will gladly hail the time when a Chinaman shall distinguish himself as much as the eminent counsel to whom I refer. I have seen stranger things than that happen.9

6. Daily Press, Hong Kong (hereafter cited as DP), 13 and 16 June 1877; 23 Jan., 12 and 13 Mar., 17 Apr., 2 May, 22 June 1878; China Mail, Hong Kong (hereafter cited as CM) 7 Jan., 20 Mar., 8, 9 and 15 May, 29 Aug., 2 and 6 Sept., 3 Dec. 1879.

7. E.g., with Feng Mingshan (Fung Ming Shan). Cf. Smith, “Emergence of a Chinese Elite,” p. 100. 8. In 1879 Cheong Wan sued the captain of a steamship for not being served tiffin and being told that such privileges were not allowed to Chinese. Wu Tingfang testified that he had been served tiffin several times on the same ship. The captain's attorney said: "The Company would never dream of excluding Mr. Ng Choy or Mr. Ho A-mei, but Chinese could not be allowed as a right." In his four years as ship's master, the captain had only allowed three Chinese to be served tiffin. CM, 11 June 1879. On Ho A-mei (He Kunshan) see Smith, “Emergence of a Chinese Elite," p. 104. 9. DP, 19 May 1877; J. W. Norton-Kyshe, The History of the Laws and Courts of Hong Kong (London: Unwin, 1898), 1:261–62.

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

During his career in Hong Kong, Wu was thus able to utilize his special status and skills, based upon his education abroad, to become the first "civic leader" of the Chinese. That is, he was acceptable to the British administrators by virtue of his training and outlook, and because of his acceptance by the colonial authorities, the wealthy Chinese hoped to use him to assert their political interests. With Wu's aid, the wealthy Chinese, especially the Tung Wah Hospital Committee, rose to a position of considerable power. The Committee and the wealthy Chinese it represented became in effect Wu's constituency in his search for influence. Its support was vital to his position, and their relationship was mutually supportive.

Hennessy and the Hong Kong Chinese

The second basis of Wu's political power was his close relationship with the new Governor, Sir John Pope Hennessy, who arrived in Hong Kong in April 1877 shortly before Wu's own return from abroad. Before coming to Hong Kong, Hennessy had had a stormy career. A barrister of Catholic Irish origins, Hennessy became a follower of Disraeli and won an election to Parliament under the new banner of Irish Conservatism. His victory was more viewed as an expression of Irish dissatisfaction with Liberal Party policy in Ireland than as a Conservative Party victory. When he lost the next election, his connections with Disraeli enabled him to receive a post in the Colonial Service.

Hennessy's Irish background and proto-nationalist sympathies led him along paths quite different from those of the average colonial administrator. As Governor of the Barbados his sympathy for the black populace brought him into direct conflict with the English settlers. He was transferred to Hong Kong because the Colonial Office thought the Colony was so peaceful that he couldn't cause any trouble there. Throughout his career, Hennessy advocated reforms designed to bring colonial subjects into the administration of their own territories. In later years, after he had left Hong Kong, these views crystallized into advocacy of Home Rule, which he sought to apply in the colonies as well as in his native Ireland.

A man of great charm and wit, he also displayed a proclivity for impetuous actions and argumentation. He treated the British residents of Hong Kong with profound disdain, and he often ignored Colonial Office bureaucrats in order to implement his reforms. The Colonial Office was often forced to support him simply because his authority as the Queen's representative could not be undermined. But when the antagonisms stirred against him were too great, and when his advocacy of Home Rule later in his career proved too embarrassing, this "stormy petrol" of the colonies was finally retired from service.10

10. This sketch of Sir John is drawn from the portrait of him in the work by his grandson, James Pope Hennessy, Verandah: Some Episodes in the Crown Colonies, 1867–1889 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1964).

Hong Kong Barrister 1877–1882

The alliance between Hennessy and Wu was a natural one. They apparently became good friends and found much in common. It seems to have delighted Hennessy to have discovered in Wu a cosmopolitan person, who was also a barrister, as was he, and on whom he could rely in dealing with the Chinese community. The Governor's sympathies with the Chinese were displayed immediately upon his arrival in Hong Kong, and Wu was the ideal person to use as intermediary.

On Wu's part, he found a sympathetic ear for many of his personal grievances and for those of the wealthy Chinese in general. Significantly, one of Hennessy's first acts was to appoint Wu member of a three-person board of examiners to test candidates for a newly-vacant interpreting position. Wu found all the candidates inadequate, and took the opportunity to tell Hennessy about the interpreters' grievances over their poor salaries and limited prospects for advancement.11

We can only imagine Wu's gratification as Hennessy flooded the Colonial Office with dispatches complaining about the poor quality of interpreters, the lack of incentive for advancement, and the deficiencies in the Colony's educational system. At last Wu and his ex-colleagues among the interpreters had a way to make their grievances known in London.12

As Hennessy's association with Wu deepened, the Governor became more outspoken in his praise of the Chinese. He went out of his way to be courteous to visiting Qing officials and available to the wealthy Hong Kong Chinese.13 He frequently lauded the achievements of the Chinese in the development of Hong Kong, asserting:

Neither the British consumer nor the British manufacturer appears to lose by it. The Chinese merchants allege that they can put Chinese goods on the British market in larger quantity and at lower prices than their English competitors; and they also allege that they can afford to sell British goods cheaper to the natives in Hong Kong and in China than the other traders. However that may be, there is no doubt of the fact that although the number of British, German and American houses in Hong Kong may be diminishing, the value of the general Hong Kong trade to the British consumer and the British manufacturer is increasing.'

11. Hennessy to Earl of Carnarvon, 6 Sept. 1877, no. 108, CO 129/179; “Supplement to the Annual Report on Government Education,” in Gt. Brit. Colonial Office, Bluebooks, Hongkong, 1877, CO 133/34.

12. Hennessy to Carnarvon, 20 July, 7 Sept., 29 Nov. 1877; 17 Jan. 1878, nos. 107, 109, 167, CO 129/179; no. 12, CO 129/181.

13. Hennessy to Carnarvon, 18 May 1877, no. 19, CO 129/177; 6 and 8 June 1877; nos. 27, 30, CO 129/178.

14. "Extract from a Dispatch from Sir John Pope Hennessy to the Earl of Carnarvon... Relating to the Economic Progress of the Chinese,” reprinted as Document no. 28 in G. B. Endacott, An Eastern Entrepot: A Collection of Documents Illustrating the History of Hong Kong (London: HMSO, 1964), p. 143.

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Hennessy's lack of sympathy for the plight of the British merchants in Hong Kong heightened the latter's irritation with the Governor, but Hennessy simply ignored them. He announced that he had held an especially favorable view of the Chinese people ever since he had served as Governor years earlier of Labuan, a tiny island located off the northeast coast of Borneo. The industriousness and commercial abilities of the Chinese, he said, made them desirable residents of any British-ruled area. .15 He characterized them as “a community industrious and temperate, with a natural aptitude for commerce,” and described China as a "safe, progressive country," views that almost all Britishers would have flatly rejected.16

Under Wu's influence, Hennessy began to consult the "leading Chinese" on every issue of concern to them. The “leading Chinese" were almost all members of the Tung Wah Hospital Committee or closely connected with it, and Wu's promoting of the Committee led to a rapid expansion of its power and influence. The close relationship between Wu, the Governor and the hospital Committee was formalized in the ceremonial call paid upon the hospital by Hennessy shortly after the Lunar New Year in February 1878. Amidst great pomp and ceremony, Wu read a speech on behalf of the Chinese community, while the Governor replied by congratulating the Hospital Committee for its varied services to the community. "When we remember that England is the greatest colonial empire on the face of the globe,” the Governor said, "the reason is that the policy of perfect fair play and justice to all is the Colonial policy of the British Government.”17

These events were the capstone to Hennessy's policy of accepting the Hospital Committee as spokesman for the Chinese community in its relations with the colonial authorities. The Chinese elite must have seen Hennessy's remarks as an open invitation to expand the role of the Hospital Committee. As the Committee's link to the government was strengthened, its power in the community increased, for Chinese of all social strata funnelled their complaints of injustices through it and petitioned it to seek redress.

The authoritative position held by the Hospital Committee was apparent to all. In 1878 the Hong Kong Daily Press declared that the directors “decide every question that affects the natives, and none of the Chinese dare [sic] dispute their decree,”18 and in 1881 the China Mail added that the “directors act as a sort of Small Case Court, Chamber of Commerce, Tribunal of Arbitration, Hong Kong Association and Advisors-General of the Government."19 From that period on, every important visitor to the Colony,

15. James Pope Hennessy, Verandah, pp. 107–8.

16. Enclosure, Hennessy to Carnarvon, 15 June 1881 (secret and confidential) CO 129/193; also reprinted in Endacott, An Eastern Entrepot, pp. 150–51.

17. Hongkong Government Gazette 24, no. 7 (16 Feb. 1878) 47-49, encl. in Hennessy to Carnarvon, 20 Feb. 1878, no. 21, CO 129/181.

18. DP, 12 Feb. 1878.

19. CM, 29 Sept. 1881. See also DP, 21 Nov. 1878, 6 May 1879; CM, 16 Aug., 4 Oct. 1879.

Hong Kong Barrister 1877–1882

Chinese or western, paid courtesy calls upon the directors, and ceremonial visits were paid on holidays and at every change in the colonial administration.20

The Qing Government also came to recognize the Hospital Committee as a gentry organization and used it to handle the collection of relief contributions from overseas Chinese. Qing officials consulted with the directors on all matters concerning overseas Chinese. As the Hospital Committee became a clearinghouse for communications between the Qing authorities and overseas Chinese, its power and prestige were furthered.21

"Damned Chinamen, Throw Them Out!"

Conflict flared into the open over the issue of penal reform. In 1876 an investigating committee had recommended that harsher jail sentences be applied to Chinese criminals as a means of lowering the crime rate. In addition to the flogging, branding and deportation that were already features of Hong Kong's penal system, the Gaol Committee also recommended reductions in the quantity and quality of prison food. The aim of prison life, the Committee wrote, was "to make the life of prisoners in Gaol, and of Chinese prisoners especially, as distasteful as it can possibly be made, consistently with reason and humanity, by hard labour, hard fare, and strict physical discipline." As to Chinese prisoners in particular, the Committee added:

Owing to the peculiar circumstances of this Colony, and the fact that by far the larger proportion of the criminals confined in the Gaol are Chinese, whose language is but little known to those who have charge of them, whose characters and dispositions are imperfectly understood, and of whose history and lives it is almost impossible to obtain any knowledge, any attempt to cultivate their higher moral faculties, and to improve their moral condition seems hopeless.22

Hennessy, appalled at the report, set about at once to ameliorate prison conditions by relieving some of the overcrowding and constructing new sanitary facilities. Hennessy refuted the view that the rise in crime was due to lowered steamship fares between Hong Kong and Guangzhou. Instead, he charged that the causes of crime were to be found in social conditions,

20. E.g., DP, 9 Feb., 27 Aug. 1878; CM, 6 May 1879. See also Sir George William Des Voeux, My Colonial Service in British Guiana, St. Lucia, Trinidad, Fiji, Australia, Newfoundland and Hong Kong, With Interludes (London: Murray, 1903), 2:199–200.

21. Li Hongzhang, Quanji, “Zougao,” 31:30; 34:37; Qingji waijiao shiliao 13:19–20; DP, 4 June 1877; NCH, 5 and 12 Apr., 2 June 1877, pp. 349, 367, 543. See also Wickberg, Chinese in Philippine Life, pp. 216–17. Other items concerning the Hospital Committee and overseas Chinese are in CM, 10 Apr., 1 May, 16 Aug. 1879; DP, 20 Feb., 30 June, 22 and 27 Sept., 14 Dec. 1882.

22. "Report of the Gaol Committee,” 21 Apr. 1876, encl. in Kennedy to Earl of Carnarvon, 28 Feb. 1877, no. 40, CO 129/177.

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

especially limited educational opportunities. He contended that flogging, branding and deportation did not constitute deterrents to crime and began to personally examine each case involving deportation. In a number of cases he concluded that those being deported were not hardened criminals even though they might have several convictions. Hennessy even undertook to reverse or overrule his subordinates' decisions on some cases.

The Governor then undertook a campaign against flogging. He felt that the use of the lash in Hong Kong was far greater than in any other Colony, due to the prevalent view that flogging was “one of the very best modes for dealing with Chinese criminals.” While he did not propose the abolition of flogging, he recommended stopping public whippings and a general decreased use in penal offenses.24

Hennessy's views were heatedly contended, and he could not get support from the Legislative Council, but nonetheless he persisted. In August 1877 he abolished the use of the cat-of-nine whip upon receipt of a report from the Colonial Surgeon, supported by the Supreme Court justices, indicating that whippings with that whip were highly injurious to the victim.25

The situation was made worse by a series of armed robberies and raids by criminal bands on Victoria in early 1878. In view of the indignation felt by the British residents, the Colonial Office rebuked Hennessy for his persistence in these reforms at the risk of further deterioration in relations between the Governor and the British residents. Due to the "Chinese character and habits of violence," the Governor was told, “you will find it necessary to exercise great caution in advising any relaxation of these exceptional but hitherto necessary laws.

"26

Hennessy still persisted and in August 1878 was finally able to obtain the consent of the Executive Council for the abolition of public flogging, although the Governor was fully aware that most of the Europeans in Hong Kong strongly opposed any change.2

The reaction he expected occurred on 7 October 1878, when leading British residents held a public meeting to protest “lawlessness” in the Colony. The meeting was significant in that it brought about the first attempt by the propertied Hong Kong Chinese to participate directly in Hong Kong politics, thereby precipitating debate and conflict over the Governor's policies towards the Chinese. Seeing the meeting as an attack upon Hennessy, Wu decided to marshal support from the Chinese community. He arranged to call a meeting

23. See Hennessy's many dispatches to Carnarvon on the subject, 14 and 23 June, 12 and 13 July 1877, nos. 34, 44, 60, 61, CO 129/178, and others printed in "Papers Relating to the Flogging of Prisoners in Hong Kong," c. 2438, Gt. Brit., Sessional Papers, 1878/79, no. 51.

24. Hennessy to Carnarvon, 6 July 1878, paper no. 1 in "Papers Relating to the Flogging of Prisoners."

25. Enclosures nos. 2–6, ibid.

26. Minute by the Earl of Carnarvon to Hennessy's dispatch no. 44, 23 June 1877, CO 129/178.

27. Hennessy to Hicks-Beach, 27 Sept. 1878, encl. no. 17 in “Papers Relating to the Flogging of Prisoners."

Hong Kong Barrister 1877–1882

at the Tung Wah Hospital (the "Chinese Government offices for this colony," the Daily Press sarcastically noted) at which a number of Chinese decided to attend the forthcoming meeting.28

The appearance of the Chinese at the public meeting thoroughly surprised and enraged the meeting's organizers. When they arrived at the meeting room in City Hall it was almost filled to capacity by Chinese. The organizers hastily decided to reconvene in the open air, with some British reportedly shouting, "Damned Chinamen, throw them out!" A group of Europeans formed a circle around the main speakers in an attempt to exclude the Chinese from the proceedings. Some Chinese who tried to penetrate the circle were said to have been roughly treated.2

The tone of the meeting was set by William Keswick of Jardine, Matheson and Company in a resolution that stated in part:

During the past eighteen months life and property have been seriously jeopardized and a feeling of insecurity... has been engendered, which in the opinion of this meeting has been mainly caused by a policy of undue leniency towards the criminal classes.30

J. J. Francis, a barrister and friend of Hennessy, rose to suggest that the final part of the resolution, with its implicit criticism of the Governor, be omitted. He was shouted down and the resolution passed in its original form. At this point Wu asked that the resolution be repeated once more since the Chinese had been unable to hear the proceedings. His request was denied and he protested: "It is not fair. The Chinese do not understand what is going on." To which the chair replied, "We cannot help it. I wish every Chinaman understood what was being said, but we cannot speak Chinese.” According to the Daily Press at this point, "the Chinamen then, at a signal from Mr. Ng Choy, moved off the ground, cheering as they went.

"31

With the departure of the Chinese, the meeting continued as before and passed several resolutions calling for the resumption of public flogging, branding and deportation of criminals. The meeting also called upon the appointment of a commission to study "the application of the criminal laws, the carrying out of sentences of the courts and the relations existing between the head of the government and the other officials in every department.”

The English-language press declared the meeting an unqualified success, despite the effort to pack the meeting with hundreds of Chinese, only a few of whom could understand or speak English. The Tung Wah Hospital Committee was charged with "unscrupulously” misleading the Chinese community to believe that the meeting was directed against Hennessy.

28. DP, 7 and 10 Oct. 1878.

29. Letter to the Editor by Ho Kwan Sun, “Late Haikuan (Customs) Broker, Swatow,” DP, 16 Oct. 1878.

30. DP, 8 Oct. 1878.

31. Ibid.

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

"Repeatedly, usque ad nauseaum," the Daily Press declared editorially, "have we protested against the position which this body has assumed in our midst of an imperium in imperio; constantly have we pointed out that the Committee, if confined to its legitimate purposes, would be the means of benefit to the native population of the colony, but that naught but evil could result from an extension of powers and influence to matters alien to its proper functions.”32 News of the meeting spread quickly throughout the treaty ports. The Shanghai weekly North China Herald soon reported that Wu had led a mob of over one thousand “cut-throats and desperados” in packing the meeting, his "band" of criminals following his commands. "It seems impossible,” the Herald concluded, "to doubt that the action of Mr. Ng Choy... was, if not instigated by, tacitly approved by the Governor," a statement for which the Herald subsequently apologized to Wu.33

The meeting and the press reaction triggered a strong response from Wu and many other Hong Kong Chinese. Wu immediately wrote to the Daily Press disputing its contention that the Hospital Committee had conspired to disrupt the public meeting. Since the meeting was public, the Chinese had decided to attend as mere observers. Moreover, the organizers of the meeting had solicited the signatures of several Chinese merchants in the petition calling for the meeting. The aim of the Chinese was certainly not to “gag” discussion. Since this was the first time that Chinese had ever attempted to attend a public meeting in the Colony, Wu said:

I am sorry that a little more consideration was not shown us, as I subsequently learnt that some of my fellow countrymen would have readily supported one or two of the resolutions that were passed if they had been present and understood their meaning.34

Other letters expressing greater indignation from Chinese appeared in the English-language press. “Of our right to take a part in that meeting," one letter to the Daily Press asserted, "there cannot be the least doubt,” and the refusal to translate the proceedings into Chinese was none other than a "great affront."35 Placards in Chinese appeared in the Colony declaring that Hennessy was an enlightened administrator, having advocated lenient laws. and distinguished between “good” and “bad” elements of the populace.36

Shortly after the 7 October meeting, the Hospital Committee wrote to the Acting Colonial Secretary asking permission to hold a public meeting at a local Chinese theater to discuss the resolutions passed by the Europeans. Having had quite enough of public meetings, Hennessy met with the

32. Ibid.

33. NCH, 5 Dec. 1878, p. 539.

34. DP, 9 Oct. 1878.

35. DP, 16 Oct. 1878.

36. DP, 10 Oct. 1878.

Hong Kong Barrister 1877–1882

Committee's representatives and asked them to reconsider their request. Were public meetings, he asked, "the most prudent and efficient means” of expressing one's views?37

The Hospital Committee took the hint and organized a petition to the Queen instead, expressing appreciation for Hennessy's deeds. In view of the Chinese contribution to the economic life of Hong Kong, the petition stated, the Chinese were equally concerned with its affairs. The petition ended with the blandly expressed hope that Chinese and Europeans would continue to live harmoniously under Her Majesty's rule.38

Dissatisfied with this mild declaration, other Chinese circulated another petition, more outspoken in its praise for Hennessy and strident in its tone. Referring directly to the public meeting, the petition stated that “a meeting of Chinese and foreigners was held, but the Chinese were despised and were not allowed to take part in it, and a haughty spirit was exhibited; the Chinese quietly swallowed the insult and left the meeting.

**39

This petition was circulated by the Hua Tuo (Wato) Hospital of Wan Chai. As the Chinese community had expanded into the Wan Chai area in the 1870s, the Tung Wah Hospital considered establishing a branch there, but instead a separate institution was formed at the Hua Tuo Temple. The petition was signed by 2,262 persons and establishments, mostly shopkeepers and Chinese medical practitioners, probably representative of middle and lower strata of the Chinese bourgeoisie. The wealthiest of the bourgeoisie were located in Victoria and the Tung Wah Hospital was their base, while the Wan Chai area was apparently occupied by smaller merchants and tradespeople. In effect, the Hua Tuo petition constituted a challenge to the more elite Tung Wah effort, thus revealing the manner in which the inequities of the colonial situation could potentially mobilize larger numbers of people for a nationalist cause.

The public meeting and its aftermath placed Hennessy in a difficult position. He sought to justify his acts to the Colonial Office by asserting that he had the support of nearly the entire Chinese community as well as many prominent Europeans.11 The Colonial Office remained unconvinced. Clearly, there was "so much want of confidence in Mr. Hennessy's Chinese policy” that it might become necessary to appoint a commission such as the 7 October meeting had demanded. Yet to do so, the London officials realized, was tantamount to asking the Governor's recall.42 They could not bring themselves to go that far, and Hennessy was given a little more time to pursue his policies or follies, as they were seen in London.

37. Hennessy to Hicks-Beach, 16 Oct. 1878, no. 100, CO 129/182.

38. Gt. Brit., Hongkong Government Gazette 25 (7 May 1879), pp. 229–34, CO 132/17:23.

39. Ibid.

40. Eitel, Europe in China, p. 510.

41. Hennessy to Hicks-Beach, 10 Oct. 1878, no. 98, CO 129/182.

42. Ibid., minutes by Undersecretary Robert G. W. Herbert.

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

The 7 October meeting propelled Hennessy further into alliance with Wu and the Chinese bourgeoisie. More than ever it was necessary to demonstrate to the Colonial Office that although the British residents might oppose him, the respectable Chinese, whose wealth was now the backbone of the Colony, fully supported him. He had the two petitions from the Chinese residents printed in the Hongkong Government Gazette and forwarded to the Queen with great flourish, much to the continued irritation of the British residents and the delight of the Chinese.

The alliance was in full swing.

Colonial Politics

Following the 7 October meeting, Hennessy began a campaign to formalize Wu's status as go-between with the Chinese community, for he was now even more dependent upon Wu and the Chinese community he represented. Hennessy quietly arranged to have all Chinese matters taken out of the Colonial Secretary's hands and placed under Wu's control, after being told by the Hospital Committee that it preferred to deal with a Chinese. Then in November 1878 Hennessy proposed a formal reorganization of the Colonial Secretary's Office, with all Chinese matters administered by a new bureau, the Department of Interpretation. Not daring to suggest Wu's name to the Colonial Office, Hennessy instead gave that of E. J. Eitel, an Austrian missionary well versed in Chinese and a confidential adviser of the Governor.43

Not trusting Eitel, an outsider and unknown, the Colonial Office refused to approve Hennessy's scheme. Moreover, unofficial word had reached London that Wu was serving in an unclearly defined capacity in the Colonial Secretary's Office and acting as go-between. In the opinion of the Colonial Office, this was intolerable. As Undersecretary Robert H. Meade minuted, "nothing can be worse" than for a Chinese to be a go-between. Echoing the reports from the Hong Kong press, Undersecretary John Bramston warned the Colonial Secretary against the activities of the Hospital Committee and Wu, who were "in constant communication” with the Qing Governor-General in Guangzhou, "who pulls their strings."44

Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, the Colonial Secretary, wrote privately to Hennessy to warn him:

Our position in Hong Kong with regard to China is a very peculiar one-and demands, I should think, special caution in dealing with a people who however friendly in appearance or even in reality be to their English rulers, yet must surely have sympathies and connections with the Chinese Empire from which much danger might result.15

43. Hennessy to Hicks-Beach, 16 Nov. 1878, no. 116, CO 129/182.

44. Ibid., minutes by Meade and Undersecretary John Bramston.

45. Hicks-Beach to Hennessy, 19 Nov. 1878, Sir John Pope Hennessy, Papers (Oxford University Colonial Research Project, Rhodes House).

Hong Kong Barrister 1877–1882

Herein lay the point of difference between Hennessy and his critics. As a colonial administrator, Hennessy saw Hong Kong as a colony to be administered in conformity with the principles under which other sectors of the globe had been brought under British rule and their native populations given the advantages (as he saw them) of British civilization. Moreover, he was inclined to view China and its civilization in a light far more favorable than many of his contemporaries.

Yet the Colonial Office maintained a different strategic evaluation of Hong Kong and its role in Asia. Hong Kong was not only a British colony, but a tiny island in the shadow of the great Qing Empire, seized in warfare and maintained as a base from which to pursue British policy objectives in China. And Anglo-Chinese relations, as the Colonial Office saw them, consisted largely of intermittent warfare. No matter how far down the road towards Home Rule administrators like Hennessy might go, the potential confrontation between Britain and China acted as a brake.

Thus, for example, the Colonial Office rejected Hennessy's 1880 proposals regarding the naturalization of Chinese who had been long-term residents of the Colony. While Hennessy felt that establishing naturalization procedures "would tend to strengthen and consolidate the loyal Anglo-Chinese community that I am happy to say now exists in Hong Kong," the Colonial Office dismissed the measure as unnecessary and burdensome.46

Also, Wu Tingfang did have contacts throughout China as a result of his fame and earlier meeting with Li Hongzhang. He often traveled to Guangzhou, perhaps to visit family but also to provide legal counsel. In 1877 he was hired as counsel by a group of Fuzhou merchants in the Porter Case (see Chapter 3). And in 1878 he advised Liu Kunyi, Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi, in a case involving the detention of a shipload of emigrants to Peru.47 Hence from the point of view of the Colonial Office in London, Wu's actions might have raised questions.

Nevertheless, Hennessy persisted. Every time a suitable vacancy arose in the government, he put Wu's name forth to fill it. In December 1878 he placed Wu's name in a new listing of Justices of the Peace for the Colony. In March 1879 the Governor brought forth Wu's name along with two others as possible replacements for Justice Snowden while the latter was on leave, but an Englishman was chosen instead.49 In April 1879 Hennessy proposed Wu's name as Police Magistrate upon the incumbent's death. Wu was lauded as a "man of high character" who had a "thorough knowledge of the work”

46. Hennessy to Hicks-Beach, 20 Jan. 1880, no. 5, CO 129/187. In 1881, however, Hennessy succeeded in arranging for the naturalization of six prominent Chinese, including Wu's associate Feng Mingshan. See Hennessy to Kimberley, 28 July 1882, no. 114, CO 129/193.

47. Liu Kunyi, Yiji, 5:2420–33; NCH, 22 June 1878; U.S. Department of State, “Consular Dispatches: Canton,” no. 49, 1878, M–92 (U.S. National Archieves).

48. Gt. Brit., Hongkong Government Gazette 14 (14 Dec. 1878), p. 599, CO 133/17:23.

49. Minutes of the Executive Council, 6 Mar. 1879, Gt. Brit., Sessional Papers, CO 131/10.

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

and a "strictly honourable disposition."50 The Colonial Office, however, was nearly unanimous in its opposition to Wu.51

Hennessy finally succeeded in 1880. In January he appointed Wu to the Legislative Council, and later in the spring he appointed him to the post of Acting Police Magistrate. The appointment to the Legislative Council was in response to a petition presented to Hennessy in December 1879 by the "leading Chinese" who asked him to appoint a Chinese to the Legislative Council as soon as a vacancy arose, so as to "ensure a mutual good understanding between the ruling class and the ruled." Noting the non- participation of the Chinese in the colonial administration, the petition stated that "there arises easily a feeling of separate interests as if foreigners and Chinese could not be treated according to the same principles." Wu's name was put forth as the preferred candidate, a man with a "personal reputation of a high standing," "well acquainted with the English language and literature, and deeply versed in English jurisprudence” while "in thorough harmony with" and enjoying "the confidence of the Chinese community."52

Hennessy appointed Wu to the Council as soon as a temporary vacancy arose, in January 1880. In reporting to the Colonial Office, Hennessy wrote that Wu was a barrister with a "good private fortune," an "accomplished English scholar" with deep knowledge of England and its civilization, and a "man of general culture," loyal to the Queen and "thoroughly identified with the interests of England in the East.” He said that Chief Justice John Smale joined him in saying that there was “not a more honourable and straight- forward gentleman in Hong Kong."53

There was great dismay in London. Colonial Office Undersecretary Meade minuted that the appointment was "an inopportune measure," suggesting that there would be "less harm” if it were understood as a temporary measure. Sir Michael Hicks-Beach wrote to Hennessy that he would agree to Wu's being seated in the Council on a provisional basis, in view of the Governor's strong personal recommendation and of the “educational advantages” that Wu had had in England. But Wu's appointment was to be seen as an experiment only.54 Privately he told Hennessy that:

I don't doubt his [Wu's] personal loyalty or worth. But it seems to me that, at any rate for the present, it would not be well to recognize Chinese representation on the Council as a regular thing. The position which Hong Kong occupies with regard to China is very peculiar. . . . In

50. Hennessy to Hicks-Beach, 28 Apr. 1879, no. 38, CO 129/184.

51. Ibid., minutes by Meade; Hicks-Beach to Hennessy, 2 May 1879 (confidential), CO 129/184, with minute by R. G. W. Herbert.

52. Encl. no. 2, Hennessy to Hicks-Beach, 19 Jan. 1880, no. 4, CO 129/187.

53. Hennessy to Hicks-Beach, 19 Jan. 1880, reprinted as Document no. 46 in Endacott, An Eastern Entrepot, pp. 268–71.

54. Ibid., minute by Undersecretary Meade and draft reply by Hicks-Beach, 20 Apr. 1880, no. 9, CO 129/187.

Hong Kong Barrister 1877–1882

the event of difficulties, actual or threatened, between England and China, a Chinese Councillor might be anything but trustworthy, and yet, if permanently appointed, it might be very impolitic to show mistrust by removing him.55

These cautious words from London were but a faint echo of the loud disapproval with which the English-language press of Hong Kong met Wu's appointment. The Daily Press declared that the news had been received “not only with astonishment but also dissatisfaction," adding: “It cannot be expected that natives of the British Isles would be content to be legislated by Chinese, for instance, or that they would willingly see subject races taking active part in legislation for them."56

For the Chinese community, however, Wu's appointment was good news. When Wu took his seat on the Council in February 1880, a delegation of twenty-five Chinese visited him and the Governor, congratulating the latter on his "love of the people" and "strict fair-play." The news of Wu's appointment, they said, "fills everybody near and far with gratitude and joy."57

The Museum Segregation Issue

The symbolic nature of Wu's position as member of the Legislative Council is readily apparent, but what did it mean in terms of actual power? What, in fact, could he do?

In truth, the Legislative Council was legislative in name only. In Hong Kong as in other Crown colonies, ultimate sovereignty rested with the Queen as exercised by the Governor, whose rule was a thinly disguised autocracy. The Governor's Executive Council was composed entirely of his administrative officials, while the Legislative Council was composed of officials and a minority of "unofficial" members who were appointed in an effort to have them represent the residents of the Colony in an informal manner. Cooperative discussion, not contentious debate, was supposed to be the working style of the Legislative Council.

Since the Council could do little more than rubber-stamp the Governor's decisions, Wu's appointment was only a symbolic threat. Realistically, once reconciled to its inevitability, the Colonial Office dismissed Wu's appointment and regarded him as probably “a complete cipher,” as had been, in their opinion, Hu Xuanze, the sole Chinese member of the Singapore Legislative Council from 1867 until his death in 1880.58

55. Hicks-Beach to Hennessy (private), 23 Apr. 1880, Sir John Pope Hennessy, Papers. See also James Pope Hennessy, Verandah, p. 212.

56. DP, 23 Jan. 1880.

57. Hennessy to Hicks-Beach, 21 Feb. 1880, no. 24, CO 129/187.

58. Minute by Undersecretary John Bramston on Hennessy to Earl of Kimberley, 9 July 1880, no. 98, CO 129/189.

"59

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Many Chinese in Hong Kong must have also wondered about the actual value of Wu's appointment to the Council, for the Governor took special note of it in the midst of an address in June 1881. “It has been asserted,” he said, “that an unofficial member of the Legislative Council has not the power of initiating anything, and that his position is a peculiar and somewhat discouraging one on that account. Hennessy's declaration that unofficial members of the Council had the same powers and privileges as members of the House of Commons in England cannot have sounded entirely convincing. Given the autocratic nature of colonial rule, the Governor's support was crucial for any legislative project. Wu's record in the Council indicates that he used the forum provided him to promote issues with which both the Governor and the Chinese community were concerned. The City Hall Museum segregation issue provides an illustration of Wu's role while suggesting the parameters of colonial reform.

The City Hall Museum was supported by an annual grant from the government but administered by a private corporation whose principal shareholders were some of the leading British residents. In 1879 Wu and other Chinese told Hennessy of their irritation with the museum's policy of restricting admission for Chinese to certain hours of the day during specified days of the week. Hennessy brought the issue before the Executive and Legislative Councils, pressing for the museum's desegregation in view of the fact that so many Chinese felt that the restricted admission was "invidious.” In February 1880 the Chinese delegation that came to congratulate Wu for being seated in the Legislative Council made special issue of the museum situation, while the Chinese-language press also began a campaign about it.60

The museum shareholders decided to compromise in order to continue to receive its annual grant from the government. A new notice appeared permitting Chinese access to the museum each morning until one p.m., when the museum would be closed for cleaning. Europeans would then be admitted daily from two until five p.m., but "any respectably dressed and well-behaved person" could apply for admission at any time with the curator. This concession was not satisfactory to Wu or his constituents, and he was determined to press the issue when it arose in the Council in September 1880.

The spokesman in Council for the Museum Committee was William Keswick, one of the organizers of the anti-Hennessy public meeting in 1878 and the Governor's principal foe in Council. In a later communication to the Colonial Office Keswick wrote that the desegregation of the museum would "practically" close it to “European ladies, respectable Chinese women and also to almost all of the European residents" of Hong Kong:

59. “Address on the Census Returns and the Progress in Hong Kong,” 30 July 1881, Hong Kong Administrative Reports, 1879–1884, Gt. Brit., Sessional Papers,CO 131/11.

60. Hennessy to Hicks-Beach, 24 Oct. 1879, no. 94, CO 129/185 and 21 Feb. 1880, no. 24, CO 129/187.

Hong Kong Barrister 1877–1882

The position that women hold in China and the fact that a Chinese lady is seldom seen outside of the private apartments of a house renders it perfectly impossible for a large number of Chinamen to understand the freedom accorded to ladies in Europe and America. This fact alone renders it extremely undesirable that ladies should be allowed to visit the Museum when it is crowded with natives. The personal habits of the Chinese of the lower classes who I am glad to observe flock in large numbers to the Museum, who eat garlic with their rice, and whose clothing in winter is not in the cleanest state and in summer is of the very scantiest description are quite sufficient to discourage Europeans from visiting the Museum when it is thus crowded.61

Wu gave an impassioned address advocating the desegregation of the museum. Although the matter itself was not of much practical import, he said, the principle involved was a highly significant one. He had traveled abroad considerably and had never seen such notices at public institutions in Europe. The Museum Committee maintained that their purpose was to prevent a "collision between the lower class of Chinese and the corresponding class of other nations,” but, he asked, “if the principle of class distinction was to prevail, where was it to end?" Was there to be segregation in all public places in the Colony, in its public parks? Would Chinese be forced to walk on one side of the street and Europeans on the other? Because of the "great principle' involved in the issue, every Chinese in the Colony found the notice objectionable. Would Mr. Keswick or other members of the museum Committee themselves like to be treated this way if they were Chinese? As a Member representing the Chinese community, he concluded to the sound of applause, it was his duty to speak out even if he had to hurt the feelings of others.62

Wu's address illustrates the growing national awareness that the colonial environment bred in him and other Chinese. It was clear to Wu that there were two sets of European institutions, one for Europe and the other for the colonies, one for Europeans and one for colonial subjects. The museum was a comprehensive symbol of the inferior position into which the Hong Kong Chinese had been placed as colonial subjects by virtue of race, and the campaign to desegregate the Museum reflected the new mobilization of the Chinese community to resist that ascription.

The Legislative Council voted to eliminate the grant to the museum unless the situation changed, and the Museum Committee reluctantly complied. As in every issue involving the Chinese, the Governor's support was vital. Had not Hennessy declared his support, Wu would have had little chance of success. Hence, Wu's power was indeed circumscribed. On the other hand, Wu's

61. Keswick to Kimberley, 31 Mar. 1881, encl. in Hennessy to Kimberley, 5 Apr. 1881, no. 31, CO 129/192.

62. "Meeting of the Legislative Council, 10 Sept. 1880,” encl. in Hennessy to Kimberley, 10 Sept. 1880, no. 134, CO 129/189.

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

presence in the Council gave the Chinese community an authentic voice that neither the Governor nor an English Member could provide. He could authoritatively demonstrate to the Colonial Office that Hennessy's policies had a legitimate basis and were not merely capricious whims. Even though Keswick persisted by appealing directly to London, the Colonial Office supported Wu and the Governor because it was committed to the principle of equal access in all public institutions. While perhaps sorry that the issue had ever arisen, the London officials had to agree with the justice of the Chinese case.63

The Bubble Bursts

Hennessy's persistence eventually brought results on issues such as penal reform, educational reform and Chinese representation. In April 1880 he was honored with the Queen's decision to make him a Knight Commander of the Order of St. Michael and St. George, which delighted the Governor and encouraged him to persist further. Ironically, however, that honor marked the high point of his influence in London. In the same month Disraeli's conservative cabinet fell and was replaced by a liberal one under Gladstone. When Hicks-Beach had been Colonial Secretary, Hennessy had been able to appeal directly to him about “Hong Kong influences" among the Secretary's subordinates with some satisfaction. The new Colonial Secretary, the Earl of Kimberley, discouraged private communications from Hennessy and was not disposed to treat him with special consideration. With the conservatives out of power, the Colonial Office had less to fear from Hennessy.

In July 1880 when Gibbs formally resigned from his seat in the Legislative Council, Hennessy unsuccessfully tried to have Wu accepted in that post on a permanent basis. In spite of Hennessy's strong personal recommendation of Wu's character and ability, the Colonial Office officials thought that although "it is quite right and politic to give some weight to the claims of the Chinese to a share in the administration . . . we must be on guard against Sir P. Hennessy's 'Chinomania."" The provisional nature of Wu's appointment was insisted upon throughout the entire period that he served in the Council.65

Hennessy's appointment of Wu as Acting Police Magistrate also aroused much opposition. In July 1880 Hennessy was criticized in the House of Commons when a Liberal Member asked the Colonial Secretary “whether he is aware that a native [i.e., Wu] has been appointed a Member of the Council and Magistrate at Hongkong, and that in the latter especially he exercises jurisdiction over Europeans as well as Natives."66

63. The Colonial Office at first upheld Keswick until the Legislative Council voted to support Wu. See Hennessy to Kimberley, 6 Oct. 1880, no. 157, CO 129/190; 5 Apr. 1881, no. 31, CO 129/192 and minutes.

64. Hicks-Beach to Hennessy, 23 Apr. 1880 (private), Sir John Pope Hennessy, Papers. 65. Minute by Kimberley on Hennessy to Kimberley, 9 July 1880, no. 98, CO 129/189. 66. No. 11134, 23 July 1880, CO 129/191.

Hong Kong Barrister 1877–1882

Wu's appointment as Acting Magistrate had caught the Colonial Office unawares, for regulations had not required Hennessy to inform London of it. On the one hand, as one of the undersecretaries minuted:

It is difficult to feel satisfied that Mr. Ng A Choy, who has plenty of ability, has the moral stability desirable in a magistrate, but it may be inferred that he is doing well, as if he had tripped in any way we should have heard a great deal about it.67

On the other hand, the Earl of Kimberley felt that Wu's appointment had not been prudent and decided to ask Hennessy for an official explanation. The MP who raised the question was told that Wu's temporary appointment to the Legislative Council was so far successful, and that the Colonial Office was still waiting for official notification of Wu's appointment as Acting Magistrate.68

Hennessy replied with a strong defense of his appointment of Wu as a person with a “good temper, patience, a sound knowledge of his profession as an English barrister, and a thorough acquaintance with the customs and real feelings of the inhabitants of the Colony," who in these qualities was “not equalled by any gentlemen [sic] that has sat on the Magistrate's bench since my arrival in the Colony."69

The situation must have been somewhat galling for Wu. In spite of his qualifications and strong recommendation from Hennessy, the Colonial Office remained hostile to the effort to place Chinese in responsible administrative positions. From the vantage point of the early 1880s, there were definite limits to efforts by educated Chinese to achieve parity within a colonial framework.

Hennessy's reaction to his deteriorating position was twofold: On the one hand, he began sending discreet inquiries to his friends about other posts. Hong Kong was getting too hot, and he began looking forward to the day when he would be gone. The death in 1881 of his patron, Benjamin Disraeli, further weakened his position. None of his inquiries were made public, but the Colonial Office began to anticipate the day when the Governor would be gone from the hornets' nest he had helped to create in Hong Kong.

On the other hand, debate and conflict made Hennessy more outspoken in his support for the Chinese community and even more radical in his concepts of colonial rule. In groping towards a theory of Home Rule, Hennessy displayed increasingly positive attitudes towards Chinese society and culture, stating that it was worth "straining every nerve" to encourage Chinese commerce in the Colony. In 1881 he asserted that “above all, we should avoid either in dealing with the Queen's subjects in this Colony, or in our

67. Ibid., minute of R. G. W. Herbert.

68. Ibid., draft reply by Undersecretary Grant Duff.

69. Hennessy to Kimberley, 17 Sept. 1880, no. 142, CO 129/189.

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

relations with the Empire near us, any attempt to force on the Chinese institutions which are unsuited to them, and some which we, in the course of time, may perhaps discover are unsuited to ourselves.” Hennessy even went so far as to propose the establishment of an armed Chinese defense force for the Colony, a suggestion that flew in the face of the Colonial Office and its views of Hong Kong and Anglo-Chinese relations.70

Towards the end of his stay in Hong Kong, Hennessy's enemies grew more numerous, and he had many quarrels with friends and supporters, leaving him in an isolated position. In March 1882 he left on a six-month leave of absence. The Governor's departure left Wu in a difficult position, for it was clear that Hennessy would not be returning. Forces hostile to Hennessy came into ascendancy. The new colonial administrator, Austin W. Marsh, sharply disapproved of Hennessy's policies and especially of Wu, who was now referred to in the English-language press as a mere "hanger-on" of Hennessy.71

The fragility of Wu's position was made painfully clear in May and June 1882, when a disastrous panic and crash in Chinese commercial circles occurred, following a speculative craze in land investments that Wu and many other wealthy Chinese had taken part in. The craze had been facilitated by Hennessy's decision in 1880 to accede to the request of many Chinese to open large areas of government-owned land for purchase, in spite of the considerable opposition on the part of the British and Europeans to further land purchases by Chinese.72

Just before leaving Hong Kong in March 1882, Hennessy agreed to lease Wu and other wealthy Chinese investors a portion of public recreation grounds for a large-scale development project that would have provided new offices for the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the Po Leung Kuk (Baoliang Ju, a Chinese organization aimed at preventing kidnapping of children), a museum and administrative offices. Wu was one of the four trustees for the lease. After Hennessy had departed, Marsh informed the Colonial Office that in his opinion, the Governor had erred in granting the lease. Accordingly, the Colonial Office refused to sanction the development scheme and the lease was nullified.73

A number of Chinese investors apparently panicked because of the uncertain political climate. A run on the Chinese banks led to their closure within a few days. The crash came with devastating suddenness, causing a "complete paralysis and stagnation" in the Colony's trade. Several members of the Tung Wah Hospital Committee went bankrupt, and one comprador was reported to have committed suicide. Wu's brother-in-law He Shantian

70. Hennessy to Kimberley, 15 June 1881 (secret and confidential), CO 129/193.

71. DP, 2 Mar. 1882.

72. Hennessy to Carnarvon, 27 Sept. 1877, no. 123, CO 129/179, printed as c. 426, Gt. Brit., Sessional Papers, 1881, no. 65; “Address on the Census Returns and the Progress in Hong Kong”; Address to the Legislative Council, 7 Feb. 1882, Gt. Brit., Hongkong Government Gazette 28 (1882), pp. 77–79, CO 132/23.

73. Marsh to Kimberley, 14 Apr. 1882, no. 21, CO 129/199.

Hong Kong Barrister 1877–1882

(Ho Tim) suffered severe losses, and Wu himself was forced to take a loan from his in-laws in order to meet his debts rumored to total $45,000.7

The British gloated over the disaster and blamed Wu along with Hennessy for it. A representative view was that of a manager of one of the major European banks in Hong Kong, whose memorandum on the subject was sent confidentially to the Colonial Office by Marsh. "This disastrous movement [to buy land] originated," the banker wrote, "with a few of the so-called 'leading Chinese' who have recently dabbled a good deal in the politics of the place to the neglect of their ordinary callings." Unfortunately, he continued, “hitherto honest and upright traders” had been drawn into it. He concluded: “The Chinese have received a terrible lesson . . . they will not recover from it for many years.

"75

The banker's prophecy did not quite come true, for Chinese commercial interests recovered and the Colony's trade was back to normal within a year. Yet the crash was of sufficient duration and severity to put an end to Wu's career in Hong Kong. As persona non grata with the new colonial authorities, Wu could no longer serve as pipeline to the administration as he had in the past. To protect their own interests, the wealthy Chinese found it best to obviate Wu's role and to try to come to terms with the new administration as best they could.

Wu's isolation from the propertied Chinese whom he had previously represented was soon painfully clear. In August Marsh received a petition signed by twenty-four wealthy Chinese ("with the notable exception of the Honourable Ng Choy,” Marsh declared triumphantly) and the seals of eighty- one shops, asking that communications between the Government and the Chinese be restored to the office of the Registrar-General, as they had been in 1877 before Hennessy's changes. Only in this way, the petition stated, would rich and poor Chinese alike have access to the Government. This of course supported Marsh's contention that the Chinese community did not wish Wu to be the go-between for them. Anxious to restore their ties to the Colonial Government, the wealthy Chinese found it expedient to make Wu and Hennessy the scapegoats for the disaster. On 28 August the directors of the Tung Wah Hospital paid a visit to Government House specifically to express their satisfaction with the Registrar-General.76

Wu's isolation is easily explained. First, his rise had been associated with Hennessy's stay as Governor. In view of the great opposition to Hennessy on the part of the powerful British merchants, it was too risky for the wealthy Chinese to pin their hopes on someone who was so closely associated with him.

74. Ibid., minute by John Bramston. On Wu's indebtedness to the Hes see Fu Bingchang, Fangwen jilu, p. 63b. On He Shantian's bankruptcy and move to Guangzhou see Choa, The Life and Times of Sir Kai Ho Kai, p. 12. Ng Sang was the comprador who reportedly committed suicide. On Ng Sang's finacial difficulties see Smith, "Emergence of a Chinese Elite,” p. 100.

75. Marsh to Kimberley, 2 June 1881 (confidential), CO 129/201.

76. Marsh to Kimberley, 17 and 28 Aug. 1882, nos. 166, 174, CO 129/202.

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Moreover, some wealthy Chinese may have blamed Hennessy for the disastrous speculative craze and subsequent crash. In September, the Zhongwai Xinbao published an article charging that Hennessy had been petitioned over a year earlier by a group of merchants asking him to issue controls against speculation. Hennessy was said to have "pocketed" the petition, and the newspaper charged Hennessy with sole responsibility for the disaster." If this indeed was correct, we must ask what was Wu's own role in the debacle. As noted above, he had speculated heavily himself and may have been motivated to see that the petition was ignored. It is possible, then, that because of his own financial interests, Wu may have acted irresponsibly and thereby incurred the enmity of the wealthy Chinese. And the crash had come at a bad time for the wealthy Chinese: they had been facing increasingly stiff competition from western trading and shipping interests and had been losing ground since 1880, as noted earlier. Moreover, their leadership now faced continued challenges from the Wan Chai and other smaller merchants. Thus a combination of reasons, some of which may have been due to Wu's own dealings, were responsible for his being abandoned by his constituency.

Wu's situation was probably worsened by Hennessy's maneuverings in London. In late July Hennessy had been visited by a group of Chinese merchants residing in Britain. They expressed appreciation for his liberal policies towards the Hong Kong Chinese and told him that things had not been going so well for them since his departure from the Colony. Acting perhaps under Hennessy's inspiration, the London Pall Mall Gazette reported the visit and expressed its hope that the Colonial Office would "scrutinize carefully" the new administration in Hong Kong. The newspaper also reported that Wu had predicted dire consequences if any of Hennessy's policies were reversed. "Unfortunately," the Gazette wrote, "this warning was unheeded. The Chinese became alarmed at one or two apparently unfriendly acts of the Administration as soon as the Governor had left."78

When the article was published in Hong Kong in September, Wu wrote to the China Mail to try to smooth things over. Although he had prophesied bad tidings if Hennessy's policies were not followed, “in justice to Mr. Marsh,” Wu wrote, his "public acts have not been antagonistic to the community; and he is in no way to blame for the commercial panic. He had no more to do with the causes which led to the recent calamity than Governor Hennessy had. The disastrous events would have happened even if neither Mr. Marsh nor Sir John Pope Hennessy had ever administered the Government of this colony. "79

Apparently Hennessy tried to put in a word for Wu with the Colonial Office, but all to no avail. Wu's position in Hong Kong was clearly untenable. Justly or unjustly, he had lost the confidence of the propertied Chinese who

77. Translated in Marsh to Kimberley, 23 Sept. 1882, no. 205, CO 129/202. 78. Pall Mall Gazette, 26 July 1882, clipping in 13141, CO 129/206.

79. CM, 6 Sept. 1882.

Hong Kong Barrister 1877–1882

constituted his political base. He could have perhaps weathered the storm, especially since the crisis was of relatively short duration, but he was also heavily in debt to his wife's family, who persistently urged him to leave Hong Kong and take up the post under Li Hongzhang that he had rejected in 1877.80 Wu finally acceded to their demands. On 31 October 1882 he took a six-month leave of absence from his seat in the Legislative Council and traveled north to Tianjin, stopping en route at Nanjing to visit with Liu Kunyi. He was cordially received by Li Hongzhang who agreed to hire him as his adviser on the same terms that they had previously arranged. Thus Wu's Hong Kong career came to a somewhat discouraging end.

Wu Tingfang's Colonial Legacy

We must assume that Wu's last few months in Hong Kong were difficult for him. As the full impact of the crash was felt and his personal debts mounted, his political base weakened by the day. Wu had little choice but to agree with his in-laws and take up the post with Li Hongzhang; but, it must be viewed in some respects as a personal defeat.

Still, from the perspective of colonial social structure, what is significant is that he did have an option, something not necessarily available to colonized peoples in other Asian and African societies. This once again points up Hong Kong's special nature in contrast to many other colonies; it existed in relation to China and not in and of itself alone.

Another issue to be examined is that of the He family's motivations in propelling Wu towards Qing officialdom, first in 1877 through Mrs. He's introduction to Li Hongzhang, and now in 1882 in insisting that he take up a post as Li's adviser. This is suggestive of a larger family strategy. He Qi had returned to Hong Kong in 1882 with his medical degree and also qualifications as barrister, not to mention his English wife, Alice Walkden. With He Qi back in Hong Kong and excellently suited to continue the role of "civic leader," the He family interests in Hong Kong, one may argue, were well taken care of. With a son-in-law well situated as Li Hongzhang's secretary, the He family could garner up additional influence and prestige. Important as the marks of elitedom were within the British colonial context, those of China itself were at least as powerful. To be an official brought enormous prestige, opportunities for personal advancement and the possibility of enrichment. The He family may well have reckoned that it certainly couldn't hurt to have Wu in a position of influence in Li Hongzhang's administration, especially in view of Li's importance in Chinese politics and growing role in developing self- strengthening enterprises.

The He family strategy is symptomatic of the larger process then beginning to occur in China by which bourgeois and gentry interests began to merge.

80. Kimberley to Hennessy, 7 Aug. 1882, Sir John Pope Hennessy, Papers.

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

This process has been discussed by Wellington K. K. Chan in his study of late Qing merchant-official relations. As China's gentry-official class began to invest in treaty-port real estate and engage in various business activities, sometimes covertly through agents or relations, the lines between the traditional elite and the new bourgeoisie weakened significantly.81 The other part of that process was the entrance of members of the bourgeoisie into the Qing administration.

With this in mind, an important point stands out: The last episode of Wu's Hong Kong career strongly suggests the lack of internal cohesiveness of the Hong Kong bourgeoisie when faced with temporary financial losses and a temporarily hostile colonial administration. The willingness of the Tung Wah group to abandon Wu points up the organizational weakness of the bourgeoisie and its inability to effectively assert itself within the colonial structure when confronted with adversity.

The lack of internal cohesiveness of the bourgeoisie has major ramifications. If the bourgeoisie could not “stand up" to the colonial authorities in Hong Kong, how could it "stand up" when dealing with the extraordinarily organized and cohesive Qing bureaucracy? Thus in the fusion of official/gentry and bourgeois interests that occurred later in the nineteenth century the non- cohesive bourgeois elements were disadvantaged.

When Wu left Hong Kong in 1882 he was forty-one years old-half of his life had passed. His careers as journalist, interpreter, barrister, magistrate and legislator had given him a degree of insight into British culture and institutions that few of his countrymen had. Understandably, his outlook differed radically from most of them. Wu's experiences in Britain and Hong Kong had made him a culturally marginal person.

On the one hand, Wu was ethnically and culturally Chinese. In the context of Hong Kong society, that meant the automatic ascription of an inferior position as a colonial subject. The indignation that Wu and other Chinese in Hong Kong felt over such issues as racial segregation was an index of the incipient national awareness that the colonial environment bred. The inferior positions to which they had been assigned in Hong Kong as Chinese were seen as reflections of the low status to which China as a nation had been assigned in the international context, where foreigners assumed privileged positions, governed themselves in treaty ports and foreign concessions, and forced the Qing Government to pay enormous indemnities and grant further privileges each time a foreigner was hurt or killed by the people. The indignation that Wu and his friends felt within the specific colonial circumstance could thus be easily transferred to the nation as a whole.

On the other hand, Wu accepted Great Britain as the standard of civilization. The belief led him to the emotional conviction that relations between China and the West should be harmonious. If China and Britain

81. Wellington K. K. Chan, Merchants, Mandarins, and Modern Enterprise in Late Ch'ing China (Cambridge: Harvard University East Asian Research Center, 1977), pp. 39–63, 107–53.

Hong Kong Barrister 1877-1882

were at odds, it was somehow because China had fallen out of step, and the task at hand was that of bringing China up to the superior level prevailing in the West. Parity was not assumed in this relationship. In debating with Britishers such as Keswick, Wu and the Hong Kong Chinese did not publicly question Britain's right to rule Hong Kong, but rather charged the Westerners with failing to live up to the ideals of British civilization. Thus the fundamental framework of British imperialism was not directly challenged by the colonial Chinese of Wu's generation. Wu and others of his generation could see themselves as Anglo-Chinese—and try to ignore the contradictions between the two components of that identity.

This world view led Wu to see himself in a very special way as a member of a tiny cosmopolitan, international elite whose duty it was to somehow bring harmony in the relations between China and the West. China had to be "opened" to modern influence: its economy developed, trade expanded, the people educated and made politically conscious, and the nation elevated to a status of equality vis-à-vis the western powers. As Wu saw it, his efforts would find their parallels among enlightened people of the western world, such as Hennessy, who would also exert themselves to reform their own societies so that all nations would progress towards a morally refined future Utopian world.

The nationalism inherent in Wu's outlook was symbiotically linked with the West and the imperialist presence. I believe that this linkage was of profound emotional depth for him and continued to be so throughout his long life. It is one aspect of the colonial legacy of his youth.

With Li Hongzhang 1882–1896

Li Hongzhang's Mufu

When Wu Tingfang moved to Tianjin in 1882 he changed worlds. In spite of his ties to family and associates in Hong Kong, and a three-year stay in the Colony from 1889 to 1891 following the death of his mother, Hong Kong was never to be his permanent home again. From Tianjin and Beijing, Wu went to Washington as Minister to the United States, Spain and Peru, and when he returned to China in 1902, Wu chose Shanghai as his new home. In 1882, then, the colonial phase of Wu's life, strictly speaking, ended, and a new world opened up to him.

This new world was that of the foreign affairs official for the Qing Government. In Hong Kong, the most an ambitious Chinese could aspire to was to become a foreign-educated professional “civic leader.” We have already seen the limitations inherent in that role. It is most significant that Wu's elite standing as a barrister was transferable to the elite standing of a Chinese official. He lost nothing in terms of prestige, formal income and opportunities for advancement. And, eventually he was able to rise to far loftier heights than the colonial social structure could offer. That the Chinese context offered greater possibilities of social mobility than the colonial could once again points up the differences between China as a semi-colony and fully colonized nations.

Wu may be viewed as a member of the first generation of modern foreign affairs officials, men trained abroad and knowledgeable about the West in a manner far deeper than was true of the vast majority of Qing officials. They were used by the Qing Government to conduct diplomacy and to manage modern enterprises developed by the state in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The first generation of modern foreign affairs officials were in the main associates of Li Hongzhang, in contrast to the second generation, who were mostly part of Yuan Shikai's Beiyang administration in the twentieth century.'

1. On Tang Shaoyi as the most prominent of the second generation of modern foreign affairs officials, see Sigel, "T’ang Shao-yi”; MacKinnon, Power and Politics, pp. 66–72, 182–86.

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

The modern foreign affairs officials were one of the key links in the process of fusion of bourgeois and gentry-official interests in modern China that has been referred to in earlier chapters. While the link between commercial and official-gentry classes was of long standing nature, the pace of their amalgamation accelerated in the latter part of the nineteenth century, particularly in highly commercialized areas such as Guangdong and Jiangsu Provinces. Of great importance in this process and in the development of modern capitalism in China was the Self-Strengthening or Westernization Movement (Ziqiang/Yangwu Yundong) of the late Qing period, in which the Qing Government undertook to develop a number of modern enterprises in an effort to deal with the protracted crisis posed by imperialism in China.

Officials such as Li Hongzhang were interested in the bourgeoisie as a source of skills and capital, while the capitalists were attracted to the self- strengthening projects as areas of investment that could also lead to the protection of Chinese sovereignty, a major concern they shared with many officials. Thus mutual self-interest created the basis for the close relationship that developed between some officials and some members of the newly emerging capitalist class.2

The institutional setting for this fusion was the mufu, "tent government" or personal staff of powerful regional officials, the most important of whom were Zeng Guofan (1811–72) and Li Hongzhang. Most American authorities on the late Qing mufu have stressed its relative modernity. Jonathan Porter has argued persuasively that the mufu as developed by Zeng and later expanded by Li departed significantly from traditional mufu structures. They were modern bureaucratic structures functioning under the personal authority of Zeng and Li.3 In their studies of Li Hongzhang's mufu, Kenneth E. Folsom and Stanley Spector also emphasize this dimension. Because the mufu functioned under the personal authority of powerful officials, the latter could bypass regular channels of bureaucratic appointments to hire persons with the appropriate areas of specialization to manage a host of modernizing activities. While having low status in traditional terms, Wu and others like him could command high salaries (his was reportedly 6,000 taels a year, compared to the formal salary of 300 taels that was the norm for regularly recruited officials) and could exercise considerable responsibility.*

2. Discussed at some length in Ding Richu and Shen Zuwei, “Lun wanQing de guojia ziben zhuyi,” Lishi yanjiu, 1983, no. 6: 151–74; Huang Yifeng and Jiang Dou, “Zhong ping Yangwu Yundong,” ibid., 1979, no. 2: 58-70; and their "Yao qiadang de pingjie Yangwu Yundong de jiji zuoyong," ibid., 1980, no. 6: 21–30; Li Shiyue, “Cong yangwu, weixin dao zichan jieji geming,” ibid., 1980, no. 1: 31-40; Wang Xi, "Shilun yangwu pai guandu shangban qiye de xingzhi yu zuoyong,” ibid., 1983, no. 6: 175–87; Xia Dongyuan and Yang Xiaomin, “Lun Qingji lunchuan zhaoshangju de xingzhi,” ibid., 1980, no. 4: 55–66; Xu Tailai, “Ye ping Yangwu Yundong,” ibid., 1980, no. 4: 19–36.

3. Jonathan Porter, Tseng Kuo-fan's Private Bureaucracy, China Research Monographs, 9 (Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, 1972).

4. Kenneth E. Folsom, Friends, Guests and Colleagues; Stanley Spector, Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army: A Study in Nineteenth Century Regionalism (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964). On salaries of Qing officials, see Ch'u Tung-tsu, Local Government in China, p. 22.

With Li Hongzhang 1882–1896

Li Hongzhang's administration, based in Tianjin but including enterprises in many parts of China, was a widespread network requiring a personal staff of several hundred people, in addition to regularly appointed local and provincial level officials under his authority. More than fifty key persons were involved at an administrative level in Li's modern enterprises and in the conduct of diplomacy.5

Wu was one of three foreign-educated experts who played important roles as Li's advisers in foreign affairs. The other two were Luo Fenglu (d. 1903) and Ma Jianzhong (1844-1900). Luo Fenglu was a native of Fuzhou (Foochow) who was a member of the first class at the Foochow Naval School. He was selected to study naval science in England and served for a period as attaché in the Chinese Legation in Berlin before joining Li Hongzhang's mufu late in 1880. He held the title of Sub-prefect, fifth grade, and later that of Expectant Daotai, first class. He was Li's expert on naval matters but also served Li as negotiator and translator in a broad range of areas.6

The third of Li Hongzhang's foreign trained advisers was Ma Jianzhong, a native of Jiangsu who came from a Catholic gentry family. He received a formal education in Jesuit schools in Shanghai as well as a classical Chinese education. In 1877 Li Hongzhang sent him to France to study ship construction. In the following year he received a baccalaureate degree, and in 1879 he received the licentiate from the Faculte de Droit of the Universite de Paris. Back with Li Hongzhang again in 1880, Ma was an important figure in Li's administration, assisting him in negotiations during the Sino-French War and then being assigned as assistant manager in the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company, the most important of the self-strengthening enterprises under Li.7 The first phase of the Self-Strengthening or Westernization Movement, 1860–72, had been dominated by Zeng Guofan. As a natural outcome of the suppression of the Taiping rebellion, his mufu expanded and became rationalized to enable him to develop military modernization projects, the most important of which was the Kiangnan Arsenal in Shanghai established in 1865. Zeng also developed ties with the American educated Chinese Rong Hong (Yung Wing, 1828–1912), who was the prototype of the late nineteenth century modern foreign affairs official, serving however in a far more limited capacity than those who followed him.8

5. See Table 17, "Western-Oriented Functionaries under Li," in Spector, Li Hung-chang, pp. 287- 96.

6. In a career somewhat parallel to that of Wu, Luo served as China's Minister to the Court of St. James from 1897 to 1901. He retired due to illness and died in 1903. See obituary notice in NCH, no. 74, p.1260, 26 June 1903. Paul King wrote that Luo was an ardent student, an admirer of Herbert Spencer, and a highly cultured man of interesting personality. See Paul King, In the Chinese Customs Service: A Personal Record of Forty-seven Years (London: Unwin, 1924), pp. 88-89. 7. This sketch of Ma's life is based on Paul A. Cohen's research. See his “Littoral and Hinterland,” pp. 203–4. Ma retired in 1896 to write his famous study of Chinese grammar, Mashi wentong. See also Qing shi (Yangmingshan, Taiwan: Guofang yanjiuyuan, 1961), 6:4947-48.

8. On Zeng Guofan's self-strengthening measures, see Mary C. Wright's The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The Tung-Chih Restoration, 1862–1874 (New York: Atheneum, 1969), chap. 9. On Rong Hong and Zeng Guofan see Lo Hsiang-lin, Hongkong and Western Cultures, pp. 92–97.

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

The second and third phases of the Self-Strengthening Movement, 1872– 85 and 1885-94, were dominated by Zeng's former subordinate, Li Hongzhang, and were marked by a shift from military enterprises to a broader range of commercial and industrial activities. These latter provided more room for the skills and interests of the bourgeoisie.

A major innovation of the late Qing modernization movement was the guandu shangban, or merchant undertaking under official supervision, form of enterprise. The most important of the guandu shangban enterprises was the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company (CMSNC), founded in 1872 as a competitor to western shipping in China. The leading figures in the Company before 1885 were the compradors Tang Tingshu, Xu Run and Zheng Guanying, all associates of Wu Tingfang's. After 1885, Sheng Xuanhuai (1844-1916) assumed the leading managerial role in the company's affairs. The CMSNC became the hub of a great number of enterprises in mining, manufacturing and communications involving these figures and all enjoying Li Hongzhang's protection.9

The guandu shangban structure has been the subject of much interest by historians of China, and in particular its relationship to the development of capitalism. On the one hand, the guandu shangban structure provided a framework for Chinese capitalists to invest funds and utilize their technical and managerial knowledge in developing modern industrial and commercial enterprises in a more effective way than might have been possible otherwise. On the other hand, guandu shangban structures left merchants at a disadvantage in dealing with the official supervisors, who found ways to siphon off funds for non-productive purposes and thereby lower the profitability of the projects. Thus the relationship between the merchants and officials, and the significance of the guandu shangban structure as aid to or impediment to the development of capitalism, as embryonic versions of national capitalism or bureaucratic capitalism, are subject to debate. Similarly, the degree to which the guandu shangban enterprises under Li Hongzhang and Sheng Xuanhuai manifested backward practices linked to bureaucratism is also an area of controversy among historians.1o

Wu Tingfang's career as an official subordinate of Li Hongzhang suggests the limited range of activities open to foreign trained foreign affairs officials in the mufu structure. As a modern official with close ties to the mercantile community and highly sympathetic to its interests, Wu was able to accomplish some of the goals of the emerging capitalist class within the mufu setting and guandu shangban structure, but increasingly found himself confronted with the limitations inherent in them as vehicles for reform.

9. The classic study in English of the guandu shangban system and the CMSNC remains Albert Feuerwerker's China's Early Industrialization: Sheng Hsuan-huai (1844–1916) and Mandarin Enterprise (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958).

10. For recently published contrasting views see Wang Xi, “Shilun yangwu pai guandu shangban qiye de xingzhi yu zuoyong,” and Ding Richu and Shen Zuwei, “Lun wanQing de guojia ziben zhuyi."

With Li Hongzhang 1882–1896

Changing Worlds

Wu's early years as a member of Li Hongzhang's mufu were dominated by foreign policy crises posed by French aggression in Vietnam and Japanese aggression in Korea. In particular, the Sino-French War put Li Hongzhang in a difficult political position. His determination to avoid all-out hostilities with France led to vehement public denunciations of his leadership on the part of most members of the Qing elite, especially the moralistic qingyi pai of critics."

Upon his arrival in Tianjin in December 1882, Wu was feted by the Tianjin manager of the CMSNC, where Wu dressed himself in wig and gown for the company's amusement, but in general, Wu maintained a low profile during the Sino-French difficulties.12 His first few months were spent getting familiar with Li's administration and cultivating cordial relations between the western diplomatic community in Tianjin and Zhang Shusheng, who temporarily replaced Li following his mother's death.13

In May 1883 Li was recalled from mourning and ordered to take charge of military operations against the French. Li brought Wu and Ma Jianzhong to Shanghai to assist in arranging for supplies and matériel. Upon entering into discussions with the French representative Tricot at the beginning of June, however, Li ordered Wu to return to Tianjin, where he remained for the rest of the Sino-French conflict, providing legal advice for Li and serving as liaison with foreigners in Tianjin.14

Thus Wu was not in Shanghai during the disastrous financial crash of November 1883 that nearly ruined Tang Tingshu and Xu Run and resulted in Li Hongzhang's removal of their leadership from the CMSNC and replacing it with that of Sheng Xuanhuai. Similarly, Zheng Guanying faced severe difficulties as a result of the crash and was forced to relinquish control of a major textile operation under the guandu shangban format. Li Hongzhang's inability or unwillingness to help these people, who were the mainstays of capitalist support for his projects, set the stage for the degeneration of the guandu shangban system into one increasingly controlled by the bureaucracy, and in which enlightened capitalists had less power.1

11. Lloyd E. Eastman, Throne and Mandarins: China's Search for a Policy During the Sino-French Controversy, 1880–1885 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), especially chap. 8. 12. NCH, 10 Jan. 1883, p.38.

13. Ibid., 27 Apr. 1883, p. 460.

14. Li Hongzhang to Zhang Shusheng, 19 May 1883 (GX9/4/12) and 2 June 1883 (GX 9/4/27), Li Hongzhang, Quanji, “Dian'gao," 1:13, 16.

15. Chuan Han-sheng, "The Economic Crisis of 1883 as Seen in the Failure of Hsu Jun's Real Estate Business in Shanghai," in Conference on Modern Chinese Economic History, ed. Hou and Yu (Taibei, 1979), pp. 493–98, and Liu Kwang-ching, “Credit Failures in China's Early Industrialization: The Background and Implications of Hsu Jun's Bankruptcy in 1883,” ibid., pp. 499–509. On Zheng Guanying's economic difficulties see Wang Xi, “Lun Zheng Guanying,” pp. 33–34.

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

As to Wu's own reactions to these events, we unfortunately have no information. He and Wang Tao maintained an active correspondence during the war, and Wu may have sympathized with Wang's dismay at the Court's inept handling of the situation, and with Wang's efforts to engage the support of sympathetic Japanese Pan-Asian military figures.16

In terms of Wu's personal life, his correspondence with Wang Tao indicates that Wu was greatly distressed over his continued childlessness. In a letter of 1884 or 1885, Wang urged Wu to find a suitable concubine. In 1886 Wu's only son Chaoshu (Tiyun) was born. Chaoshu's birth mother was surnamed Ye, and he was said to have been a good son to her as well as to Mrs. Wu, He Miaoling.1

In 1885 things began to look up for Wu in other matters as well. In February 1885 Wu served as Li's aide and interpreter in negotiations with Ito Hirobumi (1841-1909). During these negotiations, conducted in English, Wu apparently made a favorable impression on Ito, and the talks resulted in a compromise that averted war and enabled China to make an effort to strengthen its position in Korea. 18

In March 1886, Zhang Yinhuan (1837-1900), newly appointed Minister to the United States, Spain and Peru, requested that Wu serve as his councillor in the Chinese Legation in Washington, but Li was reluctant to have Wu leave Tianjin. He delayed Wu's departure on the grounds that there was unfinished business that only he could handle, then memorialized the Throne requesting that honors be granted Wu in recognition of his varied services in legal matters and diplomacy. Although he did not accompany Zhang to the United States, Wu maintained close ties with Zhang.19

Wu's influence continued to grow through 1886. After long and complicated negotiations with the foreign diplomatic corps for the transfer of the Beitang Cathedral in Beijing to a new site, Li again proposed Wu's name to the Court for honors. These were granted early in 1887 in the form of a brevet button of the second degree to add to his rank of Expectant Daotai.20 Wu's skill in diplomacy were also recognized by Westerners in Tianjin who lauded his “able and clear intellect."21

16. On Wang Tao's promoting of Sone Toshitora, see his letters to Wu of 1882–84, in his Taoyuan chidu 2:11b-12a; and 5:3b-4b. See also Paul A. Cohen, Between Tradition and Modernity, pp.103–4, 298, 299.

17. Wang to Wu, probably 1884, in Wang Tao, Taoyuan chidu 5:5b-6b. Zou Lu, Zhongguo Guomindang shigao (Shanghai: Shangwu, 1944),

p. 1618.

18. Li Hongzhang to Zongli Yamen, 12 Mar. 1885 (GX 11/1/28), Li Hongzhang, Quanji, "Dian'gao," 5:18. Fu Bingchang wrote that Wu and Ito were slightly acquainted with each other from their days as students in London, but I have found no verification of this. See Fu Bingchang, Fangwen jilu, p. 63b.

19. I have been unable to locate the original memorial and resulting edict, but a portion was translated from the Peking Gazettes of 8 and 15 March and printed in NCH, 11 and 18 June 1886. On Zhang Yinhuan see Ho Ping-ti [He Bingdi], "Zhang Yinhuan shiji,” in Weixin yu baoshou (Taibei: Zhengzhong, 1959), pp. 91–113; Qing shi 6:4928–29.

20. Li Hongzhang, “Wu Tingfang deng ren qing gei jiang pian,” 1 Oct. 1886 (GX 12/9/4), Li, Quanji, “Zougao," 58:3; Da Qing lichao shilu (1927; reprint, Taibei: Wenxing, 1963) (hereafter cited

With Li Hongzhang 1882–1896

By 1886, then, Wu was well established in Li Hongzhang's administration as an effective and influential staff member. His efforts to introduce innovations in diplomatic procedures during the Nagasaki Incident of 1886 and his experiences developing railways are both areas illustrating the possibilities as well as problems in reform under the mufu structure and Li Hongzhang's leadership.

The Nagasaki Incident

The Nagasaki Incident was a waterfront brawl between Chinese sailors and Japanese townspeople and police that occurred in summer 1886, resulting in the deaths of eight Chinese and two Japanese, as well as numerous injuries and some property damage. Wu pressed Li Hongzhang to use international legal proceedings to determine who was at fault and seek redress for damages. In general, when disputes between Chinese and foreigners occurred in China, the foreign nations insisted in upholding the principle of extraterritoriality, and Wu was well aware of the difficulties involved in introducing innovations in the established procedures.

In 1877, shortly after returning from England to Hong Kong, Wu had been hired by the Fuzhou Chinese Trade Committee to represent it in the Porter Case, in which an American vagrant seaman was accused by the Committee of participating in a fraudulent protection racket. Porter was absolved of the charges after a short inquiry by the U.S. Consulate in Fuzhou, but the Chinese Trade Committee charged that bribery had been involved in the decision. The Committee hired Wu and another Hong Kong barrister (who soon left the case) to represent it at a new inquiry held by Chester A. Holcombe, Secretary of the U.S. Legation in Beijing.

Holcombe refused to permit Wu to participate in the inquiry in any fashion. When Wu tried to present him with a brief written on behalf of his clients, Holcombe "declined to receive it at his hands or to recognize him as in any way connected with the case." He later reported: "I did not acknowledge him as having any connection with the business in hand, or right to put any questions to me." Although Holcombe did in fact later report that most of the Committee's charges were true, Wu could not even obtain a verbal promise

as Shilu), 30 Dec. 1886 (GX 12/12/6), 236:7a. The land for the Beitang Cathedral was given to the Church by the Kangxi Emperor. In an audience granted to Li in 1885, Cixi expressly ordered him to negotiate its removal to a different site because she thought that the palace grounds could be seen from the church tower. Alexander Michie and Gustav Detring were also involved in the negotiations, which resulted in an agreement to pay the Church Tls 350,000 to vacate the site and relocate. For concise summaries, see Lei Longqing, Li Hongzhang nianpu (Taibei: Shangwu, 1977), pp. 338, 339, 345, 363. Materials on the transfer of the cathedral are collected in a separate section of Li Hongzhang's collected works entitled "Canchikou jiaotang han'gao." The final agreement is also reprinted in Qingji waijiao shiliao 66:23–27.

21. NCH, 19 Jan. 1887.

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

that the culprits would be punished.22 When queried about the matter by China's ministers to the United States, Chen Lanbin and Rong Hong, the Secretary of State disclaimed all knowledge of the affair.23

This incident apparently convinced Wu that the western powers would not tolerate any innovations in judicial matters when foreign nationals were involved, and he so advised Li Hongzhang during the Shameen Affair in 1883. In that incident the Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi hired two Hong Kong barristers to participate in the trial of an Englishman accused of killing three Chinese in Guangzhou. The barristers were not permitted to participate in the proceedings before the British Supreme Court for Asia. The accused was pronounced guilty of manslaughter, and in the inflamed atmosphere prevailing during the Sino-French War, there was a great public outcry. The Governor-General, in response, wanted to have the case reopened. Wu knew that the case could not be opened after the Supreme Court had come to a decision, and he so advised Li. Li then informed the Governor-General and the Zongli Yamen, to whose attention the matter had been brought, that "since Chinese and foreign laws are different, foreign criminals must be tried by the officials of their own countries as is set forth in the existing treaties, and Chinese officials cannot change this at will.”24

In the Nagasaki case, however, the incident occurred on Japanese soil and not in China, and Wu hoped that Japan would agree to procedures based upon equality in international law. Wu may have felt that Japan would be receptive to this approach. Ito's cordiality in 1885 and Wu's contact with Wang Tao's friend Sone Toshitora, a Japanese naval officer with high connections in Japan and strong Pan-Asian sympathies for China, may have led him to form such a view.

Accordingly, Wu engaged W. V. Drummond, sometime acting British Crown Advocate in Shanghai who had earlier been involved in negotiations between the CMSNC in negotiations and Russell and Co., to conduct inquiries for the Qing Government and to press Japan for a formal apology and indemnification.25 Drummond left immediately for Nagasaki with a private detective in his employ and began gathering evidence to support China's case. These unprecedented steps, which stood in such sharp contrast to China's abject humility vis-à-vis the western powers, infuriated the Japanese leadership, who refused to accept the Chinese claims. When the inquiry opened, each side refused to accept blame and brought forth ever more witnesses to support

22. Seward to Secretary of State, 26 Oct. 1877, dispatch no. 340, U.S. Department of State, "Dispatches from U.S. Ministers in China,” M-92 (U.S. National Archives) (hereafter cited as "MCD").

23. Chen Lanbin and Rong Hong to Evarts, 1 Feb. 1879 and memorandum of 11 Dec. 1879, China, Legation, Washington, D.C., “Notes from the Chinese Legation to the Department of State" (U.S. National Archives) (hereafter cited as “NFCL").

24. Li Hongzhang to Zongli Yamen, 8 Nov. 1883 (GX 9/9/23), Li, Quanji, “Yishu hanʼgao,” 15:1-2. 25. On William Vern Drummond, see Arnold Wright, Twentieth Century Impressions, p. 516.

With Li Hongzhang 1882–1896

its claims. As the proceedings dragged on, Li and other officials became uneasy, and many foreigners in China too began to criticize Wu's methods.26

In November 1886, Japanese Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru (1835-1915) proposed a compromise in which China would share blame for the incident. Along with Japan, China was to arrest “ringleaders" and try them before a naval board of inquiry. Inoue's note to China ended with a barely concealed threat of force. Xu Chengzu, the Qing Minister to Japan, had never approved of Wu's procedures and urged the Zongli Yamen to act upon Inoue's suggestion."

But Wu fought hard to persuade Li Hongzhang and the Zongli Yamen to continue following his methods. In a strongly worded memorandum to the Zongli Yamen, Wu had urged that China await the results of the inquest before taking the steps outlined by Inoue. Only if the inquest failed to reach a clear verdict should the matter be handled through diplomatic channels, but Wu felt that China's case was so strong that to abandon the inquest at this stage would be an error. Should arbitration through a third party eventually prove necessary, Wu proposed the name of Sir Richard Rennie (1839-1905), Chief Justice of the British Supreme Court in Asia, but in any case, he repeatedly stressed the importance of the inquest.

Li Hongzhang and the Zongli Yamen at first upheld Wu's views and Xu Chengzu was chastised for his gullibility. But as the expenses rose and no prospect of a speedy settlement appeared, Li began to waver, and Prince Chun (Yixin) began to express doubts about the motives of the various Westerners involved in the matter, first William Lang, adviser to the Qing Navy, then Drummond, and now possibly Rennie.29

A few weeks later Japan threatened to break relations with China unless it agreed to share the blame for the incident. Li at once memorialized for permission to halt the inquest while he personally examined the documents in the case, even though Wu continued to maintain that Japan alone was responsible. Finally, traditional negotiation took the place of judicial procedure. In the final settlement signed in January 1887, China withdrew its demand for a formal apology, and each nation agreed to compensate the other for casualties and damages sustained. As China had sustained greater losses than Japan, it received a larger payment than that which it paid out.30

26. See Li Hongzhang to Xu Chengzu, 18 Aug. 1886 (GX 12/7/19), Li, Quanji, “Dian'gao,” 7:32; Li to Ding, 20 Aug. (GX 12/7/21), ibid., pp. 32–33; Li to Xu, 20 and 21 Aug. (GX 12/7/21, 22), ibid., p. 33; to Ding and Lang, 27 Aug. (GX 12/7/28), ibid., p. 35; Li to Zongli Yamen, 30 Aug. (GX 12/8/2), 25 Sept. (GX 12/8/28), 22 Oct. (GX 12/9/25), Qingji waijiao shiliao 68:18, 35–36, 69:15-16; NCH, 6 Oct. 1886.

27. Li to Zongli Yamen, 16 Nov. 1886 (GX 12/10/21), Li, Quanji, “Dian'gao,” 7:49.

28. "Wu Tingfang nichou Changqi'an banfa,” 22 Oct. 1886 (GX 12/9/25), Li, Quanji, “Yishu han'gao," 18:49–51. On Rennie see Who Was Who, 1897–1915, vol. 1.

29. Zongli Yamen to Li Hongzhang, 17 Nov. (GX 12/10/22) and 18 Nov. 1886, Li, Quanji, “Dian'gao,” 7:50-51; Zongli Yamen to Li, 20 Nov. 1886 (GX 12/10/25), Qingji waijiao shiliao 69:19–20.

30. Li to Zongli Yamen, 20 Nov. 1886 (GX 12/10/25); Li, Quanji, “Dian'gao,” 7:52; 26 Nov. 1886 (GX 12/11/1), 27 Jan. 1887 (GX 13/1/4), Qingji waijiao shiliao, 69:24; 70:102. The final agreement is reprinted as Document no. C 07030403, China, Foreign Ministry, Waijiao dang'an (Nan'gang, Taiwan: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica).

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Probably the closest analogies for the Nagasaki Incident were the anti- Chinese riots in the United States in the 1880s. Certainly Wu attained more positive results in the Nagasaki matter than China did with the United States.31 Yet there were troublesome implications to Li Hongzhang's vacillation. Li supported Wu's plan until the threat of force compelled him to seek a compromise rather than risk hostilities with Japan. Although Li had strongly upheld China's sovereignty in the issue of foreign-owned railways and telegraphs in China, in international disputes it was another matter. In the face of Japan's hostility, the status quo was more important than defense of China's sovereignty.32 Thus there were clearly defined limits to Li's willingness to seek reform in China's unequal relations with the imperialist world. In any case, with the conclusion of the Nagasaki matter, Wu turned his full attention to railway administration. As in the case of foreign relations, there were mixed results here too.

The North China Railways

Railway enterprise under Li Hongzhang is often considered among the more successful of the early self-strengthening projects, but for Wu and his close associates one must conclude that they did not live up to their expectations.33

The North China railways under Li are intimately connected to the Kaiping mines and to their major promoter, Tang Tingshu, whose early career was related in Chapter 1. In 1877 Li appointed Li Zhaotang and Ding Shouchang to work with Tang in developing coal mines near Kaiping, north of Tangshan. (Li Zhaotang, it will be remembered, was the relation of Wu's in-laws who arranged for Wu's introduction to Li Hongzhang.) 34

Their plan to develop the coal fields was contingent upon developing a

31. On the question of reparations by the U.S. Government, see Ma Wenhuan, American Policy Towards China as Revealed in the Debates of Congress (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1934), pp. 178–81; Jules Alexander Karlin, "The Indemnification of Aliens Injured by Mob Violence," Southwesten Social Science Quarterly 25 (1945): 235–46.

32. On Li's defense of China's sovereignty with respect to railways and telegraph lines, see Saundra Sturdevant, “Imperialism, Sovereignty, and Self-Strengthening: A Reassessment of the 1870's," in Reform in Nineteenth-Century China, ed. Paul A. Cohen and John E. Schrecker (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 63–70.

33. On the early railways see Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, "China's First Railway: The Imperial Railways of North China, 1880–1911" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1972); Li Guoqi, Zhongguo zaoqi de tielu jingying (Nan'gang, Taiwan: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan, Jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1961); Ministries of Communications and Railways, comp., Jiaotong shi, vols. 30–32, Lu-zheng bian (Nanjing, 1930). Short accounts may be found in Zeng Kunhua, Zhongguo tielu shi (Beijing: Xinhua zengjia, 1924); Ling Hongxun, Zhongguo tielu zhi (Taibei: Zhangliu banyuekan, 1954); Percy Horace Kent, Railway Enterprise in China: An Account of Its Origin and Development (London: E. Arnold, 1907); Zhang Guohui, Yanguu Yundong yu Zhongguo jindai qiye (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan, 1979), pp. 260-68.

34. Rosenbaum, “China's First Railway,” pp. 34-37. Their petition is reprinted in Yangwu Yundong (Zhongguo jindaishi ziliao congkan), ed. Zhongguo kexueyuan, Jindaishi yanjiusuo shiliao bianji shi and Zhongyang dang'an'guan Ming-Qing dang'anbu bianji zu (Beijing, 1961), 7:113–18, 129.

With Li Hongzhang 1882-1896

railroad to transport the coal. At first Li gave his support to the construction of a small line connecting the mines to Lutai, a town located on the east bank of the Beitang River, where the coal could be transported by barge to the port of Tanggu and ships of the CMSNC could dock and load the coal. However, given the opposition to railway construction following the British illegal construction of the Shanghai-Wusong line, Li apparently advised against trying to develop a railway at that time. In fact, a small railway was surreptitiously constructed in 1881 between the mines and the village of Xugezhuang. This seven-mile railway was designed by British engineer C. W. Kinder, who named it “Rocket of China." From Xugezhuang the coal was transported by barge along a canal to Lutai. The "Rocket" could not thus alleviate the problems caused by silting in the canal and theft of coal from the slow moving barges. Also, output was greatly decreased in winter when the canals froze over. Tang hoped that facilitating the transport problem would help the mines become more productive and alleviate the financial difficulties the mining venture was encountering, but the Company was unable to obtain official approval for further railway building until 1886.35

In the early 1880s there was talk of large-scale railway enterprises using the Kaiping coal fields as their hub, expanding from Kaiping to Tangshan, from Tangshan to Tanggu and Dagu, thence to Tianjin, and from Tianjin to Tongzhou, on the eastern outskirts of Beijing. While the problem of coal transport would be initially solved by the first phase of the line, increased freight and passenger traffic in the latter phases of the line would make the railway a moneymaker and help the mining enterprise to expand. In particular, the Tianjin-Tongzhou line was the linchpin in the vision. In the words of the Hong Kong Telegraph in 1889, "the Kaiping line as it were is the bones, the [Tianjin-]Tung-chow one was to be the flesh.”37

In writing to Tang Tingshu to congratulate him on getting the Kaiping mine going, Wang Tao wrote that he saw the mines as the hub of a host of industrial enterprises that would help to transform China and enable it to achieve the goal of wealth and power. For Wang, too, railways were crucial to the success of the entire endeavor. Although the above was Wang Tao's own view and not Tang's, it probably reflects views that were not too far from

35. Rosenbaum, “China's First Railway,” pp. 37-39; Li Guoqi, Zaoqi tielu, pp. 49–61; NCH, 15 Nov. 1882, p. 531; "Report on the Trade of Tientsin for the Year 1882,” enclosed in Brenan to Secretary of State for Foreign Foreign Affairs, 31 Mar. 1883, nos. 133–46, FO 17/936. On theft, see Claude William Kinder, “Railways and Coal Mines of North China,” Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers 103 (1890):286. On silting see Li, “Zhijing kaiban kuangwu zhe,” 18 May 1881 (GX 7/4/ 21), in Wei Zichu, Diguozhuyi yu Kailuan meikuang (Zhongguo jindai jingjishi ziliao congkan) (Shanghai: Shenzhou, 1954), “Kaiping meikuang di sheli,” pp. 1–3.

36. In 1883 Li contacted two well-known silk merchants in Shanghai about financing a Beijing- Tianjin railway line. See Edward Le Fevour, Western Enterprise in Late Ch'ing China: A Selective Survey of Jardine, Matheson and Company's Operations, 1842–1895 (Cambridge: Harvard University East Asian Research Center, 1968), p. 73. On his repeated efforts to get official support for the Jin-Tong line see Li to Zongli Yamen, 3 Dec. 1886 (GX 12/11/8); Lei, Li nianpu, p. 337. See also Li Guoqi, Zaoqi tielu, pp.

57-58.

37. Hong Kong Telegraph, 23 Nov. 1889.

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Tang's own, and which were shared by others in Wang's network of friends and associates, including Wu Tingfang.

Given these high expectations for the Kaiping enterprise and its associated railway ventures, it must be judged a failure, but initially the situation appeared quite hopeful. The Sino-French War had resulted in a burst of activities bolstering China's maritime defenses. Prince Chun headed the new government agency in charge of these operations and worked with Li Hongzhang and his subordinates to upgrade and modernize defenses at Luda (Port Arthur) and Weihaiwei (Chefoo). Prince Chun saw the military importance of railways for transportation of troops and matériel and became an enthusiastic supporter of the project to extend the tiny line from the Kaiping mines to Tianjin.39

This led to a flurry of activity on the part of European and American businessmen, many of whom rushed to Tianjin and Beijing with one after another grandiose proposal to help China develop its mines, communications and defenses, and to of course enrich themselves in the process."

These two factors, Tang Tingshu's need to see a commercial railway as an aid to the Kaiping mining project and Prince Chun's interest in the military importance of rail communication, led to the formation in summer 1886 of the Kaiping Railway Company, Ltd. The leading figures in the Company were Wu Tingfang and Wu Nan'gao as co-directors. Wu Nan'gao (Wu Mouding or Woo Jim Pao), was the chief comprador for the Tianjin branch of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, and closely associated with Tang Tingshu in the Kaiping mines as "resident director."41

38. Wang Tao's letter to Tang reprinted in Taoyuan chidu (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1959), pp. 137–38. See also Paul A. Cohen, Between Tradition and Modernity, pp. 193-96; Ma Jianzhong, “Tiedao lun,” in his Shikezhai jiyanjixing (Jindai Zhongguo shiliao congkan, vol. 16) (Shanghai, 1896; reprint, Taibei: Wenhai), 1:11a-19.

39. Rosenbaum, “China's First Railway,” pp. 51–55. Prince Chun became a leading figure in the government in April 1884 with the dismissal of Prince Gong. See Li Guoqi, Zaoqi tielu, pp. 61–63. For a recent analysis of his power see Ding Mingnan, “Shijiu shiji liushi zhi jiushi niandai Qingchao tongzhi jituan zuigaoceng neibu douzheng gaishu,” Jindaishi yanjiu, 1982, no. 1: 166–

70.

40. On the concession hunters, see Zhongyang yanjiuyuan, Jindaishi yanjiusuo, comp., Haifangdang (Taibei, 1957), Tielu bian, document nos. 1–3; Tyler Dennett, Americans in East Asia: A Critical Study of the Policy of the United States with Reference to China, Japan and Korea in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Macmillan, 1922), pp. 579–99; Le Fevour, Western Enterprise, pp. 77–80. Commenting on the range of proposals, the British Consul in Tianjin wrote to his superiors in London that "what is passing through the mind of the Chinese statesmen may be imagined from the remark made to me by an intelligent Chinese official who said that if China would only wait a little, foreign capitalists would not only offer to lend capital for nothing but to pay interest into the bargain.” "Report on the Trade of Tientsin for the Year 1885,” encl. in Brenan to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 15 Apr. 1886, nos. 113–35, FO 17/1030. See also NCH, 3 Dec., 1884, p. 627; 14 Aug. 1885, pp. 188–89; 17 Feb. 1886, p. 170.

41. Rosenbaum, “China's First Railway,” p. 56; Li Guoqi, Zaoqi tielu, pp. 110–11 n. 59; NCH, 9 July 1886; Kinder, “Railways and Coal Mines,” p. 288. On Wu Nan'gao see O. D. Rasmussen, Tientsin: An Illustrated Outline History (Tianjin: Tientsin Press, 1925), pp. 268–69. See also Morrison, Correspondence 1:95, 107–9.

With Li Hongzhang 1882–1896

The Kaiping Railway Company was a bona fide commercial enterprise. Its charter was based on an up-to-date model supplied by the U.S. Minister to China, Charles Denby.42 Contracts for equipment and services were arranged by competitive bidding, with the German firm of Krupp winning the contract to supply the rails for the first part of the line. Although Jardine, Matheson thought the Germans won the bid because many Chinese officials were piqued at J. M.'s effort to take over the management of the Kaiping mines, it is also true that the Krupp bid was so low as to cause the British surprise.43

The Company's main problem was lack of capital. The Company initially issued 2,500 shares at Tls 100 each, for a total of Tls 250,000. Apparently these did not sell rapidly, for the Company faced an immediate cash flow problem. This was met by a loan from Zhou Fu (1837-1921). Zhou was a fellow provincial of Li Hongzhang's who had been closely associated with him since the campaigns against the Taiping rebels. He had served in various capacities under Li and was presently in the powerful position of Tianjin Customs Daotai. Zhou's loan was an indication of his deep involvement in the railway enterprise.

Zhou's loan brought the amount of capital up to £70,000, about half of which was used to purchase the small existing line and its rolling stock. The £36,000 left enabled work to start on the line as soon as the rails arrived from Germany in November 1886, and by spring 1887 the first section of the line, a twenty-one mile stretch to Lutai costing £34,000, was complete.a

Zhou Fu's loan was repaid by Wu's negotiating a loan from a German syndicate represented by the firm of Carlowitz and Company. This loan for Tls 439,000 or DM 5 million, carried a 5% interest rate, which was very good. This proved to be the first of four foreign loans needed to complete the line to Tianjin.46

Even before construction on the line had started, however, opposition appeared. In October, a military provincial candidate named Li Fuming, a native of a prefecture through which the railway was to pass, memorialized the Censorate to oppose the project, especially the much talked about

42. Dennett, Americans in East Asia, p. 598.

43. Rosenbaum, "China's First Railway," p. 58; Le Fevour, Western Enterprise, p. 81; Kinder, "Railways and Coal Mines,” p. 289; NCH, 23 July 1886. On Germany's aggressive commercial policies see Li to Zongli Yamen, 3 Dec. 1886 (GX 12/11/8), Li, Quanji, “Yishu han’gao,” 18:55–57. 44. On the difficulty raising capital, see Rosenbaum, “China's First Railway," p. 56; Li to Zongli Yamen, 3 Dec. 1886; “Tiaofu si shi,” 2 Feb. 1887 (GX 13/1/10), Li, Quanji, “Haijun han'gao,” 3:1– 3; reply to Prince Chun, 3 Jan. 1887 (GX 12/12/10), ibid., 2:26. See also Zhou Fu, Zhou Queshengong ziding nianpu (reprint, Taibei: Guangwen, 1971), pp. 22b–23a; Hong Kong Telegraph, 23 Sept. 1889. On Zhou Fu see Boorman, Biographical Dictionary 1:409–13.

45. National Review 10 (14 Oct. 1911): 280. For reports on the railway's construction see NCH, 1 and 8 Dec. 1886, 19 Jan., 16 Feb. 1887. (It is worth noting that the NCH carried detailed news about railway construction based on reports from the Chinese Times of Tianjin.)

46. NCH, 23 Feb. 1887. Although the Bank of England charged 3% for domestic British loans, 5% was the norm for British banks lending to foreign firms in China. Domestic Chinese loans ranged well over 10%, cf. Zhang Guohui, “Lun waiguo ziben dui yangwu qiye de daikuan,” Lishi yanjiu, 1982, no. 4: 63.

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

extension of the line from Tianjin to Beijing. Li argued that the line should not be built, or if it must be built at least financed entirely by Chinese merchants. Li also charged that the Company had sold phony shares.47

In response to this development, Li Hongzhang refuted Li Fuming's charges, and he and Prince Chun memorialized early in 1887 supporting the plan to build the railway south to Tianjin and north to Shanhaiguan, but not mentioning the Tianjin-Tongzhou extension. They justified the railway enterprise on grounds of military necessity, and proposed that the Kaiping Railway Company be reorganized as the China Railway Company. This company was to be under "joint official-merchant management" (guanshang heban), with Wu Tingfang and Wu Nan'gao remaining as co-directors, and Zhou Fu and Shen Baojing added as official directors. Zhou's interest in the line was apparent, and from then on he assumed a leading role in the railway's affairs and his son Xuexi in those of the Kaiping mines. Shen Baojing had served as Financial Commissioner for Fujian Province before being demoted in 1885 as a consequence of the French bombardment of Fuzhou.48 Why was it necessary to use the guanshang heban format? One reason is that in view of the perceived military importance of the railway and to disarm critics such as Li Fuming, it was necessary to demonstrate that this was a state- sponsored project being carefully supervised by officials. The other important reason was that Tang Tingshu was not in a secure enough position to keep the railway in the private sector. Tang had been financially damaged in the financial panic and crash of 1883–84. Speculation in Kaiping stocks in fall 1883 had left the company in financial trouble. Tang had been forced to relinquish control of the CMSNC in 1885 to Sheng Xuanhuai at Li Hongzhang's insistence. Li was so angered by Tang's handling of the mine's affairs that he apparently intimated to Jardine, Matheson and Company's representatives that he would not be adverse to its taking over the management of the mine. Li subsequently backtracked from this position, but it is clear that Tang's financial difficulties weakened his bargaining power in dealing with Li.49

Arthur L. Rosenbaum's study of the early railway notes that Li Hongzhang was unable to be candid about its financial situation in his communications with the government. Although he knew that it would be impossible to rely entirely upon merchant capital to finance the line, he feared that honesty would not be rewarded with official permission to proceed.50

47. Rosenbaum, “China's First Railway,” p. 58. Reprinted in Yangwu Yundong wenxian huibian, ed. Yang Jialuo et al. (Taibei: Shijie, 1963), 6:183-86.

48. Prince Chun and Li's memorial is reprinted as document no. 5, Zhongyang yanjiuyuan, Haifangdang. Summarized by Li Guoqi, Zaoqi tielu, pp. 65–66. On Shen Baojing see Qian Shifu, Qingdai zhiguan nianbiao (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1980), 4:3164. On the guanshang heban format see Wellington Chan, Merchants, Mandarins, and Modern Enterprise, pp. 85–106.

49. Zhang Guohui, Yangwu Yundong yu Zhongguo jindai qiye, pp. 184, 188; NCH, 24 Oct. 1883, p. 471. Le Fevour, Western Enterprise, pp. 79–80.

50. Rosenbaum, “China's First Railway,” pp. 60–61.

With Li Hongzhang 1882–1896

Official involvement in the railway company proved to be the kiss of death in any case as far as merchant investment was concerned. In April 1887 the company issued 10,000 shares of stock, with the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank acting as the agent for their sale. In this way the company hoped to raise 1 million taels.51 Almost immediately, however, it was reported that Tianjin capitalists were wary of the project because of the official involvement, especially that of Zhou Fu, citing the past take-over of the CMSNC by Sheng Xuanhuai as evidence for the officials' disregard for merchant managers. If the merchants had control and if there were assurances "against being plundered," merchants said they would be happy to invest.52

Li Hongzhang wrote a proclamation which was posted throughout China's major cities declaring that the railway company, under Wu Tingfang's management, was to be run by a merchant board of directors strictly in accord with western business practices. Officials, declared Li, would not interfere with the managers' authority but only guard against malpractices. All to no avail: there was too much distrust.53

Wu was forced to resort to loans from foreign banking agencies once again. In 1887 a loan was negotiated with Jardine, Matheson for Tls 637,000 at 5% interest. In 1888 two more loans were negotiated, the first with Jardine, Matheson for Tls 150,000 at 5.5%, and the second with the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation for Tls 134,000. Together with the earlier loan from the German syndicate, the four loans needed to construct the Tangshan-Tianjin line amounted to Tls 1,360,000.54

In all, few shares were sold. According to one source, by 1889 Tls 108,500 in shares had been sold, representing about 8% of the total capitalization of Tls 1,344,500. Wu later said that he had induced his friends to invest Tls 202,000 in the railway, but they “had never been able to get a dividend paid” for reasons that will be discussed shortly.55 In addition to Wu and Wu Nan'gao, another important investor was Yan Xinhou (Yan Yibin), a Zhejiang capitalist who played an important part in a number of early industrial projects, and a Cantonese merchant named Chen Chengde.56 What is clear, however, is that the commercial success of the railway venture hinged upon the Tianjin- Tongzhou extension, but even though Li Hongzhang supported this plan, he decided to wait until the line was constructed all the way to Tianjin before

51. NCH, 22 Apr. 1887, p. 1030. On merchant financing, see Rosenbaum, “China's First Railway,” pp. 66-68.

52. NCH, 29 Apr. 1887, p. 1031.

53. Ibid., 27 May, 10 June 1887; Smithers to Porter, 21 May 1887, U.S. Department of State, "Consular Dispatches: Tientsin,” M–92 (U.S. National Archives).

54. Zhang Guohui, “Lun waiguo ziben,” p. 62.

55. Rosenbaum, “China's First Railway,” p. 72. Wu's statement is in Satow to Lansdowne, 2 Mar. 1904, FO 17/1636.

56. On Yan Xinhou see Wellington Chan, Merchants, Mandarins, and Modern Enterprise, pp. 51–52; Feuerwerker, China's Early Industrialization, p. 21. Chen is the principal merchant mentioned in the petition to build the Jin-Tong Railway. See n. 62; Zhang Guohui, Yangwu Yundong yu Zhongguo jindai qiye, p. 264.

888

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

proposing the extension, correctly perceiving that there would be strong opposition to it.5

Wu closely supervised the construction of the line to Tianjin, including the surveying, calling for bids, purchasing of land and laying of track. C. W. Kinder was hired as chief engineer for the project, and Wu hired two young American-educated engineers, Zhan Tianyou (Jeme Tien Yao, 1861-1919) and Guang Sunmou (Jingyang, or Kwong King Yang, b. 1863) to serve as Kinder's assistants. 58 He hired skilled Cantonese railway workers, many with experience in railway construction gained in the United States. He stayed with the workers and engineers as construction progressed, trouble-shooting when difficulties occurred, as they did between the Cantonese workers and locally recruited unskilled workers, between Chinese workers and foreign workers, and with farmers nettled at the way officials handled the purchase of their lands for the railway. 59

Wu's hard work and skill as a manager bore good results. In its first annual report in December 1887, the railway company's directors announced modest profits. From April to September, over Tls 22,864 had been earned from the transporting of coal, Tls 1,682 in the transporting of merchandise, and Tls 4,424 from passengers. As maintenance costs had amounted to a little over Tls 16,000 for the same period, this report was indeed encouraging. That the transport of coal was the main source of revenue for the railway was also born out in the next six-month report to the shareholders in July 1888. Because the rivers were frozen over in the winter and work in the mines slowed down, the company showed net earnings of Tls 14,698,826 and a profit of Tls 6,549 less than the previous six- month period. Still, the directors were able to propose that shareholders receive a 6% dividend. The entire 86.5 mile line from the Kaiping mines to Tianjin was completed by July 1888 with economy and efficiency, much to the surprise of many foreign observers and to the delight of Li Hongzhang and the investors.

From this point on, the railway project encountered severe-one might even say fatal-obstacles. Following the official "opening" of the line in October 1888, the principal shareholders petitioned Zhou Fu and Shen Baojing for permission to extend the railroad north to Shanhaiguan and

57. Li to Zhou Daotai [Fu], 30 Apr. 1887 (GX 13/4/8), Li, Quanji, “Dian’gao,” 8:14. 58. On Zhan Tianyou see Ling Hongxun, Zhan Tianyou xiansheng nianpu (Taibei: Zhongguo gongchengshi xuehui, 1961); Xu Ying, Li Xibi and Xu Qiheng, Zhan Tianyou (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 1956); Boorman, Biographical Dictionary 1:12–15. On Guang Sunmou see Yang Jialuo, comp., Minguo mingren tujian (n.p., 1937), 2:65; Who's Who in China.... 4th ed. (Shanghai: China Weekly Review, 1931), pp. 211–12.

59. Rosenbaum, “China's First Railway,” pp. 73–78; Li to Xu, 26 June 1887 (GX 13/5/6) and return, same date, in Li, Quanji, “Dian'gao,” 8:21, 28; Kinder, “Railways and Coal Mines,” p. 285; Zhang Yinhuan, Sanzhou riji, 5:37b; “Report on the Trade of Tientsin for the Year 1882," FO 17/ 936; NCH, 17 and 24 June 1887.

60. In December the managing directors were: Yan Xinhou, Wu Tingfang, Wu Nan'gao and Wang Yunfang. Cf. NCH, 28 Dec. 1887. See ibid. for first year income and ibid., 21 July 1888 for next six-month figures.

61. Ibid., 4 Aug., 21 Sept., 19 Oct. 1888.

With Li Hongzhang 1882–1896

west to Tongzhou. Li Hongzhang approved this plan and memorialized for its immediate implementation, suggesting that another foreign loan be obtained until enough merchant shares were purchased. Citing Chen Chengde and the other merchant investors, Li wrote that the construction costs could be rapidly repaid upon the completion of the line.62

Li's memorial gave rise to a great railway debate that lasted nearly a full year and resulted in a major defeat for Li's policies. During this period of time a great many criticisms were levied at Li, the railway he sponsored, and railway construction in general. The opposition was spearheaded by Weng Tonghe (1830-1904), President of the Board of Finance and the Guangxu Emperor's tutor, and Sun Jia'nai (1827-1909), Vice-President of the Board of War (Bing Bu). In the flood of memorials they and a host of other officials presented on the subject, the railway enterprise under Li was charged with taking farmlands out of production, moving graves, forcing farmers to move their houses, and resulting in economic dislocation for those involved in transport of grain and other goods to the capital. Also there was great concern that construction of a railway from the coast to the capital would make the Court vulnerable in case of military conflict with foreign nations.63

Li replied to these memorials with great vigor. He asserted that rather than result in loss of livelihood, the railway would stimulate the economy and create new jobs throughout the region. As to farmers being forced to leave land and houses and having their ancestors' graves disturbed, Li said that the farmers were being adequately recompensed for their trouble, and that only two complaints had been received about the company's handling of this matter. And he disputed the idea that the capital would be any more vulnerable because of the railway than it already had proven to be in past decades. In particular, Li made it very clear that abandoning this railway project would have dire consequences for the merchant investors. Without the Tianjin-Tongzhou line, the company would be unable to repay its debts, the stocks would become worthless, and merchants would lose confidence in the government.64

This great railway debate was finally resolved by a proposal made by Zhang Zhidong (1837–1909), Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi, to reject the Tianjin-Tongzhou line and instead construct a North-South trunk line starting at Lugouqiao, in Beijing's western suburbs, and going all the way to Guangzhou via Wuhan. Zhang's proposal was accepted by the Court in August 1889, and he was appointed Governor-General of Hunan and Hubei so as to take charge of its implementation. An additional stipulation was added by the Court: the great trunk line was to be built without recourse to foreign loans.65

62. Memorial reprinted as document no. 12 in Zhongyang yanjiuyuan, Haifangdang. NCH (9 Nov. 1888) listed the names of the principal shareholders as Chen Ch'eng-teh, Wu Kwang-tsi, Yueh Hien-t❜ang and Chih Teh-t'ang.

63. These memorials are summarized in Lei, Li nianpu, pp. 379–81. See also Wu Duo, “Jin-Tong tielu di zhengyi,” in Ziqiang Yundong (Taibei: Zhengzhong, 1956), pp. 135-89.

64. Ibid., pp. 379-81, 388–89.

65. Ibid., pp. 392–93, 398.

888

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Li Hongzhang, acutely skeptical about the prospects for developing the North-South line without foreign loans, as late as October 1889 was trying to persuade Zhang to first complete the Tianjin-Tongzhou line as one that could be completed rapidly and for which the financing arrangements had already been made, but it is clear that Li's political opponents were determined to take railway development out of his hands and to pursue it in ways they felt were more suitable.6

The hostile atmosphere surrounding the railway and the harsh scrutiny it was exposed to during this railway debate led to problems Wu encountered in spring 1889 regarding the railway. The first of these was an accident on the Tanggu-Tianjin portion of the line on 25 March in which over fifteen people were killed. Wu held a judicial inquiry and fixed the blame upon a foreign engineer and a station master who had given an improper signal. Wu arranged to pay for the burials of those killed and to recompense their relations, while altering procedures to guard against future tragedies of that type. Nonetheless, the timing was bad, given the anti-Li sentiment among many Chinese officials then considering the Tianjin-Tongzhou proposal. Li strongly reprimanded Wu and his assistants, a move viewed in the English- language press as a major setback for Wu.67

The second problem Wu encountered in spring 1889 was a major controversy that erupted over the company's construction of a bridge over the Bei He in Tianjin designed to facilitate transportation between the railway terminus at the north bank of the river and the foreign concessions on the south bank. Finding an appropriate site proved difficult. Initially Wu planned to construct the bridge at a site where the British Settlement and the French Concession met. Although Kinder thought this was a good site, the French Minister to China, P. Ristelheuber, objected that the bridge might impede French gunboats from reaching the concession should that measure be necessary. Unwilling to be embroiled with a controversy with France over this issue, Wu agreed to find a new site. Two subsequent locations were vetoed by local officials, one because it was feared there would not be adequate room for grain-carrying junks from the south, and one because salt-dryers objected.“

The site finally chosen led directly into the French Concession and turned out to be a poor choice. It was immediately opposed by Hu Yufen (d. 1906), the Daotai for the municipality of Tianjin. Located on a narrow curve in the river, it was subject to silting and flooding in the spring. As construction was underway in spring 1889 flooding occurred, necessitating partial blocking of the river while repairs were undertaken. Unfortunately this occurred just as

66. Ibid., p. 399.

67. NCH, 12 Apr. 1889; Hong Kong Telegraph, 23 Apr. 1889.

68. Kinder, “Railways and Coal Mines," pp. 294–95. The agreement between the Company (signed by Wu and Yan) and Ristelheuber in July 1887 is reprinted as appendix to Li Hongzhang's memorial of 30 July 1888 (GX 14/6/22), document no. 9, Zhongyang yanjiuyuan, Haifangdang. On the search for alternative locations see NCH, 20 Apr. 1889.

With Li Hongzhang 1882–1896

grain-laden boats from the south were entering the river from the Grand Canal carrying their cargo north. A fracas occurred, with the junkmasters claiming that they could not maneuver their vessels past the construction site. Although the railway company arranged to have the ships towed past the site, and although the company claimed that there was ample clearance, the Grain Commissioner, Liu Hanfang, joined Hu Yufen in demanding that the bridge be torn down. Li Hongzhang gave in and ordered the demolition of the bridge. The company refused to do it, so Li finally ordered the director of Tianjin's West Arsenal to demolish the bridge, which was done in May 1889.69

This episode was a terrible blow to the railway company and to Wu personally. First of all, the company lost £8,000 or Tls 40,000, not a small sum.70 More than the actual cost, however, were the ramifications in terms of the ability of the company to function autonomously. Wu was prevented from making a rational choice for the bridge's site because of pressure from the French and then for fear of arousing too much local opposition. Finally, in the face of the junkowners' opposition (reflecting their fear of economic displacement) and the opposition of two powerful officials, the Tianjin Daotai and the Grain Commissioner, Li did not strongly defend the company, partly because of the heat being generated by the national railroad debate.

The English-language press was quick to point out what a bad light the episode placed the railway company in. As the Hong Kong Telegraph noted, “it shows that the Board of Directors are mere puppets in the hands of others, that the traffic of the line may at any time be suppressed at the bidding of conspirators, and that the undertaking is like a house built on ice which is never secure against changes of weather." Surely Westerners exaggerated by ascribing the incident to the Chinese need to save “face,” but there is certainly a strong element of truth in the observation above, which Li himself recognized.

With the Imperial edict in August approving Zhang Zhidong's plan, the company was forced to stop work on the Tongzhou line and instead focus on the northern extension of the railroad towards Linxi and ultimately Shanhaiguan. The indefatigable Tang Tingshu began a trip south to promote the exploitation of the Linxi coal fields north of Tangshan in expectation of construction north, but it is difficult to see this as more than an effort to salvage something out of the mess. Similarly, Tang seems to have hoped that the Kaiping-Tianjin line could be expanded south to Shandong and the Yangzi Valley, and many rumors were generated about possible railway development through 1889. But there is no gainsaying that the cancellation of the Tianjin-Tongzhou line was a blow to the company's investors and

69. Li memorial of 30 July 1888; Li to Pan Junde, 9 May 1889 (GX 15/4/10), Li, Quanji, "Dian'gao," 11:17.

70. Kinder, “Railways and Coal Mines," p. 295.

71. Hong Kong Telegraph, 30 Apr. 1889.

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

probably scared off many who might have been potential investors in it and other railway projects.72

In December 1889 Wu received word that his mother had died, and he left Tianjin for Hong Kong. He stayed away for three years, ostensively to observe the conventional mourning period following the death of one's parent. While not questioning the sincerity of his grief, I am sure that the setbacks described above also played a role in his lengthy absence from North China.73 The northern extension of the line had a different economic character from the earlier railway development. The Imperial Railway Company of North China was formed as a state-sponsored enterprise. There was little effort to involve merchants in the company's affairs. Initially, Li appointed Wu Nan'gao to take charge of the northern extension. The Court's plan was to construct the railway from Shanhaiguan into the Northeast (Manchuria) all the way to Hunchun at the far eastern tip of China, via Jilin (Kirin) and with a branch line south to Yingkou. Li estimated that the total project would cost Tls 30 million and suggested that the first part of the line be constructed before the furthermost parts, but Prince Chun wanted the entire line worked on as one project.7

Financing the line was a problem. Li finally obtained the Naval Yamen's permission to negotiate a large loan with Austrian bankers who had promised his son Jingfang a 4.5% interest rate, but subsequent negotiations fell through due to mishandling by Li's subordinate, Chen Jitong.75 Following the collapse of these negotiations, Li memorialized to assume the direct management of the Guandong line and negotiated with the Board of Finance for funding. According to the arrangement he worked out with the Board's President, Weng Tonghe, each province was to contribute Tls 800,000 in installments towards the railroad project, and initially the Board of Finance provided Li with Tls 1,200,000.76

The funding for the railway always seemed to be in jeopardy. The Board of Finance gave it grudgingly and the provinces seemingly did not contribute their portions. In 1893 the railway's funds were diverted to other causes, the first being a "loan" of Tls 2 million to the Board of Finance to use for preparations for the Empress Dowager's sixtieth birthday celebrations in 1894, and the second was the use of railway funds for flood control on the Yongding

72. Ibid., 24 Sept., 15 Oct. 1889. Li tried to get approval to split the responsibility for the Lu-Han line and take charge of the northern segment, from Lugouqiao to Zhengding, using Zhou Fu as director. See Lei, Li nianpu, pp. 390, 393.

73. Wu Zhiyong boshi aisi lu. Circumstantial evidence indicates that Wu planned a short stay in the South. The Hong Kong Telegraph of 31 Dec. 1889, noting his return to the Colony, wrote that he planned to spend New Year with friends and relatives in South China and would return to Tianjin in the spring.

74. Li to Prince Chun, 17 Apr. 1890 (GX 16/xun2/28), Li, Quanji, “Dian'gao,” 12:16.

75. Rosenbaum, “China's First Railway,” pp. 98–106; Lei, Li nianpu, pp. 406, 419.

76. Li to Prince Qing, 21 Mar. 1891 (GX 17/2/12), Li, Quanji, “Haijun han'gao," 4:13–14.; Lei, Li nianpu, p. 420.

With Li Hongzhang 1882–1896

River, urgently required so that the area surrounding the capital be in perfect order in time for Cixi's birthday." By 1894 it was necessary to take a Tls 200,000 loan from the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation to proceed with work past Shanhaiguan.78

Meanwhile, the southern portion of the railway, from Tangshan to Tianjin, remained under the control of the China Railway Company, but the company's affairs deteriorated rapidly after the abandonment of the plan to build the Jin-Tong line. The leading figure in this phase of the railway was Zhang Yi (Zhang Yanmou). Zhang was from a family of hereditary bondservants of Prince Chun, and he used his relationship to the Prince in an effort to gain control of the Kaiping mines and the railway. Later under his inept management, the Kaiping mines passed into British hands. In the latter part of 1889 a power struggle had emerged between Zhang on the one hand, and Wu Tingfang, Wu Nan'gao and the other major investors on the other, for control of the southern portion of the line.79

The power struggle between Zhang Yi and Wu broke out in earnest with Tang Tingshu's death in October 1892. When Tang was alive, his deputy Wu Nan'gao represented his interests in the railway, but the latter was not powerful enough to deal with Zhang on his own. It is probably not a coincidence that Wu Tingfang was back up in Tianjin within two weeks of Tang's death.80

From the time of Wu's return all the way until the outbreak of the Sino- Japanese War in August 1894, the struggle for control of the railway continued, with Zhang Yi enlisting support from Li's relatives and Wu attempting to obtain Li's support against them.81

That this struggle reflected two different modes of management is clear. Wu viewed Zhang Yi as an inept manager and later blamed him for the loss of the Kaiping mines to Britain.82 In addition to the nepotistic practices

77. Li memorial, 30 June 1891 (GX 17/5/24), Li, Quanji, “Dianzou,” 12:7–9. On the diversion of funds for Cixi's birthday see Li to Prince Qing, 5 May 1893 (GX 19/3/20), ibid., “Dian’gao,” 14:30; Lei, Li nianpu, p. 448. On diversion of funds for the Yongding repairs, see Li to Zhou [Fu], 14 Nov. 1893 (GX 19/10/7), Li, Quanji, “Dian’gao,” 15:6; Lei, Li Nianpu, pp. 455, 457. On Cixi's birthday plans, see Shen Yunlong, “Cixi liuxun wanshou qingdian zhi sheme,” in his Jindai zhengzhi renwu shuping (Jindai Zhongguo shiliao congkan, vols. 2, 20) (Taibei: Wenhai, 1966), pp. 195–201. 78. On the loan see Zhang Guohui, “Lun waiguo ziben,” p. 62.

79. Rosenbaum, “China's First Railway,' pp. 107~10. On Zhang Yi see Wang Xi, Zhong-Ying Kaiping kuangquan jiaoshe (Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan, Jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1962), p. 40; Morrison, Correspondence 1:107–9; Wei Zichu, Diguozhuyi yu Kailuan meikuang, “Daoyan,” p. 6. 80. NCH, 4 Nov. 1892, dispatch of 22 Oct. from Tianjin, noted his return "at the Viceroy's request." Tang Tingshu died on 8 October.

81. NCH, 5 and 19 May, 2 June 1893. On 16 June the NCH reported that Zhang Jingqing (Li Hongzhang's grandson on the female side of the house) was director of the Imperial (northern segment) Railways, and Li Shutang (also a relation) its assistant director. For the Commercial (southern segment) Railway, Zhang Yi was director (as well as chief manager of the Kaiping Mines), and Wu Tingfang was assistant director general of both segments of the line, in order to "keep an eye on the economy of both departments."

82. In his eulogy of his friend Chen Aiting, who had served as managing director of the Kaiping mines from 1897 to 1899 after his long service as Qing Consul-General in Havana, Wu wrote to the

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

indicated above and diversion of funds for non-productive purposes, the Guandong Railway exhibited many examples of officials siphoning off funds and became subject to the criticism of numerous censors in 1895.8

Wu was still engaged in his fight to take control of the Kaiping line when the Sino-Japanese War broke out, and with it the demise of Li Hongzhang's mufu. Eventually, Wu sold off his shares in the railway company at a loss and severed his connection with the railway entirely.

In some respects, railway development before the Sino-Japanese War under Li Hongzhang was a successful self-strengthening enterprise, as argued by Li Guoqi in his monograph on early railway construction in China. The Kaiping- Tianjin line was constructed with economy and efficiency, due in no small measure to Wu's good management. The foreign loans were at reasonable interest rates, free of the sorts of onerous conditions that characterized many foreign railway loans after the Sino-Japanese War, and were well used.84

From this point of view the railway enterprise was indeed successful, but as I have indicated in my discussion of Wu's experiences, the railways did not live up to their promise for the bourgeoisie, either in terms of their profitability or in terms of their role in the economic development of China.

To present the problem as simply a conflict between merchants and officials for control of modern enterprises does not tell the entire story. There was a vast difference between officials such as Wu and Zhou Fu, on the one hand, and Zhang Yi on the other. What the above suggests is that Wu, Zhou and the other investors represented the more enlightened practices of the modern bourgeoisie in their management of the railway. They had to contend with a host of problems confronting and ultimately defeating them. In part this opposition included bureaucrats hoping to exploit the new enterprise, but it also included vested interests in traditional modes of transportation represented by the junkmasters of Tianjin and their supporters among Li's subordinates. This opposition was compounded by fear of increased vulnerability to foreign attack that the improved communications between. the coast and the capital could bring. When one adds to this picture the pressures brought to bear by the French over the railway bridge in Tianjin, one can easily see how Wu and the investors he represented were squeezed from both sides. Dependent upon Li's patronage, Wu and the other modern managers were highly vulnerable and unable to function effectively under the guandu shangban structure. It is easy to see why Wu Tingfang left the railway enterprise depressed about the possibilities for economic transformation of China under existing circumstances.

NCH: "If he [Chen] had been in charge of the Mining Company during the Boxer trouble, I am sure Mr. Chang Yen-mow would not have been in the unpleasant predicament in which he finds himself today. Mr. Oi-ting [i.e., Chen] would have steered the mining ship clear of the dangerous rocks and brought her to haven in safety.” NCH, 25 Aug. 1905, p. 437.

83. See Edict to Wang Wenshao, 12 Dec. 1895 (GX 21/10/26), Qingji waijiao shiliao 118:34 84. Li Guoqi, Zaoqi tielu.

With Li Hongzhang 1882–1896

The Diplomacy of Defeat

Wu Tingfang, along with most of Qing officialdom, was profoundly shocked by the overwhelming defeat suffered by China in the Sino-Japanese War in 1894. Li Hongzhang's entire program of self-strengthening was exposed as inadequate, and the Qing Navy, to which Li had devoted so much care, was virtually destroyed. Wu's despair was increased by direct contact with the Japanese through negotiations he undertook for Li, first as attaché for an abortive peace mission and then as an assistant in the talks that resulted in the Treaty of Shimonoseki.

After the Japanese army took Luda (Port Arthur) in late November 1894, they responded to American mediation efforts by offering to meet with fully accredited Qing envoys. Ito Hirobumi and Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu (1844-97) were determined to avoid foreign involvement in the negotiations until after China had been forced to accept Japan's terms, and they did not expect negotiations to be successful at that time but made the offer for the sake of appearances.

In December 1894 the Qing Court appointed Zhang Yinhuan and Shao Youlian (d. 1901) as envoys. Zhang Yinhuan had become an important figure in the central government after his return from the United States in 1890 and was serving as Vice-President in the Board of Finance and Minister in the Zongli Yamen. Shao Youlian had most recently served as Governor of Hunan Province and briefly as Governor of Taiwan. He had a reputation as an expert on Russian affairs, having served as assistant to Chonghou in St. Petersburg in 1884.86

The appointment of Zhang and Shao was correctly interpreted by Mutsu as an indication that the Qing Court was only lukewarm in the peace mission's goals. In Mutsu's words, "the fact that China entrusted the vital task of peace negotiations to men like Chang [Zhang] and Shao led us to suspect that she had not yet frankly acknowledged her defeat to herself or become sufficiently sincere in her desire to terminate the hostilities."87 Li Hongzhang was engaged in lateral negotiations with the European powers for their intervention. Hence, the envoys' credentials empowered them to discuss but not to sign a treaty.

Ito and Mutsu were anxious to avoid revealing the Japanese peace terms before China had been forced to its knees for fear of provoking European intervention, and so they used the issue of the envoys' credentials to reject the Zhang-Shao mission.88 Before the mission had left Shanghai, its members

85. Mutsu Munemitsu, Kenkenroku: A Diplomatic Record of the Sino-Japanese War, 1894–95, ed. and trans. with historical notes by Gordon Mark Berger (Tokyo: Japan Foundation, 1982), pp. 146–51.

86. Zhang to Zongli Yamen, 9 Dec. 1894 (GX 20/11/13), Qingji waijiao shiliao 101:21; Li to Zongli Yamen, 5 Jan. 1895 (GX 20/12/10), Li, Quanji, “Dian’gao,” 19:32. On Shao Youlian see Qing shi liezhuan (Taibei: Zhonghua, 1962), 63:8–9a.

87. Mutsu, Kenkenroku, pp. 152–53.

88. Ibid., p. 153.

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

were informed that Japan would find their credentials unacceptable, and that in particular, Japan found Shao Youlian unacceptable because when he had been Governor of Taiwan he had supposedly issued a proclamation offering rewards for the heads of captured Japanese soldiers. This was not the "sincerely repentant" attitude which Japan wanted China to exhibit.89

Ito and Mutsu not only refused to accept Zhang and Shao's credentials, but they also insulted them by forbidding them the right to send coded telegrams to the Qing Court on the grounds that Hiroshima (where they were meeting) was an important military site, and the envoys might take advantage of their diplomatic status to cable military intelligence to China. They refused to allow them to have the Court issue new credentials, and finally declared that the status of the envoys was too lowly and that only an envoy of the status of Prince Gong or Li Hongzhang would do.90

Although Wu expected the talks to fail, they were nonetheless a painful and humiliating experience for him. Ito and Mutsu constantly rebuked the Qing envoys as "very hazy about procedures in international law," and took every opportunity to denounce the ignorance and duplicity of the peace mission. Ito frequently appealed to Wu as an enlightened person who surely understood the weakness of China's position in international law. These asides to Wu must have embarrassed him, and how much further humiliated he must have been to see Ito's scornful laughter as Zhang and Shao, when all else had failed, humbly accept the Japanese rebukes and beg for mercy! Wu would not join in these humble apologetics but continued to maintain the propriety of their mission."1

When the abortive meeting broke up, Ito asked Wu to remain behind for a private talk in which he asked Wu why he had not seen to it that the envoys had proper credentials. Wu, who certainly understood that this issue was only a pretext to avoid negotiations at that time, could only reply that he had been in Tianjin and was not involved in the preparations for the mission. Ito then came to the point: unless China appointed an envoy of the status of Li Hongzhang or Prince Gong, China could expect Japan to occupy Beijing itself.92

Zhang and Shao sent Wu back once again to plead with Ito, but the Prime Minister was brusque and irritable, accusing the envoys and the Qing Court with insincerity. Wu stiffly denied this and said (once again) that any deficiency in the credentials could be easily rectified by cabled edict. Ito replied that

89. Ibid.; concerning the envoys' credentials see Qingji waijiao shiliao 103:3–4; Shanghai Daotai Shen to Li, 26 Dec. 1894 (GX 20/11/30) Li, Quanji, “Dian'gao,” 19:27. See also Charles Denby, China and Her People: Being the Observations, Reminiscences, and Conclusions of an American Diplomat (Boston: Page, 1906), 2:134–36.

90. Based on the Chinese version of the discussions, “Zhongguo gouhe shiji huitan jiyao,” in Zhong-Ri zhanzheng, ed. Zhongguo shixue hui (Shao Xunzheng et al.) (Shanghai: Xinzhishi, 1955), 7:75-89. See also Mutsu, Kenkenroku, pp. 154–58.

91. Ibid.

92. Zhang Yinhuan, memo to Zongli Yamen, 17 Feb. 1895 (GX 21/1/23), Qingji waijiao shiliao 106:15–18. See also Mutsu, Kenkenroku, pp. 160–63.

With Li Hongzhang 1882–1896

such "irregular" procedures would only bring forth ridicule from the western powers. Japan had to take warning, said Ito, from the "cart ahead" and be very cautious in dealing with China, as when the Court's refusal to honor treaties signed with Britain and France in 1858 led to the foreign occupation of Beijing in 1860. China was acting, said Ito, as though it wanted to buy something without having the money. Wu replied that Japan had not announced the “price.” “We didn't know your intentions,” he stated. “Since they couldn't be kept a secret forever, why didn't you announce them earlier and allow us to resolve our differences." Ito only replied with an ominous harangue:

Your country has always viewed Japan as a small impoverished country, but you are really ignorant about us. Since the war began we have not had to borrow from foreign countries to meet our military expenses. Instead, we borrowed 100,000,000 yen from our own merchants, and can count on borrowing several tens of millions more. We have many times more military supplies on hand than you. Right now our forces are taking Weihaiwei. The military situation is taking a decisive turn, and you would do well to seek early peace talks.9

Ito was referring to the great naval battle of Weihaiwei. In this two-week battle, Japan delivered the coup de grace to the Qing Navy. It ended on 13 February following the suicides of Admiral Ding Ruchang and Zhang Wenxuan (Li Hongzhang's son-in-law), and with them the last hopes for Li and the Court.94

Wu seems to have felt Ito's scorn and ridicule very deeply and to have been angered by Japan's contemptuous treatment of the Zhang-Shao mission. In view of the utter failure of Li's modern army and navy, the entire self- strengthening program seemed miniscule and laughable indeed. And what of Wu's own role in these projects? Wu certainly must have reflected on his fate in comparison to that of Ito. Since they had both been students in London some twenty years ago, Ito had become the foremost architect of Japan's transformation and one of a handful of truly powerful people in that country. By contrast, Wu had spent fourteen years as Li's subordinate, performing tasks that must have seemed in hindsight ineffective, or at worst, meaningless.

Having no options left, Li left for Shimonoseki on 15 March, accompanied by Wu, Luo Fenglu, Ma Jianzhong and a large retinue for talks that were disastrous for China. The treaty that Li was forced to accept on 17 April gave Taiwan and southern Manchuria to Japan, called for an enormous indemnity of Tls 200 million and gave Japan the right to manufacture goods in China.

93. Based on the Chinese records, Zhang Yinhuan memo to Zongli Yamen, 17 Feb. 1895. 94. On the battle of Weihaiwei see Zhang Yinlin, "Jiawu Zhongguo haijun zhan jikao,” in Diyici Zhong- Ri zhanzheng (Taibei: Zhengzhong, 1957), pp. 269–77. See also John L. Rawlinson, China's Struggle for Naval Development, 1839–1895 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 188–90.

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

The negotiations were marked by an attempt to assassinate Li Hongzhang and by continuous harping on Japan's successes in self-strengthening in contrast to China's abysmal failures.95

Li and his entourage returned to Tianjin in disgrace. Unwilling to face the Court, Li sent the draft treaty to Beijing with John W. Foster (1836–1917), an American statesman who served (ineffectually) as an adviser both to the Zhang-Shao mission and later to the Chinese delegation at the Shimonoseki talks. At the last minute Wu too found his courage wanting and declined to accompany Foster as his interpreter, explaining to him that the feeling against Li was so strong that it would “prejudice” the presentation of the treaty to the Court if Wu, Li's secretary, were to be his interpreter.

Although the Tripartite Intervention of 23 April forced Japan to relinquish its claim to southern Manchuria, Taiwan was lost to Japan. On 3 May Wu and Lianfang, a Manchu expert on Russian and French affairs who was on Li's staff, were appointed plenipotentiaries to the exchange of treaties ceremony at Yentai. Last ditch efforts to reopen negotiations over Taiwan failed, and the exchange of treaties took place on 8 May. Taiwan was transferred formally on 2 June. These events ended what was a most dismal episode in Wu's life and his nation's history,97

After reporting the exchange of treaties to the Throne, Wu returned to Tianjin. Li's satrapy was in disarray and Li was repeatedly denounced by censors demanding that he be punished. Ever since the outbreak of the war there had been a steady flight of underlings from Li's mufu in search of new patrons. Wu's personal code of honor would not permit him to abandon Li and he steadfastly defended Li to his critics.98

But Wu's loyalty to Li was not without its toll. In July 1895 he unburdened his soul to H. B. Bristow, British Consul in Tianjin, in a long (and for Bristow somewhat shocking) diatribe against Li and what he symbolized to Wu. Wu asked Bristow, who was complaining against the pro-Russian policies towards which the Court was now tending, if there was any hope of China reforming. Bristow said, “no hope whatever,” and Wu replied that he agreed completely with him, and that therefore "Foreign Powers should unite and force China to reform." When Bristow noted that this would lead to "the extinction of China as a nation," Wu replied with great pessimism: "I do not care.

95. My summary is based on the Chinese-language records in Cai Erkang, “Zhong-Dong zhanji benmo," in Zhong-Ri zhanzheng 5:351–437. See also Wang Xinzhong, “Zhong-Ri Maguan yihe,” in Diyici Zhong-Ri zhanzheng, pp. 278–315; Mutsu, Kenkenroku, pp. 164–202.

96. On Foster see Dictionary of American Biography 3: 551–52. On his pro-Japanese bias see Huang Jiamo, Meiguo yu Taiwan: Yiqibasi zhi yibajiuwu (Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan, 1966), pp. 413–22. On Li and Wu's refusal to go to Beijing see John W. Foster, Diplomatic Memoirs (Boston: Houghton, 1909), 2:148–49; Lei, Li nianpu, p. 514.

97. Shilu, 3 May 1895 (GX 21/4/9); Li to Zongli Yamen, 9 May 1895 (GX 21/4/14), Qingji waijiao shiliao 111:24; Wu to Zongli Yamen, same date, ibid., 111:25–26. On Lianfang see Lei, Li nianpu, p. 357.

98. Fu Bingchang, Fangwen jilu, p. 63b.

With Li Hongzhang 1882–1896

Anything is better than this. I would infinitely rather see China a second India than that she should go on as she is, disgraced, powerless and with no hope of amendment.” To Bristow's comment that British public opinion admired Japan as a “plucky little boy who boldly attacks a big one" and felt disgust "at the pusillanimity of the Chinese," Wu responded with an outburst against the ministers of the Zongli Yamen as a set of “old women” who had not even known where Burma (Myanmar) was when they had "given [it] away." He said that when Li had returned from Shimonoseki he had urged him to go to Beijing and face his enemies directly, but Li had refused to go out of fear of making himself “too cheap.” Bristow readily agreed and said that Li's refusal to go to Beijing when so much was at stake was “typical,” for "everything in China must be sacrificed to ‘face.”” “Perish China but save my 'face'!", Bristow exclaimed, “and the man who says this is the greatest man in China. What hope is there for the country?" To which Wu replied, "Well, that is China, as you know. Why do not foreign nations compel her to reform?"99

This extraordinary exchange indicates the depth of Wu's despair as well as his cultural marginality. Loyal to Li in a Chinese context, he expressed his true feelings to an Englishman. As Ito had recognized, Wu's background and education set him apart from the milieu in which he operated. Like Bristow, he too could feel disgust at China's performance and by Li's "cowardice" (as well as his own) in refusing to go to Beijing. Like other westernized Chinese in Hong Kong at the same time, Wu thought China needed more western influence in order to reform, even if that meant outright colonization, paradoxical as that seems.100

Roads to Reform

Depressing as the war was to Wu, it proved to be the major turning point in his career as a Qing official. The reform movement that quickly emerged at a national level following the military debacle provided a framework for Wu's advancement and eventual entrance into the diplomatic corps. His close association with Li Hongzhang made possible his rise in status.

Upon returning to Tianjin after reporting the exchange of ratified treaties at Yentai, Wu continued as Li's assistant. Wu's main work in the summer of 1895 was negotiating the terms for a new German concession in Tianjin. These arrangements were completed by October 1895.101

99. Bristow to O'Connor, 19 July 1895, nos.218–22, FO 17/1237. I am grateful to Arthur L. Rosenbaum for first calling my attention to this document.

100. Edward J. M. Rhoads, China's Republican Revolution: The Case of Kwangtung, 1895–1913 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 42.

101. Bristow to O'Connor, 24 July 1895 (confidential no. 47), encl. in O'Connor to Salisbury, 30 July 1895, nos. 197–99, FO 17/1237; Guo Tingyi, Jindai Zhongguo shishi rizhi (Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan, 1963), 2:936.

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

While working on these negotiations, Wu was also meeting with Sheng Xuanhuai to plan a new style school in Tianjin. Sheng, appointed Customs Daotai for Tianjin in 1892, was a powerful figure in Li's administration. By early September Sheng petitioned Wang Wenshao, who had been appointed to Li's posts as Governor-General of Zhili and Superintendent of Trade for the Northern Ports, to establish a “Sino-Western Academy” in Tianjin with Wu Tingfang as its director, Cai Shaoji as Wu's assistant, and with Charles D. Tenney as chief instructor. This school was later known as the Beiyang College and sometimes as the Tianjin Technical College.102

During the summer of 1895, Li Hongzhang had been subject to a variety of criticisms by officials who felt that he should be dismissed from his posts and censored for his handling of the Shimonoseki negotiations. These criticisms reached a peak on 28 August when sixty-eight officials memorialized the Emperor to dismiss Li. On the same day, Li was ordered to come to Beijing where, in audience with the Emperor, the latter upbraided him for mishandling the negotiations with Japan. Li stayed in Beijing and by mid- October was ordered to take charge of negotiations with Baron Hayashi, the Japanese Minister to China, for the retrocession of Liaodong. 103

In Beijing with Li Hongzhang and accompanying him in his meetings with the Zongli Yamen ministers about the negotiations with Japan, Wu drafted a detailed letter to three high officials proposing a number of reforms.104 The officials were Li Hongzao (1820–97), Weng Tonghe and Zhang Yinhuan. All three were at that time ministers in the Zongli Yamen. Li was a venerable statesman who had been influential in the Court before 1884 and again in the aftermath of the war. Weng, while a major foe of Li Hongzhang, was nonetheless an energetic promoter of young reformers after 1894. He had known about Wu since 1880 and later supported some of Wu's proposals. In particular, Weng was close to Zhang Yinhuan during this period, and Zhang became Wu's patron.'

105

Wu's letter presented a nine-point program for reforms couched in reasonable terms designed to appeal to officials deeply convinced of China's need to reform. Wu's major focus was on the need to elevate the status of foreign affairs experts and to reform the examination system so as to permit

102. Guo Tingyi, Shishi rizhi 2:931, 932; Feuerwerker, China's Early Industrialization, p. 69; NCH, 11 Dec. 1896, p. 999.

103. Lei, Li nianpu, pp. 534, 536.

104. Wu Tingfang, “Shang shufu shu," in Huangchao xu’ai wenbian (n.p., 1902; reprint, Taibei: Xuesheng, 1965), 3:4b-9. On Wu's official rounds with Li Hongzhang see Li Zongtong and Liu Fenghan, Li Hongzao xiansheng nianpu (Taibei: Shangwu, 1969), 2:737.

199

105. On Li Hongzao see Arthur W. Hummel, ed., Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644–1912) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943–44), pp. 861–62. On Weng's support for reformers see Ho Ping-ti [He Bingdi] "Weng T'ung-ho and the ‘One Hundred Days of Reform,' Far Eastern Quarterly 10 (1950–51): 125–35; Hsiao Kung-ch'uan, “Weng T’ung-ho and the Reform Movement of 1898,” Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies, n.s., 1 (1957): 111–243. For information on Weng and Zhang's close relations during this time see Jin Liang, comp., Jinshi renwu zhi (1934; reprint, Taibei: Guomin, 1955), pp. 298–99.

With Li Hongzhang 1882–1896

foreign-trained persons easier entrance into the bureaucracy. Because of the prevailing ignorance of foreign matters (yangwu) among most Qing officials, Wu felt that China had repeatedly been worsted in negotiations and had been unable to accomplish its goals of self-strengthening. The Emperor should issue an edict, Wu proposed, directing all officials to treat the study of foreign affairs with seriousness and respect, and to seek out those with experience in foreign affairs and put their talents to immediate use by bypassing the normal mechanisms for recruitment and promotion. But Wu was careful to distinguish between valid experts and the stereotypical “menials” of foreign firms towards whom contempt was frequently expressed, warning: "if we use men who were once employed as menials in foreign firms, they will merely know a little of foreign languages without understanding the fundamentals; hence, they will be the object of foreign ridicule.”106

Next to the study of foreign matters, Wu emphasized military reforms, including naval development and use of foreign military advisers to teach strategy. He scored Qing officers as arrogant, ignorant and stubborn.

Wu's third point was to exploit differences and rivalries among the foreign powers in an updated version of the ancient "using barbarians to control barbarians" tactic. More specifically, he advocated forming secret alliances with Great Britain, Germany and the United States in order to control the greater danger posed by Japan, Russia and France. But he emphasized that there were mere devices and could not be substituted for basic reforms.

Wu's remaining six points were specific proposals for self-strengthening projects. Echoing his earlier ridicule of the Zongli Yamen for its geographical ignorance, he devoted an entire point to the need for accurate mapping of the Empire and for obtaining accurate maps of all the foreign nations. In other points he considered the importance of an extensive railway system, the desirability of a modern postal system, revision of the tariff system to end the limit of 5% ad valorem that had been imposed in all of the unequal treaties, implementing a stamp tax to raise revenues for the new projects, and finally, encouraging the development of private Chinese banking to aid in merchant investment in self-strengthening projects while reducing the power and influence of foreign banks in China.107

Although Wu's proposals were similar to those being discussed in many letters and memorials at that time, his letter was distinct in taking as its main theme the need to elevate foreign affairs experts. Given his long experience as one such expert under Li, this gave his letter a certain personal stamp as well as a certain authority. Although a number of Li's subordinates had been, or were about to be, criticized for corrupt practices, Wu escaped such condemnation. His record was “clean” in that regard, and he was spoken highly of by a number of Chinese and European figures.108

106. Wu Tingfang, "Shang shufu shu."

107. Ibid.

108. Including Russian minister Cassini. See Jin Liang, Jinshi renwu zhi, p. 265.

100

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Although the tone and the context differed, it is worth noting that there was a basic consistency between the views expressed in Wu's letter to Li, Weng and Zhang and those expressed in his outburst to Bristow a few months earlier. In both cases, Wu felt China should reform along British patterns of development. More significantly, Wu's letter advocated an alliance with Britain directed at the latter's principal rival Russia, which Wu saw as in league with Japan to take over chunks of Chinese territory. This view was remarkable in view of the strong feeling among most high officials in favor of alliance with Russia against Japan. Even reformers such as Liang Qichao declared in 1895 that "those who speak of alliance with Russia should also speak of Poland; those who speak of alliance with England should also speak of India." Thus Wu's pro-British stance set him apart from the dominant trend in Chinese foreign policy at that time.109

In February 1896 Li Hongzhang was ordered by Cixi to represent the Qing Emperor at the coronation of Czar Nicholas II in St. Petersburg. Li did not return to China until October 1896, and during his stay in Russia he negotiated a secret treaty that provided for Russian assistance to develop railways and fortify Chinese defenses in the Northeast against Japan.

In Li's absence, Zhang Yinhuan was appointed to succeed Li in the talks with Japan for a new commercial treaty, as had been called for in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, and Wu served as Zhang's principal secretary in these negotiations. There was wide agreement that these were thankless negotiations. In the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Japan had secured the right to construct and operate factories on Chinese soil, as well as to establish Japanese concessions in the treaty ports. In a supplemental treaty of inland navigation, Japan obtained rights to conduct trade through the interior of China. In these various agreements, Japan succeeded in obtaining status equivalent to that of the European powers in China and indicated its intention to expand its economic activities in China.

The negotiations with Baron Hayashi were difficult. He refused to yield to Zhang and Wu's desire to add clauses granting reciprocal rights for Chinese subjects residing in Japan. But the major issue over which they were stalemated for some time was over whether or not China could levy import duties on Japanese goods manufactured in China. Finally Hayashi agreed that China could do so, with the understanding that these goods would then be exempt from local transit taxes, or lijin. The treaty was finally signed by Zhang Yinhuan on 21 July 1896.110

On 23 November 1896 Wu was appointed Minister to the United States, Spain and Peru upon Li Hongzhang's recommendation. On the same day, Li's

109. Cited in Wang Shuhuai, Wairen yu Wuxu Bianfa (Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan, Jindaishi yangjiusuo, 1965), pp. 157–58.

110. The reports on the negotiations and the treaty materials are in Qingji waijiao shiliao 120:3–6; 121:18–40, 122:1–17; J. V. A. MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements with or Concerning China, 1894– 1919 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1921), 1:68–74; 91–92.

With Li Hongzhang 1882–1896

101

protégé Luo Fenglu was appointed Minister to Great Britain, Italy and Belgium, Huang Zunxian to Germany, and Yang Ru to Russia, Holland and Austria.111

This marked the first time that foreign-trained Chinese were appointed to high ranking diplomatic posts. A little over a year since his pessimistic outburst to Bristow, Wu was experiencing a gratifying rise in fortune and recognition of his talents. With the development of the national level reform movement, Wu began to develop a more optimistic view of the possibilities for reform.

Wu's newly found optimism developed in the same crucible of despair that had given rise to anti-dynastic nationalism. Wu's relationship with his brother-in-law He Qi illustrates the divergence of these two paths. He Qi was also deeply affected by the war and was providing clandestine support for the Revive China Society (Xing Zhong Hui) in Hong Kong led by his former student at the Hong Kong Medical College, Sun Yixian. He Qi, his brother He Shantian and other overseas Chinese also began to show considerable interest in officially sponsored self-strengthening enterprises immediately after the war. 112

Upon Wu's urging, He Qi left his post on the Hong Kong Legislative Council with a six-month leave of absence, much as Wu had done earlier in 1882. At first it was reported that He would serve as Councillor of Legation under Wu in Washington, D.C., but then Wu arranged for He to serve as adviser and secretary for foreign affairs under Sheng Xuanhuai, who had recently been appointed as Director-General of Railways and given charge of directing the great trunk line from Beijing to Guangzhou that Zhang Zhidong had initially proposed. Sheng had received support at the highest levels for his plans. Based in Shanghai, He Qi's job would be to attract funds from Chinese capitalists for the railway and Sheng's banking projects. (Wu's relationship with Sheng on these projects will be discussed in subsequent chapters.)113

He Qi enthusiastically departed for Shanghai amidst great ceremony. Three weeks later, however, he was back in Hong Kong, having resigned from his post under Sheng in disgust at the corruption he observed. The corrupt activities, he felt, made “honour and honesty” impossible for an official, concluding:

the fortunate and less scrupulous among them amass fabulous wealth, while those endowed with a little more conscience have to be content

111. Edict, 23 Nov. 1896 (GX 22/10/19), Shilu 396:3602. For the rumor, unconfirmed by any official documents, that Wu and Luo were switched because Wu had been born in Singapore, see Shi Zhizhi [Alfred Sze], Shi Zhizhu xiansheng zaonian huiyilu (Taibei, 1954), pp. 12-13.

112. Rhoads, China's Republican Revolution, pp. 38–42. On overseas Chinese interest in investment see Qingji waijiao shiliao 119:21; NCH, 10 Jan., 7 Feb., 27 Mar., 12 June, 24 July, 28 Aug., 30 Oct. 1896.

113 Guo Tingyi, Shishi rizhi, pp. 959, 960–61, 962; Sheng to Wu, 12 Feb. 1897 (Gx 23/1/11); Wu to Sheng, 27 Feb. 1897 (GX 23/1/26), in Sheng Xuanhuai, Yuzhai cun'gao (Shanghai, 1939; reprint, Taibei: Wenhai, 1963), 91:3, 6, 7.

102

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

with a mere competency, and the upright mandarin, if such has an existence, is forced to retire after a short experimental career.114

Wu had obviously lost his scruples a long time ago, and from then on the views between him and He Qi became more and more divergent. Wu remained committed to the existing dynasty and its elite, and even when it failed to meet his expectations, as it did repeatedly in the years to come, he did not seriously consider revolution as a viable alternative.

From Wu's vantage point early in 1897, things looked promising indeed. He arrived in Hong Kong en route to Washington and was hailed by the same Chinese leaders who had utterly rejected him fifteen years ago. At an official banquet held in his honor, the Governor of Hong Kong applauded him, as a leading Chinese toasted Wu by comparing him to Ito Hirobumi, declaring, “I do not see any reason why you should not . . . become some day the Premier of China."115 In one sense, Wu had already arrived.

(New

114. Lord Charles Beresford, The Breakup of China: With an Account of Its Present Commerce. . York: Harper, 1899), p. 226. See also Fu Bingchang, Fangwen jilu, pp. 11b–12. 115. Hong Kong Weekly Press and Overland Trade Report, 11 Mar. 1897. Wu's address to the banquet is reprinted in part in Huazi Ribao, 10 Mar. 1897.

Promise and Disappointment in America

1897-1902

Eighteen Ninety-eight

Wu's stay in America coincided with events of tremendous import for China. The dramatic rise of the reform movement, its sudden collapse and the Court's support of the Boxer movement resulted in foreign invasion and the prospect of the Empire's breakup into several colonial spheres. Although Wu's term of office was three years, these events forced him to stay on in Washington, D.C., until summer 1902.

Wu began his stay in America with considerable expectations that he would be able to effectively improve China's international position. In part Wu's expectations derived from his self-confidence as a diplomat and his faith in his counterparts in the western world. His background was well suited to the world of diplomacy. In contrast to his predecessors in Washington, Wu had impressive command of English. His public speeches reveal fluency and sensitivity to nuance. As an American magazine noted in 1900, Wu was “more than a match for the wiliest reporter."1 Moreover, Wu viewed his training as a barrister as a great asset. Attention to fine points and details, fluency in debate and ease in devising tactics to win a case were all qualities of enormous value to a diplomat.2 The professional elitism of the diplomat was well suited to Wu's temperament and outlook. In later years he was fond of telling his nephew, Fu Bingchang: "A first-rate diplomat can find a solution before the problem has arisen; a second-rate diplomat can find a solution after a problem has arisen; but a person who can do neither is simply not a diplomat.” This statement accurately sums up Wu's conviction that any problem was capable of resolution by professional diplomats.

1. "His Excellency Wu Ting-fang," World's Work 1 (Dec. 1900): 177.

2. Wu's own analogy. See New York Times (hereafter cited as NYT), 16 Dec. 1900, p. 2.

3. Fu Bingchang, Fangwen jilu, pp. 19b–21.'

103

104

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Wu's hopes for the future were also pinned to the reform movement in China. The Kiaochow Incident of November 1897 and the scramble for concessions that followed proved a powerful stimulus to the reform movement. Deeply affected by the crisis, the Guangxu Emperor issued an edict on 17 December exhorting all officials, whether of high status or low, to present their plans for reform, especially plans for military regeneration.* Wu responded immediately by drafting several memorials for the Court's appraisal. Wu's most important memorial dealt with the missionary crisis, and its contents reveal to us his outlook on the world situation and something of his expectations for the future.5 In this memorial, Wu contrasted the missionary enterprise with western commerce. One of China's gravest errors, he said, had been the signing of treaties that permitted missionaries to travel freely in the interior while restricting western businessmen to the treaty ports. Wu's opposition to the missionaries was expressed in rationalist terms. While the historical trend in the West itself was towards secularism and skepticism, the missionaries who came to China were, in his view, religious fanatics. They disrupted the social order by stirring up gullible converts to a fever pitch of religiosity. Wherever the missionaries penetrated, their converts subverted the populace and resisted local authorities, arousing the righteous indignation of the masses who then directed their anger at the missionaries in spontaneous, unpredictable outbursts.

The key to preventing the incidents, in Wu's view, was to end the system of extraterritoriality. Foreigners defended the system with two arguments: first, since merchants and other foreigners were restricted to the treaty ports and foreign concessions, they should be subject only to the authority of their own consuls; second, by western standards Chinese legal punishments were too severe and foreigners would not willingly submit to them.

Wu felt that both these objections could be dealt with reasonably, following the example set by Japan in renegotiating its treaties with the western powers. Wu's first suggestion was that the Zongli Yamen make public all existing commercial agreements with the various foreign nations and then adopt a uniform standard for commercial relations with all nations. This proposal would have forced the Court to make public the secret arrangements that Li Hongzhang had concluded with Russia the year before and would prevent other nations—such as Germany-from pressuring the Court for similar secret concessions.

After this step, which was directed against the Russian presence in Manchuria and North China, Wu then proposed that the Court announce the opening of all China to trade and residence of every foreign nation on an equal basis, according to a pre-arranged timetable. Such a step would end the necessity for treaty ports and foreign concessions, and it should be possible

4. Edict of 17 Dec. 1897 (GX 23/111/24), reprinted in Wuxu Bianfa 2:6–7.

5. Wu Tingfang, “Jiaoan diqi neizhi wuquan. . . .” 10 Feb. 1898 (GX 24/1/20), Qingji waijiao shiliao 129:13-16.

Promise and Disappointment in America 1897–1902

105

to do away with them completely in one or two decades. Pointing to the recent war in which treaty ports and concessions were neutral and thus spared from hostilities, Wu suggested that the new policy would reduce the danger of war among the powers in China. Again citing the example of Japan, he stated that in actuality the Court stood little to lose by this gesture, for most foreign merchants would remain in the coastal cities rather than venture into the interior, where poor transportation made trade uncertain and unprofitable. Wu was confident that the foreign nations would respond favorably to the plan and see in it the Court's determination to turn over a new leaf and dedicate itself to modernization.

For Wu, opening China to foreign commerce was more than a mere tactic to control missionaries. He saw the development of international trade as a prerequisite for China's progress. Provided that China's new treaties with the western powers follow Japan's in granting the Court the right to levy protective tariffs, Wu felt that foreign trade was a potential stimulus to the domestic economy. On the importance of commerce in nation building, he wrote:

In studying the various western nations, whether their governing principles date one hundred, several hundred or a thousand years back, commerce is always the basis upon which the nation is established. I have never heard of commerce ruining a nation or of a nation being seized in its name.6

In presenting the western missionary enterprise as out of step and reactionary in a western context, Wu was proposing "commerce” as a progressive alternative. By opening China to western commerce, the nation was to be opened to the most enlightened influences in the western world itself. In Wu's schema, the Christian missionaries were equated with indigenous heterodox religions as emotionalist, while commerce was equated with the rationalist orthodoxy in China and viewed as a progressive force in history. While Christian missionaries were seen as socially disruptive, Wu envisaged commerce as potentially beneficial to the people and a universal basis of nation building; hence, a new basis for social stability.

In addition to opening the nation to western commerce, Wu also proposed dealing with Westerners' objections to the severity of Chinese law. He reminded the Court that the Qing code itself was the product of many centuries and reflected the necessities of differing historical circumstances. He conceded that it would be undesirable to impose western standards upon the Chinese codes in an arbitrary fashion, but he felt that a compromise solution could be negotiated together with western authorities in China. If China were to reexamine its codes and reduce the severity of punishments in each category of criminal behavior, western jurists in China might also provide stiffer sentences in their courts, thereby minimizing the vast discrepancies between the two legal systems in practice.

6. Ibid.,

15.

106

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

As the first step, Wu resurrected the 1877 proposal for the establishment of a commercial code based upon western law. Again he expressed his conviction that this modest, almost symbolic beginning would be viewed by the western powers as evidence of the Court's dedication to major legal reforms, with the result that a new era in Sino-Western relations would be ushered in and China would assume its rightful place as an equal nation.

Wu's memorial was marked by his pragmatism. The core of the missionary problem lay in the loss of sovereignty, and every other issue diminished in significance next to that situation. If law reforms were necessary in order to abolish extraterritoriality, then law reform it would be. The pragmatism embodied in Wu's approach enabled him to circumvent every issue of principle other than the central one of sovereignty. Wu thus dispensed with problems such as the intrinsic merits or defects in the Qing code, the symbolic nature of punishments, the role of law in upholding the traditional social order, or any other knotty issue implied by legal reform.

Wu's memorial also illustrates his profound absorption of British standards and values. The opening of China to international trade was in part a stratagem to cope with the menace posed by Russia and its new ally in China, Germany. At the same time that Britain was beginning to sound out the United States about the possibility of maintaining an "open door" in China to halt the trend towards the disintegration of the Empire into rival spheres of influence, Wu was proposing that the Court seize that very initiative and do so itself. In this respect Wu saw Britain and China in harmony against the threat posed by Russian policies.

More significantly, Wu was expressing the nineteenth-century British conviction that laissez-faire economic policies, in which free rein is given to a vigorous merchantry, constituted the basis of Britain's rise to power and the major source of its wealth. Wu's outlook was characterized by his conviction that British-style imperialism, seeking trade but rejecting territorial acquisitions in China, would contribute to China's economic development. With the precedent of Hong Kong's expansion through Sino-Western commerce in mind, Wu assumed that China's economy would likewise expand through increased trade as Chinese merchants and shippers would develop the capital necessary for industrialization.

Implicit in Wu's outlook was the assumption that relations between China and western imperialism were fundamentally compatible. This assumption led him to minimize the disruptive effects of imperialism in China. In discussing China's situation, he asked why it was that a tiny European nation like Switzerland was able to maintain its independence in the midst of powerful neighbors, while enormous China should be subject to repeated aggression. Wu's explanation was in the “natural human feelings" of curiosity and jealousy in facing a deep, dark mystery. Since nations like Switzerland had opened themselves to foreign commerce, they had nothing to fear. Hence China's solution lay in opening up the nation and dispelling the mystery. Although other nationalists a few years hence would see western imperialism as the product of external forces of enormous magnitude, such as nationalism or

Promise and Disappointment in America 1897-1902

107

finance capital, Wu was able to dispense with the problem, in effect, by discussing it in these psychological terms.

The assumption that Sino-Western relations were fundamentally harmonious also led Wu to minimize the profound differences between China and the western world. This tendency is reflected in Wu's pragmatic approach to legal reforms, with his conviction that great discrepancies in the two legal systems could be minimized in practice, as it is also to be found in his implicit linking of Confucian rationalism with the progressive forces of "commerce" in the West.

Wu's memorial is also noteworthy in its assumption that the progressive forces of "commerce" in the West outweigh the reactionary ones symbolized by the missionaries. Wu's assumptions of Sino-Western harmony led him to the view that in the western world there was a group of rational, pragmatic policy makers who were the counterparts to China's rational, pragmatic elite. As men of the same stripe, they should all be willing to negotiate their differences on a basis of equality and mutual trust. All China had to do, in effect, was to evince its determination to turn over a new leaf by symbolic declarations calling for law reform and the opening of China to international commerce. Wu's enlightened counterparts would then be ready, so he believed, to negotiate the abolition of their privileged status in China. Patience and flexibility could, it seems, solve almost any problem. Wu's memorial on the missionary problem expressed his deeply held conviction that negotiation by skilled diplomats such as himself would meet with a positive response from his western counterparts, and that a new era of equality in Sino-Western relations would soon be forthcoming.

Yet the key to the solution lay in Beijing and the reform movement among high officials. Wu's memorial was carefully considered. In spite of its far- reaching implications, the immediate changes proposed in the memorial were quite moderate. If only one or two provinces such as Guangdong or Jiangsu were at first opened to international trade, probably little change would immediately result. Likewise, in the case of legal reforms, the project to establish a commercial code was least disruptive to the entire corpus of Qing law, for it was one for which the traditional code was clearly least adaptable.

At a meeting of the Zongli Yamen on 25 March 1898, Weng Tonghe proposed that China follow Wu's plan by voluntarily opening its major ports to all nations on an equal basis and providing naval facilities to accommodate foreign shipping. In turn, China could then bargain with the foreign powers and obtain their pledges to respect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity. This plan was especially attractive in view of Great Britain's decision in February 1898 to demand control over Weihaiwei. After a fierce debate, however, Weng's proposal was dropped and the pro-Russian policy of the Court continued to hold sway. For the time being at least, Wu's views on foreign policy would not be implemented, but at least they were being listened to."

7. Guo Tingyi, Shishi rizhi 2:994.

108

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

On 25 April Wu was ordered to proceed with the project to establish a commercial code. He was to take charge of the investigation of the various western and Japanese codes, to compile the composite code based on the best features of each and to present his proposals to the Zongli Yamen for its consideration. At last, the plan first proposed for Wu by Li Hongzhang in 1877 was supported by the Emperor himself.

In addition to his memorial on the missionary crisis, Wu wrote three other memorials in spring 1898. In one, he proposed that western principles of military organization be used in troop training, that advanced weaponry be purchased from Europe and America, and that the nation's military strength be developed on a national basis rather than on a regional basis, with troop levels evenly distributed at all frontiers. Wu's memorial was referred to the Grand Council for its consideration, along with others written during the same period on military reform.9

In another memorial, Wu proposed a stamp tax to be levied on books, deeds, contracts, leases, receipts and banking transactions, similar to the type used in The Netherlands and in British colonies such as Hong Kong. Wu saw the tax as an easy way to provide direct funds for self-strengthening projects. Prior to his departure from China in 1896, Wu had discussed this plan with Weng Tonghe, who supported it when it arose for consideration at a meeting of the Zongli Yamen. The plan was approved by the Yamen and then by the Emperor, but circumstances prevented its immediate implementation.10

Wu's fourth memorial of spring 1898 proposed that an informal alliance of friendship and goodwill be formed with the United States. In this memorial, Wu wrote that America had been relatively friendly to China and had not been aggressive in promoting its commercial interests in Asia. The United States, he continued, was loosely allied with Britain but had observed international law by refusing to annex overseas territories and not joining the European powers in demands on China. If a crisis were to arise in China's relations with the European powers, Wu suggested that American arbitration would serve China's interests. Additional benefits for China could come in the form of technical personnel and machinery to replace that which had previously been supplied by Germany. Wu said he had spoken with high- ranking American military figures who expressed sympathy with China's plight and were willing to provide technical assistance.11

8. Decree, 25 Apr. 1898 (GX 24/int.3/5), Shilu 417:3800a.

9. Decree, 14 Apr. 1898 (GX 24/3/24), ibid. 416:3794b; Guangxu chao donghua lu, ed. Zhu Shoupeng, rev. Zhang Jinglu (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1958) (hereafter cited as DHL), 4:4070. See also Ralph Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 1895–1912 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), pp. 91-93.

10. Wu Tingfang, “Choukuan weijian.

1 June 1898 (GX 24/4/13), Qingji waijiao shiliao

131:13-15; Decree, 1 June 1898, Shilu 418:3810b.

11. Wu Tingfang, “Chaoting jiecai yidi; dang yi Meiguo weiyi,” 10 Feb. 1898 (GX 24/1/20), Qingji waijiao shiliao 129:16–17; Decree, 13 Apr. 1898 (GX 24/3/23), Shilu 416:3794a.

Promise and Disappointment in America 1897–1902

109

Wu's memorial had been written in support of his policy of promoting American railway investments in China. Before leaving China early in 1897, Wu had joined with Sheng Xuanhuai, Director-General of Railways and an old colleague of his from Li's mufu, in declaring his preference for American capital and technicians to develop the Lu-Han, or Beijing-Hankou Railway. Wu and Sheng saw America as a relatively weak and friendly power among the imperialist giants. As a somewhat independent power, America might prove less objectionable to Russia, they hoped, than would Britain.12

While in Shanghai en route to America, Wu had met several times with the representatives of an American syndicate, the American China Development Company, in a vain attempt to persuade them to abandon their demand for control of the railway's management.13 The negotiations with the American syndicate failed, in the end, largely because Wu and Sheng were unable to obtain the backing either of Li Hongzhang, who was following a pro-Russian foreign policy, or Zhang Zhidong, who was afraid that Russia would be antagonized by the American contract unless China could demonstrate that control lay firmly in its own hands.14 The Lu-Han contract was finally signed with a Belgian syndicate. Belgium was loosely allied with the Franco-Russian bloc, but Wu and Sheng hoped that China would retain control of the line, although ultimately it did not.15

Upon Wu's departure for America, Sheng instructed him to undertake discreet negotiations with the American China Development Company for the financing of the southern part of the North-South trunk line, from Hankou south to Guangzhou (Yue-Han). Wu's first year in Washington was in part spent in fitful and largely fruitless negotiations with the company's major promoters, Clarence Cary and W. D. Washburn. As Wu later reminisced:

It was only after nearly twelve months of hard work, of careful explanation and much persuasion, that I succeeded in finding a capitalist who was prepared to discuss the matter and make the loan.1

By January 1898 Wu's negotiations with the company had begun to take shape, and he cabled Sheng urging him to obtain Imperial approval for the

12. See Zongli Yamen's memorial with Sheng's statement appended establishing the railway enterprise, 20 Oct. 1896 (GX 22/9/14), Qingji waijiao shiliao 123:6–13; on Wu's views see Reed to Rockhill, 24 Dec. 1896, U.S. Dept. of State, “CD: Tientsin, 1877–1896.”

13. Sheng to Zongli Yamen, 8 Jan. 1897 (GX 22/12/6); Sheng to Zhang Zhidong, 11 Jan. 1897 (GX 22/12/9); Sheng to Zongli Yamen, 14 Jan. 1897 (GX 22/12/12), Sheng Xuanhuai, Yuzhai cun'gao 25:29-30.

14. On Li Hongzhang's railway policies see Thomas J. McCormick, The China Market: America's Quest for Informal Empire, 1893–1901 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967), pp. 80-81; Marilyn Blatt Young, The Rhetoric of Empire: American China Policy, 1895-1901 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 56ff. On Zhang's attitude see Zhang to Sheng, 19 Jan. 1897 (GX 22/12/17), Yuzhai cun'gao 25:22; Michael H. Hunt, Frontier Defense and the Open Door: Manchuria in Chinese-American Relations, 1895–1911 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 40-41.

15. Texts of the agreements in Qingji waijiao shiliao 125:16–21.

16. Wu Tingfang, America Through the Spectacles, pp. 71–72.

110

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

American venture. Sheng and the railway's two sponsors, Zhang Zhidong and Wang Wenshao, Governor-General of Zhili, memorialized to request that Wu be permitted to negotiate a loan of £4 million with American financiers. Since this marked the first instance in which negotiations of this type were to be conducted in a foreign capital rather than with the ministers of the Zongli Yamen in Beijing, both Zhang and Sheng praised Wu's accomplishments and assured the Court that he would take special pains to obtain the contract, since as a Cantonese he was both knowledgeable about the West and also had a vested interest in seeing the line linking Guangdong with North China.17

Wu sent Sheng and Zhang a draft agreement in mid-March, providing very generous terms for the American China Development Company, including the concession to supervise the railway's construction and to operate it during the first fifty-year loan period.18 The draft was unfavorably received by Zhang and the Zongli Yamen. When Wu reported that the American syndicate would not abandon its demand to construct and manage the line, Zhang favored dropping negotiations with them, much to the dismay of Wu and Sheng. Wu sent cable after cable to Sheng urging him to persuade Zhang to agree to the company's terms, especially in view of the crisis brewing between the United States and Spain over Cuba, which might have had a bad effect upon the prospects for American investment in China. Wu's persistence is an index of his strong desire to prevent the entire North-South trunk line from falling under Russian domination.19

In spite of Zhang's opposition, the Qing Court finally accepted Wu's draft contract, and it was signed on 14 April 1898. The American syndicate undertook to float market bonds totaling £4 million, issued at 5% interest, and was granted the right to supervise the line's construction, to operate it during the first fifty-year period, and to receive 20% of its profits. The syndicate also secured generous side benefits enabling it to construct branch lines, mines and other enterprises, and also an option to finance the Lu-Han line if the Belgian contract were subsequently invalidated.2

Wu's success with the railway contract occurred as the reform movement gathered momentum, peaking in the "One Hundred Days of Reform” of summer 1898. Wu was not closely associated with Kang Youwei's clique. He was considerably older than many of them and did not share their background of classical studies and civil service as a path of official advancement. Wu had tried to recruit Liang Qichao to serve on his staff before leaving China in December

17. Zhang Zhidong memorial, 26 Jan. 1898 (Gx 24/1/5), Zhang Wenxianggong quanji (1937; reprint, Taibei: Wenhai, 1963) (hereafter cited as Zhang Zhidong, Quanji), “Zougao,” 47:3–5; Sheng Xuanhuai memoral, 26 Jan. 1898, Yuzhai cun'gao 2:9–11.

18. Wu to Sheng, 14 Mar. 1898 (GX 24/2/22), Sheng, Yuzhai cun’gao 69:40.

19. Zhang to Sheng, 30 Mar. 1898 (GX 24/3/9), ibid. 31:21–22; Wang Wenshao et al. to Zongli Yamen, 31 Mar. 1898 (GX 24/3/10), China, Foreign Ministry, Waijiao dang’an, “Cables received.” On the question of a kickback, see Chapter 5, pp.162–63.

20. Text of the contract in MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements 1:146–52. See also William R. Braisted, "The United States and the America China Development Company,” Far Eastern Quarterly 11 (Feb. 1952): 149–65; Marilyn B. Young, Rhetoric of Empire, p. 90.

Promise and Disappointment in America 1897-1902

111

1896. Liang at first had accepted and even received 1,000 taels as advance travel funds, but then changed his mind, presumably because Wu was unwilling to hire his radical comrades as well. Their association came to an end at that time.2

Although Wu was not a part of the reformers' clique, he nevertheless sympathized with them. While legal reform was not greatly emphasized by Kang and Liang, it was a part of their reform program,22 and they were responsive to the needs and problems of overseas Chinese, an issue that touched directly upon Wu's position as Minister abroad and about which he had strong personal feelings.23 On 2 August Wu received a telegraphic edict. ordering him to speed up his investigations of western and Japanese law codes and to send his draft to the Zongli Yamen as soon as possible.24 Here indeed was concrete evidence of the Court's desire to embark upon a program of legal reform. Soon after, on 21 August, the Court took special notice of the talents of Wu and his colleague Luo Fenglu, along with the Qing Minister to France, Qingchang. As persons expert in the English and French languages and literatures, they were requested to compile selected translations from the most important works in those languages and send them to the Zongli Yamen.25 Here was proof that the Court was approaching foreign-trained officials in a more open-minded fashion.

The coup of 21 September and the failure of the reform movement were a severe blow to Wu. Whatever mistakes in judgment the young reformers had made, they had been on the right path. Wu's relationship with the Court, which had just begun to flourish, was broken off. Wu's disappointment over these events in China was followed by a series of distressing events in the United States: the extension of the Chinese Exclusion Laws to Hawaii in 1898 and to the Philippines in 1899, and the rise of anti-Chinese hysteria during the Boxer Uprising in 1900. These developments led Wu to a drastic reappraisal of China and its relations with the western world.

Chinese Exclusion

The Exclusion Laws aroused especially bitter feelings in Wu. During the years Wu spent in the United States, he received continuous reports from Chinese in America about all manner of abuses, ranging from insults to mob

21. Ding Wenjiang, Liang Rengong xiansheng nianpu changbian chugao (Taibei: Shijie, 1958), 1:32– 33. Liang's letter to Wu is reprinted in Liang Qichao, Yinbingshi wenji (Shanghai, 1933; reprint, Taibei: Zhonghua, 1960), 3:4–8. Liang later went to Hunan with three Cantonese assistants whose radicalism soon was cause for concern for Zhang Zhidong and other reform-minded officials. See Daniel H. Bays, China Enters the Twentieth Century: Chang Chih-tung and the Issues of a New Age, 1895– 1909 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1978), pp. 39–41.

22. See, e.g., Liang Qichao, Yinbingshi wenji 1:93–94; Kang Youwei's “Sixth Letter to the Emperor," in Wuxu Bianfa 2:200.

23. Liang's letter to Wu, cited in n. 20.

24. Decree, 2 Aug. 1898 (GX 24/6/15), Shilu 421:3845a.

25. Decree, 21 Aug. 1898 (GX 24/7/5), ibid. 423:3857a.

112

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

violence. Indeed, he himself had been subject to abuse. Soon after his arrival in the United States, Wu's carriage was chased on three separate occasions by youthful crowds in New York. He was pelted with rocks and garbage while the mob shouted abuses at him, and no policeman would come to his aid.26

Wu requested that the New York City police post warnings in the area where these incidents had occurred threatening to arrest persons who molested Chinese. "If such a thing had happened in China," he wrote the Secretary of State, "the offenders would have been punished on the spot, and proclamations at once posted all along the route warning others against a repetition of the offense."27

Herein, for Wu, lay the significant point. While anti-Chinese incidents in themselves may have been understandable, as anti-foreign incidents in China were, the vast discrepancy between the Chinese methods for handling them and those in America could not be ignored, for it reflected the unequal status of China in its relations with the western nations. When foreigners in China were assaulted, their governments threatened the Court with punitive measures and then blackmailed it into granting enormous concessions. By contrast, high Chinese officials in the United States were subjected to indignities such as no foreign official in China would have silently endured, only to be told by the Secretary of State that the Federal Government was "powerless, under our complex systems of government, to guard against such things." The Secretary of State expressed his regrets over the incident and asked Wu to inform him of future trips to New York, so that the authorities there might be notified and urged to take “proper precautions” against a similar occurrence. Yet while Wu himself might be guarded against such an incident, presumably through a police escort, he could not claim satisfaction for the Chinese in America as a group.

Chinese in the United States had also been subjected to considerable harassment in the enforcement of the Exclusion Laws. Soon after his arrival in Washington Wu received reports from outraged Chinese in Seattle and Denver, and later Portland, Oregon, of wholesale raids by immigration inspectors upon Chinese ghettos. Acting without warrants, the inspectors entered Chinese homes and business establishments, at times herding the Chinese off to jail while the searches were conducted. Those Chinese who could not immediately produce their registration papers were subject to deportation, but the Chinese residents claimed that such raids actually netted few illegal immigrants.29

26. Wu to Sherman, 8 July 1897, “NFCL”; Sherman to Wu, 8 July 1897, no. 7; 17 July (unofficial); 21 Aug. 1897, no. 3, U.S. Dept. of State, “Notes to Foreign Legations: China," M-92 (U.S. National Archives) (hereafter cited as “NTFL”).

27. Wu to Sherman, 1 Sept. 1897, “NFCL.”

28. Sherman to Wu, 27 Sept. 1897, no. 16, “NTFL.”

29. On the Seattle incident see cable from Seattle Chung Wah Hoi Kuan [Zhonghua Huiguan] to Wu, 29 Sept. 1897, in “NFCL”; on the Denver incident see Wu to Sherman, 30 Nov. 1897, no. 40, ibid.; on the Portland incident see cable from Jong Wah Association [Zhonghua Huiguan] in Portland to Wu, 8 Jan. 1899, ibid.

Promise and Disappointment in America 1897–1902

113

Wu complained bitterly against such incidents, arguing that the enforcement of the Exclusion Laws in this fashion was contrary both to the spirit and the letter of Sino-American treaties. What especially rankled Wu was the way that these incidents revealed China's unequal status in the family of nations.3o Even though Wu complained that these incidents amounted to "cruel persecution" of the Chinese populace in America, the Secretary of the Treasury invariably supported his subordinates against Wu's charges.31

A major setback for Wu occurred in summer 1898 when both houses of Congress passed a joint resolution to apply the Chinese Exclusion Laws to Hawaii. After cabling the Qing Court with an urgent plea to reestablish its consulate in Honolulu,32 Wu prepared a major brief urging Congress to reconsider its resolution. The brief included petitions from the Chinese in Hawaii and a long memorandum in which he predicted that the extension of the laws to the islands would result in “uncalled-for discrimination and manifest injustice. "33

Wu's actions were ignored, however. In October 1898 the Attorney General ruled to implement the Congressional joint resolution, even though Wu's brief and memorandum were at that very time still under consideration by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Wu wrote to Secretary of State John Hay (1838-1905) protesting this and other rulings by the Attorney General on Chinese exclusion. Wu was insulted that he had not even been consulted on these rulings and protested the entire way the Exclusion Laws were being implemented. Hay was notified that Wu would direct his government to renegotiate the Sino-American treaty when it was due to expire in 1904.35

Hay sought to mollify Wu. After consulting with the Attorney General and the Treasury Department, under whose jurisdiction lay immigration matters, Hay proposed that certain cases be brought forth for judicial decision. But Wu refused to be party to such a suit or even recognize the validity of any domestic tribunal, even if it were the U.S. Supreme Court, in deciding matters that in his opinion could be settled only through negotiation. Wu's position was that the United States was bound to its treaty obligations, no matter what the American Congress or Supreme Court decided.36

A major weapon used by the imperialist nations in China was the insistence that China honor its treaties no matter what difficulties were encountered in their enforcement. The Qing Government had thereby been forced to

30. Wu to Sherman, 4 Jan. 1898, no. 51, ibid.

31. Wu to Hay, 23 Jan. 1899, no. 119, ibid.; Sherman to Wu, 12 Nov., no. 25; 19 Jan. 1898, no. 39; Hay to Wu, 13 Apr. 1899, no. 96; 15 Apr. 1899, no. 97, “NTFL.”

32. Wu Tingfang memorial, 15 Sept. 1898 (GX 24/7/30), Qingji waijiao shiliao 134:20; Shilu 425:3889b.

33. Wu to Hay, 12 Dec. 1898, no. 110, “NFCL.”

34. Hay to Wu, 16 Nov., 14 Dec. 1898, nos. 68, 70, “NTFL.”

35. Wu to Hay, 7 Nov. 1898, no. 108, “NFCL.”

36. Wu to Hay, 25 Jan. 1899, no. 130, ibid.

114

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

suppress anti-missionary and anti-foreign uprisings at the cost of unpopularity, unrest and loss of political legitimacy. As Wu saw it, the situation in America was similar, for the anti-Chinese movement could be likened to Chinese anti- foreignism. If relations between the two nations were to be conducted on a basis of equality, the American Government should certainly, in his estimation, deal more effectively and sternly with anti-Chinese sentiment.37

An even greater blow to Wu was the extension of the Exclusion Laws to the Philippines. On 26 September 1898, the commander of American forces in the Philippines during the Spanish-American War, Major General Otis, had promulgated a law implementing Chinese exclusion in the islands, although the news was not made public in the United States. Due in part to a mix-up over the establishment of a Chinese Consulate in Manila, Wu was not officially informed of the new application of the laws for several months, but unofficial reports trickled through to him.

In early February 1899 Wu wrote Hay inquiring about American policy with respect to Chinese immigration to the Philippines. Wu cited the large Chinese population in the islands, its long history there, the degree of intermarriage with the Philippine population, and the interlocking commercial interests between China, especially Fujian Province, and the Philippines, as reasons why the Exclusion Laws should not be applied there.38

Secretary of State John Hay may have been caught unawares by Otis's extension of the Exclusion Laws to the Philippines, for he replied to Wu's note by stating that the subject was having the "most careful consideration" by the American Government, and that a “definite response" on the matter must await the end of American military occupation and the decision of the Philippine Commission. Soon after, Hay notified Wu that the Secretary of War had cabled Otis informing him of the Chinese Government's anxiety for the safety of the Chinese in the Philippines, with instructions to extend them "all practicable protection,” in accord with Wu's request.

This response apparently convinced Wu that the matter of Chinese immigration to the Philippines was as yet undecided. But in July 1899 Wu was shocked to receive a cable from the Chinese Consul in Manila informing him that the Exclusion Laws were being enforced there. When his inquiry on the matter brought forth no answer, Wu visited Acting Secretary of State Adee in person to ask whether the application of the laws in the Philippines was American policy or General Otis's temporary policy. For the first time Wu was officially informed that the Exclusion Laws had been in effect for nearly a year, and that both the War and Treasury Departments concurred that the application of the laws was "incident to the military administration of the Philippine Islands during a state of hostilities therein and therefore without prejudice to the future action of Congress.

37. Ibid.; Hay to Wu, 23 Jan. 1899, no. 79, “NTFL.”

38. Wu to Hay, 3 Feb. 1899, no. 122, “NFCL.”

"940

39. Hay to Wu, 6 and 11 Feb. 1899, nos. 86, 87, “NTFL.”

40. Adee to Wu, 18 Aug. 1899, unnumbered, ibid.

Promise and Disappointment in America 1897-1902

115

Wu told Hay that the news of the extension of the laws there was "not a little surprise." Hay replied by suggesting that Wu's surprise might be due to the fact that Otis's "military measures" had "worked without friction or hardship." Hay further stated that as of July Otis had reported that "past difficulties existing between Chinese consuls and different Chinese ports were being harmonized, and that any change from existing methods was not recommended.”41

Outraged, Wu launched a formal protest on 12 September disagreeing with Hay's contention that the laws were working smoothly. He noted that his previous inquiry of February 1899 had been answered in such a way as to leave the impression that the matter would remain unsettled until the Philippine Commission had made its report. In this “most earnest and solemn protest," Wu disputed the need for Chinese exclusion from the islands as a military measure, argued that it represented a departure from the President's policy of leaving the status of newly acquired possessions unchanged until Congress determined their relationship to the United States, and stated that the laws would result in a great injustice to a “numerous body” of Chinese.42 As the New York Times commented, Wu's note was couched in the "most dignified and courteous terms, but . . . so pointed that no doubt is left as to the deep umbrage the Chinese Government feels over the administration of General Otis. "43

Wu began to use his public-speaking occasions to get his views on Chinese exclusion and its application to the Philippines known to the American public. In mid-October Wu addressed the International Commercial Congress meeting in Philadelphia and spoke almost entirely about the issue. In this and subsequent talks, Wu held out the promise of expanded trade between China and the United States but suggested that it hinged upon reciprocity between the two nations. Unless the United States treated China fairly in repealing the exclusion legislation, especially as applied in the Philippines, commercial relations between China and the United States were not likely to improve.1

During the same conference Wu rose to a point of privilege to challenge a speaker who suggested that the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Laws would result in the immediate flooding of the United States with all 400 million Chinese. While Wu may have been willing even a year earlier to recognize the economic arguments against “cheap Chinese labor" in America, he also knew that Denis Kearney and other anti-Chinese politicians would not be able to arouse such antipathy towards the Chinese had not they also been called "heathen" and "yellow."45 Defending the Chinese laborers, he said:

41. Wu to Hay, 1 Sept. 1899, unnumbered, “NFCL”; Hay to Wu, 4 Sept. 1899, unnumbered, "NTFL."

42. Wu to Hay, 12 Sept. 1899, no. 148, “NFCL.”

43. NYT, 19 Sept. 1899, p.

44. Ibid., 19 Oct. 1899, p. 7.

45. Ibid., 25 Feb. 1899, p. 6.

116

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

These men do not rob you. They work day and night and make faithful servants. I admit that they want to make a few dollars and go home, but is not that just what you Americans who come to China want?46

Although Wu began to become well known to the American public, he could not claim satisfaction. In an address delivered to the American Asiatic Association at its annual banquet in January 1900, Wu first publicly discussed the possibility of a boycott of American goods:

If you want to have a share of China's trade, a good deal depends on the kind of treatment you extend to my country, and especially in your new possessions....

... I should not be surprised if some of my countrymen, in view of the exclusion, should boycott some American goods, but I hope this may not occur.'

Wu's aim in this and other addresses was to reach the commercial community in hopes that it would exert pressure on Congress. Likewise, Wu continued to use diplomatic protests in an effort to influence Congress. In May 1900 Wu filed his third and most vigorous protest over the application of the Exclusion Laws to the Philippines. Hay sent Wu's protest along with his earlier notes to Congress for its consideration when the Philippines question arose, but Wu lost the battle to reverse Otis's decision.48

There was little else to alleviate Wu's distress. Even the “Open Door" notes were not the definitive statement from the United States that he had hoped for, and Wu's expectations for a positive, active American role in China were not materializing. The difficulties Wu was having with the American China Development Company over the Yue-Han railway concession are illustrative. After several delays the company finally succeeded in surveying a small portion of the proposed route, only to inform Sheng and Wu that the loan agreement would have to be renegotiated before work could proceed. The company's vacillation and inability to fulfill its commitments was symptomatic of the relative weakness of American capital during that period.49 Clearly, Wu had been as overly sanguine about the prospects for American investment in China as he had been about the prospects for an expanded American political role in Asia.

46. Ibid., 19 Oct. 1899, p. 7.

47. "China: The Greatest Potential Market in One World,” Journal of the American Asiatic Association 1 (1900): 73–74. See also this in ibid., pp. 13-14.

48. Wu to Hay, 7 May 1900, no. 180, “NFCL”; Hay to Wu, 24 May 1900, no. 141, “NTFL.” Wu's protests are printed as Senate Document no. 397, 56th Congress, 1st session, "Papers Relative to the Status of Chinese in the Philippine Islands, 23 May 1900.”

49. A point made by McCormick, The China Market, as indicative of the entire period, and by Hunt, Frontier Defense and the Open Door, pp. 42–44.

Promise and Disappointment in America 1897-1902

Christ and Confucius

117

The hostile reaction of the American public to the Boxer crisis in summer 1900 profoundly shook Wu. Wu worked in concert with a coalition of high Qing officials in South and Central China who did their best to maintain open communication with the foreign powers in an effort to prevent a total collapse of dynastic power.50 Fortunately, the United States proved most willing to accept the quasi-fiction that the fighting was caused by rebellious subjects who had induced a state of "virtual anarchy" in Beijing, as expressed in the American circular telegram of 3 July 1900, the second "Open Door" note.5

Wu quickly perceived that the only way to prevent the foreign occupation of Beijing was to assure the foreign powers that their diplomats were safe. The fate of the foreign diplomats was the subject of intense speculation in the American press. In view of the confusion reigning and the unwillingness of the American public to believe information that Wu received from China asserting that the ministers were safe, he decided to seek proof in terms that the American public would accept. He wrote to Sheng Xuanhuai asking him to devise means to get a ciphered message from the State Department to U.S. Minister Conger in Beijing, and then to get Conger's reply transmitted to Washington.52 At the same time, Wu wrote a strongly worded memorial to the Throne urging it to protect the foreign ministers and other foreigners in China.53

Wu's efforts brought results on 20 July when he received Conger's ciphered reply dated 16 July. Conger's telegram said that the ministers were under siege but with the exception of German Minister Ketteler, they were all alive. Conger urged "quick relief” to “prevent general massacre."54 On the same day a letter from the Qing Emperor to President McKinley arrived, written in response to Wu's memorial. Expressing regret for the present situation, the message stated the hope that America would take the initiative in helping China out of the dilemma it was now in.55

Wu hoped that Conger's telegram and the Emperor's letter were evidence that the Qing Court had the situation in hand. Maybe it would be possible to prevent a foreign occupation after all. But the reaction of American officials and the press was that of disbelief. It was widely believed that the cables had been manufactured by Wu and the Qing Minister to London, Luo Fenglu. To

50. The activities of these officials are best described in Chester C. Tan, The Boxer Catastrophe (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955); Marilyn B. Young, Rhetoric of Empire, pp. 137–71.

51. Reprinted in U.S. Dept. of State, “United States Foreign Relations, 1900,” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1901), p. 299 (hereafter cited as “U.S. Foreign Relations, 1900”).

52. Ibid., p. 155; Wu to Hay, 11 July 1900, John Hay, Papers (Library of Congress).

53. Transmitted via Liu Kunyi and Yuan Shikai. See Yuan Shikai, Yangshouyuan zouyi jiyao (Taibei: Wenhai, 1966), 5:12.

54. Conger to Hay, 16 July 1900, “U.S. Foreign Relations, 1900,” p. 156.

55. Ibid.,

pp. 293-94.

118

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

settle the matter, Hay asked Wu to send a second dispatch to Conger in cipher asking him to reply with his sister's name as proof the cable was genuine.56

During the sixteen-day waiting period for Conger's reply, Wu worked feverishly to prevent the foreign occupation of Beijing. Hay and McKinley expressed their willingness to cooperate with anti-Boxer forces in China, if the latter could act decisively. In a letter from President McKinley to the Qing Emperor of 23 July, the U.S. Government set forth a three-point course of action for the Court to follow: (1) state whether the ministers were alive and their condition; (2) put them in immediate and free communication with their governments and remove all danger to them; and (3) place the Imperial authorities in communication with the relief expedition and cooperate with it for "the liberation of the legations, the protection of foreigners, and the restoration of order."57

Although Wu tried to mobilize support for the first two points, the situation in China either hinged upon Li Hongzhang or Yuan Shikai, both of whom were unwilling to take decisive steps. Yuan had long since rejected Sheng Xuanhuai's suggestion that he use his troops to rescue the the Emperor and Empress Dowager and restore order, while Li Hongzhang vacillated, in Sheng's opinion, because he was afraid of arousing Russian and German suspicions by working too closely with the Americans.58

After the Americans rejected Sheng's plan to arrange a cease-fire in exchange for the safe arrival of the ministers in Tianjin, Liu Kunyi cabled Li Hongzhang, Yuan Shikai, Zhang Zhidong, Sheng and others suggesting they all memorialize the Court to implement the three points. Yuan and Sheng did, but Li would not. In response to Wu's urgent requests, Li continued to evade the issue.59

Without Li's support, the Zongli Yamen would not press for free communication from the foreign ministers to their governments. Not until 5 August were the foreign diplomats permitted to send ciphered telegrams. The one-week delay dashed Wu's hopes of avoiding the foreign occupation of the capital. Conger's telegram dated 21 July arrived immediately, but it was too late to halt the advance of the relief expedition, now nearing Beijing.60

The relief expedition reached Beijing on 14 August, thereby ending the siege and ushering in a new era for China. As is well known, the Court fled to Xi'an while many parts of North China were occupied by foreign troops. In the weeks following the entrance of the eight nations' troops to the capital, there was much uncertainty about the direction China was to take in its relations with the powers and in its own internal politics.

56. Ibid., p. 156.

57. Ibid., pp. 294–95. Transmitted via Liu Kunyi and Yuan Shikai. See Wu to Liu, 25 July 1900 (GX 26/6/29), Sheng Xuanhuai, Yuzhai cun'gao 37:38; Yuan Shikai, Yangshouyuan, 6:1.

58. Sheng to Liu Kunyi, 29 July 1900 (GX 26/7/4), Sheng, Yuzhai cun'gao 38:10; Tan, Boxer Catastrophe, pp. 88–89.

59. Yuan to Sheng, 23 July 1900 (GX 26/6/27), Yuzhai cun 'gao 37:30; Wu to Li Hongzhang, 29, 30 and 31 July (GX 26/7/4, 5, 6,) Li, Quanji, “Dian’gao,” 24:7; Li to Wu, 29 July 1900, ibid. 24:6.

60. Wu to Li, 2 Aug. 1900 (GX 26/7/8), ibid. 14:17; Hay to Goodnow, 1 Aug. 1900, “U.S. Foreign Relations, 1900,” pp. 260–61; Conger to Hay, 21 July 1900, ibid., p. 156.

Promise and Disappointment in America 1897-1902

119

We know something of Wu's concerns during this period as the result of an interesting interview he had with Acting U.S. Secretary of State Hill. As its contents are revealing, it is worth citing a substantial portion of this document here:

Mr. Wu said he hoped that when negotiations were begun the treatment visited upon his pro-foreign friends in China would not be overlooked and that punishment for it would be demanded. He said that Chang Yen Hoon [Zhang Yinhuan], an ex-minister to the United States, a very intelligent man and a great friend of foreigners and for many years a member of the Tsung-li Yamen [Zongli Yamen] ... [had been exiled and executed,] also Hsu Chen Ching [Xu Jingzhen] had been executed. He said that the punishment of those ordering their execution ought to be insisted upon by the foreign governments in the course of the negotiations.

Mr. Hill asked the Minister who were responsible for these executions. He replied that undoubtedly the Empress Dowager and Prince Tuan [Prince Duan, Zaiyi] were in a sense responsible, but that Li Ping Hung [Li Bingheng] had impeached these two members of the Tsung-li- yamen as too friendly to foreigners and their deaths were ordered on this account. Mr. Hill asked the Minister if he thought it would be possible to punish the Empress Dowager and Prince Tuan for these acts. To this the Minister replied that the Empress Dowager might not be punished in person but that Prince Tuan ought to be; that the families of the beheaded ought to be compensated and the dead restored to their rank and dignity by posthumous declaration.

Mr. Hill asked the Minister if it was true that Prince Tuan had been appointed Grand Secretary. To this the Minister replied he could hardly believe it; it is the highest office in the Empire but a sinecure. Mr. Hill asked; "Why do you doubt it?" The Minister replied: "No prince of the royal blood has held that place. I think Prince Tuan may have been appointed a member of the Privy Council, which is more important. I fear he has been."

Mr. Hill asked the Minister if this would not increase the difficulty of negotiations. To this the Minister replied: “Yes, you must put the screws on." When Mr. Hill asked what it meant to put the screws on, the Minister said: "The punishment of the guilty must be absolutely insisted upon." He said that he thought the Empress Dowager ought to be brought back to Peking, but the Powers were behaving in such a way as to render it difficult if not impossible. She is now going further away and is, no doubt, afraid to come back. Every effort, he said, ought to be made to get the Imperial Court to come back to Peking. Mr. Hill asked what would be the most effective means of accomplishing this. He replied an assertion that the Empire would be dismembered if the Court did not come back, and that a return alone would save the Empire from loss of territory. He thought if “the screws were put on" the Imperial Government could be brought back and that was the essential beginning of the rehabilitation of the Emperor's authority.61

61. "Interview of Acting Secretary Hill with the Chinese Minister, 25 Sept. 1900," William McKinley, Papers (Library of Congress).

120

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Thus Wu, while anxious to assert China's national interests in its relations with the United States and the other foreign powers, nonetheless felt that they could play a positive role in China by forcing reform upon the state. Much as he had earlier expressed to British Consul Bristow in 1895 (see Chapter 3), Wu still looked to the West for help in reforming China so that it might achieve its just position of equality in its relations with the West.

In spite of the privately held views expressed in this interview, Wu's public statements revealed yet a different aspect of his outlook. With the recovery of Beijing on 14 August most of the drama ended for the American public. The press coverage frequently had a vindictive tone, and the Chinese were described as barbarous, depraved and insincere people. Wu had been brought into the public's view during the crisis and had been subjected to personal attacks in the press.

Wu was especially upset by charges that he and Luo Fenglu had not acted in good faith. The Beijing correspondent for The Times, George E. Morrison, who had been imprisoned in the legation quarters, angrily charged that Wu and Luo had manufactured "bogus edicts" to "throw dust" into the eyes of the public and western policy makers. These charges were readily believed by outraged Westerners in China and by the more vindictive sectors of the American public.

These charges evoked strong denials from Wu. In an interview in the New York Times in September, Wu reaffirmed the authenticity of the messages he received from China. Although he understood that Morrison's confinement had colored his attitude towards the Chinese Government, he thought that "as a gentleman, he ought to be careful in his statements and not to disseminate baseless gossip to the injury of others."63

In an article entitled “A Plea for Fair Treatment," Wu wrote of his dismay at the willingness of the American public to accept the fantastic and gruesome rumors that appeared in the press, when a “sober second thought should have questioned their authenticity." Any Chinese statements that the ministers were alive were merely discounted. "The prevailing opinion throughout Europe and America," wrote Wu, "seemed to be that all Chinese, whether high or low, were incapable of speaking the truth." He said he had been especially grieved to find that people familiar with China, who should have known better, made matters worse. One missionary, in fact, was reported to have stated that the entire legation had been killed and that Wu's “deceit and cunning" were to blame for the massacre, for he “knew of the impending disaster, but was too cunning to tell it." Such base accusations, Wu wrote, could only help those who want further international war in China [i.e., Russia]. He urged the public to “show a little forbearance in dealing with the Chinese," and to try to see things from the Chinese perspective instead of "judging Chinese ideas and doings by the Western standard."64

62. NCH, 3 Oct. 1900, pp. 699, 701.

63. NYT, 12 Sept. 1900, p. 7.

64. Wu Tingfang, “A Plea for Fair Treatment,” (dated 17 Aug.) Century Magazine 60 (Oct. 1900): 951-54.

Promise and Disappointment in America 1897–1902

121

The crisis also provided ample vindication for Wu. The State Department officials with whom Wu had dealt on a daily basis believed that he was acting in honorable fashion. On 29 July for example, Hay had written to President McKinley that Wu was "greatly perturbed in spirit, but seems to be acting squarely with us. He admits there are many things to explain. He does not attempt to account for the silence of the Legations, but believes the ministers except Ketteler, are alive. "65

Hay's trust was echoed by others. When the Morrison charges where publicized in late August and September, the New York Sun defended Wu against the “libel” and said that his actions during the summer had "strengthened, not weakened . . . confidence in his honorable character and diplomatic good faith. Mr. Wu has been under about as fierce a light as ever beat upon a Chinese gentleman. There have been times when appearances were against him; but from every trial his personal sincerity and personal trustworthiness have emerged unstained." And an official in the State Department told the press that Wu was “held in high esteem” by the U.S. Government. "No one can throw discredit upon Minister Wu and injure him here in Washington," he said, “and I believe that the American people appreciate the sterling qualities of the Minister of China and will back him up against any attack."66

Praise such as this enabled Wu to emerge from the Boxer crisis, surprisingly, in a stronger position vis-à-vis the American public. After a short respite Wu launched into the fray once more, embarking on a new round of speaking engagements to present the Chinese “case" to the American public and to blast the activities of the missionaries. The most extensive of Wu's speeches was an address delivered to the American Academy of Political and Social Science in November 1900 entitled "Causes of the Unpopularity of the Foreigner in China."67

In this talk he reiterated many of his earlier criticisms of the press coverage of the crisis and his indignation at Morrison's charges of deceit, but he attacked the missionaries and foreigners in China more directly than before. Wu described the callousness of foreign visitors who came to China for the sole purpose of acquiring fortunes, as well as the system of indemnities and privileged status that foreign gunboats had wrested from the Chinese, then rhetorically asked, “But supposing you were in the position of the Chinese people, would you, after such an experience, bear no ill-feeling but still entertain friendly sentiments, towards those who had thus treated you?”

Wu prefaced his remarks on the missionaries by stating that most of them were "respectable and honorable" people, having rendered China great services by their works in medicine, education and philanthropy. But some,

65. Hay to McKinley, 29 July 1900, Hay, Papers. For an expression of Wu's gratitude to Hay see Wu to Hay, 3 Aug. 1900, in “U.S. Foreign Relations, 1900,” p. 282.

66. New York Sun, 13 Sept. 1900, quoted in NCH, 7 Nov. 1900, pp. 1000–1001. Ibid., 12 Sept. 1900, quoted in NCH, 7 Nov. 1900, p. 1001.

67. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 17, no. 1 (Jan. 1901): 1–14.

122

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

he said, had been "indiscreet" because of their "excessive zeal," interfering with justice in Chinese courts and showing their contempt for Chinese traditions and customs. The display of contempt aroused the resentment of the people, and even if the Chinese did not show their feelings and retaliate, "their feeling against the offender is none the less strong."

Americans in China, Wu advised, should show more consideration and remember that "foreign ways are not always the best." Foreigners should try to understand the Chinese and their customs, remembering that "true politeness is the same in China as in Europe or America.” Although Chinese etiquette may seem complicated, “at the bottom of it lies a tenderness for the feelings of others." If foreigners refrain from treating Chinese as inferiors but "show their friendly feeling," it will "no doubt be reciprocated." Wu concluded his brief by asking foreigners in China to be more cosmopolitan and not judge China by western standards. "They should take account of both our good and our bad points, and give us credit for the former while making due allowance for the latter.” Only in this way could both sides profit from past "mistakes."

Speeches such as this received a good deal of publicity, especially as Wu continued to criticize the missionaries and charge that Christianity as a doctrine was obviously so "noble and grand that no weak and frail mortal, at least in our generation has been able to attain it. I am afraid that it has become a dead letter." Outraged clergymen took to pulpit and press to denounce Wu. As a non-Christian, one said, Wu was not qualified to judge Christian doctrine. The outcry over this aspect of Wu's speaking was so strong that Wu found it necessary to publicly reply and qualify his criticisms of the missionaries.68

Wu's views on the missionaries reflect the changes occurring in his world view as a result of his experiences in the United States. Even before the Boxer crisis Wu was becoming more critical of Anglo-Saxon culture than he had previously been.

As early as April 1899 in his first address to the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Wu had criticized missionaries and Westerners in general for ignoring China's good points and historical achievements.69 Considering the demise of other ancient civilizations-Egyptian, Persian, Greek and Roman-the endurance of Chinese civilization, he asserted, was surely a case of the “survival of the fittest.” In the Sino-Western encounter, two different social forces were meeting. Rather than seeing China being “neutralized” in the process (as western missionaries assumed), Wu said he expected to see a fusion of the two forces. Wu's goal was not the "westernization" of China but rather a mutual process of cultural fusion leading to the evolution of the entire world towards greater cosmopolitanism.

68. NYT, 16 Dec. 1900, p. 2; 29 Dec. 1900, p. 2; 28 Jan. 1901, p. 2; R. E. Speer, “Confucian Propaganda of Wu,” Missionary Review 24 (May 1901): 370–73.

69. Literary Digest 18 (22 Apr. 1899): 447–48.

Promise and Disappointment in America 1897–1902

123

Many of Wu's arguments revolved around the criticism that the western nations and their peoples had failed to live up to the ideals of their own civilization in their actions in China. This failure, for Wu, was clear evidence that Confucian and Mencian ethics constituted a superior basis of social and political behavior. Possession of advanced weaponry could not in itself constitute the basis of civilization, he insisted. Rather the proof of civilization was found in policies respecting the rights of other peoples and nations and in social behavior stressing tolerance and mutual respect. It would be better, he concluded, "to live among the people who practise the tenets of Confucius and Mencius than among a people who do not practise what they believe. The aphorism of Tennyson should be changed so as to read: 'Better fifty years in Cathay than a cycle in Europe.""70

Wu was not challenging the ideals of western civilization per se but rather developing the pragmatic argument that social and political behavior is the touchstone by which civilizations and cultures should be evaluated. Indeed, he soon came to the view that great civilizations differed little in their ideals of ethics and morality. Wu's particular distillation of Chinese and Christian ethics led him to the conclusion that the doctrine of reciprocity, the “Golden Rule," lay at the core of both Chinese and western civilization." The social arrangements developed by different cultures were significant in that they were the actual mechanisms that either facilitate or retard the individual's attempt to live by the “Golden Rule.” As Wu began to develop these ideas, the more clear it seemed to him that China was by far the superior in this respect. Here was the area of China's greatest contribution to the evolution of world civilization.

This view became the basis of Wu's subsequent attacks upon the missionaries. In an article published in The Journal in May 1900,72 Wu compared the teachings of Confucius to those of Christ, much to Christ's disadvantage. Wu's major point was that Christian doctrines requiring the turning of the cheek were so lofty as to be beyond the reach of all but saints. Wu wholeheartedly agreed with the rhetorical question posed by Confucius, "If we requite our enemy with kindness, how, indeed, can we reward our friend?" The Confucian exhortation to require justice with justice and favors with favors, he said, was far more practical and within the grasp of all.

As evidence of Christianity's impracticality, Wu cited the medieval persecutions of non-Christians in Europe, a record that, he said, had "filled me with horror." By contrast he equated China's Confucian mainstream with tolerance and pacifism. Until the Christian missionaries came to China, he declared, “Jews, Mohammedans, and Buddhists have lived... peaceably side by side." Only when the missionaries told the Chinese to destroy their “idols”

70. Ibid.

71. This idea is most fully developed in Wu's “Mutual Helpfulness Between China and the United States,” North American Review 172 (July 1900): 1–12.

72. Literary Digest 20 (26 May 1900): 640-41.

124

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

did trouble occur, especially since the Chinese could all see that Catholics too had their own “idols."

Christians, he continued, claim that an afterlife in heaven is the reward for the righteous but also insist that only Christians may be saved. As Wu saw it, if there is a heaven, there surely were "many ladders" to it, and if there were rewards to come, surely all good people would receive them. The Christian view was, he said, “too narrow.” “I am broader than that doctrine,” he wrote, "My religion comprehends all.” Finally, Wu concluded, Confucian doctrines were superior to Christianity because they offered no reward in a future life but exhorted people to do their best with no thought of reward. "That seems to me the higher view,” he summed up.

Throughout his stay in the United States, Wu continued to reflect upon these matters and develop some themes further. Wu did not develop these ideas systematically and ignored obviously troublesome or contradictory implications. In his comparisons between Chinese and western cultures, Wu was attracted to the vision of Confucius as a transcendent, charismatic figure somewhat analogous to that of Christ in western cultures, but superior to the latter because of his refusal to speculate on matters other than the practical affairs of this world. In this fashion Wu was drawn to the doctrines of Kang Youwei and his followers. Like them, Wu declared that "Confucius was a reformer himself in his day and generation," his teachings consistent with modern reform and progress.73 In an address entitled "The Teachings of Confucius" delivered to the Society for Ethical Culture in New York in December 1900, Wu pronounced Confucius to be a "model man” who "practiced what he preached" by taking an active part in public affairs and "conscientiously" discharging his duties "both as a private citizen and as a public official."74

The "teachings” of Confucius, for Wu, could be conveniently summed up in the Five Cardinal Relations (wulun), which "comprise all conceivable positions in which a man may find himself in society,” or even further distilled into the principle of filial piety (xiao), which for Wu was the “pivotal point" of the Confucian system. In summing up, Wu told his audience, “You see, the advice of parents is always good, and if you obey it, you will find it works well, and brings you happiness.'

Wu developed a highly select orthodox vision of China's past, stretching back in an unbroken line to Confucius and Mencius and even further to the legendary culture heroes, Emperors Yao and Shun. As Wu saw it, this constituted the mainstream of Chinese civilization, and he dismissed other traditions or contradictory evidence as insignificant. Hence he asserted that Buddhism and Taoism were supported only through "superstition and ignorance," and thus “their influence grows weaker and weaker as the people

73. Address at Founder's Day ceremonies at the Carnegie Institute, Pittsburgh, 1 Nov. 1900, NYT, 2 Nov. 1900,

74. Wu, “The Teachings of Confucius,” reprinted in Chautauquan 42 (Dec. 1906): 342–46.

Promise and Disappointment in America 1897–1902

125

become more intelligent." Also, "militarism” was linked to the First Qin Emperor and legalist doctrine; the Chinese "rejection" of militarism and legalism, as Wu saw it, had been a decisive factor in shaping Chinese civilization.75 As Wu presented it, Confucianism was “dominant in the national life,” lying at the “foundation of the social and political and national life” of the country, and binding “the diverse elements of the empire into a homogeneous whole."76 Here were to be found the social principles that had produced the tolerance, generosity, rationalism and pacifism that characterized Chinese culture for Wu and that would, he hoped, become the basis of the future monoculture of the world."

Wu was also attracted to Kang Youwei's historical schematization, in which a universal civilization had been born in China in antiquity and transmitted to the West, where certain facets were developed further while impeded in China by the monarchical despotism of the Qin-Han period. As an example of this, Wu asserted that the Emperors Yao and Shun had established the principle of political succession based upon merit rather than heredity, only to have it reborn, so to speak, in the United States due to the personal example of its first president, George Washington, whom he eulogized as a great nation builder who established himself as a moral example to posterity through his "entire subordination of personal ambition to public welfare," having stepped aside upon setting the nation in order.78

These views shaped Wu's outlook on Chinese law reform. In an address on the subject of "Chinese Jurisprudence,” delivered before the New York State Bar Association at its annual convention in January 1901,79 Wu equated "common law" with the Liji (Book of rites). “Common law,” for Wu, was in fact reducible to the Five Cardinal Relations and the principle of filial piety, or as he called them, the "patriarchal” and “fraternal" principles. By contrast, "statute law" consisted of the laws in the Da Qing Luli (Qing Dynasty code of laws). While acknowledging that in some cases the code's provisions “would not be tolerated by the people of a free country, nor approved by lawyers," Wu generally spoke approvingly of it and emphasized the way it upheld the "common law," namely, the principle of filial piety and the Five Cardinal Relations.

Wu defended the system of the administration of justice while acknowledging its deficiencies. The lack of a jury system, deprivation of the rights of defendants and witnesses during a trial, and the use of torture to obtain confessions were all regretfully noted, but Wu stressed the importance

75. NYT, 2 Nov. 1900, p. 1.

76. Wu, "The Teachings of Confucius,” p. 343.

77. Compare Wu's views with those of the May Fourth generation of social conservatives as described in Laurence A. Schneider, Ku Chich-kang and China's New History: Nationalism and the Quest for Alternative Traditions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970).

78. NYT, 23 Feb. 1900, p. 9; America Through the Spectacles, pp. 146–47.

79. Wu, “Chinese Jurisprudence,” Proceedings of the New York State Bar Association, 24th Annual Meeting, Jan. 15–16, 1901 (Albany, N.Y., 1901), pp. 135-63.

126

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

of judicial leniency as a major feature of China's juridical tradition, reinforced by the heavy punishments meted to officials who had wrongly convicted a person. The rights of the defendant were also safeguarded to some degree, he asserted, by legal secretaries who made sure the magistrate's decisions were in accord with precedent, thereby constituting a check upon the magistrate's arbitrary powers. Summing up this defense of Chinese juridical traditions, he said:

The laws and practices of China . . . have now been enforced for many centuries. Generations of Chinese have lived, moved, worked and died under them. Time has proved that they are adapted to the needs and genius of the people. True it is that now and then they see a miscarriage of justice, but they believe that this is due to the incompetency or corruption of the presiding officer, and not to any defect or imperfection in their system.

In characteristically pragmatic fashion, however, Wu asserted that the introduction of the West into China had altered the situation largely because of the difficulties arising from trials involving Chinese and foreigners, where the discrepancies between Chinese and western codes were readily apparent. When foreigners received lighter sentences than their Chinese counterparts would have for the same offenses, the indignation of the masses was aroused. In view of this situation, law reform was necessary so as to “suit the requirements and circumstances of the present day," ensuring equal treatment of foreigners and Chinese, but not because of any intrinsic defects in the Qing code. But Wu was most elusive about what ultimately proved to be an insurmountable problem: how to reform the “statute” laws to meet western standards while keeping intact the "common law," namely, the Five Cardinal Relations and the principle of filial piety.

Of course, as a diplomat Wu was making every effort to present China to the U.S. public in the most favorable light, yet there is reason to believe that his experiences in the United States brought him to a critical reevaluation of Anglo-Saxon culture and its role in world development. In 1897 and 1898, Wu seemed hopeful that the progressive forces in China and the West alike were on the rise and that a new era of equality, rationality and decency in Sino-Western relations was at hand. The failure of the 1898 reform movement was a severe blow to these hopes, but it did not significantly alter his perceptions of China and the western world. The strength of American xenophobia, as revealed in the Chinese exclusion debates and in the reaction to the Boxers, was a more serious blow, for it necessitated Wu's strategic reassessment of the world situation. Whereas earlier he had assumed that the progressive forces (the forces of “commerce”) were dominant in the western world, he probably now had to conclude that they were not so dominant as he had hoped. Both China and the West had their enlightened progressive forces, and they both had their reactionary forces. No longer could he view the West as enjoying a monopoly on progress.

Promise and Disappointment in America 1897-1902

127

In reacting to American xenophobia, Wu became increasingly interested in the progressive aspects of Chinese culture, as he saw them. For Wu these were epitomized by Confucianism. Not only was Confucius a dynamic figure who had founded an ideology that had served as the basis for Chinese society much as Christianity had done for Europe, but more significantly, Confucian doctrine preaching harmony and ordered social relations had brought contentment and happiness to China as Christian doctrine could not. As Wu later wrote in his America Through the Spectacles of an Oriental Diplomat:

I am sometimes almost tempted to say that Asia will have to civilize the West over again. I am not bitter or sarcastic, but I do contend that there are yet many things that the white races have to learn from their colored brethren. In India, in China, and in Japan there are institutions which have a stability unknown outside Asia. Religion has apparently little influence on Western civilization; it is the corner-stone of society in all Asiatic civilizations. The result is that the colored races place morality in the place assigned by their more practical white confreres to economic propositions. We think, as we contemplate the West, that white people do not understand comfort because they have no leisure to enjoy contentment; they measure life by accumulation, we by morality. Family ties are stronger with the so-called colored races than they are among the more irresponsible white races; consequently the social sense is keener among the former and much individual suffering is avoided.80

In looking at American society, Wu asked himself what should be the goal of progress. While industrialization was bringing increased material prosperity to the United States, it was also bringing alienation and the disintegration of a sense of community based upon shared values. Wu felt that this was resulting in a lowering of the quality of life in the United States:

From a material point of view we have certainly progressed, but do the "civilized" people in the West live longer than the so-called semi-civilized races? Are they happier than others? I should like to hear their answers. Is it not a fact that Americans are more liable to catch cold than Asiatics; with the slightest epidemic are they not more easily infected than Asiatics? If so, why? . . . Again, can Americans say they are happier than the Chinese? From personal observation I have formed the opinion that the Chinese are more contented than Americans, on the whole happier; and certainly one meets more old people in China than in America. . . . In China no man is without friends, or if he is, it is his own fault. "Virtue is never friendless," said Confucius, and as society is constituted in China, this is literally true. If this is not so in America, I fear there is something wrong with that boasted civilization, and that their material triumphs over the physical forces of nature have been paid dearly for by the loss of insight into her profound spiritualities.81

80. American Through the Spectacles, pp. 181-82.

81. Ibid., pp. 164–65.

128

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Wu's criticisms of American society were echoed by friends of his such as Andrew Carnegie (1835-1919), who expressed interest in Confucian doctrine,82 and social purity reformers such as J. H. Kellogg (1852–1945), the noted popularizer of diet, hygiene and temperance reforms. It is worth noting here that Wu was much influenced by the ideas of Kellogg and the social purity reformers, who linked diet and hygiene to the problems of civilization. According to David J. Pivar, their dietary and hygienic reforms were a defense against civilization's decline, a way to maintain an agrarian life-style under attack by the forces of urbanization and industrialization, and a way to protect Christian doctrine from attack by Darwinian teachings.83 Wu became an advocate of vegetarianism and other “modern” hygienic practices as a way of cultivating superior morality in individuals and ultimately, in nations.84

Wu's criticism of American society was probably strengthened by these ideas. We thus see a schism in Wu's attitude towards the West. On the one hand he looked towards Britain and the United States for help in exerting political (and military) pressure to force reforms upon the Qing Government. The object of the reforms was to make China a strong and viable nation in the modern world. But while these reforms would presumably alter the political system and the economic structure to some degree, Wu was most emphatic in rejecting Christianity, which he perceived as the ideological base of western society, and in his insistence that Confucian values as manifested in the social structure were valid and should be retained as China entered the modern age. He thus saw no fundamental incompatibility between these values and the requirements of modernization.

While Wu advocated reforms in China, then, he hoped that China would not follow the American path, pursuing wealth and meeting discontent. It was still important to link up with the progressive forces in the West, such as the world-wide pacifist movement supported by people such as Andrew Carnegie, but now more than ever before, it was important to convince enlightened Westerners of the superiority of Confucian principles of social organization. One may indeed say that what began as a defense against Christian missionizing ended as another form of missionizing.

82. On Carnegie's friendship with Wu, see Joseph Frazier Wall, Andrew Carnegie (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 912-13. Wu spoke several times at Carnegie Institute functions and solicited Carnegie for funds for educational development in China. Following the 1911 revolution, he appealed to Carnegie for assistance in obtaining U.S. recognition for the Republic, and Carnegie did so appeal to the U.S. Department of State. See Wu to Carnegie, 15 Jan. 1903, no. 93; 2 Mar. 1904, no. 163; 10 Nov. 1911, no. 199, 13 Dec. 1911, no. 201, Andrew Carnegie, Papers (Library of Congress).

83. David J. Pivar, Purity Crusade: Sexual Morality and Social Control, 1868–1900 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973). Wu was especially influenced by Kellogg's The Living Temple (Battle Creek, Mich., 1903) and Mary Newton Foote Henderson's The Aristocracy of Health. . . . (Washington, D.C.; Colton, 1904). On Kellogg see also Gerald Carson, The Cornflake Crusade (New York: Rinehart, 1957). 84. Wu's America Through the Spectacles, Yanshou xinfa (Shanghai: Shangwu, 1918) and “How I Expect to Live Long," Ladies' Home Journal 26 (Nov. 1909): 17.

Promise and Disappointment in America 1897–1902

The Limits of Personal Diplomacy

129

Disastrous as the Boxer crisis was, it provided an opportunity for Wu to develop personal contacts with State Department officials and key American political figures of a much closer type than might have been possible under other circumstances. Wu's strategy in the post-Boxer period was to exploit these personal contacts as fully as possible for China's diplomatic objectives.

Wu's major activities were directed towards the Congressional debate of 1902 on Chinese exclusion. Through a campaign of strong diplomatic notes, appeals to the American public, and finally direct appeals to President Theodore Roosevelt, Wu hoped that the Exclusion Laws might be repealed, at least in Hawaii and the Philippines.

Late in 1900 Wu began challenging the Treasury Department's management of immigration matters in a series of bitter notes over specific wrongdoings, and in one instance he requested that Roosevelt personally intervene on behalf of a Chinese student who had been denied entrance to the United States. Wu's feud with the Treasury Department reached a peak early in 1902, provoked by a statement by Terence V. Powderley, Commissioner-General of Immigration, in which Powderley declared that only "those sturdy men" of Scotland, Germany, Ireland and Scandinavia would be permitted to enter America, and that "whatever is done, the Chinese will be kept out." In a sharply worded note, Wu denied that Powderley could possibly be fair or impartial in matters concerning Chinese immigrants.85

In 1901 Wu had publicly refused to be seated at a banquet table with Major General Otis, who had implemented the Exclusion Laws in the Philippines in 1899 under the guise of military necessity. Wu's act brought forth critical comments from the New York Times and other newspapers, but it accomplished its purpose of keeping the issue before the American public and policy makers.86

In December 1901 Wu requested and received a private audience with President Roosevelt and made special mention of abuses in the administration of the laws. Roosevelt asked Wu to furnish examples of specific instances, and Wu replied by drafting a memorandum listing several cases of injustices in the administration, including the famous case of Fei Chi Ho and Kong Xiangxi (H. H. Kung, 1881-1967) which had become something of a cause célèbre in China and America.87

Wu followed this up with a fifty-eight page memorandum in which he formally declared China's intention to renegotiate the Sino-American treaty due to expire in 1904. Wu proposed that the U.S. Congress send a commission

85. Wu to Hay, 30 Nov. 1900, no. 199, 10 Jan. 1902, “NFCL”; Hay to Wu, 5 Dec. 1900, “NTFL.”

86. NYT, 9 Feb. 1901, p. 8.

87. Wu to Hay, 9 Dec. 1901, no. 218; to Adee, 27 Aug., 1 Oct. 1902, “NFCL”; Adee to Wu, 2 Oct., no. 242; 9 Oct. 1902, no. 243, “NTFL.” On Kong and Fei see Luella Miner, ed., Two Heroes of Cathay: An Autobiography and a Sketch (New York: Revell, 1903), pp. 223–38.

130

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

to areas with large Chinese populations, especially Hawaii and the Philippines, and personally investigate the impact of Chinese exclusion legislation in those areas. This note and Wu's subsequent notes on the matter were sent to Congress.88

The congressional debate on Chinese exclusion began in February 1902 with the introduction of new legislation calling for the complete exclusion of all Chinese persons, whether laborer or not, and all persons of Chinese descent, from the United States and its territories. The debate that ensued was fierce, and Wu figured prominently behind the scenes marshaling support for the bill's defeat. His diplomatic notes and his public speeches were cited extensively both by witnesses friendly and hostile to the Chinese case,89

To further buttress his case, Wu sent a secret telegraphic memorial to the Qing Foreign Ministry (Waiwu Bu) urging that it notify the American Minister in China, Edwin Conger, to the effect that the Qing Government was following the congressional debate with great interest, and with the hint that should the new legislation be too severe, Chinese merchants would certainly retaliate by boycotting American goods. For the second time in as many years, Wu again raised the possibility of a boycott, which eventually took place in 1905.90

As a result of the opposition to the bill, a compromise measure was adopted in which the existing legislation of the Geary Law of 1892 was basically maintained. Wu wrote a strenuous objection to this bill, charging that its passage would “seriously disturb” relations between China and the United States. Wu wrote that the especially objectionable features of the bill were those that continued the category of the "exempt classes" while denying entrance to other non-laborers, and others that called for the re-registration of all Chinese laborers in the United States and the registration of all non- laborers as well. Wu charged that the registration measures constituted an "unnecessary hardship" that served to rob new immigrants of their treaty rights. "Past experience," he stated, "shows that the Chinese have been arrested by the wholesale, placed in jeopardy, and subjected to molestation and insult.” In conclusion, Wu stated that the bill placed so many restrictions upon the Chinese and the provisions were so strict that "no Chinese having the least respect for himself would submit to such indignities and come to this country.

*91

This note was also forwarded by John Hay to Congress, but the bill was passed in spite of Wu's last-minute exertions. A final appeal to President Roosevelt via Secretary of State Hay likewise was unsuccessful.”

88. Wu to Hay, Dec. 10, 1901, no. 219, “NFCL”; Hay to Wu, 18 Dec. 1901, no. 194, “NTFL.” 89. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Immigration, Chinese Exclusion: Hearings. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1902).

90. Wu to Waiwu Bu, 25 Feb. 1902 (GX 28/1/18), Qingji waijiao shiliao 152:19.

91. Wu to Hay, 22 Mar. 1902, no. 140, “NFCL.”

92. Wu to Hay, 29 Apr. 1902, no. 243, ibid.; Hay to Wu, 30 Apr. 1902, “NTFL.”

Promise and Disappointment in America 1897–1902

131

The results of the congressional campaign, however disappointing for Wu, could not have been entirely unexpected. Nevertheless, he was certainly dismayed by some of the personal attacks levied upon him.93 All he could do now was to make a direct and personal appeal to the President and other chief policy makers with respect to the treaty negotiations shaping up for 1904.

In May 1902, soon after the new immigration law had been signed by Roosevelt, Wu addressed a note to Hay reiterating his views with the specific request that they be laid before the President.94 Hay complied with Wu's request, and Roosevelt was unquestionably favorably disposed towards them.

Soon after receiving Wu's note, Roosevelt informed the Treasury Department that unless the Department could provide reasons to the contrary, he planned to comply with Wu's views in renegotiating the Sino-American treaty in 1904. The Treasury Department responded with a strong memorandum warning against the abandonment of existing legislation.95 Roosevelt was responsive to this pressure. He let the matter drop for the present but in the following year, 1903, he removed immigration from the control of the Treasury Department and put it under the Department of Commerce and Labor.

Wu seems to have been highly sensitive to both the powers and the constraints upon the executive within the American political system. He sensed in Roosevelt a man who was responsive to a well-reasoned brief, forcefully presented and supported by influential segments of the American public and business elites. In this, he certainly had the measure of the man, for Roosevelt was often inclined to regard with favor self-assertive nationalism in Asians and see in it a reflection of his own doctrine of Darwinist-inspired assertiveness.96 Wu's understanding of Roosevelt's world view was a partial basis for the range, flexibility and passion of his diplomacy.

Unsurprisingly, Wu's last months in the United States were marked by his strongest actions yet on the question of Chinese exclusion. In August 1902 Wu was casually and accidentally informed that General Leonard Wood, commander of American forces occupying Cuba, had proclaimed the Chinese Exclusion Laws to be in force in the island just five days before the American military administration relinquished control on 15 May 1902. This act carried overtones to Wu of the decision taken by American military authorities in the Philippines that had resulted in the exclusion of Chinese from them. Wu wrote an outraged note to Secretary of State John Hay in which he stated that he feared that the new Cuban Government would construe General Wood's act as indicative of American desires and thus continue the measures

93. See, e.g., NYT, 30 Apr. 1902, p. 7.

94. Wu to Hay, 19 May 1902, no. 247, “NFCL.”

95. Hay to Wu, 22 July 1902, no. 234, “NTFL.”

96. Warren I. Cohen, America's Response to China: An Interpretive History of Sino-American Relations (New York: Wiley, 1971), p. 66ff.

132

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

after the American occupation ended. He described Wood's actions as “taken in disregard of diplomatic practice and diplomatic comity,” and asked that the matter be brought to the attention of the President, Theodore Roosevelt. "I have so much confidence in his upright manner and his hatred of injustice," he stated, "as to believe that if the matter is laid before him he will be able to devise some means to have it rectified."97

In this belief, however, Wu was mistaken. Roosevelt directed his secretary to say that Wu's protest was "absurd and without any foundation in fact.' After some consideration, the State Department decided to politely acknowledge Wu's note but declined to take steps on what high officials privately referred to as the "Wood-Cuban Chinesenhetze order.”98 A very sarcastic note that Wu had written at the same time in reply to the Secretary of the Treasury was similarly ignored by Hay and his associates, “as it would do no good and would merely prolong a disagreeable wrangle.”99

In these last bitter exchanges we sense something of the limitations inherent in Wu's diplomacy. Wu hoped to be seen as a diplomat functioning in a milieu where all were peers, all members of the same social and professional elite, all dedicated to the same principles. This is indeed the code of conduct to which he had been trained as a barrister in England and a professional man in Hong Kong. And to some degree Wu's views were reciprocated by Hay and Roosevelt and other key members of the American administration with whom he dealt.

But just so far. While Wu himself may have been acceptable to the American elite as a man with whom it could readily do business and with whom it could communicate, Wu could not function in a vacuum and at each point was faced with the fact that he was a representative of a nation that was at a disadvantage-financially, militarily, and in some respects culturally—in its dealings with the imperialist world. American policy makers like Roosevelt and the American public in general were prepared to accept Chinese nationalism only in highly limited terms. Thus by the summer of 1902 when it was clear that Wu would be shortly leaving for China, Hay and Roosevelt preferred to await his successor in the hopes that he would be more amenable than Wu. The bitterness of Wu's final notes on the immigration issue was unseemly in the eyes of Hay and his colleagues; it was “undiplomatic” in the terms with which they were prepared to accept Chinese diplomacy. And so the significance of his bitterness was lost upon them; the entire issue was reduced in their perception to a mere personal wrangle between Wu and General Wood or Wu and the Treasury Department.

On the public level a similar sort of misperception occurred. To the American public, China's modernization was virtually synonymous with its westernization, and Wu could only be understandable in these terms. Two

97. Wu to Adee, 29 Aug. 1902, no. 254, “NFCL.”

98. Adee to Hay, 2 Sept. 1902. Hay, Papers.

99. Minutes by Adee and Hay on Wu to Adee, 20 Aug. 1902.

Promise and Disappointment in America 1897–1902

133

cartoons published on the eve of Wu's departure from the United States indicate the degree of this misunderstanding. One published in the Chicago Record-Herald entitled "Scene in China After Wu Ting Fang Introduces American Methods" depicted American elevators, American-style newspapers, and American-style advertisement for "Yellow Dragon Cheroots,” an American- style lunch stand, high-rise buildings, a trolley car and other American-style objects.100 The second cartoon published in the Nashville Banner depicted Wu together with "Uncle Sam." Wu's queue was curled into ringlets spelling "western civilization,” and “Uncle Sam” admonished: “Goodbye, Wu, don't comb the ringlets out of your queue. These cartoons with their misperception of Wu and of China, when coupled with the limitations in the American willingness to come to grips with key issues in Chinese nationalism, were but ominous harbingers of the future.

"101

The weaknesses in Wu's position are more apparent in hindsight than they were to him and many other leading Chinese at that time. On the contrary, the publicity and acclaim Wu received in the American press helped his political position in China. Zhang Zhidong, Liu Kunyi and Yuan Shikai all believed that Wu was at least partly responsible for creating a relatively sympathetic American policy in China, and they were willing to follow Wu's lead in placing special reliance upon the United States to oppose the mushrooming of Russian power in Manchuria.102

By early 1902 various proposals concerning Wu were being discussed by high-level officials in Beijing. In January 1902 Zhang Zhidong memorialized to request that Wu be ordered to return to China and handle diplomatic negotiations shaping up in Shanghai for revision of China's commercial treaties. Zhang cited Wu's long experience in foreign affairs and knowledge of western law as reasons for using his skills in this fashion."

103

Soon after this, on 13 February Liu Kunyi sent a memorial to the Court resurrecting the old plan to amend the Qing law code by adding sections for new areas such as commerce and communications. He asked the Zongli Yamen's successor, the Waiwu Bu, to permit the ministers stationed abroad to collect the relevant portions of foreign legal codes for consideration.104

On 11 March Liu's memorial was approved in a decree calling for the establishment of laws covering railways, mining and commerce. The ministers abroad were ordered to gather relevant codes and statues to send to the Waiwu Bu. Liu Kunyi, Yuan Shikai and Zhang Zhidong were ordered to select people familiar with Chinese and western law to take charge of the

100. Literary Digest 25, no. 5 (2 Aug. 1902): 122.

101. Ibid., p. 123.

102. Liu Kunyi to Zhang Zhidong and Li Hongzhang, 11 Sept. 1900 (GX 26/8/18), Liu Kunyi, Yiji, "Cables," 1:43b; Liu to Grand Council, 24 Dec. 1900 (GX 26/11/3), ibid. 1:53a. See also Hunt, Frontier Defense and the Open Door, pp. 56–58.

103. Zhang Zhidong memorial, 10 Jan. 1902 (GX 27/12/1), Zhang Zhidong, Quanji, “Zougao,” 55:17-20.

104. Liu to Waiwu Bu, 13 Feb. 1902 (GX 28/1/6), Qingji waijiao shiliao 152:6.

134

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

new project. These people were to be sent to Beijing to take charge of a new bureau to compile and edit the documents. 105

On 1 April Yuan Shikai memorialized for permission to have the law project handled by Wu together with Shen Jiaben. Shen, a native of Zhejiang and a jinshi of 1883, had been a secretary in the Xing Bu, or Board of Punishments, for many years and was currently its Junior Vice-President. Yuan proposed that Wu take charge of the translations and evaluations of the various foreign codes in conjunction with a team of Japanese legal specialists who might provide advice when needed. Shen, with his thorough familiarity with the Qing law codes, would presumably take charge of the actual revision.106 By mid-May the law reform project was well under way. On 13 May the Court issued a thoughtful decree appointing Wu and Shen to work together as Co-commissioners for Legal Revisions. The Qing code was to be updated in the light of present "circumstances” and in accord with international standards. The revised version of the code was then to be submitted to the Court for approval and eventual promulgation. This decree authorized the establishment of a new agency, the Bureau for Legal Revisions (Falu Xiuding Guan), to assume charge of the translations and revisions.107

The way was now clear for Wu to return to China and participate in the law reform project and the negotiations for treaty revisions. His prospects were even brighter when Yuan Shikai sent a secret memorial to the Throne on 25 July to recommend Wu as a man of extraordinary talents. Stressing his harmonious relations with the American Government, Yuan wrote that Wu had helped to expedite the return of Tianjin to Chinese authorities and aided in numerous other friendly acts by the United States. Yuan recommended that normal procedures be abandoned and that Wu's talents be put to immediate use.

108

Following Yuan's recommendation, Wu was granted the honorary rank of metropolitan official, fourth grade, in preparation for his return to China.109 He was returning to China in a more advantageous position politically than when he had left in 1897, and could look forward to playing a more significant role in shaping policy in China. This in itself was probably encouraging to him.

Clearly, Wu's experiences in the United States were of great importance to him, not only for the advancement of his career, but also for the new insights it gave him on the question of progress and China's role in the world of the future. While in China he would continue to work for the "opening" of China by reforming its institutions and developing its economy along

105. Decree, 11 Mar. 1902 (GX 28/2/2), Shilu 495:4556; DHL 5:4833.

106. Yuan Shikai memorial, 1 Apr. 1902 (GX 28/2/23), Yuan, Yangshouyuan 14:6-8a. On Shen Jiaben see Qing shi 6:4933.

107. Decree, 13 May 1902 (GX 28/2/23), Shilu 498:4584.

108. Yuan memorial, 25 July 1902 (GX 28/6/21), Yuan, Yangshouyuan 16:3.

109. Decree, 27 July 1902 (GX 28/6/23), Shilu 501:4616a.

Promise and Disappointment in America 1897–1902

135

British and American lines, but he was now more than ever prepared to insist on equal terms in dealing with the imperialist world. Convinced as he was of the importance of the Confucian mission in the world, Wu would never again uncritically accept the West as the standard-bearer of culture and civilization.

Wu Tingfang and the New Nationalism

1902-1905

Urban Elites and the New Nationalism

The years 1902-5 saw the emergence in China of a modern nationalist movement, based in China's great cities, which developed into a major political force by the end of the decade. Mobilizing at first to counter the Russian domination of Manchuria, the new nationalist movement by 1905 was asserting itself through newly formed organizations in a variety of causes, from the recovery of railway and mining rights to the redress of inequities in U.S. policies towards Chinese immigration. The modern Chinese bourgeoisie played an important role in the development of the new nationalism as leading figures in the politically articulate public that emerged in China's major cities in the early twentieth century.

Many historians have noted the emergence of the new urban public in the first decade of the twentieth century, but there is some disagreement about the nature of this phenomenon. Many historians in the PRC view this group as the newly emergent modern bourgeoisie, born in the aftermath of the Opium War, coming to maturity in the latter part of the nineteenth century in the Chinese treaty ports and bursting upon the political stage after the Boxer episode.' Many western historians, however, are cautious in applying the term "bourgeoisie" to this new social group. Joseph Esherick prefers the term “urban reformist elite” as one that treads neutral ground between "gentry" and "bourgeoisie,” suggesting that this new social grouping was a

1. There are many recent examples of this view. Most useful have been: Zhang Kaiyuan, “Xinhai Geming yu Jiang-Zhe zichan jieji,” in Jinian Xinhai Geming qishi zhounian xueshu taolunhui wenji, ed. Zhonghua Shuju bianji bu (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1983), 1:242–82; Ding Richu, “Xinhai Geming qian de Shanghai zibenjia jieji,” ibid., pp. 281–321; Zhang Guohui, “Xinhai geming qian Zhongguo ziben zhuyi de fazhan,” ibid., pp. 184–218; Fan Baichuan, “Ershi shiji chuqi Zhongguo ziben zhuyi fazhan de gaikuang yu tedian,” Lishi yanjiu, 1983, no. 4: 11–24.

137

138

Wu Tingfang (1840–1920): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

little bit of both while not really either one.2 In her essay on social change in the late Qing, Marianne Bastid-Bruguiere describes the emergence of a new urban elite in China's major cities by the early twentieth century, composed of propertied people of various sorts: urbanized gentry and landlords, retired officials, compradors, merchants, industrialists and a host of others. This modern elite "displayed many bourgeois characteristics, but they were still too bound by traditional economic and social forms to be called a bourgeoisie. Only during the last five years of the monarchy did a truly bourgeois class begin to emerge, that is, a group of modern or semi-modern entrepreneurs, tradesmen, financiers and industrial leaders, unified by material interests, common political aspirations, a sense of their collective destiny, a common mentality, and specific daily habits."3

Whether one defines this group as bourgeoisie, emergent bourgeoisie, or hybrid elite with bourgeois leanings, it is clear that it played an important role in the late Qing political arena. It was willing to support the Qing state when the latter satisfied its needs and was increasingly critical of it when it could not. “Liberal” rather than “revolutionary,” it supported reforms aimed at greater autonomy, and when these proved impossible during the last years of the ancien régime, its members increasingly were supportive of revolution to depose the Qing rulers.

In this chapter we will examine Wu Tingfang's relationship to this new social and political force. He had close ties to it, and as an official of mercantile background, he exemplified its hybrid nature. His social connections and business interests brought him into close contact with it, and he renewed these contacts during extended leaves from official duty when he resided in Shanghai, Hong Kong and Guangzhou.1 While in office he promoted many of the new elite's goals to the best of his ability. Understanding his role in late Qing politics helps to clarify the relationship between the modern urban elite and the Qing polity.

Earlier, when we examined Wu Tingfang's role in Li Hongzhang's mufu of the 1880s, we noted that the modern foreign affairs officials were one of the key links between the modern bourgeoisie and Qing officialdom. We considered Wu as a member of the first generation of modern foreign affairs officials. As was true for Li Hongzhang's administration, modern foreign affairs officials were also needed by the central government when it set about, as it did after the Boxer catastrophe, to modernize its foreign relations and promote reform. With his background in law, diplomacy and railway

2. Joseph W. Esherick, Reform and Revolution in China: The 1911 Revolution in Hunan and Hubei (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), pp. 66–67. See also Ernest P. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai: Liberalism and Dictatorship in Early Republican China (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), pp. 9–13; John H. Fincher, Chinese Democracy: The Self-Government Movement in Local, Provincial and National Politics, 1905–1914 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), pp. 37–46; Edward [J. M.] Rhoads, “Two Cheers for 1911,” Modern China 5, no. 1 (Jan. 1979): 127–36. 3. Bastid-Bruguiere, “Currents of Social Change," pp. 558–59.

4. On the significance of officials' leaves of absence, see Fincher, Chinese Democracy, p. 32.

Wu Tingfang and the New Nationalism 1902–1905

139

management, Wu was able to play an important role in several areas of late Qing politics: in addition to diplomacy, he played a major role in the Qing state's efforts to stimulate commerce and industry and to promote law reform. The positions Wu held from 1902 to 1911 indicate the range of his activities as a high level foreign affairs official:

Co-Commissioner (with Shen Jiaben), Revision of Law Codes, 13 May

1902-12 May 1906;

Co-Commissioner (with Yuan Shikai, Zhang Zhidong, Sheng Xuanhuai and Lu Haihuan [1840–1927]), Revision of Commercial Treaties, 26 Oct. 1902-7 Sept. 1903;

Junior Councillor, Foreign Ministry, 28 May–7 Sept. 1903; Senior Vice-President, Board of Commerce, 7 Sept. 1903–14 Jan. 1904; Junior Vice-President, Foreign Ministry, 14 Jan. 1904-10 Feb. 1906; Junior Vice-President, Board of Punishments, 10 Feb.−12 May 1906; Co-Director (with Zhang Bishi [1840-1916]) of the Guangdong Yue-

Han Railway, Apr.-May 1907;

Minister to the U.S., Mexico, Peru and Cuba, 23 Sept. 1907-13 Aug.

1909.5

Wu sought to use his positions to express strongly held nationalist convictions, through his diplomatic activities and reform proposals, and when appropriate, by mobilizing the strength of public opinion, that is, the modern urban elite, in support of specific policies.

In considering Wu's role as a foreign affairs official in the late Qing, it is instructive to compare his career with that of Tang Shaoyi, who might more properly be described as Wu's rival rather than his colleague. Born in 1860 (compared to Wu's 1842), Tang came from a similar social background to Wu. A native of Xiangshan district in Guangdong, Tang was the nephew of Wu's former associate Tang Tingshu and a member of the famous Chinese Education Mission to the United States of the 1870s, where he studied in Connecticut and then at Columbia University and New York University before returning to China when the CEM was ended.

In addition to similar social background, Tang and Wu both shared an approach to foreign affairs marked by modern nationalism, as Louis T. Sigel's study of Tang's political career indicates.' But in spite of these similarities, the differences are also noteworthy.

Most important is the fact that Tang Shaoyi was an intimate associate of Yuan Shikai and a cornerstone of Yuan's political power. Tang became part of Yuan's inner circle in the 1880s when Yuan was "Resident General" in

5. Titles and dates of appointment from Shilu.

6. Sigel, "T'ang Shao-yi”.

7. Ibid. See also Lee En-han, “T’ang Shao-yi: Diplomat and Politician of Late Ch'ing China,” Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica 4, part 1 (1973): 53–126.

140

Wu Tingfang (1840–1920): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Korea and subsequently served as Yuan's major foreign affairs official when the latter was Governor of Shandong (1899–1902), then Customs Daotai at Tianjin when Yuan became Governor-General of Zhili Province in 1902. As Yuan's national political influence expanded, Tang's did too; when Yuan's national power contracted, so did that of Tang. Moreover, Tang developed his own political machine under Yuan's patronage. Known as the Communications clique or sometimes as the "Cantonese clique,” the most important figure in this network was Liang Shiyi. Under Tang's leadership the group took control of railways, telegraphs and other enterprises on behalf of Yuan Shikai. Under the Qing Tang reached his peak of political influence during the years 1905-8. He replaced Wu as Junior Vice-President in the Waiwu Bu in 1906 and then was appointed President of the newly created Ministry of Posts and Communications (Youchuan Bu) in 1906. In this capacity he succeeded in wresting control of railways from Sheng Xuanhuai. In the following year he was appointed Governor of newly created Fengtian Province, a post he held until he and his patron fell from power after the death of the Empress Dowager in 1908.8

By contrast, Wu was a loner. His main patron, Li Hongzhang, had died in 1901. Zhang Yinhuan, who might have served that role, had been driven into exile during the Boxer Uprising, where he died. Similarly, Liu Kunyi, with whom he had had a long relationship, died in 1902. While Wu had good relations (at least initially) with Yuan Shikai and Zhang Zhidong, the two most important regionally based officials of the late Qing period, he was not close to them in the way he had been to Li Hongzhang and Zhang Yinhuan.

Nor did Wu develop a network of intimate subordinates, as did Tang Shaoyi. Of the three foreign trained Chinese who played important roles in Li's mufu, only Wu survived to play an active political role in the twentieth century. (Ma Jianzhong, retired since the Sino-Japanese War, died in 1900, and Luo Fenglu died in 1903 after a lingering illness.) While there is some evidence that Wu tried to recruit able persons to serve under him, he was not powerful enough to dispense patronage.

This suggests that modern foreign affairs officials of bourgeois background could only function effectively when they enjoyed the patronage of powerful officials such as Li Hongzhang, Zhang Zhidong or Yuan Shikai and could not constitute an independent political force within the late Qing political arena. In the sections that follow, we shall see how Wu's role in the late Qing reform movement promoted the goals of the emergent bourgeoisie in China and how in turn the nationalist policies that he and others employed created new political circumstances making it more difficult for him to function as a Qing foreign affairs official. These difficulties led to a gradual loss of influence and great ambivalence towards the Qing regime.

8. On the Communications clique in the late Qing see Stephen R. MacKinnon, “Liang Shih-i and the Communications Clique,” Journal of Asian Studies 29 (1970): 581–602.

Wu Tingfang and the New Nationalism 1902–1905

From Shanghai to Beijing, December 1902-September 1903

141

Wu Tingfang returned to China in late December 1902, going directly to Shanghai to assume his duties as Co-Commissioner to Revise the Commercial Treaties. In September 1903 he moved to Beijing to take up his post of Senior Vice-President of the newly-formed Board of Commerce.

In many respects the two cities were poles apart: Shanghai the commercial capital and Beijing the political capital. Shanghai, with its dominating International Settlement and French Concession, was the center of foreign business influence in China and the center for the rise of the modern Chinese business community. The site of modern schools, a large student community also developed in the early twentieth century. Students and intellectuals, some writing from the relative safety of the foreign concessions, published widely on a broad range of modern subjects. Organizations such as the newly founded International Institute-Wu was a member of its advisory council-provided a cosmopolitan setting where the Chinese elite could meet with enlightened Westerners and discuss problems of mutual concern. All of these factors made the city an exciting place with perhaps the most "opened," or modern, atmosphere in China.9

As important as Shanghai was, however, it was Beijing that was to shape Wu's destiny during his first years back in China. With the high walls of the palace dominating the city of offices and officials, the atmosphere provided a sharp contrast to Shanghai, one that Wu was keenly aware of all his life." The dominant political figure was of course the Empress Dowager who ruled through a network of personally loyal key national and regional officials. Upon the death of Ronglu in March 1903, Prince Qing (Yikuang) became the key figure in the central government. While undoubtedly a capable administrator, he was unfortunately also notoriously fond of money and expensive gifts which those seeking his patronage found it necessary to provide, and he consequently amassed a large personal fortune during his years as high official. This weakness established a tone of corruption and decadence that made him a perfect foil for critics of the Qing, and it created an atmosphere that many officials, both traditional as well as foreign trained, found distasteful. It also appeared to verify the already prevalent contemptuous attitudes among Westerners towards Chinese politics."1

9. The Shanghai atmosphere is described in Mary Backus Rankin, Early Chinese Revolutionaries: Radical Intellectuals in Shanghai and Chekiang, 1902–1911 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), chaps. 2–4. On Wu and the International Institute see NCH, 30 Apr. 1903, pp. 855–59; 14 Aug. 1903, p. 336.

10. Wu believed that Beijing's qi or atmosphere produced a stultifying conservatism. See Wu's Yanshou xinfa, p. 20. See also his warning about Beijing's atmosphere to U.S. Minister Paul Reinsch, in Paul S. Reinsch, An American Diplomat in China (New York: Doubleday, 1922), p. 9. 11. On Prince Qing's reputation see Shen Yunlong, “Zhangwo wanQing zhangbing zhi Yikuang," in his findai zhengzhi renuu shuping 2:70–80. See also Morrison to Bland, 1 Feb. 1902; Morrison to Chirol, 7 July 1902, Morrison, Correspondence 1:177, 198. On Westerners' stereotypes of Chinese political corruption, see Jerome Chen, China and the West: Society and Culture, 1815-1937 (Bloomington, Ind.: University of Indiana Press, 1979), pp. 42–43.

142

Wu Tingfang (1840–1920): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Allied with Prince Qing in national politics was the rising figure of Yuan Shikai. From his position as Governor-General of Zhili Yuan began to exert political influence at a national level, at first through trusted subordinates and eventually through his own political positions.12 As part of Yuan's drive to increase his power, in late 1902 he had begun to move against Sheng Xuanhuai. Sheng held, among other positions, those of Director-General of Railways, Director-General of the Imperial Telegraph Administration and Director-General of the CMSNC. Using the pretext of Sheng's retirement to mourn the death of his father, Yuan succeeded in removing Sheng from his position in the telegraph agency, placing his subordinate Wu Zhongxi in charge there, and then used the anti-Sheng bloc of shareholders in the CMSNC headed by Xu Run to unseat Sheng from his position of dominance there. Xu and Yang Shiqi, the latter a trusted intimate of Yuan's, assumed control of the Company until Yuan's fall from power in 1908.13

These dynamics played an important role in Wu Tingfang's political life after his return to China. The support of Yuan Shikai and Prince Qing was an essential ingredient in his career at that stage. As noted above in Chapter 4, Yuan recommended Wu to the Court in April 1902 as a suitable figure to handle law reform together with Shen Jiaben, and then secretly memorialized in July 1902 recommending Wu as an exceptionally talented person who should be suitably entrusted with responsibility by the Court.14

Wu's return to China coincided with Yuan's moves against Sheng Xuanhuai. The sources strongly suggest that Wu was willing to ally with Yuan against Sheng, although earlier Wu had been close to Sheng. In 1896 Wu had arranged for his brother-in-law He Qi to work as Sheng's secretary, although as we noted above in Chapter 3 that did not work out. Selections from published materials from the Sheng Xuanhuai Archives in Shanghai indicate that Wu and Sheng worked closely together in 1898 while negotiating the Yue-Han Railway contract (more on this later in this chapter). They apparently had an understanding that Sheng would recommend Wu to the Court as his replacement after Wu's three-year term in Washington was over, and Sheng also offered to help Wu purchase an office as metropolitan official.15

Whatever the case in 1898, however, by 1902 Wu was in Yuan's corner. He had close ties to Xu Run and the "Cantonese faction” of shareholders in the CMSNC he was a major shareholder in the Company himself—and was presumably not ill-disposed to Yuan's maneuvering against Sheng.

Wu replaced Sheng initially in the negotiations with the United States and Japan to revise their commercial treaties, although within a few months Sheng joined the team of negotiators again. These negotiations proved unexpectedly

12. MacKinnon, Power and Politics, pp. 63–66.

13. Feuerwerker, China's Early Industrialization, pp. 73–76; 120–22.

14. See Chap. 4, nn. 106, 108.

15. Sheng to Wu, 22 May 1898 (GX 24/4/3) and 25 June 1898 (GX 24/5/7), Sheng Xuanhuai, Weikan xin'gao, ed. Beijing Daxue lishixi jindaishijiao yanjiushi (Beijing: Xinhua, 1960), pp. 70, 72.

Wu Tingfang and the New Nationalism 1902–1905

143

difficult. The Chinese negotiators, who ultimately included Zhang Zhidong, Yuan Shikai, Sheng Xuanhuai, Lu Haihuan and Wu, hoped that the U.S. and Japan would be willing to use the just-negotiated Sino-British Commercial Treaty (the Mackay Treaty) as a model. In that treaty, Britain had agreed to permit China to raise the ceiling on import tariffs from 5% to 12.5% so that China could use the extra 7.5% customs revenue to meet the Boxer Indemnity payments. In exchange, China agreed to abolish the internal transit taxes on imported goods (the so-called lijin), which had long been hated by foreign businessmen. In addition, China agreed to open Changsha, Wanxian, Anqing, Huizhou and Jiangmen to British residence and trade.16

Both the U.S. representatives, however, and those of Japan, refused to use the Mackay Treaty as a model. Japan's draft called for a customs increase to only 10% and for the opening of thirteen new treaty ports. Wu was convinced that these demands were unreasonable and a show of diplomatic bluff, and should therefore be firmly rejected. A recent study of Wu's role in the late Qing reform movement by Zhang Cunwu concludes that Wu's assessment was largely correct.17

One of the factors accounting for Japan's stiffened attitude and also for a similar attitude on the part of the United States was the situation in Manchuria. In April 1903 Russia announced a postponement of its scheduled 8 October withdrawal from Manchuria. The U.S. responded by using the Shanghai negotiations to force a test of Russia's intentions. In a hasty and ill-prepared manner, the U.S. demanded that its treaty include the opening of two treaty ports in Manchuria, Mukden (Shenyang) and Dadonggou (Tatungkou), along with Beijing. When China refused to make Beijing a treaty port, the U.S. substituted Harbin, which was administered by Russia and hence not within China's power to "open," and then finally substituted Andong (Antung) for Dadonggou, thereby ending what Michael H. Hunt has termed "the farce of the Americans in search of a treaty port. "18

The demand for Manchurian treaty ports posed a problem for the Chinese negotiators and their superiors in Beijing. Public opinion in Shanghai, Guangzhou and among students and merchants overseas was strongly anti- Russian, with some proposing that China ally with Japan against Russia. But Yuan Shikai, Zhang Zhidong, Prince Qing and other leading officials in charge of foreign relations feared that approval of the Manchurian treaty ports by China would provoke Russia and embroil China in war with its northern neighbor, a war that China would almost certainly lose. They sought to get the United States to agree to a mere verbal assurance that China would

16. For a summary of these negotiations see Stanley F. Wright, China's Struggle for Tariff Autonomy, 1843–1938 (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1938), pp. 353–68.

17. Ibid., p. 382: Zhang Cunwu, “Qingmo zhengzhi gaige yundong zhong de Wu Tingfang,” in Zongtong Jiang Gong shishi zhounian jinian lunwen ji, ed. Zhongyang yanjiuyuan (Taibei, 1976), pp. 935-37.

18. Hunt, Frontier Defense and the Open Door, pp. 70–71.

144

Wu Tingfang (1840–1920): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

open the ports after the Russian withdrawal, but the Americans kept trying to force China to make a public stand on the treaty port issue.19

Moreover, the Chinese negotiators preferred to have these ports as "self- opened" ports rather than "treaty" ports, as they wanted to retain Chinese sovereignty in them as a step towards their goal of eventual transformation of the treaty port system. This was also very much part of Wu's outlook as we shall see below. The issue of self-opened ports as opposed to treaty ports was never fully resolved although the United States and Japan eventually did agree to a formula to open the cities after the Russian withdrawal.20

Zhang Cunwu's study cited above notes that it is difficult, given the available sources, to determine precisely what Wu's own role in these negotiations was. This is partly because memorials were issued in both the names of Wu and his fellow commissioner, Lu Haihuan, and the foreign source materials are not helpful on this score, and also because Wu and Lu were obviously not free agents in these negotiations but subject to the guidance of Zhang, Yuan and Prince Qing. Nonetheless, it is clear that Wu played an important role. The negotiations earlier between the Chinese and the British had been impaired by the difficulties in interpretation, with Wen Zongyao (b. 1875) and a host of others, including Zhang Zhidong's key English-language specialists Liang Dunyan and Gu Hongming, assisting in the translation. Wu's ability to handle English and to prepare drafts in Chinese and English made him invaluable in the Sino-American negotiations, as Lu and Sheng acknowledged in requesting that he remain in Shanghai to continue the negotiations in July 1903:

Although the U.S. treaty is progressing smoothly, there are still issues that have to be pressed for in negotiation; as Wu Tingfang has been the original negotiator it is appropriate for him to handle it from start to finish. Moreover, for western language [negotiations] we need Wu Tingfang to manage personally in order to achieve the best results.21

This request was made in response to developments concerning Wu in Beijing. On 22 April 1903, the Court issued an edict acknowledging the importance of economic development as part of an overall plan for national reform. In response to a memorial by Zaizhen, the Court had already agreed to establish a Board of Commerce (Shang Bu); now Zaizhen, Yuan Shikai and Wu Tingfang were ordered to establish a code of commercial law. Following the Court's approval of the new law code, officials would be appointed to establish

19. Ibid., pp. 71–72. On the public's response see Rankin, Early Chinese Revolutionaries, pp. 75–77; Zhang Kaiyuan, “Xinhai Geming yu Jiang-Zhe zichan jieji,” pp. 263–64.

20. Hunt, Frontier Defense and the Open Door, pp. 74–76.

21. From Lu Haihuan, 17 June 1903 (GX 29/5/22), “Cables received,” China, Foreign Ministry, Waijiao dang'an, cited in Zhang Cunwu, “Qingmo zhengzhi gaige yundong zhong de Wu Tingfang,” p. 935. See also memorial of Zhang Zhidong, Lu Haihuan and Sheng Xuanhuai of 24 Sept. 1903 (GX 29/8/4), Qingji waijiao shiliao 166:19.

Wu Tingfang and the New Nationalism 1902–1905

145

the new ministry. Zaizhen, Yuan and Wu were instructed to deliberate on the nature of the new ministry and develop guidelines for it.22

This was a very important charge indeed, and one dear to Wu's heart. Zaizhen was the eldest son of Prince Qing. He had headed a special mission to England in 1902 to attend the coronation of King Edward. His brief trip abroad and contact with his foreign educated attachés, Liang Cheng and three other former CEM students, had inspired him to suggest a variety of reforms, of which this proposal was one. Obviously well intentioned and well connected through his father, Zaizhen was nonetheless inexperienced. He was also something of a playboy and his entertainments were later to give fuel to those who disapproved of the Shang Bu.23

Given Zaizhen's inexperience and Yuan Shikai's numerous other duties and responsibilities, it is understandable that Wu Tingfang came to play the major role in shaping the Shang Bu. In spring 1903, while engaged in the negotiations with the Japanese and U.S. treaty representatives, Wu and Zaizhen began a correspondence on the subject of the new ministry, with agreement that it would delay matters too much to wait until the commercial law code was developed before establishing the Board,24

But the question of Wu's own status was unsettled. On 28 May an edict was issued appointing Wu Junior Councillor in the Waiwu Bu. This was a low- ranking appointment that was in fact unsuitable, given Wu's experience and reputation in diplomacy, and which may even be viewed as insulting. Evidence is only circumstantial, but Wu was probably offended at the low level appointment; certainly he did not accept it and refused to go to Beijing and take it up when he was ordered to come to Beijing in June 1903 and continue the treaty negotiations there. Not only did the U.S. object to continuing negotiations in Beijing, but neither was Wu making any efforts to transfer the negotiation site to the capital. On 18 June, just six days after being ordered to come to the capital to continue negotiations there, Wu received a second edict ordering him to continue the negotiations in Shanghai and to proceed to Beijing when they were completed,25

By summer 1903 the negotiations with the U.S. had stalemated over the question of the Manchurian treaty ports. In May Wu and Lu had proposed

22. Shilu 514:4726b; DHL 5:5013–14.

23. Qian Shifu, Qingdai zhiguan nianbiao 4:3015. On the other CEM students in his entourage see NCH, 26 Feb. 1902, p. 392. On Zaizhen's scandalous behavior (“gambling and whoring”) see Hart to Campbell, 11 May, 20 July, 4 Aug. 1902, Sir Robert Hart, The I.G. in Peking: Letters of Robert Hart, Chinese Maritime Customs, 1868–1907, ed. John King Fairbank et al., with an Introduction by I.. K. Little (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 2:1312, 1320, 1323. See also Zaizhen's record of his travels, Zaizhen and Tang Wenzhi, Yingzhao riji (1903; reprint, Taibei: Wenhai, 1971). 24. Wellington Chan, Merchants, Mandarins, and Modern Enterprise, p. 165.

25. Shilu 515:4737a; 516:4742a, 4745a. Foreign comments ranged from “Wu's ability ignored," (30 May 1903, p. 3) to views that this appointment was necessary for Wu to receive higher appointment in the future (NCH, 28 May 1903, p. 1071; Conger to Hay, 2 June 1903, no. 1302, "MCD."

146

Wu Tingfang (1840–1920): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

that the Court take the initiative in the matter by directly asking Russia if it had objections to opening the treaty ports in Manchuria. If Russia said yes, then the Waiwu Bu could tell the Americans to deal directly with them instead of using China as their buffer, and if Russia said that it did not object, then China could seize the initiative by opening the two ports itself and resolving the situation.26 As the Russians had privately made it very clear to Prince Qing and Lianfang (the latter being Senior Vice-President in the Waiwu Bu) that they did indeed object to the opening of the new treaty ports, the Prince and Lianfang chose to ignore Wu and Lu's suggestion and use a variety of delaying tactics instead. These tactics upset the Americans, some of whom became convinced that Prince Qing and others were in collusion with the Russians. These views were echoed by radical critics in Shanghai, whose publications strongly suggested that Prince Qing had been bribed by the Russians.27

Wu and Lu's plan indicates that they would have liked the Court to be bolder in formulating policy than it proved to be. Similarly, they wanted the Court to be more assertive in moves to restore China's sovereignty in the treaty ports. The incident that brought this issue to the fore was the famous Su Bao Case of 1902, when Zhang Binglin (1868–1936) and Zou Rong (d. 1905), publishers of a violently anti-Manchu newspaper, were arrested in the Shanghai International Settlement. The Qing Government unsuccessfully attempted to have Zhang and Zou extradited and tried under its jurisdiction. On several occasions Wu was approached and asked to help in the negotiations for their extradition, but Wu did not comply.28

Y. C. Wang is certainly correct in suggesting that Wu (and Lu) were reluctant in part because they did not believe extradition was likely and also because they disapproved of harsh measures against radical intellectuals.29 In fact, while Minister to the United States, etc., Wu had managed to find indirect ways to help Liang Qichao escape capture by Qing authorities, and while Wu was certainly not associated with any of the radical groups, he was not unsympathetic to many of their views.30 But it is noteworthy that Wu and Lu responded to the Su Bao Case by memorializing the Court proposing

26. Hunt, Frontier Defense and the Open Door, n. 58, pp. 73-74.

27. See, e.g., Guomin riri bao huibian, 1903–1904, no. 1 (1903). On U.S. belief in Chinese collusion with Russia see Hay to Rockhill, 24 July 1903, William W. Rockhill, Papers (Harvard University). See also Hunt, p. 73.

28. Jin Ding to Duanfang, 16 July 1903 (GX 29/int.5/22); Duanfang to Wei Guangtao, 17 July 1903 (GX 29/int.5/23), Xinhai Geming, ed. Zhongguo shixue hui (Shanghai: Renmin, 1957) 1:425– 26, 466. On the Su Bao Case see Rankin, Early Chinese Revolutionaries, pp. 70–193; Michael Gasster, Chinese Intellectuals and the Revolution of 1911 (Seattle: University of Washington Press 1969), pp. 37-42; J. Lust, "The Su-pao Case: An Episode in the Early Nationalist Movement,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 27, part 2 (1964): 408–29; Y. C. Wang, "The Su- Pao Case: A Study of Foreign Pressure, Intellectual Fermentation, and Dynastic Decline,” Monumenta Serica 24 (1965): 102–212.

29. Y. C. Wang, “The Su-Pao Case,” p. 128.

30. Ding Wenjiang, Liang Rengong xiansheng nianpu 1:101.

Wu Tingfang and the New Nationalism 1902–1905

147

reforms in the administration of the Shanghai Mixed Court aimed at the restoration of Chinese sovereignty. In contrast to the radicals, Wu accepted the Qing state as a viable symbol of national sovereignty and would try to use it as a vehicle to protect China's sovereignty as long as possible.31

Having rejected the post of Junior Councillor in the Waiwu Bu, Wu was aiming for a more substantive position in the Shang Bu. Staffing of the new bureau was the subject of much maneuvering by people hoping for an appointment in it. Of these, the most important was Sheng Xuanhuai, who was certainly the most qualified person available in view of his control of railways and long experience in a variety of industrial and commercial enterprises. But he was frozen out of the Shang Bu, it is clear, because of the struggle he was engaged in with Yuan Shikai for control of China's modern industrial sector. The Shang Bu was to be Yuan's tool in the struggle. As Sheng's confidant in Beijing, Tao Xiang, wrote him in July 1903:

On the various matters concerning the establishment of the Shang Bu, it's not necessary to go into detail. I recently heard that its regulations have been considered and they are planning to go ahead with its implementation. There has been a lot of speculation that Prince Qing will appoint Zixu [Wu Tingfang] as [Junior] Vice-President. No matter how much service to a superior [baoxiao] Qujiang [Zhang Yintang] does, he absolutely cannot suddenly rise to the level of Vice-President. Earlier he was given the title of "Special Deputy" [chaiwei]; probably he continued to provide service [baoxiao] some more, then received [the position of] Junior Councillor [in the Waiwu Bu]. It is surmised that Chunyang [Lu Haihuan] is to be President. But as [negotiations for] the commercial treaties are to be under the Shang Bu and the negotiators to be rewarded with positions in the Shang Bu, if Chunyang is to be President and Zixu [Junior] Vice-President, the [position of] Senior Vice-President is still unaccounted for. Perhaps it is destined for [Sheng] Gongbao? I have heard foreigners say that of high officials who thoroughly understand commercial matters, there is only [Sheng] Gongbao. Chunyang is very mild mannered and not too sharp. Zixu is closer but still not first-rate. The edict to continue negotiating the treaties stems from this. To establish the Shang Bu and not make suitable appointments is truly unreasonable.... For the Government to entrust the Shang [Bu] to Wu and not call upon [Sheng] Gongbao will give rise to a lot of suspicion and really raise eyebrows!32

Wu's appointment as Senior Vice-President to the Shang Bu, which was formally made on 7 September, was the result of two phenomena. The first was Wu's own hard work in sketching out in correspondence with Zaizhen

31. Wu and Lu memorial, 29 July 1903 (GX 29/6/4), Qingji waijiao shiliao 173:10–12.

32. Tao Xiang to Sheng Xuanhuai, July 1903 (GX 29/6), Sheng Xuanhuai, Xinhai Geming qianhou: Sheng Xuanhuai dang'an ziliao xuanji zhi yi, ed. Chen Xulu, Gu Tinglung, and Wang Xi (Shanghai: Renmin, 1979), p. 2.

148

Wu Tingfang (1840–1920): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

and Yuan the scope of the Shang Bu's activities and beginning work on the development of a code of commercial law. The second was that he was a suitable substitute for Sheng Xuanhuai, who was not acceptable to Yuan Shikai for reasons outlined above. A combination of his own talents and political connections, then, made possible his move to Beijing in fall 1903 under relatively auspicious circumstances, but as we shall see below, within less than a year he was ready to leave official life altogether.

Beijing and Shanghai, September 1903-September 1904

The Shang Bu was formally established on 26 September 1903 after a summer of deliberation involving a number of high national and regional officials, and reportedly rushed into implementation before all of the issues involved had been fully resolved because of the Empress Dowager's impatience. 33

As conceptualized by Wu, Zaizhen and Yuan Shikai, the Shang Bu had a

very

broad scope, as its organizational structure indicates. It was divided into four main departments as follows:

1. The Department of Trade: management of commerce, commercial schools,

granting monopolies, awarding patents, protection of merchants

2. The Department of Agriculture and Forestry: land utilization, reclamation,

farming, sericulture, pisciculture and forests

3. The Department of Industry: management of all industrial projects,

including railways, steamships, mining and roads

4. The Department of Auditing: handling taxation, revenue, banking, currency, trade and industrial fairs, standardization of weights and measures, arbitrating disputes involving commerce and industry34

This was a very ambitiously designed agency in several ways. As Wellington K. K. Chan has noted, the scope of jurisdiction claimed by the Shang Bu was bound to conflict with several existing bureaus and offices, such as the Board of Finance (Hu Bu), the Maritime Customs (under the Waiwu Bu), the commissioners for the trade of northern and southern ports, commissioners for commercial negotiations, and the directorship of the railway system.

In part the grandiose structure reflected Wu's desire to create a truly new and modern agency that could bypass the existing bureaucratic structures and effect a highly centralized reform effort. This intent was also symbolized by the modern regulations Wu implemented. Gatekeepers were prohibited from taking bribes as entrance fees, and the staff was to be paid on a new and higher scale. In fact, as Wellington Chan notes, “the whole tone of the new

33. Wellington Chan, Merchants, Mandarins, and Modern Enterprise, p. 165.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.,

pp. 166-67.

Wu Tingfang and the New Nationalism 1902–1905

149

ministry, its style, and organization emphasized its new departure from the traditional structure."36

Wu's intent was also shared by Zhang Bishi (Zhang Zhenxun), the other key person to have input into the Court's plans to stimulate economic development. Zhang was an overseas Chinese millionaire who invested in several enterprises in China. In summer 1903 he was received in audience by the Empress Dowager, where he received an honorary title of Vice-President in the Shang Bu in exchange for a contribution of 200,000 taels to develop a commercial school to be run by the new agency. During his audience he presented an outline, which he subsequently fleshed out, for an expanded role for the Shang Bu as the overarching agency to conduct reforms stimulating economic development.37

During fall 1903 the Shang Bu presented a variety of proposals for reforms to the Throne. These included plans to publish a newspaper, to prohibit local officials from harassing merchants, especially overseas Chinese merchants, to establish procedures to handle commercial litigation, to stimulate agriculture by opening up new lands for cultivation, to develop a livestock industry, to establish agronomy schools, and to develop new regulations governing railways and mines.38

Especially important was Wu's work in developing a code of commercial law, which was vitally necessary to the success of the government's efforts. He had done some of the drafting while in Shanghai and circulated these sections to Chen Bi (1852-1928), the Board's Junior Vice-President, for his appraisal.39 The new code, which received Imperial approval on 29 December 1903 and was promulgated early in 1904, contained 131 articles in eleven sections and reflected the influence of Wu's British legal training. The law's first section contained definitions of commercial enterprises, recognizing partnerships, limited partnerships, joint stock companies and limited joint stock companies as the four major categories. The third section spelled out the rights and duties of shareholders, and the fourth and fifth dealt with management and accountability, respectively. The sixth dealt with the managers' meetings, the seventh with shareholders' meetings, the eighth with accounting, and the ninth, tenth and eleventh with company regulations, closure, and sanctions, respectively, 40

36. Ibid., p. 168.

37. Godley, Mandarin-Capitalists from Nanyang, chaps. 4-5. See also Boorman, Biographical Dictionary 1: 90–92.

38. DHL 5:5102–3; 5104–5; 5115; 5122; Zhang Cunwu, “Qingmo zhengzhi gaige yundong zhong de Wu Tingfang,” pp. 938–39. Sir Robert Hart expressed some concern to the Shang Bu officials about the broad range of activities being undertaken, but in general was very enthusiastic about the new board. See Hart to Campbell, 4 Oct. 1903, Hart, The I.G. in Peking, 2:1373. See also letter of 25 Oct. 1903, 2:1376.

39. See Zhang Cunwu, “Qingmo zhengzhi gaige yundong zhong de Wu Tingfang,” p. 940. Wu and Lu Haihuan also proposed establishing patent laws at this time. See Qingji waijiao shiliao 173:9–10. 40. Zhang Cunwu, “Qingmo zhengzhi gaige yundong zhong de Wu Tingfang,” p. 941; Tseng Yu- hao, Modern Chinese Legal and Political Philosophy (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1930), p. 197.

150

Wu Tingfang (1840–1920): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Although this company law had several drawbacks reflecting the speed with which it was drawn up, it was nonetheless an important accomplishment. It provided the bourgeoisie with a legal framework essential to its continued operation and sanctioned and granted legitimacy to its activities in a way that the traditional legal structure could not. As Fan Baichuan has recently observed, the flourishing of the bourgeoisie during the period 1904-8 was made possible by the fact that it had obtained rights enabling it to function legitimately and with relative freedom. The new law code was an important part of that new status.4

In his study of the merchantry and the Qing Government, Wellington Chan writes that the haste with which the Shang Bu was established and the inevitable conflicting claims of jurisdiction that resulted, as well as problems of inadequate funding, led to immediate problems for the new ministry that seriously hampered its effectiveness. (By November 1903 Zaizhen was denounced by a censor for unseemly behavior in a Beijing pleasure house, but he weathered the storm.) But it is also important to remember, as Fan Baichuan reminds us, that the Board's activities were an important factor in the rise of the bourgeoisie from 1904 on.42

A little over two weeks after Wu obtained Imperial approval for the commercial code, on 14 January 1904, he was suddenly transferred to the position of Junior Vice-President in the Waiwu Bu. The reasons for this remain in the realm of speculation. Zhang Cunwu suggests that Wu's demotion may have been due to the deficiencies in the code of commercial law. (In 1906 amendments were added to it, and in 1908 plans were made to have Japanese advisers draft a new one. In 1914 it was scrapped in favor of a new code as impractical and imprecise.) But it seems unlikely to me that these problems in the code should have been so immediately apparent to the

Court.

Rather, I think the explanation for Wu's transfer lies with a combination of other factors having to do with the question of who should control the Shang Bu. The problem arose immediately over the question of staffing the subordinate positions of Senior and Junior Councillor (cheng) and Senior and Junior Secretary (can). On 1 October an edict declared Xu Shichang (1855– 1939) as Senior Councillor and Tang Wenzhi (1865-1954) as Junior Councillor. On the same day, Shaoying was appointed Senior Secretary and Wang Qingmu (1860-1941) Junior Secretary.43

Xu Shichang was, according to Steven R. MacKinnon, probably Yuan Shikai's oldest friend and closest associate. A jinshi of 1886 and compiler of the Hanlin Academy, Xu had also been commander-in-chief of the Newly Created Army (Xinjian Lujun) under Yuan from 1896 to 1898, and an

41. Fan Baichuan, “Ershi shiji chuqi Zhongguo ziben zhuyi fazhan,” pp. 11, 12.

42. Ibid.; Wellington Chan, Merchants, Mandarins, and Modern Enterprise, pp. 165–68. On the denunciation of Zaizhen, see DHL 5:5101.

43. DHL 5:5119; Qian Shifu, Qingdai zhiguan nianbiao 6:3066, 3076.

Wu Tingfang and the New Nationalism 1902–1905

151

important liaison person for Yuan with the Court in Beijing. The position of Senior Councillor in the Shang Bu was an entry level position in the central government for Xu, who soon was appointed grand secretary and member of the Military Reorganization Council. In 1905 he was appointed, in addition, grand councillor, member of the Government Affairs Bureau, and vice- president of the Board of War. His appointment to the post of Senior Councillor of the Shang Bu was due to his intimate relationship with Yuan Shikai and also to his own competence, which was never in question."

There is less information available about the other appointees. The Junior Councillor, Tang Wenzhi, a native of Jiangsu Province, was a jinshi of 1892 who had served in the Zongli Yamen from 1896 to 1902, when he accompanied Zaizhen on his tour of Europe as a member of his suite. When Xu Shichang left the Shang Bu in December 1903, Tang moved up to the position of Senior Councillor and remained in that position until February 1906, when he was transferred to the new Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce (Nonggongshang Bu) as its Senior Vice-President before resigning upon his mother's death. He later had a career as a distinguished educational administrator in his native Jiangsu. He seems to have been a perfectly capable staff member.45

As to the other appointees to the lower ranking secretary posts, Shaoying and Wang Qingmu, less is known. Shaoying was a Manchu who was transferred to Junior Councillor in December 1903 when Xu left and Tang moved up. In 1905 he was appointed a member of the Commission to Investigate Constitutions Abroad and served as Senior Vice-President in the new Ministry of Finance (Duzhi Bu) from 1906 until the revolution of 1911.46 Wang Qingmu was a fellow provincial of Tang Wenzhi, and a jinshi of 1890. Along with Tang, with whom he appears to have had a close relationship, Wang had served in a clerical position in the Zongli Yamen for several years before his appointment in the Shang Bu. In December he moved up to Senior Secretary in the Shang Bu and stayed in that position until February 1906, when he moved up to that of Junior Councillor. Later in that year he was appointed Judicial Commissioner of Zhili Province but was forced to resign due to illness. He was active in the railway rights recovery movement in Jiangsu after 1907 as a leader in the company formed to rival the British concession for the Shanghai-Nanjing Line."

44. MacKinnon, Power and Politics, pp. 75–76.

45. See C. Y. Tang, “T’ang Wen-chih, Statesman and Educator,” Tien Hsia Monthly 5, no. 1 (Aug. 1937): 19–26. See also Tang Wenzhi, Rujing xiansheng ziding nianpu (reprint, Taibei: Wenhai, 1974.). 46. Qian Shifu, Qingdai zhiguan nianbiao 4:3059–64, 3066–67; Wei Xiumei, Qingji zhiguan biao 2:188.

47. Qian Shifu, Qingdai zhiguan nianbiao 4:3068, 3076–77, 3139; Wei Xiumei, Qingji zhiguan biao 2:242. On his role in Jiangsu railways see Zhang Kaiyuan, “Xinhai Geming yu Jiang-Zhe zichan jieji,” pp. 267–69. See also Lee En-han, China's Quest for Railway Autonomy, 1904–1911: A Study of the Chinese Railway-Rights Recovery Movement (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1977), pp. 43, 92, 113-14.

152

Wu Tingfang (1840–1920): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Whatever the qualifications of these people, Wu preferred to bring in his English-educated protégé Gong Xinming for one of these staffing positions, but he lost out to Zaizhen in this struggle. In November Zaizhen memorialized to accuse Gong of attempting to bribe his way into a post in the Shang Bu (hardly an unheard of practice). Gong was reprimanded and stripped of his title of expectant third class secretary in the Board of Works. 48

The incident with Gong showed the limits to Wu's power in the Shang Bu. Yuan Shikai and Zaizhen controlled the appointments of all major staff positions in the Shang Bu, including that of Chen Bi.49 This struggle brought to a head Wu's inability to truly direct policy in the Shang Bu in spite of his high position in the body. It suggests that his relationship with Yuan Shikai was no longer so strong as it had been earlier in the year and that Yuan did not view him as trustworthy enough to protect his interests in the Shang Bu. By mid-December a disheartened Wu told a New York Times correspondent that he was disgusted with official life in Beijing and claimed that Zaizhen, whose only qualification was his hurried trip around the world in 1902, vetoed most of his proposals. "I see no hope for China,” he told the reporter.50

Wu's transfer to the Waiwu Bu can be viewed in part, then, as a consequence of his losing out in the power struggle with Zaizhen and Yuan Shikai. In what may have been an effort to save Wu's face, a week after Wu's departure from the Shang Bu Zaizhen wrote a long memorial praising Wu's accomplishments and requesting Imperial approval to consult with him as needed about the new code of commercial law and other matters.51

In spite of Zaizhen's acclaim, there is no disguising the fact that Wu's transfer to the Waiwu Bu was a demotion from the position of a Senior Vice- President to that of Junior Vice-President. Although the Waiwu Bu was a powerful and important ministry, Wu could not exercise the same latitude as in the Shang Bu, where only Zaizhen as President was above him. In the Waiwu Bu there were several above him: from Lianfang, the Senior Vice- President, to Qu Hongji(1850–1918), the President, and finally to Natong as Huiban Dachen or Assistant Controller, and Prince Qing as Zongli Dachen, or Controller.52

48. DHL 5:5100–5101. Gong was said to have been educated in England and to have been Wu's protégé, with significant attainments. The NCH commented: “There are not a few of the friends of the unlucky Kung Hsin-ming [Gong Xinming] who, knowing the progressive ideas and intelligence of the man, strongly declare that there cannot be any truth in such an accusation, and that most probably Kung Hsin-ming's simple nature made him the victim of his numerous and more crafty rivals." 20 Nov. 1903, p. 1072.

49. On Chen Bi see MacKinnon, Power and Politics, pp. 85, 195–96; Tang Wenzhi, Ziding nianpu, p. 50. Chen and Xu were Yuan's men; Tang and Wang were Zaizhen's recommendees. It's hard to say who promoted Shaoying.

50. NYT, 24 Dec. 1903.

51. DHL 5:5118.

52. Guo Tingyi, Shishi rizhi 2: app. 13–14. On Qu see Wei Xiumei, Qingji zhiguan biao, 2:129. On Natong, see ibid., p. 52.

Wu Tingfang and the New Nationalism 1902–1905

153

On the other hand, it was not an inappropriate appointment. Wu replaced Gu Zhaoxin (d. 1907) as Junior Vice-President, while Gu was transferred to the Shang Bu as its Junior Vice-President, Chen Bi having moved up to the position of Senior Vice-President. Gu had been criticized, at least by the American diplomats in Beijing, for his "complete ignorance of foreign matters."53 Wu's appointment to the Waiwu Bu was said to have been upon the recommendation of both the British and Japanese ministers. As George E. Morrison wrote to J. O. P. Bland, as Wu's "appointment was the consequence of Satow [British Minister] and Uchida's [Japanese Minister] advice to the Wai Wu Pu [Waiwu Bu] it is one to be applauded. Besides he is a useful friend and can be more useful."54 Similarly, Sir Robert Hart commenting on this and other changes to his colleague wrote that “all these things mean change and reform and promise better later on.

”55 And U.S. Minister Conger wrote to Secretary of State Hay that "while on its face this seems to be a set- back, yet it is really a promotion and will be very satisfactory to most foreigners here, as we have always felt the lack on this Board [Waiwu Bu] of any personal knowledge or acquaintance with foreign affairs. "56

With his transfer from the Shang Bu, Wu could turn his attention both to foreign relations and law reform. On 23 January he and Shen Jiaben memorialized the Court requesting an allocation of 30,000 taels to accomplish two immediate tasks: finding personnel and translating legal works. This request was granted, and in spring 1904 Wu worked to get the law reform project set up. These efforts will be discussed more fully in Chapter 6.57

China's foreign relations in spring 1904 were dominated by the outbreak of war between Russia and Japan. There are hints in the documents that Wu would have liked China to assume a more active role, even while declaring its neutrality, but it was really too late in the day for China to shape events in Manchuria until the war's outcome could be seen. 58

Wu's hand could be seen immediately in negotiations with the U.S. over Chinese immigration legislation. Earlier the Qing Government had declared its intention to renegotiate its treaty with the U.S. when it expired in December 1904. Conger proposed that negotiations begin in summer 1904 to be concluded sometime after the November elections. On 2 February Wu Tingfang called upon Conger to say that Prince Qing had not realized it was

53. NYT, 15 Jan. 1904, p. 2. Shilu 523:4827a. On Gu, see Wei Xiumei, Qingji zhiguan biao 2:90. 54. Morrison refered to Wu as "that blatant ass." Morrison to Bland, Morrison, Correspondence 1:248.

55. Hart to Campbell, 7 Jan. 1904, Hart, The I.G. in Peking, p. 2666.

56. Conger to Hay, 15 Jan. 1904, no. 1475, “MCD.”

57. Shilu 524:4833a.

58. Wu pushed the Waiwu Bu for early ratification of treaties with the U.S. and Japan in fall 1903 and promoted a last-minute effort to seek mediation of the conflict between Russia and Japan. See Conger to Hay, 29 Oct. 1903, no. 1324, 12 Jan., telegraph, 28 Jan., telegraph, and 30 Jan. 1904, no. 1490, “MCD"; Satow to Lansdowne, 13 Jan. 1904, FO 17/1642; 18 Jan., no. 17 (confidential), 25 Jan., no. 25 (confidential), FO 17/1636; 26 Jan. 1904, FO 17/1624.

154

Wu Tingfang (1840–1920): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

an election year in the U.S. and as the notice of the proposed termination of the treaty on 7 December might prove an embarrassment to the U.S. administration, they would be willing to "join in any satisfactory method which might put the discussion of the question of the renewal of the Treaty over until next year, if such a method could be devised.” But it was apparently too late, unless the Qing Government were to formally withdraw the announcement of its intention to renegotiate the treaty.

Hay tried to get the Waiwu Bu to withdraw the annulment notice, arguing that the chances of getting a better treaty were nil given the strength of anti- Chinese immigration sentiment in the U.S. But Wu apparently appraised the situation differently and believed U.S. public opinion could be mobilized to reform the immigration laws in China's favor.

Conger tried to persuade Prince Qing to continue the treaty for another ten years, arguing that Theodore Roosevelt and Hay had China's interests "at heart." The Prince replied that if only laborers were to be kept out, China would not object, but as the implementation of the laws presently stood, even a Chinese banker could not enter. In reporting to Hay, Conger noted, confidentially, "I am satisfied that the real opposition comes from Mr. Wu T'ing-fang, and that Prince Ch'ing's [Qing] arguments were furnished by him."60

I think this is an accurate assessment of Wu's role in this matter. Conger and Hay kept trying all through spring 1904, although at that very time the immigration issue was brought to the fore as a result of difficulties U.S. immigration inspectors were making for organizers of the Chinese exhibit at the St. Louis Exposition. By 20 April Conger reported to Hay that it seemed useless to persist in the request that China withdraw its notification, for China was quite determined on the subject. "I am quite sure,” he added, "that Mr. Wu T'ing-fang is wholly responsible for the present situation and action of the Chinese Government. 162

Since the available Chinese sources do not indicate precisely how decision- making occurred in the Waiwu Bu, it is difficult to prove that Conger's perceptions were correct. But given Wu's history of combating U.S. immigration policy while Minister to the United States, etc., and his having raised the possibility of a boycott of U.S. goods, I think it is quite likely that he exerted the full weight of his influence within the Waiwu Bu in pursuit of reforming the U.S. anti-Chinese immigration laws, and at one point at least seems to have thought that he should be appointed special commissioner to renegotiate the treaty in summer 1904.63

59. Conger to Hay, 2 Feb., telegram; 6 Feb. 1904, no. 1494, “MCD.”

60. Conger to Hay, 1 Mar. 1904, no. 1524, "MCD."

61. Conger to Hay, 15 Mar 1904, no. 1540, “MCD.” On the St. Louis Exposition, see Zhang Cunwu, Guangxu sayi nian Zhong-Mei gongyue fengchao, 2d ed. (Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan, Jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1982), pp. 8-10.

62. Conger to Hay, 20 Apr. 1904, no. 1582, “MCD." See also ibid., 4 Apr. 1904, no. 1561.

63. Dongfang zazhi 1, no. 7 (Aug.-Sept. 1904), “Waijiao,” p. 120.

Wu Tingfang and the New Nationalism 1902-1905

155

In these and other negotiations involving railway and mining rights, and which will be discussed subsequently, Wu did play an active role in the Waiwu Bu in spring 1904. In July 1904, however, he memorialized requesting permission to resign due to illness. This permission was denied and he was granted one month's sick leave instead. He left Beijing immediately for Shanghai, arriving there in mid-month.64

The precise nature of Wu's illness is unclear, but he was ill. He later wrote that this illness led to a major change in life-style for him. He became a convert to strict vegetarianism and developed a regimen of light eating, mild exercise designed to improve his qi, ether or material force, and abstinence from alcohol and tobacco. (He later wrote that he tried to persuade Cixi to become a vegetarian, and he often harangued foreign diplomats on the virtues of temperance, much to their annoyance.) 65

While the illness was apparently genuine, it had a “diplomatic” dimension as well. Although officially “not at home" to visitors because of his illness, he nonetheless was able to give some hints of his dissatisfactions with the situation in Beijing. On 22 July the North China Herald carried a letter from Beijing stating that Wu's application for sick leave “was really due in the first place to his disappointment at the conservatism of his colleagues, none of whom had the courage to back him up in recommending reforms in the administration of the government,” while in a related story the Herald noted that “it is an open secret in Mandarin circles that Mr. Wu will not return to Peking, but ask for leave to resign upon the completion of his one month's sick leave.”66

By the time his one month's leave was up, however, Wu seems to have changed his mind. He asked for another month's leave, and was granted twenty more days to recuperate, after which he was to return speedily to Beijing and resume his duties.67

What made Wu decide to return? Since I have found no published statement explaining his decision, what follows is speculative. The atmosphere in Shanghai in summer 1904 was very exciting, especially compared to that of Beijing. Scores of Japanese victories in battle with the Russians had stimulated the development of nationalist feeling in the city. Reform and radical publications flourished, with penetrating (and sometimes scurrilous) critiques of Qing policies receiving careful attention by an expanding literate public. These latter were Wu's people: he was part of them and they appreciated him, and I believe this appreciation encouraged him to take advantage of the impact of the war in hastening reforms on the Qing state.

64. DHL 5:5196.

65. On Cixi, see Wu's Yanshou xinfa, p. 6; NCH, 25 Aug. 1905, p. 438. On efforts to convert foreign diplomats see Wu's America Through the Spectacles, p. 201; note by E. T. Williams, Chinese Secretary, U.S. Legation, in Rockhill to Secretary of State, 10 Dec. 1906, encl. 474, Case 1519/19-20, (U.S. National Archives). See also Qu Hongji's preface to Yanshou xinfa.

66. NCH, 22 Aug. 1904, pp. 194–95.

67. Shilu 532:4906b.

156

Wu Tingfang (1840-1920): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Something of this appreciation may be seen in the reformist publication Dongfang zazhi (Eastern miscellany), which began publication in 1904 and carried items of interest to the Shanghai elite, including information about U.S. immigration policies, problems with the Chinese exhibit at the St. Louis Exposition, and developments in railway and mining investments. In its July/ August 1904 issue the Dongfang zazhi had a long article about Wu's role in attempting legal reforms, in which the motivation of the abolishing extraterritoriality was clearly spelled out and acknowledged as an important national goal. Using the example of the way that leading Japanese statesmen in the 1870s and 1880s set about to reform their laws so as to end extraterritoriality, Wu expressed his hope that China could do likewise. Noting the difficulties Mutsu Munemitsu had faced in this endeavor, and which now faced Wu, the magazine commented: “As we view the current situation with respect to foreign affairs, our generation hopes that Vice-President Wu will

persevere and obtain the success that Mutsu achieved.”68

I am not sure whether Wu viewed the new atmosphere resulting from the war as creating anew the opportunity to pursue law reform, as Zhang Cunwu suggests, or whether the fact that he was so appreciated by the Shanghai public gave him additional vigor with which to go forth and do battle once again with Beijing's gray walls and yamens. Perhaps something of both was involved. At any rate, he returned to Beijing in September 1904 with renewed energy and purpose. This time he lasted longer-eighteen months-before he was ready to call it quits.

The Impact of Nationalism

The flowering of nationalism that occurred during the Russo-Japanese War affected the Chinese political scene in a profound way. In this section I would like to show how the dynamics of the new nationalism served to weaken Wu Tingfang's political position by creating tensions that made it difficult for him to operate effectively.

The first way that the new nationalist movement weakened Wu's position occurred as foreign diplomats reacted with bewilderment, indignation and anger at China's-and Wu's-efforts to be more effective in combating imperialist inroads. Their hostility was damaging to Wu because in part his political position required keeping their "goodwill," especially that of the United States and Great Britain. Their increasing hostility to him lowered his usefulness to the leaders of the Waiwu Bu. Two examples from late 1904 to early 1905 illustrate this process: Wu's efforts to protect China's position in Tibet and assume an active role in determining the political outcome of the Russo-Japanese War.

68. Dongfang zazhi 1, no. 6 (July-Aug. 1904), “Shiping,” p. 29.

Wu Tingfang and the New Nationalism 1902–1905

157

A crisis over Tibet had been brewing since 1903, when a British expedition led by Sir Francis Younghusband fought its way to Lhasa and forced the Tibetans to agree to the Lhasa Convention. In this Convention, the Tibetans were forced to pay an indemnity of £500,000, with payments spread over a 75-year period and with British military occupation during that entire period. Article IX of the Convention gave Britain many rights and privileges. Not only did Chinese nationalists such as Wu object, but also the Russians. The Qing Resident in Lhasa, Yutai, had failed to protect Chinese interests in Tibet by allying with Younghusband in the hope that he could use the British to reassert his authority over the rebellious Tibetans. Even if Russia did nothing to counter the British move in Tibet, it was still an objectionable situation for Chinese nationalists, and if Russia did strenuously object there was the likelihood of yet another war between two foreign powers fighting over another chunk of Chinese territory,69

Upon returning to Beijing in September 1904 Wu immediately informed the British Minister, Sir Earnest Satow, that China would not sign the Adhesion Agreement to the Lhasa Convention because China objected to the 75-year military occupation of the region and because Article IX would make Tibet into a "vassal state" of Britain. According to Satow's report to his superiors, Wu (“a bit of a gossip,” said Satow) “abused Yutai [Youtai] as entirely ignorant of foreign affairs and . . . as incompetent as all other Manchus." Wu declared his intention to move negotiations to Beijing, a move Satow opposed.70

Wu followed up this protest by leaking the contents of the Convention to the Chinese press, leading to a great public outcry. This act shows that Wu wanted to mobilize public opinion on behalf of a strong stance by the Qing Government on Tibet. This introduced a new element into the diplomatic relations between China and Britain, one that Satow found “obnoxious,” and Wu followed this up by arranging for Tang Shaoyi to be appointed commissioner to negotiate with the British in Calcutta. Wu probably wanted Tang to handle these negotiations because he viewed him as the most competent person for the job, and he persisted in spite of Tang's reluctance to leave China and Yuan Shikai's desire to retain him in Tianjin."1

Tang returned to Beijing in September 1905 after eight months of negotiations. The Adhesion Agreement later signed in Beijing in April 1906 by Tang and the British represented one of China's few victories in foreign relations at that time. From having previously only informally recognized China's position as a suzerain in Tibet, Great Britain now acknowledged China's sovereign rights there.72 Most of the credit for this accomplishment must of course go to Tang, but Wu deserves some credit too, for being quick

69. For background on Tibet see Li Tieh-tseng, Tibet Today and Yesterday (New York: Bookman Associates, 1960), pp. 92–97.

70. Satow to Lansdowne, 22 Sept. 1904, unnumbered, FO 17/1639.

71. On Tang's reluctance and Yuan Shikai's protests, see Sigel, "Tang Shao-yi,” pp. 139–40.

72. Ibid., pp. 137–60; Lee En-han, “T’ang Shao-yi,” pp. 75–81.

158

Wu Tingfang (1840–1920): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

enough to recognize the dangers for China and acting promptly to save the situation, and for insisting on dispatching Tang in spite of his and Yuan's displeasure at the appointment.

British Minister Satow was quite outraged by Wu's acts. In December he wrote to his friend, the American W. W. Rockhill, that “we were going on very smoothly here, when suddenly Wu Ting-fang returning from Shanghai put his oar in and persuaded Prince Ch'ing [Qing] that they ought not to agree to the convention."73 In fulminating against Wu in June 1905, Satow wrote to the British Foreign Office, privately, that

having been called to the Bar at Lincoln's Inn, he fancies himself a great authority on law! . . . I strongly suspect him of having given the Tibetan convention last year to the same native paper, and it was certainly he who persuaded the Chinese government to refuse their adhesion, and sent T'ang Shaoyi to Calcutta. (That little game has however, not proved very successful. The proposal that we should recognize the sovereignty of China in Tibet is pretty impudent considering their failure to control the Lamas at Batang which is actually in Chinese territory.)74

Foreign diplomats in China during this period in general held many unfavorable stereotypes of Chinese as passive, cowardly, untrustworthy, dishonest and fearful. They believed that Chinese statesmen responded only to force and that the only way to deal with them was to coerce them.75 They were hardly prepared to accept them as social equals, in spite of some social interactions at dinner parties, and they were in general unprepared for assertions of Chinese nationalism by people such as Wu who could not be made to fit the stereotypes. While at first looking forward to Wu's serving in the Waiwu Bu in the belief that he would be helpful to them, the foreign diplomats came to view him as “impudent” and untrustworthy.

Foreigners' hostility to Wu may also be seen in their reactions to Wu's efforts to have China play an active role in the settlement of the Russo- Japanese War. Wu hoped to obtain British approval for the dispatching of a special mission, perhaps headed by himself, to the various western nations to oversee China's interests in whatever mediation process was to occur.76

The British reaction to this idea was emphatically negative. Satow told Wu that he strongly disapproved and that he did not think there was any official who was competent to lead such a mission; if such a person existed he should be made minister of foreign affairs and instruct his diplomats abroad at the appropriate time, but in his opinion it would be "premature and therefore unwise" to send such a mission. In a "very confidential" dispatch reporting his conversation with Wu to Lord Lansdowne, Satow wrote:

73. Satow to Rockhill, 22 Dec. 1904. Rockhill, Papers.

74. Satow to Campbell, 14 June 1905 (private), FO 17/1672.

75. The American viewpoint is summarized by Hunt, Frontier Defense and the Open Door, pp. 46–49. 76. Alarm Bell (Jingzhong Ribao), 15 Sept. 1904.

Wu Tingfang and the New Nationalism 1902-1905

Mr. Wu was evidently disconcerted at my strongly expressed disapproval, and from his slipping out a suggestion that the proposed mission would resemble that of Mr. Burlingame to the Western Powers in 1868 and 1869, I'm inclined to believe that he had some idea either of heading it himself or that it should be proposed to my United States colleague.

159

Satow added that he had come to form an unfavorable opinion of Wu's abilities, and that his diplomatic colleagues joined him in his estimation that Wu was unfit to head “any high diplomatic mission":

From the opportunities I have had of conversing with Mr. Wu I am not led to form such a high opinion of his abilities as his career in America was thought to warrant. It is said, I believe with truth, that the eloquent and learned speeches which he was in the habit of delivering to American audiences were written for him by a very competent gentleman connected with the press, and I certainly have detected no signs in him of a capacity for their composition.77

As public figures often do have ghostwriters prepare their speeches, it would not be so surprising if Wu had employed an American to assist in public relations, but what is important about this is that in fact it was Wu's competence that Satow (and the Americans too, as we shall see) found so irritating and inexplicable, given their stereotypes about Chinese.

When Wu objected to the customs revenues at the Manchurian city of Niuzhuang (Newchuang) being placed in a Japanese bank and requested that these funds be transferred to the Chinese treasury, Satow strongly urged Wu to desist, and this advice plus Satow's strong words against the proposed mission abroad were approved by the Foreign Office. As far as Britain, the United States (and Japan) were concerned, China was to continue to remain "neutral" about the fate of Manchuria!78

This western hostility paralyzed the Waiwu Bu. Although Wu still pressed for the dispatching of a special mission, the other ministers split over the desirability of this act.79 In the end, nothing was done until June 1905, when Wu again proposed, and again met with hostility, that China send a special commissioner to participate in, or at least observe, the Portsmouth negotiations.

Even when Wu acted in a way consonant with British, Japanese and U.S. interests, it was resented. On 7 January 1905 the Russians handed the Waiwu Bu a note charging that Chinese in Manchuria were violating China's neutrality by joining with Japanese forces. The note threatened to reconsider whether Russia would continue to recognize China's neutrality. Wu drafted a long

77. Satow to Lansdowne, 14 Sept. 1904, no. 332 (very confidential), FO 17/1639.

78. Satow to Lansdowne, 22 Sept. 1904, FO 17/1639; Lansdowne to Satow, 19 Oct., no. 281 (confidential); 12 Nov., no. 305; 16 Nov., no. 307, FO 17/1635.

79. A report of the Asahi Shimbun, in Alarm Bell, 9 Dec. 1904.

160

Wu Tingfang (1840–1920): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

reply to this note refuting each charge in detail and then sent it to Reuters as well as a Beijing newspaper at the same time that it was handed to the Russian envoy. As in the case of the Tibetan affair, Wu used the press as a way of mobilizing public opinion behind the government. This time the Americans took umbrage at Wu's action. The chargé d'affaires for the U.S. Legation in Beijing wired the State Department that "from the tenor of the reply [to the Russian note], with its many references to international law, I should judge that Wu-ting-fang played a conspicuous part in its preparation; and his desire to have it promptly published may have been actuated more by vanity than malice. In any case, he is not to be trusted.”80

Actually, foreign irritation had been steadily rising all through 1904 over questions involving railway and mining concessions. In many parts of China, regional elites had begun to oppose these concessions and expressed desires to retain control over rails and mines themselves. In Sichuan, for example, the Waiwu Bu turned down a British syndicate's request to construct a railway from that province to Hankou because the gentry of Sichuan and Hubei were, with the support of Zhang Zhidong and the Governor-General of Sichuan, Xiliang, forming their own company for the purpose of building the line. This was to be followed by similar efforts elsewhere to cancel concessions or construct parallel lines.81

Moreover, many Chinese were raising questions about the nature of the foreign concessionaires, some of whom had obtained broad concessions earlier but not attempted to begin operations. This was especially true of the amalgam of British syndicates like the Peking Syndicate and those of the speculator John Lister Kaye. In meetings with Satow in spring 1904, Wu had raised questions about the reliability of these concessionaires and expressed annoyance at their refusing to fulfill the terms of their contracts.82

The British and other representatives were especially irritated over the movement to reclaim mining rights. Early in 1904 the diplomats began a series of protests against Hunan's provincial mining regulations as too restrictive.83 Provisional mining regulations issued by the Shang Bu in spring 1904, which Wu had drafted, were also vigorously objected to as contrary to the provisions of the commercial treaties negotiated in 1902 and 1903 which promised to permit foreigners to engage in mining. As complaints mounted,

80. Loomis to Coolidge, 14 Jan. 1905, telegram, and Hay to Coolidge, 17 Jan. 1905, telegram, "MCD." See also Satow to Lansdowne, 18 Jan. 1905, no. 25 (confidential), FO 17/1670.

81. The most comprehensive accounts of the rights recovery movement are Lee En-han's China's Quest for Railway Autonomy, his “China's Response to Foreign Investment in Her Mining Industry," Journal of Asian Studies 28, no. 1 (Nov. 1968): 55–76, and his WanQing de shouhui kuangquan yundong (Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan, Jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1963). On Xiliang's policies see Roger V. Des Forges, Hsi-Liang and the Chinese National Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 58-70.

82. Satow to Lansdowne, 2 Mar. 1904, no. 72, FO 17/1636.

83. Lee En-han, WanQing shouhui kuangquan, pp. 72–82; Satow to Lansdowne 15 Mar. 1904, no. 89, FO 17/1636; Conger to Hay, 22 Mar. 1904, no. 1544, “MCD."

Wu Tingfang and the New Nationalism 1902–1905

161

Zhang Zhidong asked to take charge of the mining regulations. In December 1904 Wu handed an augmented set of mining regulations over to Zhang, who had them reviewed by a British mining engineer and others on his staff. 84

Soon provincial gentry in Anhui attempted to expel the British owned Peking Syndicate, which had received permission to engage in copper mining in the province.85 All these events were extremely annoying to British diplomats accustomed to dealing with a more docile Chinese leadership.

Satow was especially angry with Sheng Xuanhuai for obstructing mining and related railroad plans by the Peking Syndicate in Shanxi and Hebei because these would conflict with the Hanyeping iron works, which Sheng controlled. Satow also blamed Sheng for the movement begun among gentry in Jiangsu and Zhejiang to overturn the Shanghai-Nanjing concession and to construct competing lines. Starting in spring 1904 he began directing a stream of complaints to the Waiwu Bu about Sheng's behavior.86

Sheng Xuanhuai was also coming under fire domestically as the railway concessions and loans he had contracted with various foreign groups were criticized by rights recovery advocates. In spring 1904 he was accused by a censor of profiting from land purchases made in the name of the railway company, and the Shang Bu was ordered to investigate. As the Shang Bu was controlled by Sheng's opponent, Yuan Shikai, there was the strong likelihood that this investigation would snowball into something larger. Sheng's position was gravely threatened.8

The attacks on Sheng Xuanhuai affected Wu Tingfang's position as well. In particular, the movement to annul the contract with the American China Development Company (ACDC) for the Yue-Han line had a serious impact on Wu. Wu had negotiated the original contract in 1898 as Sheng Xuanhuai's agent, and the contract was renegotiated after the Boxer crisis of 1900 to provide an even larger loan than previously. Following the Boxer disturbance, many American investors sold their shares in the Company, and these were eagerly picked up by Belgian interests, who were following an aggressive railway policy in China. These sales were in violation of Article 17 of the contract. Wu knew of the sales and had informed Sheng of the situation while engaging in a bitter but fruitless exchange with F. W. Whitridge, the Company's attorney, before leaving Washington to return to China. Apparently Sheng did not inform the Court of the sale to the Belgians because he was

84. Satow to Lansdowne, 21 Apr., no. 137, FO 17/1637; 6 July, 1904, no. 240, FO 17/1638; 15 Nov. 1905, no. 405, FO 371/21, China Trade, confidential [951] (no. 388); Rockhill to Root, 24 Nov., no. 153; 23 Dec. 1905, no. 177, “MCD”; Zhang Zhidong, memorial of 24 Dec. 1905 (GX 31/ 11/28), Zhang, Zhidong Quanji, “Zouyi,” 65:16–20.

85. DHL 5:5184–85; 5189–90; Qingji waijiao shiliao 182:20–27.

86. Satow to Lansdowne, 9 Mar., no. 83, FO 17/1636; 19 Nov., no. 390 (confidential), FO 17/ 1639; 22 Nov. 1905, FO 17/1642; Lansdowne to Satow, 2 Mar., 13 Aug., 4 Nov. 1904, FO 17/1642. 87. Lee En-han, China's Quest for Railway Autonomy, p. 75; Tao Xiang to Sheng Xuanhuai, Aug., 25 Oct., Dec. 1904, Sheng Xuanhuai, Xinhai Geming qianhou, pp. 7–8, 10, 12.

162

Wu Tingfang (1840–1920): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

anxious to obtain Imperial approval for the renegotiated contract, which was given in 1902.88

Problems of mismanagement and clashes with local people also plagued the railway venture. By 1904 these problems, especially the fact that the Belgians had obtained a controlling interest in the Company, had led to a great outcry. In response to this, Sheng warned the ACDC that China might nullify its contract because of the selling of shares to the Belgians. Sheng did not intend to truly cancel the contract at that time; correspondence with Wu at that time shows that they just wanted to force the Company to expel the Belgians.89

Barring that, Sheng and Wu hoped to arrange for the transfer of the concession to another American syndicate headed by A. W. Bash. Bash had been part of the ACDC when it had originally negotiated the Yue-Han concession. A personal friend of J. W. Foster and an acquaintance of Zhang Yinhuan and Wu, Bash came to China in fall 1904 in an effort to obtain the concession in lieu of the ACDC. Meanwhile many of the U.S. investors in the ACDC, who were dissatisfied with the autocratic policies of King Leopold, were making efforts to reestablish control over the company. They eventually did, when J. P. Morgan was persuaded to buy a large bloc of shares, but they were unable to do it fast enough to offset the rising tide of nationalist sentiment in China demanding a change.90

By fall 1904 the demand for recovery of the line had become impossible to ignore or refuse. In September and October 1904 large groups of gentry- merchants in Hunan and Guangdong held meetings pledging their opposition to the ACDC contract, and with some opposing the plan to award the concession to Bash's syndicate (“replacing Americans with Americans”). These events cannot have failed to have an impact upon Wu, especially as rumors spread that he and Sheng had both received bribes from the ACDC. Wu's bribe was said to have been $300,000 and Sheng's said to include payment of 3000 taels each month the contract was in effect.91

Since the question of bribery proved very damaging to Wu, it requires further discussion. The published source materials, plus unpublished archival materials that I have examined, contain nothing that proves the allegations. On the other hand, it is unlikely that this sort of thing would be written about. The original contract with the ACDC contained a provision in which 5% of the loan, after subtracting what it would cost to purchase land and

88. Whitridge to Hay, 20 Apr. 1901 (personal) and enclosures, Hay, Papers; Lee En-han, China's Quest for Railway Autonomy, pp. 55–60; Bays, China Enters the Twentieth Century, pp. 164–66.

89. See correspondence between Sheng and Wu during January 1904 in Sheng Xuanhuai, Yuzhai cun'gao, “Dianbao”: juan 40–41; Conger to Hay, 21 Jan. 1904, no. 1482, “MCD.” See also Lee En- han, China's Quest for Railway Autonomy, p. 62.

90. Lee En-han, China's Quest for Railway Autonomy, pp. 71–74. On Bash see NCH, 11 Dec. 1904, p. 1222.

91. Alarm Bell, 3, 4, 13 and 14 Nov., 2 Dec. 1904. The last item was entitled "Wu Tingfang swallows up the national debt himself."

Wu Tingfang and the New Nationalism 1902–1905

163

houses along the proposed route, would be used by Sheng's railway administration for various purposes, including expenses for the American railway engineers and others while they were in China.92

Materials recently published indicate that Wu and Sheng had negotiated a secret agreement by which 1% of that 5% was to go directly to Sheng. Sheng's letters to Wu suggest that Wu was worried about this secret payment. On 22 May 1898 Sheng wrote, "As to the secret agreement's provision to pay 1%, this naturally goes to the Imperial Railway Company, and in the future I will memorialize to show that there is no private [gain]."93

This apparently did not quell Wu's concern over these funds, for on 25 June Sheng again wrote to him in response to his letters. In this reply Sheng wrote that he was not motivated by private gain and in view of the heavy responsibility he bore, "as to the [5% for] entertainment expenses, there is nothing that cannot be told to others; as to retaining 1% of the 5%, which I have requested in several telegrams, it is for this and other types of other expenses and nothing else.” He said that when the Americans had previously been in China they had not required all the funds he had allocated for their expenses; hence, 4%, when added to this left-over amount, would be adequate to take care of them.94

Interspersed with these assurances were rejoinders to keep silent about this matter, much flattery, and offers to help Wu by recommending him as his replacement and also helping him to purchase a metropolitan office, as noted earlier. These can be read to imply that there was something not entirely on the up-and-up about all of this. On 29 July he wrote to Wu that he had sent the entire contract, including the provision for the return of 1%, to the Zongli Yamen, but that as the British loan for the Shanghai-Nanjing Railway and that from Belgium for the Lu-Han line did not contain provisions for the 5% expense account, “it is not convenient to make this publicly known as it could give Britain and Belgium a pretext [to protest the contract]. But whether Sheng did in fact report this to the Zongli Yamen or not remains unclear, and whether or not there was some additional monetary arrangement involving Wu and Sheng similarly is not known at this point. 96

The accusations of bribery were picked up by a censor, in sympathy with the Hunan gentry-merchants, who charged that Sheng and Wu had gravely mismanaged the Company's affairs. The Court ordered Zhang Zhidong and Cen Chunxuan, Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi, to investigate and secretly memorialize the results of their inquiries. Their secret memorial

92. Sheng Xuanhuai, Yuzhai cun’gao, “Zougao,” 21:10.

93. Sheng to Wu, 22 May 1898 (GX 24/4/3), Sheng Xuanhuai, Weikan xin 'gao, p. 70.

94. Sheng to Wu, 25 June 1898 (GX 24/5/7), ibid., p. 72.

95. Sheng to Wu, 29 July 1898 (GX 24/6/11), ibid., p. 86.

96. Lee En-han believes that Sheng did not report it. See his China's Quest for Railway Autonomy, p. 79 n. 14.

164

Wu Tingfang (1840–1920): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

does not appear

in either of their collected works or the standard compilations, and so I have been unable to uncover the results of their investigation. In December, however, Zhang Zhidong was entrusted with handling the Yue- Han matter, and Zhang's handling of the situation ultimately resulted in China's buying back the concession at the outrageous price of £6,750,000.97

Sheng Xuanhuai's confidant in Beijing, Tao Xiang, prepared a confidential account of these events for Sheng that is quite revealing and worth reproducing extensively here. After recounting the various opinions about Sheng's management of the Yue-Han affair, he wrote that "some say this is Mr. Wu's affair and not your responsibility. Some say that Zixu [Wu Tingfang] personally told others that this is Piling's [Sheng Xuanhuai] business and I [Wu] was only doing a good deed for someone else." Concerning Wu, he continued:

After Mr. Wu came back to the capital [in September] there was agreement among the government officials about awarding the concession to the other American company as a way of resolving the issue. Then unexpectedly the Guangdong gentry got agitated and began to strongly oppose Mr. Wu, saying that he had received 300,000 gold dollars. Some Hunan gentry in the capital took this up and asked Qu [Hongji], Zhang [Boxi] and others to represent them. Qu and the others put them off with evasive words, but behind their backs they nastily said: "If this Wang [Xianqian, a leader of the Hunan gentry] makes such a disturbance, who cannot talk about railways?” This word spread rapidly, which pleased the Hunanese; it seems the gentry won't agree [to switch to another U.S. company] but don't have a solution either. . When Bash came to Beijing this time, Mr. Wu avoided any suspicious [behavior]; Qu, manipulated by the gentry, refused to handle matters. [name illegible in document] said this is a British-American matter and not of concern to others. All pressed Na[tong] to act; Na said: "Why must I alone handle this hot wax candle; if the rest of the ministers are so afraid of trouble, why not turn it over to Nanpi [Zhang Zhidong]? Also this was Piling's [Sheng Xuanhuai] original intention.” All agreed and the Waiwu Bu sent a note to Bash asking him to go to Hubei and negotiate directly with Xiangshuai [Zhang Zhidong]. Qu and the others said, “Although we have evaded this, it is not a good policy." At this time Censor Huang's [Changnian] memorial was presented urging nullification [of the contract]. All were very pleased because such a large issue could be turned over to Nanpi to handle. After the edict was issued [to Zhang], some of the ministers in the Waiwu Bu said, “Having another large talent take responsibility for this means that this time we avoided troublesome words.” . . . Outsiders don't fully understand the reasons behind the Court's appointing Nanpi [Zhang]. There is a Secretary in the Board of Punishment named Liang Guangzhao who strongly opposed Mr. Wu and asked Dai Shaohuai [Jici] and Zhang Chugong [Boshi] to present a memorial for him on the subject, but the two gentlemen politely refused. Liang was furious

97. DHL 5:5248. On the buy-back see Lee En-han, China's Quest for Railway Autonomy, pp. 75–78; Bays, China Enters the Twentieth Century, pp. 169–77.

Wu Tingfang and the New Nationalism 1902–1905

165

and wanted to make a big fuss. Later his fellow provincials talked to him; just then the edict was issued [appointing Zhang Zhidong to handle the matter] and Liang stopped.98

One can see from this that Wu barely escaped a very nasty situation, and as it was he could not quite overcome the political damage. From this point on his fate was linked to that of Sheng Xuanhuai, regardless of their personal relationship.

Wu's relations with the Americans and British continued to deteriorate sharply in 1905. The U.S. attitude was especially noticeable and destructive of Wu's political position in the Waiwu Bu. In March 1905 Wu tried to have the newly-appointed U.S. Ambassador to the Netherlands, Dr. David J. Hill, appointed as one of China's two arbitrators for the permanent arbitration court at The Hague. (Hill was the McKinley Administration official to whom Wu had spoken so candidly during the Boxer crisis about the need to punish pro-Boxer officials). First the U.S. Minister refused to permit Wu to cable Hill in code, and then the U.S. State Department advised Hill to decline the appointment as Hay "feared there might be a certain embarrassment” for the U.S.99

By summer 1905, Sino-American relations were severely strained, partly because of China's intent to cancel the ACDC's concession for the Yue-Han Railway, and partly because of the movement to boycott U.S. goods in protest against U.S. immigration policy.

The 1905 boycott of American goods is considered by many as the first full-fledged manifestation of modern nationalism in China.100 Negotiations between the U.S. and Liang Cheng, China's Minister to the U.S., had been stalemated since December 1904 when the U.S. rejected China's draft for a new treaty. This draft treaty, undoubtedly drawn up by Wu Tingfang, granted the right of the U.S. to exclude Chinese laborers from the continental U.S. but abolished all restrictions for non-laborers. Hawaii and the Philippines were exempted from all restrictions. By May 1905 the boycott movement had publicly emerged in Shanghai, Guangzhou, Tianjin and other major cities. Supported by prominent members of the urban elites of these cities, the boycott committees were very well organized and nationally coordinated by the Shanghai committee.101

Wu was able to marshal support within the Waiwu Bu and among many high national and regional officials, in spite of the opposition of Yuan Shikai, of which we will speak more below. Partly their support was an expression of their own nationalistic outlook, and partly because they, like Wu, believed that a unified movement of this sort of “enlightened anti-foreignism," (wenming

98. Tao Xiang to Sheng, Dec. 1904, Sheng Xuanhuai, Xinhai Geming qianhou, pp. 16–18. 99. Coolidge to Hay, 6 Mar. 1905, telegram, “MCD.”

100. The most comprehensive recent account is Zhang Cunwu, Zhong-Mei gongyue fengchao. 101. Ibid., pp. 43–90. On the role of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce in the movement see Zhang Kaiyuan, “Xinhai Geming yu Jiang-Zhe zichan jieji,” pp. 265–66; Ding Richu, “Xinhai Geming qian de Shanghai zibenjia jieji,” pp. 298–302.

166

Wu Tingfang (1840–1920): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

paiwai) would have a great impact upon U.S. public opinion and result in the reformation of the immigration laws. With his belief in the effectiveness of the boycott as a tactic to accomplish China's aims, Wu gave his full support to the movement, cabling the boycott committee to encourage it to persevere and not be misled by assurances of W. W. Rockhill, the new U.S. Minister to China, that the negotiations then underway in Washington could result in desired changes without a boycott. Wu hoped that the boycott would create conditions conducive for the renegotiating of the treaty by himself later in the summer.102 Wu's activities to garner official support for the boycott movement were especially irritating to the U.S. Upon his arrival in Beijing, Rockhill, having earlier been informed by his friend Satow of Wu's capacity as a “troublemaker,” formally asked Prince Qing to take immediate action to stop the boycott preparations. When no action was taken, he protested again. Prince Qing waited one full week only to reply defending the legality of the movement. Hence Rockhill became convinced that the movement had received official approval "if not actual official suggestion," and stepped up his pressure on the Court.103 The movement pleases the Foreign Ministry, he fulminated, “as [an] effective means to coerce us.

"104

Rockhill's hardened attitude towards Wu at this time may also be seen in the decisive rejection of feelers sent out by the Waiwu Bu about dispatching Wu to the United States as a special envoy to represent China's interests at the upcoming Portsmouth Conference. Wu hoped to combine this function with that of negotiating the new Sino-American treaty involving immigration. Japan, however, was completely opposed to China's participation in the peace conference in any form, maintaining that Japan would negotiate separately with China over Japan's role in Manchuria. By rejecting the feelers sent out by the Waiwu Bu, the U.S. and England condemned China to the continued role of humiliating passivity to which it had been earlier assigned. Thus Rockhill (as well as other foreign diplomats) dissuaded Prince Qing from taking any action with regard to the peace settlement, even something as seemingly aboveboard, given the U.S. commitment to the concept of the "open door," as a letter to Theodore Roosevelt asking the U.S. to use its good offices to protect China's sovereign rights. And Rockhill persuaded Yuan Shikai that to keep America's goodwill, China "must remain absolutely quiet until after the conclusion of terms of peace between Japan and Russia . . ."105

102. Wu to Boycott Committee, 21 May 1905 (GX 31/4/18), China, Foreign Ministry, Waijiao dang'an, as cited in Zhang Cunwu, Zhong-Mei gongyue fengchao, pp. 47-48. On Wu as special treaty commissioner see n. 63; NCH, 11 Aug. 1905, p. 320.

103. Rockhill to Secretary of State, 6 July 1905, reprinted in U.S. Dept. of State, "United States Foreign Relations, 1904-1905," Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1906), pp. 206-7 (hereafter cited as “United States Foreign Relations, 1904-1905").

104. Rockhill to Secretary of State, 4 Aug. 1905, telegram, “MCD.”

105. Rockhill to Hay, 1 July 1905 (confidential), “MCD.” See also Rockhill to Secretary of State, 5 July, telegram, 6 July 1905, no. 24 (confidential), “MCD"; Satow to Lansdowne, 4 July, no. 236 (secret), and 8 July 1905, no. 239, FO 17/1672.

Wu Tingfang and the New Nationalism 1902–1905

167

The boycott finally started on 20 July and although it was a great and historic event, it did not result in the desired change of policy by the U.S. Although Theodore Roosevelt had recently indicated to John Hay that he intended, as Hay wrote, "to put a stop to the barbarous methods of the Immigration Bureau,"106 he, Hay and Rockhill bridled against any efforts by Chinese to assert themselves to right this injustice. On 22 August he wrote to Rockhill that he had originally planned to ask Congress to consider legislation improving immigration provisions for Chinese non-laborers, but the boycott movement and the cancellation of the Yue-Han concession had caused him to reconsider:

I have all along been intending to make that recommendation very strongly in my message. I only hesitate on account of the action of the Chinese government, or its inaction, in the matter of the boycott and in the matter of this Hankow [Hankou] railway concession. I may do it anyhow, but I wish you would in the strongest way impress upon the Chinese Government that the chance of my getting favorable action by Congress will be greatly interfered with by the failure of the Chinese to do justice themselves in such important matters as the boycott and the Hankow concession... I intend to do the Chinese justice and am taking a far stiffer tone with my own people than any President has ever yet taken, both about immigration, and so forth. In return it is absolutely necessary for you to take a stiff tone with the Chinese where they are clearly doing wrong. Unless I misread them entirely they despise weakness even more than they prize justice, and we must make it evident both that we intend to do what is right and that we do not intend for a moment to suffer what is wrong. 107

With the boycott underway and U.S. businessmen reporting their losses in panic-stricken tones, Rockhill notified the Qing Government that he viewed the boycott as a serious deterrent to the successful conclusion of the treaty negotiations then underway in Washington. On 5 August he stated that China would be held responsible for any losses sustained by the U.S. as a result of the Qing Government's failure to suppress the boycott. When these measures failed, Rockhill notified the Court on 14 August that the U.S. would suspend all treaty negotiations unless the boycott was ended. The U.S. would not hesitate to use force if necessary, the big stick being held in readiness.108

Given Rockhill's intransigence and threats, the Court began to waver. Yuan Shikai had always opposed the boycott, because he wanted to cultivate U.S.goodwill for what he undoubtedly felt was the more important issue of Manchuria. Accordingly, he banned the boycott movement in Tianjin and advised the Court against appearing to support it. Other regional officials

106. W. R. Thayer, The Life and Letters of John Hay (New York: Macmillan, 1915), 2:406–7. See also Rockhill to Hay, 17 June 1905, telegram, “MCD.”

107. Roosevelt to Rockhill, 22 Aug. 1905 (confidential). Rockhill, Papers.

108. See documents reprinted in “U.S. Foreign Relations, 1904–1905,” pp. 218, 220, 222.

168

Wu Tingfang (1840–1920): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

became alarmed when it appeared that the boycott leaders did not have complete control over the movement and that dangerous anti-dynastic sentiments were being voiced. These reports alarmed the Court, which finally yielded on 31 August and issued an edict suppressing the boycott. Except in the Guangzhou area, where it lasted over one year, the boycott soon disintegrated with the loss of Imperial sanction.109

As "the personality behind the boycott,” as American Magazine had it, for Wu the failure of the boycott to produce the desired changes in U.S. immigration policy was a severe blow to his reputation as an “America expert.” He had miscalculated the response of U.S. policy makers and the degree to which China could influence U.S. policy in this area. Moreover, he had overestimated the capacity of the U.S. leadership to accept China's new nationalism. Although some Westerners, such as Sir Robert Hart, could appreciate the potential of this new force upon Chinese politics and realize that it would be necessary to accommodate it, most could not.

110

The boycott, then, brought to a head the differences between Wu and Yuan Shikai that had existed at least since Wu's removal from the Shang Bu in January 1904. At the same time his involvement with Sheng Xuanhuai in the Yue-Han concession had damaged his relations with the other key regional figure, Zhang Zhidong. By fall, Qu Hongji, President of the Waiwu Bu, found it convenient in talking with Rockhill to blame Wu and Sheng for the cancellation of the concession and making Sheng Xuanhuai the scapegoat for British irritation over the rights recovery movement. Zhang Zhidong was similarly finding fault with Wu Tingfang's draft code of mining regulations for being too lenient to foreign interests! Wu's political position was clearly very weak.

Adding to this weakness was a physical impairment suffered on 29 September, when Wu was injured in a bomb explosion that occurred at the send-off for the officials appointed to the mission to investigate constitutional structures of various nations, a mission that Wu by training and experience should have been on had his political position been stronger. The bomb was thrown by Wu Yue, an anarchist, and Wu suffered a permanent hearing impairment in both ears as a result. It must have been deeply shocking to Wu as a harbinger of the deep

109. Decree of 31 Aug. 1905 (GX 31/8/2) translated in ibid., p. 225. On the boycott in Guangdong Province see Rhoads, China's Republican Revolution, pp. 83–91. On Yuan Shikai and the boycott see Li Zongyi, Yuan Shikai zhuan (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1980), p. 136; Zhang Cunwu, Zhong-Mei gongyue fengchao, pp. 67–75.

110. On Wu's as the "personality behind the boycott” see article by that name by D. R. Marquis in American Magazine 62 (May 1906): 74–75. On Hart's understanding of the new nationalism, he wrote to Campbell (11 June 1905): “Once they have realized the power of such combination, the people will do more to produce effect than the officials and in fact they now say 'our officials can't do anything and our govt. is powerless: let us show what popular union can do!"" Hart, The I.G. in Peking 2:1473.

111. On Qu see Rockhill to Secretary of State, 18 Aug. 1905, no. 62, “MCD"; Satow to Lansdowne, 12 Oct., no. 335; 18 Oct., no. 343 (confidential); 30 Oct. 1905, no. 355 (confidential), FO 17/ 1673. On the mining regulatons see n. 84, Zhang Zhidong memorial of 24 Dec. 1905.

Wu Tingfang and the New Nationalism 1902–1905

169

rifts separating the Qing Government from many radicals. Moreover, Wu was hospitalized for several weeks and greatly weakened.112

Wu's convalescence coincided with the return of Tang Shaoyi from his Calcutta sojourn. Within a short period of time Tang assumed a major role in Beijing. On 17 November an edict appointed him to Wu's slot as Junior Vice-President of the Waiwu Bu, with Wu transferred to the post of Junior Vice-President of the Xing Bu. Three days later, however, Tang took over Sheng Xuanhuai's position as Director-General of the Shanghai-Nanjing Railway, and his appointment in the Waiwu Bu (and Wu's transfer) was not made substantive until 10 February 1906. But during this period as a lame duck Wu appears to have played only a marginal role in the Waiwu Bu, with Tang playing a major role in the negotiations over Manchuria taking place with the Japanese representatives in Beijing.

113

As we look back over Wu Tingfang's role in the late Qing reform movement from 1902 until the end of 1905, his accomplishments are clear. As an ally of the new social forces emerging in the cities with their strong bourgeois component, Wu played an important role. First, in shaping the Shang Bu and devising China's first code of commercial law he helped to create a favorable political setting for the emergence of these new social forces in the political arena. Second, in helping to shape a more assertive foreign policy in Tibet, in Manchuria and with the United States over the Chinese Exclusion Laws, Wu was not acting alone but was very much in tune with the demands of the emerging urban public.

In examining Wu's role in the Waiwu Bu for a period lasting nearly two years, we have seen the way that he was caught in the middle between the demands of the new nationalism and the equally potent ones of the imperialist nations. His role was an ambiguous one in that as an expert on U.S. and British affairs, he could not afford to lose the goodwill of these nations, yet the policies he employed and the demands of the new forces emerging in China at that time ensured that he could not retain the favor of both sides.

We have recounted above the way that Wu was caught in the cross fire generated by the rights recovery movement and its demands for the cancellation of the Yue-Han Railway contract. This was not a simple scenario of merchants versus officials but one reflecting larger issues dividing the nascent bourgeoisie itself over the appropriate role to be played by foreign capital in China's development. Wu and Sheng were eager to see American investment in the railway project initially because they viewed railway concessions as a political tool with which to offset rising Russian influence in Manchuria and North China. Wu also was deeply skeptical about the ability of Chinese capitalists to generate sufficient capital for large projects without

112. On Wu's injuries see Tang Wenzhi, Ziding nianpu, p. 57; NCH, 29 Sept. 1905, p. 707. On Wu Yue and the assassination attempt see Rankin, Early Chinese Revolutionaries, pp. 107–8.

113. Decree of 17 Nov. 1905 (GX 31/20/21), Shilu 550:5060a; DHL 5:5434. On Tang's role in the Sino-Japanese talks in November 1905 see Cao Rulin, Yisheng zhi huiyi (Hong Kong: Chunqiu zazhi, 1966), pp. 45-49.

170

Wu Tingfang (1840–1920): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

resort to foreign loans. For both of these reasons, Wu was in favor of granting the concession to the ACDC and would have liked it to remain in Bash's hands after the ACDC betrayed China's interests. That Chinese merchant financing of railways was largely a failure under the Qing is testimony to the fact that Wu's (and Sheng's) position (and one may add Zhang Zhidong's as well) was not unrealistic. Where Wu and Sheng differed with Zhang was over the degree to which China should compromise in order to obtain the loans.114 What is obvious from the sources is that the foreign concessionaires themselves undercut Wu and the Qing Government in general by being unable to provide the capital to undertake the work they had agreed to when they obtained their concessions. This provided a raison d'être for the rights recovery advocates and made it difficult to support the foreign claims.

Wu's transfer to the Xing Bu must be viewed as a demotion of sorts. Even though he retained the same level position, Junior Vice-President, the Xing Bu could not compare in power or importance with the Waiwu Bu. But since he had been engaged in the massive law reform project since 1902, the transfer to the Xing Bu had an element of appropriateness to it which made it less of a blow to Wu's self-esteem than it might have been. In the next chapter we will consider Wu's role in the late Qing law reform project, his retirement, subsequent recall and final disillusionment with the Qing.

114. On Zhang Zhidong's skepticism about merchant-financed industrial projects see Bays, China Enters the Twentieth Century, pp. 169, 178–81. See also Chuan Han-sheng [Quan Hansheng] and He Hanwei, “Qingji de shangban tielu," Zhongguo wenhua yanjiusuo xuebao (The Chinese University of Hong Kong) 9, no. 1(1978): 119–72.

Towards a New Era 1905-1911

Reform and Revolution

As many historians have noted, the year 1905 was an important turning point in China's history. It saw the maturing of a nationalist movement stimulated by the Russo-Japanese War, in which the urban elites of the large cities organized themselves and emerged as a significant political force in the political arena. The year 1905 also marks the beginning of major structural reforms on the part of the Qing Government. Beginning that year with Wu and Shen Jiaben's first proposed legal reforms and following through with the dispatching of a mission abroad to investigate constitutional structures, the Court indicated its sincere intention to develop a modern constitutional structure.

From 1908 on, the emergence of a constitutionalist movement dramatically indicated the strength of the new urban and provincial elites, with their strong bourgeois dimension, and their determination to use the new organs of provincial and national assemblies to impress upon the Qing Court their desires in internal matters as well as foreign policy. The disaffection of the urban elites from the Qing, especially after 1910, led to a revolutionary situation that culminated in the 1911 revolution.1

During 1905-6 Wu Tingfang spent a good part of his energies on the law reform project but then resigned in May 1906, tired and disheartened. After over a year in retirement, however, he was recalled to duty to serve as China's Minister to the United States, Mexico, Peru and Cuba in September 1907. He was called back to China after completing only two years of a three-year term. Arriving in China in spring 1910 Wu refused to consider further service under the Qing and instead sought to use the new constitutional organs to obtain a decree abolishing the queue. When this effort failed, Wu led a

1. This process is described in detail in Fincher, Chinese Democracy, chaps. 4–6. For Guangdong see Rhoads, China's Republican Revolution, chap. 7; for Hunan and Hubei see Esherick, Reform and Revolution in China, pp. 91-98.

171

172

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

queue-cutting movement that met with great success in China's major urban centers. Through this activity and through his organizing an anti-cigarette smoking society, Wu joined the Shanghai and Guangzhou urban elites awaiting the moment when the Qing Dynasty would fall.

In the sections that follow we will examine Wu's role in these various activities leading to the 1911 revolution, from the attempted law reforms to his tour of duty in the Western hemisphere, and culminating in the anti- queue and anti-cigarette movements of 1910–11. In addition to the process of gradual alienation from the Qing state that is observable in Wu's career during this period, another theme emerges: the issue of westernization in China's modernization movement. While a strong believer in using British models for changes in the political realm, as we shall see below in the discussion of judicial reform, Wu sought to draw the line against westernization in life-style by rejecting those aspects he found objectionable and promoting indigenous traditions that he viewed as more desirable in their place.

Wu Tingfang and the Law Reform Movement

Wu Tingfang played an instrumental role in the first phase of the late Qing law reform movement from 1902 to 1907. During this period Wu and Shen Jiaben began their work as commissioners in the project. They coordinated substantial translations from a number of law codes, proposed several immediate reforms to humanize the judicial system, and presented a draft procedural code. In the second phase of the reform effort from 1907 to 1911, Shen Jiaben presented a draft penal code and saw the Dynasty adopt a temporary "penal law in force” in 1910. While the late Qing law reform effort is often associated with Shen Jiaben's name in view of his dominant role in the latter phase of the movement, nonetheless Wu Tingfang played a very important role in the first phase of the reform movement. Of the nine memorials submitted by the two men from 1904 to 1906, Wu was the lead signatory on the first eight, even though he was the junior member of the team in terms of position and age. (The last memorial was submitted one week before Wu's resignation with Shen as the lead signatory but showing the clear mark of Wu's influence.) Moreover, some of the memorials have a personal quality as in his reply to censorial criticism, indicating Wu's stamp. Also, Wu's forte (rather than Shen's) was the selecting, translating and compiling of materials from foreign codes, and this was an important dimension of the Commission's work in the first phase. For all of these reasons, then, it is clear that Wu played a major role in the first phase of the law reform project under the Qing.2

2. My argument is based on Zhang Cunwu, “Qingmo zhengzhi gaige yundong zhong de Wu Tingfang," pp. 954–56. For a recent account that attributes the entire enterprise to Shen Jiaben see Li Guangcan, “Cong Shen Jiaben de zouyi he xiulu kan ta de falu sixiang," Jindaishi yanjiu, 1982, no. 3: 201–15.

Towards a New Era 1905–1911

173

The Law Reform Commission was funded upon Wu and Shen's request in January 1904, and by 15 May of that year the agency was officially opened. By spring 1905 the translation work was well underway, the Commission having engaged Japanese legal experts as advisers and hired returned students from abroad to do the translations. These included substantial portions of German, French, Russian and Japanese laws, focusing on penal codes. Wu himself selected relevant British and American materials and then took charge of compiling all the translations into a large compendium. This work was finished by 1905 and provided the basis for the subsequent proposed changes."

Anticipating negative reactions among officialdom to their proposed changes, Wu and Shen selected a step-by-step method of introducing innovations rather than presenting an entire corpus of changed law all at once. The first step was revealed in three memorials of 24 April 1905. The first of these reported on the work of the commission to date, advocated the elimination of 344 redundant statutes in the Qing code, and advocated the elimination of three especially cruel punishments. These last were: (1) three cruel methods of execution: death by slicing, beheading the corpse, exhibiting the head, (2) collective liability for the entire family of a criminal, and (3) tattooing for certain crimes. Wu and Shen's reasons for advocating the abolition of these practices were, first that the essence of good government lay in humaneness (renzheng), and that second, this was the first step towards the eventual abolition of extraterritoriality, as the greatest disparities between Chinese and western law systems lay in the degree of severity and the types of punishments. These reforms would bring China more in line with prevailing practices in the West and enable it to follow in Japan's footsteps towards the abolition of extraterritorial privileges for foreigners.1

Their second memorial followed recommendations made in 1902 by Zhang Zhidong and Liu Kunyi in advocating the complete renunciation of the use of torture in the judicial process and the abolishing of corporal punishments in favor of fines and sentences in workhouses or rehabilitation centers (xiyisuo). The rationales for these humanizing reforms were, as in the first memorial, the emphasis upon compassion in governance and the need to introduce these changes so as to eventually end extraterritoriality. They recognized that the mere issuance of an edict would not suffice to transform the judicial system. Hence they advocated that provincial officials establish modern police agencies to take over investigative functions. With police collecting evidence proving guilt or innocence, the need to use torture to extract confessions would be avoided. They also proposed that a system of workhouses be established throughout the Empire. (Wu and Shen subsequently elaborated on how to avoid corporal punishment in sentencing robbers.)5

3. DHL 5:5325–28.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., pp. 5328–32; 5342–43.

174

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Their third memorial of 24 April proposed establishing law curriculum at the regional and national level to provide trained personnel to staff the courts. At the national level, there should be a law academy patterned after Japan's leading institution, with recruitment by examination. At the regional level law should be included in the new educational curriculum being developed by the Ministry of Education. Clearly, the purpose of the latter was to train a body of modern legal specialists who, as we shall note below, were seen by Wu and Shen as an essential part of the reformed judicial process.

These proposals received enthusiastic support from the Qing Court. In an edict of 25 April, the Empress Dowager ordered the abolition of the cruel punishments Wu and Shen had specified and forbade the use of torture by officials. As for the third memorial, the head of the Ministry of Education, Sun Jia'nai, was ordered to consult and report on it, and his report was favorable as well.7 On 6 May a compiler of the Hanlin Academy, Wu Yinpei, memorialized in support of the proposals and urged that the system of police and reformatories developed in Zhili by Yuan Shikai be used as a model by other provincial officials in implementing the reforms. His proposal too received clear endorsement from the Throne. 8

Even those who opposed the new measures raised more questions concerning the step-by-step method Wu and Shen employed rather than the principle of leniency itself. A censor, Liu Pengnian, noted that foreign nations did not employ torture to obtain confessions because they had police forces and fully developed judicial processes that included the use of lawyers and juries. He expressed concern that unscrupulous people would try to take advantage of the new system, leading to a great backlog of unsolved cases, unsolved because without using torture to obtain confessions the magistrate's hands would be tied. He proposed that China should draft procedural and penal codes first, making a sharp distinction between civil and penal offenses (which did not exist in the Qing code), and retain the use of torture in penal cases.9

Wu's response to Liu was heated and emotional. He cited his personal experience abroad and work in the Hong Kong police court to indicate that he did not think Chinese were any different from Westerners (same blood and qi) and if the system worked in Hong Kong without producing a large backlog of unsolved cases, it could work in China too. In view of the social evils that the use of torture produced, in the form of the common people's fear of the yamen and the ease with which the yamen's personnel could abuse their power for improper ends, Wu felt that it was imperative to abolish all use of torture. 10

6. Ibid., pp. 5383–84; Zhang Cunwu, “Qingmo zhengzhi gaige yundong zhong de Wu Tingfang," p. 945.

7. DHL 5:5383–84.

8. Ibid., pp. 5338, 5339. On Yuan's police reforms see MacKinnon, Power and Politics, pp. 151–63; Li Zongyi, Yuan Shikai zhuan, pp. 123–25.

9. DHL 5:5356-59.

10. Ibid.

Towards a New Era 1905–1911

175

A recent study of the subject by Bernard Hung-kay Luk concludes that Liu's comments were "reasonably well-informed and realistic," differing from Wu only in tactics rather than principle, and Wu's response was “somewhat emotional and personal." Since Liu proposed retaining torture for penal cases the differences with Wu were not merely tactical; Wu wanted to see the total abolition of torture in the judicial process. As Zhang Cunwu's study points out, Wu's angry response indicates his fear that Liu's objections could have nipped the entire project in the bud and therefore required his strenuous objections. This analysis makes sense. One may argue that Wu overreacted to Liu's criticism, but if so that is a measure of his strong feelings on the subject of the use of torture, his fear that the reforms would prove impossible to implement, and concern for the long-range prospects for the recovery of sovereignty in the treaty ports.11

A second critic, a censor named Qian Nengxun, also raised concerns that the Chinese people were not ready for these changes and would subvert the intent of the new system. He thought it would be better to retain the use of torture until the police and prison system were all in place. He too advocated the separation of civil and criminal process. Both the Bureau of Government Affairs and the Board of Punishment issued strongly worded memorials opposing Qian's views, another indication of the Court's full support for the reform measures.

There is more evidence that the Court made a determined effort to make sure that the new system was used. In July and August 1905 two officials were impeached for employing torture, and on 15 October Wu asked for, and received, another Imperial edict sternly warning officials not to evade the new regulations.13

Still more encouragement was received in fall 1905. The Court approved Wu and Shen's plan to dispatch two secretaries, Dong Kang and Wang Shouxun, to Japan to thoroughly research Japan's law reforms. This was evidence of what was to become the marked influence of the Continental code and the Japanese experience in the second phase of the Chinese law reform movement.

Also in fall 1905, Wu and Shen moved to implement proposals that Wu and Lu Haihuan had made in 1903 concerning the Shanghai Mixed Court. While Wu was Co-Commissioner in charge of the commercial treaties with Lu, the two of them had proposed, in response to the Su Bao Case, that a set of regulations be drawn up for the Chinese magistrate on the Mixed Court providing similar procedures and sentences as those used by the foreign judges. At that time as well as in 1905 Wu viewed this as the first step towards

11. Bernard Hung-kay Luk, “A Hong Kong Barrister in Late-Ch'ing Law Reform,” Hong Kong Law Journal 11, no. 3 (Sept. 1981): 347; Zhang Cunwu, “Qingmo zhengzhi gaige yundong zhong de Wu Tingfang," p. 948.

12. DHL 5:5360–62; 5362–64.

13. Ibid., pp. 5367, 5385, 5413-14.

14. Ibid., pp. 5412-13.

176

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

the restoration of China's sovereignty in Shanghai. In 1905 he and Shen spelled out their vision that the Shanghai Mixed Court judicial structure could serve as a model for the rest of the nation to eventually employ. The new regulations were drawn up and Zhou Fu, Governor-General of Jiangsu and Jiangxi, was ordered to implement the changes. All of these were important changes. 15

As positive as the response of the Court and high officials was, the foreign response, especially that of the British, was not terribly encouraging. The diplomats and journalists duly noted the memorials and edicts and expressed skepticism as to the ability of the Court to enforce them. The end of extraterritoriality did not even occur to them. It did to Sir Robert Hart, who wrote to his subordinate that Wu's efforts were “a real success and will be followed by other ameliorations, but it is still a long, long way to extraterritoriality." What may have been possible in 1870 or 1880 (and that is debatable) was clearly out of the question for the foreign powers by 1905. On the other hand, Wu did not view these changes as ends in themselves and understood that restoration of sovereignty hinged upon many factors, of which the key one was law reform.16

In spite of the relative disinterest on the part of the western diplomats in Wu and Shen's efforts, the positive response from the Court and the majority of high officials was most encouraging to Wu. Although he was ill and probably very disheartened by his transfer out of the Waiwu Bu, he persevered to finish up what he viewed as his most important project, the Draft Procedural Code, which was submitted and commented upon one week before his resignation.

The Draft Procedural Code was an extraordinary document reflecting Wu's training in, and admiration of, British legal traditions. The Code represented a sharp departure from many Chinese institutional practices. Composed of 260 articles divided into five sections, its main innovations were the use of lawyers and the concept of trial by jury. Its main features may be summarized as follows.17

Civil and penal cases were separated. In general, there was to be a strict time limit set for litigation. The judges had the right to seclude themselves from public attention, and the court personnel was to be trained in the new system, not carried over from the old yamen system. Wu wanted a clean sweep. Trials were to be open, and defendants were entitled to stand rather than kneel before the judge. There was to be no punishment of relatives or tattooing, no corporal punishment, and no torture or verbal threats employed against defendants or witnesses.

15. Ibid., pp. 5413–14; 5459; 5463–64.

16. Hart to Campbell, 30 Apr. 1905, Hart, The I.G. in Peking, p. 2823; Satow to Lansdowne, 25 April., no. 137; 4 May 1905, no. 162, FO 17/1671. The NCH of 28 Apr. 1905, p. 210 carried a letter from "Sympatica” complaining that Westerners had not given the law reforms due notice nor acknowledged sufficiently Wu's role in them.

17. I have not personally examined the Draft Procedural Code. My account is based on summaries by Bernard Luk, “A Hong Kong Barrister," and Zhang Cunwu, “Qingmo zhengzhi gaige yundong zhong de Wu Tingfang.”

Towards a New Era 1905–1911

177

In penal cases, the code specified under what circumstances a suspect could be arrested. Police had to have search warrants and in other ways had their power strictly delimited by the law. A suspect could be held for twenty- four hours before appearing before the judge and charged. This time period could be extended to seven days if necessary, and renewed for a maximum of ten times, totaling a maximum of seventy-one days in which a suspect could be held before being charged. If not charged within this period, the suspect had to be released. Bail was to be granted except for serious crimes. Accused had the right to see and have counsel cross-examine their accusers in court.

In civil and criminal cases alike lawyers were part of the judicial system. Their rights and behavioral standards were outlined in the code. Regulations involving the selection of a jury were similarly outlined. Regulations concerning testimony of witnesses were detailed. (It is worth noting that the testimony of wives was permitted in inheritance cases.) Procedures for appeal were spelled

out.

Finally, in cases involving Chinese and foreigners, where the foreigner had no consul to represent him or treaty relations with China, then he was to be tried by Chinese law. If a foreigner were to accuse a Chinese in a penal suit, the Chinese should be tried by Chinese law as if it were an ordinary suit involving only Chinese.

Bernard Luk has described this draft as "an English island in a stream of Japanese-style revisions," one that "with only slight exaggeration be called an English trial grafted onto the existing Chinese district magistrate's court.” There was no formal prosecuting structure nor mechanism for pre-trial examination. Luk concludes that "it is not clear how it was expected to work if it had been adopted."18

This, it seems to me, is a rather harsh judgement. Wu and Shen did not expect that this system could be immediately implemented, recognizing that it depended upon the development of a legal profession, a process that could not occur overnight, and upon the dissemination of information about this new system to those likely to form part of a jury selection pool. Rather I think they viewed it as an ideal to work towards, and it is clear that the ideal was that of the British system of justice. It was a code that, as Zhang Cunwu argues, upheld civil rights against the arbitrary exercise of power by police and judges, a feature far more marked in the Anglo-Saxon system of justice than in the Continental system. It is quite true that this represented a radical departure from Chinese legal traditions and helps to explain why the Qing ultimately opted for the Continental structure rather than the Anglo-Saxon mode. 19

Luk raises the question of why Wu "unrealistically" sought to have this law implemented and concludes that perhaps his Hong Kong experience had distorted his perceptions. Hong Kong as a “laboratory for an experiment

18. Bernard Luk, “A Hong Kong Barrister,” pp. 340, 352.

19. Zhang Cunwu, “Qingmo zhengzhi gaige yundong zhong de Wu Tingfang," p. 952.

178

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

involving a British model in a Chinese community" meant that, according to Luk, the same model could not work outside of laboratory conditions.20

Realistic or not, Wu was deeply committed to these concepts of judicial administration and persisted in them even though the majority of his countrymen rejected them. Later as the first Minister of Justice under the Republic he tried to implement the same principles and met with similar lack of success, but it appears that these failures did not diminish his feeling that the British system of justice constituted the best in the world and that ultimately China would adopt it.21

Anticipating a strong reaction to the Draft Procedural Code from traditionalists, Wu and Shen tried to argue that it did not impinge upon the essence of China's cultural traditions. They did this by using the ti/yong, or essence/function dichotomy familiar to nineteenth century reformers and popularized by Zhang Zhidong. Thus their memorial argued that “penal law is the essence (ti) and procedural law is the function (yong)." Wu was arguing that one could alter the judicial structure without touching the major body of substantive law and thereby leave untouched the "common law” of Confucian familial relationships. I think this may have been more than a tactic; it reflected Wu's belief that one could separate the two and that it should be possible to selectively preserve key features in China's social system while making judicial reforms so as to recover China's lost sovereignty in the treaty ports.22

The Court was not convinced, however. Its response was an edict calling upon provincial officials to study the draft law to see whether or not it could be implemented. This was a far cry from the enthusiastic endorsement of the spring 1905 reform proposals. Wu resigned immediately, believing that his work was substantially over. He confidentially told a foreign friend that his work over, he preferred to resign rather than face the political storms sure to occur when the Empress Dowager died.23

Over the next year responses from the provinces drifted slowly back to Beijing, all questioning the desirability and practicality of the code. Most damaging was the criticism of Zhang Zhidong. In a lengthy and heated memorial Zhang charged that the procedural code went against China's traditions in a fundamental way and would undermine the code of familial authority that constituted the core of the Chinese polity. Zhang also argued, speciously, that law reform by itself would not lead to the restoration of sovereignty in the treaty ports unless China were a strong and powerful nation. The fury of Zhang's attack leads one to conclude that his opposition was not merely to the Draft Procedural Code per se but to the entire

20. Bernard Luk, “A Hong Kong Barrister,” p. 354.

21. See Chap. 7, pp. 227–28.

22. DHL 5:5504-6.

23. Pearl, Morrison of Peking, p. 173.

Towards a New Era 1905–1911

179

enterprise of law reform based on Anglo-American legal principles.24 But by the time Zhang and the other voices in the chorus of disapproval had rolled in from the provinces, Wu had long since left Beijing.

Retirement and Last Service, 1906–1909

On 12 May 1906, one week after receiving the Court's lukewarm response to the Draft Procedural Code, Wu asked for, and received, permission to repair his ancestral graves in Xinhui, Guangdong. He left Beijing immediately and soon after submitted a long memorial requesting permission to permanently resign, claiming that the injuries he had sustained in the bomb explosion in September 1905 had left him permanently weakened.25

That there were other reasons for Wu's resignation were obvious to all observers. His gradual loss of influence in the Waiwu Bu has been recounted above, and the move to the Xing Bu had the quality of a demotion to it. Wu was not happy in that situation, especially as Shen Jiaben was reported to refer to Wu as "that foreign devil," but Wu waited until finishing the Draft Procedural Code before resigning. As a "prominent" Chinese official told W. W. Rockhill, Wu “had not come up to the expectations of the Peking Government," and would not be returning. This reflected Wu's estrangement from the centers of power under the Qing.26

After staying in his Shanghai home for a while, Wu visited Guangdong Province, presumably to take care of his family graves. He stayed for some time in the Guangzhou-Hong Kong area, engaging in some philanthropic pursuits and fitting the time-honored mould of the retired official. Wu's major semi-official activities during this period occurred in spring 1907 when Zhou Fu, his old associate from Li Hongzhang's mufu, arranged for Wu to be appointed Director-General of the commercial company in charge of the Guangdong portion of the Yue-Han Railway. Wu's appointment, together with that of the Singapore millionaire Zhang Bishi, represented Zhou Fu's effort to resolve the disputes that had arisen between the shareholders and the previous Governor-General, Cen Chunxuan, when Cen had tried to place the railway company under official control. Zhou hoped that Wu and Zhang Bishi would be acceptable to the shareholders while at the same time enable Zhou to maintain some measure of supervision over the company's affairs.2

In spite of this appointment (and there is some question about whether Wu accepted it), Wu's career under the Qing certainly seemed at an end, the

24. Zhang's memorial is summarized in DHL 5:5732-34. See also M. J. Meijer, The Introduction of Modern Criminal Law in China, 2d ed. (Hong Kong: Lung Men, 1967), pp. 79–100.

25. Shilu 558:5121b. Wu's memorial is translated by E. T. Williams. See Chapter 5, n. 65. 26. On "foreign devil," see E. T. William's note on the translation of Wu's memorial, cited in Chapter 5, n. 65. On the “prominent Chinese” see Rockhill to Root, 13 June 1906, no. 326, “MCD.” 27. Shilu 571:5230b-31a. Lee En-han, China's Quest for Railway Autonomy, pp. 103-6; Godley, Mandarin-Capitalists from Nanyang, pp. 156–57; Rhoads, China's Republican Revolution, pp. 91–94.

180

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

combined result of advanced age (he was sixty-five years old in 1907) and disillusionment. In September 1907, however, Wu was appointed once again to the position of Minister to the United States, Mexico, Peru and Cuba. Declining at first, Wu accepted before long. 28

Wu's appointment coincided with the rise of Yuan Shikai to a position of paramount influence in the Beijing Government. On 4 September 1907 Yuan was appointed to the Grand Council and concurrently to the position of President of the Waiwu Bu as a mark of Cixi's great esteem for him. In spring 1907 Yuan and his ally, Prince Qing, had been subjected to a concerted attack spearheaded by Qu Hongji, a Grand Councillor and President of the Waiwu Bu, and Cen Chunxuan, whose most recent appointment was as Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi. By summer, their attempt to unseat Yuan had failed although sporadic attacks continued through the summer.29

One of Yuan's first acts as President of the Waiwu Bu was to appoint Wu to the post of Minister to the U.S., etc., to replace Liang Cheng, whose term of office had since expired. But surprisingly the United States balked at Wu's appointment and actually considered refusing to accept it. The circumstances surrounding these events were as follows: In May 1907 the United States had been informed by the Waiwu Bu, headed by Yuan's enemy Qu Hongji, that Liang Dunyan was slated for the post. This coincided with the Qu-Cen attack on Yuan Shikai, for Liang, a returned student from the U.S. who had previously served as Zhang Zhidong's secretary, was an indispensable figure in Yuan Shikai's Zhili administration as Customs Daotai for Tianjin. Dispatching Liang Dunyan to the United States would be a severe blow to Yuan's position. Unaware that Liang Dunyan's appointment represented an attack on Yuan, the U.S. officials were merely pleased to have someone who was obviously in an influential position appointed to the Washington post. Suddenly, in September 1907, the U.S. was informed that Liang was to be appointed Junior Vice-President in the Waiwu Bu, while Liang Cheng, who had been rumored to be slated for that post, was to be Director-General of the Guangdong portion of the Yue-Han Railway Company, while Wu Tingfang was to go to Washington as Minister.30

This news was received with some dismay in the State Department. The U.S. opposition to Wu within the State Department was headed by Huntington Wilson, third assistant secretary, who believed that Wu did not command enough political influence in China either with the Court or with the so- called "Cantonese clique" or Communications clique headed by Liang Shiyi. Therefore Wilson maintained that Wu's appointment should be rejected as

28. Shilu 578:5293a.

29. MacKinnon, Power and Politics, pp. 79–89.

30. Charles Denby, Jr., to Asst. Secretary of State, 18 Nov. 1907, Case 5971 (U.S. National Archives); Waiwu Bu to Rockhill, 4 May 1907, ibid. On Liang Dunyan see Yang Jialuo, Minguo mingren 11:38; Bays, China Enters the Twentieth Century, pp. 188–89.

Towards a New Era 1905–1911

181

reflecting poorly on U.S. prestige. W. W. Rockhill, then on leave in Europe, was cabled to ask if Wu's appointment was unfavorable to American prestige or in any other way objectionable, and if reasons could be substantiated for possible rejection. We have already noted Rockhill's hostility to Wu at several points above. Although Rockhill mistakenly believed Wu lacked influence with the Court or with Yuan Shikai, he replied that he did not think it was possible to substantiate reasons for rejection.31

The U.S. chargé d'affaires in Beijing informally sounded out Natong, Senior Vice-President in the Waiwu Bu, and was rebuffed. Wilson, meanwhile, was trying to marshal evidence with which to reject Wu. J. W. Foster and ex- Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, solicited by Wilson, wrote that they considered Wu a "blackmailer,” but did not elaborate.32 I strongly suspect that their bitterness concerned Wu's role in the boycott movement and in the abortive Yue-Han concession, and may be seen as reflecting the continued feeling of the America China Development Company's investors that Wu was to blame for the cancellation of its concession. That their objections had little substance is indicated by the fact that Theodore Roosevelt chose to ignore them and to accept Wu:

My feeling would be strongly that we ought not to object to Wu. He is a bad old Chink [sic] and if he had his way he would put us all to the heavy death or do something equally unpleasant with us; . . . [but] I do not object to any Chinaman showing a feeling that he would like to retaliate now and then for our insolence to the Chinese.33

And that was as much of a nod as Theodore Roosevelt was willing to grant Chinese nationalism, and in its curious way it is a mark of respect for Wu.

As Michael H. Hunt notes in his study of Sino-American relations involving Manchuria, the hostile attitude of Wilson, Rockhill and others revealed "the way misinformation and prejudice influenced discussions of Chinese affairs in the State Department." Wu was well suited to the post in view of his previous experience and positions, and his appointment in fact indicated a measure of political influence with Yuan Shikai, who was definitely the key figure in Beijing by that time. The hostility of the American officials is partially understandable if one views Wu as a scapegoat for the various nationalistic policies that the U.S. found objectionable.3

31. Hunt, Frontier Defense and the Open Door, pp. 167–69.

32. Loeb to Adee (confidential) 29 Sept. 1907, encl. nos. 10-14, Case 5971 (U.S. National Archives). When I examined these materials, the enclosures of clippings and other materials provided by Foster and Lodge were missing, and so I have been unable to personally see them. 33. Roosevelt to Root, 26 Sept. 1907, Roosevelt, Papers, cited in Hunt, Frontier Defense and the Open Door, p. 168. See Warren I. Cohen, America's Response to China, p. 76, where TR's comment is seen as evidence that he approved of Chinese nationalism.

34. Hunt, Frontier Defense and the Open Door, p. 169.

182

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Had Yuan realized the degree of hostility towards Wu among U.S. officials and the degree to which Qu Hongji had contributed to that hostility by speaking against Wu to U.S. and British diplomats, it is debatable whether he would have made the appointment. Michael H. Hunt may be correct in observing that Wu's appointment "put a cloud" over Yuan's efforts to obtain U.S. assistance in limiting Japan's role in southern Manchuria; on the other hand it is impossible to prove that Liang Dunyan's appointment would have made a difference in the long run.

As part of Yuan's policy of seeking U.S. support in Manchuria, Wu negotiated a Sino-American Treaty of Arbitration, which was signed by him as plenipotentiary in January 1909 and ratified the following month.36 But Yuan's efforts were largely unsuccessful. In September 1908 Yuan's trusted subordinate Tang Shaoyi was deputed as special ambassador to the U.S. for the purpose of thanking the U.S. for the return of its share of the Boxer Indemnity funds. Although this was the publicly stated purpose of Tang's mission, he and Yuan hoped to involve the U.S. in a major rail and banking project in Manchuria using the returned Boxer funds as collateral. That the U.S. was uninterested in this or any other project of the sort was underscored by the fact that Secretary of State Elihu Root came to a “gentleman's agreement" with Japan (the Root-Takahira Agreement) acknowledging southern Manchuria as within Japan's sphere of influence and by the fact that this agreement was made public just as Tang arrived in the U.S.37

Except for the Arbitration Treaty, Wu's first year in Washington was less active diplomatically than was true of his first term in the U.S. W. W. Yen (Yan Huiqing, 1877-1950) has left us a charming account of the less official aspects of Wu's second term in the U.S. Yen served as Wu's Second Secretary of Legation. According to Yen, life for staff and servants in the large Legation at the corner of 19th and U Streets in the capital was like life in a big Chinese family, as living quarters were combined with office space. Other than a formal reception at which Wu presented his credentials to Theodore Roosevelt, there was only one other function at the White House before the Guangxu Emperor and the Empress Dowager died in November 1908 and the Legation went into a formal mourning period that was supposed to last for three years.

The formal mourning did not prevent Wu from accepting numerous speaking engagements outside of Washington. Yen drafted many of Wu's speeches and accompanied him on many trips, hitting the road to speak at university commencement exercises and to various special interest groups about China's progress and the need for fair treatment. Of special note were

35. Ibid.

36. Qingji waijiao shiliao XT [Xuantong]:1:21.

37. Hunt, Frontier Defense and the Open Door, pp. 170-78.

38. W. W. Yen [Yan Huiqing], East-West Kaleidoscope, 1877–1946: An Autobiography (New York: St. John's Press, 1974), pp. 40-44.

Towards a New Era 1905-1911

183

Wu's speeches to several groups in the health food and vegetarian circuit. (Wu also was asked to write a piece for the Ladies' Home Journal about his views on diet and hygiene. Entitled "How I Expect To Live Long,” it was published in November 1909 on the eve of his departure from the U.S.)39

Wu may have had more success with the U.S. public than with his immediate family on vegetarianism. About Wu's vegetarianism, Yen wrote that the staff eluded Wu's urgings to follow his path by saying that when his immediate family did, they would too. Wu had a fixed daily routine, arising early, running up and down a small hill several times, and then working until about ten a.m. each day before the first of his two daily meals. About Wu's personality, Yen wrote:

In spite of his age, he was very active. Full of fun and humor and extremely good-natured, he was endowed with a strong personal magnetism, so that even strangers would be attracted to him and listen with pleasure to his conversation. This was partly due to his Chinese costume and his dignified appearance, and partly to his mannerisms, learned from his old patron, the Viceroy Li Hung-chang.

As noted earlier, the Guangxu Emperor and the Empress Dowager died in November 1908. Their deaths set in motion a train of events leading to Yuan Shikai's forced resignation from his posts on 2 January 1909. The Imperial deaths sealed the fate of Tang Shaoyi's mission as he too went into formal mourning and then departed from the U.S. for a leisurely return to China via Europe. As Yuan's appointee, Wu's position was similarly uncertain, but Wu continued with the plans he had underway for a major Latin American tour to Peru, Mexico and Cuba. His Latin American trips were experiences that left a deep impression on him.

Wu left Washington on 21 May 1909 en route to Peru and arrived in Panama four days later. During a ten-day stay in Panama, Wu saw the Panamanian President and had lengthy visits with the Chinese community. He subsequently memorialized to establish diplomatic relations with Panama as soon as possible. He reasoned that large numbers of Chinese laborers had been brought to Panama to construct the Panama Canal and it was possible that difficulties might arise with the local population at some point in the future; hence it would be wise to have a consulate there to assist the Chinese. Also, given the large U.S. interest in Panama it was quite likely that it would be annexed by the U.S. as Hawaii had been earlier, and if this were to transpire, China would be in a better position to resist the extension of the U.S. Chinese Exclusion Laws to Panama if it had already negotiated a treaty with Panama first. The Waiwu Bu approved Wu's plan and by the beginning of 1910 plans were in motion to establish a Chinese consulate in Panama.1

39. Ibid., p. 45. Wu, “How I Expect to Live Long,” p. 17.

40. W. W. Yen, East-West Kaleidoscope, pp. 45, 48–49.

41. Qingji waijiao shiliao XT:9–17–18; 12:22–23; for a survey of Wu's policies on behalf of Chinese in Latin America see Zhang Cunwu, "Wu Tingfang shiMeishi dui Zhong Nan Mei de waijiao yu huqiao," Si yu yan 13, no. 1 (May 1975): 28-36.

184

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

On 15 June 1909 Wu departed by ship from Panama for Peru, with stops at various South American ports along the way. At all these stops overseas Chinese greeted the ship, and upon arriving in Callao, Lima's port, Wu was given a tumultuous reception by the Peruvian Chinese. Several weeks before Wu's arrival there had been a major anti-Chinese riot in Lima, and in its aftermath the Peruvian Government had imposed new regulations governing Chinese immigration. These were designed to stop the daily flow of new arrivals. Wu immediately plunged into negotiations with the Peruvian Foreign Ministry and then directly with the Peruvian President in an effort to protect the interests of the Peruvian Chinese, but found himself in conflict with the Waiwu Bu as to tactics.

Wu thought the chances of obtaining a good treaty would be stronger if it were to have a supplementary agreement limiting it to a ten-year period. If neither side had any objections at that time it could continue in force for another ten years, when it would come up for review yet again. He asked the Waiwu Bu for permission to negotiate this type of treaty, using as a model a treaty negotiated earlier that year with Canada. Wu also cited the example of the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 which had a ten-year limit. The Waiwu Bu, however, rejected Wu's proposal, maintaining that it represented a bad precedent. Instead it proposed that China simply agree to a self-imposed restriction on Chinese immigration to Peru. Wu must have been displeased with these instructions as they represented a considerably less effective approach than his, and one bound to conflict with his nationalistic outlook as well as with that of the Chinese in Peru and neighboring Chile. (The Chinese community in Chile had earlier that year requested that a Chinese warship be dispatched to Chilean waters in a show of force and had requested their government's protection in the face of rising anti-Chinese sentiment.) The Waiwu Bu's advice was unrealistic and did not address the needs of the Chinese communities in Latin America.42

In spite of these instructions, Wu continued directing negotiations for a Sino-Peruvian treaty. These proved difficult, but Wu was prepared to wait in Lima until he could negotiate a treaty acceptable to the Peruvian Chinese. He took time out to tour Peru, and found himself feeling not a small amount of national pride upon taking a train ride high into the Andes and finding Cantonese peasants firmly implanted in those heights. But the differences that revealed themselves in the Waiwu Bu's instructions were to become even greater: while the treaty negotiations were still underway on 13 August Wu was shocked to receive an Imperial edict recalling him to Beijing!43

The reasons for Wu's early recall are not clear but probably reflect Yuan Shikai's fall from power. On 18 May, before Wu had left for South America, the Waiwu Bu had very confidentially informed W. W. Rockhill that it planned

42. On the treaty, see Qingji waijiao shiliao XT:5:42, 43. On the requests of the Chinese in Chile, see ibid. 3:32–33; 4:17–18.

43. Shilu XT:16:26a.

Towards a New Era 1905–1911

185

to recall Wu in the near future and inquired whether Zhang Yintang would be acceptable. The U.S. eventually did reply that Zhang would be acceptable, but apparently Wu was not informed of these discussions. Most likely Wu's recall was related to the fall of Yuan Shikai in January 1909. Wu had been Yuan's appointee, and the Regent, with his bitter hatred of Yuan, most likely wanted a clean slate. But the timing of the recall was an embarrassment to Wu and to China. Wu hastily wound up negotiations and presented a draft treaty to the Waiwu Bu in which some of the onerous legislation was modified, but Wu felt he could have achieved better results if he had not been recalled. In 1916 he gave an interview to the Shanghai Times in which he recounted his disgust with the Qing Government's ineptness in recalling him while he was in the midst of negotiations.44

By mid-September Wu was back in Washington but only to catch his breath before departing on a trip to Mexico and Cuba. On 22 October he left by train for Mexico, the trip's purpose being to express thanks for the Mexican Government's condolences upon the deaths of the Guangxu Emperor and the Empress Dowager. Wu had negotiated China's first treaty with Mexico in 1898 (China's first modern equal treaty) but had never had the opportunity to visit that country; he very much wanted a chance to do so before leaving office.45

Again, W. W. Yen has left us a personal account of this trip. They were given a wonderful reception in Mexico by President Diaz, complete with special audience and official banquet. The envoys were colorfully dressed in costumes that were technically incorrect but very vivid, and Yen himself refused to bother with queue and official dress. “Quite irregular,” but Wu did not object. Upon departing the Mexican capital they were given a military escort to Veracruz and toasted with champagne upon their departure, with Wu "muttering softly, 'poison, poison.”” In Cuba they were given a large reception by the Cuban Government and by the Cuban Chinese, with the band striking up what was supposed to be the Chinese national anthem—actually a Cantonese folk

song.

By mid-November Wu was back in Washington preparing to depart. Among his final official acts were three memorials. The first reported that an agreement had been reached on reparations to the Peruvian Chinese merchants for damages sustained in the April riots. Wu's second memorial also reflected his recent travels in Latin America. As Chinese had settled in several Latin American countries in substantial numbers, they required their own diplomatic representatives for protection. Hence Wu's memorial requested that the Waiwu Bu establish diplomatic relations with many Latin

44. Shanghai Times of 24 Nov. 1916, encl. in Sammons to Secretary of State, 24 Nov. 1916 (U.S. National Archives), 893.00/2552. For the draft treaty see Qingji waijiao shiliao XT:8:7–15, 20-26; 9:15– 17, 10:37-39.

45. On Wu's role in Sino-Mexican relations see Sha Ding and Yang Dianqiu, “Zhongguo yu Moxige de shouci li de jianjiao ji qi yingxiang,” Lishi yanjiu, 1981, no. 6: 181–89.

46. W. W. Yen, East-West Kaleidoscope, pp. 46–48.

186

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

American nations.47 Wu's third memorial was a request for an edict abolishing the queue, which will be discussed in the next section.

On 20 December 1909 Wu formally transferred the seal of office to Zhang Yintang. He leisurely left the United States, returning to China via England, where he and Li Jingfang, Minister to the Court of St. James (and Li Hongzhang's adopted son) were honored guests at a banquet of the Author's Club.48 Wu arrived in Shanghai in spring 1910 amidst much speculation about possible positions awaiting him. Wu, however, was uninterested in further service to the Qing and instead settled into retirement, once again, in Shanghai.49

Prelude to Revolution, 1910-1911

At home in Shanghai, Wu Tingfang became a part of the city's propertied elite, an amalgam of businessmen, members of the new professions, teachers, literati and officials, some like Wu living in retirement. The elite's strength was indicated by the vigor of its main administrative organ, the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce, and in 1911 by the formation of its militia force, the Shanghai Merchants' Volunteer Corps Association.50

As a retired metropolitan level official, Wu was quite prominent. He devoted time and attention to the International Institute, an organization earlier formed by Gilbert Reid dedicated to the goal of increased mutual understanding between Chinese and Westerners. While in the U.S. Wu had raised substantial funds for the Institute, the most famous donor being Andrew Carnegie (Wu's “fellow student of Confucius”). Wu told Carnegie that a gift to the International Institute would make his name widely known and perpetuated in China. Carnegie replied that he did not want his name perpetuated in China, but donated $3,000 to the Institute. The Institute's brochure in 1911 had Wu's portrait on its cover and a prominent statement of his within lauding its work.51

Much of Wu's first year back in China was devoted to his campaign to get the Qing Court to issue an edict abolishing the queue. His first memorial on the subject had been written during his last days in the U.S. In it he wrote that many overseas Chinese, including those he had most recently met with

47. On the reparations, see Qingji waijiao shiliao XT:10:39. On establishing relations with other Latin American nations see ibid. 11:29–30.

48. NCH 15 Feb. 1910, p. 407.

49. The rumors were of appointments as tutor to the Xuantong Emperor, various diplomatic posts, and positions in the Waiwu Bu.

50. See articles by Zhang Kaiyuan and Ding Richu cited in Chapter 5, n. 1. On the Volunteer Corps see also Shen Weibin and Yang Liqiang, “Shanghai shangtuan yu Xinhai Geming,” Lishi yanjiu, 1980, no. 3: 67–72.

51. National Review 10, no. 4 (1 July 1911); NCH, 20 May, p. 491; 1 July 1911, p. 100. Brochure enclosed in no. 497, 22 Aug. 1911, FO 371/1092.

Towards a New Era 1905-1911

187

during his Latin American trip, had expressed their dismay at having to wear a queue. The long braid had become an object of western ridicule as "feminine"; it was inconvenient when working with modern machinery, if not actually dangerous; and it was unhygienic as well. Wu tried to place the issue of the queue in a non-political context by arguing that it had nothing to do with political loyalty to the Qing. Wu felt that it was a hair style that was not suited to life in the modern world, and in fact many overseas Chinese dealt with the issue by coiling the braid up on top of their heads and covering it with a cap. Not only did overseas Chinese find it a nuisance, wrote Wu, but also many Chinese in China proper too. It was a symbol of something that was best left to China's past as it entered the modern world; its abolition would be a declaration of China's intention to continue its reforms and transform itself into a modern nation like Japan.

Wu's memorial made a sharp distinction between the queue, which he wanted to abolish, and the question of dress styles. Wu was quite distressed by the abandonment of Chinese clothing for western styles and felt that Chinese styles were far more comfortable and suitable than western fashions. If it was necessary to wear western style clothes when dealing with Westerners or when traveling abroad, then so be it; but Chinese dress should be retained for other occasions, as the Japanese did. He thought it would be a mistake to abandon China's clothes for the bizarre and unnatural “tyranny of fashion" that prevailed in the West.53

In this critique Wu was following many of the arguments made by Kellogg and the other social purity reformers in the U.S. (see Chapter 4), but it also suggests that Wu was concerned with the issue of westernization and sought to draw the line at questions of life-style as symbolized by dress. Wu was afraid that many Chinese would indiscriminately adopt all that the West had to offer; Wu wanted a more selective type of westernization based on deeper knowledge of the West.

In addition to the question of westernization, Wu was also concerned about repercussions for China's native silk industry if Chinese began to use western clothes in an indiscriminate manner. He himself experimented with using silk clothes in new styles, but apparently without success.54

Wu felt so strongly about the question of western clothing that in 1913 he formed a society to oppose western dress and vigorously protested to President Yuan Shikai about the Parliament's decision to adopt formal western attire. He proposed instead that the Parliament's costume be two outfits of modified traditional pants and jackets, one in Chinese manufactured silk for winter and one in Chinese cotton for summer.55

52. I have only seen the translation of Wu's memorial in NCH, 5 Aug. 1910, p. 309.

53. The term is from Wu's America Through the Spectacles, p. 79. See also his Yanshou xinfa, pp. 21b- 22a.

54. Carl Crow, China Takes Her Place (New York: Harpers, 1944), pp. 125–26.

55. Wu's Minguo tuzhi chuyi, pp. 62–65a.

188

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Wu's first memorial to abolish the queue and retain Chinese dress was not acted upon by the Qing Court. Accordingly Wu drew up a second, longer memorial on the same subject in July 1910. In this memorial he reiterated the arguments he had presented in the first one and stressed that the opinions in the memorial not only represented his personal views but also those of the majority of Chinese,56

This memorial was similarly shelved but the issue was taken up by the National Assembly when it opened in fall 1910. Amidst politically loaded resolutions calling for the early convening of a Parliament and demanding that Prince Qing be impeached, the National Assembly also dealt with the queue. In response to a petition forwarded to the body from the Beijing Chamber of Commerce by the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, the National Assembly passed a resolution in December 1910 calling for the abolition of the queue and recommending changes in dress style. This latter was said to have caused a panic among hatters, clothiers, furriers, silk merchants and those in allied trades.5 57

The decree issued on 21 December discouraged changes in dress style, using Wu's arguments about harm to China's domestic textile industry, and did not mention the queue at all, in spite of the fact that Zaitao, the influential uncle of the infant emperor, advocated cutting the queue. Once again the National Assembly passed a resolution calling for an edict to cut the queue and change dress style, and once again the request was refused. The decree of 30 December read, "Further discussion is useless."58

Having exhausted the avenues of limited constitutionalism, Wu turned to direct action. On 15 January 1911 the Rational Diet Society (of which more later) called a meeting in a popular Shanghai meeting place, Zhang's Gardens, attended by five to six thousand people. Wu personally did not attend (it would have been unseemly) but sent a letter to the assembled group announcing that he had removed his own queue and declaring his support for the meeting. Perhaps as many as one thousand people publicly removed their queues at this meeting. In similar actions throughout the major cities of China in spring 1911, thousands more followed their example.59 Commenting on Wu's activities, the North China Herald wrote that although his proposed reforms could not fail to provoke opposition from the Manchus, Wu “has had the courage of his convictions.”60

While not of such obvious political importance as the queue-cutting movement, Wu's other activities during the period preceding the 1911 revolution are significant. As mentioned above, Wu organized the Rational

56. Reprinted in Dongfang zazhi 7, no. 8 (Sept. 1910): 98–100.

57. Jordan to Grey, 26 Dec. 1910, FO 371/1082.

58. Guo Tingyi, Shishi rizhi, p. 1376.

59. On the queue-cutting movement in Guangdong see Rhoads, China's Republican Revolution, pp. 205-6.

60. NCH, 20 Jan. 1911, p. 123.

Towards a New Era 1905–1911

189

Diet Society (in Chinese, Hygiene Society or Weisheng Hui). The Society was said to have two to three hundred members and met fortnightly in Wu's home for lectures on the dangers of alcohol, tobacco and meat-eating. In 1911 the Society established a vegetarian restaurant in Shanghai that subsequently became well-known for its excellent food. The Society's decision to sponsor the queue-cutting meeting was based on the supposedly hygienic issue that the queue was injurious to health in the modern age. Much as Wu and his fellow vegetarians tried to disassociate themselves from the political and anti-Manchu aspects of the queue-cutting drive, these were apparent to all.61

An offshoot of the Rational Diet Society was the Anti-Cigarette Smoking Society, reorganized in June 1911. The reorganized Society's officers included among some of the most important figures in Shanghai: Chen Zuling, Chair of the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce, Shen Tunhe, a prominent comprador, and Li Pingshu (1853–1922), head of the Shanghai Self-Governing Bureau and the Shanghai Merchants' Volunteer Corps Association, were all appointed vice-presidents of the society, and a key person was Wen Zongyao, formerly Chinese Resident in Tibet and a leading representative of the Cantonese mercantile community in Shanghai.62

The goal of the Society was, through books, placards and public speaking, to inform the public about the dangers of cigarette smoking to the health and to try to discourage ordinary people from spending their hard earned cash on cigarettes. Wu felt strongly about the dangers of tobacco and devoted a chapter to the subject in his Yanshou xinfa (New methods to prolong life), written in 1914.63

While the question of cigarette smoking was certainly appropriate within the context of hygiene, it is worth noting that as in the case of Chinese versus western clothing, it suggests a concern with the overt manifestations of westernization and a desire to draw the line against westernization of the Chinese life-style. While tobacco had been smoked in China for several centuries, cigarettes were a recent introduction from the United States. The first (American) companies began producing and selling cigarettes in China in 1890, and the quantities consumed rose greatly after 1902 with the establishment of a virtual monopoly by the British American Tobacco Company. Although there were Chinese tobacco manufacturers (the leading firm got its start during the 1905 boycott of American goods), the cigarette was a visible symbol of the West, especially the United States,64

61. Ibid., p. 159; Crow, China Takes Her Place, p. 16; on the restaurant also see NCH, 19 Aug. 1911, p. 477.

62. NCH, 17 June 1911, p. 754.

63. Wu, Yanshou xinfa, chap. 13.

64. Sherman G. Cochran, “Big Business in China: Sino-American Rivalry in the Tobacco Industry, 1890-1930" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1975), chaps. 1–2.

190

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

The anti-cigarette movement was said to have spread widely within a short period of time in summer 1911. According to an account in the North China Herald in August 1911, societies had been formed in many provincial capitals, with thousands of people pledging to abstain from smoking.65

In the long run, of course, the Society was unable to eradicate the use of tobacco or cigarettes from China, but its formation suggests the kinds of issues that "westernized” Chinese such as Wu grappled with: how much, what kinds, and what pace of culture change was appropriate for China. That there were no easy answers then as now is clear.

From May 1911 on a revolutionary situation developed in China over the main issue of nationalization of China's trunk lines, which was heatedly opposed by the shareholders of the major lines, including the Cantonese shareholders in the Yue-Han line. Many propertied Chinese in Shanghai had already been fed up with the Qing after the Court's inept handling of the financial crisis of 1910, and the new issue mobilized many to try to force the Court to pay heed to the new organs of public expression, the Provincial Assemblies and the National Assembly.66

In late September a large rally was held in Shanghai attended by about one thousand Cantonese residents to hear two delegates from the Guangdong Railway Protection Association en route to Beijing to try to lobby against the nationalization scheme. Wu Tingfang was one of the speakers at this rally, in which the main theme was the need for the Court to place all significant issues before the Provincial Assemblies before deciding policy. The meeting did not oppose the nationalization plan per se but announced that approval would be withheld pending discussion by the Provincial or National Assemblies.67 Summing it up later for the participants was Gu Hongming, erudite English scholar born in Singapore and late member of Zhang Zhidong's staff. The issue, said Gu, was whether "the reform of China . shall be decided and monopolized by a few persons who happen to have the Prince Regent's ear and others who are in power; or shall it be carried out by and with the full and free consent of the nation.”68

A few days after the publication of Gu's comments the answer was apparent: a soldiers' mutiny at Wuchang quickly became a signal to local and provincial elites throughout Southern and Central China to establish their independence of the Qing. Revolution was at hand, and with it a new role for Wu.

65. NCH, 19 Aug. 1911, p. 476.

66. On the financial crisis of 1910 see Fan Baichuan, "Ershi shiji chuqi Zhongguo ziben zhuyi fazhan," p. 24. For relevant documents see Marie-Claire Bergere, Une crise financiere a Shanghai a la fin de l'ancien regime (Paris: Mouton, 1964).

67. NCH, 30 Sept. 1911, p. 851. On the Railway Protection Association see Rhoads, China's Republican Revolution, pp. 207–8; Qiu Jie, “Guangdong shangren yu Xinhai Geming,” in Jinian Xinhai Geming qishi zhounian xueshu taolunhui lunwen ji, ed. Zhonghua Shuju bianji bu, pp. 373–78. 68. NCH, 7 Oct. 1911, p. 34.

Towards a New Era 1905-1911

Summing It All Up

191

In 1914, when he was temporarily retired, Wu set thoughts to paper in his Minguo tuzhi chuyi (Crude thoughts on ways to govern the republic).69 In this work he set forth his views on the need for a strong state tempered with respect for the law and the nurturing of the individual's right to be protected against the arbitrary exercise of power. He wanted a state to promote industrial and commercial development on behalf of the nation and to guard against officials' exploitation of these enterprises for private gain. He hoped to see universal education, using reformed simplified characters, and the training of young Chinese in technical subjects and modern managerial methods. And he was greatly afraid that the leaders of the Republic would be unable and unwilling to implement these ideas, and therefore would be unable to succeed where the Qing had failed.

And why had the Qing failed? Wu was most emphatic in stating that it was not because the leaders had been immoral, chasing after concubines and letting eunuchs bring the nation to ruin, as had happened, so Wu believed, many times in China's history. On the contrary, Dezong was not lazy or immoral, and the Empress Dowager had been an effective ruler as regent. The high level officials were not especially corrupt, and there had been a pretty good record in terms of finding talented personnel.

Rather, failure was due to a state of mind, a conservatism that despised changes and was contemptuous of anything foreign. This attitude prevented the Qing leadership from seeing that modern technology had transformed the world and made China's traditional defenses against foreign aggression outmoded. Men such as Li Bingheng, Xu Tong (1819–1900) and Gangyi (d. 1900) were not corrupt or greedy or lacking in patriotic feelings; they were simply so reactionary and blindly anti-foreign that genuine reform became impossible. (Xu was said to have been so anti-foreign he would not permit messages from the Zongli Yamen to the foreign legations to pass in front of his residence.) We called this primitive or “savage" anti-foreignism to distinguish it from "civilized" anti-foreignism or modern nationalism which sought to establish China's equal place in the family of nations. It is noteworthy that Wu did not single out the Manchus as responsible for China's troubles. Of the three mentioned above, only Gangyi was a Manchu. Wu understood the problem as a problem of Chinese culture and one that Chinese of all ethnic origins were going to have to confront.

Because of the conservative and anti-foreign attitudes of the leadership, its promoting of reforms was only half-hearted and ineffectual. Dezong tried in 1898 in a laudable effort to do what was necessary, but unfortunately his effort was undermined by reactionary officials who slandered the reform effort to the Empress Dowager and caused her to stop it. The later efforts to promote constitutionalism were a sham, and the attempt to nationalize the

69. The following is based on Wu, Minguo tuzhi chuyi, chap. 1.

192

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

railways in the last months of the dynasty was disgraceful, showing that the rulers were not genuinely acting in the interests of the nation (as they should have been) but actually standing in opposition to the economic interests of the modern bourgeoisie, which Wu viewed as the backbone of the modern nation.

Because those above were unable to reform, China could not resist the foreign nations militarily and was saddled with enormous indemnities that sorely pressed the common people and angered the merchantry. As much as anything else, the indemnities were the cause of China's present troubles, making it impossible to generate enough capital in the public or private sector to modernize China's economy without resort to foreign loans. Overseas Chinese who could see the disparity between the wealth of the western nations and the poverty of China became alienated, especially when upon returning to China they could see how inept Qing officialdom was. Thus the Qing had alienated the common people and the merchants; in short it had lost all legitimacy.

What was needed was a clean sweep to get rid of the old outlook of blind conservatism and xenophobia that had led China into its present wretched state. Yes, the Manchus had to go and the monarchy had to go too, but these were not ends in themselves but the necessary precondition for the new beginning Wu felt China needed.

Wu Tingfang and the 1911 Revolution

As is well known, the soldiers' uprising at Wuchang that started on 10 October 1911 set in motion a chain of events that led three months later to the abdication of the Qing Emperor and the establishment of a Republic with Yuan Shikai installed in a position of paramount political influence.

Wu Tingfang played an important role in this process. He served as foreign affairs representative for the Shanghai Military Government that was formed following the revolutionary coup in that city on 3 November, then handled foreign affairs on a national level for the revolutionary forces as they groped towards the establishment of a provisional governmental structure in November and December 1911. These accomplishments were followed by his selection as the chief Republican delegate to the North-South peace talks that started in December 1911 and continued in permuted form until the Manchu abdication on 12 February 1912. In January 1912 he was chosen to serve as Minister of Justice in the first cabinet of the Republic formed by Sun Yixian and the Nanjing Provisional Government. In many respects these activities constitute the most politically significant acts of Wu's entire life.

In earlier chapters we traced the development of several themes related to Wu's earlier life. One theme is Wu's emergence as a foreign affairs specialist of bourgeois background and orientation in the late Qing period functioning in a political environment with which he was not entirely compatible. Earlier we explored the ways Wu's marginality led to great ambivalence towards the Qing and eventual estrangement from it. A second theme has been Wu's relationship to the modern urban elite that emerged in Shanghai in the early twentieth century and the ways that his political role in the late Qing reflected the political aspirations of this newly emergent group with its strongly bourgeois composition and flavor.

In many ways the events of 1911 serve as the culmination of these themes. While a member of Li Hongzhang's mufu in the 1880s and 1890s, Wu was often a man out of step with his times whose problems reflected in a broader sense the inability of modern capitalists to fully utilize the mufu structure to fulfill their aspirations, both economic and political.

In the period after the Boxer Uprising, Wu as a foreign affairs specialist. rose to a position of greater power and influence than had ever been possible previously. This too was a reflection of the growing importance of the skills—

193

194

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

in the broadest sense of the term- -that the modern bourgeoisie could bring to the state. Yet here too, genuine power proved elusive as Wu and other foreign affairs specialists were dependent upon, and subordinate to, figures such as Prince Qing, Yuan Shikai or Zhang Zhidong and could not function independently. I have recounted above how Wu's efforts to implement serious reforms and a more nationalistic foreign policy met with opposition that weakened his political position and led to his growing estrangement from the Qing. This process mirrored the aspirations and frustrations of the modern urban public in the last decade of Qing rule, and in particular the frustrations of the modern bourgeoisie and helps to elucidate the process by which the Qing gradually lost its legitimacy with propertied groups and thereby hastened its downfall.

The revolution of 1911 was a highly complex phenomenon involving a large number of political actors. Due to the painstaking work of many historians of the event, our understanding of it is far more comprehensive than was possible even a decade ago.1 Throughout most regions of China, local and provincial elites seized power in tandem with existing military forces. Given the uneven character of Chinese socio-economic development, the nature of these elites and their alliances with the military varied considerably, giving the revolutionary process an extraordinarily complex and diverse dimension.

As a retired official in 1911, Wu Tingfang became a part of the powerful and largely bourgeois elite of Shanghai, with whose members he had formed close ties since returning to China from the United States since 1902. In his political role during the revolution, he acted together with other leading members of this group. In particular, he was politically associated with the Jiangsu constitutionalists, led by Zhang Jian. As a group, Wu and his associates played an important role in the revolutionary transformation in Shanghai and surrounding Jiangsu Province and then emerged as a national political force as well.

Just as the Qing rulers had needed the skills of foreign affairs specialists such as Wu, so too the revolutionaries found them essential in their quest to avoid foreign intervention and in seeking diplomatic recognition. This situation helped to facilitate the political emergence of Wu and the constitutionalists with whom he was associated. But as in the case of his relationship with the Qing rulers, Wu found that his own hopes and those of his associates were not to be fully realized in the revolution and that, moreover, the new conditions created by the revolution made fulfillment of his political ideals seem nearly as elusive as before.

1. Useful surveys are: Winston Hsieh, Chinese Historiography on the Revolution of 1911 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975); “A Symposium on the 1911 Revolution,” Modern China 2, no. 2(Apr. 1976): 139–226; Rhoads, “Two Cheers for 1911,” pp. 127–36; Edmund S. K. Fung, “Post-1949 Chinese Historiography on the 1911 Revolution,” ibid. 4, no. 2 (Apr. 1978): 181–214; Zhang Kaiyuan, “Xinhai Geming shi yanjiu zhong de yige wenti,” Lishi yanjiu, 1981, no. 4: 53–58; Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase 1900–1913 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

Wu Tingfang and the 1911 Revolution

The Shanghai Restoration

195

The revolution in Shanghai was the product of an alliance formed between the Central China Bureau of the Revolutionary Alliance (Tongmeng Hui) and members of the city's propertied elite in the anxious days following the uprising in Wuchang." The formation of this alliance had been the goal of the revolutionaries in Shanghai since early 1911. As Wu Qiandui has noted, the strategy of the Shanghai group differed from that of revolutionaries in Hubei, where the infiltration of the New Army was the successful strategy that culminated in the Wuchang Uprising. In Shanghai, Song Jiaoren (1882– 1913), Chen Qimei and other revolutionaries hoped to tap the various resources of the Chinese elite. These resources included access to funds, administrative competence, and control of military units such as the Shanghai Merchants' Volunteer Corps Association.3

Although the sources are not explicit on this point, the strategy suggests that the revolutionaries recognized that Shanghai was something of a special case because of the large foreign presence in the city. The problem for revolutionaries in Shanghai was not only the seizure of power, but the need to avoid any pretext for foreign intervention, and the best way to accomplish this was to establish a viable governmental structure that could maintain order and protect foreign interests, in short to establish legitimacy in terms the foreigners could accept. This could not be accomplished without the cooperation of the upper stratum of the Shanghai bourgeoisie.

The key figure in arranging the cooperation of the Shanghai elite was Shen Manyun. Shen was the founder and manager of the Xincheng Bank, influential in banking circles, one of the founders of the Shanghai Merchants' Volunteer Corps Association, a director of the Shanghai Board of Public Works and one of the directors of the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce. Having joined the Revolutionary Alliance early in 1911, he was excellently placed to aid the revolutionaries in forming connections with other members of the Shanghai bourgeois elite.*

Along with Wu Tingfang, many influential Chinese in Shanghai had been ambivalent about the Qing regime even before the Wuchang Uprising occurred. The financial crisis of 1910 caused by overspeculation in rubber stocks had been mishandled by Qing authorities, in the opinion of many contemporary observers. (In November W. W. Yen caustically stigmatized the

2. Useful secondary accounts of the Shanghai Restoration are: Rankin, Early Chinese Revolutionaries, pp. 203–14; Shen Weibin and Yang Liqiang, “Shanghai shangtuan,” pp. 67–88; Wu Qiandui, "Shanghai guangfu he Hujun dudufu,” ibid., 1981, no. 5: 34–47; Zhang Kaiyuan and Lin Zengping, Xinhai Geming shi (Beijing: Renmin, 1980-81), 3:120–23.

3. Wu Qiandui, “Shanghai guangfu,” pp. 34–35.

4. On Shen Manyun's role see ibid., p. 35; Shanghai shehui kexueyuan, Lishi yanjiusuo, ed., Xinhai Geming zai Shanghai shiliao xuanji (Shanghai: Renmin, 1981), pp. 981–85 (hereafter cited as Shanghai shiliao).

196

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Shanghai revolutionary government personnel as “bankrupt rubber boomers."5) And, as we noted in Chapter 6, many influential Chinese in Shanghai and other large cities were strongly opposed to the railway nationalization policy the court developed in 1911.

In the aftermath of the Wuchang Uprising, a financial crisis developed in Shanghai that was only temporarily ameliorated by 20 October. Members of the financial elite had a natural desire to maintain order and many probably entertained doubts about the effectiveness of the dynasty in protecting their interests. Moreover, many were active in the constitutionalist movement, which was especially powerful in Jiangsu Province, and were attracted to the ideal of provincial self-determination. For these reasons, as members of the elite observed the inability of the Qing to suppress the revolt and the growing numbers of provinces declaring their independence of the Dynasty, they were inclined to be receptive to overtures from the revolutionaries in their own city.

On 24 October planning for the Shanghai uprising actively began at a meeting between Chen Qimei and Shen Manyun. At this meeting it was decided that Shen should contact Li Pingshu (1853-1922), a leading figure within the Shanghai elite. Li had earlier served as a district magistrate under the Qing but had lived in Shanghai for many years. He was a director of the Board of Public Works, a proctor of the Kiangnan Arsenal and one of the leaders of the Merchants' Volunteer Corps, as well as being actively involved in a variety of self-government enterprises.?

When Li indicated to Shen that he favored a revolutionary action in Shanghai, Shen arranged for Li to meet with Chen Qimei. Chen and Li met on 29 October and made concrete plans to deploy the Merchants' Volunteer Corps in the coup, and other prominent figures were mobilized to support the movement financially and in other ways. These included Mu Xiangyao and Wang Yiting, who along with Li Pingshu were to play a prominent role in the civil government established after the coup, and the famous comprador Yu Xiaqing, who contributed funds to help with the coup.8

The fall of Hanyang to Qing forces on 2 November spurred the Shanghai group to decisive action. Shanghai was recognized as the key to the lower Yangzi valley region. A strong victory there could offset the precarious situation in Hubei. Along with the military plans being made, plans to form the civil government were also completed in the last hours before the coup began, and the revolutionaries, through Li Pingshu, contacted Wu Tingfang and

5. Morrison, Correspondence 1:672.

6. National Review 10 (2 and 28 Oct., 11 and 18 Nov. 1911): 322, 344, 383, 403; Shen Weibin and Yang Liqiang, "Shanghai shangtuan," p. 73.

7. Wu Qiandui, “Shanghai guangfu,” p. 37; Shen Yunlong, “Li Pingshu yu Xinhai Shanghai guangfu," in his Jindai zhengzhi renwu shuping 2:110–18; Shanghai shiliao, pp. 971–80.

8. On Yu Xiaqing's role see Fang Teng, "Yu Xiaqing lun,” Zazhi yuekan 12, no. 4 (Jan. 1944): 59– 60; Ding Richu and Du Xuncheng, “Yu Xiaqing jianlun,” Lishi yanjiu, 1981, no. 3: 145–66.

Wu Tingfang and the 1911 Revolution

197

persuaded him to handle foreign relations for the revolutionaries. Although the sources differ, this probably occurred on 3 November.9

Why did Li Pingshu and the revolutionaries decide to ask Wu? They may have suspected that he would be sympathetic to their cause, given his decision in 1910 to retire from service under the Qing and his subsequent leadership of the queue-cutting movement. But also, as Zhang Cunwu has argued, there was no one else who had Wu's experience or reputation in Shanghai. Other possible persons were Zhang Jian, prominent constitutionalist and leader of the Jiangsu gentry, Tang Wenzhi, who had served under Wu in the Ministry of Commerce and was a leading figure in Jiangsu educational circles, and Wen Zongyao, educated in the U.S. and with some experience in diplomacy. But none of these combined Wu's experience in foreign affairs with his international reputation.10

At first Wu declined in view of his advanced age, but Li Pingshu returned to Wu's residence with Wen Zongyao who joined Li in persuading Wu to undertake the responsibility. Wen had been Wu's assistant in 1903 in the negotiations to revise the commercial treaties with the U.S. and Japan and had subsequently served as the Qing Resident in Tibet. He was a leader of the large and influential Cantonese mercantile community in Shanghai, with which Wu had close ties, and he agreed to serve together with Wu in managing foreign relations for the Shanghai revolutionary government. Years later, Li Pingshu recalled the event with pleasure: “When I recall that day, one may say that his [Wu's] spirits were elated, his sense of justice (y) competing with the moon for brightness."ll

With Wu agreeing to handle foreign relations, a task seen as crucial to the success of the movement, the coup could go forward. Zhang Chengyou, a Hubei student in command of the “dare-to-die" forces that were used in the coup, recalled that on 3 November he was told that Wu had agreed to undertake foreign relations, and when this was confirmed by Yu Youren, one of the leading revolutionary figures in Shanghai, they decided to act immediately. Having neutralized the two Qing garrisons by receiving assurances from their commanders that they would not move unless directly attacked, later that same day Chen Qimei led the "dare-to-die" troops to attack the Kiangnan Arsenal. Unexpectedly, Chen was captured and not released until the following morning, 4 November, when Restoration Society leader Li Xiehe led additional forces and succeeded in taking over the arsenal.12

9. On the differing sources for the date for Li's approach to Wu see Zhang Cunwu, "Wu Tingfang yu Xinhai Geming," in Zhongguo xiandaishi zhuanti yanjiu baogao, ed. Zhonghua Minguo shiliao yanjiu zhongxin, 6:96–97.

10. Ibid., p. 99.

11. Shanghai shiliao, p. 972.

12. Feng Ziyou, Geming yishi 5:283–84.

198

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

By mid-morning on 4 November white flags were flying throughout Shanghai and the city was firmly in the hands of the revolutionaries. Having sustained only light casualties, the revolutionaries moved next to the task of forming a government and extending the revolution to other parts of China. Thus Wu's decision to join the revolutionary movement was an important turning point in determining its success, and it similarly was a major turning point in his own life.

Wu Tingfang and the Shanghai Military Government

As the revolutionaries had correctly predicted, their victory in Shanghai was a decisive turning point in the revolution. On the next day, 5 November, the Qing Governor of Jiangsu Province, Cheng Dequan, declared Jiangsu's independence (the way having been paved by Yu Xiaqing's offer to raise one million dollars to pay for troop expenses).13 Zhejiang Province followed thereafter, and the revolutionaries gained control of the strategically important and wealthy lower Yangzi basin. This in turn made possible their capture of Nanjing on 2 December, offsetting losses in Hubei and assuring the success of the revolutionary movement.

In spite of the detailed work that had gone into planning for the coup, the formation of a military government in Shanghai was marked by conflict. According to some accounts, Chen Qimei was determined that the Revolutionary Alliance rather than its rival, the Restoration Society, take control of the new Shanghai government. Chen's analysis placed the Restoration Society in the leading role in the Hubei Military Government under Li Yuanhong, and he feared that the Revolutionary Alliance would lose out in the national struggle for power if Shanghai were not firmly in its hands.14

Shortly after their victory at the Arsenal, the revolutionaries held a meeting to discuss the formation of the military government. There are three conflicting accounts of this meeting. Although they differ in details, they all indicate conflicts between Chen Qimei and Li Xiehe, the leading Restoration Society figure in Shanghai. In particular, it showed Chen Qimei's use of the Shanghai underworld groups, the Qing Bang and Hong Bang, to intimidate his opponents. These conflicts and Chen's tactics left Wu and other elite supporters of the revolution uneasy.

According to the memoirs of Zhang Tianjue, Li Pingshu was the strongest proponent of Li Xiehe as dudu, or military governor, of Shanghai, arguing that Li had been dispatched to Shanghai as "chief commander” (zongsiling) by the Hubei Military Government and would therefore command the greatest

13. Fang Teng, “Yu Xiaqing lun,” p. 60.

14. Zhang Tianjue, “Huiyi Xinhai,” in Xinhai Geming shi congkan (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1980), 2:155– 56.

Wu Tingfang and the 1911 Revolution

199

support, domestically and abroad. Moreover, as a Hunanese he would be an effective leader of the many Hunanese troops stationed nearby at Wusong. According to Zhang's account, Chen's supporter Wang Zhongsheng countered these arguments and upheld Chen's role in the planning and implementation of the coup. After Wang's speech, Chen Qimei's followers Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), Liu Fubiao and Wang Jigao shouted that they all should support Chen, with Liu and Wang displaying their guns in a threatening manner. Liu Fubiao, it should be noted, was a key figure in the Qing Bang. According to this account, those present were intimidated and dared not continue to oppose Chen. Wu Tingfang tried to resign from handling foreign relations, claiming his advanced age and illness, but he was pressed to continue.15

A second account by Shang Binghe, based on several eyewitness accounts, has Wu Tingfang opposing the establishment of a separate military government in Shanghai, only to be interrupted by Wang Zhongsheng, who banged his firearm on the table and shouted, “We battled in Shanghai and won it. I will shoot anyone who opposes the establishing of a [Shanghai] military government." This effectively squelched all opposition.16

The third account is based on a roundtable discussion of participants in the Shanghai revolutionary movement held in 1961. This account has Liu Fubiao as the probable wielder of arms who intimidated Chen's opponents, and does not mention who these latter were.

In spite of the differences in these accounts, they suggest that Li Pingshu and Wu Tingfang were not entirely happy with Chen's leadership but accepted it when faced with the strong-arm tactics of Chen's supporters. From the beginning, then, there were strains in the relations between Chen Qimei and his supporters among Shanghai's upper crust, and these strains were to become more serious as time went on.

These tensions notwithstanding, the military government was formally inaugurated in an afternoon meeting on 6 November and seems to have enjoyed great popularity, at least initially. This popularity was facilitated by a series of decrees made by the new government between 4 and 6 November declaring a moratorium on many taxes, especially the lucrative but hated transit taxes on goods.

While these measures brought the new government much goodwill from the Shanghai populace, they created enormous financial problems that ultimately proved insurmountable and led to increased strains with the bourgeois supporters of the military government. Initially, however, the

15. Ibid., p. 158.

16. Shang Binghe, Xinren chunqiu (Beijing, 1924; reprint, Taibei: Wenxing, 1962), 12:3.

17. "Xinhai Shanghai guangfu qianhou,” in Xinhai Geming huiyilu 4:7-8. Also reprinted in Huiyi Xinhai Geming, ed. Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi quanguo weiyuanhui, Wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui (Beijing: Wenshi ziliao, 1981), pp. 327–28.

18. Wu Qiandui, “Shanghai guangfu,” pp. 42-45; Shanghai shiliao, pp. 287–88. The full list of personnel for the military government is given in Shanghai shiliao, p. 1243.

200

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

government was able to mobilize large sectors of the population to contribute towards the campaign to conquer Nanjing. Wu Tingfang and other members of the elite joined these efforts with enthusiasm, speaking at large rallies and personally contributing large sums of money. Wu himself contributed 100,000 dollars towards the success of the Nanjing campaign.

These measures were followed by efforts to establish a new bank and float bonds, efforts which encountered numerous difficulties, and by resort to borrowing the sum of Tls 1,500,000 from the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company. As Wu was also a member of the Board of Directors of the CMSNC, he was also presumably instrumental in helping to arrange this transaction as well.20

Wu's greatest contribution to the Shanghai Military Government, of course, lay in his handling of foreign relations. Before the assault on the Arsenal had even been completed, the revolutionary forces notified the British Consul- General in Shanghai that they had taken over the city and asked the help of the foreign diplomatic corps in maintaining order in the International Settlement.21

As soon as the military government was formally established on 6 November it issued a circular to the foreign diplomatic corps announcing that it would protect the Settlement, and this was followed up with notices warning Chinese to respect foreign lives and property. The military government several times issued decrees prohibiting armed men from entering the International Settlement without prior notification of the foreign authorities, but this appears to have been ignored by both sides after some time. (There is one account that Wu negotiated with the Settlement authorities to permit soldiers to traverse the Settlement along Nanjing Road, but this is not supported by any documentary materials.) 22

Negotiations began immediately over two matters of great concern to the revolutionary government. One was its effort to secure the funds and securities of the Shanghai Daotai, Liu Yanyi, who had taken them along with all the documents of his office and fled into the International Settlement on 3 November. Although somewhat concerned about the possibility of reprisals from the revolutionaries, the foreign consuls were opposed to any act that could be seen as interference with their administration of the International Settlement. 23

19. On fund-raising meetings see Shanghai shiliao, pp. 1256, 1258. On Wu's personal contribution see Chen Dingshan, Chun Shen jiuwen (Taibei: Shijie wenwu, 1967), p. 116.

20. Shanghai shiliao, pp. 531–35, 614–75, 1259.

21. Jordan to Grey, 7 Nov. 1911, FO 371/1094.

22. Shen Weibin and Yang Liqiang, “Shanghai shangtuan,” p. 86; Jordan to Grey, 4 Nov. 1911, FO 371/1094. Yu Zhijiang asserted that Wu negotiated the N-S passage through the International Settlement. See "Xinhai Shanghai guangfu qianhou,” in Xinhai Geming huiyilu 4:17, where participants in this roundtable discussion recalled that armed men did pass unhindered through the Settlement.

23. Jordan to Grey, 7 Nov. 1911, FO 371/1094.

Wu Tingfang and the 1911 Revolution

201

Wu Tingfang and Wen Zongyao were not only eager to have the military government gain access to the Daotai's funds and securities, but also anxious to prevent any act on the part of the foreign diplomats that could be construed as support for the Qing regime, as the British Consul-General had earlier announced his government's neutrality in the conflict between the Qing and its opponents. Wu and Wen were careful to let the foreign diplomats understand that in laying claim to the funds they were not challenging the status of the International Settlement and were even willing to allow the Qing- appointed magistrates on the Mixed Court continue to function. Moreover, Li Pingshu added that the revolutionaries would leave undisturbed the 100,000 taels of the Daotai's funds marked for the upkeep of the Mixed Court.2

When Wu and Wen's conciliatory approach bore no results, Chen Qimei took matters into his own hands. On 10 November he sent Liu Yanyi a letter demanding all the securities. Liu showed it to the British Consul-General, Sir Everard Fraser, who bridled at its "insolent" tone. Chen followed this with a dispatch to the Consul-General bidding him to order his police to hand over arms confiscated from persons found bearing them within the Settlement. Although this second letter had nothing to do with the securities issue, its tone was offensive to Fraser.25

The diplomats were angered by these notes and after considerable discussion, they decided to privately inform Wu Tingfang that they would henceforth ignore Chen, the “discordant element.” Wu was able to persuade Chen to back down, fearing the possibility of a clash or at least the deterioration of relations at a time the revolutionaries were eager to gain the goodwill of the western nations. On 13 November, Wu gave Fraser verbal assurances that for now the revolutionaries would be content with a communication listing the securities and reserving the right to discuss their claim to them in the future.26

This incident obviously illustrates the difference in approach between Wu and Chen. Yu Zhijiang, a young revolutionary who served as intermediary between Chen Qimei and Wu Tingfang later recalled that Wu concluded from this incident that Chen was very ignorant about foreign affairs and could not be trusted. Relations between Wu and Chen were even more distant from then on. 27

The second issue requiring immediate negotiation concerned the occupation of the Shanghai-Nanjing Railway station in Shanghai by an international force and the declaration that the railway itself was neutral in the civil war, which made it impossible for the revolutionaries to use the railway for the transport of troops or matériel for the siege of Nanjing. On 7 November Wu was able to obtain Fraser's agreement to the occupation of

24. Fraser to Jordan, 11 Nov. 1911, encl. in Jordan to Grey, 17 Dec. 1911, FO 371/3010. 25. Fraser to Jordan, 13 Nov. 1911, encl. no. 1 in Jordan to Grey, 23 Nov. 1911, FO 371/1097. 26. Fraser to Jordan, 3 Dec. 1911, encl. in Jordan to Grey, 17 Dec. 1911, FO 371/3010. 27. "Xinhai Shanghai guangfu qianhou,” pp. 16–17.

202

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

the railway station by revolutionary troops. Partly, the British recognized that it would require a larger force than was immediately available to reoccupy it and might be viewed as a breech in Britain's policy of neutrality. Also the British occupation of the station had aroused the criticism of other foreign nationals who felt that British interests had been "unduly favored to the danger of the International Settlement. "28

The railway line itself, however, was still out of bounds for the revolutionary troops. On 12 November, in response to Wu's "urgent pleading," Fraser proposed to his government that the embargo on revolutionary troops and munitions be lifted except for an area ten miles in radius of the station. In that revolutionary forces controlled the entire area along the railway except Nanjing itself, this would appear to have been long overdue. Fraser's proposal was finally accepted as British policy after another formal note from Wu urged ending the embargo. Wu wrote that such an act would be "in the interest of foreigners as well as Chinese . . and in the cause of humanity," since the conduct of Qing officials in Nanjing had left that city in a “state of perfect anarchy."29

Wu's assertion that the revolutionaries were better prepared to maintain order than were the Qing administrators was one that he repeated throughout his diplomatic efforts following the Shanghai restoration and which will be discussed below. In general, it is fair to say that Wu's diplomacy successfully neutralized foreign hostility to the revolutionaries in Shanghai. A French observer noted that "foreigners in Shanghai were very much impressed by the way the revolutionaries behaved towards them. They were evidently obeying strict orders to show them every consideration and courtesy.

"30

Although British and other foreign military authorities in Shanghai worried about the possible effects of the situation upon foreign interests, within a few days of the coup most of these fears had been allayed, and certainly the prominent roles played by Wu Tingfang, Wen Zongyao and Li Pingshu helped in this regard.31

Wu's first public statements to the foreign press in Shanghai were also designed to be reassuring. In his first interview with the North China Herald, which appeared in print on 11 November, Wu stated that the revolutionaries' policies towards foreign nations would be on "liberal-minded conservative lines." "There will be no further obstruction to foreigners in trade, but the whole of China will be thrown open," he declared. Wu also held out the promise of employment of many foreign advisers in a government "thoroughly

28. The British rationale for this act was that the railway's bondholders included English nationals. See Jordan to Grey, 7 and 13 Nov. 1911, FO 371/1094, 1095.

29. Wu to Fraser, 14 Nov. 1911, encl. in Jordan to Grey, 29 Nov. 1911, FO 371/1097. See also Jordan to Grey, 13 Nov., nos. 55 and 70, FO 371/1095; 15 Nov. 1911, FO 371/1096.

30. Fernand Farjenal, Through the Chinese Revolution: My Experiences in the South and North. . . . trans. Margaret Vivian (London: Duckworth, 1915), pp. 69–70.

31. E.g., Jordan to Grey, 6 Nov. 1911, FO 371/1094; The Times (London), 6 Nov. 1911, encl. in Addis to Lindley, 30 Dec. 1911, FO 371/1098.

Wu Tingfang and the 1911 Revolution

203

up-to-date and modern,” and which would no longer be "playing off one nation against the other."32

These themes were reiterated at greater length in Wu and Wen's famous "Letter to our Foreign Friends," dated 14 November and published in the North China Herald on the 18th. This letter was written in response to a letter written by Gilbert Reid, with whom Wu had been associated in the International Institute, and C. Spurgeon Medhurst, entitled "To Our Chinese Friends," which had been written on 12 November and published in the Herald. In this letter, Reid and Medhurst had deplored the violence and bloodshed accompanying the revolution in areas outside of Shanghai and expressed concern over the plight of Manchus living throughout China. They urged reasonable Chinese to lay down their arms and to negotiate a peaceful settlement under the framework of constitutional monarchy.33

In their reply, Wu and Wen scored the Manchus for their ineptitude and inability to govern China "in a manner compatible with the forward movement signalizing the modern history and development of the civilized world.” “By its benighted conceptions and barbaric learnings," they said, the Qing Dynasty had brought China to a “position of degradation." By contrast, the revolutionaries were portrayed as progressive and having an identity of interests with the foreign powers who sought reform in China. Both the enlightened Chinese and the foreign powers had failed to force the Manchu regime to get into step with the rest of the civilized world; now the Manchus were no longer deserving of the Chinese people's confidence. The revolutionaries had, by contrast, controlled the "forces of evil” to such a degree as to "characterize this revolution as the least sanguinary in the history of the world, when the sins of the country and the nature of the masses are taken into consideration." As further evidence of the revolutionaries' intentions, Wu and Wen declared that they had

taken every possible step to protect vested interests, safeguard international obligations, secure continuance of commerce, and shield educational and religious institutions; and, what is even more important, striven continually to maintain law and order, sustain peace, and promote a constructive policy upon sound and enduring grounds.

Wu's efforts to influence western public opinion also carried across the Pacific to the United States, where Wu sought to mobilize his contacts to press the U.S. State Department for early recognition for a Republic. On 8 November Wu received a cable from Andrew Carnegie expressing congratulations and wishes for the success of the movement. Wu replied immediately asking Carnegie to help seeking U.S. recognition. Carnegie was

32. NCH, 11 Nov. 1911, p. 354.

33. Ibid., 18 Nov. 1911, pp. 444-45.

34. Ibid., p. 445; also printed in National Review 10 (8 Nov. 1911): 391–92.

204

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

happy to do so: he directed Wu's cable to the State Department with the note that he and Wu were old friends, both being students of Confucius. 35

Wu followed this with a cable to William Randolph Hearst asking him to print a plea for recognition in his newspapers. Hearst agreed and the plea, containing many of the same arguments as Wu and Wen's "Letter to Our Foreign Friends," was carried in the Hearst chain newspapers in mid- November.36

These efforts did not, of course, result in an early recognition of the Republic by the United States. Diplomatically, these efforts did not even succeed in obtaining recognition as a belligerent, which would have been useful later as the revolutionaries sought foreign funds.37 But it is worth noting that these efforts helped to establish the legitimacy of the revolution in the eyes of many Westerners and helped the revolutionaries in their quest to avoid direct military intervention by the powers.

In part because of Wu's soothing declarations, and in part because of their desire to avoid a clash with the more avid revolutionaries under Chen Qimei, Britain decided against landing an occupying force in the International Settlement. Concerned that the "more hot-headed followers" of the revolution would take umbrage, Britain instead opted for sending a large man-of-war to Shanghai in the hopes that it would have a "considerable overawing effect."38 But that was the limit of Britain's direct military intervention in the conflict, and Wu and the revolutionaries succeeded in preventing the imperialist nations from overt acts in support of the Qing.

The foreign powers had good reason to feel pleased with the restraint shown by Wu and Wen on behalf of the revolutionaries in Shanghai. As British Minister John N. Jordan summed up the situation on 23 November:

Our position [is] even stronger than it has ever been in the past. So long as the revolutionaries protect foreign life and property and pay due respect to the established usages and practices on which the government of the international settlement rests, there would appear to be no need of foreign military intervention with all its attendant complications.39

35. Carnegie to Hilles, 13 Nov. 1911, U.S. National Archives, 893.00/673.

36. Li Tien-yi, Woodrow Wilson's China Policy (New York, 1952), p.58, cited in Zhang Cunwu, "Wu Tingfang yu Xinhai Geming,” pp. 104–5.

37. On 4 December Wu sent a note to all the foreign consuls declaring the revolutionary government's right to board vessels suspected of carrying contraband. Normally the search of neutral ships is a right granted to belligerent parties under international law, but the powers refused to grant the revolutionaries status as a belligerent even though they later permitted the search of foreign ships. See materials in Dept. of the Navy to the Secretary of State, 11 Dec. 1911, U.S. National Archives, 893.00/767; 3 Jan. 1912, ibid., 893.00/889; 3 Jan. 1912, ibid., 893.00/926; 21 Feb. 1912, ibid., 893.00/1100; Grey to Jordan, 18 Dec. 1911, nos. 379, 380, FO 371/1097; Jordan to Grey, 8 Jan. 1912, no. 475, FO 371/1311.

38. Jordan to Grey, 10 Nov. 1911, no. 144, FO 371/1094.

39. Jordan to Grey, 23 Nov. 1911, FO 371/1097.

Wu Tingfang and the 1911 Revolution

205

Obviously, Wu's diplomacy was national in scope in that Wu spoke not only on behalf of the Shanghai Military Government, but on behalf of the republican movement in China as a whole. Not only was Wu handling the Shanghai regime's foreign relations, he was also acting as de facto foreign minister for the entire revolutionary movement. As such, he stepped into the national political arena and helped to thrust the Shanghai group into national prominence as well.

National Politics

Wu Tingfang's first act of national political importance took place on 11 November, when he, Zhang Jian, Tang Wenzhi and Wen Zongyao sent a telegram to the Prince Regent urging him to abdicate in the interests of peace and progress. Wen Zongyao was, of course, Wu's assistant in the managing of foreign affairs for the Shanghai Military Government, and Zhang Jian and Tang Wenzhi were influential leaders of the constitutionalist movement in Jiangsu. In particular, Zhang's reputation and influence were national in scope, and it is also important to note that Zhang Jian was Yuan Shikai's confidant.

The telegram boldly declared that constitutional monarchy under the Manchus was not possible and implied that Yuan Shikai was the indispensable man of the times:

The mind of the people of the Nation is at one and the opinions of intelligent foreigners agree. It is that a Constitutional form of government inaugurated by the Sovereign is not suitable for the China of these latter days.... You ought to act as did [Emperors] Yao and Shun in order to obtain the man for the Empire.1

The telegram held out the promise of “peace, riches, honour, and glory” to the Imperial family if it acted properly, “otherwise war will be prolonged and troubles will accumulate." Their plea concluded:

The Northern Army is cruel and inhuman. How can the Throne stand alone? We, Wu Ting-fang the others, cannot bear to sit quiet as spectators. We dare to utter our last loyal warning. The clamor continues, but tears have been dried.11

Wu and his colleagues submitted this telegram to the U.S. Chargé d'Affaires in Beijing, William J. Calhoun, with the request that it delivered personally to the Prince Regent. They also requested that Calhoun speak with the Regent

40. Encl. in Calhoun to Secretary of State, 22 Nov. 1911, 893.00/827.

41. Ibid.

206

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

on their behalf and assure him that “if H.M. will abdicate we will do our best to afford safety to the Court and protection of their property."42 The use of the U.S. official as go-between was necessary because Wu and the others were concerned that the Regent would never see their telegram if it went through normal channels, and of course there was the additional dimension of using a foreign power to constitute a kind of pressure on the Regent.

This telegram marked the emergence of the Jiangsu constitutionalists on the national scene as a political force in their own right, with Wu firmly allied politically with them. Within a short period of time this alliance was to give rise to the formation of several new political parties and associations that stood independent of the Revolutionary Alliance. These, and Wu Tingfang's role in them, will be discussed below.

It is worth noting that this telegram does not espouse a republican form of government per se but instead urges the Prince Regent to hand over power to Yuan Shikai. There is other evidence suggesting that at this stage, at least, Wu was not strongly committed to the concept of a republic. Shortly after the Shanghai Restoration took place, Wu gave his first interview to the North China Herald. The date of this interview is not clear (perhaps 8 November), but it was not published until 11 November. In this interview Wu stated:

Whether ... the present movement succeeds or the Government is able to hold its place upon the throne and restore peace, it will have been for the good of the country. If the present movement succeeds, it will have to be decided whether there is to be a constitutional monarchy, or whether the country will become a republic. Those in this part of China are in favour of a republic, but there are many who desire a constitutional monarchy. If it is to be a republic, it will be modelled upon the lines partly of the United States and partly on those of the German Federation, taking the best parts from each.44

Understandably, the revolutionaries were not too pleased with this statement, and one of the leading revolutionaries, Ma Junwu, strongly criticized it in their newspaper as lacking in clarity about the revolution's aims.4

For Wu, Zhang Jian and other constitutionalists such as Cheng Dequan, now Military Governor of Jiangsu Province, their support of the revolution was more an expression of disfavor with the Dynasty than support for any of the republican ideals of the revolutionary movement, and in particular their act may be viewed as an expression of support for Yuan Shikai, whose main opponent at Court was the Prince Regent. The Regent had been forced to appoint Yuan Prime Minister on 7 November following the collapse of Yuan's

42. Ibid.

43. Zhang Cunwu, "Wu Tingfang yu Xinhai Geming,” p. 101.

44. NCH, 11 Nov. 1911, p. 354.

45. Cited in Zhang Cunwu, “Wu Tingfang yu Xinhai Geming,” p. 118 n. 24.

Wu Tingfang and the 1911 Revolution

207

opposition within the Beiyang Army. That Wu, Zhang and others were not alone in seeing Yuan Shikai as the indispensable person may be demonstrated by the fact that on 9 November, Huang Xing had cabled Yuan inviting him to assume the presidency of a new republic.46

In spite of his differences with the revolutionaries on the issue of republicanism, Wu was indispensable to the revolutionary cause because of his ability to credibly handle foreign relations. In the long run, moreover, the differences over the form of the government were not significant, and in any case Wu was not a firm upholder of the principle of constitutional monarchy. When it was clear to him, Zhang Jian and many other constitutionalists that practical politics necessitated a republican form of government, they did not oppose it. The question of the man (Yuan Shikai) was more important than governmental form (republic or monarchy).

Soon after the Shanghai Restoration occurred, efforts were undertaken to establish a provisional republican government, with considerable wrangling between the Hubei group and the Jiangsu-Zhejiang-Shanghai group over its location and leaders. On 9 November the Hubei Military Governor, Li Yuanhong, cabled all the provinces that had declared their independence of the dynasty inviting them to send delegates to Wuchang to organize a central government. Due to disrupted communications, this telegram did not reach. Shanghai for three weeks, and in the interim the Shanghai group had already begun its initiative.47

On 12 November the four representatives of the Military Governors of Jiangsu and Zhejiang cabled all the provinces requesting that they recognize Wu Tingfang and Wen Zongyao as temporarily in charge of foreign relations, and inviting them all to send delegates to Shanghai to discuss the establishment of a provisional government. This was followed on the next day, 13 November, with a cable from Chen Qimei to fourteen Military Governors inviting them to send representatives to Shanghai to discuss forming a central government with Shanghai as its seat. Chen's initiative was supported by Lin Shuqing, a revolutionary and Military Governor of Zhenjiang. 48

The Jiangsu-Zhejiang-Shanghai initiatives reflected the fact that Li Yuanhong's invitation had not yet been received by them and also reflected their uncertainty about the military situation in Hubei, where Qing forces were about to begin an offensive that would lead to the loss of Hanyang to the revolutionaries on 27 November. Moreover, by mid-November the

46. Reprinted in Huang Xing, Huang Xing ji, ed. Hunan sheng shehui kexueyuan (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1981), pp. 81–82.

47. These events are recounted in K. S. Liew, Struggle for Democracy: Sung Chiao-jen and the 1911 Chinese Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 129; Hsueh Chun-tu, Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), pp. 119–21; “Zhongguo dashi ji,” Dongfang zazhi 8, no. 7 (Apr. 1912).

48. Liu Xingnan, “Xinhai gesheng daibiao huiyi rizhi,” in Xinhai Geming huiyilu, p. 241; documents in “Zhonghua Minguo kaiguo shiqi shiliao,” in Geming wenxian, ed. Lo Jialun, 1st ser. (Taibei, 1953),

pp. 1-3.

208

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

revolutionaries in Hubei had largely lost out to Li Yuanhong in their struggle to control the army and governmental structures. In Joseph Esherick's words, the revolutionaries had "written off" Hubei. They were largely powerless to prevent Li Yuanhong from meeting with Liu Cheng'en and Cai Tinggan, two emissaries from Yuan Shikai, and coming to an understanding with Yuan even if this meant jettisoning the principle of republicanism.49

While Chen Qimei and the Revolutionary Alliance were not firmly in control in Jiangsu, they were nonetheless in a stronger position than the Hubei revolutionaries. On 13 November, the same day he issued the invitation for the delegates to convene in Shanghai, Chen had received a lengthy letter from Tang Wenzhi and a number of other prominent gentry constitutionalists urging him to place Shanghai under the authority of Cheng Dequan, the Jiangsu Dudu. Li Xiehe responded to a similar request by complying and ending the separate Wusong Military Government. Chen had no intention of doing so. Forming a provisional government based in Shanghai could help Chen maintain his position and help to prevent the revolutionaries from completely losing control over the political situation.50

For one week the two sides were deadlocked. The Hubei group readily agreed to Wu Tingfang's handling foreign relations on its behalf but insisted that Wuhan was the seat of the provisional government. On 14 November the various provincial representatives in Shanghai cabled Li Yuanhong agreeing that the Hubei Military Government was the site for the formation of the provisional government, but reiterating their support for Wu and Wen as foreign affairs representatives. Chen Qimei, meanwhile, continued to oppose Hubei's desires, and together with Song Jiaoren, who returned from Wuchang on 17 November, persuaded the provincial delegates in Shanghai to hold out for Shanghai as the site for the new government.

On 20 November a compromise was reached. The delegates recognized Hubei as the central government and proposed that they go to Wuchang, leaving behind in Shanghai one representative from each, and also with the proviso that Wu Tingfang and Wen Zongyao would remain in Shanghai and continue to manage foreign relations. Their departure was facilitated by the Hubei group's dispatching the revolutionary Ju Zheng to escort the delegates to Hubei. The group left Shanghai for Hubei on 28 November, the day after Hanyang fell to Qing forces.52

Song Jiaoren, Chen Qimei and the other revolutionaries were not satisfied with this compromise. The delegates were forced to meet in Hankou's British

49. Esherick, Reform and Revolution in China, p. 220; on the mediation mission of Cai Tinggan and Liu Cheng'en see Zhang Kaiyuan and Lin Zengping, Xinhai Geming shi 3:255-58.

50. On Li Xiehe see Wu Qiandui, “Shanghai guangfu,” p. 44; on the exchange between the Jiangsu constitutionalists and Chen see Shanghai shiliao, pp. 313–16.

51. Documents in Geming wenxian, 1st ser., pp. 3–5; Liu Xingnan, “Xinhai gesheng daibiao rizhi,” p. 241.

52. Liew, Struggle for Democracy, p. 130; Liu Xingnan, “Xinhai gesheng daibiao rizhi,” pp. 241–43.

Wu Tingfang and the 1911 Revolution

209

concession for their first meeting on 30 November, while Wuchang itself was subject to bombardment from across the river and Li Yuanhong himself had fled to the city's outskirts. The delegates produced a draft outline for the provisional government, hastily drawn up, that was not entirely satisfactory to the Shanghai-based group. In the meantime, on 2 December, the revolutionary forces succeeded in capturing Nanjing, and in their meeting of 4 December the delegates decided that Nanjing should be the site of the government. This was ultimately agreed upon by all, and the deadlock with its resulting political damage to the revolutionary side was ended.53

Following the fall of Hanyang Li Yuanhong proposed a fifteen-day armistice to Yuan Shikai, with the possibility of a fifteen-day extension if necessary. During this period the provincial delegates could meet and select a representative to meet with Yuan. This proposal was sent to Yuan through British diplomats, and it was shortly accepted. On 3 December a three-day cease-fire began, which through various extensions (and violations) continued until the Emperor's abdication on 12 February. Thus the military phase of the revolution was largely over, and politics now rose to the fore.54

The conflict between Li Yuanhong and the Shanghai-Nanjing based revolutionaries continued, however. The most dramatic expression occurred on 2 December and again on 4 December when the provincial representatives in Nanjing voted that Huang Xing should be appointed Commander-in- Chief of the Republican forces, with Li Yuanhong as his second in command. On 8 December Li formally protested this decision; meanwhile a number of military figures who had played a prominent role in the Nanjing campaign objected to Huang Xing, a defeated general, as their commander-in-chief, so on 14 December the Nanjing delegates reversed the order and chose Li as their commander-in-chief and Huang as his subordinate!55

On 5 December those delegates still in Hubei decided on a four-point outline for peace talks. They decided that the talks should take place in Hankou and chose Wu Tingfang as their representative. Why was Wu selected to handle this task? First, the Hubei revolutionaries were ever concerned with the role of the foreign powers, especially Great Britain, in the situation. Wu's appointment suggests that at the very least the peace talks had a public relations dimension. Moreover, Wu was a diplomat skilled in negotiation and these skills were precisely those needed in the talks. He was also well acquainted with Yuan Shikai and, while not in Yuan's inner circle, he was on good terms with him. In addition, it is worth noting that the Hubei delegates were hoping to have the talks held in Hankou, which was certain to be opposed by the Nanjing-Shanghai group, but if Wu were to be the chief delegate they may have reasoned that Song Jiaoren and the others in Shanghai and Nanjing would be more likely to agree to Hankou.

53. Liew, Struggle for Democracy, pp. 131–33; Liu Xingnan, “Xinhai gesheng daibiao rizhi,” p. 248. 54. Zhang Kaiyuan and Lin Zengping, Xinhai Geming shi 3:260–61.

55. Liew, Struggle for Democracy, pp. 133–34.

210

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Even before he received official word that he had been selected, Wu vigorously opposed Hubei as the site of the talks. As early as 2 December he and the Shanghai Military Government proposed their city as appropriate, and on 6 December when he was formally notified via the British Consul in Hankou of his selection to head the negotiating team, Wu replied that it would be impossible for him to come to Hubei. He also used a foreign intermediary, E. S. Little, to cable Yuan Shikai urging him to send his representative to Shanghai for talks.56

On 7 December, one day following the Prince Regent's abdication, Yuan was formally appointed plenipotentiary to negotiate with the revolutionary forces. Yuan immediately appointed his old friend and subordinate, Tang Shaoyi, to represent him, and on 9 December the truce was extended for an additional fifteen-day period while the talks were to be held.57

On Yuan's side, he informed the British that he preferred Hankou as the site but was prepared to send Tang to Shanghai if necessary. Meanwhile he had Tang cable the leading constitutionalists in Jiangsu and Zhejiang, Zhang Jian, Tang Shouqian and Zhao Fengchang, urging them to accept Hankou as the site for the talks. Wu Tingfang along with Zhang, Tang and Zhao continued to insist on Shanghai even after Tang had arrived in Hankou on 10 December, and in spite of Li Yuanhong's offer to dispatch the prominent Jiangsu constitutionalist Lei Fen to escort Wu from Shanghai to Hankou.58

On 11 December Wu cabled Li Yuanhong that he was personally willing to come to Hubei but that the delegates, including Lei Fen, opposed it. Wu followed this with a telegram to Yuan Shikai through British officials asking Yuan to send Tang Shaoyi to Shanghai, and another cable to Li Yuanhong saying that the foreign consuls preferred Shanghai as the site for the talks. At the same time Wu let British officials in Shanghai know that the revolutionaries in Shanghai did not accept Wuchang's leadership. In the face of this determination, Yuan agreed to have Tang go to Shanghai, and on 13 December Li Yuanhong too bowed to the inevitable but took the precaution of adding his two key foreign affairs persons, Wang Zhengting (1882–1961) and Hu Ying, to the Republican delegation. On the next day, 14 December, Tang and his retinue, along with Wang and Hu, departed for Shanghai, arriving on 17 December. Now the real negotiations could begin.59

56. Guandulu [Wu Tingfang] comp., Gonghe guanjian lu (Shanghai: Zhuyitang, 1912) (hereafter cited as Guanjian lu), 1:2.

57. Ibid., “Shiyisheng gongtui Wu daibiao dian,” p. 1; Jordan to Grey, 28 Nov. 1911, no. 138, FO 371/1096.

58. Ibid., 1:2–3; Shanghai shiliao, pp. 1070–71; Morrison, Correspondence 1:677; Jordan to Grey, 8 Dec. 1911, no. 613, FO 371/1096.

59. Guanjian lu 1:1–3; Jordan to Grey, 12 Dec., no. 187, 17 Dec. 1911, no. 278, FO 371/1097, 1310; Shanghai shiliao, p. 1260. on Wang Zhengting see Boorman, Biographical Dictionary 3:362–64.

Wu Tingfang and the 1911 Revolution

The North-South Peace Talks

211

The five North-South peace talks that took place between 18 and 31 December 1911 were, in Louis T. Sigel's words, "primarily a public relations gimmick directed both towards domestic opinion, and more importantly towards foreign observers."60 They were also marked by intense behind-the-scene political negotiations involving a large number of people.

These included Wang Jingwei (1883–1944), a revolutionary who had been imprisoned after an abortive assassination attempt in Beijing, where Yuan Shikai made overtures to him and arranged for his release from prison after the revolution broke out. Wang served as a major intermediary between Yuan's delegation and the revolutionaries.61

Other important figures were Zhao Fengchang, whose home became a center of political discussion involving Song Jiaoren and other revolutionaries on the one hand, and leading constitutionalists such as Zhang Jian who were supporting the revolutionary side. Much revolutionary strategy was worked out at Zhao's home at long late-night sessions, so much so that Tang Shaoyi is reported to have said: “Zhi-lao [Venerable Wu] has the title of head of the Southern delegation, but in reality he has no decision making power; he can only represent the views of the Southern side, while the true decision maker is the old man Zhao [Fengchang].”62

Moreover, it is important to note that lateral negotiations were taking place among military figures in Nanjing at the same time that the formal negotiations were taking place in Shanghai. These negotiations resulted in a five-point draft treaty signed on 20 December by representatives of Yuan's Beiyang Army and representatives of the united Jiangsu–Zhejiang-Shanghai forces under Huang Xing. The treaty provided for the establishment of a republic, favorable terms for the ruling family, and the presidency to go to whomever overthrew the dynasty. This was a secret agreement and it is unlikely that Wu and the other Southern negotiators knew its terms.63

From the start, there was no question about Yuan Shikai's assumption of power. Wu and a number of other figures on the revolutionary side made no secret of their support for Yuan and their desire for a peaceful settlement.64

60. Sigel, "Revolution by Diplomacy: A Re-examination of the Shanghai Peace Conference of 1911,” in Papers on Far Eastern History: China's 1911 Revolution, ed. John Fincher, vol. 19 (Mar. 1979), pp. 131-32.

61. Wu's Guanjian lu (see n. 56 above) remains the major primary source for the conferences. Eyewitness accounts include “Xinhai Shanghai guangfu qianhou,” pp. 14-16; Gan Yi, “Xinhai heyi zhi mishi,” in Xinhai Geming 8:116–19; Feng Gengguang, “Miaochang dushi nanxia yu Nanbei yihe,” in Xinhai Geming huiyilu 6:348–68. On Wang Jingwei see Boorman, Biographical Dictionary 3:369–76. On his role during the peace talks see Ju Zheng, Xinhai zhaji: Meichuan riji (reprint, Taibei: Zhongyang wenwu gongying she, 1956), p. 80.

62. Feng Gengguang, “Miaochang dushi,” p. 362, cited in Zhang Kaiyuan and Lin Zengping, Xinhai Geming shi 3: 283.

63. Qian Jibo, “Xinhai Nanbei yihe bieji,” in Xinhai Geming 8:103–9.

64. National Review 10 (9 Dec. 1911): 446; Wilkinson to Jordan, 11 Dec., encl. in Jordan to Grey, 4 Jan. 1912, no. 308, FO 371/1311.

212

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

The real issues involved the terms under which Yuan was to assume power. Was he to be prime minister under a constitutional monarchy, or even emperor himself, or was he to be president of a republic; and where were the revolutionaries to fit into the scheme of things? These were the basic questions to be resolved backstage.

The two key foreign powers, Britain and Japan, were strong supporters of a constitutional monarchy with Yuan as the prime minister. Japan in particular tried to force Britain to exert more pressure in favor of a monarchy. This led to substantial strains in the relations between these two allies. Although British policy-makers were personally supportive of constitutional monarchy, they were reluctant to intervene in the blatant ways the Japanese proposed during the talks. This will be discussed further below.65

Rather than overt intervention, all the powers' consular representatives in Shanghai decided to present an identic note to the delegates at their second meeting on 20 December. This note urged both sides to resolve their dispute rapidly and without resort to further warfare. This had the effect of pressuring the revolutionaries and the Qing Court while strengthening Yuan Shikai's hand. Both Tang and Wu, meanwhile, publicly agreed to leave the note unanswered."

Throughout these proceedings, Yuan was playing a very complex and subtle political game designed to maximize his own power. On the one hand, his appointment of Tang Shaoyi as his representative could not but please Wu and the other Shanghai-based revolutionaries. Tang made no secret of his support of republicanism and ostentatiously cut his queue before departing from Beijing.67

But Yuan was no pushover. According to Zhang Jian, Yuan did not give Tang a free hand, but staffed his delegation with others who were staunch monarchists and who reported independently to Yuan.68 Moreover, having appointed Tang, Yuan now took a tough line against the revolutionaries and against republicanism in his communications with the Court and with other monarchists. Even earlier, Yuan had ridiculed Wu and the Jiangsu revolutionaries when talking with Liang Qichao's supporter Luo Yinggong:

Wu was originally my disciple some time ago. He is now old and his brain is no longer active. At first he advocated constitutional monarchy

65. See nn. 78, 80. For a discussion of Japanese policy during the revolution see Banno Junji, “The Japanese Army's China Policy from 1911: Split or Division of Labor,” in Papers on Far Eastern History, ed. J. Fincher, 19:168-73.

66. On the identic note of 20 December, see John Gilbert Reid, The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, 1908-1912: An Episode in Pre-War Diplomacy: A Study of the Role of Foreign Diplomacy During the Reign of Hsuan-t'ung (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1935), p. 268.

67. On Tang's republicanism see Jerome Chen, Yuan Shih-k’ai (1859–1916): Brutus Assumes the Purple (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), p. 120; on the queue cutting see Morrison, Correspondence 1:678.

68. Liu Housheng, Zhang Jian zhuanji (Hong Kong: Longmen, 1965), pp. 192–93.

Wu Tingfang and the 1911 Revolution

but recently changed his fundamental principles. Although Zhiyong [Wu Tingfang] is serving as [Republican] spokesman, he doesn't have the support of the entire group. Just look at the southern provinces, where every prefecture and district has its own military governor! How could they be unified."

213

Yuan's supporters similarly made disparaging comments about Wu and the Shanghai group to G. E. Morrison, the Australian correspondent of The Times who was to become Yuan Shikai's adviser, and then told British Minister Jordan that Wu and Wen were men “who had no administrative experience and little knowledge of the country," and hence could not represent the views of the Chinese people.'

Although Wu and his colleagues were prepared to support Yuan, they nonetheless were not going to give in so easily. After Tang arrived in Shanghai, Wu gave Tang a courteous reception but refused to call upon him first, as British Consul-General Everard Fraser wished, because as Fraser wrote to G. E. Morrison, Wu said that "Tang has come here to sue for peace, then [Wu] changed his words into arrange terms with us, so he ought to make the first call I [Wu] think."71

At the first meeting of the two delegations on 18 December they mutually agreed upon an extensive cease-fire on all fronts. This was clearly in response to the pressure exerted by the foreign powers, who were in the process of preparing their identic note for presentation to the peace conference. Many on the revolutionary side opposed this cease-fire and were dubious about the entire notion of the peace conference. In fact as the authors of the recent authoritative account of the revolution, Xinhai Geming shi, have observed, the cease-fires had the effect of constricting the revolutionaries and preventing them from extending and consolidating the gains of the revolution, while allowing Yuan Shikai to consolidate his power in Shaanxi, Shanxi, Anhui and Shandong and to suppress revolutionaries in Northeast China and other areas under the rule of the Beiyang Army. Thus many revolutionaries perceived that the cease-fire contributed to the further loss of revolutionary momentum and the continued strengthening of Yuan's position.

At the second meeting on 20 December, Tang and Wu got down to business about the form of government—the real business having already been worked out after hours. The day before the meeting, Fraser called upon Wu at Tang's private request to urge him not to be "truculent" on the issue of a republic. Wu replied that "he would exhort his party, but among the rank

69. Lo Yinggong to Liang Qichao in Ding Wenjiang, Liang Rengong xiansheng nianpu, pp. 349–50. 70. Jordan to Grey, 28 Dec. 1911 (confidential), FO 371/3010 (received 15 Jan. 1912). For other disparaging comments see Morrison, Correspondence 1:672.

71. Morrison, Correspondence 1:681.

72. Zhang Kaiyuan and Lin Zengping, Xinhai Geming shi 3:284-87. The formal record of the conference is in Guanjian lu 1:5–9.

214

*73

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

and file feeling for insistence on a republic was very strong. Fraser commented to his superior in Beijing, Minister Jordan, that the bulk of the revolutionaries "seem to regard foreign intervention as a not unlikely contingency and to face the possibility without fear, if not without recklessness."74 This of course was not true but it indicates the importance that Fraser and Jordan ascribed to their own role in shaping the political outcome of the conflict, and it shows why Tang and Wu put on this show for Fraser.

At their meeting on the 20th Wu and Tang held a lengthy public discussion on the question of the form of government appropriate for China, in general expressing broad agreement with each other. Having set the framework, they proceeded—for the record—to devise a plan whereby a national convention would be convened to decide upon the form of government suitable for China.75

It is difficult to discern from the sources the origin of this idea of a national convention. It may have originated with Yuan Shikai himself, for on 15 November he sent out feelers to British Minister Jordan about the idea of having a national convention to determine the form of government. Jordan apparently was non-committal in response to this inquiry. The idea may also have been Tang Shaoyi's. On 19 November he similarly raised the issue in a meeting with Jordan in an effort to discern the British response. My own guess is that this idea originated with Tang Shaoyi and that Yuan had approved it as a contingency plan if the Southern side proved “truculent" about the form of government.76

At their subsequent meetings, Tang and Wu worked out the details for the convention. At their third meeting on 29 December they decided that each province was entitled to send three representatives and would have a total of three votes. When three-quarters of the delegates had assembled the discussions could begin. At the fourth and fifth meetings on 30 and 31 December, Wu and Tang debated at great length but failed to come to an agreement about where the convention should be held, how the delegates should be chosen, and when it should be convened. Wu held out for the convention to be held in Shanghai on 8 January, but the whole plan was shelved before ever getting to that stage.

As soon as Tang cabled him with the national convention plan, Yuan Shikai made a great public display of opposition to it. It is difficult to determine

73. Jordan to Grey, 20 Dec. 1911 (private), FO 371/1098.

74. Fraser to Jordan, 20 Dec. 1911, encl. in Jordan to Grey, 28 Dec. 1911, no. 517, FO 371/1310. It should also be noted that Britain and the U.S. were displeased with Wu's desire to have reporters present at the presentation of the identic note and commented adversely on his “fondness for publicity."

75. Guanjian lu 1:9–16.

76. Jordan to Grey, 15 Nov. 1911, FO 371/1095; on Tang's overture to Jordan see Sigel, “Revolution by Diplomacy," pp. 133–34.

77. Guanjian lu 1:16–37.

Wu Tingfang and the 1911 Revolution

215

whether his opposition was genuine or merely designed to convince the Court of his loyalty. As noted above, he spoke disparagingly to Jordan about Wu and Wen Zongyao and then began angling to see if he could use British and Japanese opposition to republicanism for his purposes. On 22 December he asked Japanese Minister Ijuin Hikokichi if he could look to foreign intervention to support monarchism. Even though he received a negative response and this episode was understood by Jordan as Yuan's effort to have Britain and Japan urge him to assume the presidency of a republic, Yuan nonetheless cabled Tang telling him that the powers would not recognize a republic.78

After ascertaining that foreign intervention was not likely, the Court reluctantly gave its approval to the idea of a national convention on 28 December.79 Meanwhile, Yuan's inquiries had stimulated Japan to press for direct intervention on behalf of a constitutional monarchy. Minister Ijuin tried to rally the foreign diplomatic corps to exert “moral pressure,” but the British Foreign Office decisively vetoed any such act. Meanwhile Tang Shaoyi let Wu know that Japan was contemplating some act. Wu responded that mere publication of Japan's opposition would unite all Chinese “in a fight to the death." He then sent a cable to Japan warning against intervention, British opposition and the strength of the Republican reaction prevented any further action on Japan's part, and Japanese officials privately told the British that they suspected Yuan had misrepresented them to Wu.80

Having maneuvered the Court into issuing the decree approving the idea of a national convention, Yuan began to publicly reject Tang's diplomacy. On 24 December Yuan had dispatched an official to visit U.S. diplomats in Beijing to tell them that he was disappointed in Tang Shaoyi and would not consent to a Republic. On 31 December Yuan told a U.S. official that he had not and would not agree to “such a farcical convention as proposed by Wu,” criticizing it as not representative enough. Yuan's disapproval grew stronger and finally led to Yuan's repudiation of Tang's acts on 1 January 1912 and Tang's resignation as Yuan's representative to the peace talks on the same day 81

What also (and more fundamentally) lay behind Yuan's repudiation of Tang was a change in the situation among the revolutionaries. Many

78. Jordan to Grey, 22, 23, 24 and 28 Dec. 1911, nos. 98–100, 115, 259, FO 371/1098, nos. 525–27, FO 371/1310.

79. Jordan to Grey, 24 Dec. 1911, no. 124, FO 371/1098; Decree, 28 Dec. 1911 (XT 3/11/9), Shilu 67:1202.

80. Jordan to Grey, 25 and 28 Dec. 1911, nos. 127, 391, FO 371/1098; MacDonald to Grey, 29 Dec. 1911, no. 404, FO 371/1098. On British-Japanese differences see Morrison, Correspondence 1: 682–84. For an unfortunately unreliable account based on the life of W. H. Donald, an Australian journalist who was advising Wu and the Republican delegation at the time, see Earl Albert Selles, Donald of China (New York: Harper, 1948), pp. 114–17.

81. Calhoun to Secretary of State, 24, 28 and 31 Dec. 1911, U.S. National Archives, 893.00/806, 832, 875; Guanjian lu 1:39.

216

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

revolutionaries had opposed the peace talks from the beginning, but they were unable to convince Song Jiaoren, Huang Xing and others who were close to Zhang Jian and the other constitutionalists.82 But with the return of Sun Yixian from Europe the situation underwent a radical change. While still in Hong Kong Sun told U.S. officials that he repudiated Wu Tingfang and the other leaders in Shanghai, "the feeling of his party being," wrote the U.S. Consul, “that Wu Ting Fang and various other leaders cast their lot with the revolution only after its success became reasonably certain.”83

Sun arrived in Shanghai on 25 December with a large number of revolutionaries who had seized power in Guangdong. He received a tumultuous reception. On the next day at a secret meeting, Song Jiaoren, Huang Xing and Chen Qimei resolved to support Sun for the provisional presidency. Certainly their decision reflected their dissatisfaction with the solution derived by Tang, Wu, Yuan and the constitutionalists. Chen Qimei, for example, when hearing about the proposed scheme for a national convention, was said to have been so incensed that he vowed to assassinate Yuan upon his inauguration as president.84

On 29 December, as Wu was trying to rally support for the national convention, Sun Yixian was elected provisional president and 1 January 1912 was set as the first day of the new republic. The establishment of the Provisional Republican Government altered the situation: the ground rules had changed. Yuan confided to Jordan that he had lost control of the situation, and a new phase in the political settlement began.85

The Political Settlement, January-March 1912

Wu Tingfang was selected to serve as Minister of Justice in the first cabinet of the Provisional Republican Government. He was one of four former high Qing officials with close ties to the constitutionalist movement to be included in the list of nine appointees, the other three being Tang Shouqian, Minister of Communications; Cheng Dequan, Minister of the Interior; and Zhang Jian, Ministry of Industry. All of these appointments attest to the important role the Jiangsu and Zhejiang constitutionalists had played on the political scene since the Wuchang Uprising in October and their emergence as a quasi-independent power bloc within the Republican camp. Wu Tingfang was involved in the formation of several political associations in the revolutionary period, including the Gonghe Tongyi Hui (Republican Unification Association), which he co-sponsored along with Zhang Jian and Tang Wenzhi,

82. Zhang Kaiyuan and Lin Zengping, Xinhai Geming shi 3:278-79.

83. Anderson to Secretary of State, 22 Dec. 1911, U.S. National Archives, 893.00/1016.

84. On Sun's election see Liew, Struggle for Democracy, p. 136; on Chen Qimei's threat, see Gan Yi, “Xinhai heyi zhi mishi,” pp. 118–19.

85. Jordan to Grey, 1 Jan. 1912, no. 121, FO 371/1310.

Wu Tingfang and the 1911 Revolution

217

the leading figures in the Jiangsu constitutionalist movement. These political associations underscore the fact that the constitutionalists had emerged as an organized political force by the beginning of 1912.

Understandably, the issue of cabinet appointees was subject to political infighting among the revolutionaries. Having rejected Song Jiaoren's concept of a cabinet formed along party lines by the prime minister, Sun Yixian as Provisional President made up a slate of cabinet appointees for the provisional parliament's approval. According to Ju Zheng's account, the list Sun Yixian at first presented to the delegates assembled in Nanjing included three appointees who were heatedly opposed. These included Song Jiaoren as Minister of the Interior, Zhang Binglin as Minister of Education, and Wang Chonghui (1881-1958) as Foreign Minister. Also, there was strong sentiment in Nanjing and Shanghai in favor of Wu Tingfang continuing to serve as Foreign Minister.86

Sun's nominee as Foreign Minister, Wang Chonghui, was just thirty years old at the time of the revolution and had only returned from Europe a few weeks before the Wuchang Uprising. A Cantonese from a Christian family, Wang had received his early education in Hong Kong, then at the Beiyang University in Tianjin before going abroad. Early on he had made law his specialty, studying first in Japan and then in the United States, where he received a doctorate in law from Yale University in 1904. After his studies in the U.S., he continued studying law in Germany and England, and he served for a time at the International Court of Justice at The Hague. He was called to the Bar at Inner Temple shortly before returning to China. Wang had also been a disciple of Sun Yixian's. Although he may not have formally been a member of the Revolutionary Alliance, according to one account by Feng Ziyou, part of his legal education had been financed by the revolutionary movement under Sun's auspices. Although inexperienced in diplomacy per se, Wang was certainly knowledgeable about Europe and the United States and possessed many of the qualifications necessary to conduct diplomacy. Nonetheless, it is not difficult to see why many of the delegates opposed Wang, young, inexperienced and relatively unknown, and preferred Wu in the post.

In an effort to break the deadlock, Huang Xing proposed to Sun that Cheng Dequan be appointed Minister of the Interior instead of Song Jiaoren, that Cai Yuanpei (1868–1940) serve instead of Zhang Binglin as Minister of Education, and that Wang Chonghui and Wu Tingfang change places. In any case, Huang reasoned that substantive power in these and other ministries would devolve upon the assistant ministers, all of whom were staunch revolutionaries. Sun reportedly told Huang that while he would compromise

86. Ju Zheng, Xinhai zhaji, pp. 104–5; Shen Yunlong, “Huang Keqiang yu Chen Yingshi,” in his Jindai zhengzhi renwu shuping 1:88–90.

87. Feng Ziyou, Geming yishi 1:100–101. On Wang Chonghui see also Boorman, Biographical Dictionary 3:376–78.

218

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

in the case of Cheng Dequan and Cai Yuanpei, he would not in the case of the Foreign Ministry:

Concerning the question of Foreign Affairs, I will want to deal directly with the Minister and Zhi[yong, i.e., Wu] is very old and it won't be convenient to see him frequently; Liangchou [Wang Chonghui] can receive instructions at my convenience and so I am firm in wanting to use him.88

Sun Yixian's insistence on this point was very upsetting to Wu and his supporters. When the cabinet appointees were made public on 3 January, the powerful Cantonese Guild in Shanghai cabled Sun protesting his treatment of Wu and threatened to withdraw its proposed loan of 400,000 dollars to the Nanjing Government. Both Wu and Wen Zongyao, it should be noted, were directors of the Guild and had probably been instrumental in arranging the loan.8

Under the circumstances, Wang Chonghui demurred, claiming that he lacked the qualifications to handle the post. According to Hu Hanmin, who was chief secretary to Sun at that time, Sun scoffed at this:

We have to completely get rid of these so-called bureaucratic qualifications; as to foreign affairs problems, we ourselves will solve. them; [so] don't be afraid.

To journalists inquiring about the appointment of Wu Tingfang as Minister of Justice instead of remaining on as Foreign Minister, Sun extolled Wu's accomplishments in law reform under the Qing. Rather than reflecting a low opinion of Wu, Sun asserted that his appointment as Minister of Justice reflected the esteem in which he and the other Republican figures held issues of law and justice.o1 Sun responded in a similar way to the Cantonese Guild in an effort to reassure its members that he held Wu in high regard, and that Wu and Wen were still in charge of the North-South peace negotiations. The loan came through.92

These were nice replies, and there was certainly a measure of truth to them. But there is no disguising the fact that Sun preferred someone whom he could completely trust to follow his guidance in conducting foreign

88. Cited in Shen Yunlong, “Huang Keqiang yu Chen Yingshi,” pp. 90–91.

89. Sun to Shanghai Guangchao Gongso and Chaozhou Huiguan, 5 Jan. 1912, in Sun Yixian [Sun Yat-sen], Guofu quanji, ed. Committee for the Centennial of Sun Yixian's Birth (Taibei, 1965), 9:109.

90. Hu Hanmin, Zizhuan (Taibei: Zhuanji wenxue, 1969), p. 65.

91. Shen Yunlong, “Minguo diyi ren neige renxuan de kaozheng,” in his Jindai zhengzhi renuu shuping 1:180–81.

92. Sun to Wu Tingfang et al., 26 Jan. 1912, Sun Yixian, Guofu quanji 9:122.

Wu Tingfang and the 1911 Revolution

219

relations, and that he did not have such confidence in or ability to control Wu and the Jiangsu-Zhejiang constitutionalists with whom Wu was close. It should be remembered that at this same time Wu was dispatching and receiving telegrams from provincial figures about the proposed national convention, a plan Sun and his followers heatedly opposed. Sun's repeated telegrams to Wu urging that the latter report fully and promptly on the progress of the negotiations, and even to come to Nanjing, suggests that Sun was concerned that the Shanghai group would continue to act independently of the newly constituted government in Nanjing,93

Although the list of cabinet appointees was made public on 3 January, the issue of the Foreign Ministry was not fully settled for about ten days. In the interim, Wu in fact acted as Foreign Minister. On 5 January Sun Yixian issued a "Manifesto from the Republic of China to All Friendly Nations," which was countersigned by Wu Tingfang as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Wu transmitted this manifesto to U.S. officials with a note of his own.94 Not until 11 January did Wu and Wen formally turn over the duties of the Foreign Ministry to Wang Chonghui. One of Wang's first acts was to issue another communication to the various foreign governments, which they declined to answer, fearing it would imply recognition.95

Thus the transition was accomplished, and Wu finally accepted his post as Minister of Justice. He did not, however, assume that post actively until after the Manchu abdication in mid-February. Until that time his full energies were taken

up with the negotiations leading up to that event. His activities as Minister of Justice will be considered separately below, but let us now turn to a consideration of Wu's role in the last phases of the negotiations between Yuan Shikai and the Republican forces.

The latter phase of these negotiations starting on 1 January 1912 were of a very different character from those earlier. Having forced Tang Shaoyi's resignation on 1 January, Yuan proceeded to negotiate directly with the Southern forces headed by Wu. Correctly perceiving that the establishment of the Nanjing Provisional Government and the election of Sun Yixian had undercut his position, Yuan took a tough line, politically and militarily, against the revolutionary forces. Although he had earlier been assured that he would receive the presidency of the Republic upon the abdication of the Qing ruling house, Yuan was not entirely convinced.

The national convention scheme was completely dead by 7 January. On 2 January Sun cabled Yuan Shikai directly declaring his opposition to the plan

93. For Sun's cables to Wu, see ibid., 9:107-8. For cables to and from Wu on the national convention see Guanjian lu 1:44–49.

94. The manifesto was published on 6 January but dated 5 January. Enclosure in Gracey to Calhoun, 8 Jan. 1912, U.S. National Archives, 893.00/1047; also Wilder to Secretary of State, 8 Jan. 1912, ibid., 893.00/1065.

95. Clip from Shanghai Mercury 13 Jan. 1912, encl in Wilder to Secretary of State, 18 Jan. 1912, ibid., 893.00/1091; Wang Chonghui to Secretary of State, undated telegram arrived 11 Jan. 1912, ibid., 893.00/913; Wang to Sir Edward Grey, 11 Jan. 1912, no. 467, FO 371/1310.

220

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

for a national convention but proclaiming his desire to come to a peaceful settlement with Yuan. Following Sun Yixian's public opposition to the convention, Wu continued to press for it and to try to hold Yuan to the agreements that Tang had already made, but Yuan refused to be held to them.

As was true of the earlier phase of the negotiations, informal and secret communications were conducted between Yuan's emissaries and the revolutionaries. Although Tang Shaoyi had been dismissed and repudiated by Yuan, he stayed on in Shanghai and continued to play an important role in the peace settlement. Moreover, Yuan sent Liang Shiyi, another trusted confidant, to Shanghai to join in the discussions. Liang was a colleague of Tang's who had come to play a major role in Yuan's bureaucracy managing rails and other communications agencies. Liang played an important role in the private negotiations leading to the abdication. Along with Tang, Wu, Sun and a number of others in the Republican camp, Liang was a Cantonese whose presence added to the "Cantonese” nature of the talks.97

With the plan for the national convention now dropped, Yuan developed an alternate strategy whereby the Court would abdicate and turn power over to Yuan, who would establish a separate provisional government based in Tianjin. Yuan would then arrange a separate political settlement with the Nanjing revolutionaries. Starting on 11 January, Yuan confidentially sought out sympathetic foreign diplomatic figures to ascertain their views on this plan.98

When Yuan felt confident that Britain and Japan would not oppose

such a plan, he apparently had Liang and Tang discuss this scheme with Wu and the Nanjing revolutionaries. Although the facts are not entirely clear, it seems as though Wu had obtained Sun's agreement to this plan, or thought he did. With this understanding in mind, Yuan on 16 January sent a memorial to the Court proposing early abdication. On this same day an assassination attempt on Yuan failed, and Yuan stayed out of the limelight while the Court considered his memorial.9 99

On 19 January, however, Sun Yixian objected strenuously to Yuan's plan, and Huang Xing joined Sun in his denunciation. Sun insisted that the Qing ruler's abdication edict state that it was doing so at the behest of the already existing Provisional Republican Government in Nanjing. Following the abdication, Sun promised that he would formally resign the provisional presidency and request that the National Assembly elect Yuan Shikai as president. 100

96. See Sun to Yuan, 2 Jan. 1912, Sun Yixian, Guofu quanji 9:108; Guanjian lu 1:49–54, 56–58, 60– 61.

97. On Liang Shiyi, see Boorman, Biographical Dictionary 2:354–57. On the Cantonese dimension see Yu Zhijiang's account in “Xinhai Shanghai guangfu qianhou,” pp. 14–15.

98. Jordan to Grey, 12, 13 and 14 Jan. 1912, nos. 492, 506, 514, FO 371/3010, 1310.

99. Sun Yixian, Guofu quanji 9:112.

100. Guanjian lu 1:72–79; Sun Yixian, Guofu quanji 9:118–19.

Wu Tingfang and the 1911 Revolution

221

Yuan was opposed to this plan and sought to mobilize British and Japanese opposition to it. Japan favored direct foreign intervention, maintaining that Sun's plan would leave the North without an effective government, but Britain, along with the U.S. and Germany, took a strong initiative against military intervention.101

Meanwhile, Britain refused to promise Yuan that a provisional government in Tianjin would be recognized, and the influential journalist G. E. Morrison strongly urged him to remain in Beijing. Finally, the Manchu princes expressed their strong opposition to Yuan's plan. In the end, Yuan was forced to abandon it. On the revolutionary side, Wu and Tang exerted the full force of their influence by refusing to transmit further demands from Sun to Yuan.102

Matters might have dragged on for some time had it not been for the financial difficulties both sides were experiencing. Early on, Wu had been able to obtain assurances that foreign governments would not lend the Qing Government funds while hostilities lasted; the Republican side was also, of course, prohibited from obtaining foreign loans. However, Yuan was in a better position to draw upon the resources of the Qing state to pay his troops than were the Southern revolutionaries, but he too could not continue indefinitely without foreign assistance to pay his military bills.

By mid-January the Nanjing Government was facing an acute financial crisis. Efforts to levy domestic loans, such as that the Canton Guild gave

the Provisional Government, bore increasingly meager results and also increased the strains between the bourgeoisie and the revolutionary governments. These strains were manifested in Zhang Jian's decision to resign from his cabinet post as Minister of Industry because of Sun's attempt to use the Hanyeping Iron Works as collateral for a Japanese loan. The strains were also to be seen in the great indignation aroused among shareholders of the CMSNC upon receiving an ultimatum from the Republican military commanders on 24 January giving the Company two days to levy a loan of Tls 10 million from a Japanese steamship company, using its ships as collateral. This will be discussed more fully in the next section.

These strains were reflected in Wu's not-too-secret disapproval of the Nanjing regime. In late January Wu confided in a foreign friend that “the Nanking program was not to his liking; [Wu] spoke of the young and inexperienced men whose counsels dominate, and evinced some annoyance at the humiliations he had endured. Dr. Wu, while commending the patriotic purpose of Sun Yat Sen, spoke of Yuan Shih Kai as the greatest administrator in sight at present. . . . His attitude is 'If they don't want me to run the government, let them run it themselves."" Wu was said to have "lost his jaunty air” and appear “worried. "103

101. Reid, Manchu Abdication, pp. 274–88.

102. Jerome Chen, Yuan Shih-k’ai, pp. 127–28; Morrison, Correspondence 1: 704–5.

103. Wilder to Calhoun, 25 Jan. 1912, encl. in Calhoun to Secretary of State, 21 Feb. 1912, U.S. National Archives, 893.00/1212.

222

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

These financial strains led to a fruitless drive to obtain diplomatic recognition conducted by Sun and Wang Chonghui, and forced Sun and the rest of the revolutionaries to come to a settlement with Yuan in spite of their obvious distrust of him. Much as Sun would rail against Yuan's duplicity, there was little he could do to alter the trend towards Yuan's assumption of power and the weakening of the Nanjing revolutionaries' power, 104

By 30 January the Empress Longyu had decided to proclaim a republic by imperial decree. The Court's acquiescence was preceded by two important events. The first of these occurred on 18 January when all the major commanders of the Beiyang Army headed by Duan Qirui petitioned the Court requesting that it abdicate in the interests of peace. The second event was the assassination of Liangbi, the able Manchu military figure who had become the leader of the anti-abdication forces, on 26 January.'

105

On 3 February Yuan cabled Wu with the Court's conditions for abdication. Further negotiations resulted in a settlement on the main points by 6 February. The settlement allowed the Emperor to retain his title, temporarily reside in the Forbidden City and then permanently at the Summer Palace, and retain his full retinue of attendants. The Republican Government agreed to pay an annual sum of four million dollars for the Emperor's living expenses, to maintain the Imperial family's family shrines and mausolea, and to pay for the completion of the two mausolea under construction. Imperial kinsmen and "bannermen" (Qiren) retained the right to keep their titles but would enjoy equal rights as other Chinese citizens, and were furthermore assured that their private property would not be tampered with.106

It had already been arranged that Sun would resign upon the publication of the edict, the Assembly would elect Yuan president, and Yuan would come to Nanjing to take up his post. The understandings having been reached, the abdication edict was issued on 12 February. The edict itself, drafted by Zhang Jian and Liang Shiyi, had received prior approval from the Republican side but contained a last minute nasty surprise: an insertion by Yuan Shikai in which he was granted full powers to organize a provisional republican government. This of course meant that the existing Provisional Government was not granted the legitimacy it needed to obtain diplomatic recognition and further weakened the revolutionaries in their struggle with Yuan.107

While complying with the terms of the agreement with Yuan, Sun and the revolutionaries nevertheless strongly objected to the wording of the edict. Wu and Tang themselves told David Fraser that they felt sick at heart and

104. On the financial difficulties as they affected the negotiations see Jordan to Grey, 29 Jan. 1912, no. 49, FO 371/1313. On the drive for recognition see Wang Chonghui to Grey, 19 Jan. 1912, no. 120, FO 371/1311 and telegram of same date to U.S. Secretary of State, U.S. National Archives, 893.00/938.

105. Zhonghua Minguo kaiguo wushinian wenxian bianzuan weiyuanhui, ed., Zhonghua Minguo kaiguo wushinian wenxian, ser. 2, vol. 2, Kaiguo guimo (Taibei, 1962), 2; 590.

106. Guanjian lu 1:94–98.

107. Jerome Chen, Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 129–30.

Wu Tingfang and the 1911 Revolution

223

dissatisfied with the tone of the edict and the extravagance of the terms to the Manchus. Nonetheless, Wu cabled his congratulations to Yuan upon the latter's formal selection as President.108

Throughout these proceedings, Wu Tingfang served as intermediary between Sun Yixian and Yuan Shikai, a trying and difficult position. He was not fully trusted by the revolutionaries and was in fact not acting in their interests but rather in accord with the views of Zhang Jian and the constitutionalist bloc that bolstered Yuan's position at the expense of that of the revolutionaries.

It is problematic as to whether the political settlement could have varied greatly from the one that would have resulted if Wu had not undermined the revolutionary cause. In the long run the hostility of the imperialist nations to the republican cause led to the downfall of the revolution. Without diplomatic recognition the revolutionaries could not obtain foreign loans with which to continue militarily against the Dynasty. Moreover, all within the revolutionary camp feared the specter of foreign intervention and further loss of sovereignty. Already, Mongolia and Tibet were exhibiting political instability and there was great danger of Chinese interests suffering in those outlying areas. Financial difficulties and fears of further loss of sovereignty were decisive factors in the political defeat of the revolution.

Suffice it to say that Wu's relations with the Nanjing Provisional Government and the revolutionary forces showed considerable strain during the negotiations described above. With the conclusion of the negotiations Wu took up his post as Minister of Justice (amidst rumors that he would be appointed Foreign Minister in Yuan Shikai's cabinet), and engaged in sharp debates with Chen Qimei that reflected strongly differing views on China's future path.109

Liberalism and the 1911 Revolution

Recently Edward Rhoads made a plea for the 1911 revolution to be "seriously and rigorously evaluated by the standards of bourgeois liberalism rather than ... dismissed as ‘mere liberalism.”” In this concluding section, I would like to show how the revolutionaries themselves undermined “liberalism,” and how from the perspective of a person imbued with liberal values such as Wu Tingfang, Yuan Shikai could have seemed like a better bet for the fulfillment of liberalism than Sun Yixian and his comrades in the Revolutionary Alliance- at least in 1911–12."

110

Liberalism, in Wu Tingfang's case, is a convenient term to describe his attachment to a variety of political institutions associated with England, the

108. Morrison, Correspondence 1:735.

109. For an example of these rumors see ibid., pp. 741-42.

110. Rhoads, "Two Cheers for 1911,” p. 134.

224

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

United States and western European nations. These institutions included some form of representative political structure, whether republican or monarchical, and a system that protects the specific interests of its members in the form of constitutional rights against arbitrary conduct. Above all, it meant a rule of law to provide structure and stability for society and politics. To this end, throughout his adult life Wu upheld concepts such as the right of trial by jury and the independence of the judiciary, and advocated the necessity of an independent (but responsible) press.

Wu's liberalism was not in conflict with the nationalist requirement of a strong, fairly centralized government. For him, there seemed to be no contradiction. It is instructive to remember that in his first public statement to the North China Herald on 8 November, Wu stated that a republic would be partly patterned after the United States and partly after the German Federation. While the first model conjures up images more familiarly “liberal," the second model is more commonly associated with the construction of a centralized and somewhat autocratic state under the powerful figure of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck—he, clearly, was to be Yuan Shikai's model.1

Wu's Minguo tuzhi chuyi, written in 1914, indicates clearly the tasks that a national government should perform in China. These of course included the all important protection of sovereignty against encroachments on the periphery, but went beyond that to see the state promote land reclamation, scientific irrigation and a variety of other methods to stimulate agricultural production, promote commerce and industry, encourage modern education and widespread literacy, and improve the lives of its citizenry by creating a stable and civilized environment.112 It may well be argued that for Wu, liberal institutions were seen as part of this larger national goal rather than goals in and of themselves.

With this in mind, the conflicts between Wu and the revolutionaries that emerged throughout the revolutionary period are illuminating. Throughout this chapter we have noted points of stress in the relations between Wu and the revolutionaries, starting with the threats of force employed by Chen Qimei's followers at the meeting on 6 November that formally established the Shanghai Military Government.

The conflict between Chen on the one hand and Li Xiehe and the Restoration Society on the other continued through the revolutionary period. In November Li had narrowly escaped an assassination attempt believed to have been made by Chen's followers, and then on 14 January 1912 a leading Restoration Society figure, Tao Chengzhang, was assassinated in a Shanghai hospital as he was about to be appointed Governor of Zhejiang Province. Tao's murder was then (and still is) widely believed to have been arranged by Chen Qimei's follower Jiang Jieshi, although this remains unproven. This was a shocking event that also upset Sun Yixian and Huang Xing. Later events

111. See n. 44.

112. Especially chaps. 3–16.

Wu Tingfang and the 1911 Revolution

225

were of course to prove that Chen Qimei did not have a monopoly on assassination attempts, but in 1912 Yuan Shikai had not yet fully shown the

range of his autocratism and contempt for liberalism.113

full

Also disturbing to propertied people in Shanghai were the forced levies made upon individuals and firms by the Shanghai Military Government, or soldiers acting in its name, and later by the Nanjing Provisional Government as well. By January, financial distress had led Chen's government to reimpose the transit and other taxes it had so confidently waived in November; still the money problems remained acute. On 20 January the military government issued a proclamation prohibiting soldiers from using threats to obtain contributions and offering to reimburse those who had been coerced into giving funds. But the practice continued and included threats and kidnapping.

114

These forced levies were actually a notorious feature of Chen Qimei's government, much commented upon by Chinese and foreigners alike. Even an orthodox Nationalist Party biography of Chen written in 1977 acknowledged that several millions in property were thus taken but attributes it to "bad elements" (buliang fenzi) among his followers.115 If the latter was true it indicates that Chen's troops were poorly disciplined and that he was not in complete control over their activities; if it is not true, it suggests that the financial problems of the new regime were so overwhelming that Chen was forced to write off the support of propertied groups. In any case, the lack of respect for private property led to a serious loss of support for the revolutionary government.

Financial distress was also the most acute problem faced by the Nanjing Provisional Government. Many commanders were disgusted with the political settlement with Yuan Shikai that Wu and Tang were arranging and wanted to complete the "northern expedition," but they were frustrated by the utter lack of funds available to them. On 20 January the managers of the CMSNC received a telegram signed by eighteen military commanders, most of them based in the lower Yangzi provinces, demanding that the Company allow the Provisional Government borrow 10 million dollars using the Company's properties as collateral. The officers also demanded that Sheng Xuanhuai's shares in the Company be expropriated. Although the telegram began politely, it progressed to demands and threats. The Company was given a 48-hour period to respond, and if it did not comply it would be considered a public

113. On the assassination see Rankin, Early Chinese Revolutionaries, pp. 149, 211; Sun Yixian, Guofu quanji 9:112; Huang Xing, Huang Xing ji, p. 103.

114. Shanghai shiliao, pp. 425–26.

115. Shao Yuanzhong, Chen Yingshi xiansheng geming xiaoshi (Taibei: Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang weiyuanhui, Dangshi weiyuanhui, 1977), p. 20. See also Jean Rodes, Scenes de la vie revolutionnaire en Chine (1911–1914), 2d ed. (Paris: Plon, 1917), pp. 69–72; Straight to J. P. Morgan and Co., 4 Feb. 1912, encl. in J. P. Morgan to Secretary of State, 16 Mar. 1912, U.S. National Archives, 893.00/1191; NCH, 23 and 30 Mar. 1912, pp. 768, 884; 13 and 20 Apr. 1912, pp. 95, 109, 110-12, 145-47.

226

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

enemy and its key personnel would face execution. It was an extraordinary document.116

Wu Tingfang had been elected chairman of the stockholders in October 1911 following Sheng Xuanhuai's flight to Japan. Soon after his election to this position, he became occupied with handling foreign affairs and then the peace negotiations and apparently was unable to be actively involved in the CMSNC's affairs. When this ultimatum was received, Wu was cabled by the managing directors and asked to handle the situation, but he declined to be involved, stating that he had sent Wen Zongyao in his place to earlier board meetings with his request to resign, which had not been accepted. He repeated his desire to resign and stated that if the stockholders publicly decided to comply with the demand he would not oppose it. Actually, Wu's resignation was never accepted and he remained chairman of the board until Yuan Shikai forced a major reorganization of the Company in November 1912.117

The directors decided to hold a public meeting in Zhang's Gardens on 1 February to vote on the loan. The meeting was to be widely publicized throughout China. Huang Xing and Sun Yixian reluctantly granted the Company the extra time needed to accomplish this, but by now the shareholders were in an uproar. One group of shareholders from Hong Kong and Macau not only boycotted the meeting but wrote to Sun and Huang denouncing the government's action in scathing terms. They pronounced the plan as even worse than the Qing Government's railway nationalization plan and viewed it as especially reprehensible because the Republican government claimed to be "civilized." Other shareholders in Shanghai boycotted the public meeting to prevent a quorum from being reached and thereby invalidate the vote.118

Although the shareholders who attended the meeting, representing 10% of the stockholders, did vote to comply with the demand, the opposition by the vast majority of shareholders prevented the loan from being implemented. In March, the Provisional Government finally dropped the issue.119 From the point of view of the majority of shareholders the Provisional Government could hardly be counted upon to protect their interests; from the perspective of the revolutionaries it appeared to show that the propertied classes were only fair-weather friends. Following this incident, Chen Qimei several times

116. Encl. in Liang Qingliu and Tang Guotai to Wu Tingfang, 20 Jan. 1912, in Zhongguo di’er lishi dang'an,

ed., "Nanjing linshi zhengfu shiyi Zhaoshangju changshi jie Rizhai shiliao,” Lishi dang'an, 1983, no. 3: 43–44.

117. Wu to Managers, 21 Jan. 1912, in ibid., p. 45; Pan to Managers, 9 Feb. 1912, ibid., p. 53; NCH, 13 Apr. 1912, p. 118. On the reorganization in November 1912 see “Zhongguo dashi ji,” Dongfang zazhi 9, no. 10 (Jan. 1913).

118. Managers to Sun Yixian and Huang Xing, 3 Feb. 1912, in Zhongguo di'er lishi dang'an, "Nanjing linshi zhengfu shiyi Zhaoshangju,” p. 49.

119. “Zhaoshangju dongshihui guanyu Nanjing linshi zhengfu jiekuan shixiang huiyi jilu,” 10 Feb. 1912, in Zhongguo di'er lishi dang'an, ed., Zhonghua Minguo shi dang'an ziliao huibian, 2d ser. (Yangzhou: Jiangsu renmin, 1981), pp. 305–8. See also NCH, 2 Mar. 1912, p. 564.

Wu Tingfang and the 1911 Revolution

227

tried to resign from his position as Military Governor, claiming that he could not overcome obstructionist tactics in coping with financial difficulties.120

The events described above may be seen as setting the stage for the celebrated exchange of letters between Wu Tingfang and Chen Qimei of spring 1912 when Wu as Minister of Justice in the Nanjing Provisional Government clashed with Chen over jurisdiction and procedures in two cases. The first case involved the trial of Yao Rongze for murder of two young revolutionaries in northern Jiangsu, Zhou Shi and Ruan Shi, during the revolutionary transition. Yao was the commander of the Qing garrison in the Huaibei region of the province and Zhou and Ruan were students who returned to their native Huaibei with armed student supporters. When Yao (whose superiors were close to Yuan Shikai) refused to go along with the "restoration" proclaimed by the students and others in the Huaibei region, Zhou and Ruan denounced him. Shortly thereafter they were both murdered, and Yao fled to Suzhou.121

The relatives of the two murdered youths petitioned Chen Qimei and Sun Yixian requesting that Yao be brought to justice. Sun granted Chen permission to conduct the trial in Shanghai, but Wu as Minister of Justice wanted to set up a special tribunal and use it as a showcase of modern judicial procedure, with his handpicked judges. After much wrangling Chen Qimei agreed to permit Wu to select the chief magistrate, Chen Yifan (Ivan Chen), with Chen Qimei's legal expert Cai Yin assisting Wu's choice Ding Rong (Alexander Ting) as assistant magistrate.122

An even greater dispute arose over the use of western law and western lawyers. Yao asked to be represented by a foreign lawyer. Chen vehemently opposed it while Wu thought it should be permitted. Wu argued that this would help to establish the principle of judicial reciprocity. Of course, this reveals that Wu believed that British legal practices would be employed under the Republic and that the new crop of lawyers emerging would use them as the basis for China's own reforms. As noted above in Chapter 6, Wu did indeed wish to see China apply British judicial procedures virtually without alteration. 123

Chen Qimei scathingly denounced Wu's defense of "cosmopolitanism.” He denounced the defeatist spirit of those who, in Chen's estimation, were slavishly devoted to the West. Wu responded at great length to this issue, asserting that in the area of law China did indeed have a great deal to learn

120. See Shen Yunlong, "Huang Keqiang yu Chen Yingshi," pp. 98–99.

121. In addition to the documents cited below, see also those in Yangzhou shifan xueyuan, comp., Xinhai Geming Jiangsu diqu shiliao (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin, 1963), pp. 341-63; Wong Young-tsu, "Popular Unrest and the 1911 Revolution in Jiangsu,” Modern China 3, no. 3 (July 1977): 333.

122. Chen to Wu, 4 Feb., Wu to Sun, 18 Feb. 1912, in Wu Tingfang, Wu Zhiyong xiansheng gongdu, ed. Zhou Chengxu (Shanghai: Wenruilou, 1926) (hereafter cited as Wu Tingfang, Gongdu), 1:20b– 24.

123. Wu to Chen, 7 Mar. 1912, ibid., pp. 24b–25.

228

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

from the West. He felt that the legal profession in China was still relatively weak and immature, and that Chinese lawyers could learn much from studying their foreign counterparts. Willingness to debate with foreign lawyers should be viewed as a mark of confidence rather than evidence of defeatism.124

The issue of "cosmopolitanism" that emerged in this exchange indicates a significant difference between the British-educated, Hong Kong-raised Wu, and the younger revolutionaries educated in China or Japan. We have at various points in earlier chapters noted that Wu's nationalism was tempered by his background and training and revealed in the degree to which he assumed that British liberal institutions were superior to Chinese, even as he held that Chinese social organization was superior to that of Britain and America. This was seen by some revolutionaries as defeatist: Yu Zhijiang, Chen Qimei's assistant who served as intermediary between Wu and Chen in November and December, recollected many years later, "In truth, Wu Tingfang revered the West to an incredible degree!" (chong yang chong de lihai)125

Yao Rongze's trial itself was a success for Wu. It was China's first modern jury trial, the jury being selected from a panel prepared by Wu with some additions by Chen Qimei. The jury declared Yao guilty of one of the murders, not both. The judge declared Yao guilty of murder with a capital sentence, but Yao was given a three-week period to petition Yuan Shikai for mercy. A number of the jurors and others as well cabled President Yuan asking that Yao be pardoned in view of the fact that the crime occurred during a turbulent period of civil disorder. Wu arranged for a large number of Shanghai gentry and merchants to submit similar petitions and then forwarded them to Yuan, who issued a presidential decree on 13 April pardoning Yao. Notwithstanding the fact that the case revealed overtones of the political struggle between Yuan and the revolutionaries, it also was viewed by Wu as a “civilized” procedure symbolizing the new spirit of the Chinese Republic.126

Wu's success in the Yao Case was overshadowed by the shocking kidnapping and arrest on 24 March of Song Hanzhang (Song Lu), manager of the Shanghai branch of the Bank of China (formerly DaQing Bank). Song was dining with friends in the International Settlement when he was spirited away by launch to a police station outside the Settlement and held incommunicado while charged with corruption and embezzlement.

Actually, Song had earlier materially aided the revolution by withholding large sums, amounting to nearly Tls 2,500,000, from the Qing authorities in the early phases of the revolution. According to Yu Zhijiang, the real reason for Chen's action was that Song kept evading his demands for the bank to lend the military government money and he wanted to pressure him.127

124. Ibid., 2:1–7.

125. "Xinhai Shanghai guangfu qianhou,” p. 16.

126. Wen Zongyao to Yuan Shikai, 11 Apr. 1912, in Wu Tingfang, Gongdu 2:7b8a; NCH, 30 Mar. 1912, pp. 837–38, 844; 6, 13 and 20 Apr. 1912, pp. 118–20, 147–48.

127. Ray O. Hall, Chapters and Documents on Chinese National Banking (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1920), pp. 104-5; “Xinhai Shanghai guangfu qianhou,” pp. 13–14.

Wu Tingfang and the 1911 Revolution

229

This incident caused a great uproar in Shanghai's business community. The acting director of the bank and members of its management board petitioned Wu asking that Chen release Song while the Ministry of Finance, under whose jurisdiction the matter properly belonged, investigate the matter. Wu promptly responded, forwarding the letters from the bank personnel to Chen and asking for clarification.128

Chen blandly replied that Song was held during the military government's investigation, that he had arrested him because Song had not responded to earlier communications, and that the case properly fell in his own jurisdiction because the embezzlement had occurred before the Provisional Government had been established and therefore martial law applied. Chen also (and insultingly) implied that the bank could not be impartial in an internal investigation and neither could ex-Qing officials serving the Republican government!129

Wu correctly saw this as a personal attack and responded in kind. Chen had blurred the distinction between executive and judicial functions of the government, something even little children understood. The separation of powers had even been upheld in the reactionary Qing constitution; certainly the progressive Republican government should follow this principle. Wu asserted that the military government had no investigative powers and that Chen had infringed upon the authority of other branches of government. Wu's heated response also defended the loyalty of former Qing officials such as himself. 130

According to Yu Zhijiang's account, Wu was able to obtain Song's release by personally assuming responsibility for him. However, the war of letters between Chen and Wu continued through Song's trial in May 1912 in which the charges against him remained unproven. Throughout his letters Wu maintained a strong defense of the independence of the judiciary and of the importance of a rule by law as a fundamental principle of the Republic. By the time Song's trial was concluded, the Shanghai Military Government had been forced to disband under pressure from Yuan, Chen Qimei had alienated most of the propertied people of Shanghai and was never able to regain a strong position in the city again. 131

The exchange of letters with Chen over the Yao Rongze Case and the kidnapping of Song Hanzhang was edited by Wu and printed at his expense under the title Wu Zhiyong xiansheng gongdu (Public papers of Mr. Wu Zhiyong [Tingfang]). He did so because he felt that his position was clearly right and that the exchange provided a good opportunity to publicize it. The exchange won Wu a good deal of fame as an advocate of constitutional government and liberal principles. The portion of these letters dealing with

128. Wu Tingfang, Gongdu 2: 8–9a.

129. Ibid., pp. 9-11a.

130. Ibid., pp. 11-12.

131. “Xinhai Shanghai guangfu qianhou,” pp. 13–14.

230

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

the Song kidnapping was also reprinted in the important collection, Minguo jingshi wenbian (Collected essays on Republican statecraft), which is one of the most important sources for the constitutionalist movement of the early republican period. 132

Many historians who view the revolution of 1911 as a failure see it as “not much of a revolution," or not revolutionary enough.133 From the perspective of the revolutionaries themselves the failure was marked by their inability to seize political power. But from Wu Tingfang's perspective in 1912, the revolution had succeeded in overthrowing the Qing Dynasty, the necessary precondition for China's fulfillment of its national goals. For Wu, the implementation of institutional reforms patterned after the Anglo-American political system was an integral part of the attainment of these national goals. His experiences with Chen Qimei's military government and to some degree with the Nanjing Provisional Government led him to doubt that the revolutionaries could fulfill his view of China's national goals. The jettisoning of parliamentary democracy in the struggle for power, the lack of concern for the inviolability of private property, and the inability to control its soldiery were all indications that the revolutionaries did not deserve the support of the propertied classes whom Wu viewed as the backbone of the nation. For Wu, the real test of the revolution was yet to occur.

132. Reprint, Taibei, 1962, 2:480–82.

133. Esherick, "1911: A Review,” in “A Symposium on the 1911 Revolution,” Modern China 2, no. 2(Apr. 1976): 141–84.

Elder Statesman 1912-1922

The first decade of the Chinese Republic, and the last of Wu Tingfang's long life, was one of increasing disappointment after the high hopes of revolution. To counter the centrifugal tendencies towards national disintegration Yuan Shikai employed increasingly autocratic means. This trend culminated in Yuan's disastrous campaign to establish a new monarchy and his subsequent true loss of the "mandate."

Wu Tingfang, having committed himself to the concept of republicanism, and particularly to the notion of constitutionalism, was distressed to see the latter diluted and finally abandoned by Yuan. Still, Wu was willing to overlook much in the interest of maintaining a viable state and in view of his personal relationship with Yuan. But when Yuan tried to make himself emperor, that was too much for Wu and he joined in the anti-Yuan movement.

With Yuan Shikai's death Wu emerged from retirement. In November 1916 he agreed to assume the post of Foreign Minister in the newly constituted government under President Li Yuanhong. He did so in the hopes of breaking the deadlock between Duan Qirui and his coalition of northern militarists on the one hand, and the broad coalition of political figures who opposed them on the other. Within short order, however, this conflict paralyzed Li's government and led to its collapse in June 1917, under circumstances to be described later in this chapter.

Wu Tingfang had hoped to be a mediator and a peacemaker but eventually was forced to take a stand of public opposition to Duan and the northern militarist faction. His finest hour occurred when he resisted the threats to his life in refusing to countersign President Li's order to dismiss the Parliament.

From 1917 until his death in 1922 Wu was a key figure in the southern governments based in Guangdong (the so-called Guangzhou Governments) formed under the rubric of protecting the principle of constitutionalism. These southern governments united a broad coalition of opponents of northern militarism, including old revolutionaries under Sun Yixian's leadership, political figures loosely associated with the Guomindang, and various military figures.

There were two such governments formed in the years 1917–22, and Wu Tingfang served in both as Foreign Minister, sometimes Finance Minister, Acting President and, briefly, Governor of Guangdong. As was the case earlier

231

232

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

in Li Yuanhong's government, Wu tried to play the role of mediator and peacemaker between the different factions that comprised the coalition. The first government failed in 1920 when Wu threw his support to Sun Yixian, who had left the coalition in 1918. The second government derived from a coalition between Sun Yixian and Chen Jiongming, an enlightened militarist based in northern Guangdong. Wu died in June 1922, as the second coalition collapsed, before being able to see any of his efforts to establish a viable political structure achieve success.

In his work Peking Politics, 1918-1923, Andrew Nathan has argued that the politics of the period were primarily characterized by strong factionalism. Nathan's research indicates that political figures shared broadly similar views and formed political cliques that fought over control of the state and its resources. Ideological differences, while often used as rationalizations for political behavior, were in fact secondary to power considerations.'

Much can be said for using the “factionalism” model or framework to view the events of the early Republic. In Wu Tingfang's case we see a person strongly committed to the constitutionalist program but who nonetheless faced the question of how it was to be implemented. And how else but through dependence upon strong leaders: first Yuan Shikai, then Li Yuanhong, then Cen Chunxuan and finally Sun Yixian. In each of these people Wu sought the type of leader who could exert political and military power to establish the type of state that could implement Wu's broad national goals. This perspective led Wu down the path to factionalism as the inevitable mode of politics from 1917 until his death in 1922.

In Retirement, 1912–1916

As soon as the Yuan Shikai government was established with the cabinet in place under Tang Shaoyi's premiership, Wu Tingfang retired from political life. In his home at 3 Gordon Road in the International Settlement (a residence sometimes described as “palatial”), Wu settled down to the life of the retired official and civic leader. In fact, there was quite a community of such people in Shanghai in the early Republican period, including a number of prominent ones such as Tang Shaoyi, with whom Wu was closely associated during this period, Sheng Xuanhuai, Qu Hongji, Wen Zongyao, Li Jingfang, Cen Chunxuan, and Wang Chonghui.

A good part of Wu's time in 1912–14 was spent writing. In 1912 his Gonghe guanjian lu (Record of the turning point in the establishment of the republic) was published. The year 1914 saw the publication of his America Through the Spectacles of an Oriental Diplomat, and a Chinese edition of this work as well. In 1915 his Minguo tuzhi chuyi saw publication. He completed work on his

1. Andrew J. Nathan, Peking Politics, 1918–1923: Factionalism and the Failure of Constitutionalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).

Elder Statesman 1912–1922

233

Yanshou xinfa which was published in 1918. During his period he also completed a work on spiritualism entitled Linghun xue (The study of the soul). This work was never published as the manuscript was destroyed in the fire in the Governor's mansion in Guangzhou in 1922 just before Wu's death.2

Several of these works have been discussed in earlier chapters. Taken as a group, they reveal three major preoccupations. The first was the form and functions of the state, the second was westernization, and the third was spirituality.

The issue of political structure was dealt with most fully in Minguo tuzhi chuyi and has been discussed in Chapter 7. Wu hoped to see a strong, fairly centralized state to promote China's equality in the world and to develop China's economy and raise the standard of living of the nation. At the same time, he promoted the concept of rule by law rather than personal fiat, extolled the independence of the judiciary and the importance of liberal press laws, advocated the separation of church and state, and hoped to see the concept of legislative power expanded as the Chinese people became more educated. Increasingly, he believed the hope for China's future lay with education, especially with overseas education, in creating an enlightened citizenry.

The issue of westernization has been discussed earlier in Chapters 4 and 7. While advocating the introduction of British liberal political structures, Wu hoped to preserve a core of Chinese values and institutions in interpersonal relationships and daily life. The Anti-Cigarette Smoking Society, vegetarianism and promotion of Chinese dress styles reflected this concern. In America Through the Spectacles of an Oriental Diplomat Wu discussed these issues at great length and upheld the superiority of Chinese customs of social organization and daily life over those of the United States.

As Wu aged, he became increasingly preoccupied with spiritual issues. His concepts of diet and hygiene, developed soon after the turn of the century, reflected his view that proper life-style could nurture and improve the moral qualities of an individual's qi, and that cumulatively, this could improve the moral climate of a nation or even the entire earth. Many of these ideas can be found in his works Spectacles and Yanshou xinfa. In his seventies, Wu came to believe in the immortality of the soul. He experimented with "sand writing” to communicate with the dead and believed that they visited with him in his sleep. He urged his contemporaries (Yuan Shikai and Huang Xing among them) to read Buddhist classics, nurture their souls and prepare for their afterlives."

In addition to his writing, Wu participated in the sometimes ceremonial functions called for by his status as an ex-official and ex-diplomat. These included speech-making, presence at important social events such as formal receptions for the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, ground-breaking of the

2. Please see these items in the Bibliography.

3. On Huang, see Wu Tingguang, Wu Tingfang lishi, p. 28; on Yuan, see Wu's letter to him in English translation, in North China Daily News (hereafter cited as NCDN), 28 May 1916, p. 8.

234

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Chinese YMCA, the opening of the Bank of Territorial Development, ceremonies at the Shanghai Commercial College, and receptions for the Ladies' International Club.*

Wu had been active in the International Club formed by missionary Gilbert Reid but dropped away from the Club as Reid's overbearing presence became offensive." Wu then participated in the Saturday Club, an association formed to facilitate communication between prominent Westerners and members of the Shanghai Chinese elite. In one ironic turn, he introduced a talk by W. W. Rockhill, with whom he had crossed swords over the Chinese boycott of American goods in 1905.6 Wu was also honorary president of the World's Chinese Students' Federation and hosted several receptions for departing students at his home."

As one of the leaders of the Canton Guild (Guangzhou Gongsuo) of Shanghai, Wu was frequently called upon to engage in ceremonial and philanthropic activities on behalf of the Guild. These activities included organizing contributions for flood relief in 1914 and 1915, urging the national government to prohibit the gambling monopoly in Guangdong, negotiating repayment of the loan the Guild had advanced the Provisional Government early in 1912, and hosting receptions for famous Cantonese visitors to Shanghai such as Kang Youwei.

These varied activities were undertaken in addition to Wu's continuing the work of the Anti-Cigarette Smoking Society and his Hygiene Society, and in addition to business activities, such as the forming, with Tang Shaoyi and others, of the Venus Life Assurance Company in 1914.9

Other activities that Wu undertook during this period of retirement, while considered "non-political,” nonetheless had political implications, reflecting in part the upsurge of political interest that occurred in China during World War I. Shortly after the war's outbreak in 1914, Wu was joined by other public figures in Shanghai, and later in Hankou, in forming the World Peace Association. The Association made a public appeal to the leaders of the combatant nations to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict, perhaps through the offices of The Hague Tribunal, so as to avoid the world-wide catastrophe they envisioned if the war were to be prolonged.10

4. See NCDN, 2 Feb., p. 9; 3 Feb., p. 7; 9 Mar., p. 10; 27 Apr., p. 14; 8 Dec. 1914, p. 5; 13 July 1915, p. 8; 18 Mar. 1916, p. 10.

5. NCDN, 19 Mar., p. 8; 20 Mar. 1914, p. 8.

6. NCDN, 13 May, p. 10; 5 Feb., p. 8; 16 Apr. 1914, p. 7.

7. NCDN, 2 June 1913, p.7; 29 July, p. 5; 16 Oct. 1916, p. 7; Hu Guangbiao, Po ju liushi nian (Taibei: Xinwen tiandi she, 1968), p. 78.

8. On flood relief, see NCDN, 9 July 1912, p. 10; 9 July 1915, p. 7; 23 May 1916, p. 8; on gambling see NCDN, 20 June 1914, p. 10; 13 May 1915m p. 10; on the loan, see NCDN, 19 May 1915, p. 7; on receptions see NCDN, 20 Nov. 1914, p. 5; 10 Dec. 1912.

9. NCDN, 31 Mar., p. 7; 3 Apr., p. 7; 16 Sept. 1914, p. 8; as a shareholder in the Commercial Press, 2 June 1915, p. 5; on the Anti-Cigarette Smoking Society, see 16 Jan. 1915, p. 10.

10. NCDN, 16 Nov. 1914, p. 10; 9 Apr. 1915, p. 10.

Elder Statesman 1912–1922

235

Also in 1914 Wu organized a society to stimulate Chinese industry and trade. Known variously in English as the “Chinese Product Protection Society” and the "Society to Encourage Use of National Goods,” the Society prepared an exhibit of Chinese goods in Shanghai and sought ways to promote the export of Chinese products. Yuan Shikai was petitioned by Wu to find means of ending the hated transit tax (lijin) and raising the tariff on imported goods to 12.5% so as to stimulate trade in Chinese goods. In 1915 the society helped to organize a national exhibition of Chinese products in Beijing."1

An activity reflecting these concerns was Wu's attendance at the Philippine Exhibit in February 1915 at the request of Chinese merchants in the Islands. As the official representative of the Ministry of Agriculture and Industry at the Exhibit, Wu was also helping to fulfill the objectives of the Society by promoting Chinese products abroad.12

Along similar lines, Wu, Tang Shaoyi and other prominent Chinese in Shanghai organized the Mutual Help Society in 1915, a "non-political” organization similar to the National Salvation Fund that had emerged in 1914 to collect funds for national development. The Mutual Help Society had as its objectives the promotion of national unity, national education and national industry, so that "the people of China [could] help each other and work out their own salvation instead of depending upon others... "13

Finally, during this period Wu was the President of the Far Eastern Athletic Association and helped to organize the Far Eastern Olympic Games in Shanghai in May 1915. These games, lasting one week, were widely attended, with participation of about 230 athletes from China, Japan, and the Philippines. They featured track and field events, swimming, tennis, basketball, soccer, and an exhibition baseball game performed by a Honolulu baseball team.14

This list of Wu Tingfang's activities should suffice to show that retirement, in his case, meant only that he was not holding public office; it did not mean that he had truly retired from public life. Wu also was involved to some degree in the political life of the early Republic. During and in the immediate aftermath of the 1911 revolution, Wu's name was associated with at least nine political parties or associations. Two of these merged with three others in May 1912 to form the Gonghedang (Republican Party), which supported Yuan Shikai in the Provisional Parliament that began meeting in Beijing in fall 1912. In spring 1913 the Republican Party became part of a new amalgam called the Jinbudang (Progressive Party), which similarly supported Yuan

11. NCDN, 13 May, p. 10; 14 Dec. 1914, p. 5; 18 Jan., p. 5; 9 Apr., p. 10; 20 Apr., p. 8; 7 July, p. 10; 4 Aug., p. 10; 26 Aug., p. 10; 4 Sept., p. 10; 7 Sept., p. 5; 20 Sept. 1915, p. 10; Li Yuanhong made reference to the society's good works in NCDN, 9 Oct. 1916, p. 8.

12. NCDN, 2 Mar., p. 5; 12 Mar., p. 5; 23 Mar. 1915, p. 8.

13. NCDN, 11 June, p. 10; 12 June 1915, p. 7.

14. Dongfang zazhi 12, no. 4, “nei-wei shiping,” p. 14; NCDN, 29 Mar., p. 5; 22 Apr., p. 7; 28 Apr. 1915, p. 7; and daily coverage of the events, 17–22 Apr. 1915.

236

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Shikai against the Guomindang (Nationalist Party), in the Legislature. Wu was a member of the Jinbudang's nine-person executive committee, along with Li Yuanhong, its chairman, Liang Qichao and other notables, but Wu did not play an active role in party politics and viewed these functions as purely honorary.15

Although Wu was involved in early republican political associations, he left the office-holding to his son Wu Chaoshu, known to foreigners as C. C. Wu, who had returned from his studies in England in May 1911. Born in 1886, C. C. had attended high school in the United States, graduating in 1904 from Atlantic City High School. Upon returning to China he held a post in the Guangdong Provincial Board of Works at Guangzhou and briefly, in 1907, in the Guangdong Provincial Board of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce. In 1908 he went to England and studied law at the University of London. Following in his father's footsteps, he was called to the Bar and graduated first in his class in 1911.16

At the time that Wu Tingfang was retiring from political life, C. C., now twenty-six years old, was about to enter it. In May 1912 he took a post as head of the Hubei Province Office of Foreign Affairs." It seems likely that this appointment reflected a combination of C. C.'s own obvious abilities and Li Yuanhong's desire to show respect to Wu Tingfang. C. C. authored a pamphlet entitled "A Plea for the Recognition of the Chinese Republic,” and it is tempting to speculate that C. C. hoped to use his association with Li Yuanhong as a springboard to national level foreign affairs work. The pamphlet was distributed by Wu Tingfang to a number of prominent Americans in hopes that the United States would lead the other nations in speedy recognition.18

C. C. held this post until September 1912, when he was selected member of the House of Representatives (Zhongyiyuan) of the Provisional Parliament from Guangdong Province as a Guomindang representative. In Beijing, C. C. was elected by his peers to serve on the Committee to Draft the Constitution

15. According to Zhang Yufa, Wu was involved with eleven political associations in the early Republic. I have been able to link him to nine. Wu was listed as an organizer of five political organizations in 1911–12. They were, with date of founding in parenthesis, Gonghe Tongyi Hui (21-23 December 1911); Zhonghua Gonghe Cuijin Hui (23 December 1911); Zhengjian Shanghui (25 April 1912); Gonghedang (9 May 1912); and Guomin Gongdang (17 May 1912). He was listed as a supporter of four others: Zhonghua Minguo Jianhe Hui (19 November 1911); Zhonghua Minguo Xianzheng Dang (4 December 1911); Datong Gongji Danghui (22 February 1912); and Guomindang (28 February 1912). See Shanghai shiliao, pp. 765–66, 793, 797–803; 806–7, 811-12, 834-40, 860, 871–74, 879–86. See also Zhang Yufa, “Minchu zhengdang diaocha yu fenxi,” in Zhongguo xiandaishi lunji (Taibei: Lianjing, 1980), 4:33–41. The reference to Wu in p. 38. On these early parties, see also George T. Yu, Party Politics in Republican China: The Kuomintang, 1912–1924 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), chap. 4; Li Shoukong, Minchu zhi guohui (Taibei: Zhongguo xueshu zhuzuo qiangzhu weiyuanhui, 1964), pp. 43–70; Xie Bin, Minguo zhengdang shi (Shanghai, 1928; reprint, Taibei: Wenxing, 1962), pp. 42-47, 53.

16. On C. C. see Wu Tiyun boshi aisi lu.

17. Liu Shoulin, Xinhai yihou shiqi nian zhiguan nianbiao (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1966), p. 359.

18. Austin P. Brown to William Sulzer, 23 Aug. 1912, encl., U.S. National Archives (hereafter cited as USNA), 893.00/634.

Elder Statesman 1912–1922

237

along with twenty-four other Representatives and thirty Senators from the Upper House (Canyiyuan).

While serving as Representative, C. C. came to the attention of Yuan Shikai and Yuan's adviser Dr. G. E. Morrison. This eventually led to C. C.'s appointment as Councillor in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and adviser to the President, posts he held until Yuan Shikai's death in 1916.20

As is apparent from the above, the relations between Yuan Shikai and the Wu father and son were good. Yuan's communications with Wu Tingfang were of the most courteous nature. In 1912 Wu was awarded honors by Yuan along with others who had played an important role in negotiating the revolution.21 On at least two occasions he cabled Wu requesting that he come to Beijing and take part in the government; each time Wu declined but did come to Beijing and meet with Yuan on more than one occasion.22

Enjoying good relations with Yuan Shikai, Wu nonetheless was linked with many members of the Guomindang (including, of course, his son). This put him in a good position in trying to mediate disputes between Yuan and the Guomindang or southern forces during the crisis that started with the murder of Song Jiaoren in March 1913 and culminated in the abortive "second revolution" in July and August of that year. Shortly after the assassination, when it became known that the assassins were linked to Yuan's inner circle of associates, Wu joined with Cen Chunxuan and several other notables in South and Central China calling upon Yuan to compromise with the Guomindang forces in order to keep the confidence of the nation. Then and later Wu's name came up often as a possible “moderate” foreign minister in Yuan's cabinet, and as a possible mediator between Yuan and his enemies.2

In an effort to defuse the opposition, Yuan's cabinet appointed Wu to join with Dr. Morrison in a commission to investigate the possible connection of Zhao Bingjun, Yuan's Premier, with Song's murderer. This had the effect of being an in-house investigation. Morrison, after a cursory discussion with Wu, declared that there was nothing to investigate.24

Wu himself arrived in Beijing on 14 June. Zhao had requested resignation on grounds of illness in the aftermath of the revelations following Song's murder; Wu was one of those discussed as Zhao's successor, but Wu firmly

19. Liu Shoulin, Xinhai yihou shiqi nian zhiguan nianbiao, p. 508; list of committee members in Li Shoukong, Minchu zhi guohui, pp. 159–60.

20. Liu Shoulin, Xinhai yihou shiqi nian zhiguan nianbiao, pp. 508, 514, 546, 25, 26, 2; for G. B. Morrison's views see Ernest P. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, p. 295.

21. Yuan Shikai, “Shou qian Sifa zongzhang Wu Tingfang xun yi wei zhengshu," in his Yuan dazongtong shudu huibian (Taibei: Wenhai, 1971), chap. 3.

22. Ibid., “Fu Wu Tingfang," chap. 5.; Huazi Ribao, 9 July 1912; 9 Feb. 1913. I am indebted to Honming Yip for these references.

23. Edward Friedman, "The Center Cannot Hold: The Failure of Parliamentary Democracy in China from 1911 to the World War in 1914" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1966), pp. 418-22, 424–25; NCDN, 10 June 1913, p. 7.

24. Pearl, Morrison of Peking, p. 284.

238

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

dismissed this or any other post. On 28 June the North China Daily News reported that "reliable sources" indicated that Zhao had asked Wu's advice about whether to obey the summons to attend the tribunal in Jiangsu or not; Wu advised him to do so. 25

Yuan courted Wu during this period. Shanghai Chinese newspapers reported that Wu was invited daily by Yuan to give advice on important matters of state and that Yuan had asked him to move into the presidential palace so as not to cause him fatigue from traveling back and forth from C. C.'s residence. He was offered the post of Chinese Minister to the United States, or to head a special delegation upon U.S. recognition of the Republic, but Wu declined these as well.2

In an interview given to a correspondent from the Hong Kong newspaper Huazi Ribao at this time, Wu refrained from any criticism of Yuan's government, counseling patience and forbearance, and attributing criticism of the government to a small minority.27 Wu permitted his name to be used in one of Yuan's counterattacks against the Guomindang in mid-July as the anti-Yuan uprising starting in Jiangxi. This took the form of charges that Huang Xing had juggled election funds in order to provide monies to armies in Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Anhui. Supposedly, these facts were revealed in the documents that Wu and Morrison were said to be examining in connection with the Song murder.28

Wu returned to Shanghai from North China on 24 July and was soon called upon by the business community to negotiate a compromise to the conflict in Shanghai. The "second revolution" in Shanghai took the form of a battle for control of the Shanghai Arsenal in which Chen Qimei was defeated. During the battle, Wu arranged a cease-fire while he attempted to negotiate between Chen and Yuan. From Chen he received a set of conditions under which peace could be restored, but these were unacceptable to Yuan, who was determined to press for complete victory. Wu appealed to Yuan to show forbearance and generosity to the rebels so as to avoid further bloodshed. But Yuan was not inclined to magnanimity towards Chen and the revolutionaries, then or later. 29

As a man in the middle Wu found plenty to blame on both sides. He was queasy about Yuan's ruthlessness in suppressing the rebellion. As he told a reporter from the New York Times, he viewed Yuan's course of action as "dangerous." But he refrained from going as far as Tang Shaoyi, for example,

25. NCDN, 28 June 1913, p. 11; also 16 June, p. 9; 19 June, p. 7; 20 June 1913, p. 7. 26. NCDN, 3 July, p. 7; 20 June, p. 7; 27 June, p. 7; 3 July, p. 7; 10 July 1913, p. 7. 27. Huazi Ribao, 1 July 1913. I am indebted to Honming Yip for this reference. 28. NCDN, 15 July 1913, p. 7.

29. The exchange of letters is in Zhongguo Guomindang, Zhongyang weiyuanhui, Dangshi shiliao bianji weiyuanhui, ed., Geming wenxian, vol. 44, Erci geming shiliao (Taibei, 1968), pp. 258–—– 60; Yuan Shikai, Yuan dazongtong shudu huibian, chap. 7; see also NCDN, 25 July, p. 7; 28 July, p. 7; 30 July 1913, p.

30. NYT, 30 July 1913, p. 3.

Elder Statesman 1912–1922

239

in calling for Yuan's resignation. He did speak with some foreigners of liberal persuasion about his concerns. In October 1913 he told the newly-arrived U.S. Minister to China, Paul S. Reinsch, about Yuan's antipathy to liberalism:

Yuan Shih-kai's sole aim is to get rid of parliament. He has no conception of free government, is entirely a man of personal authority. The air of absolutism surrounds him.31

Still, Wu refrained from public criticism of Yuan's person or policies for nearly two more years. These two years saw Yuan's outlawing of the Guomindang and abolishing the Parliament, followed by the measured effort to manipulate the traditional symbols of authority. Through all of this, Wu sought to maintain a middle of the road stance, urging balance and moderation. For example, in presiding over opening ceremonies for the government-sponsored Bank of Territorial Development in December 1914, Wu was reported to have characterized China as

in a state of transition. There were many things for her to do. On the one hand, people urged them to go on, but what was called the Young China party wanted to go too far. On the other hand, they [the audience] were warned not to go too fast; they had to be cautious in everything they did. Some of the "old fogies" wanted to stop the Young China party from going any further. They must not repeat . . . the mistakes which had been made previously. Since China had become a Republic many things had been done, but he was sorry to say that some had not been done in a very cautious way. But they must profit by their mistakes. 32

The fact that C. C. Wu was serving as Yuan's adviser and councillor in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs probably helped to induce Wu Tingfang to maintain what was referred to as his “golden silence” about those policies he found objectionable. It was rumored that he remained silent because he did not want to harm C. C.'s chances for advancement.

Certainly he did not approve of the growing authoritarianism of Yuan's government. His Minguo tuzhi chuyi, published in 1915, reads as a brief for the constitutionalist ideal. He was also strongly opposed to the concept of Confucianism as a state religion just as Yuan Shikai was experimenting with this very idea.34 But Wu maintained a discreet silence and continued to allow himself to be linked to the government in a quasi-official way, as in February

31. Reinsch, An American Diplomat in China, p. 9.

32. NCDN, 8 Dec. 1914.

33. NYT, 19 July 1916, 5:15.

34. See Wu's Introduction to Chinese Religion Through Hindu Eyes: A Study in the Tendencies of Asiatic Mentality, by B. K. Sarkar (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1916), p. xxiii. Sarkar visited Shanghai in 1916.

240

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

1915 when he attended the Philippine Exhibit as the Chinese Government's representative and upon his return indicated his desire to go to the capital and exert his influence on Yuan Shikai to implement his ideas for trade protection, industrial development and the advancement of higher education.3

Wu also maintained his silence during the negotiations over Japan's infamous Twenty-One Demands, presented in January and accepted by Yuan in May 1915. In sharp contrast to Wu's promotion of the boycott of American goods in 1905, ostensibly to strengthen the Qing Government's hand in negotiations with the U.S., no such publicly organized movement emerged in 1915 with Wu at its helm. It is ironic that at the very time public outrage against Japan and Yuan were mounting in China, Wu was hosting the Far Eastern Olympics, an enterprise that suggests a kind of Pan-Asian ideology.

Wu was a guest at a meeting hosted by Yuan's governmental representatives in Shanghai, Daoyin Yang Cheng and Admiral Zheng Rucheng, to explain the government's role in the Sino-Japanese negotiations that had just transpired. Wu gave a talk in which he spoke of the need to practice endurance and patience in fulfilling China's desire to become strong. He advised his countrymen to follow Japan's "splendid example" in persistence of national goals, citing as examples Japan's being forced to give up the Liaodong Peninsula in 1895 only to obtain it in 1905, and similarly obtaining its objectives in Qingdao.36 What a contrast to the Wu of a decade earlier!

Only when Yuan made efforts to become emperor did Wu become roused to public opposition. In September 1915, with the formation of the Chou'an Hui and the orchestrated chorus of support for Yuan's assumption of the throne in the background, Wu chose not to go to Beijing and officiate at a national exhibit of Chinese products. This was an event sponsored by the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce under Zhou Ziqi, who had personally invited We to officiate at the exhibit. Wu's organization, the Society for the Protection of Chinese Trade, had promoted such an exhibit, and Wu had at first accepted Zhou's invitation but then declined to attend because, he let it be known, he did not want to be associated with the pro-monarchist movement.37

According to one source, Wu was several times approached by Yuan's representatives with flattering requests to be associated with the monarchist movement. Wu is said to have scornfully rejected an overture from Frank J. Goodnow, Yuan's American adviser whose pro-monarchist advice to Yuan was used as justification for the movement, and then Wu later rejected an emissary who used every trick in the book to get to see Wu with the President's appeal to come to Beijing. He is said to have characterized the monarchist

35. NCDN, 12 Mar., p. 5; 16 Aug. 1915, p. 10.

36. NCDN, 1 June 1915, p. 10.

37. NCDN, 26 Aug., p. 10; 4 Sept., p. 10; 7 Sept., p. 5; 20 Sept., p. 10; 23 Sept. 1915, p. 4.

38. Wu Tingguang, Wu Tingfang lishi, pp. 20–21.

Elder Statesman 1912–1922

241

movement as a “staged play.” “It is all right for us to watch the play, but it would be foolish for us to believe what the players have to tell us.'

939

Meanwhile, efforts were being made to rope C. C. Wu into the monarchist net. In December he was invited to be an adviser to the Bureau for the Preparation of Ceremonies. It would appear that the only way to advance in Yuan's administration was to become another sycophant of the would-be emperor. Earlier, in spring 1915, C. C. had been considered as a candidate for Minister to the United States but had been turned down in favor of Gu Weijun (V. K. Wellington Koo), who was certainly an able candidate for the post. But C. C. was turned down because Cao Rulin, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and an intimate associate of Yuan Shikai's, told Yuan that although C. C. was qualified for the post in terms of training and experience, he was too ill with tuberculosis to take up the position! As C. C. did not suffer from tuberculosis, one can only assume that Cao Rulin was deliberately undermining C. C.'s position in the foreign affairs bureaucracy. Clearly, C. C.'s career was not going to advance further under Cao, and Yuan. As Wu Tingfang told the New York Times shortly before Yuan's death, there were many foreign-educated Chinese serving in Yuan's Government, “but the majority of them are conservative and an unsurmountable obstacle to reform.” Perhaps that was why the Yuan administration was, he said, “going too slow" and was “swinging back to the other extreme" away from the revolution.41

C. C. got out of the monarchist dilemma by asking for sick leave. According to one source, this was the act of a “filial son” following his father's request, as Wu's friends began suggesting that it was unseemly for his son to be affiliated with Yuan at this time. C. C. remained in seclusion at his Beijing residence for the remainder of the Yuan Shikai's presidency, emerging only after Yuan died in June 1916.42

As is well known, Yuan's effort to make himself emperor led to his loss of power. Starting with the uprising in the Southwest in December 1915, Yuan continued to lose his grip on politics. Yuan renounced his plan to be emperor in March while Xu Shichang as Prime Minister attempted to salvage the situation for Yuan. Wu, along with Kang. Youwei, Tang Shaoyi, Tang Hualong and others were called upon to be mediators between the southern provinces and Yuan. But in spring 1916 the pressure began to mount for Yuan to resign and prominent people began to publicly call for his resignation.

On 20 April Wu did so as well. In a lengthy letter to Yuan, Wu called upon him, as an old colleague and friend, to resign for his own and the nation's good. He stated that the Republic was endangered by misgovernment, and

39. Ibid., pp. 21–22.

40. Cao Rulin, Yisheng zhi huiyi, p. 114.

41. NYT, 9 July 1916, 5:5.

42. Wu Tiyun boshi aisi lu; Wu Tingguang, Wu Tingfang lishi, pp. 22–23.

43. Li Chien-nung [Li Jiannong], The Political History of China, 1840–1928, trans. and ed. Teng Ssu- yu and Jeremy Ingalis. East-West Student ed. (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1963), p. 335.

242

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

that the costs, financially and politically, of suppressing the anti-Yuan movement were too great. In order to end the chaos, he should resign and allow Vice-President Li Yuanhong to reconstitute the government. He closed his letter by urging Yuan to think about doing good deeds (i.e., resigning) so as to ensure a good afterlife for his soul!44

Apparently Yuan was not sufficiently worried about his soul, for he continued to flounder in indecision through May, while many of his subordinates met in Nanjing at a meeting called by Feng Guozhang. Wu took this occasion for further public statements. To a correspondent from the English-language North China Daily News, Wu said that all were agreed that Yuan must resign, and that there were several capable people who could be called upon to serve as president after Li Yuanhong convened the government. He concluded:

I bear no malice toward Yuan; I still count him as a friend. But in my opinion the longer he remains in office the worse it will be for China and himself, the sooner he leaves the better it will be for China and for him. Yuan is a capable man, but he has never been abroad, has never left China, and he has much to learn about government. He has made the mistake of surrounding himself with partisans many of whom are corrupt and incapable, and is unable to free himself of them.45

Yuan's death on 6 June brought an end to the stalemate, ushering in a new period in which the constitutionalist dream was given one more chance to become fulfilled, but which ended once again in disaster. Wu Tingfang, while philosophically opposing Yuan's autocratism, nonetheless found himself constrained from public criticism until Yuan began to lose power. The constraints were due to personalist ties, with Yuan of course, but more importantly, with his son C. C. Wu, for whom Tingfang entertained high hopes for official advancement.

Beijing Politics, 1916-1917

With Yuan Shikai's passing from the scene, Wu Tingfang came back into public life at the age of seventy-four. In November 1916 he agreed to serve as Foreign Minister in the newly constituted government that had been formed with Li Yuanhong as President and Duan Qirui as Premier. This government was marked by strong factional conflict between the President and Premier. Struggles occurred over which constitution should be used to constitute the government and who should be appointed to the cabinet posts, and finally

44. NCDN, 29 Apr. 1916, p. 4; Bai Qiao, Yuan Shikai yu Zhonghua Minguo (reprint, Taibei: Wenxing, 1962), pp. 349–50.

45. NCDN, 28 May 1916, p. 8.

Elder Statesman 1912–1922

243

culminated in the conflict over whether China should enter World War I. These conflicts resulted in the fall of the government on 1 July 1917.46

Although Andrew Nathan's work deals with the period following the one we are viewing in this section, his perspectives on factionalism are helpful in understanding these events. This is especially so for the conflict between Li and Duan, which eventually merged into the conflict between the Anfu clique, dominated by Duan Qirui, and the Zhili clique, dominated by Feng Guozhang, Cao Kun and Wu Peifu.47

The first issue between Li and Duan was whether the government should be based on the Provisional Constitution of 1912 or the 1914 constitution that had granted Yuan Shikai such sweeping executive powers. In this issue Duan and the Beiyang militarists he led showed themselves to be the auto- cratic successors to Yuan Shikai, and Li Yuanhong showed himself to be a figurehead both for constitutionalism as an ideal and also for the Guomindang in its second chance to play a national political role since 1913. Wu Tingfang joined with Tang Shaoyi, Liang Qichao and others in upholding the Provi- sional Constitution of 1912. The conflict was resolved when the Navy joined in support of the Li-Guomindang position and Duan was forced to yield.48

Having lost the battle over the Constitution, Duan then sought to minimize the role of the Guomindang in the Cabinet. At issue were the appointments of Tang Shaoyi as Foreign Minister and Sun Hongyi as Minister of the Interior. As the struggle developed in summer 1916, Tang found himself ousted before he had even taken up the post. En route to Beijing he received threats against his life from Duan's subordinates; in the face of this opposition he withdrew and returned to Shanghai.49

Duan then proposed Lu Zhengxiang as Foreign Minister, but the Guomindang members of Parliament refused to confirm the appointment of the grounds that Lu had been in Yuan Shikai's "Imperial” cabinet. Duan would have liked to propose Cao Rulin for the post, but knew that Cao would be rejected on similar grounds. Next he proposed Wang Daxie, but Wang was rejected because of his association with Yuan's monarchical plans.50

Summer drifted into fall as Duan was unable to form a cabinet. Pressing foreign affairs issues arose, in particular the Zhengjiadun Affair with Japan and the Laoxikai Affair with France. The first involved a clash between Chinese and Japanese soldiers over an extension of Japanese police stations in Manchuria. The second involved a clash with France over its unapproved

46. These events are described in detail in Tao Juyin, Dujuntuan zhuan (Taibei: Wenhai, 1971). See also Li Chien-nung, Political History of China, pp. 351–73; Shen Yunlong, Li Yuanhong pingzhuan (Taibei: Wenhai, 1971), pp. 86–122.

47. Nathan, Peking Politics, pp. 28–58.

48. Li Chien-nung, Political History of China, pp. 354–355.

49. Tao Juyin, Beiyang junfa tongzhi shiqi shihua (Beijing: Shenghuo, Tushu, Xinshi, Sanlian, 1957), 3:62–63; Shen Yunlong, Li Yuanhong pingzhuan, pp. 92–93.

50. Tao Juyin, Beiyang junfa tongzhi shiqi shihua 3:66.

244

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

expansion of the French concession in Tianjin. Both issues were arousing strong nationalist reactions among the Chinese urban public and calls for boycott against Japan and France.

In November Li Yuanhong proposed Wu Tingfang as Foreign Minister. Duan agreed, his defeat mitigated by the fact that Wu was a political figure who had been closely associated with Yuan and who had many ties with Beiyang political circles. His son C. C. had served as counsellor in the Foreign Ministry through the Yuan Shikai years and continued to do so. Although Wu was not intimately tied with the Beiyang groups, he was not associated with the radical faction of the Guomindang either, and he made a point about being above factional politics. Nor was he politically ambitious for higher posts. Thus, from Duan's point of view Wu did not pose the same threat as had Tang Shaoyi. And, certainly not the least important, he was known to be a very capable diplomat in handling foreign affairs. For all of these reasons, we may speculate, Duan chose to agree with Li's suggestion to use Wu.

On Wu's part, he was not particularly eager to assume the office; he did so only because of Li Yuanhong's strong personal appeal. During the 1911-12 negotiations that established the Republic, Li's communications with Wu had been very courteous. After settling the issue of where to hold the North- South peace talks, they had been allies in helping to facilitate the peace settlement. Wu's son C. C. had been hired by Li to handle Hubei provincial foreign affairs in 1912. While the Li-Wu relationship was not intimate or deep, it was of some significance. It was strong enough to bring Wu out of his retirement and studies of the “mystery of the ‘afterlife.””51

After ascertaining that Duan would not oppose him, Wu accepted the post. The House of Representatives approved the appointment by a vote of 390 to 28; in the Senate the vote was 179 to 8. This was certainly an indication that Wu had the support of the most Parliamentary factions.52

Having agreed to come to Beijing, Wu hoped that his presence would facilitate the government's effective functioning. In an interview with Shanghai reporters, he said that with regard to foreign affairs, his policy would be

hostility to none, and sincere friendship to all. By this I do not mean an aggressive policy, by no means, but a defensive one.

The foreign affairs of China are in a difficult state, but I shall be consistent, and hope to have some measure of success.

With regard to domestic policy, he said:

I shall steer clear of all party strife, and shall belong to no party. On the contrary, I shall always try to conciliate them and smooth matters. I am a peaceful man both in domestic and international politics.53

51. NCDN, 25 Dec. 1916, p. 8.

52. NCDN, 9 Nov., p. 7; 13 Nov. 1916, p. 7.

53. Shanghai Times, 13 Nov. 1916, encl. in Sammons to Secretary of State, 24 Nov. 1916, USNA, 893.00/2552.

Elder Statesman 1912–1922

245

Wu's high hopes were apparently shared by others. The Shanghai Xinwen Bao (Sinwanpao) commented that congratulations were in order in that such a “universally admired man” had been found for the post:

But we cannot possibly remain silent as to our hopes and expectations of Dr. Wu. Generally speaking the people hope to see him accomplish something in two respects only, namely, to restore a spirit of harmony in the Cabinet and to settle quickly all outstanding diplomatic questions, while at the same time maintaining our national rights. But what we hope of him goes a step further.

The disease of inertia, if not eradicated, will do far greater harm than jealousy and squabbles between three or four men. We hope Dr. Wu, apart from restoring harmony, will take action to impart some energy and life to the machine of our Government so that some appreciable progress may

be made. As Dr. Wu commands respect from all parties, we expect him soon to instil a new life in the officialdom of Peking."

Against this set of expectations, Wu set out for Beijing, first consulting with newly-confirmed Vice-President Feng Guozhang in Nanjing, and then proceeding north by special train. At Xuzhou he was wined and dined by Dujun Zhang Xun. According to one account Zhang, whose pro-Qing loyalist sympathies were well known, admired Wu because he had been a high official under the Qing. Zhang reportedly told him of his plans to restore the Qing Emperor to power. Wu listened but said nothing in response and continued on the next morning to Beijing.55

In Beijing Wu took over the administration of the Foreign Ministry. In consulting with the Vice-Minister, Xia Yiting, he quickly set his priorities. First, negotiations to settle the disputes with Japan and France; then negotiations with Russia over several outstanding issues; then with Britain over border issues in Tibet; and finally, with Portugal over the re-demarcation of the Macau boundary.

The Laoxikai Affair with France had occurred on 20 October, when French consular troops occupied the area adjacent to the French concession in Tianjin, resulting in a clash with Chinese police. France had requested the extension much earlier, but China had never formally agreed to it. In frustration at their inability to reach a negotiated agreement, French authorities simply occupied the area. Negotiations began with Xia Yiting as Acting Foreign Minister but soon broke down, and British Minister Sir John Jordan stepped in with an offer to arbitrate the dispute. Jordan's settlement was rejected by China soon after Wu was appointed in the belief that Wu's negotiations would have more support in Parliament.5

54. NCDN, 1 Dec. 1916, p.

55. Wu Tingguang, Wu Tingfang lishi, pp. 32–33; Jamieson to Reinsch, 28 Nov. 1916, encl. in Jamieson to Secretary of State, 7 Dec. 1916, USNA, 893.00/2556.

56. NCDN, 6 Dec. 1916, p. 8.

57. NCDN, 4 Nov., p. 5; 10 Nov., p. 7; 17 Nov. 1916, p. 8.

246

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Meanwhile, a spontaneous movement to boycott French goods had sprung up in Tianjin, and Shanghai merchants had informally declared their support in spite of the Government's telegram to provincial officials ordering them to suppress any boycott movements. A run on a French bank in Tianjin had also occurred in November. While still in Shanghai, Wu had been visited by a delegation of Tianjin businessmen who told him the "true state of affairs” and pressed him about his plan of action. Another group of Tianjin businessmen called upon him in Beijing shortly after he had opened talks with the French Chargé, the Count de Martel, to inquire about the negotiations.

The French Chargé refused to negotiate until the boycott agitation was suppressed. In mid-December the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce publicly declared that it would not support a boycott and would trust Wu to negotiate an equitable solution. In a public statement issued at the same time, the French Consul in Shanghai wrote to the French Minister reporting that good understanding existed between French and Chinese merchants in Shanghai, and expressing his hope that a settlement agreeable to the “cordial friendship” between China and France could be reached.59

In the agreement reached between Wu and the Count de Martel, France agreed to restore the disputed territory to China and to return the Chinese policemen who were being held by the French. In turn, China agreed to make the district into an international settlement, open to all foreign nations for trade and residence. At the end of December, however, the French Government refused to ratify this agreement, and the discussions stalemated. The French Minister to France, Hu Weide, was instructed to resume negotiations in Paris. But other pressing issues, domestic and foreign, soon diverted the public's attention from the Laoxikai matter.60

More successfully resolved was the dispute between China and Japan over the clash that had occurred in Zhengjiadun, Fengtian, in March 1916. The principal issue was that Japan insisted on the right to establish its own police stations and police patrols on Chinese territory, claiming the need to protect Japanese nationals and their property. It also demanded the right to have Japanese soldiers and commanders in the Chinese forces stationed in the region. These demands were part of the Group V of the infamous Twenty- One Demands of 1915 that Japan had been earlier forced to withdraw and which were the most objectionable to nationalistic Chinese.

Sino-Japanese negotiations were the object of parliamentary scrutiny caused by fears that Duan was engaged in secret diplomacy in order to obtain Japanese funds. In early December Duan had appointed Cao Rulin, his notoriously

58. NCDN, 24 Nov., p. 8; 8 Dec. 1916, p. 8.

59. NCDN, 18 Dec. 1916, p. 7.

60. NYT, 30 Dec. 1916, p. 2; NCDN, 28 Dec. 1916, p. 5. According to Paul Reinsch, the French Minister hated Wu Tingfang. See Reinsch, An American Diplomat in China, p.

279.

Elder Statesman 1912–1922

247

pro-Japanese intimate, as special envoy to present the Grand Order of Merit to the Japanese Emperor. Anti-Duan forces in Parliament objected that Parliament had not consented to the appointment as called for in the constitution. Cao's appointment was rescinded. Eventually Wang Daxian was appointed in his place and successfully received parliamentary endorsement, but only after the Zhengjiadun event was resolved through Wu's negotiations with Count Hayashi in Beijing.

Wu opened negotiations with Hayashi in mid-December, with Hayashi joking that Wu's proficiency in English was causing the Japanese diplomat some hardship. The final agreement was reached by mid-January with an exchange of notes. China agreed to formally apologize to Japan for the clash and to punish the officers in command of the troops that fought with the Japanese. Chinese citizens were to be warned to act properly towards Japanese. In turn, Japan was to fix a date for withdrawal of its troops from the region.“

Japan dropped its demand to have Japanese officers in the Chinese constabulary, and China informally agreed to hire some Japanese military advisers so long as they were subordinate to the Chinese army and police constabulary. On the question of Japanese police rights in the area, a compromise of sorts was reached. China refused to concede the right to Japan; Japan continued to insist upon its right formally as a matter of principle.63

Hayashi's relatively conciliatory approach reflected the moderate line towards China of the Terauchi cabinet that had replaced Okuma's cabinet in October 1916. Part of the moderate line was to advance generous funds to Duan's faction in the so-called Nishihara loans. In fact, Cao Rulin was then engaged in secret financial negotiations on Duan's behalf, and in mid-January the first Nishihara loan was negotiated through the Bank of Communications, of which Cao was governor. Thus the Wu-Hayashi compromise was facilitated by the shift in Japanese policy. While the compromise reflected in the exchange of notes between Wu and Hayashi may not have been fully satisfactory for China, enough confidence existed in Wu to enable a consensus to emerge in support of his diplomacy.

While Wu was engaged in these various negotiations, the conflict between the President and Premier continued to intensify. Duan pressed Li to dismiss Sun Hongyi as Minister of the Interior. In a compromise arranged by Xu Shichang, Li agreed to Sun's dismissal with the understanding that Xu Shuzheng, Duan's secretary and leading Beiyang military figure, would be replaced. Xu Shuzheng was dismissed, but then Duan pressed for the dismissal of Li's secretary, Ding Shijie.

61. NCDN, 7 Dec., p. 8; 28 Dec. 1916, p. 4; 17 Mar. 1917, p. 7. See also Cao Rulin, Yisheng zhi huiyi, pp. 124-25.

62. NCDN, 23 Dec. 1916, p. 7; 23 Jan. 1917, p. 6.

63. NCDN, 29 Jan. 1917, P. 7.

64. Li Chien-nung, Political History of China, pp. 360–61; Tao Juyin, Dujuntuan zhuan, pp. 45–50.

248

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

The delivery of the U.S. note to China of 3 February 1917 inviting it and other neutral nations to sever relations with Germany brought the Li-Duan conflict to a head and precipitated the crisis that brought down the government. Duan became converted to the view that it would best suit China's (and his faction's) interests to speedily declare war on the Axis powers because he believed that it would further cement relations with Japan and provide increased Japanese funds for the government and army. This in turn would strengthen his faction's control over the state. The U.S. Minister to China, Paul S. Reinsch, also exerted great personal pressure on China to enter the war on the side of the Allies, even to the point of misrepresenting the U.S. Government's position about assistance to China, in the mistaken belief that this would decrease China's dependence upon Japan.65

Wu Tingfang was placed in the center of the dispute. Personally disposed to follow the U.S. lead, he nonetheless came to believe that a declaration of war would be harmful domestically in that it would too greatly strengthen Duan's hand over that of the President. The conflict with Duan over the war issue brought Wu closer to Li Yuanhong than ever before and also brought him into closer contact with the Guomindang members of Parliament.66

China responded to the U.S. note on 8 February by directing a protest to Germany over the policy of unlimited submarine warfare that had provoked the U.S. to break relations with Germany. But following this action Wu refused to go along with Duan's desire for a rapid declaration of war. In mid-February Duan began to organize a separate body to mobilize support for the declaration of war. Composed of representatives of the parliamentary factions that supported him, Duan added foreign affairs personnel such as Lu Zhengxiang and Cao Rulin, who shared his views and could be counted upon to support him.67

The Diplomatic Affairs Discussion Commission, as it came to be called, unsurprisingly came to the conclusion that China should declare war on the Axis powers. According to Cao Rulin's reminiscences, Wu was willing to go as far as breaking relations with Germany but would not agree to the declaration of war. When Duan asked Cao his views, Cao replied that he felt it would make a better impression on the Allied powers to declare war. Duan, agreeing, said that he could understand that the Cabinet, under the influence of Li and the Parliament, would disagree, but why should Wu, an old foreign affairs official (who presumably should know better) take this position? Cao replied that probably Wu was following the traditional American view in which declarations of war should only follow direct provocation.68 C. C. Wu also

65. Analyzed in Madeleine Chi, China Diplomacy, 1914–1918 (Cambridge: Harvard University East Asian Research Center, 1970), p. 115ff.

66. Wu had been working closely with Zou Lu and other Cantonese members of Parliament over the issues of prohibiting opium and opposition to the gambling monopoly in Guangdong Province. See Zou Lu, Huigu lu (reprint, Taibei: Wenhai, 1971), 1:81–89.

67. On the composition of the body see NCDN, 21 Feb. 1917, p. 7.

68. Cao Rulin, Yisheng zhi huiyi, p. 124.

Elder Statesman 1912–1922

249

indicated that he personally favored a declaration of war as better suiting China's interests but stated that China should follow U.S. policy at present. This was similar to Gu Weijun's view that China should follow America's lead with respect to the war. Wu used the excuse of following America's lead as a way of resisting Duan's pressure.69

When Duan continued to press for the immediate declaration of war, Wu Tingfang simply resigned as Foreign Minister on 1 March, claiming illness as his reason. In fact, he had been ill with a severe cold, but this was not the real reason for his resignation. The Vice-Minister, Liu Shixun, also attempted to resign at this time, but Li Yuanhong refused to accept their resignations. In consequence, Duan, with some of his followers in the cabinet, left for Tianjin on 5 March. Li was forced to back down. Vice-President Feng Guozhang went to Tianjin and persuaded Duan to return, apparently with the understanding that Li would not “interfere” with the administration of the government."

Upon his return to Beijing, Duan used the Diplomatic Affairs Discussion Commission to supersede the Foreign Ministry as the effective policy-making agency with respect to the European War. Headed by Duan, with Wu as the vice-chairman, the Commission was loaded with Duan's supporters and representatives of other factions who supported his policy, such as Lu Zhengxiang, Wang Shizhen, Xiong Xiling, Cao Rulin, Lu Zongyu, Sun Baoqi and Wang Daxie. It also included two Guomindang members of the Parliament who supported the declaration of war, Wang Zhengting and Wang Chonghui. The commission became Duan's de facto Foreign Ministry, organized to do an end run around the real Foreign Ministry, which was too subordinate to the President for Duan's liking."

On 14 March, China formally severed relations with Germany. Henceforth, the commission took over full control over foreign relations, with Lu Zhengxiang, Sun Baoqi, Cao Rulin and Lu Zongyu assuming full authority in its daily meetings and organizational structure.72 Again Wu and his Vice- Minister Liu Shixun submitted their resignations on 23 March, protesting against their powerlessness. To show that he meant it, Liu left the capital. Duan immediately proposed Lu Zhengxiang as Wu's successor. But once again, Wu was persuaded by President Li to withdraw his resignation.73

Following the severing of relations with Germany and Austro-Hungary, public opinion was largely against China's entrance into the war, with the exception of Liang Qichao, who publicly supported Duan's policy. Sun Yixian and most other prominent Guomindang political figures opposed entry;

69. NCDN, 23 Feb. 1917, p. 5; Gu Weijun, Huiyilu (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1983), 1:151–56. 70. Madeleine Chi, China Diplomacy, pp. 120–21.

71. List from NCDN, 14 Mar. 1917, p. 7.

72. NCDN, 17 Mar. 1917, p. 5 lists the division of responsibility within the body.

73. NCDN, 21 Mar., p. 8; 23 Mar., p. 8; 29 Mar., p. 8; 2 Apr. 1917, p. 8.

250

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

business and commercial interests in the large cities were also against it. A majority of the Parliament similarly opposed it.74

With the U.S. declaration of war in April, Duan intensified his drive for China's declaration of war. As Wu had all along recommended following U.S. policy, Duan thought that now he and the new Vice-Minister Gao Erjian would consent. But Duan's overbearing methods alienated Wu and made him even more than ever President Li Yuanhong's ally against Duan. In late April Duan convened a meeting of the military commanders, or dujuns, in Beijing. This was obviously meant by Duan as a show of force to Li and the Parliament. The dujuns came through on 25 April when they issued a statement supporting Duan's policy.75

Duan was now ready to bring the question before Parliament on 10 May. Although it was likely that Parliament would have gone along with Duan, he nonetheless arranged for several thousand troops to surround the Parliament in a supposedly spontaneous demonstration of citizens' groups demanding China's entrance into the war. These were, of course, the same tactics Yuan Shikai had employed in his war against the Guomindang. Several Guomindang representatives were beaten by the soldiers. There was an immediate outcry against Duan. At this time Duan arrested Eugene Chen (Chen Youren), editor of the English-language Peking Daily, for printing a story asserting that Duan had signed a secret agreement with Japan for massive funding. On the following day, 11 May, Wu and three other cabinet ministers resigned, leaving only Duan as Premier and Fan Yuanlian as concurrently Minister of Education and the Interior.76

Once again Li refused to accept Wu's resignation and that of the Minister of the Navy, Cheng Biguang, who along with Wu had drawn closer to the Guomindang during this conflict with Duan." Duan, with the support of the dujuns, demanded that Li dismiss the Parliament, a demand that Li refused.

Duan submitted his resignation on 23 May. But this time Li's response was to dismiss Duan from his post. Wu as Foreign Minister countersigned the mandate, following a 1913 precedent when Lu Zhengxiang as Foreign Minister had countersigned a Presidential order instead of Prime Minister Zhao Bingjun. Wu was then appointed Acting Premier in Duan's place. On 29 May Li Jingxi was appointed Premier but as he delayed in taking up the appointment, Wu continued to serve as Acting Premier through the disastrous events that occurred in June.

The following events are well known. Li's actions were predicated on the belief that he had ample military support. But when Dujun Ni Sizhong declared his independence of the government Li's position became

74. Zou Lu, Huigu lu, p. 89.

75. Tao Juyin, Dujuntuan zhuan, pp. 57–62.

76. Ibid., PP. 63-65.

77. Zou Lu, Huigu lu, pp. 89–90.

Elder Statesman 1912–1922

251

increasingly precarious. Attempted mediation through Xu Shichang and others proved impossible this time, and Li chose to ally with Dujun Zhang Xun. Zhang's price, it turned out, was the dismissal of Parliament, and by the time the conditions were made known publicly by Zhang, Li had no alternatives but to comply if he were to try to maintain the presidency.

But Wu as Acting Prime Minister refused to countersign the order to dismiss the Parliament, much to Li's consternation. To Guomindang parliamentarian Zou Lu, who came to see Wu to persuade him not to sign, Wu said that he had already determined not to sign. Placing his hand on Zou's shoulder, Wu told him, “Even with a knife to my head I will not sign one word."78

Li called Wu for a meeting; Wu refused to come, claiming illness. According to one account, Li's subordinate tried to bribe Wu by offering C. C. Wu high position and money, but this only made Wu angrier.79 According to some accounts, Li sent Jiang Chaozong, commander of troops in Beijing, and Wang Shizhen, Li's new Minister of War, to persuade Wu, but Wu refused to give in. In a statement that may be apocryphal but was widely repeated, Wu told them: “Offices can be resigned but names not signed; heads can be cut off but the law cannot be disobeyed.” To the possibility of threats to his life he replied that since he believed in the immortality of the soul, death did not frighten him.80

Whether or not Wu actually said these words cannot be known. But he did resist great pressure to countersign the order. As he later wrote, “I would have sooner died than be laughed at by my people and my friends abroad.”81 In the words of Guomindang moderate Wang Zhengting, Wu was "begged, pleaded [with], cajoled, threatened [and] promised great sums” for over four hours.82 His courage made him the hero of the hour in the South.83

Wu made a last minute, futile personal appeal to U.S. President Wilson to indicate in some way his support for Li's presidency and for the concept of parliamentary rule. Even if such an appeal had been forthcoming it is difficult to speculate about what its impact would have been; as it is, the U.S. State Department decided to defer any action on Wu's note.8

Faced with Zhang Xun's ultimatum, Li finally dismissed Wu as Acting Premier on 13 June. Chief of the Beijing Commandery Jiang Chaozong was appointed in Wu's place and he promptly signed the mandate. As Zhang

78. Zou Lu, Huigu lu, p. 91; see also Li Chien-nung, Political History of China, pp. 368–69.

79. Tao Juyin, Dujuntuan zhuan, p. 82.

80. Xu Jincheng, Minguo waishi (Hong Kong, n.d.), pp. 34–35.

81. Millard's Review 1, no. 6: 154–55 (14 July 1917).

82. NCDN, 30 June 1917, P. 6.

83. NCDN, 13 June, p. 8; 15 June 1917, p. 6.

84. Reinsch to Secretary of State, 5 June 1917, USNA, 893.00/2584 and 893.00/2587; Wellington Koo to Wu Tingfang, 9 June 1917, 893.00/2603.

252

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Xun and his "pigtailed" troops neared the capital, Wu and C. C. left Beijing for a "vacation" at Shanhaiguan. Since he was still legally Foreign Minister, he took the precaution of taking the seal of the ministry with him.85

On 1 July Zhang Xun declared the restoration of the Xuantong Emperor. The news arrived as Wu was dining with G. E. Morrison. Wu later said he had been shocked and found it difficult to believe. He told Morrison that the telegraphic service must have mistranslated "Hsuan Tung [Xuantong] ascended Throne” for “Hsuan Tung ascended Heaven." Upon hearing of the restoration, Wu and C. C. made immediate plans to leave North China as soon as possible. They arrived in Shanghai on 7 July, still with the seal of the Foreign Ministry.86

Zhang's restoration lasted one week before Duan's forces drove his troops out of Beijing. Duan declared that Wu had no legal authority to act as Foreign Minister as he had earlier submitted his resignation. When Duan appointed Wu's replacement on 9 July, Wu gave in, announcing that he had only meant to safeguard the seal so as to prevent the "Imperial" Foreign Minister, Liang Dunyan, from being able to act on behalf of what was, for Wu, an illegal government.

This mess had a profound impact on Wu. Earlier he had followed Yuan Shikai; Yuan had proven unworthy of support in the end. Li Yuanhong was surely not Yuan's equal in ability, charisma or military might, but he became a symbol for the constitutionalist program. In the end he too proved unworthy of support. Although Wu had functioned as a part of Li's faction in Beijing politics, he deserted Li when the latter acted in a manner too far removed from the publicly articulated rationale for their behavior.

Publicly Wu maintained his faith in the constitutionalist program, insisting that there was nothing wrong with the vision, only with the people who attempted to implement it. For example, at a reception in Shanghai on 9 July given him by members of Parliament, he gave a speech in which he said:

One cannot blame the form of government because it did not work right but the men who participated in the working of it. They say we had six years of republicanism and accomplished nothing but what did the Manchus accomplish in the 260 years they had? Moreover, during the five of the six years of its existence, the Republic was coping with a dictator...

Under President Li, we had but a year. He is very considerate to all men. But the majority of his officers were not educated to handle a republican form of government and there was considerable friction between the old and the new faces. . . . 88

85. Tao Juyin, Beiyang junfa tongzhi shiqi shihua 3:216–17.

86. Pearl, Morrison of Peking, p. 338.

87. Millard's Review 1, no. 6 (14 July 1917): 154–55.

88. Ibid.

Elder Statesman 1912–1922

253

The solution was time. It would take time for the Chinese people to become educated as modern citizens, time for political figures to be responsible to the stated goals of the nation. In a theme that many Guomindang political figures were to repeat during the summer of 1917, Wu drew the analogy between the situation in China and the European conflagration. At a tiffin given in his honor by the American University Club in Shanghai on 13 July he stated:

The war in Europe is being fought to put an end to Prussian militarism; and I want the Americans here to understand that China's troubles are due to exactly the same causes. We are engaged in a struggle between democracy and militarism. Between fifty-five and sixty percent of the taxes of China are now going to support militarism in China. This must be changed, but the change must be gradual. I ask Americans to be patient and give China a chance. Democracy will triumph.89

It would be a mistake to dismiss the sentiments expressed by Wu as mere propagandistic covering for a factional struggle for power. Struggle for power there was, and factionalism there was as well, but the events of spring 1917 suggest that the struggle and factionalism were at least partially motivated by genuine differences between the Beiyang military political groups and the southern civilian political groups about how China should be governed, not only about who should govern it.

At the same time, Wu's faith was clearly shaken by the debacle in Beijing. In Shanghai during summer 1917 as Sun Yixian and others were preparing to establish a separate government in Guangzhou, he told foreign diplomats that he was thinking of two separate governments or two separate parliaments for China, or perhaps two separate governing bodies with one central authority for purposes of foreign relations, or perhaps a federal form of government such as existed in the United States.90

In the years that followed his departure from Beijing, Wu was drawn deeper into the morass of factional politics. In his last five years, factional struggle became the dominant form of political life in China, and it was to prove impossible to escape participating in it if one was to remain a politically active person.

Establishing the Military Government, July 1917–May 1918

With the collapse of Li Yuanhong's presidency in the North, Chinese liberals formed an alliance to establish a base in South China. The so-called Guangzhou Governments from 1917 to 1922 were characterized by the

89. Ibid.

90. Sammons to Reinsch, 11 July 1917, encl. in Reinsch to Secretary of State, 10 Aug. 1917, USNA, 893.00/2704.

254

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

weakness of political structures, the pre-eminence of factional politics and their dependence upon military support from the armies of the region.

The dominant military power in Guangdong was the Guangxi Army under Lu Rongting, who had been appointed Commissioner to Oversee Affairs of Guangdong and Guangxi during Li Yuanhong's presidency in view of his role in defeating Long Jiguang, Yuan Shikai's appointee as Military Governor of Guangdong. Together with the Guangxi Army, Guangdong also “hosted" part of Tang Jiyao's Yunnan Army. The Yunnan Army played a relatively "progressive" role during this period, in that leading figures in it, such as Li Liejun, were far more supportive of the constitutionalist cause than was the Guangxi Army under Lu.

In addition to these two armies, there was a Guangdong army in northern Guangdong under Chen Jiongming. Its forces were numerically inferior to those of the Guangxi Army, but it was inclined to support the constitutionalist movement and was an important ally of Sun Yixian during this period. Also supporting the constitutionalists was the naval power of the ten ships of the First Naval Squadron under former Minister of the Navy, Cheng Biguang, and the fleet's commander Lin Baoyi.91

The major political organization involved in the Guangzhou Governments was the Guomindang, which was split into three main factions. These were characterized by Li Jiannong as first, the "extreme right wing," composed of members of the Political Study Group who had been frozen out of Duan's Government in the North and led by Li Genyuan and Gu Zhongxiu. Li supported Cen Chunxuan as head of the military government because Cen could control Lu Rongting, the leader of the Guangxi military clique. Gu hoped to use the Zhili clique of northern warlords and Feng Guozhang to defeat Duan. The "extreme left wing," according to Li Jiannong, was composed of members of the Association of Friends of the People, including former cadres of Sun Yixian's China Revolutionary Party. The balance in Parliament was held by the “moderate” faction, the Good Friends Association.92

In part the political history of the Guangzhou Governments may be seen as the political split between the political figures who decided to support the Guangxi Army and pursue a negotiated peace with the Zhili clique in the North, on the one hand, and on the other, Sun Yixian and his supporters and allies who sought to use the Yunnan Army and Chen Jiongming's forces

91. The political events that are described below await monographic treatment. Especially helpful has been Luo Jialun, Guofu nianpu (Taibei: Zhengzhong, 1958), 2 vols. (hereafter cited as Luo, GFNP). A general overview may be found in Li Chien-nung, Political History of China, pp. 373-400. On the role of the Yunnan Army in Guangdong see Donald S. Sutton, Provincial Militarism and the Chinese Republic: The Yunnan Army, 1905–25 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980), pp. 238-61. On the Guangxi military clique in Guangdong during this period see Diana Lary, Region and Nation: The Kwangsi Clique in Chinese Politics, 1925–1937 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), pp. 30–33, 42–48. The events in this section are described in Li Shoukong, “Guofu hufa yu Guangzhou junzhengfu zhi chengli," in Zhongguo xiandaishi lunji (Taibei: Lianjing, 1982), 7: 167– 212.

92. Li Chien-nung, Political History of China, p. 385.

Elder Statesman 1912–1922

255

to establish a stronger territorial base from which to ultimately defeat all the northern forces. As both tactics and goals of the two political groups differed, the coalition was not destined to survive very long.

Wu Tingfang spent the summer of 1917 in Shanghai. The events of June and Li Yuanhong's departure from politics left him confused about future directions for China, as noted above. He had, however, been instrumental in urging Naval Minister Cheng Biguang to unite with Sun Yixian, Tang Shaoyi and Cen Chunxuan in Shanghai. On 5 June Cheng had secretly visited Wu at night in Beijing to ask his advice. According to a contemporary account of Cheng's life, Wu advised him to join Sun, Tang and Cen in Shanghai. Cheng left Beijing the next day and met with Sun, Tang, Zhang Binglin and others in Shanghai in early July. Cheng and Zhang hoped to use the navy to rescue Li and bring him south, but they were unable to secure the help of the Japanese Legation in Beijing to implement this plan. Also, Li had decided to retire from public life.93

Assured of Cheng's support, Sun, Zhang and others departed for Guangdong on 12 July, the day Duan Qirui's troops ended the Zhang Xun Restoration in Beijing. They arrived in Guangzhou on 17 July and shortly announced their intention to establish a "Constitution Protection" government. The Navy responded by declaring itself independent of Beijing and in support of the Constitution Protection Movement. Members of the Parliament who had fled Beijing were invited to reconvene in Guangzhou, and Sun cabled Wu Tingfang, Tang Shaoyi and Cen Chunxuan to come south and join the movement.94

Wu waited until Feng Guochang's assumption of the presidency before reentering political life. He came to believe that he might help to mediate between North and South and thereby help to defeat Duan and the Anfu clique, which was attacking the southern provinces in the civil war that had erupted in summer 1917. The war broke out when Duan violated his understanding with Lu Rongting and moved his subordinate into Hunan while moving to curtail the influence of the Yunnan Army in Sichuan.95

Duan's moves in Sichuan brought Tang Jiyao into the fold of the Constitution Protection Movement and provided the impetus for the speedy establishment of the military government. This was also facilitated by the arrival of Cheng Biguang and his fleet on 5 August. In August the Parliament met in “extraordinary session”; on 3 September Sun Yixian was elected Grand Marshal of the military government, with Lu Rongting and Tang Jiyao Marshals.9

93. Zhang Binglin, Taiyan xiansheng ziding nianpu (reprint, Taibei: Wenhai, 1971), pp. 30–31; Cheng Shenxiutang, ed., Cheng Biguang xunguo ji (reprint, Taibei: Wenhai, 1971), pp. 39–46.

94. Luo, GFNP, pp. 424–28; Sun Yixian, Guofu quanji 9:302. According to Ma Fengchi, Wu Tingfang was sending coded telegrams most likely on behalf of Cheng Biguang. See Ma, “Ma Fengchi midian,” arranged by Zhang Bofeng, Jindaishi ziliao 36, no. 1 (1978): 42.

95. Li Chien-nung, Political History of China, pp. 378–80.

96. Luo, GFNP, pp. 431–32; Zhang Binglin, Ziding nianpu, p. 31; Cheng Shenxiutang, Cheng Biguang xunguo ji, pp. 57-59.

256

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

The new government was inaugurated on 10 September, with Wu Tingfang appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. Two members of Parliament were deputed to go to Shanghai and escort Wu and the appointee for the Ministry of the Interior, Sun Hongyi, to Guangzhou. Earlier in August Wu had replied to Sun's request by declining to come to Guangzhou, giving his advanced age as the reason, and offering to send his son C. C. in his place. Now Wu continued to evade the invitation to come to Guangzhou, with C. C. cabling Guangzhou on 14 September that his father was "old and weak" and therefore could not fix a date to come south. On 3 October Wu again cabled that he was unable to come south. Thus while Wu did not exactly refuse to assume the post, he was not eager to take an active part in the government. Most likely this is because he hoped that he could serve as a mediator should a settlement between Feng and the Guomindang prove likely and did not want to personally assume a post in the southern government. However, Wu did send his son C. C. to Guangzhou in October, and C. C. agreed to serve as an interim foreign minister.97

Another reason for Wu's reluctance to commit himself to the southern government may have been unwillingness to work too closely with Sun Yixian at this time. Although the sources are not clear on the subject, it seems that C. C. was loosely aligned with the Good Friends Association (Yiyou She) faction of the Guomindang, whose leader was the Speaker of the Senate, Wu Jinglian. Wu Jinglian reportedly had a bitter dispute with Sun Yixian in August about the role of the Parliament in decision-making, with Sun reluctant to grant too large a decision-making capacity to it. In any case, Wu favored an accommodation with the Guangxi military to secure a negotiated settlement of the civil war and saw that as preferable to establishing a government under Sun's domination that was not firmly committed to that goal.

In October and November behind the scenes feelers were going between Feng Guochang's faction and the Guangxi faction on possible peace terms, and it appears that C. C. was in support of these efforts. On 1 November C. C. reportedly left Guangzhou to personally persuade his father to come south; meanwhile Lu Rongting personally invited Cen Chunxuan, Wu Tingfang and Tang Shaoyi, none of whom had come to Guangzhou, to visit him at his headquarters in Wuzhou.99

By mid-November it was reported that the terms the South (i.e., Lu, Wu, Tang, and Cen) would insist upon included restoring the "old" Parliament and restoring Li Yuanhong as President until Parliament had reconvened and could elect Feng Guozhang or another person president. Wu Tingfang was to be Premier to form a permanent cabinet in which Sun Hongyi would

97. SCMP, 18 Aug., p. 6; 15 Sept., p. 7; 3 Oct. 1917, p. 6; Reinsch to Secretary of State, 27 Oct. 1916 [sic], USNA, 893.00/2733.

98. Zhang Binglin, Ziding nianpu, p. 31; on C. C. and the Yiyou She, see Nathan, Peking Politics, pp. 257-61.

99. Heintzleman to Reinsch and Secretary of State, 1 Nov. 1917, USNA, 893.00/2742.

Elder Statesman 1912–1922

257

serve as Minister of the Interior. Punishment of Duan Qirui was insisted upon, and southern forces would control the provinces of Hunan, Sichuan, Anhui, Fujian and Jiangxi.'

100

Having come to this understanding with Lu Rongting, Tang Shaoyi and Wu Tingfang now agreed to come to Guangzhou. Wu arrived on 30 November via Hong Kong to a large reception including Admiral Cheng Biguang, Sun Yixian's representative Hu Hanmin, and the new Guangdong Dujun Mo Rongxin representing Lu Rongting. Tang Shaoyi arrived soon thereafter.101

Wu's first act was to cable Feng Guozhang asking him to send representatives south to negotiate a cessation of the civil war. Meeting Lu Rongting at Wuzhou on 1-2 December, Wu discussed the conditions for negotiations with Feng's representatives. Following this meeting, Wu sent another cable to Feng offering to be a mediator between the North and South. He indicated that he had not yet taken up the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, "considering that arrangements are being made to settle the trouble peacefully."

"102

Through December 1917 the situation seesawed back and forth. In mid- December it was reported that Wu planned to return to Shanghai because he had been unable to negotiate a settlement, but he was finally persuaded to remain in Guangzhou by Wu Jinglian, Wang Zhengting, Vice-Speaker of the Senate and a member of the Yiyou She faction, and Mo Rongxin, representing the Guangxi Army and its commander Lu Rongting. On 25 December Feng Guozhang proclaimed a cease-fire, and Wu declared himself willing to return to Shanghai and join Cen Chunxuan in going to Beijing to discuss the matter. But these efforts were to lead to nought as Feng was unable to achieve supremacy over Duan's faction and the war in Hunan continued in spite of Feng. As the situation in Beijing and in the Hunan battlefield remained fluid, Cen decided not to go to Beijing, and Wu Tingfang remained in Guangzhou, 103

As Wu, Tang and Cen pursued this course of action, the differences between them and the revolutionary wing of the Guomindang became more acute and reflected the growing tension emerging between Sun Yixian's forces and the Guangxi Army. In December Lu and Mo were uneasy at Sun's efforts to recruit soldiers to serve under him. According to the report of Ma Fengchi, a spy for Duan's forces, Sun had set up a recruitment office to hire retired soldiers and bandits and had even had flyers posted in Xinhui to recruit men. Mo viewed this activity as interference in the military affairs of the

100. SCMP, 26 Nov. 1917, p. 6; see also below, and Peking Evening Times, 1 Dec. 1917, encl. in Reinsch to Secretary of State, 3 Dec. 1917, USNA, 893.00/2750.

101. Heintzleman to Reinsch and Secretary of State, 4 Dec. 1917, USNA, 893.00/2753; SCMP, 3 Dec. 1917,

102. SCMP, 8 Dec. 1917, p. 3; Reinsch to Secretary of State, 1 Dec. 1917, USNA, 893.00/2750; Ma Fengchi, "Ma Fengchi midian,” p. 65.

103. SCMP, 17 Dec., p. 6; 29 Dec. 1917, p. 6; Nathan, Peking Politics, pp. 113–18.

258

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

province and as military governor or dujun, he protested to Lu Rongting. Wu and Tang Shaoyi mediated this dispute by getting Sun to agree to dismantle the recruiting office, and then they sought to reassure the powerful business interests of Guangzhou. 104

In January 1918 further conflict between Sun and Mo occurred. Mo's troops surrounded the military government building, arresting and then executing a number of troops whom Sun called "bodyguards" and Mo called "bandits." In retaliation, Sun ordered naval officers to bombard Mo's headquarters at Guanyinshan. Mo again complained to Lu. Once again an open split was prevented by intervention. On the military side, Li Liejun persuaded the naval commander Lin Hu to desist from further action, while Wu Tingfang, Wu Jinglian and Wang Zhengting met with representatives of the various factions. Characterizing the attack on Mo as "rash and foolhardy," an agreement was reached whereby the military government was to be informed before any one of its members could be convicted on a political charge. Later Wu Tingfang, Cheng Biguang and Zhu Zhixin, the latter representing Sun, held an open tea at the Chamber of Commerce in an effort to reassure the Guangzhou public about the political state of affairs.105

Meanwhile, under Cheng Biguang's leadership, efforts were being made to reorganize the military government so as to give the Guangxi military a larger role in it and facilitate the prospects of a negotiated North-South settlement. In December Cheng sponsored a series of meetings to draft the charter of the new structure, a confederation of constitutionalist provinces. After some difficulties, Lu Rongting's support was obtained, and on 31 December the articles of the new entity were made public. The governing council was to consist of representatives from each independent province, the navy, appropriate military units, and an unspecified group of “elder statesmen." Based in Guangzhou, the provinces would coordinate their military affairs and foreign relations. Cen Chunxuan was to be appointed chief delegate to North-South peace talks, Wu Tingfang was to handle foreign affairs and Tang Shaoyi finances, while Tang Jiyao, Lu Rongting and Cheng Biguang were to be the military representatives.106

The announcement of this development caused much distress to Sun Yixian and his revolutionary followers. In a famous telegram to Wu, Tang and Cheng, Zhang Binglin urged them not to proceed with the planned reorganization. Charging that it constituted splitting and capitulation, Zhang wrote that seeking peace at that juncture was a suicidal policy that undermined Li Yuanhong, the cause of constitutionalism and degraded its authors as well, 107

104. Ma Fengchi, “Ma Fengchi midian,” p. 65; SCMP, 19 Dec., p. 6; 20 Dec. 1917, p. 6.

105. Luo, GFNP, p. 444; Li Liejun, Li Liejun jiangjun zizhuan (reprint, Taibei: Wenhai, 1971), pp. 58–59; Heintzleman to Secretary of State, 11 Jan. 1918, USNA, 893.00/2778; SCMP, 18 Jan. 1918, p. 6.

106. Text in Cheng Shenxiutang, Cheng Biguang xunguo ji, pp. 79–81; Luo, GFNP, p. 444. 107. Cheng Shenxiutang, Cheng Biguang xunguo ji, pp. 82–83.

Elder Statesman 1912–1922

259

On 2 February 1918 Cheng, Wu, Tang Shaoyi and Mo Rongxin announced their plan to go ahead with the reorganization of the military government. With the support of many members of Parliament assured through Wu Jinglian's backing, Wu and Tang were made the key persons to handle the reorganization. Sun Yixian, while not openly opposing the plan, was clearly displeased as it resulted in a diminution of his power and influence in the southern government. Also, Lu Rongting was reported to be not enthusiastic about the reorganization plan as he was independently working out an accommodation with the Zhili militarists in the North.108

The tensions were exacerbated when, on 26 February, Cheng Biguang was assassinated. This remains one of the more mysterious events to have occurred in the Guangzhou Government period. Pro-Guomindang histories place the blame for his death on the Guangxi military clique. Some assert that Cheng's desire to expand his military and political influence in Guangdong brought him into conflict with Mo Rongxin and Lu Rongting. Yet the sources do not indicate any overt antagonism between Cheng and the Guangxi group; if anything Cheng's reorganization plan would have given them more formal power in the governing structure than they had earlier had. Another hypothesis has been advanced that Cheng was assassinated at the command of Zhu Zhixin, Sun Yixian's follower, for reasons that remain unclear but perhaps as a means of forestalling the reorganization. But this remains speculative and is not supported by any documentation that I have examined.109

Wu and his son had worked closely with Cheng Biguang and had been staying with him on board his ship since arriving in Guangzhou. Whatever Wu's personal knowledge or understanding of the circumstances of Cheng's assassination may have been is not known. In the long run, Cheng's death had little impact beyond perhaps delaying the implementation of the reorganization plan for a short while. In March Wu and C. C. met with Lu Rongting at the latter's headquarters in Wuzhou. They obtained his support for the plan so long as the new entity did not use the term "government” and thereby jeopardize the chances of negotiating with Feng Guozhang.110

In April the reorganization plan was debated in Parliament and on 4 May received majority support. Sun Yixian resigned his position as Grand Marshal on the same day but was persuaded by Parliament to remain in Guangzhou until the reorganization took place. Through the revolutionary Tan Renfeng, Sun let Wu know that he would instruct his followers not to resist the change although he felt it would lead to further misfortunes for Guangdong."

108. Ibid., pp. 84–87; Luo, GFNP, p. 446; Heintzleman to Secretary of State, 10 Feb. 1918, USNA, 893.00/2786; SCMP, 23 Feb. 1918, p. 3.

109. For the Guomindang view see Luo, GFNP, p. 446; for the view suggesting Zhu Zhixin as the culprit see biographical sketch of Cheng by Guo Luo, in Minguo renwu zhuan (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1981), 3:33-40.

110. Cheng Shenxiutang, Cheng Biguang xunguo ji, pp. 99–107; SCMP, 21 Mar., P. 6; 26 Mar. 1918, p. 6; Heintzleman to Secretary of State, 29 Mar. 1918, USNA, 893.00/2828.

111. Luo, GFNP, pp. 451–52.

260

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

On 20 May the reorganized government was formally announced. Parliament elected Sun, Cen Chunxuan, Lu Rongting, Tang Jiyao, Tang Shaoyi, Wu Tingfang and Lin Baoyi (Cheng Biguang's successor as Naval Commander) as directors (zongcai) of the military government. On the following day Sun formally resigned and shortly thereafter left Guangzhou with about thirty followers. Sun Yixian's departure effectively ended the first phase of the history of the Guangzhou Military Government. With Sun gone, the way was now clear for Wu, Tang and Cen to pursue their plan to seek a negotiated peace with the North.112

The reorganization was a great blow to many revolutionary followers and associates of Sun Yixian. It symbolized for some the end to all hopes of using the Guangzhou base to implement their goals of national unification and development. Wu did not make any efforts to placate them, nor find any need to be especially courteous either. Indeed, his well-known enfant terrible style seems to have intensified as age provided him with the excuse to be as ill-mannered as he pleased to those younger and lower in status.

The diary of Zhang Nanxian serves to illustrate these observations.113 Zhang was a Hubei scholar who had participated in the 1911 revolution. In winter 1917 the civil war in Hunan caused him much distress and he decided to visit Guangdong himself. He wrote to Wang Jingwei in Shanghai asking him to arrange an introduction to Wu Tingfang, as one of the few truly eminent political figures of the day, the other two being Zhang Binglin and Wang Jingwei himself. Wu was very fond of Wang. Wang wrote a letter of introduction and asked Zhang to bring an old book from him to Wu.

Upon seeing Wu, Zhang wrote, Wu's bureaucratic air was so offensive that "it made one want to throw up.” The conversation started off badly and went from bad to worse, with Wu sizing up his humble dress and speaking to him very rudely:

Wu: What do you do at home?

Zhang: Teach and farm.

Wu: Why aren't you home teaching and farming?

Zhang: With the situation like this, it's not peaceful at home

and so I came out for a look.

Wu: Have you been to Beijing?

Zhang (hurt but still wanting to show respect to an elder): No.

Wu: Ha! Never been to Beijing!

Zhang (firmly): I've been there but was so ill at ease I didn't stay

long.

Wu (more softly): Why have you come here?

112. Ibid., p. 452; SCMP, 22 May, p. 6; 24 May 1918, P. 7.

113. Zhang Nanxian, “Yichi liushi zishu,” in Xinhai Geming shi congkan, arr. Modern History Group

of Wuhan University (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1980), 1: 178–202.

Elder Statesman 1912–1922

Zhang (politely): Not to look for a position. The situation is so unsettled and the lives of the people so difficult, and you are one of the elders of the nation, so I have come to request some news for the people.

Wu (uneasily): How could I; I'm only handling some negotiations. Zhang (angrily): You have such a heavy responsibility, not like ordinary people, so how can you talk of “negotiation”?

Wu (sudden outburst): Without negotiations there will be much more fighting!

Zhang: And the fighting will end through negotiation? You have been negotiating since the 1911 revolution, and what have you accomplished?

Wu (very angry): What are you saying? What are you saying?

Zhang (firmly): You shouldn't be this way; you have great responsibilities but never advocate anything or have your own opinion.

261

After leaving Guangzhou, Zhang Nanxian wrote to Wang Jingwei and told him what happened, and Wang wrote back apologetically for having failed to warn Zhang about Wu's peculiarities but still not condemning him: "Old Zhi[yong] has bad [bureaucratic] habits and recently uses his old age as an excuse [yi lao mai lao], so he is even worse.'

Aside from Wu's arrogance, which even those close to him, such as Fu Bingchang and Wang Jingwei acknowledged, Zhang Nanxian called into question Wu's entire enterprise of the "Peacemaker" who was above politics. It is perhaps a sad commentary that Wu, who had tried to bring a new spirit to officialdom in 1903 when he began to organize the new Ministry of Agriculture, Commerce and Industry, was now a veritable symbol of an old and decadent style of political administration for people such as Zhang Nanxian. And it is suggestive of factional politics that a major amount of Wu's energies went into unsuccessful, fruitless efforts at mediation. Administering and mediating, what else was there to do?

The Unification Effort, May 1918–May 1919

With Sun's departure in May, Cen Chunxuan now declared his intention of taking part in the reorganized government, arriving in Guangzhou on 3 July. On 5 July Wu announced the formal establishment of the government and immediate convening of the directors' council (often called Administrative Council or Political Council). This latter did not occur until 19 August, apparently the earliest that Tang Jiyao and Lu Rongting could decide on their representatives, Li Liejun and Mo Rongxin respectively.114

114. SCMP, 5 July, p. 6; 6 July, p. 6; 9 July, p. 3; 22 Aug. 1918, p. 6.

262

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Cen and Wu were the key figures in the reorganized government. Cen was chosen the head of the government, and Wu served as Foreign Minister. As Tang Shaoyi, the Finance Minister, was in Shanghai, Wu served jointly as Finance Minister for much of the period. Sun Yixian, of course, declined to participate, although he did send a representative. Tang Jiyao and Lu Rongting's representatives similarly were not involved in the administration, although Cen consulted regularly with Lu in person and by cable. Tang Shaoyi never really participated in the government. From April to early July he was in Japan as Cen's representative in an effort to secure the Japanese Government's approval for a negotiated settlement. He also tried to get the Japanese Government to stop the Nishihara loans to the Beijing Government. Thus Wu and Cen, and to some extent the Naval Commander, Lin Baoyi, were the mainstays of the reorganized government.115

In April Wu had drafted a long statement in English for publication in the foreign newspapers in China. In this statement he deplored the “military autocracy" of the Beijing Government, unleashing of Long Jiguang's "undisciplined hordes” to burn and plunder Guangdong, and violation of constitutional and legal principles:

They [the militarists] treat the Constitution as a scrap of paper; they dissolve Parliament, not only the Lower House but the Upper House as well, and propose to assemble a new one at their own pleasure; they force one President to vacate office [Li Yuanhong] and reduce another to the position of an impotent figurehead [Feng Guochang].

Wu set forth what were to remain the firm negotiating terms maintained by the South: reconvening the Parliament that had been dissolved by Li Yuanhong and maintenance of the Provisional Constitution until a permanent one could be drafted by Parliament. He wrote that President Feng's inability to open negotiations, in spite of numerous invitations to do so, constituted a refusal by the northern militarists to abide by the legitimizing principles of the Republic. Wu concluded by lauding the efforts of E. S. Little to facilitate a negotiated settlement.116

From the start Wu was pessimistic about the prospects for negotiating an acceptable settlement. He had observed Feng Guochang's inability to constrain Duan Qirui in Duan's war against the South and was well aware of Feng's weaknesses, personal and political. None of the leading figures in the North would accept the South's demand that the old Parliament be reconvened,

115. Wu had made a ten-day visit to Lu at Wuzhou when he had first arrived. SCMP, 18 Oct., p. 3; 5 Nov., p. 6; 22 Nov. 1917, p. 6. On relations with Lu after the reorganization see SCMP, 15 July, p. 6; 24 July, p. 6; 9 Aug. 1918, p. 6. Tang Shaoyi's Japan trip requires research beyond the scope of this study, but see SCMP, 3 Apr., p. 6; 16 Apr., p. 6; 31 May, p. 6; 24 July 1918, p. 6; for protests on the loans: see SCMP, 17 Jan., p. 6; 13 May 1918, p. 5; Heintzleman to Secretary of State, 21 Jan. 1918, USNA, 893.00/2773.

116. NCDN, 9 Apr. 1918, encl. in Sammons to Secretary of State, 9 Apr. 1918, 893.00/2827, USNA; see also SCMP, 5 Apr. 1918, p. 6.

Elder Statesman 1912–1922

263

Duan because of his deep seated hostility to the Guomindang-dominated body, and Feng because he feared it would not confirm him as President due to an earlier scandal. As the two factions in the North appeared deadlocked, Xu Shichang was emerging as the “dark horse" presidential candidate, but Wu characterized him as a "stubborn reactionary" at heart, still loyal to the Qing cause and hostile to the principles of constitutionalism that the South represented. 117

In view of Wu's pessimism one must ask why he continued to serve in the military government. He had come south only in the expectation that he might help to facilitate a North-South agreement; by the end of 1917 it was clear that such an agreement would not occur and that the reorganization freezing Sun Yixian out of the military government would not appease the northern military factions either. The sources do not help in revealing Wu's motivations, but he apparently could not assume an independent stance in the way that Tang Shaoyi did. Much like his experiences under the Qing, he had great staying power. As long as there was a shred of hope, he would

persevere.

Given Wu's pessimistic view of the situation in Beijing, he began a campaign to seek foreign recognition for the military government as a belligerent state; in particular to use the United States as an ally for the southern cause. In summer 1918 he drafted a manifesto to the foreign powers on behalf of the southern government in which the constitutionalist case was eloquently made. The purpose of this drive for recognition was, as he wrote in a personal note to U.S. Secretary of State Lansing, to make Duan and his faction "see the error of their policy and come to to reasonable terms.'

"118 This manifesto was followed by the dispatching of a delegation, composed of Wang Zhengting, Guo Taiqi and Chen Youren (Eugene Chen) to the U.S. in September 1918 to seek international recognition as a belligerent state. The thrust of U.S. policy emphasized the unification of China, as formulated by officials in the State Department and reflecting the views of financial interests in the U.S. and Britain. Given this situation, Wu's efforts were not destined for success, although Lansing did respond courteously to Wu's note.119

By summer 1918 Duan had failed in his effort to pursue the civil war in Hunan because Wu Peifu refused to engage in battle. In August, Feng Guozhang agreed to support Xu Shichang as the new president. On 12 August the newly-organized Parliament, dominated by Duan's Anfu clique, was convened in Beijing and soon voted to hold the presidential election on 4 September. 120

117. Heintzleman to Secretary of State, 11 Jan. 1918, USNA, 893.00/2778.

118. Wu to Lansing, 5 Aug. 1918, USNA, 893.00/2874; SCMP, 22 Aug. 1918, p. 6.

119. Materials on these events may be found in USNA materials numbered 893.00/2869, 2892, 2893, 2896 1/2. See also Roberta A. Dayer, Bankers and Diplomats in China, 1917–1925: The Anglo- American Relationship (London: F. Cass, 1981), chap. 2.

120. Nathan, Peking Politics, pp. 114–19.

264

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

The response of the Guangzhou Government was to consistently denounce the "new" Parliament as illegal and to refuse to recognize the election of Xu Shichang as legitimate. On 3 August Wu and the other members of the Political Council issued a circular telegram declaring that the "new" Parliament was illegal. The "old" Parliament meeting in Guangzhou attained a quorum on 6 August and declared that it would not recognize any of the activities of the body meeting in Beijing, including the presidential election or any laws, mandates or agreements made.121

On 16 September Cen and Wu sent a private telegram to Xu urging him not to take office. On 8 October the “old” Parliament passed a resolution declaring that it would not recognize Xu's election as legal, and on 11 October Wu cabled the foreign diplomatic corps in Beijing announcing that the South did not recognize Xu as President.122

In spite of these public pronouncements, the various factions of the military government split over politics towards Beijing. While Wu and the Parliament were denouncing the election as illegal, Cen Chunxuan and Lu Rongting were engaged in secret negotiations with Xu through the person of Liang Shiyi, Cantonese member of the “new” Parliament and head of the powerful Communications clique. Liang had previously supported Duan's policies but starting in summer 1918 Liang was helping Feng and then Xu to come to terms with the South. Tang Shaoyi, who had never come to Guangzhou after returning to Shanghai from Japan, was waiting in the wings. As an old colleague of Xu's from the Qing days of Yuan Shikai's mufu, he was viewed as the logical choice to lead the negotiations on Cen's behalf.123

By fall Xu's intelligence indicated that Cen and Lu were the people to deal with in the South. Wu and Sun were viewed as hard-liners, while the smaller warlords and non-Guomindang political figures did not hold fixed positions. Whatever was discussed via Liang and other private mediators with Cun and Tang Shaoyi is not known, but rumors indicated that possible political settlements would include Cen, Tang and possibly Wu in a reorganized cabinet under Xu as President. 124

The drive for a negotiated settlement attained new urgency in November and December 1918 due to events in Europe. On 11 November armistice was reached, and the issue of representation at the Paris Peace Conference attained new significance, becoming intertwined with the domestic issue of the North- South talks. On 2 December the foreign powers issued an aide-mémoire both to

121. Ibid., p. 126; See also Cen Xuelu, Sanshui Liang Yansun xiansheng nianpu (reprint, Taibei: Wenxing, 1962), 1:430; SCMP, 7 Aug., p. 6; 8 Aug., p. 6; 6 Sept., p. 6; 7 Sept. 1918, p. 6.

122. Nathan, Peking Politics, p. 126; Cen Xuelu, Sanshui Liang Yansun xiansheng nianpu, 1:433–34; Reinsch to Secretary of State, 9 Nov. 1918, USNA, 893.00/2916.

123. On Liang's movements during this period see Nathan, Peking Politics, pp. 122–24.

124. Nathan, Peking Politics, p. 133 n. 15, citing a report by Zhou Tingli; on Tang Shaoyi, see remarks by the counselor of the Chinese Legation in Washington, Yung Kwei, reported in E. T. Williams "Memo of a Conversation with Mr. Yung Kwei. . . ." 9 Aug. 1918, USNA, 893.00/2873 1/ 2.

Elder Statesman 1912–1922

265

the Beijing and Guangzhou foreign ministries urging both sides to reach a peaceful settlement. This was followed by Japan's announcement that it would not proceed with further loans to the Beijing Government. Open resistance to Xu's peace policy from the militarists in the North immediately ceased.125

But Wu continued to seek to use foreign pressure, particularly arbitration by the U.S., to improve the South's position in negotiating with the North. There were two major issues: the first concerned the cease-fires in Shaanxi and Fujian, control of which was seen as vital to a strong Southern position. The second issue was the fundamental one of the “old” versus the "new" Parliament. The Southern Parliament took a hard-line in refusing to confirm the appointees to the talks, and it took further pressure from the foreign powers to force the South to the table. Under a foreign threat to withhold the South's share of the Customs surplus funds, Wu and the Parliament agreed to set a date for the talks. At the end of December 1918 the list of delegates' names was released, and on 20 February the conference opened.126

As a result of the deadlock among the Southern political factions, the issue of the South's representation at the Paris Peace Conference was complex. On 13 November the Political Council of the military government appointed Wu Tingfang, Sun Yixian, Wang Zhengting, Wang Jingwei and C. C. Wu to represent it at Versailles, pending parliamentary approval. But foreign diplomatic pressure was employed to create a unified delegation with representation from both governments.

127

Finally it was decided to send C. C. Wu as special envoy to Beijing to discuss question of a joint delegation to Paris. These discussions resulted in an agreement for a united delegation composed of three northern representatives and two from the South, Wang Zhengting and C. C. Wu. But the Southern Parliament refused to confirm this agreement. Sun and Wu declined to be appointed, and Sun Yixian viewed it as an error to appoint a separate delegation in view of the fact that the military government had not received foreign diplomatic recognition. He thought it better to send observers.128

In the end, Wang Zhengting did end up as part of the Chinese delegation to Paris, C. C. did not, and the sources suggest that many were upset with Wang's decision to join the delegation and viewed him as opportunistic. According to an account by Gu Weijun, C. C. presented the head of the delegation, Lu Zhengxiang, with a long statement reiterating the position of

125. Nathan, Peking Politics, pp. 143-44; text of aide-mémoire in Pontius to Secretary of State, 2 Dec. 1918, USNA, 893.00/2927.

126. On efforts to get U.S. arbitration, see Sammons to Secretary of State, 4 Dec. 1918, USNA, 893.00/2910; on the Customs surplus issue see Pontius to Reinsch, 20 Jan. 1919 and Reinsch to Secretary of State, 25 Jan. 1919, 893.00/2974; 893.00/2976. See also SCMP 16 Jan., p. 6; 19 Jan., p. 6; 22 Jan. 1919, p. 6; Nathan, Peking Politics, pp. 148–49.

127. Pontius to Secretary of State, 14 Dec. 1918, USNA, 893.00/2936.

128. Sammons to Secretary of State, 27 Dec. 1918, USNA, 893.00/2942; SCMP, 20 Dec. 1918, p. 6; Sun Yixian, Guofu quanji 9:404; Pontius to Secretary of State, 22 and 30 Jan. 1919, 893.00/2972; 893.00/2975.

266

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

the military government about the Beijing government. This was interpreted by Lu as declining to be part of the delegation and Wei Chengzu was appointed in his place.129

On 4 February C. C. left for Paris as an observer with three secretaries. According to Gu, he attended much of the conference but did not participate. In addition to C. C., Chen Youren and Guo Taiqi, who had earlier been to the United States to present the Southern case there, were official observers representing the Southern Military Government at the Conference. In addition, Wang Jingwei was an observer as well. When Wang Zhengting spread a rumor that Gu Weijun was pro-Japanese and engaged to Cao Rulin's daughter, C. C. and Wang Jingwei denounced Wang Zhengting to Gu and Wang emphatically denied that Wang Zhengting represented the Southern government.130 These events illustrate the diversity within the Southern camp about its role in China's politics.

As the events in Paris were unfolding, the Shanghai peace conference was taking place in a manner of speaking. Having started on 20 February, Tang Shaoyi broke off negotiations on 2 March in protest over the violations of the truce in Shaanxi. This was the doing of Duan's clique, which viewed Shaanxi as essential to the maintenance of its power, and they also wanted to undermine Xu's peace efforts. The chief Northern delegate, Zhu Qiqian, submitted his resignation. On the Southern side, Tang's breaking off negotiations caused Lu Rongting and Cen Chunxuan some dissatisfaction. Lu threatened to resign from the Political Council of the military government, and Li Liejun threatened to resign as a delegate to the conference. Cen appeared caught in the middle between Lu on the one hand, and Tang and Wu on the other. In late March the conference reconvened when Xu was able to arrange for a face-saving truce in Shaanxi, but the Anfu resistance to the Southern demand for the restoration of the "old" Parliament, when coupled with the insistence of the "two Suns,” Sun Yixian and Sun Hongyi, and their supporters that this be done, made it impossible to come to an agreement.131 Events in Paris and Shanghai culminated in early May. As the news of the sell-out at Versailles reached China, giving rise to widespread public resistance, it was apparent that the Shanghai peace talks could not resolve the differences between the Northern militarists and the Southern constitutionalists. Both Tang and Zhu submitted their resignations on 13 May, to the great disappointment of Xu Shichang and Cen Chunxuan alike. A major phase in the history of the Southern Military Government was now over.

132

As the conferences ended, the strains in the southern alliance were apparent to many

observers. Relations between Wu and Cen were strained to the

129. Gu Weijun, Huiyilu, p. 179.

130. Ibid., pp. 193–95.

131. Nathan, Peking Politics, p. 151ff.; SCMP, 13 Mar. 1919, p. 3; Pontius to Secretary of State, 28 Mar. 1919, USNA, 893.00/3091. For Sun's views see Sun Yixian, Guofu quanji 9:418–19.

132. Sammons to Secretary of State, 13 May 1919, USNA, 893.00/3099; there were many rumors of Tang and others having sold out to Japan, e.g., 893.00/3018; 3106; 3117.

Elder Statesman 1912–1922

267

breaking point over Wu's hard-line towards the North. In this, Wu and Tang Shaoyi had been responsive to Sun Yixian and the members of the "old" Parliament who bitterly opposed Xu. In late March U.S. officials in Guangzhou reported that Cen Chunxuan was dissatisfied with Wu Tingfang's failure to press the Southern case before the diplomatic body in Beijing. Cen was said to have pressed Wu to resign but proved unable to get the other directors of the Political Council to agree with him. Certainly this reflects in part Cen's inability to achieve his political goals through the failed negotiations. And as journalist David Fraser assessed the situation at the end of May, the military leaders of the South agreed to form a military government when they thought Wu Tingfang could achieve foreign recognition and a steady flow of foreign funds; since Wu was unable to bring them this, they had no use for the military government.133

Wu Tingfang and Cen Chunxuan, June 1919–March 1920

As noted above, strains between Wu and Cen began to be apparent in the course of the abortive peace negotiations in spring 1919. These strains burst into the open in June 1919 as a result of two interrelated developments: the student movement in protest against the Versailles treaty and the movement to install Wu Tingfang as Governor of Guangdong Province. These converged in a genuine mass movement in July 1919. Over a month's activity, however, failed to unseat Cen and his Guangxi military backers from their domination of the military government. His bid for the governorship thwarted, Wu continued to serve as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Finance Minister in spite of the continuing deterioration of administrative authority. Finally in March 1920, he switched his support from Cen Chunxuan to Sun Yixian.

Students in Guangzhou responded to the student movement in Beijing almost immediately. By 20 May it was reported that a boycott of Japanese goods was in full swing in Guangzhou, and on 29 May over eight thousand students paraded through the city to spread the word about the boycott. These demonstrations continued through 31 May, when an incident occurred between the students and Japanese residents. Under the threat of the deployment of Japanese warships to Guangzhou, Mo Rongxin decided the student movement had gone far enough and tried to suppress it.134

Earlier, in response to the national and local student movement, the military government had expressed its support for the movement initially and had demanded the release of the students arrested in Beijing. On 24 May the Parliament meeting in joint session had resolved to instruct the Chinese delegates in France not to sign the treaty.'

135

133. NCDN, 31 May 1919, encl. in Sammons to Secretary of State, 31 May 1919, USNA, 893.00/ 3155. See also Pontius to Secretary of State, 28 Mar. 1919, USNA, 893.00/3091.

134. SCMP, 20 May, p. 6; 23 May, p. 6; 26 May, p. 6; 29 May, p. 6; 31 May, p. 6; 2 June, p. 6; 3 June 1919, p. 6.

135. SCMP, 10 May, p. 6; 13 May, p. 6; 29 May 1919, p. 6.

268

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

In spite of Mo's opposition, Wu and the major Guomindang figures in Parliament continued to support the students. At a large student rally on 9 June the student leaders made an appeal to the military government to aid in bringing the "national traitors" (Lu Chengyu, Cao Rulin and Zhang Zongxiang) to justice and help in arranging the release of the students arrested on 4 June in Beijing. Wu spoke with the students, commending them for their patriotism and reporting that he had already cabled Beijing demanding the same things.136

In the midst of the growing student movement, the Acting Governor of Guangdong, Qu Wang, resigned on 12 June, apparently reflecting an internal conflict between Lu Rongting and Mo Rongxin. The governorship of the province had been the object of struggle between the Guomindang and the Guangxi military ever since the establishment of the military government. In July 1917 Lu Rongting had forced the resignation of Zhu Qinglan as Governor. Zhu had been Duan's appointee but had acted too independently for Lu's liking, forming ties with the Yunnan forces in Guangdong and with the Guomindang upon the latter's arrival in July. With Zhu's departure, Lu and his subordinate, Mo Rongxin, sought to keep the governorship firmly within their grasp. In 1918 the post was held temporarily by Lu's subordinate Chen Bingkun, then by Li Yuehan, and then upon Li's resignation in September 1919 it was given to Qu Wang. Qu held it as Acting Governor until his resignation in June. Both Li and Qu were natives of Guangdong; both had served as military commanders in Zhaoyang district and were Mo's subordinates; their only qualification for the office was loyalty to Mo.137

Various accounts indicate that control of the provincial administration by the Guangxi military was a source of much dissatisfaction in Guangzhou. In part this dissatisfaction may be viewed as a form of provincialism, for even though Li and Qu were natives of Guangdong, they were figureheads for the Guangxi military commanders. But partly the opposition reflected the educated, propertied civic elite's disgust with the nature of the provincial administration under Guangxi rule. In addition to maintaining strict press censorship, the Guangxi military leaders also milked the province dry in a variety of ways, including reinstituting the lottery monopoly that Wu Tingfang and others had vigorously opposed. They had, it was charged, illegally exported rice, moved the provincial library, with its rare books, to Guangxi, and sold mining rights to the highest bidders. They had also incurred loans on the domestic and foreign loan market.138

As Wu Tingfang had become something of a figurehead for the opposition to Cen and the Guangxi military through his support of the students, it was perhaps logical that on 18 June a meeting of "political, social and commercial"

136. SCMP, 12 June 1919, p. 6.

137. Sutton, Provincial Militarism, pp. 238–48; Li Peisheng, Guixi ju Yue zhi youlai jiqi jingguo (reprint, Taibei: Wenhai, 1971), p. 3; Liu Shoulin, Xinhai yihou shiqi nian zhiguan nianbiao, pp. 418– 19, 555, 610.

138. Li Peisheng, Guixi, pp.

9-57.

Elder Statesman 1912–1922

269

groups in Guangzhou unanimously decided that Wu Tingfang should be Governor.139 On 21 June a mass meeting, probably organized by the Guomindang, was held at East Garden in Guangzhou. Those present decided to petition the military government to appoint Wu Tingfang as the "most popular Cantonese for the post." Three groups were dispatched to present the petition to the military government.

140

A second mass meeting on 23 June presented another petition calling for Wu's appointment, but on 25 June it was announced that Zhang Jinfang had been appointed Governor. Zhang, a native of Henan, was understood to be Mo Rongxin's choice for the post. Mo chose to ignore the two petitions, and received the support of Cen Chunxuan and Lu Rongting, the key figures in the military government. He took further precautions by deploying his forces in and around Guangzhou, as Wei Bangping, chief of police for Guangzhou and Li Fulin, defense commissioner of Guangwai, cabled their support for Wu. Zhang Jinfang dared not take up his post yet.141

Indignation at the high-handedness of the Guangxi military gave rise to a general strike. At a mass meeting on 10 July called to discuss the international situation and the continuing boycott of Japanese goods, the crowd demanded that the military government promulgate a mandate to punish the national traitors, cancel all secret treaties with foreign powers, and issue a statement about its diplomatic policy. Criticizing the military government for its appointment of Zhang Jinfang as Governor, several thousands marched to the offices of the military government where they were met by Wu and Cen, who made speeches reported to be "sympathetic" to the marchers' patriotic views. The crowd then went on to the office of the Chamber of Commerce demanding that a notice calling for a general strike on the 11th be posted. The purpose of the strike was to protest over the governorship as well as to demand the punishment of the traitors in Beijing and the cancellation of the secret treaties. The militancy of the crowd was a startling phenomenon. 142

The general strike was in full force from 11 July to 21 July. On 11 July many large department stores, as well as smaller shops, closed their doors, while students circulated notices about the strike to encourage other merchants to join. The engineers and workers of the Canton Electric Supply Company stopped work, and they were joined by the waterworks engineers and workers as well. With a few days, workers of the Guangzhou-Sanshui Railway, the Yue-Han Railway and the Guangzhou-Hong Kong Railway had also joined the strike.143

139. SCMP, 19 June 1919, p.

140. SCMP, 20 June, p. 6; 23 June, p. 6; 24 June 1919, p. 6.

141. SCMP, 24 June, p. 6; 25 June, p. 3; 26 June, p. 3; 27 June, p. 6; 2 July, p. 6; 3 July, p. 3; 5 July 1919, p. 6.

142. Pontius to Secretary of State, 11 July 1919, USNA, 893.00/3204; SCMP, 11 July 1919, p. 6. 143. SCMP, 14 July, p. 6; 15 July, p. 6; 16 July 1919, p. 7; Jean Chesneaux, The Chinese Labor Movement, 1919-1927, trans. H. M. Wright (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), pp. 165–

66.

270

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

By 13 July Cen decided to take strong action against the movement. Armed soldiers were dispatched to patrol the streets while shops were ordered to open; meanwhile representatives of several public organizations were invited to a meeting at Mo's headquarters to discuss the strike's settlement. On the 14th an incident occurred when the Guangdong Provincial Assembly, split between Cen's supporters and opponents, met to determine whether to support the general strike. Mo dispatched a battalion of troops to the Provincial Assembly building. They dispersed the meeting by firing about one hundred shots in the air. 144

While the Government succeeded in getting railways working and the electricity and water back on by using troops and strikebreakers from Hong Kong, the strike was by no means over. Telegrams poured into the military government from overseas Chinese in Singapore, Penang, Batavia, Haiphong and the Philippines in support of Wu. Cantonese in Shanghai joined them, as did the Chinese press of Guangzhou and Hong Kong. Journalists from the colony were barred from Guangzhou because of their sympathy for the strike. 145

A student meeting on 15 July was surrounded by troops carrying machine guns and dispersed. Two student leaders were arrested, but on the next day the students held a parade. Again they were stopped and four more arrested. Now the military government forbade all meetings. Amidst many protests about police interference, the students held another parade on 21 July, but the show of force on the part of the military greatly curtailed the movement. By 22 July it was reported that the strike was almost over. The students, in exchange for the release of those who had been arrested, agreed to hold orderly meetings. But on 2 August another mass meeting declared support for Wu Tingfang and the intention of all to carry on until their object was obtained.146

On 2 August Wu submitted his resignation as member of the Political Council, telling a delegation of four Cantonese from the Shanghai Cantonese community who had come to Guangzhou in an effort to mediate the dispute that if the people really wanted him to take the post, he would be compelled to take it. On 7 August Sun Yixian joined Wu in a show of support by submitting his resignation as member of the Political Council. Tang Jiyao cabled his support for Wu's appointment as well. But Cen and the Guangxi military refused to give in. Cen told the delegation from Shanghai that the military government was waiting to obtain the "real opinions" of the people before making any further decisions, and then later told them that the issue. could not be settled until the approval of all parties had been obtained. In

144. SCMP, 15 July, p. 6; 16 July 1919, p. 7.

145. SCMP, 16 July, p. 7; 19 July, p. 6; 21 July, p. 6; 29 July 1919, p. 6.

146. SCMP, 23 July, p. 6; 1 Aug., p. 3; 5 Aug. 1919, p. 6. On Wu's efforts to intercede on behalf of the students and inability to do so, see Deng Cengxiang, “Guangzhou xuesheng Wu-Si Yundong ji," in Wu-Si Yundong huiyilu, ed. Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan, Jindaishi yanjiusuo (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue, 1979), 2:826–34, especially p. 834.

Elder Statesman 1912-1922

271

the face of the intransigence of Lu, Mo and Cen, Wu was unable to secure the appointment and the mass movement dissipated. 147

On 9 August Sun Yixian extended an invitation through his son Sun Fo (Sun Ke) to Wu Tingfang and C. C. to leave the military government and come to Shanghai to plan strategies with him, but Wu was not able to leave Guangzhou for nearly eight months.148 He continued to serve as one of the directors of the military government's Political Council, Foreign Minister and Acting Finance Minister.

Wu's persistence is puzzling. We may speculate that several factors were involved: his continued distrust of Sun Yixian, stubbornness in refusing to admit he had erred, and perhaps hope that he could still mitigate some of the Guangxi military's excesses. At some point Wu did decide to leave but his departure was delayed for two reasons, according to his nephew Fu Bingchang. The first was that he and C. C. were closely guarded by Mo's troops; the second was that he wanted to find a way to bring the Customs surplus funds out with him.'

149

In September the Parliament, now considerably reduced in numbers, voted to further reorganize the military government. This was generally understood as a public statement of no confidence in Cen Chunxuan's leadership, and he resigned at the end of October. But as in the case of Wu's earlier effort to resign, it was not implemented. In reality Cen continued to wield administrative power on behalf of the Political Study clique and its Guangxi military backers. The morale of the military government declined even further as the military dominated it and the Guangdong countryside. Meanwhile, Cen and Lu were engaged in backstage negotiations with a variety of military and civil figures of the Northern government. At the same time, in the Parliament, struggle occurred over the issue of revising the Constitution, which was blocked by the Political Study Group and its Guangxi backers.150

In December 1919 the newly-arrived U.S. Consul in Guangzhou, who had known Wu for some time, could only report that "although Dr. Wu was quite eloquent in discussing the evils which exist in China, he was unable to suggest a remedy."151

The last straw for Wu occurred in February and March 1920, when the Guangxi clique moved to wrest control of the Yunnan Army in Guangdong from Tang Jiyao. This took the form of a struggle between Li Genyuan, supported by the Guangxi faction, and Li Liejun, supported by Tang Jiyao and the Guomindang. At one point both Lis were commander-in-chief of the Yunnan Army in the province, each claiming a different authority for the appointment. When negotiation proved fruitless, war broke out in eastern

147. Sun Yixian, Guofu quanji 9:426–29; SCMP, 6 Aug., p. 6; 8 Aug., p. 6; 16 Aug, 1919, p. 3. 148. Sun Yixian, Guofu quanji 9:429.

149. Fu Bingchang, Fangwen jilu, pp. 8–9.

150. Luo, GFNP, p. 472; Meinhardt to Secretary of State, 26 Nov. 1919, USNA, 893.00/3281. 151. Bergholz to Secretary of State, 1 Sept. 1920, USNA, 893.00/3516.

272

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Guangdong between the "two Lis," amidst reports of staggering military expenditures and an empty treasury.'

152

The Parliamentarians began leaving Guangzhou, many to join Sun Yixian's supporter Chen Jiongming in northern Guangdong. By mid-March the list of departed figures included Wu Jinglian, the speaker of the Senate, and Lin Sen, the speaker of the House of Representatives, as well as Wang Jingwei, Hu Hanmin and Li Shizeng. Wu had also decided to leave, but found it difficult to evade Mo's guards and arrange to bring the Customs surplus funds with him. By 29 March the arrangements were complete. The funds were deposited in his name, as Minister of Finance in the military government, in accounts in the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation both in its Hong Kong and Shanghai branches. Another smaller sum was deposited with the Sincere Company in Guangzhou. On 29 March, using a ruse, Wu Tingfang and C. C. separately slipped past Mo's guards. Meeting at a site a short distance from his residence, they departed for Hong Kong and thence to Shanghai.153

Wu's sudden departure apparently caught Cen by surprise; hurrying back from northern Guangdong where he was said to have been negotiating with Li Liejun, he dispatched representatives to Hong Kong in an effort to persuade Wu to return. Instead, Wu issued statements denouncing the military government. Cen retaliated by spreading the story that Wu had absconded with the Customs surplus funds to pay off C. C. Wu's gambling debts. 154

From Shanghai on 9 April, Wu issued a circular telegram explaining his reasons for leaving Guangzhou. He wrote that he had come to Guangzhou originally because the military government represented the legitimate continuation of the republican government based on the Provisional Constitution. The seven directors were elected by Parliament and were to have operated as a coordinated, democratic council. He cited five reasons for his most recent actions.

The first was the destruction of the Parliament. The Guangxi militarists had hindered the passage of a permanent constitution, squandered the Par- liament's funds on local armies, and had swept the spirit of constitutionalism into the dirt.

Wu's second reason was his dissatisfaction with Cen's leadership. Wu wrote that the chairman of the Political Council was to have been only one among seven, with no more power than the rest. But ample documentation existed that Cen had engaged in separate negotiations with many northern warlords and had come to an understanding with them that maintained warlordism, sacrificed the Parliament, and showed indifference toward foreign relations.

152. For background to the conflict see Luo, GFNP, pp. 479–80; on financial difficulties see SCMP, 12 Mar. 1920, p. 3; on attemted compromises see SCMP, 6 Mar. 1920, p. 3.

153. Fu Bingchang, Fangwen jilu, p. 8; SCMP, 17 Mar. 1920, p. 7; Luo, GFNP, p. 482.

154. SCMP, 2 Apr. 1920, p. 7; George E. Sokolsky, “Confidential Memorandum on Conditions in Canton,” 18 May 1920, encl. in Cunningham to Secretary of State, 26 May 1920, USNA, 893.00/3376.

Elder Statesman 1912–1922

273

As his third point, Wu claimed that in over ten months as Finance Minister, it proved impossible to hold the military accountable for funds disbursed to it. In particular, funds disbursed for the Yunnan troops seemed to mysteriously disappear, presumably into the pockets of Guangxi commanders. Fourth was Mo Rongxin's brazen effort to diminish Tang Jiyao's influence among the Yunnan troops by supporting Li Genyuan over Tang's objections. Finally, all of this had transformed the military government of the Southwest into the private clique of a few people, still claiming to govern under the high-sounding name of "protecting the constitution.”155

Having come to Guangzhou in 1917 in the belief that he could be a mediator and a peacemaker, Wu found that severe factionalism dominated all spheres of political life by 1920. He initially was willing to support Feng Guozhang against Duan's Anfu clique, but compromise with all factions in the North was precluded by the members of the "old" Parliament over the issue over the "new" Parliament's legitimacy. Wu's support for the members of Parliament led to a split with Cen Chunxuan. After Wu's unsuccessful bid for the Guangdong governorship, Wu's position became increasingly untenable. Given the factionalized nature of politics, an independent political role was no longer possible. His decision to join with Sun Yixian marked the last major political choice of his life. Having committed himself to Sun, Wu would find himself completely submerged in factionalism.

With Sun Yixian, 1920–1922

From April 1920 until his death in June 1922, Wu Tingfang worked closely with Sun Yixian to pursue the latter's plan of securing Guangdong as a stable base and then launching a northern expedition to unify China under his leadership. Sun's plan placed him at odds with Chen Jiongming, Sun's chief military backer based in Guangdong Province, and Tang Jiyao, whose main interest was in regaining his military base in Yunnan. Sun's plan also necessitated allying with his former archenemy, Duan Qirui of the Anfu clique and Duan's ally, the warlord Zhang Zuolin, so as to counter the Zhili clique and its military allies in Guangxi. From having previously denounced the Anfu clique repeatedly from 1917 on, Wu now found himself allied with it in order to attempt to implement Sun's vision of national unification. This turnabout made a mockery of previous statements in defense of constitutionalism and illustrates the way factional coalitions dominated political process. Increasingly isolated from public opinion, which wanted compromise and peace, Wu's death came as Sun's plan collapsed.

Shortly after arriving in Shanghai, Wu entered a legal battle with Zhang Shizhao, Cen Chunxuan's representative, over custody of the Tls 1,123,400 (approximately $2 million) of the Customs surplus funds that he had had

155. Li Peisheng, Guixi, pp. 131–33.

274

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

deposited in his name in the Shanghai branch of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank. Another sum reported to be $1.8 million had been deposited in the Hong Kong branch of this bank. In Shanghai, Zhang Shizhao was able to obtain an injunction against Wu. Wu challenged the injunction on the grounds that Zhang did not represent a legal entity, that the Court had no jurisdiction over him, Wu, as Minister of Finance of a legal government, and that the issue was a purely political matter. The Court ruled that it was a political issue but upheld the injunction, which remained in effect until January 1921, when Wu succeeded in getting the injunction lifted. The funds in Hong Kong were similarly frozen by the courts. Another $300,000 was deposited in the Guangzhou branch of the Sincere Company, whose manager refused to release them to Cen's government. 156

According to George Sokolsky, who was acting as public relations officer for Cen during this period, Wu brought $400,000 in cash of the Customs surplus funds to Shanghai and gave to Sun Yixian. Sun used $100,000 to pay the Parliament members, who were planning to reconvene in Yunnan. Another $300,000 went to Li Liejun, presumably for the Yunnan troops, although some of this was probably used to help Chen Jiongming's forces.157

According to Fu Bingchang's reminiscences, Sun Yixian was less than pleased that Wu was not able to free up more funds initially. At a meeting with Wang Jingwei, Hu Hanmin, Liao Zhongkai, Tang Shaoyi and others at Sun's home in the French Concession, Sun spoke in a disparaging way to Wu. Wu became very angry and left the meeting. He instructed C. C. to remain in his place while he went to a spiritualist meeting. Later, however, Sun and Wu did manage to work smoothly together. Wu told Fu how much he respected Sun for his spirit of public service and selflessness, and Wu's respect appears to have been matched by Sun's for the old man who became the administrative mainstay for his regime in Guangzhou,158

Barred from withdrawing funds from accounts in his name in the Shanghai International Settlement, Wu took the opportunity to rest and travel. He and his nephew Fu Bingchang traveled to Hangzhou, where they paid a call on Kang Youwei, then they visited Japan. In Japan they visited often with Liao Zhongkai's brother Fengshu, who had a post in the Chinese embassy. Wu took this occasion to revisit Shimonoseki, where he had gone as Li Hongzhang's assistant in 1895. This Japan sojourn came to an abrupt end in Hakone in June, when Wu received a threatening letter from a pro-Japanese Chinese student accusing Wu of being too pro-American and too anti-Japanese."

156. A. M. Kotenev, Shanghai: Its Mixed Court and Council (Shanghai: North China Daily News and Herald, 1925), pp. 243–44; Fu Bingchang, Fangwen jilu, p. 8; SCMP, 19 Apr., p. 6; 20 Apr., p. 6; 24 Apr., p. 6; 3 June 1920, p. 6. On the $300,000 deposited with the Sincere Co., see SCMP, 6 May, p. 2; 25 May, p. 2; 9 July, p. 2; 28 July, p. 2; 14 Aug., p. 3; 18 Aug. 1920, p. 7. 157. Sokolsky, "Confidential Memorandum."

158. Fu Bingchang, Fangwen jilu, p. 21a.

159. Ibid., pp. 9, 16b; on the threats see SCMP, 8 July, p. 3; 27 July, p. 3; 29 July 1920, p. 2.

Elder Statesman 1912–1922

275

While Wu was thus engaged, Sun and his followers, including C. C., were planning their next moves. In May members of "old" Parliament who had remained in Guangzhou elected Xiong Kewu of Sichuan, Liu Xianshi of Guizhou and Wen Zongyao to take the places of Sun, Wu and Tang Shaoyi. Wen had earlier worked closely with Wu Tingfang but according to Fu Bingchang, owed his political start to Cen Chunxuan. Even though Wen opposed him, Wu was said to sympathize with him as he understood the nature of Wen's relationship with Cen,160

On 3 June Sun Yixian, Wu Tingfang, Tang Shaoyi and Tang Jiyao issued a manifesto declaring that the military government in Guangzhou was not a legal entity because it did not have a quorum either among the directors of the Political Council or within the Parliament. They maintained that Wu still held the Foreign and Finance Ministerships, Tang Shaoyi was to be in charge of peace negotiations, which should be public and take place in Shanghai, and that Sun and Tang Jiyao were still military commanders in the government, 161 At this stage, Sun began negotiations with a secret emissary from Duan Qirui. Duan was then facing attack from the Zhili clique, under Cao Kun and Wu Peifu, which had begun making tentative alliances with Cen Chunxuan and Lu Rongting in the South. As the Guangxi clique was moving into alignment with the Zhili militarists, Sun joined forces with their mutual enemy, the Anfu clique. On 23 June Duan Qirui sent Sun a cable expressing regrets for past misdeeds and support for the 3 June proclamation. Duan ordered his commander in Fujian, Li Houji, to provide logistical support for Chen Jiongming's forces in southern Fujian if they launched an attack upon the Guangxi forces, 162

This policy was certainly controversial. Tang Jiyao disapproved of Sun's arrangements with Duan and rejected a similar overture from Duan's emissary. Still Tang joined with Sun, Wu and Tang Shaoyi in manifestos issued during the civil war between the Anfu and Zhili warlords calling for the winning faction to cancel the military agreements reached with Japan in recent years. Unfortunately, Wu Tingfang's views are not known, as he did not comment publicly on the accommodation with Duan. In any case, this was not a full blown alliance by any stretch of the imagination, being a side current removed from the main torrent of civil war in Central China.163

All this notwithstanding, Cen Chunxuan was able to make hay denouncing the Anfu clique for the same things that Wu had just a short time ago attacked it for: traitorous loans from Japan and thwarting the Shanghai peace conference. In response, Sun, Wu and the two Tangs issued a second manifesto in mid-July declaring that whoever wins the civil war in North China must

160. Fu Bingchang, Fangwen jilu, p. 64 [31].

161. Luo, GFNP, p. 484; China Press, 20.6.4, encl. in Cunningham to Secretary of State, 5 June 1920, USNA, 893.00/3378.

162. Luo, GFNP, pp. 484, 488–89.

163. Ibid., pp. 484–85.

276

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

cancel all Sino-Japanese agreements made in the past few years. This was clarified in a later statement to include the Sino-Japanese military cooperation agreement and the Twenty-One Demands as well,164

It was clear that Tang Jiyao was not a firm ally. He disapproved of a plan to have the Parliament reconvene in Yunnan, although many parliamentarians had already left Shanghai for that destination. In early August Lu Zhao in Sichuan invited the Parliament to convene in Chongqing, and the Parliament decided on 16 September to move to that site. But on 14 October the Parliament was forced to disperse when Lu Zhao lost Chongqing to the forces of Xiong Kewu, who was allied to the Guangxi and Zhili factions.165

Given the remoteness of Yunnan and Sichuan and the uncertainty of Tang Jiyao's attitude towards the Guomindang, recovery of Guangzhou became an absolute necessity for Sun. By mid-August a somewhat reluctant Chen Jiongming was prodded to leave his southern Fujian-eastern Guangdong stronghold and begin an offensive to retake Guangzhou from the Guangxi militarists. Fighting began at the end of August, and Guangzhou was taken by Chen Jiongming's troops on 27 October. This victory was greatly facilitated by the fact that Wei Bangping, chief of police in Guangzhou, and Li Fulin, a local commander, cast their lot with Chen Jiongming and Sun Yixian on 26 September. As Chen's forces drew near, Cen Chunxuan and his associates were on the verge of coming to an agreement with the Beijing government for the unification of China. Cen proclaimed that the military government was abolished and then sought asylum at foreign legations rather than risk capture by Chen Jiongming's forces. Until the very end Mo Rongxin was haggling with the Guangzhou merchant community over funds (at first $10 million and finally less than $2 million) before he and his troops would depart. In the end he was forced to leave without these monies as he could not provide Chen Jiongming assurances that they would not be used for further fighting.166

With Guangzhou secured by Chen's troops, Sun, Wu, Tang Shaoyi and Tang Jiyao proclaimed that the military government was still functioning under their leadership. On 23 October, just before Chen entered Guangzhou, they had issued a third manifesto opposing any secret agreements for settlement with the Beijing government. Thus Cen's plan to unify with the Zhili group, by now victorious in the civil war, was aborted.'

167

On 10 November Chen Jiongming was declared Governor of Guangdong. The title of Military Governor, or Dujun, was abolished, although Chen remained commander of the Guangdong Army. On 25 November, Wu departed

164. Ibid., p. 485; China Press, 20.7.29, encl. in Cunningham to Crane, 31 July 1920, encl. in Ruddock to Secretary of State, 5 Aug. 1920, USNA, 893.00/3479.

165. Luo, GFNP, pp. 485, 486–87, 490.

166. Ibid.; Sun Yixian, Guofu quanji 9:507. On Mo's effort to raise funds from the Guangzhou merchants see SCMP, 29 Sept., p. 7; 5 Oct., p. 7; 8 Oct., pp. 6–7; 9 Oct., p. 8; 12 Oct., p. 7; 14 Oct., p. 6; 16 Oct., p. 7; 18 Oct. 1920, p. 6.

167. Luo, GFNP, p. 491; SCMP, 2 Nov. 1920, p. 6.

Elder Statesman 1912–1922

277

from Shanghai with Sun Yixian, Tang Shaoyi and Sun's followers. Stopping briefly in Fujian so that Sun could pay a call on Duan's supporter Li Houji, the party arrived at Guangzhou on 29 November and set up offices for the military government at Guanyinshan, the former headquarters of Mo Rongxin.168

The new administration began on an elevated note. The provincial gambling monopoly, long hated by enlightened Cantonese, was abolished. On 1 December Sun and Wu issued an announcement that the military government would promote provincial autonomy, universal education, the stimulation of commerce and orderly finances, and the main personnel were announced. Plans for various fiscal reforms were announced.169

The new government was marked by sharp differences between Chen Jiongming and Sun Yixian. Chen Jiongming wanted to establish a model province under his authority as Governor. He was interested in federalism as a political structure for China, as were many intellectuals during that period (1919-20). Hunan had been influenced by federalism and had implemented a federalist constitution; apparently Chen had similar ideas for Guangdong. Whether federalism as a doctrine meshed well with the realities of provincial militarism is an open question. It should be noted that Chen Jiongming certainly did not fit the warlord stereotype. He was genuinely interested in liberal and radical ideas to the point of hiring Chen Duxiu, the noted communist, in his provincial administration, and encouraging the young communist Peng Pai to organize the peasantry in eastern Guangdong. There is no reason to doubt that he wanted Guangdong to become a model province and that he was inspired by elevated motives in his acts during this period.170 Sun Yixian, on the other hand, stood for a centralized national government. Guangdong was to be a secure base for the unification of China under his authority so as to establish Guomindang power nationwide. Sun's views, needless to say, were fundamentally at odds with Chen's. Sun believed that Chen was supportive of his broad goals, but as the actual political events evolved, Chen became less and less tolerant of Sun's leadership, leading to the split between them of June 1922.

Wu Tingfang was firmly with Sun Yixian in his national orientation, as opposed to Chen Jiongming's provincial orientation. Even when he disagreed with specific acts, or the timing of those acts, he remained loyal to Sun in the belief that he was China's only hope for a genuine national unification, Towards this end, he and the younger men like C. C. and Liao Zhongkai who assisted him kept the Guangzhou government functioning and did their best to aid Sun and the Guomindang achieve national power.

168. Ma Xiang, “Gensui Sun Zhongshan xiansheng shi you nian de huiyi,” in Huiyi Xinhai Geming, p. 100.

169. On the goals of the military government, see Luo, GFNP, p. 496. On gambling, see SCMP, 2 Dec. 1920, p. 3.

170. On Chen Jiongming see Boorman, Biographical Dictionary 1:173–80. On federalism, see Jean Chesneaux, "The Federalist Movement in China, 1920–3,” in Modern China's Search for a Political Form, ed. Jack Gray (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 96–137.

278

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Foremost on Sun Yixian's agenda was to abandon the structure of the military government and to establish in its place a "formal" (zhengshi) government. On New Year's Day 1921, Sun gave a speech advocating this change. Later in January the newly reconvened Parliament met in Guangzhou. In spite of the fact that Chen Jiongming and others were not too enthusiastic about the plan, Sun's supporters in Parliament brought the issue before it for consideration in early April. On 7 April the Parliament voted in the change with Sun Yixian as the new President. This government was formally established on 5 May 1921, the inauguration ceremonies inauspiciously dampened by pouring rain. 171

In part Sun's plan was a response to the national political situation. In summer 1920 the brief civil war between Duan's Anfu faction and Wu Peifu's Zhili faction had resulted in a complete victory for the latter. Upon taking office in Guangdong, Sun and Wu cabled the Beijing government their stated desire to reopen the long dissolved peace conference in Shanghai, and again on 6 January they repeated this intent. But it seems clear that Sun had abandoned the possibility of a negotiated settlement with the Zhili faction.172 These events created great strain between Sun and Chen Jiongming. Chen made clear his desire to see the eventual establishment of a federalist structure in China. Chen was also uneasy about Sun's plan to recruit a certain number of troops to form a military force under his own authority so as to reduce his dependence upon Chen. In addition to Chen's disapproval, Tang Jiyao was similarly unenthusiastic about the plan and had to be wooed into lending his name by supporting his subordinate in Yunnan.173

Chen and Tang's opposition were cause for concern for Wu and Tang Shaoyi. Following Sun's election as president by the Parliament, Tang retired to his home in Xiangshan and henceforth refused to have anything to do with the Guangzhou Government. Sun made efforts to bring him back, but he remained adamant. Subsequent remarks to foreign diplomats were disparaging of Sun's efforts. 174

Wu was also opposed to the election initially and advised postponing it, but after it was held and Sun was elected, he split with Tang Shaoyi and continued to support Sun in spite of his misgivings. In an interview with journalists from the Hong Kong South China Morning Post, Wu declared that Sun represented democracy and was good for China. He renewed his support by declaring: "We are now in this fight and we will not cease until this fight is

over.

"175

171. Luo, GFNP, pp. 501–5; on the inauguration see SCMP, 6 May 1921, p. 6.

172. Luo, GFNP, pp. 494, 499.

173. SCMP, 4 Feb., p. 7; 23 Feb. 1921, p. 7; Crane to Secretary of State, 11 Jan. 1921, USNA, 893.00/3772.

174. SCMP, 19 Apr., p. 3; 21 Apr., p. 3; 28 Apr., p. 5; 18 May 1921, p. 7; Huston to Secretary of State, 24 Apr. 1922, USNA, 893.00/4393.

175. SCMP, 15 Apr., p. 5; 30 Apr. 1921, p. 7.

Elder Statesman 1912–1922

279

The advantage of establishing a “formal" government, if it succeeded in obtaining foreign recognition, was in that it could open the door to loans and other forms of financial assistance as well. Pressed for funds, in spite of the lifting of the injunction on the Customs surplus funds in Shanghai, the Guangzhou Government sought to obtain recognition from the foreign diplomatic corps in Beijing. This body had refused to release the 13.7% of the Customs surplus which had been formerly allocated to the military government in Guangzhou. Wu and Sun sent Guo Taiqi to Beijing in January 1921 in an effort to obtain the Guangzhou share; the diplomats refused to release it. Wu then announced that the Guangzhou Government would take over customs collection in the area under its control beginning 1 February. A diplomatic crisis was narrowly averted. But because of a decline in customs receipts and a fall in the price of silver, there were no surplus funds available for use in any case.

176

The unpredictability of this source of funding may well have convinced Wu of the necessity of seeking foreign recognition as a state, even though he certainly knew that it would be difficult if not impossible to achieve this goal. Wu immediately began a campaign to seek diplomatic recognition from the United States, hopeful that supportive American public opinion and positive reports from U.S. consular officials would facilitate this task. For example, journalist Rodney Gilbert had recommended that the U.S. withdraw recognition of the Beijing government in favor of Guangzhou, prompting a protest by W. W. Yen (Yan Huiqing) who was then serving as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Beijing government.177

On 3 March Wu had sent a cable to newly inaugurated U.S. President Warren G. Harding congratulating him upon his inauguration. But the U.S. State Department decided not to acknowledge Wu's cable. Soon after the establishment of the “formal” government, Wu drafted a manifesto of the government and an appeal for recognition. This was conveyed to the U.S. Government by Ma Soo, but Ma was unable to obtain an audience in Washington, and the manifesto was similarly not acknowledged.178

176. SCMP, 28 Jan. 1921, p. 6; Ruddock to Secretary of State, 9 Sept. 1921, USNA, 893.00/4111. On the role of bankers in setting British and American policy in this issue see Dayer, Bankers and Diplomats in China, pp. 88–89.

177. Price to Secretary of State, 11 Jan. 1921, USNA, 893.00/3772; Bergholz to Secretary of State, 7 May 1921, 893.00/3902; “Letter of Executive Committee of American Association of South China to Secretary of State Hughes," 19 May 1921, encl. in Ester to Hughes, 13 July 1921, 893.00/3962. On Gilbert's reportage see NCDN, 23 Feb. 1921, encl. in Perkins to Secretary of State, 28 Feb. 1921, 893.00/3844; and NCH, 9 July 1921, in Ruddock to Secretary of State, 4 Aug. 1921, 893.00/4033. The NCH commented editorially in February: “As for Dr. Wu Ting-fang he is surely one of the wonders of modern China; and if he does not ultimately achieve her regeneration, no one will blame the vegetarianism to which his hale and hearty four scores so nearly convert us.” For a detailed description of Sun's policies towards the U.S. see Li Yunhan, “Zhongshan xiansheng hufa shiqi de dui-Mei jianshe (1917–1923),” in Zhongguo xiandaishi lunji (Taibei: Lianjing, 1982), 7:213– 48.

178. Memo, 9 Mar. 1921, USNA, 893.00/3794, and telegram, 3 Mar. 1921, 903.00/3797; Ma Soo to Secretary of State, 14 May 1921, 893.00/3855; Christian to Fletcher, 27 July 1921, 893.00/3998; Luo, GFNP, p. 510.

280

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

The U.S. intransigence was certainly a blow for Wu's hopes. The formal government established in May was diplomatically as well as politically isolated. It proved impossible for Wu to send a recognized representative to the Washington Conference in fall 1921, and efforts to create a unified delegation with nominal representation from the South failed because of Wu and Sun's intransigence, based on their bitter memories of the situation at the Paris Peace Conference in 1918. The South refused to acknowledge as legitimate the delegation selected by Beijing and rejected an overture to have C. C. Wu join the delegation. Instead, Wu prepared a manifesto opposing Japanese aggression in Shandong, which he hoped would be unofficially presented to the Conference. The U.S. sources reveal that it was carefully read and well received by American officials.179

In spite of the inability to secure foreign recognition, Sun pressed ahead with his plans. In late May the war against Lu Rongting in Guangxi had begun immediately following the establishment of the "formal" government, with a reluctant Chen Jiongming pressed into action. By the end of July Lu's forces had been defeated, and this was followed by the capture of Guilin on 21 August.180

Before Guangxi had been fully secured, however, Sun was pushing ahead with his plans for a northern expedition into Central China. On 10 August Parliament passed a resolution introduced by Sun's supporters urging the Government to launch a northern expedition. But for Chen Jiongming, the Guangxi campaign was not seen as the first phase of the northern expedition, but rather as a defensive move to help secure Guangdong Province against further attacks from the Guangxi militarists. 181

By early October Sun Yixian presented his plan for a northern expedition to the Parliament, calling for a thrust into Hubei. In spite of Chen Jiongming's lack of support and rumors that the Cantonese public was grumbling, Sun was determined to implement his drive north. Wu Tingfang agreed to serve as Acting President while Sun Yixian was personally leading the military campaign.

182

Sun's plan of national unification by military force led him to seek understandings with the Zhili clique's opponents. The arrangement with Duan Qirui of summer 1920 served as precedent for the arrangements of 1921–22. The shifting constellation of factional forces had brought the Anfu clique in alignment with Zhang Zuolin's Fengtian clique. In October 1921 a representative from Zhang Zuolin met with Sun in Guangzhou, and in December Xu Shuzheng arrived in Guangzhou for talks with Sun's people. Xu was a leading member of the Anfu military faction. He had been the

179. Luo, GFNP, p. 510; SCMP, 5 Aug., p. 6; 17 Aug., p. 7; 29 Aug., p. 3; 7 Sept., p. 7; 7 Oct., p. 8; 28 Nov., p. 3; 1 Dec. 1921, p. 7.

180. Luo, GFNP, pp. 507-10.

181. Ibid., p. 509; SCMP, 12 Aug. 1921, p. 6.

182. Luo, GFNP, p. 511; SCMP, 15 Sept., p. 6; 14 Oct. 1921, p. 7; Bergholz to Secretary of State, 17 and 26 Oct. 1921, USNA, 893.00/4135; 893.00/4140.

Elder Statesman 1912–1922

281

secretary to the cabinet and Duan's confidant under Li Yuanhong's presidency, when Wu was Foreign Minister. As Sun was in Guilin making preparations for the northern expedition, he deputed Liao Zhongkai, Wang Jingwei and Jiang Jieshi to negotiate with Xu on strategy to defeat the Zhili clique. 189

In spite of having obtained the Parliament's approval, it was several months before Sun's northern expedition could be mobilized. On 4 December Sun arrived in Guilin to lead the expedition, and on 6 December Tang Jiyao finally declared his decision to join the campaign. But Sun had no funds, and Chen Jiongming refused to release Guangdong provincial revenues for the expedition, declaring his intention to scale back provincial expenditures. This included a retrenchment in military expenditures necessitating demobilization of one-third of the Guangdong Army under his control. Finally in mid-January Wu was able to raise $200,000 from various revenues for Sun Yixian. 184

On 2 February Sun Yixian was able to give the order for the northern expedition to begin. There were to be two thrusts northward, one under Li Liejun to attack Jiangxi and one under Xu Chongzhi to enter Hunan. Again, Duan Qirui's representative came to Guangzhou to discuss cooperation with Sun, and soon after this Zhang Zuolin sent another emissary to Sun in Guilin for further discussions. 185

Sun followed up Zhang's initiative by dispatching C. C. Wu to visit Zhang in Shenyang. C. C. was in Manchuria for ten days engaged in discussions. Although C. C. was tight-mouthed about the substance of his discussions, according to a report by U.S. Naval Intelligence, Zhang Zuolin was said to have agreed to advance $2 million in gold to help Sun's northern expedition. Other sources gave the sum as $300,000 with another comparable sum to follow. 186

The agreement was said to be the following: Sun would agree to attack Wu Peifu and Zhang would not come to Wu's aid, while both would help Duan Qirui to take Henan and Shandong. In April C. C. told the U.S. Consul in Guangzhou that the political understanding reached with Zhang Zuolin was to result in the following political arrangement: Sun Yixian was to be President, Duan Qirui Vice-President of a newly constituted government. Liang Shiyi was to be Premier. Duan's cooperation was said to be obtained without that of the “undesirable” element of the former Anfu clique. The old Parliament was acknowledged as “unfit” and would be disbanded with a public statement that it had been illegally disbanded by force. The new government was to be

183. Luo, GFNP, p. 518; SCMP, 14 Oct. 1921, p. 7.

184. On Sun in Guilin see SCMP, 5 Dec. 1921, p. 6; on Tang Jiyao, see SCMP, 6 Dec., p. 7; 12 Dec. 1921, p. 3; on Chen's withholding funds, see SCMP, 17 Dec., p. 7; 23 Dec., p. 13; 31 Dec. 1921, p. 6; Bergholz to Secretary of State, 3 Jan. 1922, USNA, 893.00/4209. On Wu's obtaining the funds see SCMP, 24 Jan., p. 2; 18 Feb. 1922, p. 7.

185. Luo, GFNP, pp. 523-24.

186. Navy intelligence, 29 Mar. 1922, USNA, 893.00/4259; SCMP, 22 Mar. 1922, p. 5.

282

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

organized along federal lines after a new parliament had been formed. But Duan's forces declared that after the war, Sun Yixian would travel abroad, leaving Duan Qirui as head of state. This was not acceptable to Sun, however, according to Eugene Chen, who was based in Shanghai writing pro-Sun publicity pieces for the press. Later, C. C. also denied that he had brought any funds from Zhang Zuolin. 187

Pressed for funds, Sun also began holding discussions with representatives of the Soviet Union and the Comintern about possible Soviet assistance. According to U.S. sources, the first contact was in February 1921 when a Mr. Alexieff arrived in Guangzhou to discuss recognition of the Soviet Union. In December of that year the Comintern representative Maring (M. Sneevliet) met with Sun Yixian in Guilin for several days, and Sun also met with Serge Dalin at different times during this period. Although these talks bore no concrete results at that time, they paved the way for future Soviet-Guomindang cooperation. Sun realized that the policy of pursuing a Soviet alliance would be controversial and arouse a great deal of opposition. He told Dalin that Wu Tingfang would be opposed to it.188

Indeed, one of Wu's English language "propaganda” pieces on behalf of the Guangzhou government written in 1922 was entitled "Bolshevism Has No Chance in China.” In this article he characterized fears that the Constitutionalist Government could harbor communist ideas as "sheer nonsense." While among the nearly one million members of the Guomindang there were some youngsters who were influenced by Marxian ideas, Wu claimed that they would become “more moderate in their views as they come in contact with their senior members." He characterized Sun Yixian as "progressive" but denied that he was a Bolshevik. “I can guarantee that he holds no such views; if he did I could no longer associate myself with him.”189 In addition to raising funds to send to Sun for the Northern Expedition (and no doubt crossing swords with Chen Jiongming to do so), Wu had his hands full as Acting President in Sun's absence. On 13 January 1922, the Hong Kong Seamen's Strike began, and in the weeks to come, Guangzhou was the temporary home of about eight to ten thousand strikers. They needed food and lodging, which was provided by the government in the form of a long-range loan. While sympathetic to the strikers, the government urged a compromise after the strike flowered into a full-scale general strike in February. During this entire period until the settlement of the strike on 8 March, affairs in Guangzhou were dominated by its concerns.

190

187. Bergholz to Secretary of State, 4 Apr. 1922 and Huston to Secretary of State, 12 Apr.1922, USNA, 893.00/4336 and 893.00/4361; SCMP, 3 Apr., p. 7; 3 June 1922, p. 6.

188. On Alexieff, see Crane to Secretary of State, 10 Feb. 1921, USNA, 893.00/3835; on Dalin, see C. Martin Wilbur, Sun Yat-sen: Frustrated Patriot (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), pp. 121-23; Luo, GFNP, pp. 518–20.

189. Wu Tingfang, “Bolshevism Has No Chance in China,” China Review, June 1922: 269–70. 190. Chesneaux, Chinese Labor Movement, pp. 180–86.

Elder Statesman 1912–1922

283

Meanwhile, by mid-March Chen Jiongming's opposition to the northern expedition was open. The rupture between Chen and Sun may have been hastened by the assassination on 21 March of General Deng Keng, Chen's chief of staff and commander of the First Division of the Guangdong Army. Deng was reported to be enthusiastic about the northern expedition and was assassinated while returning from a mission to Hong Kong to purchase arms for it. Although Chen denied any responsibility for Deng's death, it was widely believed that he had had a hand in it.191

Against a background of stalemate on the battlefield, on 26 March Sun ordered Chen to meet with him amidst rumors that Chen had agreed with Wu Peifu to help hinder the northern expedition's thrust into Hunan. Meanwhile the situation in Yunnan turned against Sun as well. Earlier Tang's subordinate Gu Pinzhen had driven Tang out and indicated his support for Sun's policies, but by the end of March, Tang Jiyao had the upper hand, Gu was killed, and Tang ordered his troops out of Guizhou and back to Yunnan. Tang was abandoning the northern expedition.192

It appears as though Sun Yixian slighted the significance of Chen Jiongming's opposition to his plans. Up until the eve of the coup launched against him, Sun refused to believe the numerous rumors circulating and a stream of reports indicating what was happening. Although Chen's army was fifty thousand strong, many of its commanders and junior officers were Guomindang stalwarts and loyal to Sun. Sun believed his relationship with Chen was secure; in fact it was not. When Sun ordered Chen to meet with him, Chen refused and Sun on 20 April forced his resignation from the posts of Minister of the Interior, Commander-in-Chief of the Guangdong Army, and Governor of Guangdong. Chen left Guangzhou with a number of his troops

for his base in Huizhou.193

Returning to Guangzhou on 22 April, Sun countered a week later with a successful surprise attack on the naval flotilla stationed at Guangzhou and Huangpu (Whampoa). Said to have been the brainstorm of Hu Hanmin, it placed the navy in Sun's hands. With this effort to secure his position in Guangzhou, Sun once again turned his attention to the task of continuing the northern expedition.194

Wu Tingfang was appointed to fill the post of Governor of Guangdong following Chen's forced resignation. He assumed office on 22 April and moved into the Governor's mansion as a great fire had largely destroyed the building housing the Foreign Ministry in March.195

191. On C. C. Wu's view of Chen, see Huston to Secretary of State, 12 Apr. 1922, USNA, 893.00/ 4361; on Deng Keng's assassination, see Luo, GFNP, pp. 525–26; SCMP, 25 Mar., p. 7; 27 Mar., p. 6; 28 Mar. 1922, p. 8.

192. Sutton, Provincial Militarism, pp. 254–56.

193. Luo, GFNP, pp. 526–27.

194. Ibid., p. 529; Huston to Secretary of State, 24 Apr. 1922, USNA, 893.00/4393.

195. Luo, GFNP, pp. 530–31. On the first see SCMP, 11 Mar., p. 1; 15 Mar. 1922, p. 8.

284

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Wu's duties were added to in May when Sun formally launched the northern expedition and appointed Wu to serve, once again, as Acting President in his absence. It is obvious that Wu was personally unable to attend to these offices in addition to those of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Finance. Several accounts indicate that Liao Zhongkai, a trusted subordinate of Sun's who was appointed Vice-Minister of Finance, handled virtually all the work of that agency, while C. C. Wu, as Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, together with Guo Taiqi, were entrusted with much of the ministry's administrative work. When Wu assumed the governorship, C. C. and Guo took on much of his administrative work as well. C. C. was publicly acknowledged as the “power behind the throne" of the Governor's Office.196

From Shaoguan, Sun issued the order on 13 May to attack southern Jiangxi, but on 23 May ten thousand of Chen's troops from the Guangxi campaign surrounded Guangzhou demanding their commander's reinstatement. In response, Sun offered Chen the position of duban, or overseer, of Guangdong and Guangxi, but Chen refused to take this post. Sun returned from Shaoguan to Guangzhou on 1 June, leaving Hu Hanmin in charge of affairs in the North, where the northern expeditionary forces scored a significant victory on 13 June. 197

These events coincided with another change in the national situation. In the Zhili-Fengtian war of spring 1922, Wu Peifu and the Zhili clique emerged victorious, dashing Sun's hopes for national power. The Zhili victory was followed by a peace initiative that was China's first genuine opportunity for unification since 1917. On 14 May Wu Peifu issued a circular telegram calling for the restoration of the "old" Parliament, the issue which, it may be recalled, more than any other was responsible for the failure of Xu Shichang's peace initiative in 1919. At the end of May, Sun Chuanfang, warlord of Jiangsu, called for both Xu Shichang and Sun Yixian to resign. Xu responded immediately by so doing, and a groundswell was underway for Li Yuanhong to reassume the Presidency so as to enable unification to proceed. This was supported by a number of members of the “old” Parliament meeting in Tianjin. Chen Jiongming joined in by calling for Xu and Sun's resignation; as Xu already had resigned, this was a call for Sun's resignation. 198

Sun's public response was to denounce Wu Peifu's move as a trap set by the Zhili clique, and to reject unification on these terms. Wu publicly supported Sun's position and called upon the foreign powers not to interfere in China's internal affairs (as they had earlier in coercing both sides to engage in the 1919 talks).199

196. Huston to Secretary of State, 2 May 1922, USNA, 893.00/4402. On Liao Zhongkai, see He Xiangning, "Wo de huiyi,” in Huiyi Xinhai Geming, p. 31ff.

197. Luo, GFNP, PP. 529-33.

198. Ibid., pp. 536–37; Li Chien-nung, Political History of China, pp. 420–21.

199. Luo, GFNP, pp. 534–35; transmitted to the U.S. President by Ma Soo, 12 June 1922, USNA, 893.00/4449.

Elder Statesman 1912–1922

285

Wu maintained this stance publicly although Li Yuanhong indicated that he would like Wu Tingfang to serve as his first formal premier, and Wu Peifu followed suit by inviting Wu Tingfang to take up the premiership and work towards reconstruction. Warlord Yan Xishan of Shanxi Province similarly cabled Wu urging him to take up this offer. This was an important gesture to the southern forces and a way of attempting to reestablish the continuity of legitimacy. There is no question that the offer to Wu was made in good faith and was genuine. Whether Wu would have continued in his firm support of Sun and opposition to the Zhili position is difficult to assess, because Chen's coup against Sun and Wu's death occurred before the situation was resolved.2

Following Chen's coup on 16 June, Sun was forced to take refuge upon one of the Navy's ships when Chen's troops attacked his residence; Wu and C. C. similarly had to take refuge elsewhere as C. C.'s home, where both had been staying, was seized and looted by Chen's troops.

201

200

In a meeting on board Sun's warship on 17 June, Wu pleaded with Sun to retire. But Sun was determined to launch a counter-attack against Chen in the belief that he would have no political credibility in China or abroad unless he stood and fought. In dismay, Wu resigned from the governorship on 21 June in what should be viewed as a gesture of disapproval of Sun. He died two days later, on 23 June, after a short bout with pneumonia, extremely despondent about the current situation.202

One is tempted to speculate that in spite of his age, Wu Tingfang might yet have lived further had the last three months of his life not been so emotionally stressful. Having reentered political life in 1917 with the hope that he could have something to contribute to China's future, he had played his cards to the bitter end. Having backed Sun as the leader to unify China, he had to face the fact that Sun's program could not succeed at that time. Would Wu have split with Sun at that point and return to Beijing to take part in yet further warlord-dominated cabinets? Or would he have continued to cast his lot with Sun and Soviet assistance for the unification of China under the Guomindang? Unfortunately we shall not be able to answer these questions but must content ourselves with the mere phrasing of them.

200. Nathan, Peking Politics, p. 191; SCMP, 12 June, p. 6; 14 June, p. 6; 17 June, p. 7; 19 June 1922,

p. 7.

201. Huston to Secretary of State, 22 June 1922, USNA, 893.00/4576. Wu's last interview was probably given with U.S. journalist Edna Lee Booker on 15 June. See her News is My Job: A Correspondent in War-Torn China (New York: Macmillan, 1941), p. 122.

202. He Xiangning was in the hospital with Wu. See He, “Wo de huiyi,” p. 34; Luo, GFNP, p. 542; Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek], Sun dazongtong Guangzhou mengnan riji (Shanghai: Minzhi, 1927), pp. 6-8.

Conclusion

Wu Tingfang's death in June 1922 occurred at the time the Chinese nationalist dream-a dream of a powerful, united and modern Chinese nation-appeared more ephemeral than at any time since the 1911 revolution. The timing of Wu's death was coincidental to the lowest ebb in the nationalist tide of modern China's history. Within a short time after Wu's death, however, Sun Yixian and the nationalist movement appeared reborn, a phoenix risen from the ashes of a factionalized and warlord-ridden China. Newly armed with Soviet weapons, Leninist organizational techniques and a dynamic reshaping of nationalist ideology, Sun emerged at the helm of a revitalized movement that ultimately swept Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party into power in 1949 on a revolutionary flood tide of peasant nationalism.

The early nationalist movement of which Wu Tingfang was part may be viewed as a catalyst in the revolutionary process described above. Based in the urban bourgeoisie rather than the peasantry, inclined towards gradual reform rather than revolution, and preferring liberal Anglo-American models for institutional change rather than Leninist ones, the early nationalist movement failed to create successful structures to implement the nationalist program. This failure, in turn, reflects the weakness of the modern bourgeoisie—since the early nationalism was based in this class—in early twentieth century Chinese society and politics.

Wu Tingfang was an example of the "colonial intelligentsia" of nineteenth century Hong Kong, a miniscule group of western-educated Chinese of mercantile bourgeois backgrounds. Along with He Qi, Wang Tao, Zheng Guanying and others, Wu was part of a social and political stratum which was noted for espousing an early form of modern nationalism in China, calling for institutional reforms in the structure of the state to facilitate industrial development and promote commercial competition with foreign commercial interests. They advocated modernizing educational facilities so as to create a modern bureaucracy, and proposed reforms in recruitment qualifications for officialdom. Finally, they advocated broadening the decision-making base of the Qing state through the adoption of British-style advisory bodies. They maintained that these reforms would promote unity and national strength. Their overall objective was to promote Chinese equality in its relations with the western world and to protect China's sovereignty against forces and institutions, such as extraterritoriality, that weakened it. Selective westernization and adoption of British-style “liberal” laws and institutions were but means to achieve the nationalist vision.

287

288

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

It is my contention that the content of this early nationalism reflected the reaction of the colonial intelligentsia of Hong Kong to the structural inequalities of the “colonial situation," which Hong Kong shared with other nineteenth century European colonies in Asia and Africa. While mobilizing politically to assert the economic and political interests of the wealthier Hong Kong Chinese, Wu Tingfang and others did so in the framework of the cultural and political assumptions of the British colonizers rather than in terms of their indigenous society. This made them relatively marginal and isolated from the vast majority of Chinese in nineteenth century China, masses and elite alike.

During the years 1877–82, Wu Tingfang attempted to reform the Hong Kong colonial structures so as to strengthen the position of wealthy Chinese and improve the status of all Chinese colonial subjects. His mixed experiences, however, reflected his dependence upon sympathetic colonizers such as Sir John Pope Hennessy, without whose support reform was an impossibility. When Hennessy's weakened position forced his departure from Hong Kong, Wu Tingfang too fell from power.

Upon leaving Hong Kong in 1882, Wu Tingfang became part of the nationalist-inspired reform movement that developed in China Proper in the latter part of the Qing Dynasty. His participation in the reform effort can be divided into three distinct phases: (1) the pre-1895 Self-Strengthening Movement under Li Hongzhang, (2) the post Sino-Japanese reform movement, 1895-98, and (3) the post-Boxer reform movement, 1902-11. In all three phases Wu Tingfang sought to use his skills to implement a nationalist foreign policy, to develop railway, mines and other industrial and commercial projects, and to promote law reform so as to abolish extraterritoriality,

Wu Tingfang was a central figure in the Self-Strengthening Movement under Li Hongzhang. While his accomplishments, especially in railway development, were impressive, they fell short of his expectations. Unable to attract sufficient merchant capital, the role of the state in funding and managing the railway became more critical and led to structural problems stemming from the nature and organization of the Qing bureaucracy. The railway and other modernizing projects were regional rather than national in scope, and were relegated to Li Hongzhang's private bureaucracy (mufu) rather than the formally designated bureaucratic state structure. Wu's authority derived in great measure from his personal relationship to Li Hongzhang, but this relationship, in turn, was inadequate to enable Wu to prevent the railway administration from falling prey to the prevailing bureaucratic parasitism and factionalism. This was most marked when he lost control of the railway in 1891 to one of Li's relatives.

The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 led to a new phase in China's modernization movement. On the one hand, the various modernizing projects Li Hongzhang had previously sponsored were put under the control of other regional officials as a consequence of Li's fall from power. Also, Wu Tingfang suffered from his association with Li in the political climate that surrounded China's disastrous defeat. On the other hand, however, the crisis created an

Conclusion

289

environment in which the reform agenda was taken up in a more thorough way at the national level, while able foreign-affairs officials like Wu were given the opportunity to move into more substantive diplomatic positions. Wu's appointment as Minister to the United States and Spain in 1896 was seen by him as an opportunity to advocate a more assertive foreign policy and to implement a more nationalist diplomacy than previously possible.

Just as the war gave rise to a greater impetus for state-sponsored reforms, it also led to Sun Yixian's organization of a revolutionary movement dedicated to the overthrow of the Qing and the establishment of new political system. This new development led to a split between Wu and his brother-in-law He Qi. He Qi briefly considered taking an official position under Sheng Xuanhuai but fled in disgust at the retrogressive atmosphere of Qing official life. He subsequently became a sometime patron of Sun Yixian. Wu, on the contrary, continued committed to his career under the Qing and to the prospects of its reform for nationalist ends. Wu never publicly displayed sympathy for the revolutionary agenda during his years as a Qing official in spite of ambivalent feelings about the Qing's prospects for genuine reform.

Upon his arrival in the United States in 1897, Wu supported the reform movement among high officials and threw his weight behind a pro-British anti-Russian foreign policy, which, however, was not implemented. During the peak of the 1898 reform movement he received a mandate to undertake the law reforms he had advocated for over twenty years, but the reform movement was stifled in the Empress Dowager's coup of September 1898 before Wu could have had much time to embark upon this project.

Although Wu was an admirer of Kang Youwei, he had not been part of Kang's faction, and thus was kept on in his post after the reform movement was crushed. In spite of the discouraging events in China, Wu began an aggressive but ultimately unsuccessful campaign to prevent the extension of the Chinese Exclusion Laws to Hawaii and the Philippines. His diplomacy followed his long-standing conviction that to be effective, China had to wage an aggressive campaign to influence public opinion in the western world. Wu did succeed in becoming a public figure in the United States in a manner never before achieved by a Chinese figure. In the short run,

he was unsuccessful in his efforts to repeal Chinese Exclusion legislation, but it is more difficult to assess how useful his public exposure was in aiding China's long-term national interests.

The crushing of the Boxer Uprising and subsequent occupation of the Chinese capital by the Allied Expeditionary Force created a new and more powerful impetus for the modernization reform effort, and it provided opportunities for Wu Tingfang to play a more central role in it. He was able to take some of the credit for what many high Qing officials viewed as the relatively lenient policy of the United States in the negotiations of 1901 between the Court and the foreign powers, and Wu's reputation accordingly rose in China.

Returning to China in 1902, Wu assumed key posts in the Beijing government until 1906. He helped to design and establish the new Board of

290

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

Commerce in 1903 but was removed from the Board after clashing with his patron Yuan Shikai over its staffing. Turning then to foreign policy, Wu utilized the emerging political power of the Chinese bourgeoisie in Shanghai and other major cities to promote a nationalistic approach in foreign policy. He did so by leaking sensitive information to the press in hopes of stimulating public outcry over Britain's aggression in Tibet and by taking a tough line over various problems foreign syndicates encountered in capitalizing railway and mining projects. But his nationalist approach was seen most strikingly in his encouraging the development of the boycott of American goods in 1905.

These policies and acts earned him the enmity of British and American diplomats, who were unprepared to calmly accept China's new nationalism and who consequently sought to coerce the Qing government into a more submissive mold. Wu's political position, ironically dependent upon foreign goodwill, was thus undermined by the nationalist policies he promoted.

Moreover, Wu's main patron during this period was Yuan Shikai, but Wu, unlike Tang Shaoyi, was not a close subordinate of Yuan's. Thus Yuan used Wu when convenient and relegated him to lesser positions when it was not, as in the instance of the Board of Commerce noted above. Hence Wu was prey to the vagaries of bureaucratic factionalism to a higher degree than previously. These finally led to Wu's removal from foreign policy decision-making in 1905.

The limitations of his situation depressed Wu and led him to considerable ambivalence about the viability of Qing reform and his role in the government. He had nearly resigned in 1904 and again in 1905, only to return to his official positions in the end. He resigned yet again in 1906 but later agreed to serve once more as Minister to the United States and various Latin American nations. After being recalled in 1909, Wu declined further appointment and bided his time until the revolution of 1911. His persistence under the Qing reflects the enduring seductions of official life-personal as well as political- and his underlying belief that reform of the Qing, no matter how difficult, was still China's best hope for modernization.

Wu's second major contribution to the late Qing modernization effort lay in the area of law reform, but even more so than in the case of foreign policy described above, his accomplishments were muted by frustrations. In spite of some Imperial support for his and Shen Jiaben's proposals to humanize judicial proceedings, his Draft Procedural Code, which was heavily based on British judicial procedures, was rejected at all official levels as too subversive to the maintenance of public order.

Wu promoted law and judicial reforms so as to enable China to abolish extraterritoriality, which he viewed as an institution that seriously diminished China's sovereignty. In this respect Wu appears as a simple nationalist. But it is also clear that his interest and involvement in law reform were quite obviously products of his early experiences in the Hong Kong courts and his barrister's training in London; his advocacy of the British system not only reflected his background but also his firm belief in the universal value of British legal and judicial institutions. This belief distinguished Wu from other nationalists who sought reforms as means to achieve national power in a

Conclusion

291

purely instrumental sense without regard for the moral or philosophic underpinnings inherent in the reforms.

Wu's example suggests that the term "liberal" is appropriate to describe the nexus of values associated with at least some elements of the new urban elites that emerged politically in the late Qing and early Republican period. Wu was “liberal" in the sense of non-radical—in promoting a reformist rather than revolutionary approach to change—as well as in the sense of advocating nineteenth century “liberal” British political structures as crucial to China's modernization.

Liberals like Wu played a moderating role in the revolution of 1911, throwing support to the Republican forces but blunting the radicalizing impulses of the revolutionary movement. Their main political accomplishment was assisting Yuan Shikai in his drive to power. But there were limitations to liberalism. For Wu and the constitutionalists he was associated with, the issue of the form of government-constitutional monarchy or republic-was secondary to the issue of Yuan Shikai's assuming the reigns of power. Men thus took precedence over institutions, even for those liberals such as Wu who deeply believed in the superiority of British political institutions.

The tendency to look to powerful or charismatic individuals as linchpins of state power and authority, which appears characteristic of twentieth century Chinese politics, is thus shown in Wu Tingfang's political role during the 1911 revolution and after. Wu helped to engineer Yuan's assumption of the Presidency in 1911–12 and then continued to support him in spite of Yuan's increasing autocratism. Not only did Yuan fail to implement liberal reforms patterned after Anglo-American political institutions, but he eventually violated their spirit in highly public ways. Not until the public outcry against Yuan's monarchical plans was underway, however, did Wu hesitantly join the anti- Yuan chorus. Even then his criticism was muted: bad advisers surrounding Yuan were responsible for Yuan's failures.

Given the cultural emphasis upon powerful individuals rather than institutions, and given the political weakness of social classes and political groupings in early Republican China, political factionalism at all levels became deeply embedded in the Chinese political landscape following Yuan Shikai's death. In this increasingly factionalized and fractionalized environment, Wu's overriding concern became the search for that individual who possessed the political authority, coupled with military backing, who could reassemble a viable national state structure.

Wu's quest led him, first, to support Li Yuanhong in the latter's drive to reconstitute the national government under the Republican constitutional structures. By spring 1917, however, it was clear that these structures were politically unviable; that is, they were unauthoritative in the operative political culture of the early Republic. Wu's defiant defense of constitutionalism in the face of Li Yuanhong's betrayal of its principles in May 1917 was a symbol of Wu's personal courage. But Wu's personal victory was largely hollow, for his act created little more than a ripple of admiration, which meant little in a Chinese political arena now dominated by factionalism and militarism.

292

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

In the last period of Wu's life, in which he was politically active in the Guangzhou-based rump governments, constitutionalism and liberalism appear to have been little more than slogans employed by various southern factions intent on seizing national power and obtaining international recognition. That principles were largely irrelevant is demonstrated by the shifting coalitions that marked the national political scene. Wu and his son C. C. Wu were players on this vast board game as one team among the many politicians who participated in the endless negotiations and deal-making that were endemic to factional politics.

In addition to their role as would-be peacemakers, the Wus functioned secondarily as key administrators of the Guangzhou Governments from 1917 to 1922. These governments were only marginally effective in providing the security and leadership so desperately craved by the urban public in Guangzhou and other cities nominally under their jurisdiction; nor could they protect the rural population against the pillaging by “guest” armies in the latters' exploitation of Guangdong's resources.

Public disgust over these outrages led to the provincialist "Guangdong for the Guangdongese" sentiment of 1919, which in turn merged with nationalist outrage over the humiliating Versailles negotiations. Nationalism and provincialism, in this instance, complemented rather than competed with each other. In his opposition to the Guangxi clique, Wu Tingfang emerged both as symbol for Guangdong provincialism as well as for the emerging nationalist-inspired May Fourth Movement. But as in the case of his earlier opposition to Li Yuanhong, Wu's hands were empty; he had no military authority to back up the moral authority of the cause he had come to represent.

In the last two years of his life, Wu worked closely with Sun Yixian in helping Sun achieve his dream of a united China under Nationalist Party leadership. The Wu-Sun alliance should be seen both in the context of the faction-driven politics of the period, as well as of the invalidity of the constitutionalist program in the Republican period.

As noted above, institutional reform following Anglo-American models had been submerged during the revolution of 1911 by the strength of the constitutionalists' faith in Yuan Shikai's executive abilities, only to later drown in the tides of militarism and factionalism that followed Yuan's death. Wu joined Sun, I believe, not only because they both shared a Cantonese heritage, but also partly because from Wu's perspective there was nobody else in the national political arena who had a genuinely national vision of China's future and the personal dynamism and charisma needed to unify an emerging nationalist movement. Just as during the revolution of 1911, Wu and his friends looked to Yuan Shikai to maintain and strengthen a national government capable of modernizing China, so now Wu Tingfang, following his son's lead, looked to Sun Yixian in hopes of seeing a new "strongman" who could lead China into the promised land of national strength and dignity. That the issue of national unification and state building assumed priority amidst the crumbling edifices of Chinese political life in Wu's later years is

Conclusion

293

clear. Concerns about westernization and China's cultural identity most understandably assumed a lower priority. But these deeper issues have surfaced in China time and time again during this century. Although westernization has sometimes been viewed within the "western stimulus-Chinese response" model described by Paul A. Cohen, a "China-centered" approach still requires that one examine the issue of westernization in modern and contemporary Chinese history.'

In the context of nineteenth century Chinese history, Wu Tingfang would appear to be at the far end at the "scale" of westernization in China. What is significant, however, is that Wu was always an advocate of selective rather than complete westernization, and as he aged, he became more and more selective. A baptized Christian in his youth, he was an early critic of Christian missionaries as “un-Christian.” As an adult he never believed that the West was completely progressive and China completely reactionary in the framework of world history. During his lengthy stay in the United States, 1897-1902, he developed a world view that rejected outward westernization of Chinese life- style, as symbolized by diet, dress and “hygienic” behaviors. In particular, he upheld Chinese familism and the Confucian values associated with it as core values in Chinese culture. He saw these as forces of stability in a world of rapid change, and he admired the works of American social purity reformers, who like many of their contemporaries in China, were cultural conservatives reacting with dismay to rapid social changes in their world. Wu maintained these views at the same time that he advocated wholesale adoption of British legal and political institutions in China for reasons, as discussed above, that were only partly pragmatic.

What is of interest here is the delicate balancing act inherent in Wu's style of selective westernization. His particular blend of what to keep and what to reject in China's culture and what to import from contemporary western culture reflects the particular historical period in which he grew to maturity. That was a period in which England was the dominant foreign power in China and a major power in the world, and Wu Tingfang, like many others, looked to British economic and political institutions as keys to unlock the secrets by which to attain the nationalist goals of "wealth and power.

The historical period is different now, the culture of powerful nations in the world is different too; but the issue of China's cultural identity still remains as one of potential contention as the twenty-first century nears and modern communications technology makes it increasingly difficult for powerful states to control access to information. While the enterprise of selective westernization is still alive, as repeated campaigns against “spiritual pollution” and “harmful bourgeois ideological influence” suggest, they coexist with more persistent exhortations calling for China's rapid modernization at

1. Paul A. Cohen, Discovering History in China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).

2. As brilliantly explored in Benjamin Schwartz's classic study, In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West (Cambridge, Mass., 1964).

294

Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History

all cost. We may speculate that in an era in which modern China's early nationalist vision, which Wu Tingfang helped to shape, has been only partially realized, the issue of culture change remains subordinate to the political call for nation building. While subordinate, however, it is far from absent, and as the nation building effort is hopefully more successful in decades to come, we may expect that the cultural issues may assume greater prominence.

Glossary

Baoliang Ju

baoxiao 報效

Bing Bu

buliang fenzi 不良分子

can 參

Canyiyuan 參議院

chaiwei 差委

cheng 承

chong yang chong de lihai

崇洋崇得厲害

Chou'an Hui 籌安會

Da Qing Luli 大清律例

daotai 道台

daoyin 道尹

guandu shangban 官督商辦

Guangzhou Gongsuo 廣州公所

guanshang heban 官商合辦

Hanlin Academy

Hong Bang 洪幫

Hu Bu 戶部

Huazi Ribao

#7°*»

Huiban Dachen 會辦大臣

Jinbudang 進步黨

jinshi 進士

Liji《禮記》

lijin 釐金

mufu 幕府

Nanbei Guild 南北行

dibao 地保

Nonggongshang Bu 農工商部

Donghua Hospital

qi 氣

duban 督辦

dudu 都督

Qing Bang 青幫

qingyi pai 清議派

dujun 督軍

Duzhi Bu 度支部

Emperor Shun 舜帝

Emperor Yao 堯帝

Falu Xiuding Guan 法律修訂館

Gonghe Tongyi Hui 共和統一會 Gonghedang 共和黨

Qiren 旗人

renzheng 仁政

ru儒

Shang Bu 商部

shangzhan 商戰

Tongmeng Hui

295

296

tongxiang 同鄉

Waiwu Bu 外務部

Weisheng Hui 衛生會

wenming paiwai 文明排外

Wenwu Temple 文武廟

wulun 五倫

xiao 孝

Xing Bu 刑部

Xing Zhong Hui 興中會

Xinwen Bao《新文報》

xiyisuo 習藝所

Xunhuan Ribao «»

yangwu rencai #^ƒ

yi 義

yi lao mai lao 倚老賣老

yici 義祠

Yiyou She 誼友社

yong 用

Youchuan Bu 郵傳部

zhengshi 正式

Zhonghua Huiguan 中華會館

Zhongwai Xinbao

Zhongyiyuan 眾議院

Ziqiang/Yangwu Yundong

自強/洋務運動

zongcai 總裁

Zongli Dachen

Zongli Yamen 總理衙門

zongsiling 總司令

Glossary

Bibliography

Alarm Bell (Jingzhong Ribao). Sept. 1904-Feb. 1905.

American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. Report of the Forty-third Meeting,

1852. Boston, 1852.

Bai Qiao. Yuan Shikai yu Zhonghua Minguo. Reprint. Taibei: Wenxing, 1962. Balandier, G. "The Colonial Situation: A Theoretical Approach (1951).” In Social Change: The Colonial Situation, edited by Immanuel Wallerstein, 34-61. New York: Wiley, 1966.

Banno Junji. “The Japanese Army's China Policy from 1911: Split or Division of Labor." Papers on Far Eastern History: China's 1911 Revolution, edited by John Fincher, vol. 19 (Mar. 1979), 165–79.

Bastid-Bruguiere, Marianne. "Currents of Social Change." In The Cambridge History of

China. Vol. 11, Late Ch'ing, 1800–1911, Part 2, edited by John K. Fairbank and Liu Kwang-ching, 535–602. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.

Basu, Dilip K. "Perspectives on the Colonial Port City in Asia." In The Rise and Growth of

the Colonial Port Cities in Asia, edited by Dilip K. Basu, xiv-xxv. Santa Cruz, Calif.: Center for South Pacific Studies, University of California, Santa Cruz, 1979. Bays, Daniel H. China Enters the Twentieth Century: Chang Chih-tung and the Issues of a New

Age, 1895-1909. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1978.

Beresford, Lord Charles. The Breakup of China: With an Account of Its Present Commerce, Currency, Waterways, Armies, Railways, Politics, and Future Prospects. New York: Harper, 1899.

Bergere, Marie-Claire. Une crise financiere a Shanghai a la fin de l'ancien regime. Paris:

Mouton, 1964.

Booker, Edna Lee. News is My Job: A Correspondent in War-Torn China. New York:

Macmillan, 1941.

Boorman, Howard L., ed. Biographical Dictionary of Republican China. 4 vols. New York:

Columbia University Press, 1967–71.

Bourne, F. S. A. “Historical Table of High Officials Composing the Central and

Provincial Governments of China.” China Review 7, no. 5 (1878–79): 321. Braisted, William R. "The United States and the America China Development Company."

Far Eastern Quarterly 11 (Feb. 1952): 147–65.

Britton, Roswell S. The Chinese Periodical Press, 1800–1912. Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1935. Cai Erkang. "Zhong-Dong zhanji benmo.” In Zhong-Ri zhanzheng, edited by Zhongguo

shixue hui (Shao Xunzheng et al.), vol. 5, 351-437. Shanghai: Xinzhishi, 1955. Cao Rulin. Yisheng zhi huiyi. Hong Kong: Chunqiu zazhi, 1966.

Carnegie, Andrew. Papers. Library of Congress.

Carson, Gerald. The Cornflake Crusade. New York: Rinehart, 1957.

Cen Xuelu. Sanshui Liang Yansun xiansheng nianpu. 2 vols. Reprint. Taibei: Wenxing,

1962.

Chan, Ming. “A Tale of Two Cities: Canton and Hong Kong.” In The Rise and Growth of

297

298

Bibliography

the Colonial Port Cities in Asia, edited by Dilip K. Basu, 135–37 (abstract). Santa Cruz, Calif.: Center for South Pacific Studies, University of California, Santa Cruz, 1979. Chan, Wellington K. K. Merchants, Mandarins, and Modern Enterprise in Late Ch'ing China. Cambridge: Harvard University East Asian Research Center, 1977; distributed by Harvard University Press.

Chang Yu-chuan [Zhang Yujuan]. "The Legal Practitioner in China.” Chinese Social and

Political Science Review 22, no. 2 (1938): 146–84.

Checkland, S. G. The Rise of Industrial Society in England, 1815-1885. London:

Longmans, 1964.

Chen, Jerome. China and the West: Society and Culture, 1815–1937. Bloomington, Ind.:

University of Indiana Press, 1979.

Yuan Shih-k'ai (1859–1916): Brutus Assumes the Purple. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961.

Chen Cisheng. Wu Tingfang yishi. Shanghai: Hongwen tushu, 1925.

Chen Dingshan. Chun Shen jiuwen. Taibei: Shijie wenwu, 1967.

Chen Lanbin. "Shi Mei jilue." In Xiaofanghuzhai yudi congchao, compiled by Wang Xiqi.

Shanghai, 1877-97. Reprint. Taibei: Guangwen, 1964.

Chen Zhao. "Xianggang de chuqi jiaoyu." In Xianggang bainian shi, edited by Li Jinwei.

Hong Kong: Nanzhong bianyi, 1943.

Cheng, Irene. Clara Ho Tung: A Hong Kong Lady, Her Family and Her Times. Hong Kong:

The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1976.

Cheng Shenxiutang, ed. Cheng Biguang xunguo ji. Reprint. Taibei: Wenhai, 1971. Chesneaux, Jean. The Chinese Labor Movement, 1919–1927. Translated by H. M. Wright.

Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968.

"The Federalist Movement in China, 1920–3.” In Modern China's Search for a Political Form, edited by Jack Gray. London: Oxford University Press, 1969.

Chi, Madeleine. China Diplomacy, 1914–1918. Cambridge: Harvard University East Asian

Research Center, 1970.

China. Foreign Ministry. Waijiao dang'an. Nan'gang, Taiwan: Institute of Modern

History, Academia Sinica.

China. Legation, Washington, D.C. "Notes from the Chinese Legation to the Department

of State, 1868–1906.” Record Group 59. U.S. National Archives.

Chinese Repository. 20 (1851).

Choa, G. H. The Life and Times of Sir Kai Ho Kai: A Prominent Figure in Nineteenth-Century

Hong Kong. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1981.

Chong Kay Ray. “Cheng Kuan-ying (1841-1920): A Source of Sun Yat-sen's Nationalist

Ideology?" Journal of Asian Studies 28 (Feb. 1969): 247–67.

Chroust, Anton-Hermann. The Rise of the Legal Profession in America, vol. 1. Norman, Okla.:

University of Oklahoma Press, 1965.

Ch'u T'ung-tsu [Qu Tongzu]. Law and Society in Traditional China. Paris: Mouton, 1965. Local Government in China Under the Ch'ing. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,

1962. Chuan Han-sheng [Quan Hansheng]. "The Economic Crisis of 1883 as Seen in the Failure of Hsu Jun's Real Estate Business in Shanghai.” In Conference on Modern Chinese Economic History, edited by Hou and Yu, 493–98. Taibei, 1979.

Chuan Han-sheng and He Hanwei. “Qingji de shangban tielu." Zhongguo wenhua yanjiusuo xuebao (The Chinese University of Hong Kong) 9, no. 1 (1978): 119–72. Church Missionary Record 22 (1851); n.s., 2 (1872).

Church Missionary Society. Proceedings. 52nd year (1850–51) and 53rd year (1851-52).

London, 1851–52.

Bibliography

299

Cochran, Sherman G. “Big Business in China: Sino-American Rivalry in the Tobacco

Industry, 1890–1930.” Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1975.

Cohen, Paul A. Between Tradition and Modernity: Wang T'ao and Reform in Late Ch'ing

China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974.

Discovering History in China. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.

“Littoral and Hinterland in Nineteenth Century China: The 'Christian' Reformer." In The Missionary Enterprise in China and America, edited by John K. Fairbank, 197–225. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974.

Cohen, Paul A., and John E. Schrecker. Reform in Nineteenth-Century China. Cambridge:

Harvard University Press, 1976.

Cohen, Warren I. America's Response to China: An Interpretive History of Sino-American

Relations. New York: Wiley, 1971.

Crow, Carl. China Takes Her Place. New York: Harpers, 1944.

Da Qing lichao shilu. 1927. Reprint. Taibei: Wenxing, 1963.

Daily Mail (Hong Kong). 1879, 1881-82.

Daily Press (Hong Kong). 1877-78, 1880.

Dayer, Roberta A. Bankers and Diplomats in China, 1917–1925: The Anglo-American

Relationship. London: F. Cass, 1981.

Denby, Charles. China and Her People: Being the Observations, Reminiscences, and Conclusions

of an American Diplomat. 2 vols. Boston: Page, 1906.

Deng Cengxiang. “Guangzhou xuesheng Wu-Si Yundong ji.” In Wu-Si Yundong huiyilu, edited by Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan, Jindaishi yanjiusuo, vol. 2, 826–34. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue, 1979.

Dennett, Tyler. Americans in East Asia: A Critical Study of the Policy of the United States with Reference to China, Japan and Korea in the Nineteenth Century. New York: Macmillan, 1922. Dennys, N. B., ed. The Treaty Ports of China and Japan.... by William Frederick Mayers,

N. B. Dennys, and Charles King. London: Truebner, 1867.

Des Forges, Roger V. Hsi-Liang and the Chinese National Revolution. New Haven: Yale

University Press, 1973.

Des Voeux, Sir George William. My Colonial Service in British Guiana, St. Lucia, Trinidad, Fiji, Australia, Newfoundland and Hong Kong, With Interludes. 2 vols. London: Murray, 1903.

Dictionary of American Biography.

Ding Mingnan. "Shijiu shiji liushi zhi jiushi niandai Qingchao tongzhi jituan zuigaoceng

neibu douzheng gaishu.” Jindaishi yanjiu, 1982, no. 1: 153-74.

Ding Richu. “Xinhai Geming qian de Shanghai zibenjia jieji.” In Jinian Xinhai Geming

qishi zhounian xueshu taolunhui wenji, edited by Zhonghua Shuju bianji bu, vol. 1, 281–321. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1983.

Ding Richu and Du Xuncheng. “Yu Xiaqing jianlun.” Lishi yanjiu, 1981, no. 3: 145–66. Ding Richu and Shen Zuwei, “Lun wanQing de guojia ziben zhuyi.” Lishi yanjiu, 1983,

no. 6: 151-74.

Ding Wenjiang. Liang Rengong xiansheng nianpu changbian chugao. Taibei: Shijie, 1958. Diyici Zhong-Ri zhanzheng. Taibei: Zhengzhong, 1959.

Dongfang zazhi. 1–8 (1904–11). Shanghai.

Eastman, Lloyd E. Throne and Mandarins: China's Search for a Policy During the Sino-French

Controversy, 1880–1885. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967.

Eitel, E. J. Europe in China: The History of Hongkong from the Beginning to the Year 1882.

London: Luzac, 1895. Reprint. Taibei: 1968.

Endacott, G. B. A Biographical Sketch-book of Early Hong Kong. Singapore: D. Moore for

Eastern Universities Press, 1962.

300

Bibliography

An Eastern Entrepot: A Collection of Documents Illustrating the History of Hong Kong. London: HMSO, 1964.

•

Government and People in Hong Kong, 1841–1962: A Constitutional History. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1964.

A History of Hong Kong. 2d ed. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1973. Esherick, Joseph W. “1911: A Review.” In "A Symposium on the 1911 Revolution."

Modern China 2, no. 2 (Apr. 1976): 141–84.

Reform and Revolution in China: The 1911 Revolution in Hunan and Hubei. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976.

Fan Baichuan. "Ershi shiji chuqi Zhongguo ziben zhuyi fazhan de gaikuang yu tedian."

Lishi yanjiu, 1983, no. 4: 11–24.

Fang Teng. "Yu Xiaqing lun.” Zazhi yuekan 12, no. 2 (Nov. 1943): 46–51; no. 3 (Dec.

1943): 62-67; no. 4 (Jan. 1944): 59–64.

Farjenal, Fernand. Through the Chinese Revolution: My Experiences in the South and North.

Translated by Margaret Vivian. London: Duckworth, 1915.

Feng Gengguang. “Miaochang dushi nanxia yu Nanbei yihe." In Xinhai Geming huiyilu,

vol. 6, 348–68.

•

Feng Ziyou. Geming yishi. Shanghai, 1946–47. Reprint. Taibei: Shangwu, 1953. Feuerwerker, Albert. China's Early Industrialization: Sheng Hsuan-huai (1844–1916) and

Mandarin Enterprise. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958.

Feuerwerker, Albert, et al. Approaches to Modern Chinese History. Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1967.

Fincher, John H. Chinese Democracy: The Self-Government Movement in Local, Provincial and

National Politics, 1905–1914. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981.

Folsom, Kenneth E. Friends, Guests and Colleagues: A Study of the Mu-fu System in Late

Ch'ing China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968.

Foster, John W. Diplomatic Memoirs. 2 vols. Boston: Houghton, 1909.

Freedman, M. “Colonial Law and Chinese Society.” Journal of the Royal Anthropological

Institute 80 (1950): 97–126.

Friedman, Edward. "The Center Cannot Hold: The Failure of Parliamentary Democracy in China from 1911 to the World War in 1914.” Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1966.

Friend of China (London). 1, Mar.-Oct. 1875.

Fu Bingchang. Fu Bingchang xiansheng fangwen jilu. Nan'gang, Taiwan: Institute of

Modern History, Academia Sinica; New York: Columbia University.

Fung, Edmund S. K. "Post-1949 Chinese Historiography on the 1911 Revolution."

Modern China 4, no. 2 (Apr. 1978): 181–214.

Gan Yi. “Xinhai heyi zhi mishi.” In Xinhai Geming, edited by Zhongguo shixue hui, vol.

8, 116–19. Shanghai: Renmin, 1957.

Gasster, Michael. Chinese Intellectuals and the Revolution of 1911. Seattle: University of

Washington Press, 1969.

Ge Gongzhen. Zhongguo baoxue shi. Shanghai: Shangwu, 1935.

Godley, Michael R. Mandarin-Capitalists from Nanyang: Overseas Chinese in the Modernization

of China, 1893-1911. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Great Britain Colonial Office. Bluebooks, Hongkong. 1860–73, 1877–82. CO 133/17–30,

34-39.

Hongkong: Correspondence, Original. 1877–82. CO 129/177–207. Hongkong Government Gazette. 1876–82. CO132/17–23.

Sessional Papers, Hongkong. CO131/6, 10–13.

Great Britain Foreign Office. China Materials. 1895–1912. Series FO 17 and FO 371.

Bibliography

301

Great Britain Parliament. House of Commons. Sessional Papers. 1857-82. Gu Weijun [V. K. Wellington Koo]. Huiyilu. Beijing: Zhonghua, 1983. Guangxu chao donghua lu. Edited by Zhu Shoupeng and revised by Zhang Jinglu. 5 vols.

Beijing: Zhonghua, 1958.

Guo Tingyi. Jindai Zhongguo shishi rizhi. 2 vols. Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan, 1963. Guomin riri bao huibian, 1903-1904. Reprint. Taibei: Zhonghua Minguo shiliao

congbian, 1968.

“Guo’nei shixuejie guanyu jindai Zhongguo zichan jieji de yanjiu.” Lishi yanjiu, 1983, no.

4: 55–66.

Hall, Ray O. Chapters and Documents on Chinese National Banking. Shanghai: Commercial

Press, 1920.

Hao Yen-p'ing. The Comprador in Nineteenth Century China: Bridge Between East and West.

Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970.

Harding, Alan. A Social History of English Law. London: Penguin, 1965.

Hart, Sir Robert. The I.G. in Peking: Letters of Robert Hart, Chinese Maritime Customs, 1868– 1907. Edited by John King Fairbank, Katherine Frost Bruner, and Elizabeth MacLeod Matheson, with an Introduction by L. K. Little. 2 vols. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975.

Hay, John. Papers. Library of Congress.

He Qi and Hu Liyuan. Xinzheng zhenquan. N.p. 1909. Reprinted in Wuxu Bianfa, edited by Zhongguo shixue hui, vol. 1, 187–216. Shanghai: Shenzhou guoguang she, 1953. He Xiangning. “Wo de huiyi.” In Huiyi Xinhai Geming, edited by Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi quanguo weiyuanhui and Wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui, 11-58. Beijing: Wenshi ziliao, 1981.

Henderson, Mary Newton Foote. The Aristocracy of Health: A Study of Physical Culture, Our Favorite Poisons and a National and International League for the Advancement of Physical Culture. Washington, D.C.: Colton, 1904.

Hennessy, James Pope. Verandah: Some Episodes in the Crown Colonies, 1867–1889. London:

Allen & Unwin, 1964.

Hennessy, Sir John Pope. Papers. 1875–92. Oxford University Colonial Research Project,

Rhodes House.

"His Excellency, Wu Ting-fang." World's Work 1 (Dec. 1900): 177–78.

Ho Ping-ti [He Bingdi]. “Weng T'ung-ho and the 'One Hundred Days of Reform."" Far

Eastern Quarterly 10 (1950-51): 125-35.

"Zhang Yinhuan shiji.” In Weixin yu baoshou, 91–113. Taibei: Zhengzhong, 1959. Hong Kong. Historical and Statistical Abstract of the Colony of Hong Kong. Hong Kong:

Noronha, 1907.

Hong Kong Telegraph. 1889-1891.

Hong Kong Weekly Press and Overland Trade Report. 3 Feb., 11 Mar. 1897.

Hou Chi-ming and Yu Tzong-shian, eds. Proceedings of the Conference on Modern Chinese Economic History, Taipei, 1977. Taipei: Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, 1979; distributed by the University of Washington Press.

Hsiao Kung-ch'uan [Xiao Gongquan]. Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth

Century. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1960.

"Weng T'ung-ho and the Reform Movement of 1898.” Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies, n.s., 1 (1957): 111–243.

Hsieh, Winston. Chinese Historiography on the Revolution of 1911. Stanford: Stanford

University Press, 1975.

Hsu, Immanuel C. Y. China's Entrance into the Family of Nations: The Diplomatic Phase,

1858–1880. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960.

302

Bibliography

Hsueh Chun-tu [Xue Jundu]. Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution. Stanford:

Stanford University Press, 1961.

Hu Guangbiao. Po ju liushi nian. Taibei: Xinwen tiandi she, 1968.

Hu Hanmin. Zizhuan. Taibei: Zhuanji wenxue, 1969.

Huang Jiamo. Meiguo yu Taiwan: Yiqibasi zhi yibajiuwu. Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan,

1966.

Huang Xing. Huang Xing ji, edited by Hunan sheng shehui kexueyuan. Beijing:

Zhonghua, 1981.

Huang Yifeng and Jiang Dou. "Yao qiadang de pingjie Yangwu Yundong de jiji zuoyong."

Lishi yanjiu, 1980, no. 6: 21–30.

"Zong ping Yangwu Yundong." Lishi yanjiu, 1979, no. 2: 58–70.

Huazi Ribao [Wah Tze Yat Po] (Hong Kong). 1897, 1912–13.

Huazi Ribao, ed. Huazi Ribao qishinian jinian kan. Hong Kong, 1934.

Huiyi Xinhai Geming, edited by Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi quanguo

weiyuanhui and Wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui. Beijing: Wenshi ziliao, 1981. Hummel, Arthur W., ed. Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644–1912). 2 vols.

Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943–44.

Hunt, Michael H. Frontier Defense and the Open Door: Manchuria in Chinese-American

Relations, 1895–1911. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973.

Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek]. Sun dazongtong Guangzhou mengnan riji. Shanghai: Minzhi,

1927.

Jin Liang, comp. Jinshi renwu zhi. 1934. Reprint. Taibei: Guomin, 1955.

Journal of the American Asiatic Association. 1–3 (1898–1900).

Ju Zheng. Xinhai zhaji: Meichuan riji. Reprint. Taibei: Zhongyang wenwu gongying she,

1956.

Karlin, Jules Alexander. “The Indemnification of Aliens Injured by Mob Violence."

Southwestern Social Science Quarterly 25 (1945): 235–46.

Kellogg, J. H. The Living Temple. Battle Creek, Mich., 1903.

Kennedy, Raymond. “The Colonial Crisis and the Future." In The Science of Man in the World

Crisis, edited by Ralph Linton, 306–46. New York: Columbia University Press, 1945. Kent, Percy Horace. The Passing of the Manchus. London: E. Arnold, 1912.

Railway Enterprise in China: An Account of Its Origin and Development. London: E. Arnold, 1907.

Kinder, Claude William. “Railways and Coal Mines of North China.” Proceedings of the

Institution of Civil Engineers 103 (1890): 278–306.

King, Frank H. H., and Prescott Clarke. A Research Guide to China Coast Newspapers, 1822–

1911. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965.

King, Paul. In the Chinese Customs Service: A Personal Record of Forty-seven Years. London:

Unwin, 1924.

Kohn, Hans. "Reflections on Colonialism.” In The Idea of Colonialism, edited by Robert

Strausz-Hupe and Harry W. Hazard, 2–16. New York: Praeger, 1958.

Kotenev, A. M. Shanghai: Its Mixed Court and Council. Shanghai: North China Daily News

and Herald, 1925.

Lary, Diana. Region and Nation: The Kwangsi Clique in Chinese Politics, 1925–1937.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974.

Latourette, Kenneth Scott. A History of Christian Missions in China. New York:

Macmillan, 1929.

Le Fevour, Edward. Western Enterprise in Late Ch'ing China: A Selective Survey of Jardine, Matheson and Company's Operations, 1842–1895. Cambridge: Harvard University East Asian Research Center, 1968.

Bibliography

303

Lee En-han [Li Enhan]. China's Quest for Railway Autonomy, 1904–1911: A Study of the Chinese Railway-Rights Recovery Movement. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1977.

"China's Response to Foreign Investment in Her Mining Industry." Journal of Asian Studies 28, no. 1 (Nov. 1968): 55–76.

•

"T'ang Shao-yi: Diplomat and Politician of Late Ch'ing China." Bulletin of the

Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica 4, no. 1 (1973): 53–126.

WanQing de shouhui kuangquan yundong. Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan, Jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1963.

Lei Longqing. Li Hongzhang nianpu. Taibei: Shangwu, 1977.

Leong Yuen Sang. "Regional Rivalry in Mid-Nineteenth Century Shanghai: Cantonese

vs. Ningpo Men.” Ch'ing-shih wen-t'i 4, no. 8 (Dec. 1982): 29–50.

Lethbridge, Henry. Hong Kong: Stability and Change: A Collection of Essays. Hong Kong:

Oxford University Press, 1978.

Li Chien-nung [Li Jiannong]. The Political History of China, 1840–1928. Translated and edited by Teng Ssu-yu and Jeremy Ingalis. East-West Student ed. Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1963.

Li Guangcan. “Cong Shen Jiaben de zouyi he xiulu kan ta de falu sixiang.” Jindaishi

yanjiu, 1982, no. 3: 201–15.

Li Guoqi. Zhongguo zaoqi de tielu jingying. Nan’gang, Taiwan: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan,

Jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1961.

Li Hongzhang. Li Wenzhonggong quanji, edited by Wu Rulun. Nanjing, 1905. Reprint.

Taibei: Wenhai, 1965.

Li Liejun. Li Liejun jiangjun zizhuan. Reprint. Taibei: Wenhai, 1971.

Li Peisheng. Guixi ju Yue zhi youlai jiqi jingguo. Reprint. Taibei: Wenhai, 1971.

Li Shiyue. "Cong yangwu, weixin dao zichan jieji geming.” Lishi yanjiu, 1980, no. 1: 31–40. Li Shoukong. "Guofu hufa yu Guangzhou junzhengfu zhi chengli." In Zhongguo

xiandaishi lunji, vol. 7, 167–212. Taibei: Lianjing, 1982.

1964.

Minchu zhi guohui. Taibei: Zhongguo xueshu zhuzuo qiangzhu weiyuanhui,

Li Tieh-tseng. Tibet Today and Yesterday. New York: Bookman Associates, 1960.

Li Tien-yi. Woodrow Wilson's China Policy. New York, 1952.

Li Yiji, comp. Gu Gangzhou gujin shi. 2 vols. Hong Kong: Guangxin, 1975.

Li Yunhan. "Zhongshan xiansheng hufa shiqi de dui-Mei jianshe (1917-1923).” In

Zhongguo xiandaishi lunji, vol. 7, 213–48. Taibei: Lianjing, 1982.

Li Zongtong and Liu Fenghan. Li Hongzao xiansheng nianpu. 2 vols. Taibei: Shangwu,

1969.

Li Zongyi. Yuan Shikai zhuan. Beijing: Zhonghua, 1980.

Liang Qichao. Yinbingshi wenji. Shanghai, 1933. Reprint. Taibei: Zhonghua, 1960. Liew, K. S. Struggle for Democracy: Sung Chiao-jen and the 1911 Chinese Revolution. Berkeley:

University of California Press, 1971.

Lim Boon-keng [Lin Wenjing; Wen Ching, pseud.]. The Chinese Crisis from Within.

London, 1901.

Lincoln's Inn. Legal Education Examination Papers, 1874–1877.

Ling Hongxun. Zhan Tianyou xiansheng nianpu. Taibei: Zhongguo gongchengshi

xuehui, 1961.

-. Zhongguo tielu zhi. Taibei: Zhangliu banyuekan, 1954.

Literary Digest (New York). 18-25 (Apr. 1899-Aug. 1902).

Liu Housheng. Zhang Jian zhuanji. Hong Kong: Longmen, 1965.

Liu Kunyi. Liu Kunyi yiji. Compiled by Zhongguo kexueyuan, Yanjiusuo, Di sansuo. 6

vols. Beijing: Zhonghua, 1959.

304

Bibliography

Liu Kwang-ching. “Credit Failures in China's Early Industrialization: The Background and Implications of Hsu Jun's Bankruptcy in 1883." In Conference on Modern Chinese Economic History, edited by Hou and Yu, 499–509. Taibei, 1979.

"Li Hung-chang in Chihli: The Emergence of a Policy, 1870-1875." In Approaches to Modern Chinese History, by Albert Feuerwerker et al. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.

"Tang Tingshu zhi maiban shidai.” Qinghua xuebao, n.s., 2, no. 2 (June 1961): 143-80.

Liu Shoulin. Xinhai yihou shiqi nian zhiguan nianbiao. Beijing: Zhonghua, 1966. Liu Xihong. “Yingzhao riji.” In Xiaofanghuzhai yudi congchao, compiled by Wang Xiqi.

Shanghai, 1877-97. Reprint. Taibei: Guangwen, 1964.

Liu Xingnan. “Xinhai gesheng daibiao huiyi rizhi.” In Xinhai Geming huiyilu, edited by Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi banshang huiyi, 6:241–60. Beijing: Zhonghua, 1962. Liu Yuesheng. Xianggang Jidujiao huishi. Hong Kong, 1937.

Lo Hsiang-lin. Hongkong and Western Cultures. Tokyo: Centre for East Asian Cultural

Studies, 1963.

London Missionary Society. Report of the Directors. 1849–73.

Lovett, Richard. The History of the London Missionary Society, 1795–1895. 2 vols. London:

Frowde, 1899.

Luk, Bernard Hung-kay. “A Hong Kong Barrister in Late-Ch'ing Law Reform.” Hong Kong

Law Journal 11, no. 3 (Sept. 1981): 339–55.

Luo Jialun. Guofu nianpu. 2 vols. Taibei: Zhengzhong, 1958.

Lust, J. "The Su-pao Case: An Episode in the Early Nationalist Movement.” Bulletin of the

School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 27, part 2 (1964): 408–29. Ma Fengchi. “Ma Fengchi midian.” Arranged by Zhang Bofeng. Jindaishi ziliao 36, no.

1(1978): 41-75.

Ma Jianzhong. Shikezhai jiyanjixing. Jindai Zhongguo shiliao congkan, vol. 16. Shanghai,

1896. Reprint. Taibei: Wenhai.

Ma Wenhuan. American Policy Towards China as Revealed in the Debates of Congress. Shanghai:

Kelly & Walsh, 1934.

Ma Xiang. "Gensui Sun Zhongshan xiansheng shi you nian de huiyi." In Huiyi Xinhai Geming, edited by Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi quanguo weiyuanhui and Wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui, 86–135. Beijing: Wenshi ziliao, 1981. McCormick, Thomas J. The China Market: America's Quest for Informal Empire, 1893–1901.

Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967.

McKinley, William. Papers. Library of Congress.

MacKinnon, Stephen R. “Liang Shih-i and the Communications Clique.” Journal of Asian

Studies 29 (1970): 581–602.

Power and Politics in Late Imperial China: Yuan Shikai in Beijing and Tianjin, 1901– 1908. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.

MacMurray, J. V. A. Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 1894–1919. 2 vols.

New York: Oxford University Press, 1921.

Mai Meisheng. "Jidujiao zai Guangdong." In Guangdong wenwu, edited by Guangdong

wenwu zhanlan hui. Hong Kong: Zhongguo wenhua xiejin hui, 1941.

Mann, Susan. "The Ningpo Pang and Financial Power at Shanghai.” In The Chinese City Between Two Worlds, edited by Mark Elvin and G. William Skinner, 73–96. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974.

Marquis, D. R. "Personality Behind the Chinese Boycott." American Magazine 62 (May

1906): 74–77.

Meijer, M. J. The Introduction of Modern Criminal Law in China. 2d ed. Hong Kong: Lung

Men, 1967.

Bibliography

Millard's Review (Shanghai). Vol. 1, no. 6 (14 July 1917).

305

Miner, Luella, ed. Two Heroes of Cathay: An Autobiography and a Sketch. New York: Revell,

1903.

Minguo renuwu zhuan. 3 vols. Beijing: Zhonghua, 1981.

Ministries of Communications and Railways, comp. Jiaotong shi. Nanjing, 1930.

Missionary Herald at Home and Abroad 46 (1850). Boston, ABCFM.

Modern China. “A Symposium on the 1911 Revolution.” 2, no. 2 (Apr. 1976): 139–226. Morrison, George Ernest. The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison. Edited by Lo Hui-min. 2

vols. London: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

Murphey, Rhoads. The Outsiders: The Western Experience in India and China. Ann Arbor:

University of Michigan Press, 1977.

Mutsu Munemitsu. Kenkenroku: A Diplomatic Record of the Sino-Japanese War, 1894–95. Edited and translated with historical notes by Gordon Mark Berger. Tokyo: Japan Foundation, 1982.

Nathan, Andrew J. Peking Politics, 1918–1923: Factionalism and the Failure of

Constitutionalism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976.

National Review (Shanghai). 9-10 (1910-12).

New York Times. 1897–1905.

North China Daily News (Shanghai). 1912–17.

North China Herald (and Supreme Court Consular Gazette). Shanghai, 1877–1912. Norton-Kyshe, J. W. The History of the Laws and Courts of Hong Kong. 2 vols. London:

Unwin, 1898.

Pearl, Cyril. Morrison of Peking. Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1967.

Pelcovits, Nathan A. Old China Hands and the Foreign Office. New York: Institute of Pacific

Relations, 1948.

Pivar, David J. Purity Crusade: Sexual Morality and Social Control, 1868–1900. Westport,

Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973.

Pomerantz, Linda. “The Chinese Bourgeoisie and the Anti-Chinese Movement in the

United States, 1850–1905.” Amerasia Journal 11, no. 1 (Fall 1984): 1–33.

Porter, Jonathan. Tseng Kuo-fan's Private Bureaucracy. China Research Monographs, 9.

Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, 1972.

Pound, Roscoe. The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times. . . . St. Paul, Minn.: West Pub.

Co., 1953.

Powell, Ralph. The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 1895-1912. Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1955.

Presbyterian Church. U.S.A. Board of Foreign Missions. Missions Correspondence, China,

1837-1911. Incoming Letters, 1837–1894.

Purcell, Victor. The Chinese in Malaya. London: Oxford University Press, 1948.

Qian Jibo. "Xinhai Nanbei yihe bieji.” In Xinhai Geming, edited by Zhongguo shixue hui,

vol. 8, 103–9. Beijing: Renmin, 1957.

Qian Shifu. Qingdai zhiguan nianbiao. 4 vols. Beijing: Zhonghua, 1980.

Qing shi. 8 vols. Yangmingshan, Taiwan: Guofang yanjiuyuan, 1961.

Qing shi liezhuan. Taibei: Zhonghua, 1962.

Qingji waijiao shiliao. Compiled by Wang Liang. 1935. Reprint. Taibei: Zhonghua, 1964. Qiu Jie. "Guangdong shangren yu Xinhai Gemning." In Jinian Xinhai Geming qishi zhounian

xueshu taolunhui lunwen ji, edited by Zhonghua Shuju bianji bu, vol. 1, 362–96. Rankin, Mary Backus. Early Chinese Revolutionaries: Radical Intellectuals in Shanghai and

Chekiang, 1902-1911. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971.

Rasmussen, O. D. Tientsin: An Illustrated Outline History. Tianjin: Tientsin Press, 1925. Rawlinson, John L. China's Struggle for Naval Development, 1839-1895. Cambridge:

Harvard University Press, 1967.

306

Bibliography

Reid, John Gilbert. The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, 1908–1912: An Episode in Pre- War Diplomacy: A Study of the Role of Foreign Diplomacy During the Reign of Hsuan-t'ung. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1935.

Reinsch, Paul S. An American Diplomat in China. New York: Doubleday, 1922. Remer, C. F. The Foreign Trade of China. Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1926. Rhoads, Edward J. M. China's Republican Revolution: The Case of Kwangtung, 1895–1913.

Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975.

"Two Cheers for 1911.” Modern China 5, no. 1 (Jan. 1979): 127–36.

Rockhill, William W. Papers. 1874-1914. Houghton Library, Harvard University. Rodes, Jean. Scenes de la vie revolutionnaire en Chine (1911–1914). 2d ed. Paris: Plon, 1917. Rosenbaum, Arthur Lewis. “China's First Railway: The Imperial Railways of North

China, 1880-1911.” Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1972.

Roxburgh, Sir Ronald, ed. The Records of the Honourable Society of Lincoln's Inn (The Black

Books). London: Lincoln's Inn, 1968.

San Francisco Post. 1877.

Schiffrin, Harold Z. Sun Yat-sen and the Origins of the Chinese Revolution. Berkeley:

University of California Press, 1970.

Schneider, Laurence A. Ku Chieh-kang and China's New History: Nationalism and the Quest

for Alternative Traditions. Berkeley: University of Callfornia Press, 1970.

Schoppa, R. Keith. Chinese Elites and Political Change: Zhejiang Province in the Early Twentieth

Century. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982.

Schwartz, Benjamin. In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West. Cambridge, Mass.,

1964.

Selles, Earl Albert. Donald of China. New York: Harper, 1948.

Sha Ding and Yang Dianqiu. “Zhongguo yu Moxige de shouci li de jianjiao ji qi

yingxiang." Lishi yanjiu, 1981: 181–89.

Shang Binghe. Xinren chunqiu. Beijing, 1924. Reprint. Taibei: Wenxing, 1962.

Shanghai shehui kexueyuan, Lishi yanjiusuo, ed. Xinhai Geming zai Shanghai shiliao

xuanji. Shanghai: Renmin, 1981.

Shao Yuanzhong. Chen Yingshi xiansheng geming xiaoshi. Taibei: Zhongguo Guomindang

zhongyang weiyuanhui, Dangshi weiyuanhui, 1977.

Shen Weibin and Yang Liqiang. “Shanghai shangtuan yu Xinhai Geming,” Lishi yanjiu,

1980, no. 3: 67-88.

Shen Yunlong. "Huang Keqiang yu Chen Yingshi." In his Jindai zhengzhi renuu shuping, vol.

1, 77-119.

Jindai zhengzhi renuu shuping. Jindai Zhongguo shiliao congkan, vols. 2, 20. Taibei: Wenhai, 1966.

"Li Pingshu yu Xinhai Shanghai guangfu.” In his Jindai zhengzhi renuu shuping, vol. 2, 110-18.

Li Yuanhong pingzhuan. Taibei: Wenhai, 1971.

"Minguo diyi ren neige renxuan de kaozheng.” In his Jindai zhengzhi renwu

shuping, vol. 1, 177–88.

Sheng Xuanhuai. Weikan xin'gao. Edited by Beijing Daxue lishixi jindaishijiao yanjiushi.

Beijing: Xinhua, 1960.

Xinhai Geming qianhou: Sheng Xuanhuai dang'an ziliao xuanji zhi yi. Edited by Chen Xulu, Gu Tinglung, and Wang Xi. Shanghai: Renmin, 1979.

Yuzhai cun'gao. Shanghai, 1939. Reprint. Taibei: Wenhai, 1963.

Shi Zhizhi [Alfred Sze]. Shi Zhizhi xiansheng zaonian huiyilu. Taibei, 1954.

Siah U Chin. "Numbers, Tribes and Avocations of the Chinese in Singapore." Logan's

Journal 2 (1848).

Bibliography

307

Sigel, Louis T. “Revolution by Diplomacy: A Re-examination of the Shanghai Peace Conference of 1911.” In Papers on Far Eastern History: China's 1911 Revolution, edited by John Fincher, vol. 19 (Mar. 1979), 111-43.

"T'ang Shao-yi (1860-1938): The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism,” Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1972.

Smith, Carl T. "An Early Hong Kong Success Story: Wei Akwong, the Beggar Boy."

Chung Chi Bulletin, no. 45 (Dec. 1968): 9–14.

"The Emergence of a Chinese Elite in Hong Kong." Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 11 (1971): 74–115.

Song, Sir Ong Siang. One Hundred Years of the Chinese in Singapore. London: Murray, 1923. Spector, Stanley. Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army: A Study in Nineteenth Century

Regionalism. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964.

Speer, R. E. "Confucian Propaganda of Wu.” Missionary Review 24 (May 1901): 370–73. Sturdevant, Saundra. “Imperialism, Sovereignty, and Self-Strengthening: A Reassessment of the 1870's." In Reform in Nineteenth Century China, edited by Paul A. Cohen and John E. Schrecker, 63–70. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976.

Sun Yixian [Sun Yat-sen]. Guofu quanji. Edited by Committee for the Centennial of Sun

Yixian's Birth. Taibei, 1965.

Sutton, Donald S. Provincial Militarism and the Chinese Republic: The Yunnan Army, 1905–

25. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980.

Tan, Chester C. The Boxer Catastrophe. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. Tang, C. Y. “T’ang Wen-chih, Statesman and Educator,” Tien Hsia Monthly 5, no. 1 (Aug.

1937): 19-26.

Tang Wenzhi. Rujing xiansheng ziding nianpu. Reprint. Taibei: Wenhai, 1974.

Tao Juyin. Beiyang junfa tongzhi shiqi shihua. Beijing: Shenghuo, Tushu, Xinshi, Sanlian,

1957.

Dujuntuan zhuan. Reprint. Taibei: Wenhai, 1971.

Thayer, W. R. The Life and Letters of John Hay. 2 vols. New York: Macmillan, 1915. Topley, Marjorie. "The Role of Savings and Wealth Among Hong Kong Chinese." In Hong Kong: A Society in Transition, edited by Ian C. Jarvie and Joseph Agassi, 167-227. New York: Praeger, 1968.

T'oung Pao. 21 (1922).

Tsai Jung-fang. “Comprador Ideologists in Modern China: Ho Kai (Ho Ch'i, 1859–

1914) and Hu Li-yuan (1847–1916).” Ph.D. dissertation, UCLA, 1975.

"The 1884 Hong Kong Insurrection: Anti-Imperialist Popular Protest During the Sino-French War." Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 16, no. 1 (Jan.-Mar. 1984): 2–14. "The Predicament of the Comprador Ideologists, He Qi (Ho Kai, 1859-1914) and Hu Liyuan (1847–1916).” Modern China 7, no. 2 (Apr. 1981): 191–225. Tseng Yu-hao. Modern Chinese Legal and Political Philosophy. Shanghai: Commercial Press,

1930.

Tucker, Frank H. The White Conscience. New York: Ungar, 1968.

U.S. Congress. Papers Relative to the Status of Chinese in the Philippine Islands. 56th Congress, 1st session, 23 May 1900. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1900.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Immigration. Chinese Exclusion: Hearings..

Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1902.

U.S. Department of State. “Consular Dispatches: Canton, 1877–1884.” M-92; “Tientsin,

1877-1896." M-92. U.S. National Archives.

"Dispatches from U.S. Ministers in China, 1896–1906.” M-92. U.S. National

Archives.

308

Bibliography

"Notes to Foreign Legations: China.” M-92. U.S. National Archives. "Records Relating to Internal Affairs of China, 1910–1929.” M-329. U.S. National

Archives.

"United States Foreign Relations, 1900.” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. . . . Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1901.

"United States Foreign Relations, 1904-1905." Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. . . .Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1906. van der Sprenkel, Sybille. Legal Institutions in Manchu China: A Sociological Analysis.

London: Athlone Press, University of London, 1966.

Wakeman, Frederick, Jr. Strangers at the Gate: Social Disorder in South China, 1839–1861.

Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965.

Wall, Joseph Frazier. Andrew Carnegie. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973. Wang, Y. C. "The Su-Pao Case: A Study of Foreign Pressure, Intellectual Fermentation,

and Dynastic Decline.” Monumenta Serica 24 (1965): 102–212.

Wang Shuhuai. Wairen yu Wuxu Bianfa. Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan, Jindaishi

yanjiusuo, 1965.

Wang Tao. Taoyuan chidu xuchao. Shanghai, 1889. Beijing: Zhonghua, 1959. Wang Xi (P.R.C.). "Lun Zheng Guanying." Lishi yanjiu, 1982, no. 1: 18–38.

"Shilun yangwu pai guandu shangban qiye de xingzhi yu zuoyong." Lishi yanjiu, 1983, no. 6: 175–87.

Wang Xi (Taiwan). Zhong-Ying Kaiping kuangquan jiaoshe. Taibei: Zhongyang

yanjiuyuan, Jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1962.

Wang Xinzhong. "Zhong-Ri Maguan yihe." In Diyici Zhong-Ri zhanzheng, 278-315.

Taibei: Zhengzhong, 1957.

Wang Xiqi, comp. Xiaofanghuzhai yudi congchao. 26 vols. Shanghai, 1877–97. Reprint.

Taibei: Guangwen, 1964.

Wei Xiumei, ed. Qingji zhiguan biao (fu: Renwu lu). 2 vols. Shiliao congkan, vol. 5. Taibei:

Zhongyang yanjiuyuan, Jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1977.

Wei Zichu. Diguozhuyi yu Kailuan meikuang. Zhongguo jindai jingjishi ziliao congkan.

Shanghai: Shenzhou, 1954.

Who Was Who. 1897-1915.

Who's Who in China: Containing the Pictures and Biographies of China's Best known Political, Financial, Business and Professional Leaders. 4th ed. Shanghai: China Weekly Review, 1931.

Wickberg, Edgar. The Chinese in Philippine Life, 1850–1898. New Haven: Yale University

Press, 1965.

Wilbur, C. Martin. Sun Yat-sen: Frustrated Patriot. New York: Columbia University Press,

1976.

Wong Young-tsu. "Popular Unrest and the 1911 Revolution in Jiangsu.” Modern China 3,

no. 3 (July 1977): 321–44.

Woo Sing Lim [Wu Xinglian]. Xianggang Huaren mingren shilue. Hong Kong: Five

Continents Book Co., 1937.

Wright, Arnold, ed. Twentieth Century Impressions of Hongkong, Shanghai, and Other Treaty

Ports of China.... London: Lloyd's Greater British Pub. Co., 1908.

Wright, Mary C. China in Revolution: The First Phase 1900-1913. New Haven: Yale

University Press, 1968.

The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The Tung-Chih Restoration, 1862–1874. New York: Atheneum, 1969.

Wright, Stanley F. China's Struggle for Tariff Autonomy, 1843–1938. Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh,

1938.

Bibliography

309

Wu Duo. "Jin-Tong tielu di zhengyi." In Ziqiang Yundong, 135-89. Taibei: Zhengzhong,

1956.

Wu He Miaoling. Guangzhou: Wu family, 1937.

Wu Qiandui. "Shanghai guangfu he Hujun dudufu.” Lishi yanjiu, 1981, no. 5: 34–47. Wu Tingfang. America Through the Spectacles of an Oriental Diplomat. New York: Stokes, 1914.

"Bolshevism Has No Chance in China.” China Review, June 1922: 269–70.

"Causes of the Unpopularity of the Foreigner in China.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 17, no. 1 (Jan. 1901): 1–14.

"China: The Greatest Potential Market in the World.” Address, 26 Jan. 1900. Journal of the American Asiatic Association 1 (1900): 13–14.

“Chinese Jurisprudence.” Proceedings of the New York State Bar Association, 24th Annual Meeting, Jan. 15–16, 1901, 135–63. Albany, N.Y., 1901.

[Guandulu, pseud.], comp. Gonghe guanjian lu. Shanghai: Zhuyitang, 1912. "How I Expect to Live Long." Ladies' Home Journal 26 (Nov. 1909): 17.

Introduction to Chinese Religion Through Hindu Eyes: A Study in the Tendencies of Asiatic Mentality, by B. K. Sarkar. Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1916.

Minguo tuzhi chuyi. Shanghai: Author, 1915.

"Mutual Helpfulness Between China and the United States.” North American

Review 172 (July 1900): 1–12.

"A Plea for Fair Treatment.” Century Magazine 60 (Oct. 1900): 951–54.

"Shang shufu shu.” In Huangchao xu’ai wenbian, vol. 3, 4b-9. N.p. 1902. Reprint. Taibei: Xuesheng, 1965.

"The Teachings of Confucius.” Chautauquan 42 (Dec. 1906): 342–46.

Wu Zhiyong xiansheng gongdu. Edited by Zhou Chengxu. Shanghai: Wenruilou, 1926.

Yanshou xinfa. Shanghai: Shangwu, 1918.

Wu Tingguang. Wu Tingfang lishi. Shanghai: Guomin tushuju, 1922.

Wu Tiyun boshi aisi lu. N.p. 1934.

Wu Zhiyong boshi aisi lu. N.p. 1922.

Wuxu Bianfa. Edited by Zhongguo shixue hui (Qian Bozan et al.). 4 vols. Shanghai:

Shenzhou guoguang she, 1953.

Xia Dongyuan and Yang Xiaomin. “Lun Qingji lunchuan zhaoshangju de xingzhi."

Lishi yanjiu, 1980, no. 4: 55–66.

Xianggang Donghua Sanyuan fazhan shi (1870–1960). Hong Kong, 1960.

Xie Bin. Minguo zhengdang shi. Shanghai, 1928. Reprint. Taibei: Wenxing, 1962.

Xinhai Geming. Edited by Zhongguo shixue hui. 8 vols. Shanghai: Renmin, 1957.

Xinhai Geming huiyilu. Edited by Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi banshang huiyi. Beijing:

Zhonghua, 1962.

Xu Jincheng. Minguo waishi. Hong Kong, n.d.

Xu Tailai. "Ye ping Yangwu Yundong.” Lishi yanjiu, 1980, no. 4: 19–36.

Xu Ying, Li Xibi and Xu Qiheng. Zhan Tianyou. Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian

chubanshe, 1956.

Yang Jialuo, comp. Minguo mingren tujian. N.p. 1937.

Yangun Yundong. Edited by Zhongguo kexueyuan, Jindaishi yanjiusuo shiliao bianji shi

and Zhongyang dang'an'guan Ming-Qing dang'anbu bianji zu. 7 vols. Beijing, 1961. Yangwu Yundong wenxian huibian. Edited by Yang Jialuo et al. 8 vols. Taibei: Shijie, 1963. Yangzhou shifan xueyuan, comp. Xinhai Geming Jiangsu diqu shiliao. Nanjing: Jiangsu

renmin, 1963.

Yen, W. W. [Yan Huiqing]. East-West Kaleidoscope, 1877–1946: An Autobiography. New York:

St. John's Press, 1974.

310

Bibliography

Young, Ernest P. The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai: Liberalism and Dictatorship in Early

Republican China. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977.

Young, Marilyn Blatt. The Rhetoric of Empire: American China Policy, 1895–1901. Cambridge:

Harvard University Press, 1968.

Yu, George T. Party Politics in Republican China: The Kuomintang, 1912–1924. Berkeley:

University of California Press, 1966.

Yuan Shikai. Yangshouyuan zouyi jiyao. Taibei: Wenhai, 1966.

Yuan dazongtong shudu huibian. Taibei: Wenhai, 1971.

Zaizhen and Tang Wenzhi. Yingzhao riji. 1903. Reprint. Taibei: Wenhai, 1971. Zeng Kunhua. Zhongguo tielu shi. Beijing: Xinhua zengjia, 1924.

Zhang Binglin. Taiyan xiansheng ziding nianpu. Reprint. Taibei: Wenhai, 1971. Zhang Cunwu [Chang Tsun-wu]. Guangxu sayi nian Zhong-Mei gongyue fengchao. 2d ed.

Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan, Jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1982.

"Qingmo zhengzhi gaige yundong zhong de Wu Tingfang." In Zongtong Jiang Gong shishi zhounian jinian lunwen ji, edited by Zhongyang yanjiuyuan, 929–61. Taibei,

1976.

•

"Wu Tingfang shiMeishi dui Zhong Nan Mei de waijiao yu huqiao,” Si yu yan 13, no.1 (May 1975): 28–36.

"Wu Tingfang yu Xinhai Geming." In Zhongguo xiandaishi zhuanti yanjiu baogao, edited by Zhonghua Minguo shiliao yanjiu zhongxin, vol. 6, 93–129.

Zhang Guohui. “Lun waiguo ziben dui yangwu qiye de daikuan.” Lishi yanjiu, 1982, no.

4: 61-75.

"Xinhai Geming qian Zhongguo ziben zhuyi de fazhan.” In Jinian Xinhai Geming qishi zhounian xueshu taolunhui wenji, edited by Zhonghua Shuju bianji bu, vol. 1, 184-218. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1983.

1979.

Yangwu Yundong yu Zhongguo jindai qiye. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan,

Zhang Kaiyuan. “Xinhai Geming shi yanjiu zhong de yige wenti.” Lishi yanjiu, 1981, no.

4: 53-58.

"Xinhai Geming yu Jiang-Zhe zichan jieji.” In Jinian Xinhai Geming qishi zhounian xueshu taolunhui wenji, edited by Zhonghua Shuju bianji bu, vol. 1, 242–82. Zhang Kaiyuan and Lin Zengping. Xinhai Geming shi. 3 vols. Beijing: Renmin, 1980–81. Zhang Kaiyuan and Liu Wangling. "The 1911 Revolution: The State of the Field in

1982.” Late Imperial China 6, no. 1 (June 1985): 113–22.

Zhang Nanxian. “Yichi liushi zishu.” In Xinhai Geming shi congkan, arranged by Modern

History Group of Wuhan University, vol. 1, 178–202. Beijing: Zhonghua, 1980. Zhang Tianjue. “Huiyi Xinhai.” In Xinhai Geming shi congkan, vol. 2, 154–66. Beijing:

Zhonghua, 1980.

Zhang Yinhuan. Sanzhou riji. N.p., ca. 1890.

Zhang Yinlin. "Jiawu Zhongguo haijun zhan jikao.” In Diyici Zhong-Ri zhanzheng, 245–77.

Taibei: Zhengzhong, 1957.

Zhang Yufa. “Minchu zhengdang diaocha yu fenxi.” In Zhongguo xiandaishi lunji, vol. 4,

33-41. Taibei: Lianjing, 1980.

Zhang Yunqiao. Wu Tingfang yu Qingmo zhengzhi gaige. Taibei, 1987.

Zhang Zhidong. Zhang Wenxianggong quanji. 1937. Reprint. Taibei: Wenhai, 1963.

Zhang Zhongli [Chang Chung-li]. The Chinese Gentry: Studies on Their Role in Nineteenth

Century Chinese Society. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962.

The Income of the Chinese Gentry. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962. Zhang Zongliang. "Suishi riji." In Xiaofanghuzhai yudi congchao, compiled by Wang Xiqi.

Shanghai, 1877-97. Reprint. Taibei: Guangwen, 1964.

Bibliography

311

Zhongguo di'er lishi dang'an. "Nanjing linshi zhengfu shiyi Zhaoshangju changshi jie

Rizhai shiliao." Lishi dang'an, 1983, no. 3: 43–54.

ed. Zhonghua Minguo shi dang'an ziliao huibian. 2d ser. Yangzhou: Jiangsu renmin, 1981.

Zhongguo Guomindang, Zhongyang weiyuanhui, Dangshi shiliao bianji weiyuanhui,

ed. Geming wenxian. Vol. 44, Erci geming shiliao. Taibei, 1968.

"Zhonghua Minguo kaiguo shiqi shiliao." In Geming wenxian, edited by Luo Jialun, 1st

ser. Taibei, 1953.

Zhonghua Minguo kaiguo wushinian wenxian bianzuan weiyuanhui, ed. Zhonghua

Minguo kaiguo wushinian wenxian, ser. 2. Vol. 2, Kaiguo guimo. Taibei, 1962.

Zhonghua Shuju bianji bu, ed. Jinian Xinhai Geming qishi zhounian xueshu taolunhui

wenji. 3 vols. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1983.

Zhong-Ri zhanzheng. Edited by Zhongguo shixue hui (Shao Xunzheng et al.). 7 vols.

Shanghai: Xinzhishi, 1955.

Zhongyang yanjiuyuan, Jindaishi yanjiusuo, comp. Haifangdang. Taibei, 1957. Zhou Fu. Zhou Queshengong ziding nianpu. Reprint. Taibei: Guangwen, 1971.

Zou Lu. Huigu lu. Reprint. Taibei: Wenhai, 1971.

Zhongguo Guomindang shigao. Shanghai: Shangwu, 1944.

Index

American Asiatic Association, 116 American China Development Company

(ACDC), 109, 110, 116, 161–63, 170 Anfu clique, 243, 255, 263, 273, 275, 280,

281

Anti-Cigarette Smoking Society, 172,

189, 233, 234

Bank of China, 228

Bash, A. W., 162, 164, 170 Bastid-Bruguiere, Marianne, 138

Beiyang College, 98 Belgium, 101, 109, 163 Bland, J. O. P., 153

bourgeoisie, Chinese, 8, 10, 11, 13, 15,

18, 21, 23, 36, 41–43, 44, 55, 56, 68, 72, 74, 92, 137, 138, 140, 150, 169, 192, 194, 195, 221, 287, 290

Bowring, Sir John, 16

Boxer Indemnity, 143, 182

Boxer Uprising, 3, 111, 140, 193, 289 boycott of U.S. goods, 116, 130, 154,

165–68, 181, 189, 234, 240, 244, 246, 290

Cai Shaoji, 98

Cai Tinggan, 208 Cai Yin, 227

Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培,218

Caldwell, R. D., 15–16 Calhoun, William J., 205 Cao Kun 曹錕. 243, 275

Cao Rulin, 241, 243, 246-49,

266, 268

Carlowitz and Company, 83 Carnegie, Andrew, 128, 186, 203 Cary, Clarence W., 109

Cen Chunxuan 岑春煊,232, 254-76

passim

Chan, Ming, 12

Chan, Wellington K. K., 68, 148, 150

Chen Aiting, 24, 30–31, 36

Chen Bi, 149, 152, 153 Chen Chengde, 85, 87 Chen Duxiu, 277

Chen Jiongming, 16, 232, 254,

272-78, 280-84

Chen Jitong, 90

Chen Lanbin 陳蘭彬,31,36, 37, 78

Chen Qimei 陳其美,5,195-99, 201,

204, 207, 208, 216, 223–25, 226–30, 238

Chen Youren 陳友仁,250,263, 266 Chen Zuling, 189

Cheng Biguang H, 250, 254, 255,

257-59

Cheng Dequan 程德全,198,206, 208,

216, 217-18

Chiang Kai-shek. See Jiang Jieshi China Merchants' Steam Navigation

Company (CMSNC), 21, 46, 73, 74, 75, 78, 81, 84–85, 142, 200, 221, 225-27

China Railway Company, 84–92

Chinese Exclusion Laws, 3, 111–16, 129–

32, 169, 183, 289

Choa, G. H., 23

Chou'an Hui, 240

Christianity, 27, 35, 122-24, 127, 128 Chung Ngoi San Po. See Zhongwai Xinbao Cohen, Paul A., 13, 293

colonial intelligentsia, 1, 7, 17, 20, 31,

287,288

colonial situation, 13, 16, 25, 29, 40, 288 commercial code, 5, 106, 107, 108, 150

commercial law code, 38, 145

commercial treaties, 133, 139, 141, 142,

147, 160, 175, 197

Communications clique, 140, 180, 264 Confucianism, 35, 125, 127, 239

313

314

Conger, Edwin, 117-18, 130, 153-54 constitutionalists, 194, 197, 205–8, 210,

211-12, 216-17, 219, 220–30 passim cosmopolitanism, 122, 227, 228 Cotton Dealers' Guild of Guangzhou, 8,

Cuba, 31, 36, 110, 131, 139, 171, 180,

183, 185

Customs surplus, 265, 271-74, 279

Daily Press, 29, 45, 50, 53, 54, 59 Dalin, Serge, 282 Denby, Charles, 83

Ding Richang TB, 35, 37

Ding Rong, 227

Ding Ruchang, 97

Ding Shijie, 247

Ding Shouchang, 81

Diplomatic Affairs Discussion

Commission, 248, 249

Draft Procedural Code, 5, 172, 176–79,

290

Drummond, W. V., 78, 79

Duan Qirui, 6, 222, 231, 242,

243, 255, 257, 262, 273, 275, 280–82

Eitel, E. J., 16, 17, 30, 56

Empress Dowager (Cixi), 5, 90, 118, 119,

140, 141, 148, 149, 174, 178, 182, 183, 185, 191, 289

Empress Longyu, 222 England, 9, 22, 23, 25, 31-34, 35, 50,

59–60, 73, 77, 100, 132, 145, 166, 186, 217, 223, 236, 293

Eurasian, 14, 15

extraterritoriality, 2, 3, 78, 104, 106, 156,

173, 176, 287, 288, 290

factionalism, 6, 232, 243, 253, 273, 288,

290-92

Fan Baichuan, 150

Fan Yuanlian, 250

Far Eastern Athletic Association, 235

Fei Chi Ho, 129

Feng Guozhang, 242, 243, 245,

249, 254-57, 259, 262, 263, 273

Feng Ziyou, 217

Fengtian clique, 280

filial piety, 124–26

Five Cardinal Relations, 124–25

flogging, 15, 52-54

Folsom, Kenneth E., 72 Foster, John W., 96, 162, 181 Francis, J. J., 54

Fraser, David, 222, 267

Index

Fraser, Sir Everard, 201, 202, 213, 214 Fu Bingchang, 103, 261, 271,

274, 275

Fuzhou Chinese Trade Committee, 77

Gangyi, 191

Gao Erjian, 250

Gilbert, Rodney, 279

Gong Xinming, 152

Good Friends Association, 254, 256

Goodnow, Frank J., 240

Great Britain, 1, 7, 13, 24, 31, 69, 99,

101, 106, 156, 157, 209

Colonial Office, 19, 56–57, 61, 62–64 Gu Hongming, 144, 190

Gu Weijun, 241, 249, 265, 266 Gu Zhaoxin, 153

Gu Zhongxiu, 254

guandu shangban, 2, 75, 92

Guang Sunmou, 86

Guangxi Army, 254, 257

Guangxu Emperor, 5, 87, 104, 182, 185 Guangzhou

and Hong Kong 10-13

general strike (1919), 269-70 Governments, 6, 231, 253-85 guanshang heban, 84

Guo Songtao, 35, 36, 37, 38-40 Guo Taiqi, 263, 266 Guomindang, 6, 231, 236–39, 243, 244,

248-51, 253, 254, 256, 257, 259, 263, 264, 268, 269, 271, 276–77, 282, 283,

285

Hague, The, 165, 217, 234 Harding, Warren G., 279

Hart, Sir Robert, 39, 153, 168, 176 Hawaii, 3, 111, 113, 129, 130, 165, 183,

289

Hay, John, 113-16, 118, 121, 130-32,

153, 154, 165, 167

Hayashi, Count, 98, 100, 247

He Dong (Sir Robert Ho Tung), 21, 22 He Jinshan 何進善, 22, 28, 31

He Miaoling 何妙齡,28,76

Index

He Qi, 1, 4, 21, 22–23, 28, 31, 34,

67, 101, 142, 287, 289

Hennessy, Sir John Pope, 48–67 passim Hicks-Beach, Sir Michael, 56, 58, 62 Hill, David J., 119, 165

Ho Tung, Sir Robert. See He Dong Holcombe, Chester A., 77 Hong Kong, 7-69 passim

Chinese intelligentsia, 17-24 commerce (1877–82), 41-47 Chinese bourgeoisie, 8-13, 18 City Hall Museum, 60–62

flogging of Chinese prisoners, 15, 52–

Government Central School, 20, 22, 23 Police Magistrate's Court, 29–30 Seamen's Strike, 282

Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking

Corporation, 85, 91, 272

Hu Hanmin

Hu Weide, 246

283, 284

E, 218, 257, 272, 274,

Hu Xuanze, 36, 40, 59

Hu Ying, 210

Hu Yufen, 88

Hua Tuo Hospital, Hong Kong, 55 Huang Sheng, 22

Huang Xing, 207, 209, 211, 216,

217, 220, 224, 226, 233, 238

Huang Zunxian, 101

Huazi Ribao (Wah Tze Yat Po), 24, 238 Hunt, Michael H., 143, 181, 182

Ijuin Hikokichi, 215

Imperial Railway Company of North

China, 90

Inoue Kaoru, 79

International Institute, 141, 186, 203 Ito Hirobumi, 76, 93–95, 102

Japan, 2, 76, 79–80, 92, 97, 99, 100, 105,

127, 142-44, 153, 159, 166, 174–75, 182, 187, 212, 215, 217, 220, 221, 226, 228, 235, 243, 245–47, 262, 264, 265, 274, 275

Jardine, Matheson and Company, 14, 21,

22, 53, 85 Jiang Chaozong, 251 Jiang Jieshi

199, 224, 281

(Chiang Kai-shek),

Jordan, John N., 204, 213–16, 245 Ju Zheng, 208, 217

315

Kaiping mines, 2, 21, 80-82, 91 Kaiping Railway Company, 83, 85 Kang Youwei, 4, 110, 124, 125,

234, 241, 274, 289

Kaye, John Lister, 160 Kellogg, J. H., 128, 187

Kennedy, Raymond, 13-14

Keswick, William, 53, 61–63, 69

Kiaochow Incident, 104

Kinder, Claude W., 81, 86, 88

Kong Xiangxi, 129

Koo, V. K. Wellington. See Gu Weijun

Labuan, 50

Lang, William, 79

Lansing, Robert, 263

Laoxikai Affair, 243, 245-46

law reform, 2, 5, 38–40, 106–8, 125–26,

134, 139, 153, 156, 170, 171, 172–79, 218, 227-28, 290–91

Legge, James, 20, 23, 34

Lei Fen, 210

Li Bingheng, 191

Li Fuming, 83, 84

Li Genyuan 李根源,254,271,273 Li Guoqi, 92

Li Hongzao, 98

Li Hongzhang 李鴻章,2-4,35, 38-39,

57, 67, 71-102 passim, 104, 108, 109, 118, 138, 140, 179, 186, 193, 274,

288

Li Houji, 275, 277

Li Jiannong, 254

Li Jingfang, 186, 232

Li Liejun, 254, 258, 261, 266,

271, 272, 274, 281

Li Pingshu, 189, 196–99, 201,

202

Li Shizeng, 272

Li Xiehe, 197, 198, 208, 224

Li Yuanhong, 6, 198, 207–10,

231, 232, 236, 242–44, 248–56, 258, 262, 281, 284, 285, 291, 292

Li Zhaotang, 38, 80 Lianfang, 96, 146, 152

Liang Cheng 梁誠, 145, 165, 180 Liang Dunyan, 144, 180, 182, 252

316

Liang Qichao 梁啟超,4,100, 110, 146,

212, 236, 243, 249

Liang Shiyi, 140, 180, 220, 222,

264, 281

Liangbi, 222

Liao Fengshu, 274

Liao Zhongkai 廖仲愷,274,277, 281,

284

liberalism, 5, 138, 223–25, 239, 291, 292

Lin Baoyi 林葆懌,254,260,262

Lin Hu, 258

Lin Sen, 272

Lincoln's Inn, 23, 32–34, 158

Liu Cheng'en, 208

Liu Fubiao, 199

Liu Hanfang, 89

Liu Kunyi-, 36, 40, 57, 67, 118,

133, 140, 173

Liu Pengnian, 174

Liu Shixun, 249

Liu Xihong, 36

Liu Yanyi, 200

Lodge, Henry Cabot, 181

London Missionary Society 20, 23, 29 Long Jiguang, 254, 262

Lu Haihuan, 139, 143, 144, 175 Lu Rongting, 254–62, 264, 266,

268, 269, 275, 280

Lu Zhengxiang, 243, 248-50,

265

Lu Zongyu, 249

Luk, Bernard Hung-Kay, 175, 177, 178 Luo Fenglu, 73, 95, 101, 111,

117, 120, 140

Luo Yinggong, 212

Ma Fengchi, 257

Ma Jianzhong, 73, 75, 95, 140 Ma Junwu, 206

Ma Soo, 279

McKinley, William, 117, 118, 121 MacKinnon, Stephen R., 150 Manchuria, 90, 95, 96, 104, 133, 137,

143-44, 146, 153, 159, 166, 167, 169,

181-82, 243, 246, 281

Maring, 282

Marsh, Austin W., 64-66

Martel, Count de, 246

Medhurst, C. Spurgeon, 203

Mexico, 139, 171, 180, 183, 185

Index

missionaries, 3, 14, 20, 35, 104, 105, 107,

121-24, 293

Mo Rongxin 莫榮新,257,259,261,

267-69, 273, 276, 277

modernization, 7, 24–25, 74, 75, 104–7, 128, 132–33, 172, 288–91, 294

Morrison, George E., 120, 221–37, 238,

252

Morrison Education Society, 20, 21 Mu Xiangyao, 196

mufu, 2, 72–74, 77, 92, 96, 109, 138, 140,

179, 193, 264, 288

Murrow, Yorick Jones, 29 Mutsu Munemitsu, 93–94, 156

Nagasaki Incident, 77-80 Nathan, Andrew, 232, 243

nationalism, 1, 4, 32, 37, 39, 69, 101,

106, 131-33, 137–39, 156, 158, 165, 168, 169, 181, 191, 228, 287, 288, 290, 292

Natong, 152, 164 Ng A-ts’un, 30

Ng Chan. See Wu Chen Ni Sizhong, 250

Nishihara loan, 247

North-South Peace Talks (1911–12),

211-16, 219–22

North-South Unification Talks (1918-

19), 261-67

Otis, Major General, 114–16, 129

Panama, 183, 184

Paris Peace Conference, 264–66, 280 Peking Syndicate, 160, 161

Peng Pai, 277

Peru, 3, 31, 36, 37, 57, 71, 76, 100, 139,

171, 180, 183, 184

Philippine Exhibit, 235, 240

Philippine Islands, 3, 111, 114–16, 129–

31, 165, 235, 270, 289

Po Leung Kuk, 65

Political Study Group, 254, 271

Porter, Jonathan, 72

Porter Case, 57, 77

Portsmouth Conference, 166

Portuguese, 14, 15, 30

Powderley, Terence V., 129

Prince Chun (Yixin), 79, 82, 84, 90, 91

Index

Prince Qing (Yikuang), 141-47, 152-54,

166, 180, 188, 194

Prince Regent, 190, 205, 206, 210 Progressive Party, 235

Qian Nengxun, 175

Qing Bang, 199

Qingchang, 111

Qu Hongji, 152, 164, 168, 180,

182

Qu Wang, 268

queue, 133, 171, 172, 185-89, 197, 212

railways, North China, 80-92 passim Rational Diet Society, 188, 189 reform movement

post-Sino-Japanese War, 97-100, 104–

post-Boxer Uprising, 138-92 passim Reid, Gilbert, 186, 203, 234 Reinsch, Paul S., 239, 248 Rennie, Sir Richard, 79 Republican Party, 235

republicanism, 207, 208, 212, 215, 252 Restoration Society, 197, 198, 224 Revive China Society, 101 Revolutionary Alliance, 195, 198, 206,

217, 224

Rhoads, Edward, 223

rights recovery movement, 160–65, 169,

170

Ristelheuber, P., 88

Rockhill, W. W., 158, 166–68, 179, 181,

184, 234

Rong Hong 容閎,73,78

Roosevelt, Theodore, 129–32, 154, 166,

167, 181, 182

Rosenbaum, Arthur L., 84 Rozario, R. A., 30

Russia, 3, 100, 101, 104, 106, 109, 143,

146, 153, 157, 159, 166, 169, 245 Russo-Japanese War, 153, 156, 158–59,

170

St. Paul's College, Hong Kong, 20, 21,

27-29

Satow, Ernest, 153, 157-61, 166

Saturday Club, 234

Shameen Affair, 78

Shang Binghe, 199

Shang Bu, 144, 145, 147–53, 160, 161,

168, 169

Shanghai Merchants' Volunteer Corps

Association, 186, 189, 195

Shanghai Mixed Court, 147, 175, 176,

201

317

Shanghai Restoration, 195–205 passim shangzhan, 24

Shao Youlian, 93 Shaoying, 150, 151

Shen Baojing, 83, 86

Shen Baozhen, 39

Shen Jiaben 沈家本,5,134,139, 142,

153, 172–79, 290

Shen Manyun 沈漫雲,195,196 Shen Tunhe, 189

Sheng Xuanhuai, 74, 75, 84, 85,

98, 101, 109, 117–18, 139, 140, 142, 143, 147, 148, 161–65, 168, 169, 226, 232, 289

Sigel, Louis T., 139, 211

Sino-American Treaty of Arbitration, 182 Sino-Japanese War, 93-97 Smale, Sir John, 47, 58

social purity reformers, 128, 187, 293 Society for the Protection of Chinese

Trade, 240

Sokolsky, George, 274 Sone Toshitora, 78

Song Hanzhang 宋漢章,228-30 Song Jiaoren, 195, 208, 209, 211,

216-17, 237

Su Bao Case, 146, 147, 175

Sun Baoqi, 249

Sun Chuanfang, 284

Sun Fo, 271

Sun Hongyi, 243, 247, 256, 266 Sun Jia'nai, 87, 174

Sun Yixian (Sun Yat-sen), 4, 6,

101, 193, 216–27, 231, 232, 249, 253-85 passim, 286, 289, 292, 293

Tan A-choi, 18 Tan Renfeng, 259

Tang Hualong, 241

Tang Jiyao, 255, 258, 260–62, 270,271, 273, 275, 276, 278, 281, 283

Tang Maozhi, 21

Tang Shaoyi, 21, 139, 140, 157,

318

Index

169, 182, 183, 210–16, 219, 220, 232, 234, 235, 239, 241, 243, 244, 255-60, 262–64, 266, 267, 274–78, 290 Tang Shouqian, 210, 216

Tang Tingshu 唐廷樞,21,74, 75, 80−

82, 84, 89, 91, 139

Tang Wenzhi, 150, 151, 197,

205, 208

Tao Chengzhang, 224

Tao Xiang, 147, 164

Tenney, Charles D., 98

Tianjin Technical College, 98

Tibet, 4, 156–58, 169, 189, 197, 223,

245, 290

Treaty of Shimonoseki, 92–96, 101 Tsun Wan Yat Po. See Xunhuan Ribao Tung Wah Hospital, Hong Kong, 18, 19,

22, 28, 47, 48, 50, 51, 53, 55, 64, 65 Hospital Committee, 47, 48, 50, 51,

53-55, 64

Twenty-one Demands, 240, 246, 276

Uchida, 153

United States, 3, 4, 5, 22, 31, 34–36, 71,

76, 78, 80, 86, 93, 99, 100, 103–35 passim, 139, 142–46, 153–54, 159, 165-68, 171, 180–83, 186, 189, 194, 203-4, 206, 217, 224, 233, 236, 238, 241, 253, 263, 266, 279, 289, 290, 293

U.S.-China Relations

Chinese Exclusion Laws, 3, 111–16,

129–32, 169, 290

Boxer Uprising, 117–19

Wu Tingfang's views on (1898), 108 boycott of U.S. goods, 153–55, 165-68 urban elites, 137–38, 165, 171, 172, 291

vegetarianism, 128, 155, 183, 233 Venus Life Assurance Company, 234

Wah Tze Yat Po. See Huazi Ribao Waiwu Bu, 130, 133, 140, 145–48, 150,

152-70 passim, 176, 179, 180, 181, 183-85

Walkden, Alice, 23, 67 Wang, Y. C. 146

Wang Chonghui, 217–19, 222, 232, 249 Wang Daxie, 243, 249

Wang Jigao, 199

Wang Jingwei 汪精衛,211,260, 261,

265, 266, 272, 274, 281

Wang Qingmu, 150, 151

Wang Shizhen, 249

Wang Tao E, 1, 24, 31, 34, 37, 76, 78,

81, 287

Wang Wenshao, 98, 110 Wang Yiting, 196

Wang Zhengting EE, 210, 249, 251,

257,258, 263, 265, 266

Wang Zhongsheng, 199 Washburn, W. D. 109

Wei Chengzu, 266 Wei Guang, 22

Wei Yu, 21, 22

Wen Zongyao 溫宗堯,144,189, 197,

201, 202, 205, 207, 215, 218, 226, 232, 275

Weng Tonghe 翁同龢,87,90, 98, 107,

108

westernization, 2, 122, 132–33, 172, 187,

189, 233, 287, 293–94 Westernization Movement (Yangwu

Yundong) 72-74

and overseas Chinese, 35-40 Whitridge, F. W. 161

Wilson, Huntington, 180, 181 Wilson, Woodrow, 251 Wong A-kee, 16

Wood, General Leonard, 131, 132 World Peace Association, 234 World's Chinese Students' Federation,

234

Wu Chaoshu

(C. C. Wu), 6, 28,

76, 236-39, 241, 242, 244, 248, 251, 252, 256, 259, 265, 266, 271, 272,

274, 275, 277, 280–82, 284, 285, 292 Wu Chen (Ng Chan), 29

Wu Jinglian 吳景廉,256-59,272 Wu Nan'gao, 82, 84, 85, 91 Wu Peifu, 243, 263, 275, 278,

281, 283-85

Wu Qiandui, 195

Wu Rongzhang 伍榮彰,26,27,37 Wu Tingfang 伍廷芳

and boycott of U.S. goods, 153–54,

165-68

and Cen Chunxuan, 253-76 passim and Chen Qimei, 198–205, 224–30

passim

Index

and law reform, 35–40, 104–11, 125–

26, 156, 172–79

and Li Hongzhang, 35-40, 71–102 and North China railways, 80-92 and Sino-Japanese War, 93-97

and Sir John Pope Hennessy, 48–67

passim

and Sun Yixian, 217-23, 253-85

passim

and Yuan Shikai 140, 142–52, 180–83,

232-42 passim

as barrister in Hong Kong, 47-48, 49–

67 passim

as interpreter in Hong Kong courts,

29-32

childhood, 26-28

in Nagasaki Incident, 77–80

in post-Sino-Japanese War reforms,

97-100, 104-11

in queue-cutting movement, 186–89 in revolution of 1911, 193–230 in Shang Bu, 144–52

in Waiwu Bu, 152-70

marriage, 28, 76

Wu Yinpei, 174

Xia Yiting, 245 Xiliang, 160

Xing Bu, 134, 169, 170, 179

Xing Zhong Hui, 101 Xinhui, 26, 179, 257

Xu Chengzu, 79

Xu Chongzhi, 281

Xu Run, 74, 75, 142

Xu Shichang, 150–51, 241, 247,

251, 263, 264, 266, 284

Xu Shuzheng, 247, 280 Xuantong Emperor, 252

Xunhuan Ribao (Tsun Wan Yat Po), 24

Yan Huiqing. See W. W. Yen

Yan Xinhou, 85

Yan Xishan, 285

Yang Ru, 101

Yao Rongze, 227, 228, 230

Yen, W. W., 182-83, 185, 195, 279

Youtai, 157

Yu Xiaqing, 196, 198

Yu Youren, 197

Yu Zhijiang, 201, 228, 229

319

Yuan Shikai, 4-6, 71, 118, 133,

134, 139, 140, 142–45, 147, 148, 150–52, 157, 161, 165–67, 174, 180, 181-85, 187, 193, 194, 205, 206–16, 219-28, 231-44 passim, 250, 252, 254, 264, 290-92

Yunnan Army, 254, 255, 271

Zaizhen, 144, 145, 147, 148, 150,

152

Zeng Guofan, 72, 73

Zhan Tianyou, 86

Zhang Binglin 章炳麟,146,217, 255,

258, 260

Zhang Bishi 張弼士,139,149, 179 Zhang Chengyou, 197

Zhang Cunwu, 143, 144, 150, 156, 175,

177, 197

Zhang Jian, 5, 194, 197, 205-7,

210-12, 216, 221–23

Ahang Jinfang, 269

Zhang Nanxian, 260-61

Zhang Shizhao章士釗,273, 274

Zhang Shusheng, 75

Zhang Tianjue, 198

Zhang Wenxuan, 95

Zhang Xun, 6, 245, 251, 252, 255 Zhang Yi, 91, 92

Zhang Yinhuan, 76, 93, 98, 100,

119, 140, 162

Zhang Yintang, 147, 185, 186 Zhang Zhidong, 87, 89, 101,

109–10, 118, 133, 139, 140, 143, 144, 160, 161, 163–65, 168, 170, 173, 178, 180, 190, 194

Zhang Zongxiang, 268

Zhang Zuolin 張作霖,273,280-82 Zhao Bingjun, 237, 250

Zhao Fengchang, 210, 211

Zheng Guanying鄭官應,1,24, 74, 75,

287

Zheng Ruchen, 240

Zhengjiadun Affair, 243, 247

Zhili clique, 243, 254, 273, 275, 280, 281,

284

Zhonghua Huiguan, 34

Zhongwai Xinbao (Chung Ngoi San Po), 24,

29, 66

Zhou Fu, 83–86, 92, 176, 179 Zhou Ziqi, 240

320

Zhu Qiqian, 266

Zhu Qinglan, 268

Zhu Zhixin, 258, 259

Zongli Yamen, 37–40, 78, 79, 93, 97, 98,

99, 104, 107, 108, 110, 111, 118,

133, 151, 163, 191

Zou Lu, 251

Zou Rong, 146