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Foreword by Yeung Yue-man vi

Foreword by Ling Kar-kan viii

Acknowledgements xi

Introduction 1

Duality in planning (1841–1898) 6
Expansion of the territory (1898–1941) 69
Experiencing the war (1941–1945) 118
High-density development planning (1945–1979) 143
Approaching the handover (1979–1997) 220
Transformation after the return to China (1997–2015) 298
Challenge of sustainable development (1997–2015) 373

Conclusion 444

Bibliography 452

Index 467

Foreword

Professor Yeung Yue-man, Emeritus Professor, Geography Resource Management Department, The Chinese University of Hong Kong

Hong Kong is geographically a tiny territory, yet it is strategically situated in relation to southern China and Pacific Asia. In the past 174 years since the British landed in Hong Kong, Hong Kong has metamorphosed from a minus- cule fishing village to a thriving world city, ranking at present among the best in Asia and the world. This Hong Kong story of how it has evolved to become a sparkling city is told in this scholarly and monumental book full of historical and official documentation, objective interpretation, and insightful analysis.

Despite the many challenges Hong Kong has faced from the outset as a colo- nial outpost to a throbbing modern city, the literature is surprisingly sparse on any attempt to tackle the intriguing Hong Kong chronicle from the standpoint of town planning. It is full of life-and-death struggles, absorbing turning points and dashing decisions. What makes this book unique is its ambitious and com- prehensive treatment of town planning in Hong Kong in its full stretch from the beginning to the present. It takes a scholar with history training and meticulous care to handle source materials and data, plus Ho Pui-yin’s earlier pioneering research on Hong Kong’s water supply, land and harbour development, and transport to produce this impressive and breath-taking volume.

The main body of the book consists of six stages but is grouped into seven chapters (with two chapters for the last stage) devoted to major periods of development with vital implications on how and why Hong Kong was devel- oped in the ways it was. Details of dates, personalities and debates surrounding some key decisions are given in ample reference to sources, tables and figures. The reference in Chapter 1 to the construction of water reservoirs, typhoons, conflagrations and plagues is especially poignant to someone who is familiar with early Hong Kong history and how these calamities caused massive loss of lives and heartrending grief among the community at that time.

Chapter 2 traces the territorial expansion of Hong Kong, in particular the planning of New Kowloon. Large-scale development of the Kowloon Canton Railway and Kai Tak Airport laid the foundation for later development. The regularisation of town planning began in this half-century before the Second World War.

Chapter 3 details the war experience in Hong Kong under the Japanese Occupation. Hong Kong became a resource port for the Japanese war efforts, and development vastly departed from that of the previous period under the British.

FOREWORD BY YEUNG YUE-MAN · vii

The remaining chapters deal with the next three stages, starting with Hong Kong in its rapid evolution after the war, with the early influence of Abercrombie’s plan to guide town development. The debate on building the subway system is revealing. China’s opening had much influence on Hong Kong development, which capitalised on new opportunities. The Ten Core Projects in the wake of the decision to build the new airport at Chek Lap Kok in the 1990s laid the foundation for Hong Kong’s rapid development in the subse- quent decades. It is revealing to find that Chek Lap Kok was one of 13 sites recommended by the consultants. The return of Hong Kong to China in 1997 marked the beginning of urban governance leaning towards transparency and sustainable development.

As is clear from reading this volume, Hong Kong has successfully thrived against all odds to develop into a world city of fame and substance. Town plan- ning certainly has its role, and major political turning points have been capi- talised on to the city’s benefit. The main lesson from reading the Hong Kong story is that it has thrived on new thinking to develop its urban identity and future. The evolving identity echoes well with the world around Hong Kong and beyond. This book will equip scholars and planners alike with a solid foundation to take Hong Kong to its next stage of urban development and modernisation.

Foreword

Ling Kar-kan, Director of Planning (2012–2016), Hong Kong

One should first survey the harmonious aspects of the yin and yang of the site, taste its waters, examine the suitability of the soil, and observe the exuberance of its vegetation. After this, one may build the city and erect its walls, conduct zoning and designate residential sites; then followed by building access to the fields and demarcating their boundaries. Only after all the above work is done may one start building houses.

The above is a vivid and succinct enunciation by Chao Cuo, a Chinese political adviser and official of the Han Dynasty (202 BC–AD 220), as recorded in the ancient history book of Han Shu. The quotation describes the process involved in building a city, planning a community and constructing one’s home. As a town planner, I can feel the continuation of a city’s history and the consolidation of its culture every time I read these writings.

For the past 170 years or so since its inception, which is neither long nor short, Hong Kong has gone through a lot of challenges and difficulties in the history of urban development. Western theories and practices of town planning have been introduced to the territory, and have gradually evolved into plan- ning concepts, strategies and systems in line with the local conditions. This is a subject worthy of our in-depth exploration.

Compared with the relatively abundant land resources in the West, the limited land available for development in Hong Kong means it always has to face the challenge of coping with a growing population. Therefore, high-density and high-rise development is a pattern and a form suitable for Hong Kong consistent with the local situation to meet the city’s economic and livelihood development needs. In the 1960s and 1970s, some Western town planners were so sceptical about the model of high-density urban development that they even went to the extreme of blowing up entire communities of high-rise and high-density housing. However, after the planning and practices of different periods, the high-density and compact model of urban development in present-day Hong Kong not only fully takes the environment and conservation into account, but also enables rea- sonable layouts and appropriate public facilities and open spaces. A convenient and vibrant urban environment is successfully provided for its citizens, thanks to the highly efficient municipal services and urban management. Hong Kong has set a good example for modern urban development.

In the 1990s, town planners in foreign countries started to reflect on the automobile-led model of city expansion promoting ‘suburbanisation’. Instead,

FOREWORD BY LING KAR-KAN · ix

Hong Kong planners advocated the model of ‘transit-oriented development’ (TOD). As early as the 1980s, the formulation of the Territorial Development Strategy stipulated a focus on public transport with railways as the backbone, for the benefit of coordinating land use and spatial distribution. Currently, about 90 per cent of Hong Kong’s daily traffic volume relies on public transport, including 40 per cent by railway. About 75 per cent of the commercial and office premises and 40 per cent of residences (by floor area) in the territory are within a 500-metre walking distance of railway stations.

TOD, characterised by compactness and high density, has become the most sustainable model of urban development widely recognised by the town plan- ning industry around the world. Hong Kong is a pioneer and, more importantly, a firm practitioner in this field.

From the handover to the early twenty-first century, the evolution of town planning in Hong Kong may be summarised as transformation in three aspects: a more open and transparent system; a more diverse and inclusive paradigm; and the formation and strengthening of a multi-centre, multi-axis spatial devel- opment model.

The implementation of the Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance 2004 has enabled more open and transparent arrangements of the town planning system, in terms of the provision of planning information, channels for public input, deliberation by the Town Planning Board (TPB) of planning applica- tions, formulation of statutory plans, consideration of public representations, and so on. These institutional reforms have provided a more open and inclusive platform that facilitates more active interactions amongst stakeholders on town planning issues, enabling public attention and monitoring of planning proposals in a broader and closer manner.

The ‘development-led’ planning paradigm, which has effectively helped Hong Kong to cope with many challenges in the post-war era, remains the mainstream of planning efforts. However, this paradigm must become more diverse and inclusive in order to cope with today’s complicated challenges and aspirations involving various stakeholders. A number of factors are playing a more and more important role in the mentality and practice of planning, such as town planning, local construction, smart city, environmental protection, ecological and cultural conservation, sustainable development, biodiversity, climate change and an ageing population.

With a number of strategic planning exercises and new town developments in the post-war era, we have managed to construct nine new towns in addi- tion to traditional development areas on both sides of Victoria Harbour. And a multi-centre spatial pattern has been formed in terms of population distribution. However, we have not yet formed a spatial distribution well aligned with eco- nomic activities and employment. This results in high volume and long-distance one-way commuter flows, with serious congestion on trunk roads during rush hour. The large amount of commuting time by the working population also means additional carbon emissions by motor vehicles. In the ongoing study of ‘Hong Kong 2030+: Towards a Planning Vision and Strategy Transcending 2030’, one of the core topics is advocating the construction of a more balanced

x · MAKING HONG KONG

pattern of spatial distribution of population and jobs by leveraging the geo- graphical advantages and supporting transport infrastructure of the various dis- tricts in the New Territories. It is intended to establish and reinforce a long-term strategic planning concept featuring multiple centres and axes, so that Hong Kong can move towards a spatial development model which is sustainable and more balanced.

Urban development should provide our citizens with a better life, working space and environment. Under the high-density and compact model of urban development, it remains the biggest challenge and even an endless responsibility for Hong Kong town planners to constantly improve the liveability of the city.

We are very pleased that Professor Ho Pui-yin of the Chinese University of Hong Kong has conducted an extensive and in-depth study of town planning in Hong Kong, commenting on town planning efforts from a historical perspective and providing a summary. This is a professional publication long anticipated by town planners, builders of cities and all those who care about Hong Kong’s development. I am convinced that this book will help us review the history of Hong Kong’s urban development and town planning and summarise the expe- rience, so that we can optimise town planning to create a better life for our citizens.

Acknowledgements

Started in 2011, it took me six years to conduct research on this immense topic which I am grappling with due to the vast variety and quantity of materials. Without the support of different organisations and experts, I would not have been able to make use of my initial research results and publish a preliminary research report. My special thanks must first go to the Planning Department of the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, for their trust in me and their generous support in providing valuable raw materials that include town planning reports, maps and original statistics. Their verification of my data and professional opinions have significantly enhanced the standard and accuracy of this book. Planners and senior colleagues including Mr Raymond LEE Kai Wing, Mr LING Kar Kan, Dr POON Kwok Sing, Mrs Ava NG Suk Ying, Mr Jimmy LEUNG Cheuk Fai, Mr FUNG Chi Keung, Ms Phyllis LI Chi Miu, Mr LO Chai Wan, Mr CHAN Pun Chung and Ms Ophelia WONG Yuen Shang. Despite their heavy workload, they have offered valuable assistance by explaining to me, with great patience, the complicated details of the town planning process. I also had to draw on the professional expertise of Mr LING Chi Tak, Mr CHAN Wai Shun, Mr Edward LO Wai Ming, Ms CHAN Yuet Mei, Ms KWAN Wai Ling, Ms TANG Yeuk Mei, Ms LAU Sau Yee, Ms Vivian TSANG Wai Man, and Ms Gina WONG W.M. to verify the accuracy of data. Their support has enabled this research to acquire a firm understanding of town planning development in Hong Kong.

I particularly wish to thank the late Miss LEUNG Hung Kee for her gener- ous support in establishing the Leung Po Chuen Research Centre for Hong Kong History and Humanities, which empowers historical research on Hong Kong. My sincere gratitude goes to my research assistants: Miss LEUNG Yin ling, Miss CHEUNG Sau Chun, Miss LAU Man Ting and Mr WONG Chun Yu, for their efforts in gathering and collating data, as well as typing and proof- reading the manuscript. Special thanks are also due to the following bodies and persons: Public Records Office, Highways Department, Civil Engineering and Development Department and Lands Department of the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region for their provision of maps, plans and photos; and Dr TONG Cheuk Man and Mr KO Tim Keung for gener- ously making available to us their precious collections of photos to give readers views from other angles. Last but not least, I am grateful to the many research institutions that have rendered generous assistance to this project. They include the libraries of the Chinese University of Hong Kong and of the University of Hong Kong, and the editorial team of Edward Elgar Publishing, in particular Ms Barbara Pretty, Ms Katy Crossan and Ms Karen Jones. The publication of this research would not have been possible without their support.

xii · MAKING HONG KONG

With very limited knowledge and strength, my analyses are immature and inevitably contain numerous errors and omissions, for which I take full responsibility.

Introduction

Cities are a crucial attribute of the rise of human civilisation. An ideal city of the twenty-first century should not only serve as a manifestation of its political, eco- nomic and modern technological achievements, but also strive actively for the harmonious coexistence of humanity and its natural environment. Systematic town planning and regular review are therefore the only way to improve the livelihood of modern city-dwellers. To build an ideal city, planning has to be comprehensive and cover multiple areas: from planning layout, urban design, development and infrastructure, to the enactment and implementation of town planning legislation, as well as daily operation and management. As the number of people paying close attention to or joining the field of town planning as professionals continues to rise, different stakeholders in society have taken up the responsibility of monitoring the city’s town planning. During its plan- ning process, the government is frequently faced with political, economic and social challenges. To achieve established goals, the government has to deal with increasingly complex internal and external problems.

When the British landed at Possession Point in Sheung Wan in 1841, they found Hong Kong Island, a barren rock, located at the southern edge of China, lacking land resources for development. With typhoons striking in the summer, the island did not possess the conditions for agricultural develop- ment. Nor could it be considered an ideal place for living. The first popula- tion census of Hong Kong Island conducted by the British in 1841 revealed that only around 5,450 Chinese lived on the island at the time, most of whom were fishermen from Stanley and Shau Kei Wan. The Qing govern- ment never considered Hong Kong a city prior to that. By contrast, in 2015 the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) estimated that Hong Kong had a population of 7.32 million.1 Today’s Hong Kong is a modern city with excellent facilities, rivalling other international metropolises. It can be seen that the growth and development of Hong Kong is inextricably linked to the conscious allocation of resources to make good use of modern technology to overcome the city’s shortcomings. Hong Kong’s urban development experience is not only a development model for Chinese cities after the implementation of the open-door policy in China in 1978, but also an example for a better understanding of other Asian cities.

Town planning was developed as a profession even before the Second World War, only it was named differently then. According to historical data, profes- sional terminology such as ‘town-building plans’ and ‘town-extension plans’ did not appear until the early twentieth century, but the term ‘street planning’ had

1 http://www.censtad.gov.hk/hkstat/sub/so20_tc.jsp.

been used since 1851.2 The historical remains (such as city walls, roads, squares, temples and water supply systems) of famous cities around the world offer ample proof of town planning’s fundamental influence on a city’s development as a whole.3 A number of geographers who studied Hong Kong’s urban develop- ment were of the view that, prior to the war, Hong Kong’s urban development was fragmented and lacked a comprehensive plan.4 However, this view may be due to their neglect of the city’s early development. How could one explain the City of Victoria on Hong Kong Island having the functions of European cities in the mid-nineteenth century but for the fact that the city’s town planning started as early as the 1840s?

The process by which a city is built from scratch depends on its geographical environment, the inhabitants, its economic resources, the development status of its neighbouring regions, and objective economic and political circumstances. At the initial stage, there is much freedom in terms of planning. As the city’s population grows continuously and its population structure changes, its eco- nomic and political terrain shifts, while new technologies are introduced and the external environment alters, requiring the city’s planning to be updated accord- ingly. This is because very complicated issues would arise should early planning lack comprehensiveness. Hong Kong’s early city development suffered from its poor geographical conditions and lack of natural resources. The development of the entrepôt mainly relied on technology. With a continuously growing popula- tion, issues such as whether old buildings should be retained or torn down and rebuilt, and the coexistence of new and old constructions and their cultural rela- tionship may well make urban renewal even more daunting than planning from scratch. If Hong Kong’s urban development started from scratch, did the city’s early construction and planning reflect the cultural conflicts of Western and Chinese civilisations? What were the factors that led to town planning adapt- ing and changing with the times? What opportunities did the colonial govern- ment grasp to introduce European city models into Hong Kong? How major a role did factors such as Chinese external political and economic circumstances, Hong Kong’s population growth, internal structural changes, allocation of avail- able economic resources, introduction and modernisation of technologies, and enactment of town planning legislation each play? How did changing Sino- British relations and China’s external political and economic environment affect Hong Kong’s urban planning policies? What were the difficulties encountered

2 John Weale, London Exhibited in 1851, London, 1851, p.770.

3 Lewis Mumford, City Development, London, Secker & Warburg, 1947, p.79; John Summerson, Georgian London, Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1962; Steen Eiler Rasmussen, London: The Unique City, London, Cape, 1948; William Ashworth, The Genesis of Modern British Town Planning, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954; H.J. Dyos, Victorian Suburb, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1961; George Laurence Gomme, London in the Reign of Victoria, Chicago, 1898.

4 Roger Bristow, Land Use Planning in Hong Kong: History, Policies and Procedures, Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, 1984, p.27; D. Henry Talbot, ‘An Outline of the Urban Development of Hong Kong Island during the Nineteenth Century’, in D.J. Dwyer, ed., The Changing Face of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Ye Olde Printerie, 1971, p.50; T.R. Tregear and L. Berry, The Development of Hong Kong and Kowloon as Told in Maps, Hong Kong, South China Morning Post, 1959, p.8.

in repeated redevelopment? Were there conflicts between urban renewal and new planning? How did the authorities balance the interests of different parties through town planning and achieve established goals? These are all questions worth exploring in depth, for they were not only Hong Kong’s internal issues. They also involved Sino-British foreign relations, as well as China–Hong Kong political and economic problems.

Unfortunately, discussions on the history of Hong Kong’s town planning development have been few and far between until now, with limited analysis on Hong Kong’s impacts on China following the implementation of the open-door policy. Most of these discussions focused on the pros and cons of town planning in Hong Kong in recent years, with an emphasis on the contents and benefits of land use and town planning legislation.5 They seldom touched on town planning history, or Sino-British and China–Hong Kong relations. A number of years ago, I conducted comprehensive research on subjects including Hong Kong’s water supply systems, land and harbour development and transport systems. This was the first attempt at studying the development process of urbanisation based on planning policy. The research focused on town planning and sought to analyse the formation, focal points and changing trends of town planning through stud- ying the evolution of town planning. It also attempted to compare the inter- relationship between town planning and changes in social structure at different stages of development, in order to understand how Chinese immigrants affected Hong Kong’s town planning and how town planning acted as a medium of mediation in the various disputes between Britain and China at different stages, which in turn drove social transformation. In addition, my research showcased the ways in which China’s social, economic and political environments in differ- ent eras have influenced the pace of Hong Kong town planning since 1841, and how such planning would in turn provide the forward-looking ideas that would lead the city in the foreseeable future. Hopefully, we would rethink the cultural shocks of Western culture to the city, as well as the changing political situation of China through which the city’s distinctive local style was developed, so as to bring new thinking to the urban research and direction of Hong Kong’s future development as a city.

Looking back on the past, town planning in Hong Kong can be roughly divided into six major stages of development.

The first stage began in the second half of the nineteenth century, with the duality of planning. On the one hand, technology was used to resolve the short- age of resources and the attack of typhoons, while water supply systems were built, land was reclaimed from the sea, typhoon shelters were constructed, and the roads and basic facilities of a commercial port were built to establish the city’s commercial foundations. Western culture was introduced, Western

5 Lawrence Wai-chung Lai, Town Planning in Hong Kong: A Critical Review, Hong Kong, City University of Hong Kong Press, 1997; Lawrence Wai-chung Lai with Ki Fong, Town Planning Practice: Context, Procedures and Statistics for Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 2000; Lawrence Wai-chung Lai, Town Planning in Hong Kong: A Review of Planning Appeal Decisions, 1997–2001, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 2003.

lifestyles were promoted through European architecture, and planning was mainly focused on Central on Hong Kong Island. On the other hand, the colo- nial government mostly ignored the Chinese population who took refuge in Hong Kong, employing a laissez-faire policy towards the Chinese communities and thus exacerbating the city’s public hygiene and law and order crises. In the atmosphere of anti-imperialism which pervaded the Chinese communities in Hong Kong, it was difficult for the colonial government to plan for public health districts in those communities. Out of this turbulent political landscape, Hong Kong emerged as an entrepôt.

The second stage lasted from 1898 to the Pacific War, and encompassed the expansion of the territory. The Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory was signed in 1898, under which the land north of Boundary Street and south of the Shenzhen River was leased. As the shifting political landscape in China brought about a continuous influx of population, the city had to expand in size, and the Convention promptly addressed this by providing new land resources. Determining the district of New Kowloon, enacting legislation on land use plan- ning, expanding transport networks and developing the countryside had all contributed to making the northern coast of Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and New Kowloon regions of focused development, thus allowing for the territorial expansion of Hong Kong. In the 1930s, the colonial government contemplated purchasing the New Territories from China to solve Hong Kong’s land short- age problem, but it had to carefully consider British relations with the Chinese nationalists and the Chinese Communist Party, as well as British–Japanese rela- tions. The idea was aborted following the outbreak of the Pacific War.

The third stage lasted from 1941 to 1945, when Hong Kong was a resource port for the Japanese military. Under the rule of a Japanese military government, Hong Kong became a resource port for the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. As it was a Japanese military port, planning in terms of population, dis- trict functions and the promotion of economic activities differed greatly from that of the British colonial government. The views put forth by the Japanese on the city’s layout and development of agriculture and other resources are rarely discussed, and they warrant fresh deliberation.

The fourth stage lasted from 1945 to 1978, with high-density development planning. Faced with severe population pressures after the war, the govern- ment introduced high-density residential planning in order to solve housing problems for new immigrants. On the other hand, this also provided a large, cheap workforce for processing industries, transforming Hong Kong into a city of processing industry. The first generation of new towns were built to alleviate population pressure, and planning was made for integrated communities that would provide employment and daily living facilities. The city’s development was guided by technology, management and a bureaucratic system. The ways and patterns of living at the time were also led by technology. The high-density development planning model laid the foundation for absorbing large numbers of Chinese immigrants. It was also a model for Chinese cities after the open- door policy was implemented in 1978.

The fifth stage lasted from 1979 to 1997, with the westward extension of the

city’s centre. A free-trade economic system propelled Hong Kong to become an international financial centre and one of the ‘Four Asian Tigers’, gaining other regions’ recognition of Hong Kong’s economic stature. At the same time, with China implementing its reform and open-door policy, the northward migration of industries, the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration Agreement, the transfor- mation of the economy and concerns over political issues related to the return to China in 1997 meant that Hong Kong’s economic development was hardly plain sailing as disputes occurred between China and Britain. To downplay the political disputes between China and Britain, the government undertook the ‘Rose Garden Project’, a project with the Hong Kong International Airport on Lantau Island as its core. The project saw a further expansion of the city to East Lantau and the westward extension of the city’s core districts, boosting Hong Kong’s ranking among other international metropolises.

The sixth stage of development started with the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997 and continues until now, with the challenges of sustainable devel- opment. With changes in the political system, the impacts on the global natural environment brought on by climate change and rising civil awareness among its citizens, the government has introduced sustainable planning policies and amended public consultation procedures to give the Town Planning Board a greater role. As part of the Greater Pearl River Delta, Hong Kong has to coor- dinate with the overall development of South China and face opposition from Hong Kong citizens regarding deeper integration between Hong Kong and Mainland China. This means town planning policies in Hong Kong have to undergo another transformation and guide the city to find a new path.

Hong Kong’s town planning faced intricate challenges in different periods. This not only resulted in adjustments corresponding to each period’s needs, but also created many styles with local characteristics. Let us now delve in depth into such intricacies.

1

Duality in planning (1841–1898)

1841 Captain Charles Elliot, R.N., administered from 26.1.1841 to 10.8.1841.

H.K. is taken over (26/1) and Govt. administered by Capt. ELLIOT as Chief Superintendent of Trade of British subjects in China in accordance with proclamation issued by him (29/1) which also declared that Chinese should be governed according to laws of China and others according to laws of Gr Britain. 2nd proclamation (1/2) promised free exercise of religious rites, social customs and private rights. (Historical and Statistical Abstract of the Colony of Hong Kong

1841–1930, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1932)

In 1843, using European cities as a model, the colonial government designated the northern coast of Hong Kong Island as the city’s boundary, establishing government departments and building commercial facilities for the entrepôt, expending human and other resources in constructing the City of Victoria. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the development of the City of Victoria was restricted by natural resource shortages and a poor natural envi- ronment. In response, the government had to make use of new construction techniques and infrastructure to solve daily life problems resulting from the population growth, which included housing, transport facilities, water and elec- tricity supply, law and order and public hygiene, in order to make Hong Kong a place of residence for Europeans coming to the East for business. How did town planning reflect government policies and choices? How did changes in the social background influence planning? The analysis below seeks to study the charac- teristics of nineteenth-century town planning via two important entry points: the government’s use of engineering techniques in formulating the layout of the City of Victoria; and how the government solved the law and order and public hygiene crises in the densely populated Chinese communities and strengthened its rule over them. This will strengthen our understanding of the reasons behind the splitting of the City of Victoria into two districts of widely different styles in the nineteenth century, and enables us to assess the effects of the government’s active development of the European district while neglecting the living environ- ment and hygiene problems in the Chinese communities.

Conception

The present-day territory of Hong Kong includes Hong Kong Island, the Kowloon Peninsula, the New Territories and over 230 outlying islands.1 From August 1842 to October 1860, the territory of Hong Kong consisted only of Hong Kong Island, which had an area of 32 square miles (82.9 square kilometres). Between October 1860 and June 1898, Hong Kong’s territory expanded northwards to Boundary Street on the Kowloon Peninsula, gaining 3 square miles (7.8 square kilometres).2 With effect from July 1898, the United Kingdom leased from the Qing government the New Territories (south of the Shenzhen River and north of Boundary Street), as well as some 230 islands within Hong Kong’s territorial waters, with a claimed land area of 957 square kilometres3 (the New Territories and the outlying islands occupied an area of 226,918 acres4 (918.3 square kilometres), thus increasing Hong Kong’s total area to 1,009 kilometres. According to an official announcement following land surveys carried out in the New Territories and the outlying islands between 1900 and 1906), Hong Kong’s total area was 1,047.7 square kilometres. In 2014, Hong Kong had an area of 1,105 square kilometres,5 only 24 per cent (i.e. 265 square kilometres) of which was developed land. Of that total, 59.3 square kilo- metres was land reclaimed from the sea after the war. Before the war, records of land reclamation were incomplete, and the government figure was around 5 square kilometres. The total area of reclaimed land is therefore 64 square kilome- tres. While this represents only 6 per cent of the total land area of Hong Kong, it also represents 24 per cent of built-up areas. Should the pre-war reclaimed area be greater than 5 square kilometres, the percentage would be even higher.

The discussion concerning nineteenth-century Hong Kong town planning in this chapter is based on the City of Victoria on the northern coast of Hong Kong Island in the early 1840s and covers Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula south of Boundary Street from 1860 to 1898. It does not include the New Territories and the outlying islands.

1 The number of outlying islands that are considered to be within Hong Kong’s territories has decreased over the years as a result of land reclamation works that link these islands to the Mainland. Prominent exam- ples include Chek Lap Kok Island and Stonecutters Island.

2 The Kowloon Peninsula referred to the area south of Boundary Street at the time, which differed from today’s concept of including the districts that used to be known as New Kowloon. ‘Report on the Census of the Colony for 1931’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1931, p.99.

3 CO882/5, J. Stewart Lockhart, ‘On the Extension of the Colony of Hong Kong’, 8 October 1899, p.36.

4 According to the figures in the 1899 Hong Kong Government Gazette, the New Territories had a land area of 376 square miles. The government undertook land surveys in the New Territories and the outlying islands between 1900 and 1906, and the announced figure in 1907 was 226,918 acres (918.3 square kilometres). The figure obtained by land surveys is used here. See Hong Kong Blue Book, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1907.

5 The total land area of Hong Kong has increased as a result of reclamation. According to Hong Kong Guide, Hong Kong, Lands Department, 2015, Hong Kong had an area of 1,105 square kilometres. Hence different eras showed slightly different figures. According to page 1 of Land Utilization in Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1966, Hong Kong only had an area of 1,032 square kilometres. This is even smaller than the figure of 1,060 square kilometres provided by the 1899 government record. This means Hong Kong would have a reclaimed area of between 44 and 66 square kilometres.

Choice of stronghold

Hong Kong Island is situated at latitude 22° 11’ to 22° 17’ north, longitude 114° 07’ to 114° 15’ east, and is the southern most extension of the South China hills into the sea, with geographical features similar to those of the South China regions. The island is mountainous, with significant variations and frequent changes in terrain within very short distances. The island’s terrain alternates between highs and lows, with as much as 82 per cent being moun- tainous land. Highland is not concentrated at the centre of the island, but is rather spread around different regions, 13 per cent of which is alluvial soil. Lowland occupies very little area, amounting to only 5 per cent of the entire island, and consists of narrow strips of coastal lowland mainly situated on the island’s northern and southern coasts. From the northern coast to the south is a range of hills that run across the east and west. On the west side of the range is the 554-metre Victoria Peak, with the 531-metre Mount Parker on the east side. Hong Kong Island slants from the north to the south, with a flatter terrain in the south with altitudes of 250–300 metres. The protruding highlands in this region are the peninsulas of Stanley and Cape d’Aguilar.6 Hong Kong Island has very limited flat land available for development.

The British occupied Hong Kong Island in order to build a trade settlement.7 In the era of maritime trade, geographical locations and harbour depths, even more than natural resource deposits, were the prerequisites for developing a trading port. From 1806 to 1819, the East India Company, which had a monop- oly on Britain’s trade with China, engaged the hydrogeologist James Horsburgh to conduct explorations of the topography of the Pearl River Estuary. He found that the maritime traffic to and from Hong Kong was unparalleled in the region.8 From his explorations of Hong Kong waters, Horsburgh believed that west of Kap Shui Mun, the East Lamma Channel between Hong Kong Island and Lamma Island, Lei Yue Mun on the east side of Hong Kong Island and Tai Tam Bay on the south side of Hong Kong Island were all good typhoon shelters and ideal berths for ships.9 R.E. Collison’s exploration of the waters around Hong Kong Island in 1845 yielded similar results. According to indications on Collison’s maps, the deepest waters around Hong Kong Island at the time were as follows:10

6 So, C.L., Xianggang dili (Geography of Hong Kong), Guangzhou, Guangdong keji chubanshe, 1985, pp.18–37.

7 The Governor had stated that the British had no intention of migrating to Hong Kong.

8 In the early nineteenth century, Guangzhou was the only Chinese port open to foreigners, and European merchants bound for Asia had to pass through Hong Kong. European trading vessels sailing east would usually stop for food and water resupply in Hong Kong before heading further north to Guangzhou, or down south to the South-east Asian countries. Thus the Europeans had an excellent knowledge of Hong Kong’s coastal situa- tion. Geoffrey Robley Sayer, Hong Kong, 1841–1862: Birth, Adolescence, and Coming of Age, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 1980, p.23.

9 Geoffrey Robley Sayer, Hong Kong, 1841–1862: Birth, Adolescence, and Coming of Age, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 1980, pp.23–24; E.S. Taylor, Hong Kong as a Factor in British Relations with China, 1834–1860, London, 1967, p.30.

10 Hal Empson, Mapping Hong Kong: A Historical Atlas, Hong Kong, Government Information Services, 1992, p.128.

Lyemoon (Lei Yue Mun) Pass off the eastern coast of Hong Kong Island. It was 46 metres (150 feet) deep and only 402 metres (1,320 feet) from the New Territories mainland.11 It was the bottleneck when entering the harbour from the east, and was an ideal typhoon shelter, as ships could avoid typhoons hitting from the north-east.
The East Lamma Channel between the south-west of Hong Kong Island and north-east of Lamma Island was 46 metres (150 feet) deep and was a place that ships entering Hong Kong from the south could not miss. Aberdeen, which was in the south-west of Hong Kong Island, was shielded by Ap Lei Chau and was an ideal mooring point in the southern part of Hong Kong Island.
The northern coast of Hong Kong Island (the coastal area between Admiralty and Sheung Wan today), now known as the Victoria Harbour, was not as deep as the two places mentioned above, being only 18 metres (60 feet) at its deepest. As the converging point of maritime traffic enter- ing Hong Kong from the east and the west, it could also serve as a berth- ing location for ocean-going vessels, which had a draught of only some 6 metres (20 feet) then.

When British forces landed at Possession Point in Sheung Wan in 1841,12 they did not choose either Lei Yue Mun in the east or the East Lamma Channel in the south-west, which had deeper waters, as their stronghold. Instead they set up camp around East Point (Kellett Island in the nineteenth century, which was reclaimed after the war and is now the area west of Gloucester Road, near Victoria Park) and Shek Tong Tsui. This is because these two places were but- tressed by Jardine’s Lookout and Victoria Peak respectively and, being situated in the east and west of the northern coast of Hong Kong Island, had important military use, as they allowed for a clear monitoring of the Qing government’s activities on the opposite coast of the Kowloon Peninsula. While Lyemoon Pass, off the eastern coast of Hong Kong Island, was the bottleneck when entering the harbour through the east, it offered shelter from typhoons. Many fisher- men were living there and building a city there might lead to their opposition. If British soldiers were to construct a city in the south-west of Hong Kong Island, a large number of men would need to be stationed on the northern coast of the island to guard against counter-attacks by Qing soldiers from the opposite coast, it would be a difficult task with insufficient troops.

In the mid-nineteenth century, trade was mainly conducted by barges and sailing boats. Even ocean-going vessels at the time had a draught incomparable to today’s large ships. Therefore, the northern coast of Hong Kong Island, with its 18-metre-deep harbour, was sufficient for the needs of ocean-going vessels at the time. With Victoria Peak in the south and the Kowloon Peninsula in the

11 Chiu, T.N., The Port of Hong Kong: A Survey of Its Development, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 1973, p.5.

12 Xianggang shangye huibao, ed., Xianggang jianzao ye bainian shi (One Hundred Years of Building Construction in Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Xianggang shangye huibao, 1958, p.40.

north shielding against typhoons, the area around Central and Admiralty was ideal for mooring ships. Because of the above factors, the northern coast of the island naturally became the core of the city. Therefore, in choosing the location for the construction of the city, the British in fact did not base their decision solely on an economic perspective that a wide and deep harbour would be ideal for developing entrepôt trade, which was always stressed by the colonial gov- ernment. On 14 June 1841, Henry Pottinger, for the very first time, sold land from East Point in the east to Sheung Wan in the west by public auction, for the purpose of raising funds from land sales as well as developing Hong Kong Island with private investments. Major trading firms bid enthusiastically for the coastal lots in this first sale of land by auction, reflecting investors’ favourable view of the advantages of Hong Kong Island’s northern coast. This also indirectly caused the northern coast to become the city’s core later on.

On 29 March 1842, the government appointed Captain George F. Mylius as the Land Officer,13 responsible for land surveying and assessment, designing naval bases, shipyards and road distribution, and solving water supply prob- lems. He was the first town planning engineer of Hong Kong. In April 1842, the government officially named the city after Victoria, Queen of the United Kingdom,14 and in January 1843 Governor Pottinger appointed the engineer Alexander T. Gordon as the Land Officer, Surveyor and Inspector of Roads of Hong Kong,15 responsible for planning the city’s public facilities such as govern- ment buildings, roads and seawalls as well as projects including land formation, water supply and sewerage systems,16 so as to formulate a blueprint for building the City of Victoria.

Planning

On 6 July 1843, in a letter to the then Acting Colonial Secretary, Gordon set out an idea for a belt-shaped city (see Figure 1.1). The city’s primary facilities, with the transport network being the first, would be built up using the layout of contemporary European cities as a model. Queen’s Road, as well as a main road around the city that would go through Sai Wan, Stanley, Shek Pai Wan, and so on, would be built for the convenience of citizens as well as to serve as a main route for military patrols around the island. It would be followed by planning for the locations of the political and economic heart of the city, and lastly the layout of areas for residential, religious and cultural activities. Owing to the vast terrain of the Wong Nai Chung valley, it was proposed that the valley be filled

13 Friend of China and Hong Kong Gazette, 31 March 1842.

14 Friend of China and Hong Kong Gazette, 7 April 1842.

15 Friend of China and Hong Kong Gazette, 5 January 1843.

16 In 1844, the government established the Surveyor General’s Office. In 1883, the Surveyor General’s Office was renamed the Public Works Department and, in 1891, the Surveyor General was renamed the Director of Public Works. Hong Kong Blue Book, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1844–1892; Ho Pui-yin, The Administrative History of the Hong Kong Government Agencies 1841–2002, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 2004, p.119.

Notation:

Taipingshan Chinese Community Lower Bazaar

Upper Bazaar Johnston House

Source: CO129/2, p.457.

Figure 1.1 The first city development blueprint drafted by Gordon (6 July 1843)

up to serve as the city’s core district (this proposal was ultimately rejected, as the government considered that the low terrain would trap swamp gas and miasma and thus be a health hazard to residents). It was also proposed that the area around the Mid-Levels in Central and Admiralty be developed. The Mid-Levels in Central would be the Government Hill, with primary government institutions to be built around the Governor’s residence. A church would be built on the flat land in front of the Governor’s residence, with the courts to the south of the residence. To the south of Queen’s Road, the land from the Government Hill to Lot No. 14 would be designated as residential areas for Europeans, and Queen’s Road would only be allowed for houses and stores developed by Europeans. The area stretching from the south of Queen’s Road to west of the harbourfront (around today’s Sheung Wan) would be developed into a residential area for the Chinese, while Wellington Street in Central and Bonham Strand in Sheung Wan would become the Upper and Lower Bazaars respectively.17 Seawalls would be erected along the coast from Morrison Hill in Wan Chai to Central for the development of a centre of commercial activities and government administra- tive institutions, while Morrison Hill in Wan Chai would be a cluster location for educational institutions. A canal would be constructed at Wan Chai (near today’s Canal Road Flyover) for sailing boats to load and unload goods conveni- ently. And barracks would be built from Central to Admiralty, as well as from the Lower Bazaar in Sheung Wan to the coast at Sai Wan. The planning was reflective of a governing philosophy that focused on economic development. The distribu- tion of roads and public spaces and the buildings in the core district all had their administrative functions, and due consideration was given to the day-to-day life as well as the religious, cultural and recreational space of Europeans living in the city.18 Gordon’s idea was adopted by the government and was realised, step by step. This explains why the area from the Government Hill to Central’s coast is the centre of political, commercial and cultural activities today.

On 9 May 1844, Gordon was officially promoted to Surveyor General and was responsible for the staged construction of government buildings with adminis- trative functions. The European buildings erected in the 1840s in the city’s core district were not only landmarks that gave the City of Victoria the impression of a European town, but also a prominent sign of the various administrative func- tions of its different districts. The temporary residence (Johnston House) of the Governor, who represented the pinnacle of power, was situated at the starting point of Queen’s Road, halfway up the hill, and was built between 1842 and 1843. In 1879, the building was purchased by Emmanuel R. Belilios, the general manager of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and a Legislative Council member; it was renamed Beaconsfield Arcade in 1889 in honour of British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli (Earl of Beaconsfield). The building was then sold to the Missions étrangères de Paris for 380,000 Hong Kong dollars in 1915, and was rebuilt as an administrative building for the French Mission in 1917. After

17 CO129/4, ‘Despatch from Colonial Land and Emigration Office’, 9 December 1843, pp.216–220.

18 CO129; Ho Pui-yin, Challenges for an Evolving City: 160 Years of Port and Land Development in Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Commercial Press (HK), 2004.

the Second World War, it was used for a time as the provisional government’s headquarters. From 1953 to 1997, the building was used as offices for multiple government departments. It was declared a historical monument in 1989 and, after refurbishment, served as the Court of Final Appeal of Hong Kong from 1997 to 2015. On 8 September 2015, the Court of Final Appeal was relocated to the Legislative Council Building in Central. The former French Mission Building has been taken over by the Department of Justice and is to be used by institutions pro- viding mediation and legal services. The northern part of Hong Kong Island (the area from today’s Admiralty to Sai Ying Pun) encompassed important military locations – military buildings included the Murray Barracks, the Victoria Barracks, the Explosives Magazine Compound and the British Military Hospital. Next to the Governor’s temporary residence was the Central Police Station, responsi- ble for law enforcement and public order, as well as the Victoria Prison and the Central Magistracy. St John’s Cathedral, a centre of religious activities, was also close by, while the office building of the Harbour Master’s Office (responsible for overseeing commerce) was situated at the corner of today’s Wyndham Street. The coastal area on the north side of Hong Kong Island was the operation base from which foreign firms developed their trades. While private enterprises eagerly built piers, dockyards and godowns, the Harbour Master’s Office (today’s Marine Department) and the Post Office also had piers for loading and unloading goods. The area around today’s Wan Chai and Happy Valley served as a base for cemeter- ies, religious groups and schools.19

Private firms were the primary force driving the city’s development. Before the first land sale by auction, Pottinger, the first Governor of Hong Kong, classi- fied land into marine, inland and bazaar lots according to locations. Land use was not expressly provided for, and the market determined the land price by its loca- tion. Most successful bidders developed their land on the basis of mixed com- mercial and residential uses. For example, piers were built by trading companies in front of their buildings, using the ground-level shops for commercial use and at the same time making available guest rooms. While there were Chinese par- ticipating in bidding for the Upper Bazaar (around today’s Wellington Street) land in the first land sale in the early 1840s, the government, in the 1850s, con- sciously developed Central as a commercial district for Europeans and gradually drove those Chinese who had opened their businesses in Central out of the dis- trict into Sheung Wan. The government did not have comprehensive plans for the development of Sheung Wan, which was mostly inhabited by the Chinese. Using respect for the Chinese traditional culture as an excuse, the government neglected the management of public hygiene in Sheung Wan as the district grad- ually became a densely populated Chinese area. In 1888, to prevent sanitation problems in the Chinese communities from spreading to the European commu- nities, the government even deliberately designated specific European residen- tial areas that were off limits to the Chinese.

19 1842 Pottinger’s Map, in Hal Empson, Mapping Hong Kong: A Historical Atlas, Hong Kong, Government Information Services, 1992, pp.160–161.

The colonial government was aware of the importance of open space in the city’s development. By the 1860s, cultural and recreational facilities in the European style had been completed. The Government Gardens, which existed beside the Governor’s residence, were also known as ‘Garden for the Chief of Soldiers’, as the Governor was also the Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces Overseas Hong Kong. In 1848, the then Registrar General, Charles Gutzlaff, proposed at the Royal Asiatic Society the construction of a public garden. This proposal was accepted by the government in 1856 and, on 12 October 1861, the Garden Committee was established.20 The proposal was eventually realised in the 1860s by the Surveyor General’s Office. Thomas McDonaldson was appointed as the curator, overseeing the construction of the public garden on the land which had been the Government Gardens. The gar- den’s plants and their seeds were mainly imported from Britain and Australia. The garden was inaugurated by Governor Lord Rosmead and officially opened to the public in 1864. The Parsee community even made donations to provide for regular performances by a military band in the garden. In 1870, the govern- ment promulgated the Public Gardens Ordinance,21 and the garden was renamed the Botanical Gardens in 1871.22 Charles Ford was recommended by Sir Joseph Hooker, Director of Kew Gardens, to be Superintendent of the Government Gardens and Tree Planting Department. He assumed office on 13 May 1871, taking charge of all matters in relation to plants and trees, as well as the tree- planting in the Government Gardens and by the roads and the afforestation of hillsides.23 At first, the Botanical Gardens only had various types of plants as well as a collection of trees and flowers of commercial value to Hong Kong planted for the general public’s appreciation. Later on, however, the Public Gardens Advisory Committee was established and held the first Flower Show in 1872. By 1878, the Hong Kong Herbarium was added to the Botanical Gardens, making the Botanical Gardens a botanical centre in the Far East.24 The Botanical Gardens were not only a green space in the city’s core district, but also a driving force in promoting botanical research.

The cultural activities of the European bourgeoisie also began taking root in Hong Kong. The old City Hall, designed by French architect A. Hermitte and officially opened by Prince Alfred, was Hong Kong’s cultural centre in the late-nineteenth-century Hong Kong that promoted European bourgeoisie

20 Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 12 October 1861, p.315.

21 Leung Ping-wa, ed., Xianggang zhongxiqu fengwu zhi (Heritage of the Central and Western District, Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Central and Western District Council, 2011, p.285; Wu Hao and Zhang Jianhao, eds, Xianggang laohuajing zhi shenghuo jiumao (Hong Kong Reading Glasses – Old Memories of Livelihood), Hong Kong, Huangguan chubanshe (Xianggang) youxian gongsi, 1996, p.155.

22 Hong Kong Zoological and Botanical Gardens website, www.lcsd.gov.hk/tc/parks/hkzbg/; Desmond Hui, Selected Historic Buildings and Sites in Central District, Hong Kong, Antiquities and Monuments Office of the Leisure and Cultural Services Department, 2004, p.68.

23 Patrick C.C. Lai and Joseph K.L. Yip, Hong Kong Herbarium: 130th Anniversary, 1878–2008, Hong Kong, Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department, 2008, p.18.

24 Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department, Hong Kong Herbarium, Hong Kong, Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department, 2006, p.2, http://herbarium.gov.hk/DocFile/ Publications/2014325174392962.pdf.

culture. The building’s structure and functions were modelled on the social life of the European upper class – with a 569-seat royal theatre, the magnificent St George’s Hall and St Andrew’s Hall, music rooms, a public library, confer- ence rooms, a museum and offices for the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce. Balls, concerts, conferences and lectures were often held in the halls. The Morrison Library, an integral part of the public libraries, already had 8,000 books in 1871. In the first half of the twentieth century, the old City Hall gave way to economic development, and its main building was converted into the headquarters of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation in 1933, while the rest was used as the clubhouses of private clubs, including those for the military, between 1934 and 1946. In 1947, it was redeveloped into the old Bank of China building.

The landmark buildings in Central imitated the European building style of the time. Examples included: Murray House (Government Headquarters), Flagstaff House and the clubhouse of the Hong Kong Club, built in 1846; St John’s Cathedral, the foundation of which was laid in 1847 and construction completed in 1849; the Central Police Station, the Victoria Prison and the Central Magistracy, built in the 1840s; the Government Gardens built in 1864; buildings including the old City Hall, which was built in 1869; and the Supreme Court, completed in 1911. They all had European characteristics: stone pillars, semi-circular window heads, geometric decor for the doorframes, Roman bel- fries, Gothic spires, castles from the European Middle Ages, and so on. The con- struction not only exuded aesthetically the elegance of European cities, but also corresponded functionally to the Western administrative mode of operation. Central was like a miniature British city. On the other hand, the construction in Sheung Wan was funded by the Chinese. From the design to the materials, the structures adopted the standards used by the common people under the Qing rule. They were of crude design and high density, contrasting strongly with the European design in Central.

Construction

Roads

Roads are like blood vessels in the human body. The design of a city’s road network illustrates its government’s jurisdictional purview, while serving as an important facility for enhancing its economic development. To establish the city’s core area, the colonial government first built Queen’s Road on the north- ern coast, which ran eastwards and westwards, while streets leading to Queen’s Road ran northwards and southwards. The 50-feet (15 metres) wide Queen’s Road first headed east before extending west, as Jardine Matheson had already established its foothold at East Point and quite a few buildings had been built in the east. On 1 July 1848, a contractor from Wuhua in Guangdong Province named Tsang Sin signed a contract with the then Colonial Secretary, William Caine, and Colonial Treasurer, William Thomas, for the formation works of Queen’s Road Central and the Government House, and paid a 300 silver dollar

bond as surety that the works would be completed on time.25 The works on Queen’s Road were completed by the end of the 1840s. A thoroughfare that wound through the northern coast of Hong Kong Island, Queen’s Road was the starting point for all visitors upon arrival in Hong Kong by sea. As the alti- tude of the terrain rose gradually from the low-lying coastal region towards the north, travelling along Queen’s Road upon arrival in Hong Kong had a con- notation of presenting oneself before the Queen. At the beginning of the twen- tieth century, the colonial government built Statue Square near the pier where government officials would disembark, reinforcing the British overtones of the area. Queen’s Road, connecting the pier on the northern coast and the com- mercial and residential areas, ran along northwards and southwards, and was winding and narrow as a result of the constraints of the terrain.26 During the mid-nineteenth century, insufficient flat land proved to be the major obstacle in building roads on the rough and rugged terrain of Hong Kong Island’s northern coast. As a result, the geographical and physical environment dictated the distri- bution of roads.

The Praya, built in the nineteenth century on the northern coast of Hong Kong Island, was between 50 and 100 feet wide and used by both pedestri- ans and carriages. The method adopted to build this road was similar to that employed in land reclamation. First, a seawall was built at the coastline, and the space between the seawall and the coastal area was then filled up. The seawall not only broadened the harbourfront, but also smoothed out the coastline to facilitate the docking of ships and loading and unloading of cargo. Government files showed that the construction of the harbourfront and seawalls was a recur- rent government expenditure in the nineteenth century, accounting for a total of 70,620 pounds sterling over the 38 years from 1844 to 1882.27 Such works were mainly carried out between 1859 and 1867, indicating that harbourfront works were a major construction project of the City of Victoria in the 1860s. The roads and facilities along the coast facilitated entrepôt trade. From 1889 to 1903, the government spent millions of Hong Kong dollars on extending the harbourfront northwards by 75 feet, which began from the Hong Kong and China Gas Works in Shek Tong Tsui in Sai Wan in the west and stretched east to Murray Pier in Central. A total land area of 58.5 acres (23.68 hectares), 10,200 feet long and 250 feet wide, was ultimately obtained by reclamation,28 primarily for the construc- tion of a new road to address transport needs. The original Praya was renamed

25 HKRS No. 149, D & S No. 2/81, ‘Bonds for $300 by Affat as Surety for Assen the Contractor to Cut and Level Site for New Government House’.

26 Lo, C.P., ‘Changing Population Distribution in the Hong Kong New Territories’, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Volume 58, No. 2, June 1968, pp.273–284.

27 ‘Return of All Public Works, Civil Roads, Canals, Bridges, Buildings, &c., Not of a Military Nature, Which Have Been Undertaken during the Year’, Hong Kong Blue Book, H2, Public Works, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1844–1882.

28 ‘Report of the Director of Public Works’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1893–1903; ‘Praya Reclamation Scheme’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1889, pp.23–30; Ho Pui-yin, Challenges for an Evolving City: 160 Years of Port and Land Development in Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Commercial Press (HK), 2004, p.73.

after the tenth Governor of Hong Kong (in office between 1887 and 1891), George William Des Voeux, and was called Des Voeux Road. In 1890, Prince Arthur, Duke of Connaught and Strathearn, visited Hong Kong when the new Praya was being built, and the government consequently named it Connaught Road, after his title. Queen’s Road, Des Voeux Road and Connaught Road were the main passages running through the heart of the city, and their importance is reflected in the fact that they were all named after significant establishment figures of the time.

Although Hong Kong’s territory extended to the Kowloon Peninsula in 1860, the peninsula was used by the British as a military stronghold. Thus, com- mercial activities remained primarily on Hong Kong Island. Robinson Road, leading from Mody Road in Tsim Sha Tsui northwards to Austin Road, was the earliest main transport avenue developed on the Kowloon Peninsula. The road was named after the fifth Governor of Hong Kong, Hercules Robinson (1824–1897), who was in office between 1859 and 1865. Land reclamation was conducted at the end of the nineteenth century for the construction of a railway terminus at the southern end of the Kowloon Peninsula. After reclama- tion in Tsim Sha Tsui Bay, Salisbury Road (its Chinese name changed after 1970 to what it is today) extended east, connecting with Robinson Road, which extended south.29 After 1909, Robinson Road was renamed Nathan Road, after Mathew Nathan, the 13th Governor of Hong Kong, who was in office between 1904 and 1907. (See Figure 1.2.)

In the 1870s, the government began developing the western part of the Kowloon Peninsula (the area around Yau Ma Tei today) by way of public auction. In 1876, the government sold Kowloon Marine Lot Nos 29, 30 and 31, which included the seabed from today’s Temple Street in Yau Ma Tei in the east, to Kansu Street in the south, Reclamation Street in the west and Wing Sing Lane in the north. The lots allowed their purchasers to undertake reclamation and build sections of Station Street (renamed Shanghai Street in 1909). The roads in west Kowloon were named after various provinces and cities in China to reflect the community-driven nature of the area’s development. In 1899, the govern- ment again sold by public auction the waterfront west of Station Street, allowing purchasers to build Reclamation Street.30 The pace of development of roads in Kowloon in the second half of the nineteenth century suggests that the govern- ment was focused on building main roads that would run through the Kowloon Peninsula. At the same time, using private investments, the government sought to develop the areas to the west of the peninsula. The government’s intentions to rule the Chinese and foreigners separately at the time were obvious. The large- scale land reclamation works at the southern end of the peninsula were a result of coordination with planning for the Kowloon–Canton Railway terminus.

29 Hal Empson, Mapping Hong Kong: A Historical Atlas, Hong Kong, Government Information Services, 1992, pp.179–180.

30 ‘Report of the Director of Public Works for the Year 1899’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1900, No. 14/1900, p.232.

Source: Hong Kong public Records Office, Reference No. HKRS207-12-73, Map of Hong Kong – with British Kowloon (ca. 1888) (Map No. 73), 1888.

Figure 1.2 Street map of the Kowloon Peninsula in the nineteenth century

Piers

As marine transport was a main form of transportation in the nineteenth century, trading companies and government departments strove to set up their headquarters haphazardly on the northern coast of Hong Kong Island, building piers, dockyards and godowns. From 1841 to 1845, the government spent 559 pounds sterling on building the first pier at today’s Chater Garden in Central: the Harbour Master’s landing steps were the first government-built pier. The

works, which included the Harbour Master’s temporary living quarters, only accounted for 1.2 per cent of total government spending from 1841 to 1844.31 Apart from the Harbour Master’s landing steps, the dedicated landing place for officials was by the shore of the Victoria Barracks.32

From 1841 to 1882, Hong Kong spent up to 16,060 pounds sterling on building and maintaining piers, of which 11,389 pounds sterling was invested in building new piers,33 or 71 per cent of such total expenditure. The number of piers built or rebuilt during this period was estimated to be about 30, with each costing an average of 380 pounds sterling and mostly built within the City of Victoria. Piers built by the Chinese communities were not large in scale. One pier built in the Taipingshan District cost only 16 pounds sterling, illustrating the crudeness of its construction. According to the Hong Kong Blue Book and the annual reports of the Public Works Department, 120,300 Hong Kong dollars was spent between 1889 and 1901 on building Blake Pier,34 the construction of which began soon after the initial stages of the land reclamation works from Sai Wan to Central. This shows how much the government valued the pier. The project was contracted to Messrs Kinghorn & MacDonald and supervised by J.F. Boulton and J.R. Mudie of the Public Works Department. The pier was 200 feet (60.96 metres) long and 40 feet (12.19 metres) wide, with its founda- tion made up of 126-feet (38.40 metres) wide granite ashlar, and protruded 40 feet (12.19 metres) from the harbourfront, with four sets of landing steps each on both sides.35 The pier was built with concrete, and was the largest pier in Central from the end of the nineteenth century to the early twentieth century. Owing to difficulties encountered in the construction of piles, the project took longer than expected to complete.36 Blake Pier, which commenced construction on 1 December 1889 and was completed in November 1900, was unveiled by Governor Henry Blake and opened to public use on 29 November the same year. When Hong Kong was struck by a strong typhoon in 1905, the roof of Blake Pier suffered serious damage, causing the government to build piers with a concrete and steel structure.

On 5 January 1897, the government rebuilt Murray Pier, using 5,989 cubic feet of granite ashlar, 63 cubic yards of lime concrete and 628 cubic yards of cement concrete.37 These concrete-built piers were considered large-scale

31 CO129/5, ‘Detailed Account Disbursements of the Land Department from June 1841 to January 1844’, 10 February 1844.

32 The Military Cantonment (1880), in Hal Empson, Mapping Hong Kong: A Historical Atlas, Hong Kong, Government Information Services, 1992, p.164.

33 ‘Return of All Public Works, Civil Roads, Canals, Bridges, Buildings, &c., Not of a Military Nature, Which Have Been Undertaken During the Year’, Hong Kong Blue Book, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1844– 1882, H2, Public Works, CO133/3.

34 ‘Report of the Director of Public Works for the Year 1900’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1901, No. 16, p.337.

35 Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 11 May 1901, pp.959, 961.

36 ‘Report of the Director of Public Works for the Year 1900’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1901, No. 16, p.337.

37 Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 30 October 1897, p.922.

projects at the time, and signified the importance of entrepôt trade for Hong Kong at the end of the nineteenth century.

The people of Hong Kong have a strong emotional tie to Queen’s Pier (origi- nally named Queen’s Statue Wharf). Queen’s Pier was actually completed after Blake Pier. The first Queen’s Pier was even more primitive than Blake Pier and Murray Pier, with its history being traced back to 1899. The naming of Queen’s Pier was deeply connected to Statue Square. After the completion of the land reclamation works at the harbourfront outside the old City Hall in 1896, the government built Statue Square at the junction between Connaught Road and Wardley Street,38 and had plans to build the Supreme Court near the square, as well as Wardley Street Wharf at the harbourfront opposite the square, which would replace the government pier close to Victoria Barracks.39 On 19 June 1897, the Governor announced that a fireworks display would be held over the harbour and forbade any Chinese without a pass from going to Wardley Street Wharf,40 thus showing that completed in 1897, a year after Statue Square was built, the wharf area was reserved for Europeans. By comparing maps of Central at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, one can see that Wardley Street Wharf was situated at the same location as Queen’s Statue Wharf. In January 1899, the Government Gazette proclaimed multiple piers in Central, including Queen’s Statue Wharf, to be off limits to livestock.41 This piece of information is the earliest mention of Queen’s Statue Wharf in any official records, and it is reckoned that Wardley Street Wharf was renamed Queen’s Statue Wharf in 1899. According to records of the Legislative Council of 12 July 1904, Legislative Council members Gershom Stewart and

A.M. Thomson inquired as to whether the government would improve the facili- ties of Blake Pier and Queen’s Statue Wharf, to which the Colonial Secretary’s reply was that Queen’s Statue Wharf was a temporary construction,42 thus showing that the structure of Queen’s Statue Wharf was very primitive at the beginning of the twentieth century.

The government had proposed rebuilding Queen’s Statue Wharf in 1906,43 190844 and 1910,45 but such proposals never came to fruition. At a Legislative Council meeting held on 15 September 1910, Governor Francis Henry May, when approving the public expenditure for the year 1911, set aside 30,000 Hong Kong dollars for the reconstruction works of Queen’s Statue Wharf. However,

38 Hongkong Telegraph, 28 May 1896.

39 Map of Hong Kong Central 1911, in Hal Empson, Mapping Hong Kong: A Historical Atlas, Hong Kong, Government Information Services, 1992, p.165.

40 Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 19 June 1897.

41 Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 14 January 1899.

42 Hong Kong Hansard, Hong Kong Government, 12 July 1904, p.36, http://www.legco.gov.hk/1904/ h040712.pdf.

43 Hong Kong Hansard, Hong Kong Government, 13 September 1906, p.37, http://www.legco.gov.hk/ 1906/h060913.pdf.

44 Hong Kong Hansard, Hong Kong Government, 24 September 1908, p.122, http://www.legco.gov.hk/ 1908/ h080924.pdf.

45 Hong Kong Hansard, Hong Kong Government, 29 September 1910, p.102, http://www.legco.gov.hk/ 1910/h100929.pdf.

official records of the government show that, before the wharf was rebuilt in 1921, the government did no more than repeated repairs and maintenance.46 In November 1920, Maurice Fitzmaurice visited Hong Kong and proposed extension plans for the old Queen’s Statue Wharf. The Public Works Committee discussed the plans and ultimately approved reconstruction, thus officially commencing such works. Built with concrete, the new pier was 160.7 feet long,

41.3 feet wide and 16.8 feet deep. It was supported by 80 concrete piles that were 60 to 68 feet tall, with a roof made of steel to withstand typhoons. The basic construction of the new Queen’s Statue Wharf was completed by the end of 1922, with follow-up works carried out in 1923 and 1924. Total construction cost amounted to 204,000 Hong Kong dollars.47

Queen’s Statue Wharf was the first landing spot for principal government officials on their arrival in Hong Kong, allowing them to see the statue of Queen Victoria in Statue Square immediately after disembarking. Its significant politi- cal implication indicates that the wharf not only served transport functions, but also was a political tool in shaping the city’s image. Owing to its unique archi- tectural features, Queen’s Statue Wharf was an important landmark of Central. It was situated on the most expensive land in Central, off limits to the Chinese without a pass whenever important ceremonies were held there. Queen’s Statue Wharf, Murray Pier, Blake Pier and Ice House Street Pier (later renamed Star Ferry Pier) in Central all forbade the transport of livestock (the government only allowed the transport of livestock at the Yau Ma Tei Police Station Pier every day from seven o’clock in the morning to five o’clock in the afternoon, and livestock transport at the Hung Hom Pier at the same hours).48 The piers, therefore, were not a daily transport facility for the general public at the time, but rather something for the privileged or economically celebrated and busi- nessmen. For the average citizen, taking a ferry ride was probably a major event in one’s life.

Reservoirs

The construction of reservoirs was the most costly of the various infrastruc- ture works in urban construction. It was also the most difficult, as the works were unique to Hong Kong, without examples from other cities to follow. Such construction plans would be hard to realise without good planning in years of tight finances. In the 1840s and 1850s, the people of Hong Kong mostly relied on creeks, streams and groundwater sources to meet their daily fresh water needs. After the Taiping Rebellion in 1850, Hong Kong’s population grew

46 Hong Kong Blue Book, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1911, F40–F41; Hong Kong Administrative Reports, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1911, Appendix P, p.22.

47 ‘Report of the Director of Public Works for the Year 1921’, Hong Kong Administrative Reports, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1922, Appendix Q, Q 59–60; ‘Report of the Director of Public Works for the Year 1924’, Hong Kong Administrative Reports, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1925, Appendix Q, Q 89.

48 Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 14 January 1899; Hong Kong Hansard, Hong Kong Government, 14 September 1904, p.42, http://www.legco.gov.hk/1904/h040914.pdf.

continuously. As Hong Kong lacked rivers and lakes with an abundant supply of water, it was impossible to satisfy the growing population’s needs for fresh water by solely relying on scarce natural water sources.

On 14 October 1859, the government offered a reward of 1,000 pounds ster- ling to publicly solicit proposals to develop water sources.49 On 29 February 1860, S.B. Rawling, Clerk of Works, Royal Engineers, suggested building a man- made reservoir in the Pok Fu Lam valley to collect rainwater and then, by making use of the higher terrain of the Pok Fu Lam valley and the principle that water flows downwards, to carry the collected rainwater through aqueducts to densely populated regions in Central and Sheung Wan. His proposal was adopted by the government.50 With the first reservoir, which was built in 1863, the people of Hong Kong began drinking fresh water from reservoirs that store rainwater, and these reservoirs have become a unique characteristic of Hong Kong. At its completion, the Pok Fu Lam Reservoir only had a capacity of 2 million gallons (9.08 million litres). With the population of Hong Kong standing at 124,000 in 1863 and assuming each person consumed 4 gallons (18.16 litres) of water daily, the daily water consumption of Hong Kong would be 500,000 gallons (2.27 million litres). The Pok Fu Lam Reservoir could therefore only supply four days’ consumption for the entire population of Hong Kong at the time. According to the statistics in the Key Facts, August 2015 of the Water Supplies Department, in 2014 Hong Kong consumed an average of 2.63 million cubic metres (2.63 billion litres) of fresh water daily, equivalent to an annual total of 959 million cubic metres (959.5 billion litres).51 The Census and Statistics Department estimated Hong Kong’s population to be 7.27 million at the end of 2014,52 which means that each person in Hong Kong consumed an average of

0.362 cubic metres (362 litres) of water daily, a twentyfold increase over 1863.

As the population climbed, the government employed vast economic resources in building additional reservoirs to meet people’s need for fresh water. The government built the Tai Tam Water Supply System in the Southern District on Hong Kong Island from 1883 to 1917, raising the capacity of reser- voirs to 2.2 billion gallons (10 billion litres), and introduced new water pumps to improve the efficiency of the water supply system. In 1917, Hong Kong’s pop- ulation was about 540,000, and the Tai Tam Water Supply System could supply 11 gallons (50 litres) of fresh water for each person daily. The government further built the Shing Mun Reservoir, which has a capacity of 3 billion gallons (13.62 billion litres), between 1929 and 1939, so that each day an average of up to 3.5 to 4.5 million gallons (15.89 to 20.43 million litres) of fresh water would be conveyed to districts throughout Hong Kong by submarine pipelines.53

49 ‘Government Notification No. 98’, Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 15 October 1859.

50 Leonard Jackson, The Hong Kong Waterworks, Hong Kong, Local Printing Press, 1949, p.31.

51 Water Supplies Department, Key Facts, August 2015, Hong Kong, Water Supplies Department, p.14, http://www.wsd.gov.hk/filemanager/tc/share/pdf/key_facts_2015.pdf.

52 http://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hkstat/sub/so20_.jsp.

53 Ho Pui-yin, Water for a Barren Rock: 150 Years of Water Supply in Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Commercial Press, 2001, p.94.

In the few decades after the war, collecting rainwater by building reservoirs remained the primary source of fresh water for the people of Hong Kong. As the result of a rapidly growing population and abundant economic resources, the new reservoir projects grew larger in scale. By the 1950s and 1960s, newly completed reservoirs included the Tai Lam Chung Reservoir (with a capacity of 5 billion gallons (22.7 billion litres)) and the Shek Pik Reservoir (with a capacity of 5.4 billion gallons (24.52 billion litres)). Although both of these reservoirs are larger than the Shing Mun Reservoir (which was the largest reservoir before the war), they still proved insufficient to meet the rapidly rising need for fresh water after the war. The Plover Cove Reservoir and the High Island Reservoir, built in 1968 and 1979 respectively, were epoch-making constructions – the design phi- losophy and practical functionality behind the construction of these reservoirs are a testimony of the rapid pace with which Hong Kong developed as a society. Utilising the topography of the Tolo Harbour, the Plover Cove Reservoir was the largest coastal lake in the world when it was built, with a capacity of 51.7 billion gallons (234.75 billion litres). The High Island Reservoir, built with the benefit of the experience from the construction of the Plover Cove Reservoir, was even larger in scale and had a capacity of 60 billion gallons (272.44 billion litres), thus helping to solve Hong Kong’s water supply problems. The annual rainfall in Hong Kong is very unevenly distributed. According to the yearly average rainfall recorded by the Hong Kong Observatory from 1883 to 2014, the average annual rainfall for those 131 years was 2,256 mm54 (from 2010 onwards, the Hong Kong Observatory began adopting a different calculation method – calculating the average rainfall with the use of the standard climate normal between 1981 and 2010). As the annual rainfall for 1997 was 3,343 mm and the climate normal before 1981 was not included in the calculations, the official average annual rain- fall for 2014 in Hong Kong was 2,399 mm.55 However, the rainy season is mostly concentrated between May and September each year, with a drastic variation in rainfall between the wet (May to September) and dry (October to April) periods. In a dry year like 1963, when the annual rainfall was only 901 mm,56 the rainwater collected was clearly insufficient to meet people’s needs. It was not ideal to rely on rainfall to solve Hong Kong’s water supply problems, for, if there were no rain, there would be no rainwater to collect regardless of how large the reservoirs were. Therefore using rainwater for drinking was only a solution com- pelled by circumstances. An insufficient fresh water supply plagued the overall development of Hong Kong.

On the other hand, the building of reservoirs required that catchment areas be reserved close to the reservoirs, so that catchwaters could be built to channel

54 ‘Ranking of Air Temperature and Rainfall in Hong Kong at Annual’, Hong Kong Observatory website, http://www.hko.gov.hk/cis/statistic/erank13.htm.

55 Summary of Meteorological Observations in Hong Kong, Hong Kong Royal Observatory, 1993–1999.

56 J.E. Peacock, ed., Hong Kong Meteorological Records and Climatological Notes 60 Years, Hong Kong Royal Observatory, 1951; Meteorological Results Annual Report, Hong Kong Royal Observatory, 1951–1990;

G.J. Bell and P.C. Chin, The Probable Maximum Rainfall in Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Government Press, 1968;

P. Peterson, The Rainfall of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Government Press, 1957, p.3.

rainwater into the reservoirs and to drain away torrents during the rainy season. To minimise the loss of rainwater and slow down surface erosion by the ele- ments, plans that would facilitate the drainage of water, such as horsetail trees, slash pines, forest grey gums and lemon-scented gums, were planted in catch- ment areas in abundance. These catchment areas therefore have become Hong Kong’s green areas, and the reservoirs built to supply fresh water are a unique characteristic of Hong Kong and great picnic destinations for the people of Hong Kong during the holidays. (See Table 1.1.)

The City of Victoria in the nineteenth century had all the essential political, cultural and religious infrastructure of a European city. Balancing the interests of different sectors, the city provided Europeans with space to develop their political, economic and daily life activities. Furthermore, in response to the city’s unique environment, a great deal of human and material resources were employed to build the basic and important infrastructure required for the estab- lishment of an entrepôt, which included seawalls, main roads and piers, while the construction of reservoirs proved to be investment projects of the largest scale. The spending of government resources prescribed the focus of development on the northern coast of Hong Kong Island and the area south of Government Hill in the second half of the nineteenth century. Western District of Hong Kong Island was not mentioned in the blueprints of completed projects, indicating that this district was developed at a later stage.57 The city’s reliance on rainwater for its survival was only altered in the 1960s, when China agreed to supply Hong Kong with fresh water from the Dongjiang (East River).

Crises

Fire disasters: land reclamation

Since the City of Victoria was built on the northern coast of Hong Kong Island,58 the population of Hong Kong had continuously grown. The topography of Hong Kong Island is hilly and tilts from the north to the south, with the north- ern part composed mostly of land that is mountainous with an altitude of 250 to 300 metres. Only a very small area of flat land is available for development. In order to accommodate the growing population and develop as an entrepôt trade centre of the Asia-Pacific region, Hong Kong had to make use of new technology in construction to solve its housing, water supply and transport problems. Of the various Western construction techniques, land reclamation was most useful for solving the problem of land shortage in the city’s core district. The newly reclaimed land was in fact located within the core district. In other words, the core district of the city was mostly built by manual labour. The realisation of land reclamation plans at that time faced as many challenges as it does today. Apart from insufficient resources, there was also obstruction by private landowners, as

57 Historical and Statistical Abstract of the Colony of Hong Kong 1841–1930, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1932, p.1.

58 Friend of China and Hong Kong Gazette, 7 April 1842.

Table 1.1 Construction year and scale of Hong Kong reservoirs

Reservoir Establishment Total 1996 2015

Year Reservoir storage

(’000 gallons

(’000 m3))

Total area of catchment (acre (km2))

Expenditure (HK$’000)

Total area of catchment (acre (km2))

Total expenditure of establishment and extension (HK$’000)

Reservoir capacity (’000 gallons

(’000 m3))

Reservoir capacity (’000 gallons

(’000 m3))

Reservoir storage* (’000 gallons

(’000 m3))

pok Fu Lam	1863	2,000	–	170	416	455	57,420	30,580	–
Reservoir		(9)			(1.68)		(261)	(139)
tai tam Reservoirs						4,775
tai tam Upper	1889	312,330	680	1,257	680.56	1,365	360,140	327,800	193,820
Reservoir		(1,420)	(2.75)		(2.75)		(1,637)	(1,490)	(881)
tai tam Byewash	1904	22,400	–	142	–	–	22,440	17,600	13,420
Reservoir		(102)					(102)	(80)	(61)
tai tam	1908	210,400	–	896	–	–	199,320	150,920	149,380
Intermediate		(956)					(906)	(686)	(679)
Reservoir
tai tam tuk	1918	1,420,000	–	2,371	–	–	1,368,180	1,330,340	933,240
Reservoir		(6,455)					(6,219)	(6,047)	(4,242)
Wong Nai chung	1899	30,340	100	82	100	82	33,220	–	–
Reservoir		(138)	(0.4)		(0.4)		(138)
Kowloon Group					941	2,283
of Reservoirs					(3.8)
Kowloon Reservoir	1906	352,500	438	1,234	755	1,600	347,160	347,160	321,200
		(1,602)	(1.77)		(3.06)		(1,578)	(1,578)	(1,460)

Table 1.1 (continued)

Reservoir Establishment Total 1996 2015

Year Reservoir storage

Total area of catchment

Expenditure (HK$’000)

Total area of catchment

Total expenditure

Reservoir capacity

Reservoir storage*

(’000 gallons

(’000 m3))

(acre (km2))

(acre (km2)) of establishment

and extension (HK$’000)

(’000 gallons

(’000 m3))

(’000 gallons

(’000 m3))

(’000 gallons

(’000 m3))

Kowloon Reception	1926	33,150	96	164	– –		33,220	26,620	26,620
Reservoir		(151)	(0.38)				(151)	(121)	(121)
Kowloon Byewash	1931	185,500	90	519	– –		187,660	176,000	144,760
Reservoir		(843)	(0.36)				(853)	(800)	(658)
Shek Lei pui	1926	116,100	139	247	139 247		100,760	82,280	74,800
Reservoir		(528)	(0.56)		(0.56)		(458)	(374)	(340)
Aberdeen							276,980
Reservoirs							(1,259)
Aberdeen Lower	1890	4,420	– – – – –					106,920	33,880
Reservoir		(20)						(486)	(154)
Aberdeen Upper	1931	175,000	145	1,005	1,009	2,555	–	170,060	63,800
Reservoir		(795)	(0.59)		(4.08)			(773)	(290)
Shing Mun
Reservoirs
Shing Mun	1939	3,000,000	3,050	8,664	3,050	8,664	2,921,380	2,921,380	2,618,220
Reservoir		(13,636)	(12.34)		(12.34)		(13,279)	(13,279)	(11,901)

Lower Shing Mun	1965	950,000	–	–	–	–	945,780	945,780	206,580
Reservoir		(4,318)					(4,299)	(4,299)	(939)
tai Lam chung	1957	4,500,000	2,000	100,000	2,000	100,000	4,507,800	4,507,800	4,285,600
Reservoir		(20,455)	(8.09)		(8.09)		(20,490)	(20,490)	(19,480)
Shek pik Reservoir	1963	5,515,000	8,959	250,000	8,959	250,000	5,381,640	5,381,420	4,509,340
		(25,068)	(36.26)		(36.26)		(24,462)	(24,461)	(20,497)
plover cove	1968	37,378,000	–	407,000	–	435,000	50,540,380	50,540,380	43,330,100
Reservoir		(169,900)					(229,7290)	(229,729)	(196,955)
High Island	1978	60,280,000	14,826.3	1,348,000	14,826.3	1,348,000	61,847,280	61,847,280	47,603,600
Reservoir		(274,000)	(60)		(60)		(281,124)	(281,124)	(216,380)

Note: * Statistics as at 1 December 2015.

Sources: Ho pui-yin, Xianggang gongshui yibai wushi nian lishi yanjiu baogao 《香港供水一百五十年歷史研究報告》 (A Study of Historical Development of Water Supply in Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Water Supplies Department, 2001; Water Supplies Department, Hong Kong’s Water, Hong Kong, Water Supplies Department, 1996; Water Supplies Department, ‘the Legacy of Waterworks’, 10 June 2014, http://www.wsd.gov.hk/tc/ education/history/the_legacy_of_waterworks/the_legacy_of_waterworks/index.html, accessed 13 June 2015; Water Supplies Department, ‘capacity of Impounding Reservoirs in Hong Kong’, http://www.wsd.gov.hk/tc/publi- cations_and_statistics/statistics/capacity_of_impounding_reservoirs_in_hong_kong/index.html, accessed 7 December 2015; Water Supplies Department, ‘current Storage position of Impounding Reservoirs’, http://www.wsd. gov.hk/tc/publications_and_statistics/statistics/current_storage_position_of_reservoirs/index.html, accessed July–December 2015.

well as opposition from the British military. After the first large-scale reclama- tion project commenced in the 1850s, the government had intended to press on with land reclamation in earnest. However, it was only after some 30 years of disputes that the approval of various parties was obtained in 1899 to relaunch reclamation projects.

The first large-scale manpower-dependent land creation project in Hong Kong was actually sparked by a major fire that broke out on Wednesday, 28 December 1851 at 10 p.m. at the Lower Bazaar (today’s Jervois Street in Sheung Wan) and lasted until 5.30 a.m. in the early morning of 29 December 1951.59 It was a milestone for the expansion of the core district towards the west through reclamation. The fire started at Che-cheong Clothes Shop at No. 601, Lot No. 16 of Sheung Wan, only 150 feet from the warehouse of Gibb, Livingston & Co. in Central. The fire was most severe at 1 a.m. on 29 December, spreading eastwards to the present-day junction between Queen’s Road Central, Jervois Street and Wellington Street, southwards to Queen’s Road Central, westwards to the intersection of Jervois Street and Morrison Street, and northwards to the harbourfront north of Jervois Street. The fire affected an area of 189,792 square feet (about 4.4 acres).60

During the fire, in order to stop it from spreading east into the Central dis- tricts, the army and the navy used 100-pound explosives to collapse houses to cut off the fire. The fire resulted in 450 houses destroyed, two lieutenants, R.A. Tomkyns and R.A. Lugg, killed, several servicemen injured, 200 Chinese missing, and some 30,000 pounds sterling worth of damage to property. Factors including the high density of houses, the large amount of stored goods, and a lack of sources of water for putting out the fire, as well as crude fire protection equipment, all contributed to the fire spreading rapidly and becoming out of control,61 and the site of the fire suffered severe damage as a result. The government, which had up to that point always been critical of the environmental hygiene and public order of the Chinese settlements in the coastal area around Taipingshan, saw the fire as an opportunity to give the Chinese community an overhaul.

After the fire, Surveyor General Gordon made plans for the first large-scale reclamation project at Praya Bonham Strand, Sheung Wan. The works com- menced at the junction of today’s Wellington Street, Jervois Street and Queen’s Road Central and ended at the interchange of Jervois Street and Morrison Street. The project saw a 50-feet-wide praya by the waterfront, extending along Bonham Strand north. The materials used for reclamation were primarily taken from hills on Hospital Road, while some were construction waste from Taipingshan area. The estimated construction cost was 2.78 Hong Kong dollars per square foot. The government sold the marine lots publicly by auction, and the owners of these

59 D. Henry Talbot, ‘An Outline of the Urban Development of Hong Kong Island during the Nineteenth Century’, in D.J. Dwyer, ed., The Changing Face of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Ye Olde Printerie, 1971, p.57.

60 Friend of China and Hong Kong Gazette, 3 January 1852, p.2.

61 CO129/38, No. 89, ‘Special Report from Police Department to Major Caine’, 29 December 1851, pp.120–127; Friend of China and Hong Kong Gazette, 31 December 1851, pp.426–427.

marine lots had to bear the construction cost of piers, part of the reclamation works and seawalls. On the other hand, the government allowed the marine lot owners to collect a fee from members of the public who used the piers. By asking the private landowners to fund the reclamation works and the construction of piers and collecting Crown rent from these new landowners, the government managed to cut costs while at the same time raising revenue for the Treasury.

Most marine lot owners did not favour reclamation, as they had to shoulder the costs for reclamation in order to attain ownership of the reclaimed land. Furthermore, the original piers would not be able to remain in normal operation while the works were in progress, thus bringing economic loss to the owners. The reclamation works at Praya Bonham Strand were able to be carried out smoothly because of the fact that most of the owners were Chinese, who typically did not dare to oppose government policy. The only lots owned by European owners were Gibb, Livingston & Co. of Lot Nos 1 and 4, J.G. Mornson of Lot No. 6 and

L.M.S. Chapel of Lot No. 191. Moreover, most of the leases for the lots were going to expire in two to three years. There was therefore little reason for owners with these leases to oppose reclamation. Under these circumstances, the gov- ernment was able to reach agreements more easily with owners.62

The completed Bonham Strand was the centre of gold and silver trading by the Chinese at the end of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. The Chinese Gold and Silver Exchange Society, established in 1910, also moved into 52 Bonham Strand in 1933. The construction method of land reclamation by making use of materials from hills and building seawalls proved to be a model followed by reclamation projects to come. After the reclama- tion project of Bonham Strand, the government further proposed plans for the Praya Reclamation Scheme as well as reclamation in Central, in order to actively develop Hong Kong’s land resources.

The data on the Sheung Wan reclamation works disclose in detail the tech- niques and construction characteristics of early reclamation projects. The key part of the works was the building of the seawall. Once it was built, the seabed between the seawall and the coast was filled with sediment and rocks in order to connect the seawall to coastal land. The seawall was built using the method of Pierre-perdue, which was similar to the modern method of vertical seawall construction: using large rocks (each no smaller than 8 cubic feet in size) as its foundation, the seawall would have a gradient of 2:1 on the seaward side and 1:1 on the landward side.63 The interstices were then filled with rubble. The stone- work above the seawall footings foundation was constructed of ashlar masonry. To ensure the strength and durability of the new seawall, the masonry was set in cement mortar in place of pure cement. The use of lime was not allowed in any part of the work.64

62 Friend of China and Hong Kong Gazette, 3 January 1853, pp.2–3.

63 CO129/129, ‘Proposed Extension of Praya Bonham Strand – Supplementary Report and Estimate No. 23 of 1868’, 24 March 1868.

64 CO129/129, ‘Proposed Extension of Praya Bonham Strand – Supplementary Report and Estimate No. 23 of 1868’, 24 March 1868.

After being struck by the severe typhoon of 1874, the government proposed large-scale reclamation works along coastal areas in 1875. However, these pro- posals were never realised, owing to a lack of funds. By the 1880s, the seabed of the northern coast of Hong Kong Island had become increasingly shallow as a result of prolonged accumulation of alluvium from the Pearl River Delta. When the tide was low in spring, the shallow waters were under 20 feet deep. As the tonnage of ocean-going ships continued to climb, the waters could no longer allow for the berthing of the larger vessels. On 13 July 1887, Paul Chater, taipan of the Hong Kong and Kowloon Wharf and Godown Co., reintroduced discus- sion on the Praya Reclamation Scheme. This was because, during the reclamation works, dredging works could also be carried out to deepen the coastal chan- nels and solve the berthing problems for ocean-going vessels. Moreover, with the price of land rising continuously, landowners stood to make a profit even after taking into account the construction costs and other losses. Chater’s proposal was therefore well suited for society’s needs at the time. With consensus reached between the government and the commercial sector, a reclamation scheme of the largest scale since the mid-nineteenth century commenced in 1889.

The land reclamation from 1889 to 1903 covered an area from the Hong Kong and China Gas Works in Sai Wan (today’s Whitty Street) in the west to Murray Pier in Central (today’s City Hall multi-storey car park) in the east. A total of 2 miles (about 3,218.6 metres) in length and creating 59 acres (23.9 hectares) of land, the reclamation project was the main reason behind the exist- ence of Connaught Road and a range of new facilities. From 1921 to 1931 the government created a further 86 acres of land by reclamation from Central to Wan Chai. These two projects established the mechanism for future reclama- tion in Hong Kong: in order to save government spending, reclamation works would continuously be included in land to be sold, so that the works could be funded by the private sector; and, to ensure that the reclamation materials and construction techniques used by the private developers as well as the reclama- tion area would suit the government’s overall development plans, the govern- ment would specify the fixed completion date and specifications before selling the land to facilitate future regulation. This process not only increased revenue for the Treasury through the creation of land, but also utilised the economic power of the private sector in undertaking the reclamation works to develop coastal land. As for issues concerning the respective rights and obligations of the government and private landowners, such as construction costs, ownership of the newly created land, the determination of the land premium and Crown rent, and the future development of the land, they were dealt with in advance through contracts. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the City of Victoria gradually extended in a belt shape from Central and Sheung Wan to Sai Wan in the west, and subsequently to Wan Chai and Causeway Bay in the east.

By the first half of the twentieth century, the reclamation techniques used in Hong Kong had become rather mature. Apart from building facilities that could withstand storm surges and typhoons, the government also had to manage both the new and the old ancillary facilities of reclaimed land, for example the con- nection of new and old water pipes and sewerage pipelines, the convergence of

roads, traffic arrangements during construction, and so on. In the 1970s, before the use of the band drains in speeding up settlement, the reclamation works in Hong Kong mostly utilised the European method of rock-mounding in building seawalls. Reclaimed land may only be built on after it has settled, allowing its soil to lose moisture. While settlement was in progress, the government would use the reclaimed land as small bazaars, allowing merchants to set up store and street performers to perform. Such land was therefore called the ‘commoners’ night- club’, and was a favourite among the general public looking for entertainment in their leisure time.

In densely populated areas, land reclamation projects with systematic plan- ning are a way for the government to expand a city’s core district. In carrying out reclamation projects, one has to balance the society’s needs, its political and economic development, and the interests of various parties. The reclaimed land in the coastal areas on Hong Kong Island, the Kowloon Peninsula and the New Territories has allowed the latest harbour facilities to be built up along the coast towards both the east and the west. (See Table 1.2.)

Typhoons: redeveloping the harbourfront and building typhoon shelters

Every year from June to October, Hong Kong is subject to typhoons moving north from the Philippines towards South-east Asia and the South China Sea. From 1956 to 2014, a total of 349 tropical cyclones (an average of 5.9 per year) necessitating a tropical cyclone warning signal to be hoisted by the Hong Kong Observatory were recorded. In the same period, as many as 919 tropical cyclones were recorded within Hong Kong’s area of responsibility.65 Typhoons usually hit during the summer, and in the nineteenth century when buildings were still quite primitive they caused severe damage to life and property.

Before the Hong Kong Observatory was established in 1883, there was no professional department within the government responsible for observing and recording the movement of typhoons, nor were there any specific procedures for releasing information on typhoons. As a result, there was an almost com- plete lack of data on typhoons at the time. After the establishment of the Hong Kong Observatory, more detailed records of the direction of movement, average hourly wind speeds and maximum gust of typhoons began to accumulate. According to newspapers at the time, the strongest typhoons causing the most serious damage before 1883 were those of 1867, 1870 and 1874.66 In particu- lar, the typhoon that hit Hong Kong on 22–23 September 1874 was the most ferocious, and was the strongest typhoon of the second half of the nineteenth century. The city’s original constructions were almost completely destroyed by the typhoon, and the number of deaths just a few days after the typhoon hit was estimated to be as high as around 2,000, with the actual number of victims

65 Hong Kong Observatory, Tropical Cyclones in 2014, Hong Kong, Hong Kong Observatory, 2015, p.86.

66 Wah Kiu Yat Po, 29 May 1964; Wah Kiu Yat Po, 18 October 1964; Wah Kiu Yat Po, 29 May 1966.

Table 1.2 Statistics on land reclamation in Hong Kong over the years

Fiscal year	Area reclaimed during the year	Total area reclaimed	Area of Hong Kong	Fiscal year	Area reclaimed during the year	Total area reclaimed	Area of Hong Kong
	(km2)	(km2)	(km2)		(km2)	(km2)	(km2)
1850–1930		<5.00		1986–1987	1.51	23.77	1,070.12
1945–1959	1.38	1.38	1,047.73	1987–1988	1.74	25.51	1,071.86
1959–1960	0.76	2.14	1,048.49	1988–1989	1.52	27.03	1,073.38
1960–1961	0.38	2.52	1,048.87	1989–1990	1.24	28.27	1,074.62
1961–1962	0.26	2.78	1,049.13	1990–1991	0.68	28.95	1,075.30
1962–1963	0.50	3.28	1,049.63	1991–1992	0.97	29.92	1,076.27
1963–1964	0.32	3.59	1,049.94	1992–1993	0.97	30.89	1,077.24
1964–1965	1.08	4.67	1,051.02	1993–1994	4.70	35.59	1,081.94
1965–1966	0.61	5.28	1,051.63	1994–1995	8.97	44.56	1,090.91
1966–1967	0.84	6.11	1,052.46	1995–1996	2.43	46.99	1,093.34
1967–1968	0.55	6.66	1,053.01	1996–1997	0.75	47.74	1,094.09
1968–1969	0.53	7.19	1,053.54	1997–1998	0.77	48.51	1,094.86
1969–1970	0.32	7.51	1,053.86	1998–1999	1.33	49.84	1,096.19
1970–1971	0.38	7.90	1,054.25	1999–2000	0.49	50.33	1,096.68
1971–1972	0.41	8.31	1,054.66	2000–2001	1.40	51.73	1,098.08
1972–1973	0.32	8.63	1,054.98	2001–2002	1.92	53.65	1,100.00
1973–1974	0.52	9.14	1,055.49	2002–2003	1.73	55.38	1,101.73

1974–1975	0.51	9.65	1,056.00	2003–2004	0.83	56.21	1,102.56
1975–1976	0.35	10.00	1,056.35	2004–2005	1.16	57.37	1,103.72
1976–1977	0.21	10.21	1,056.56	2005–2006	0.32	57.69	1,104.04
1977–1978	0.41	10.63	1,056.97	2006–2007	−0.07	57.62	1,103.97
1978–1979	1.90	12.52	1,058.87	2007–2008	0.30	57.92	1,104.27
1979–1980	0.98	13.50	1,059.85	2008–2009	0.05	57.97	1,104.32
1980–1981	0.99	14.49	1,060.84	2009–2010	0.06	58.03	1,104.38
1981–1982	0.89	15.39	1,061.74	2010–2011	0.01	58.04	1,104.39
1982–1983	0.44	15.82	1,062.17	2011–2012	0.02	58.06	1,104.41
1983–1984	2.05	17.88	1,064.23	2012–2013	0.02	58.08	1,104.43
1984–1985	3.43	21.30	1,067.65	2013–2014	0.03	58.11	1,104.46
1985–1986	0.96	22.26	1,068.61	2014–2015	1.16	59.27	1,105.62

Note: the total area of Hong Kong in the financial year 2006–2007 became smaller in comparison with the previous year owing to a change of calculation method.

Sources: Hong Kong Lands Department, Architectural Services Department and civil Engineering and Development Department.

34 · MAKING HONG KONG

expected to be much higher. Among those affected, the boat people, accounting for 17 per cent of Hong Kong’s population of 120,000 at the time,67 suffered the most casualties.

The reports submitted after the typhoon to the Colonial Secretary on 30 September 1874 by the heads of various departments of the government, includ- ing the Captain Superintendent of Police, the Colonial Surgeon, the Director of Public Works, the Surveyor General and the Harbour Master, detailed the sever- ity of the situation. The typhoon was at its strongest from 1 a.m. to 4 a.m. in the early morning of 23 September, and the 0.75-mile-long area from the busy old City Hall to Tung Kai Street (today’s Cosco Tower at Wing Lok Street), the 1-mile-long harbourfront from Tung Kai Street to the Mariner’s Club (the junc- tion of Western Street and Des Voeux Road West, where the Western Police Station, or ‘Police Station No. 7’, was – this is now known as the Western District Headquarters and Western Police Station) and the seawall along the coast of East Point had all been destroyed and required reconstruction. None of the godowns or piers along the coast had been spared. The bodies recovered by the police included 604 Chinese and 17 Europeans, while the Office of the Registrar General recorded 712 drowned and 84 crushed under collapsed buildings. The number of casualties was so numerous that it was difficult to be accurate, with initial estimates reaching over 1,000. Drowned bodies were left floating across the harbour days after the typhoon, buffeted by the waves. Moreover, the sewage outfalls along the coast were blocked because of damage to the seawalls, causing sewage to flow backward. The stench of death hung over the city. In addition, 200 houses collapsed, two ocean-going vessels were stranded, eight ships sank, and hundreds of sailing boats and sampans were destroyed. Government build- ings were also damaged to various degrees by the typhoon, with the Government Civil Hospital suffering the most severe damage: its doors and windows were damaged and the building’s top-floor ceiling was blown away. Other buildings with their roofs swept off by the typhoon included police stations, post offices, six primary markets of the City of Victoria, and public schools. Victoria Prison and Stonecutters Island Prison were also seriously damaged. The majority of plants in the Botanical Gardens were destroyed, and the trees in the city were also pulverised. The streets were blocked by trees that had fallen. Telegraph stations and gaslights in the city were destroyed and, as a result, the streets were left with no illumination at night. Devastation filled the City of Victoria, leaving almost no safe shelter. The damage caused by the typhoon made the govern- ment realise that construction materials were not strong enough to withstand typhoons.68 After disaster struck, reconstruction of the seawalls became a prior- ity. Reclamation was also undertaken as part of the reconstruction works.

67 The total population of 1874 is actually data from 1872. Hong Kong Blue Book, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1874, p.122. From 1873 to 1876, the government did not conduct any census and only cited figures from 1872 as reference. Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 24 February 1877, p.81. Such figures are provided here as well for reference only.

68 ‘Captain Superintendent of Police to Colonial Secretary’, 30 September 1874, Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 17 October 1874, No. 168.

In 1875, the government proposed large-scale construction of the Praya. Governor A.E. Kennedy appointed Registrar General C.C. Smith, Surveyor General J.M. Price, Superintendent of Fire Brigade C. May, P. Ryrie of Turner & Co., and H. Rowlock of Gibb, Livingstone & Co. to a committee69 discussing the reconstruction of the Praya and the large-scale reclamation works from west to east along the coast. The plans also included the waterfront that would connect the barracks in Central and Wan Chai. Districts with wider reclamation areas included the District No. 2 (Sai Ying Pun) and District No. 4 (Sheung Wan) of the City of Victoria,70 and also the area from White’s Lane at Sheung Wan’s harbourfront (today’s Wing Wo Street in Sheung Wan) to the Government Wharf in front of the Cricket Ground in Central, the navy’s dockyard and the coastal area of the neighbouring buildings of the British military. (See Figure 1.3 and Table 1.3.) In order to reinforce the seawalls against typhoons, the govern- ment proposed using new construction technologies that increased construc- tion costs. The owners of marine lots in Sai Wan and Sheung Wan were invited to participate in the plans. However, although the original owners were guaran- teed the ownership of the reclaimed land by the government, most were only willing to pay for the basic reclamation works and not the additional works for reinforcing the seawalls. The government was facing economic difficulties after the typhoon and could not afford such major expenditure. It was also difficult to find financial backers other than the prospective owners of the reclaimed land. The committee therefore had no choice but to propose a loan from the British government.

The government planned to borrow a loan of 214,500 Hong Kong dollars from the United Kingdom at an interest rate of 5 per cent per annum, to be repaid over 15 years. With an annual payment of 15,000 Hong Kong dollars, the loan principal repayment amount would be 14,250 Hong Kong dollars after deducting interest of 750 Hong Kong dollars. The 15-year loan would have been sufficient to cover the reclamation costs.71 One thing of note is that the British military had always opposed reclamation in front of the land it owned before the typhoon hit Hong Kong in 1874. However, the typhoon had blocked the drains and sewers of the coastal land owned by the British military, causing water to accumulate and sewage to backflow during heavy downpours. In addi- tion, after the typhoon struck, local residents disposed of garbage by discharge along the coast, badly affecting the hygiene of the barracks. The British military therefore also supported the reconstruction of the harbourfront and its expan- sion by way of reclamation.72 Regrettably, the government failed to secure the loan in the end. With unfavourable economic conditions after the typhoon, Governor Kennedy was unable to implement the plan during his time in office.73

69 CO129/170, pp.531–534.

70 CO129/170 refers to Sai Ying Pun as District No. 2 and Sheung Wan as District No. 4.

71 CO129/170, pp.536–538.

72 CO129/174, ‘Foreshore in Front of Naval and Military Reserves’, 11 July 1876, pp.350–363.

73 Geoffrey Robley Sayer, Hong Kong, 1862–1919: Years of Discretion, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 1975, p.39.

Source: CO129.

Figure 1.3 Reclamation plan for Victoria Harbour in the late nineteenth century

Table 1.3 Expenditure budget for Praya reconstruction works (May 1875)

HK$

Repairing, and where necessary rebuilding, seawall from Gas Works to White’s Lane

55,000

Rebuilding seawall from White’s Lane to Government Wharf	105,400
Increasing width of praya central	12,500
Repairs to praya East	20,000
contingencies	19,100
Total	212,000

Sources: CO129/170, praya Wall – transmits Report of Board of Enquiry on, and other papers Relating to Rebuilding of, 6 May 1875.

The reclamation works from the Hong Kong and China Gas Works in Sai Wan to the Government Wharf in Central did not commence until 1889.

Compared to reclamation works, building typhoon shelters requires less funds. The government’s building of the first typhoon shelter in Causeway Bay for boat people was also a response to the devastation the boat people suffered in the 1874 typhoon. Causeway Bay Typhoon Shelter was completed in 1883, and cost around 97,000 Hong Kong dollars to build.74 When it was first built, the breakwater was only 1,400 feet long75 and could not accommodate a lot of ships.76 It therefore could not offer sufficient space when typhoons struck. In December 1903, Legislative Council member Gershom Stewart proposed an expansion of the Causeway Bay Typhoon Shelter, which was approved unanimously in the Legislative Council. However, despite approval, the plan was not implemented, owing to insufficient funds. In 1904 and 1906, although being pressed by Legislative Council members and the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce, the government was still not able to expand the Causeway Bay Typhoon Shelter.77 On 18 September 1906, Hong Kong was again struck by a strong typhoon, which destroyed 3,653 ships and killed over 15,000, most of whom were boat people.78 The expansion of the typhoon shelter was thus again brought to the forefront, and in March 1908 the government accepted the proposal of the General Chamber of Commerce dated 16 July 1904, increasing the depth by 9 feet and expanding its area by 75 acres. In 1953, the gov- ernment undertook reclamation works at the Causeway Bay Typhoon Shelter, and the typhoon shelter was moved north from its original location.79

From the end of 1906 to the beginning of 1907, the Legislative Council considered building a new typhoon shelter at one of these locations: Cheung

74 ‘Report of the Director of Public Works for the Year 1909’, Hong Kong Administrative Reports, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1910, Appendix O.

75 Wah Kiu Yat Po, 25 August 1968; Wah Kiu Yat Po, 19 June 1960.

76 Huazi ribao (Huazi Daily), 2 November 1906.

77 Huazi ribao (Huazi Daily), 2 November 1906.

78 ‘A Review of Natural Disasters of the Past’, in Ho Pui-yin, Weathering the Storm: Hong Kong Observatory and Social Development, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 2003, p.81.

79 Wah Kiu Yat Po, 19 June 1960.

Sha Wan, east of Stonecutters Island, Kellett’s Bank in Causeway Bay, the har- bourfront of Kennedy Town, and so on. In 1908, the Public Works Committee agreed unanimously that Mong Kok Tsui in Yau Ma Tei would be most suitable. The typhoon shelter, upon completion, would have an area of 166 square acres80 and was estimated to cost 1.54 million Hong Kong dollars.

On 7 March 1908, the Hong Kong government submitted the proposal and budget for the Mong Kok Tsui Typhoon Shelter to Britain for approval. On 2 September 1908, in order to make timely precautions against typhoons, the government purchased the hopper dredger St Enoch from Messrs Punchard, Lowther & Co. to start dredging works at the site even before approval was obtained from Britain. The design plans of the typhoon shelter were consid- ered and revised by engineer J.F. Boulton of the Public Works Department and other consulting engineers, and the new plans were approved by the Legislative Council in November 1909. Dredging works were completed by the end of January 1910. Construction works were contracted to Messrs Him Tai on 27 October 1910 at the lowest price, and included building a breakwater that was 3,325 feet long with a foundation 192 feet wide, as well as a 450-feet-long and 30-feet-wide concrete pier to be built on the south of the harbour by reclama- tion. Upon completion, the typhoon shelter area within the breakwater would cover 165 acres (0.67 square kilometres). The depth would be affected by tidal movement and would range from 9 to 18 feet, with 82 per cent of the waters at 12 feet deep and 56 per cent of the waters deeper than 15 feet. There were two entrances into the typhoon shelter: the northern entrance was 300 feet wide, while the southern entrance was 390 feet wide.81

Building the Mong Kok Tsui Typhoon Shelter necessitated raising the level of Reclamation Street, which was originally adjacent to the sea, as well as relaying sewage and water discharge facilities. The government was also of the view that the houses with a frontage to the sea should be rebuilt, as they were damaged by lack of repair or even destroyed by typhoons or fires in some cases. However, when the redevelopment plans were introduced, the owners of Marine Lot Nos 29, 30 and 31 opposed the new reclamations and demanded that the government compensate them for the loss of value in their land as a result of losing their favourable coastal positions. The government paid 161,217 Hong Kong dollars as compensation to the owners of Marine Lot Nos 29, 30 and 31 in April 1911.82 The works spanned five years and were finally completed in August 1915 as scheduled. The typhoon shelter was unveiled by Governor F.H. May on 16 December that year. The works cost 2.21 million Hong Kong dollars, exceeding the originally estimated 1.54 million

80 ‘Correspondence Regarding the Typhoon Shelter at Mongkoktsui and the Proposed Temporary Increase in Light Dues’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, No. 24, 1908, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1909, pp.506–507.

81 ‘Report of the Director of Public Works for the Year 1915’, Hong Kong Administrative Reports, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1916, Appendix Q, Q 86–88.

82 CO129/377, ‘Memo in Reply to Messrs Deacon, Looker & Deacon’s Letter’, 18 March 1911, 7 April 1911, 18 April 1911.

Table 1.4 Statistics on typhoon shelters in Hong Kong

Place Year of build/

		(hectare)	(acre)
typhoon shelters:
causeway Bay	1883/1951	9.9	24.5
tau Ma tei	1915/1992/1993	64.6	159.6
Aberdeen West	1964	34.2	84.5
Aberdeen South	1985	26.1	64.5
Rambler channel	1966	12.9	31.9
Shuen Wan	1966	10.3	25.5
Yim tin tsai	1968	9.2	22.7
Sam Ka tsuen	1960s	1.9	4.7
Shai Kei Wan	1972/1992	17.2	42.5
Kwun tong	1974	33.8	83.5
cheung chau	1981	50	123.6
tuen Mun	1982	56.8	140.4
to Kwa Wan	1994	14.8	36.6
Hei Ling chau	1999	76.6	189.3
Sheltered anchorages: chai Wan cargo Basin	1986	11.2	27.7
Sha tau Kok	1991	0.6	1.5
tai O	2006	4	9.9
Kat O		1.6	4.0
tsuen Wan		3.7	9.1

reconstruction

Size in 2015

Sources: Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works for the Financial Year 1969–1970, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1970, p.154; Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works for

the Financial Year 1965–1966, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1966, p.33; planning and Development Office, Marine Department, internal data; Sing Tao Daily, 30 April 1959; Wah Kiu Yat Po, 25 March 1968; Wah Kiu Yat Po, 19 January 1966; Oriental Daily News, 29 June 1990.

Hong Kong dollars by 670,000 Hong Kong dollars.83 On 2 September 1937, Hong Kong was again ravaged by a strong typhoon, and the space provided by the typhoon shelter proved insufficient. However, it was not until 1962 that the government would build additional typhoon shelters. In the 1970s, the government implemented a priority settlement housing programme for boat people voluntarily giving up their fishing vessels and settling inland. Hong Kong’s floating population has drastically dropped since. By 2015, the floating population only accounted for 0.2 per cent of the entire population of Hong Kong. (See Table 1.4.)

Carrying out reclamation works and building reservoirs and typhoon shelters – these were all Hong Kong’s responses in answer to nature’s challenges,

83 ‘Report of the Director of Public Works’, Hong Kong Administrative Reports, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1916, Appendix Q, Q 74.

drawing on both human and material resources to strive for the city’s sur- vival. Swift responses in the face of adversity have also helped develop a habit amongst the people of Hong Kong where speed is pursued in everything. The city’s numerous constructions served as the government’s means to drive urban development in its attempt to take the initiative in the city’s town planning. However, was infrastructure alone sufficient in meeting the needs of an ever growing population?

The bubonic plague: redeveloping the Taipingshan District

After the typhoon in 1874, not only did the city’s hygiene not improve, but it actually grew worse. This is because, while the population increased cease- lessly, the government had taken no measures to improve the environment. From January to May 1894, a bubonic plague broke out in Guangzhou, taking tens of thousands of lives.84 In May, the first case of the plague was found in the Taipingshan District in Hong Kong, and by June the bubonic plague had reached its peak. Some had speculated that this was due to the warm and humid weather at the end of spring being conducive to bacterial growth. From October 1893 to 16 May 1894, no rain had fallen in Hong Kong. In districts with a crowded living environment where residents already paid little attention to hygiene, the issue of cleanliness was even more neglected in periods of insuf- ficient fresh water supply.

The abhorrent hygiene environment caused the disease to spread rapidly. The government hired Dr M. Wilm to conduct a study of the bubonic plague from 1894 to 1896. The doctor pointed out that the living environment of Chinese residents was overcrowded: small living areas that were generally one-tenth or one-fifteenth of those of Europeans. In 1894, the Chinese population was about 210,000, while the European population was only 6,000. A typical Chinese res- idence would be a three-storey stone cottage with small windows facing the street. Each floor would house around 16 to 25 residents, adding up to at least 48 residents in total in the tenement without a well-laid sewerage system.85 In the early stages of the plague, voluntary cleaning groups were organised, which included as members the voluntary servicemen of the Shropshire Light Infantry and the police. These groups, under the supervision of the Sanitary Board execu- tive committee, disinfected the Taipingshan District with lime water.86 About 7,000 Chinese residences were quarantined for inspection, 350 of which were sealed off where the plague bacteria were found. However, Chinese residents

84 ‘Medical Report on the Prevalence of Bubonic Plague in the Colony of Hong Kong during the Years 1895 and 1896’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1897, p.289; Huazi ribao (Huazi Daily), 21 June 1895, 30 December 1895.

85 Staff Surgeon Wilm, Epidemic of Bubonic Plague at Hong Kong in the Year 1896, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1897, p.23.

86 Yiu Chung-yim, Xianggang shuyi weisheng huanjing yu jianzhu (Hong Kong’s Bubonic Plague, Environmental Health and Architecture), Hong Kong Historical Photo Research Competition, organised jointly by the Hong Kong Museum of History and We Love Hong Kong Association, 2007, http://www.welo vehkhist.com/thesis/2007/2007-1-1.pdf.

were disgruntled by the government sending quarantine personnel into their homes for hygiene inspections, as they considered this a disturbance to decent ladies staying at home, and thus an affront to traditional ethics.87

According to the government’s medical reports, by mid-May in 1894 there were 150 confirmed cases of the plague, and over 70 were hospitalised daily because of the plague. Glass Works Hospital, a hospital managed by the Tung Wah Hospital, admitted some 200 patients, twice that of Tung Wah Hospital’s capacity.88 In fact, those willing to be admitted and treated were in the minority

– the actual number of infected might well be far more than recorded numbers. At the end of May the number of deaths announced by the government was over 450, and by 15 June the number announced by the government had risen to 1,900. Among those infected, the rate of death of the Chinese was 93 per cent higher than that of Europeans or other ethnicities.

Commercial activities in Hong Kong were deeply impacted by the plague. A lot of business owners brought with them their employees and families and returned to Guangdong, while those who had plans to come to Hong Kong for business delayed such plans. By 15 June, the number of people leaving Hong Kong and returning to Guangdong reached 80,00089 (accounting for 38 per cent of the population of Hong Kong). Of the population of 210,000, only 130,000 remained. As a result of a shortage of supply caused by the declining trade and commercial activities, the prices of food and daily goods soared 30 to 50 per cent.90 In addition, the Victoria Harbour was ravaged by two consecutive typhoons in September and October 1894. With the government at its wits’ end with the plague, the 11th Governor, William Robinson, ordered Sheung Wan and the entire district of Taipingshan to be sealed off and all residences within the districts demolished. Hong Kong was declared an infected city, and those infected with the plague were prohibited from leaving Hong Kong.

Ripon, a British engineer, was of the view that the Hong Kong government should immediately increase the capacity of Hong Kong’s two reservoirs, with the supply capacity of Tai Tam Reservoir to be increased by 80 million gallons. He also suggested that the government devoted resources to cleaning each house with a generous amount of water in order to destroy the bacteria.91 However, to increase the supply capacity of reservoirs was easier said than done. While the government had no way of improving the circumstances on water supply, the situation was worsened by the unfavourable weather conditions. Hong Kong experienced a drought year in 1895, with annual rainfall only at a

87 Ripon, ‘Governor’s Despatch to the Secretary of State with Reference to the Plague’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1894, p.283.

88 Ripon, ‘Governor’s Despatch to the Secretary of State with Reference to the Plague’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 20 June 1894, p.286.

89 Ripon, ‘Governor’s Despatch to the Secretary of State with Reference to the Plague’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, No. 21/1894, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 20 June 1894.

90 William Robinson, ‘Governor’s Despatch to the Secretary of State with Reference to the Plague’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1894, p.288.

91 Ripon, ‘Governor’s Despatch to the Secretary of State with Reference to the Plague’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, No. 21, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 20 June 1894.

total of 45.8 inches (1,163 mm) – half of the yearly average. To conserve water, the government had to restrict water supply to three to four hours a day from April to June and from October to December that year. The average daily water supply per capita was only 7.7 gallons (35 litres) from April to June, while that of June to July was 9.7 gallons (44 litres). Some contaminated wells were sealed shut in order to impede the spread of the plague, thus further worsening the shortage of water supply. In 1895, the recorded number of deaths as a result of the plague was 2,000. It should be noted that the official number of deaths was based on records made of bodies found. There were still cases beyond count where the Chinese had dealt with the bodies privately. It is therefore undisputed that the plague was out of control.

From 4 to 29 January 1896, a further 45 cases of the plague were diagnosed in Hong Kong. The infected were immediately transferred to the Kennedy Town Hospital in the Western District for quarantine, and their houses were sealed off. From 25 February to 21 April the same year, the Sanitary Board’s quarantine personnel inspected Chinese houses every ten days, disinfecting 3,200 houses, or a total of 8,330 floors of residences. Abandoned bodies of the infected were found by the government in the streets, at the piers and in the sea.92 To prevent the spread of the plague, the government decreed that infected bodies must be buried with lime. The Chinese were also prohibited from leaving Hong Kong. Governor Robinson’s methods of quarantining patients for inspection were met with opposition from the Chinese, and an increasing number demanded to be allowed to return to Guangdong for treatment. The government in the end lifted the prohibition order on 21 March, allowing people to leave Hong Kong. Despite the various government measures, the plague remained uncontrollable. Of the 715 Chinese patients infected with the plague who were treated by the govern- ment from January to May that year, 639 died, representing a death rate of 89 per cent.93

In 1896 the Government Analyst conducted a sampling survey on 40 wells in the Yau Ma Tei, Tsim Sha Tsui and Mong Kok districts in Kowloon and in Central and Sheung Wan, and found that the well water was severely contami- nated by wastes from both humans and livestock. In a water well at 267 Queen’s Road West, the level of chlorine was found to be 373.8 milligrams per litre. The average chlorine level of the 40 wells was 106 milligrams per litre,94 whereas today people are worried about carcinogens where the level of residual chlorine is 1 milligram per 1 litre of water.95 The large quantity of chlorine in water at the time was due to people trying to sterilise their water by using bleaching powder, a method of sterilisation not unlike drinking poison to quench thirst. With the

92 ‘Report of the Medical Officer of Health on the Epidemic of Bubonic Fever (Plague) During the Half Year Ending June 30, 1901’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, No. 35, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1901, p.457.

93 Joseph Chamberlain, ‘Governor’s Despatch on the Incipience and Progress of the Bubonic Plague in Hong Kong during 1896’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, No. 27, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., May 1896.

94 W. Edward Chow, ‘Report of the Government Analyst’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1896, p.310.

95 According to the report on the hygiene standards of Hong Kong’s fresh water published by the Water Supplies Department in 2000.

water supply contaminated by human and livestock wastes, the water had a high

E. coli content, causing gastroenteritis in those who drank it, or other gastroin- testinal diseases such as cholera and dysentery in more severe cases. The reason for such contamination of the water supply was overpopulation. The fresh water in the Chinese communities was of poor quality and insufficient supply. The physical safety of the residents at the time was truly worrying.

Dr M. Wilm’s report in 1896 showed that the bacteria of the plague could survive for 20 days in distilled water, 16 days in 200 millilitres of cultured samples taken from tap water and well water, and 6 days in 200-millilitre samples taken from seawater. In June, when the plague was spreading swiftly, Dr Wilm took water samples from three wells at Yau Ma Tei on the Kowloon Peninsula still in use at the time, and found that one well, which was situated in lowland and always overflowing, had a large quantity of the plague bacteria in its water, while the other two remained uncontaminated, owing to the fact that they were situ- ated on higher ground and thus the water level was almost 4 yards away from the mouth of the wells.96 Apart from well water, water from rivers and the sea was also highly susceptible to contamination by bacteria. The entire harbour was under the threat of the plague in 1896. In September, the number of deaths announced by the government was 2,000. However, the actual number may well have been much higher than this. The government’s reluctance to disclose the actual circumstances concerning the plague was a sign of its helplessness against the plague.

Health reports from the end of the 1890s show that those who died of the plague were mostly from Central and Sheung Wan. In particular, the situation was most serious in the Taipingshan District. In 1861 the district had a popula- tion of only 18,000.97 This rose to 31,000 in 1891.98 By 1891, 272,000 square feet of private land was divided into 355 land lots in just 31 years. There were estimated to be about 400 tenement buildings, 76 of which had at least three infected residents per building. Assuming each tenement building housed some 70 residents, these small and densely populated land lots were stuffed with the poorest in society in terrible hygiene conditions. They were therefore the areas where the plague was most severe. Apart from the 272,000 square feet of private residence, the district was also home to the Chinese charitable organisation Tung Wah Hospital, the Pound Lane Police Station, No. 8 Police Station and the Taipingshan market. It could only be imagined that, with the police stations keeping public order and the hospital providing shelter to patients, there was little space left for any other activities. Such was the kind of place the Chinese lived in at the time.

On 17 September 1894, the Legislative Council passed the Taipingshan

96 Staff Surgeon Wilm, Epidemic of Bubonic Plague at Hong Kong in the Year 1896, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1897, p.27.

97 ‘Return of the Population and of the Marriages, Births and Deaths’, Hong Kong Blue Book, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1861.

98 ‘Report on the Census of the Colony for 1891’, Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 28 September 1901, p.754.

Resumption Ordinance, 1894 (or ‘An Ordinance for the Summary Resumption of Certain Crown Lands Situate in the Taipingshan District of the City of Victoria and for Other Purposes’) after the third reading. In March 1895, Surveyor General F.A. Cooper submitted the Scheme for the Improvement of the Resumed Area in the District of Taipingshan.99 The Surveyor General divided the district into 11 sections – A to K. In accordance with Ordinance No. 8 of 1894,100 the Surveyor General submitted the plans for ‘Enclosed Area Taipingshan, with Details of Lots’ in August 1895. The government accepted the proposal of Belilios and burnt down the district by fire starting from August that year. From August to October 1895, the wooden structures and houses on Taipingshan Street, Market Street, Upper Station Street, Square Street, Bridges Street and Tank Lane were the first to be demolished. At the same time, in order to avoid old gutters hindering the progress of the redevelopment of Taipingshan, new stormwater drains were laid from Hollywood Road to Caine Road. Demolition works were halted by heavy rainfall in February 1896, and were only half done by June. The entire project was not completed until 1898.101 A total of 6.2 acres (0.025 square kilometres) of land was resumed from private owners for replanning (Figure 1.4), as the government required that each adult should have on average a minimum of 21 square feet of living space. It was estimated that 820,000 Hong Kong dollars was paid for this private land.102 With these meas- ures in force, the district lost 12,554 (40 per cent) of its population. By 1897, the population left in Taipingshan District was 18,784,103 such was the impact of the plague on the district.

In 1900, the government attempted to improve public hygiene in Chinese communities by introducing new waste disposal methods. Five public latrines, each with about 40 cubicles, were added in five locations with Chinese com- munities: in the east end of Wing Lok Street, Taipingshan District, at the slaughterhouse at the end of Queen’s Road West, So Kon Po and Gough Street. Some 2,000 to 4,000 Hong Kong dollars was invested in each of these public latrines, with the dry closets replaced with water closets. This was considered a public hygiene breakthrough at the time, as it not only changed the daily habits of the Chinese, but also introduced the use of water closets into the Chinese communities.104

In 1903, the plans for the redevelopment of Taipingshan District were pub- licised by the government. The most striking was Blake Garden, which was to be built in sections D and E in the middle area of the district after the houses there were burnt down. The garden would cover an area from Square Street in

99 Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 30 March 1895, p.262.

100 CO129/264, ‘Sanitary Board . . .’, 7 September 1894, pp.83–86.

101 Jerome J. Platt, The Whitewash Brigade: The Hong Kong Plague of 1894, London, Dix Noonan Webb, 1998, p.78.

102 Hongkong Telegraph, 11 January 1895.

103 ‘Report on the Census of the Colony for 1897’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1897, p.485.

104 ‘Annual Report of the Director of Public Works, for the Year 1900’, Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 11 May 1901, p.957.

Source: ‘Insanitary properties Resumptions’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & co., 1905.

Figure 1.4 Map of Taipingshan District (1895)

the east to Po Hing Fong in the south, Pound Lane in the west, and Kat Cheung Street in the north. The entire eastern portion of Taipingshan District – the original lots in sections A and B – was to be replanned from the ground up. In the south-east, the Bacteriological Institute was to be built on land in section G (today’s Caine Lane) after clearance, and to the south-west of the Institute would be the staff quarters for the disinfection work staff of the Sanitary Board. No. 8 Police Station in the south would be expanded, as the houses in section G were to be demolished, and sections H and I in the west (today’s Rutter Street to Po Hing Fong) would be replanned as larger land lots after clearance. Inland Lot No. 700 (today’s Wa On Lane to Po Yan Street) was to be overhauled as the Chung Hing cinema. Section K, after clearance, would become a new wing of Tung Wah Hospital. While inland Lot No. 361 would continue to be used by Tung Wah Hospital, section F beside the hospital would become inland Lot No. 1356 after clearance and would be used by Tung Wah Hospital and would eventually become the founding site of Po Leung Kuk.105 A small portion of land in the north would be retained for private residential development, though at a much lower density.

According to figures published by the government in 1905, compensation paid for the resumption of Taipingshan District reached 821,000 dollars. Adding this to the 123,000 Hong Kong dollars of expenditure in relation to roads and sewerage systems, cost totalled 944,000 Hong Kong dollars. On the other hand, sale of private land after redevelopment brought in 171,000 Hong Kong dollars, and profits from the sale of construction waste from the clearance as reclama- tion materials amounted to 20,000 Hong Kong dollars, bringing total income to 191,000 Hong Kong dollars.106

After redevelopment, the density of buildings was greatly lowered, with land available for private development reduced from 272,000 square feet (25,270 square metres) to 97,000 square feet (9,012 square metres).107 (See Table 1.5.) The redeveloped Taipingshan District has added public open space in the form of Blake Garden, an entertainment venue in Chung Hing Theatre, and health- and hygiene-oriented facilities including the Bacteriological Institute, quarters for the Sanitary Board’s disinfection, and public latrines. (See Figure 1.5.) These, together with the pre-existing Tung Wah Hospital and police station, made up a very complete set of public facilities that also served as a blueprint for the plan- ning of future Chinese communities.

From 1894 to 1896, a large number of Chinese left Hong Kong for Guangzhou to escape from the bubonic plague, and the people around south- ern China were reluctant to trade with Hong Kong. According to statistics in

105 ‘Tablet of the Reconstruction of the Property at Po Yan Street (Original Site of Po Leung Kuk)’, in Donghua sanyuan gengzi nian dongshi ju, ed., A Development History of Tung Wah Group of Hospitals, 1870– 1960, Hong Kong, Tung Wah Group of Hospitals, 1960, p.10.

106 ‘Resumption Schemes Financial Statement, to 1 May 1905’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1905, p.1.

107 ‘Resumption Schemes Financial Statement, to 1 May 1905’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1905, p.18.

Table 1.5 Land use comparison before and after the replanning of Taipingshan District

		Area
	(sq. ft)		(m2)
Before:
Lots leased or granted	272,021		(25,271.58)
Market and police Station	11,492.5		(1,067.69)
Roads	79,177.5		(7,355.83)
Total	362,691		(33,695.10)
After:
Disposed of by public auction	46,631		(4,332.16)
Granted to tung Wah Hospital, District Watchman’s	39,613		(3,680.17)

Quarters, and temple, taipingshan Street Utilised for Bacteriological Institute, Sanitary Board

Quarters, Latrine and Bath House Laid out as public gardens

(gross area including roads: 67,950)

28,169 (2,616.99)

47,700 (4,431.48)

Still available for sale	50,926	(4,731.18)
Devoted to roads, steps, lances, etc.	149,652	(13,903.13)
Total	362,691	(33,695.10)

Source: ‘Resumption Schemes Financial Statement, to 1 May 1905’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & co., 1905, p.18.

Guangdong’s customs records, the number of people heading from Guangzhou to Hong Kong fell at an average rate of 10 per cent per annum over the four-year period 1894–1898. At the same time, the population moving from Hong Kong to Guangzhou was on the rise, with the highest rate of increase being recorded in 1898 – a 23 per cent increase when compared to 1897.108 Hong Kong’s economy was slowed down to almost a standstill, and the authorities faced major govern- ing challenges. The Hong Kong government invited many experts from Britain to advise on the problem of the plague. As it was widely accepted at the time that the plague was spread by rats, the 12th Governor, Henry Arthur Blake, actively advocated rat eradication upon assuming office in 1898, calling upon the entire population of Hong Kong to participate and imposing a reward of 2 shillings per rat caught. In 1900, the people of Hong Kong got rid of up to 43,000 rats. However, despite the rising number of rat deaths, the hygiene situation barely improved. In the end the government found that some people were smuggling rats on to Hong Kong Island from the New Territories in order to earn the

108 Guangzhou shi difang zhi bianzuan weiyuan hui, Guangzhou shi zhi (Gazette of Guangzhou), Volume 18, Guangzhou, Guangzhou chubanshe, 1996, p.270; Guangzhou shi difang zhi bianzuan weiyuan hui bangong shi and Guangzhou haiguan zhi bianzuan weiyuan hui, ed., Jindai Guangzhou kouan jingji shehui gaikuang: Yue haiguan baogao huiji (1860–1949) (An Economic and Social Overview of Modern Guangzhou Port – A Collection of Reports of Guangdong Customs), Guangzhou, Jinan daxue chubanshe, 1995, p.928.

Source: ‘Insanitary properties Resumptions’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & co., 1905.

Figure 1.5 Redevelopment plan for Taipingshan District (1905)

reward. The rat eradication thus ended in confusion.109 Hong Kong would go on to live in the haze of the plague for the next decade.

Governing

The demarcation of Chinese and foreign residential areas

On 6 July 1843, when then Land Officer, Surveyor and Inspector of Roads Alexander T. Gordon110 was drawing up the building plans for the City of Victoria, the Chinese’s residential areas were intended to be mostly located in Sheung Wan. In the development plans for the city drafted by the first Governor, Henry Pottinger, in 1841, there was never a ‘Chinatown’ planned as a settlement area for the Chinese. In Pottinger’s plans, there was only a planned location for the bazaar. Among the pieces of land that the government offered for bidding by the private sector on 14 June 1841, a total of 268 pieces were bazaar lots, including the Upper Bazaar, consisting of 118 pieces of land of 504 square feet (14 feet by 36 feet) each, and the Lower Bazaar, consisting of 150 pieces of land of 800 square feet (20 feet by 40 feet) each. The Upper Bazaar is located west of today’s Aberdeen Street and north of Hollywood Road, around the area at Kau U Fong and Gough Street, while the Lower Bazaar is situated at today’s Jervois Street and Bonham Strand West. The first land sale did not prohibit Chinese participation. As the bazaar lots were smaller and thus would not require a large amount to invest in them, they attracted quite a few Chinese purchasers who were hoping to identify investment opportunities in Hong Kong. Therefore, there were a lot of Chinese landowners around Wellington Street and the Sheung Wan waterfront in the 1840s. Thus it can be seen that the extent of active territory of the Chinese in the early days was largely determined by commercial investment opportunities. While the government’s land development policies did not intentionally divide between Chinese and foreign communities, the dis- parate Eastern and Western cultures and the rapidly rising Chinese population had meant that each of the communities had created their own distinct and increasingly diversifying features based on their daily needs.

As Hong Kong’s status as an entrepôt continued to elevate and most of its commercial activities were concentrated in Central, the price of land in Central rose substantially. The military barracks at today’s Admiralty and the govern- ment department offices in Central had already occupied a large portion of the land in Central. The government very much intended to alter its original plans, resume the 1.5 acres (0.61 hectares) of land at the heart of the Central com- mercial district that was the Upper Bazaar and turn it into an area for European commercial activities in order to collect more Crown rent. The government’s plan was to designate the area east of Possession Street and around Taipingshan Street south of Queen’s Road Central as the commercial district for the Chinese

109 G.B. Endacott, Fragrant Harbour: A Short History of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, 1962, p.128.

110 Friend of China and Hong Kong Gazette, 5 January 1843.

– the Taipingshan District – and move the stores of the Upper Bazaar to that district.

At the end of 1843, Land Officer Gordon resold by auction the land around the waterfront at Sheung Wan (around today’s Bonham Strand to Gough Street) and the Upper Bazaar lots (west of today’s Aberdeen Street, north of Hollywood Road, Kau U Fong and Jervois Street).111 On 22 January 1844, the 27 pieces of land situated at the Upper Bazaar were successfully bid for by Europeans. Accordingly, the government ordered the businesses and residents of the Upper Bazaar to move out within six months from 15 January 1844.112 The Chinese of the Upper Bazaar therefore had to relocate.113

The Chinese landowners were unhappy with the government reselling the Upper Bazaar lots without their consent. After the sale of the Upper Bazaar land, Governor Pottinger ordered then Chief Magistrate Major William Caine, Registrar General Charles Gutzlaff and Land Officer Gordon to form a commit- tee to handle the relocation of the businesses of the Upper Bazaar. However, not only did the government not consider the interests of the original owners, but it declared that the land leases executed by the first Land Officer, George F. Mylius, were provisional in nature and had no permanent effect. Public opinion at the time was harshly critical of the colonial government forcing Chinese busi- nesses out of the Upper Bazaar, even going so far as referring to the government as bandits.114 The government paid no heed to such opposition, but declared on 25 July 1844 that the Upper Bazaar businesses were to move out by September 1844. The Upper Bazaar was then transformed into a European commercial district.

With no bargaining power, the Chinese businesses had to accept the govern- ment’s arrangement to re-establish at Lot Nos 44 and 78 of Taipingshan District (the area around the east of today’s Possession Street and west of Shing Wong Street). The government exempted the annual Crown rent of the affected busi- nesses until January 1849, and each business was paid 40 Hong Kong dollars compensation.115 However, Governor Pottinger was of the view that those conducting immoral businesses such as running gambling houses and brothels should not be compensated. Among the 112 businesses that were relocated by the government, only 81 were paid the 40 Hong Kong dollars compensation.116 During the relocation, the government spent some 5,900 Hong Kong dollars on forming land in Taipingshan District. Thus the area around Bonham Strand, Taipingshan Street and the Lower Bazaar in Sheung Wan became an area where the Chinese settled. As the government imposed no specifications on the houses built by the Chinese, they were allowed to build temporary houses with thatch or wood. Therefore, the constructions in areas where the Chinese were active

111 CO129/2, ‘Gordon to Pottinger’, 19 December 1843, p.445.

112 CO129/5, ‘Woosnam to Gordon’, 10 January 1844, p.69.

113 CO129/2, ‘Davis to Stanley’, 26 July 1844, p.435.

114 Friend of China, 10 August 1844.

115 CO129/6, ‘Carrie, Gutzlaff and Gordon to Bruce’, 21 May 1844, p.444.

116 CO129/6, ‘Carrie, Gutzlaff and Gordon to Pottinger’, 21 May 1844, p.440.

were mostly very primitive. This, coupled with the dense population and poor environmental hygiene, resulted in a big gap between the environment of the Chinese commercial areas and their Western counterparts. The government thus made every attempt to segregate the Chinese communities from the for- eigners. Chief Magistrate Caine even ordered that, except police officers, no Europeans be allowed to live in Chinese-populated areas.

From the seven districts to the ten districts

In 1844 the colonial government not only forced the Chinese businesses in the Upper Bazaar out of Central into Taipingshan District, but also enacted multiple laws in an attempt to deal with law-and-order problems by way of a Western legal system. In order to block undesirables from entering Hong Kong and maintain public order, the second Hong Kong Governor, Sir John Francis Davis, who had assumed office less than six months earlier, promul- gated the Ordinance for Establishing a Registry of the Inhabitants of the Island of Hongkong and Its Dependencies on 21 August 1844 to monitor by administrative means those entering Hong Kong. The ordinance was to come into force on 1 November 1844, and provided that everyone entering Hong Kong should declare to the Registrar General within 24 hours their date and place of birth, address and marital status. In addition, those who had a monthly income above 20 Hong Kong dollars had to pay a 5 Hong Kong dollar annual registration fee to the office of the Registrar General, while those with a monthly income below 20 Hong Kong dollars and 10 Hong Kong dollars had to pay 3 Hong Kong dollars and 1 Hong Kong dollar, respectively.117 This annual fee became known as a ‘poll tax’.

From an administrative standpoint, the ordinance allowed the government to have a good grasp of information on the newly immigrated population and facilitated governing, while also increasing the government’s financial income. However, the ordinance was also criticised by various parties when it was announced: the foreign businessmen believed that a law preventing undesira- bles from entering Hong Kong should not apply to them, as people of economic status, as such an application would mean equal treatment between them and the Chinese as bad people, as well as that foreign businesses would have to go through registration procedures and be taxed as well. On the other hand, the Chinese workers, who were paid a salary of 2 to 3 Hong Kong dollars per month, considered the 1 Hong Kong dollar tax to be too severe a burden on them. On 2 November 1844, the day after the intended effective date of the ordinance, a strike broke out among workers in Hong Kong against the poll tax. A large number of Chinese workers left Hong Kong for their home towns. Meanwhile, British businesses also jointly petitioned Britain in opposition to the same tax. The government was ultimately forced to suspend the enactment of the ordinance.

117 ‘An Ordinance for Establishing a Registry of the Inhabitants of the Island of Hongkong and Its Dependencies’, Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 21 August 1844.

On 13 November, the Legislative Council amended the original ordinance and named it An Ordinance to Repeal Ordinance No. 16 of 1844 – Registry and Census of the Inhabitants of the Island of Hong Kong. The amended ordinance provided that each male adult of 21 years of age or above had to register with the Registrar General upon arrival in Hong Kong and be declared a person with no criminal conviction before he could work in Hong Kong. The Registrar General would have the right to refuse residence in Hong Kong to those without a good record. However, those who belonged in the military or worked at gov- ernment departments or the East India Company, whose annual salary was over 250 Hong Kong dollars or whose annual income was otherwise not less than 500 Hong Kong dollars, were exempted from registration.118 There was no mention of the imposition of any tax in the amended ordinance. Thus the poll tax originally intended for monitoring the incoming population was revised even before it took effect. The registration ordinance for Hong Kong residents, which was modelled on the governing methods of European cities, failed to be implemented according to plan, and Governor Davis was forced to step down.

Since the construction of the city, the government of Hong Kong had never implemented any policy that would prohibit the Chinese from entering Hong Kong, as the cheap labour force coming to the city looking for job opportuni- ties was a solution to Hong Kong’s lack of human resources in its develop- ment. Separately, being situated at the centre of the Pacific Ocean and on the southern tip of China, Hong Kong was influenced by the Chinese political cir- cumstances and was becoming increasingly important as it fell into pace with the global economy. In the 1850s, the Taiping Rebellion of the Qing Dynasty had caused the Chinese around the Guangdong and Guangxi area to escape south, and British-governed Hong Kong was considered a political refuge. At the same time, railroads were being built in America and Canada, while gold mines were being discovered in Australia. As a result, Hong Kong also served as a springboard for Chinese workers seeking to head to these places to make a living. Transporting Chinese workers overseas became a big part of the entrepôt trade of Hong Kong. According to government figures in the Hong Kong Blue Book, the population of the City of Victoria rose by 24 per cent from 25,000 in 1849 to 31,000 in 1850. By 1859, the population of Hong Kong had increased by 2.4 times when compared to that in 1849 (see Table 1.6).

The rapid increase in population of the City of Victoria exposed the weakness that the government was only focused on the city’s commercial constructions. Issues affecting the livelihood of the city’s people, such as public order, food, housing and health, had led to a governing crisis for the administration. As a result, it was obvious that the government’s pace of urban development was influenced by the relief measures employed to address the Chinese communi- ties’ urgent social needs, and not driven by any long-term planning strategy. In fact, without mid- to long-term development goals in the governance of the city,

118 ‘An Ordinance to Repeal Ordinance No. 16 of 1844 and to Establish a Registry and Census of the Inhabitants of the Island of Hongkong’, Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 13 November 1844.

Table 1.6 The statistics on Hong Kong’s population increase in the second half of the nine- teenth century (1841–1897)

Year Chinese Europeans and other

Total

	Victoria	in the villages of Hong Kong Island		population
1841	800	4,350	–	2,000	300	–	7,450
1842	6,081	4,180	–	2,100	–	–	12,361
1844	6,640	5,068	–	5,368	1,925	454	19,455
1845	19,014	4,100	–	–	–	1,043	24,157
1846	15,675	4,774	–	–	–	1,386	21,835
1847	17,599	4,867	–	–	–	1,404	23,870
1848	12,281	4,897	–	5,644	–	1,176	23,998
1849	15,257	5,018	–	8,022	–	1,210	29,507
1850	16,712	4,898	–	10,359	–	1,305	33,274
1851	15,601	5,234	–	10,178	450	1,520	32,983
1852	17,070	6,168	–	11,829	450	1,541	37,058
1853	18,017	4,820	–	13,119	1,580	1,481	39,017
1854	26,252	5,359	–	21,189	1,272	1,643	55,715
1855	36,743	6,279	–	23,529	4,100	1,954	72,605
1856	38,007	5,800	–	19,944	5,500	2,479	71,730
1857	43,290	4,051	–	25,017	3,325	1,411	77,094
1858	45,417	4,704	–	21,925	1,700	1,757	75,503
1859	48,219	4,574	–	30,837	1,650	1,661	86,941
1860	56,856	5,276	–	28,559	1,750	2,476	94,917
1861	66,069	6,110	5,105	30,909	8,187	2,941	119,321
1862	68,277	5,866	6,431	31,639	8,326	2,972	123,511
1863	70,288	7,628	4,922	30,537	8,395	3,080	124,850
1864	73,982	7,967	3,869	29,334	2,795	3,551	121,498
1865	80,639	7,220	4,151	26,885	2,780	3,829	125,504
1866	72,264	6,200	3,418	26,954	2,718	3,544	115,098
1867	82,194	6,133	3,818	21,323	452	3,551	117,471
1868–69	79,698	6,696	4,468	22,529	478	3,416	117,285
1870–71	79,593	5,946	4,561	23,709	479	3,478	117,766
1872	82,026	6,474	5,198	20,199	441	3,314	117,652
1876	90,304	7,526	7,704	22,745	512	3,733	132,524
1881	102,385	7,585	9,021	28,989	870	4,008	152,858
1891	145,340	12,493	19,997	32,035	530	6,878	217,273
1897	160,273	11,644	26,442	33,275	1,646	8,482	241,762

City of

Residing

Kowloon Boat

Others

nationalities

Sources: ‘chinese Repository’, Hong Kong Gazette, May 1841, p.289; Friend of China and Hong Kong Gazette, 24 March 1842; ‘census of Hong Kong chinese population’, Hong Kong Blue Book, Hong Kong, Noronha & co., 1844–1899; ‘census Returns of the population of the colony for the Year . . .’, Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 1856– 1881; ‘census Report’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & co., 1891, 1897.

it would be difficult to draw in the cheap labour force that would satisfy the ever growing entrepôt trade. With the failure of the attempt to implement legislation on household registration in 1844, the government had no choice but to divide the city into different districts and rule the districts separately. In addition, the government made use of the traditional Chinese community self-monitoring system or self-administration system (lijia system), and tried to get a better picture of the population in Hong Kong by asking the head of the community (jiazhang) to provide the number of people in each household and the occupa- tion of each member of a household.

In the 1840s, the urban area of the City of Victoria did not include the entire Hong Kong Island, nor was the city divided into districts. The urban area of the city covered mostly Wan Chai in the east, to the Mid-Levels of Central in the south, the area around Sheung Wan in the west, and the coast in the north. The whole area consisted of about 1,000 acres (4 square kilometres) of land, with unclear borders and no notion of division into districts. In 1857, 13 years after the backlash on the Ordinance for Establishing a Registry of the Inhabitants of the Island of Hongkong and Its Dependencies, in order to compile statistics on the new population and its distribution in different areas, the government divided Hong Kong into nine districts: the City of Victoria, Shau Kei Wan, Sai Wan, Shek O, Tai Tam Tuk, Stanley, Heung Kong, Aberdeen and Pok Fu Lam. The City of Victoria was further divided into seven districts (yue) for the purposes of conducting a census.119 These seven districts of the City of Victoria were, from the west of Hong Kong Island: District 1 – Sai Ying Pun; District 2 – Sheung Wan; District 3 – Taipingshan; District 4 – Central; District 5 – Ha Wan; District 6 – Wong Nai Chung; and District 7 – So Kon Po.120 Among the seven districts, Taipingshan and Central were the most densely populated.

The government also transformed the much-criticised poll tax of 1844 into a household tax with each household as a unit, requiring the owner of every house or ship to register with the Registrar General and pay the tax within ten days of the arrival of a resident. The regular requirement of reporting the number of resi- dents and each resident’s employment status thus became an accepted practice, and the burden of the tax was usually shifted from the owner who was renting out the premises to the tenant. Take the example of a manual labour centre: each tenant had to pay an extra 2 Hong Kong cents of rent per month, or 24 Hong Kong cents a year, which was less than the 1 Hong Kong dollar registration tax proposed in 1844. This could be seen as an alternative way for the government to levy a poll tax. Through the results of the census, the government could also get a rough idea of the size and composition of the population of the City of Victoria.

In 1858, the government extended the boundaries of the City of Victoria towards both the east and the west: to Shek Tong Tsui in the west and So Kon Po in the east. With the addition of Shek Tong Tsui as a district, the

119 ‘Ordinance No. 6 of 1857’, Historical Laws of Hong Kong Online, paragraphs 8–12, http://oelawhk.lib. hku.hk/archive/files/7aba90fa0b9491d70d88f47787206a9f.pdf.

120 ‘Government Notification No. 69’, Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 9 May 1857, p.14.

Table 1.7 District distribution of the City of Victoria (1857–1930s)

District	1857	1858	1866	1874	1886	1888	1902	1930s
Kennedy town	–	–	–	–	–	D1	D1	
Shek tong tsui	–		D1	D1	D1	D2	D2	
Sai Ying pun	D1		D2	D2	D2	D3	D3	
Sheung Wan	D2		D4	D4	D4	D5	D5	
taipingshan	D3		D3	D3	D3	D4	D4	–
chung Wan (central)	D4		D5	D5	D5	D6	D6	
Ha Wan	D5		D6	D6	D6	D7	D7	
Wong Nei chung	D6		–	–	–	–	–	–
Wang Hai	–	–	–	–	D7	–	–	–
Wan chai	–	–	D7	D7	–	D8	D8	
Bowrington	–	–	D8	D8	D8	D9	D9	
So Kon po	D7		D9	D9	D9	D10	D10	
total no. of districts	7	8	9	9	9	10	10	9

Notes: D: District no.; : District no. unknown.

Sources: Data of 1857 come from ‘Government Notification No. 69’, Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 1857, p.14; Ordinance No. 6 of 1857. Data of 1858 come from Hong Kong Blue Book, Hong Kong, Noronha & co., 1858, p.146; ‘Return of the population’, Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 5 March 1859. Data of 1866 come from Victoria Registration Ordinance, 1866. Data of 1874 come from Victoria Registration Ordinance, 1874.

Data of 1886 come from Map MM-0147, Plan of the City of Victoria, Hong Kong, 1886; Ho pui-yin, Challenges for an Evolving City: 160 Years of Port and Land Development in Hong Kong, Hong Kong, commercial press (HK), 2004, pp.58–59. Data of 1888 come from The Regulation of Chinese Ordinance No. 13, 1888; ‘Return Showing the Amount of Assessment in Each District from 1881 to 1891’, Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 22 August 1891, p.760. Data of 1902 come from CO129/313, p.241. Data of 1930s come from Modern Map of Hong Kong (1933) [private cartography].

number of districts rose to eight. In 1866, the city was divided into nine districts, which were, from the west of Hong Kong Island: District 1 – Shek Tong Tsui; District 2 – Sai Ying Pun; District 3 – Taipingshan; District 4 – Sheung Wan; District 5 – Central (south and north); District 6 – Ha Wan; District 7 – Wan Chai; District 8 – Bowrington; and District 9 – So Kon Po. There were four rings, or wan, within the nine districts – Sheung Wan, Central, Ha Wan (Admiralty) and the Wan Hai (Wan Chai). From the establishment of the City of Victoria in 1842 to 1903, its boundaries were extended seven times. In 1900, the city’s area increased to 1,434 acres (5.8 square kilometres).121 The change in geographical scope of the City of Victoria from 1850 to 1930s is illustrated in Table 1.7.

The boundaries of the City of Victoria had expanded with the rising popula- tion, and the city was divided into seven to ten governing districts for an easier understanding of its population’s distribution and employment status. With the notion of district division, the government would delegate its governing power down to each district, so that each district could be managed with refer- ence to its own characteristics and thus the government’s new policies could be implemented more effectively as a whole. In fact, the division of districts in the nineteenth-century City of Victoria was not coordinated by the Governor or any

121 Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1900, p.337.

particular government department. Different government departments came up with different concepts of division based on the social issues that emerged in the society in different periods. Therefore, the geographical and functional scope of each department’s division of districts was different from that of the others. While each government department used numbers to differentiate the districts, there was no coordination on this between the departments. In the 1860s, the police used security districts in order to supervise the neighbourhood house- hold system and keep public order. They also assigned numbers to the districts and called the managed areas ‘districts’, yet the demarcation of these districts was different from that of the districts for population registration. This showed the confusing situation in the nineteenth century where the government was simultaneously headed in different directions.

Security districts

The lower classes that settled in Sheung Wan, Taipingshan and Ha Wan came from all kinds of background and all walks of life. Crime was therefore not uncommon. Information on nineteenth-century Hong Kong suggests that the City of Victoria was far from a secure place. According to 1868–1900 statis- tics from the government’s Prisons Department, Hong Kong had on average some 5,000 crimes per year, the most common of which were break-in robbery, theft, kidnapping and drunkenness. The records on such crimes were based on successful arrests. As Hong Kong was a port drawing in the grassroot class in droves, the actual crime situation could be much worse than these records show. Keeping public order and allowing commercial activities to be normally con- ducted was therefore a challenging problem for the government.

In October 1844, two months after the promulgation of the Registration Ordinance, the government promulgated an Ordinance for the Preservation of Good Order and Cleanliness within the Colony of Hong Kong, to be enforced by the Surveyor General.122 The ordinance provided that residents must use non-flam- mable construction materials to build houses, in order to lower the chance of fire caused by flammable materials such as wood, herbaceous leaves or thatches.123 The ordinance also required that any Chinese outdoors between 8 p.m. and 10 p.m. had to carry a lantern and apply for a night pass from a police station, and prohibited any Chinese from being outdoors after 10 p.m. on pain of being fined or imprisoned. In addition, firecrackers, the playing of drums, and any other noises were strictly prohibited in the morning and at night.124 These curfew laws were enforced until the end of the nineteenth century, and were designed to

122 ‘Ordinance No. 5 of 1844’, A.J. Leach, The Ordinances of the Legislative Council of the Colony of Hongkong, Commencing with the Year 1844, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1890–1891, p.14.

123 A serious fire that broke out in the Lower Bazaar burnt down 40–50 thatch houses. The government began to think about requiring the Chinese to build houses with bricks. Friend of China, 1 December 1842, 23 October 1844.

124 Historical Laws of Hong Kong Online website, http://oelawhk.lib.hku.hk/exhibits/show/oelawhk/ home, 1844–1888.

ensure the safety of Europeans by severely impeding any outdoor activities on the part of the Chinese. Prohibiting the Chinese from being outdoors at night allowed the authorities to make immediate arrests when suspicious individuals were spotted, as a means of more effective crime-fighting.

In the same year, the government promulgated the Ordinance for the Appointment and Regulation of Native Chinese Peace Officers (Paouchong and Paoukea) within the Colony of Hongkong, utilising the traditional Chinese com- munity self-monitoring system to try to govern and control the Chinese in Stanley, Wong Nei Chung, Pok Fu Lam and other districts with Chinese set- tlements by allowing local Chinese leaders to manage law and order in districts where the Chinese were active. The Governor appointed local Chinese repre- sentatives as paouchong (native Chinese peace officers), who would have power equivalent to that of local police and were under the authority of the Chief Magistrate of Police. They were subject to the same criminal liability as the police, would be disciplined by the government if they made mistakes or were negligent, and had to wear a police badge when they were on duty.125 These paouchong carried out the work of maintaining law and order in the districts.

Furthermore, Ordinance No. 3 of 1853, An Ordinance to Extend the Duties of Chinese Tepos Appointed under Ordinance No. 13 of 1844, provided that taxpay- ers within Hong Kong Island could elect 5–12 tepos, who were then appointed by the Governor in the district they lived in. When fewer than 12 were elected, the Governor could appoint additional (up to 12) tepos according to the dis- trict’s needs. Such tepos were like local police officers. They would handle dis- putes between Chinese under the supervision of the Chief Magistrate and report to the Chief Magistrate the arbitration results. Each Chinese household was required to pay a tepo fee.126 An Ordinance for Registration and Regulation of the Chinese People, and for the Population and for Other Purposes of Police127 described more specifically the community self-monitoring system: every ten households were considered a ‘kap’, with a kapcheong (leader) appointed. The kapcheongs would be responsible for crime prevention, as well as assisting the police with arrests and fighting crime within the area under their purview.128

In August 1866, the government employed ‘watchmen’ to patrol the streets, strengthen local security and prevent crimes. This was a more systematic imple- mentation of the Chinese local paouchong structure. Patrol routes in Hong Kong were divided among seven districts. However, the boundaries of these seven districts were different from those of the districts drawn up for the purposes of the census, as the primary focus of patrol routes was the distribution of streets. District 1 began from Shek Tong Tsui in the west on Hong Kong Island and

125 ‘Ordinance No. 13 of 1844’, Historical Laws of Hong Kong Online, http://oelawhk.lib.hku.hk/archive/ files/b71f055644e0ad4ac24dd499cc3985c3.pdf.

126 ‘Ordinance No. 3 of 1853’, Historical Laws of Hong Kong Online, http://oelawhk.lib.hku.hk/archive/ files/fd0bce8e1e766663462e1ace14e8d8dd.pdf.

127 ‘Ordinance No. 6 of 1857’, Historical Laws of Hong Kong Online, http://oelawhk.lib.hku.hk/archive/file s/7aba90fa0b9491d70d88f47787206a9f.pdf.

128 ‘Ordinance No. 6 of 1857’, Historical Laws of Hong Kong Online, http://oelawhk.lib.hku.hk/archive/file s/7aba90fa0b9491d70d88f47787206a9f.pdf .

covered an area that included Shek Tong Tsui and Sai Ying Pun; District 2 covered Sai Ying Pun to Sheung Wan; Districts 3 and 4 were also in Sheung Wan; District 5 was in Central; and Districts 6 and 7 were in Wan Chai. These districts were mainly areas where the Chinese were active, but also included the business district in Central. (See Figure 1.6.) Each district had its own head watchman and three to nine watchmen.129 District 5 was the largest, with 73 streets to patrol.130 The head watchman of a district was recommended locally by the district and appointed by the Governor. Supervised by the Registrar General, the head watchman would have similar official power to the police. The number of watchmen to be hired for a district was proposed by the residents of that dis- trict, and they were then appointed by the Governor.131 A total of 40 per cent of these security teams’ funds would come from the government, while Chinese organisations shouldered the remaining 60 per cent.

Obviously, the security districts served different functions from those of the nine districts for population registration (Shek Tong Tsui, Sai Ying Pun, Sheung Wan, Taipingshan, south and north Central, Ha Wan, Wan Chai, Bowrington and So Kon Po). The districts designed to facilitate a census began from Shek Tong Tsui in the west on Hong Kong Island and stretched to So Kon Po in the east, with no overlapping of the area covered by each district. The security dis- tricts however were focused on streets with frequent commercial activities, and mainly covered the more densely populated areas of Central, Sheung Wan and Wan Chai. While varying in terms of functionality, both types of districts were identified by numbers. The security districts were supervised by police superin- tendents, while census and registration were the responsibilities of the Registrar General. As the powers and responsibilities of the two authorities did not overlap, there was no cross-referencing of each other’s area of jurisdiction. By the 1880s, health districts were set out to deal with health and hygiene issues, and were overseen by the Colonial Surgeon. The area covered by these health districts, as well as their numbering, was again completely different from that of the census districts and the security districts. Thus it was increasingly apparent that each government department was dividing the city up into areas according to its own needs and was enforcing relevant laws without regard to other departments.

Health districts

In nineteenth-century Hong Kong, Chinese districts were but a stone’s throw from the foreigners’ residential areas. However, there were no grand commer- cial buildings, courts, city hall, Hong Kong Club or European garden villas in the Chinese community. Most of the lower class lived in crude tenement buildings

129 ‘Number and Cost of District Watchmen’, Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 11 June 1881, pp.448–452.

130 ‘Government Notification No. 87’, Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 11 March 1983, pp.176–188.

131 ‘Hongkong Anno Tricesimo Victorie Regine No. 7 of 1866’, Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 25 August 1866, p.336; Victoria Registration Ordinance, 1866.

Notation:

1	District No.1	5	District No.5
2	District No.2	6	District No.6
3	District No.3	7	District No.7
4	District No.4

Source: CO129.

Figure 1.6 Distribution of security districts

with mud-brick walls, thatch roofs and silt flooring. A tenement building would house dozens of people, with no mains water supply, electrical lighting, kitchen or even toilet.

The houses in Taipingshan in the 1850s were described in the Colonial Surgeon’s report as cramped, dark, airtight and foul-smelling, with garbage and faecal matter littering the streets and an overall terrible hygiene situation.132 Chinese workers who had recently left farming for work in Hong Kong would raise livestock at home in hopes of supplementing their family’s income. Adults and children, pigs, chickens and dogs all mingled in a dingy space with polluted and putrid air,133 and diseases spread as a result. Some inspection reports of the Colonial Surgeon even revealed up to 70 pigs being raised in a tenement build- ing of around 300 square feet on various floors (not just in the basement), with some even found hiding under beds.134

The densely populated Chinese communities had poor sanitary conditions. At first, in 1866, Fan Ah Wai and three Chinese individuals, Tam Yik Sam, Lam Tak Kee and Wong Fung Wan, applied to the government for the appropriation of 9,100 square feet of land for building a Chinese hospital.135 However, the govern- ment felt that the sanitary conditions were not that bad, and twice rejected the application on issues with the land lots. Then in April 1869 it was reported in the China Mail that the Registrar General inspected the Kwong Fook I Tsz in Sheung Wan where the terminally ill shared a room with dead bodies. The situation at Kwong Fook I Tsz attracted the attention of both the media and the govern- ment. At the time, the Chinese did not trust doctors and feared that the doctors would perform a post-mortem on their bodies. Those who were sick therefore mostly did not want to be admitted into a Western hospital for treatment, and the Government Civil Hospital was not able to serve its purpose of healing the Chinese. Taking this into account and with a view to preventing the spread of diseases from the I Tsz (temples that provided shelter to critically ill Chinese, temporary storage of corpses and coffins, and placement of wooden memorial plaques), Governor MacDonnell swiftly drafted the Hospital Ordinance in 1869 (which was signed into enactment the next year) and called upon local elites to make an application to the Colonial Office for the establishment of a Chinese-run hospital that would utilise Chinese medicine in providing treatment. This eventu- ally became the Tung Wah Hospital. Since 1869, the government had intended for those Chinese elites with financial power to act as representatives in dealing with the health issues of their community. From the 1870s to the 1890s, the Tung

132 ‘Report of Colonial Surgeon 1854’, Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 9 July 1855, p.358.

133 ‘Report of the Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Existence of Yellow Fever’, Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 12 May 1866, p.190.

134 ‘Report of Colonial Surgeon 1877’, Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 23 November 1878, p.563.

135 Memorandum by Governor Sir Richard Graves MacDonnell, CB, Concerning the ‘I-Ts’z’ or Chinese Hospital for Moribund Patients, Enclosure 4, Registrar to Colonial Secretary, Victoria, Hong Kong, 19 February 1867, in The Honourable T.H. Whitehead, ‘Report on the Tung Wa Hospital’, 17 October 1896, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1896, Appendix II, p.102.

DUALItY IN pLANNING (1841–1898) · 61

Wah Hospital differed from modern hospitals in that the majority admitted into the hospital were terminally ill patients. The hospital replaced the I Tsz in accept- ing dying patients. The poor sanitary conditions in the Chinese residential areas were probably similar to those of industrial cities in Britain before the 1820s.

Since the industrial revolution in 1750, cities in Britain had a demand for a large labour force in production. However, those who lived in the rural areas were unable to adapt to the cramped living space and the factories with terrible sanitary conditions. As a result, a lot of farmers contracted diseases, and bacte- ria spread rapidly. The cities had great difficulty recruiting workers. In 1833, the radical Edwin Chadwick believed that workers were getting sick as a result of a terrible working environment, and proposed the Factory Act in answer to the sani- tary conditions of the factories at the time. Edwin Chadwick also believed that the diseases were the reason behind poverty and that the diseases were transmittable. He therefore advocated a focus on the ventilation and sewerage systems of houses, improving living conditions of the poor, and the enactment of laws on preven- tion of diseases. In 1836, the Registration of Births and Deaths Act was passed in the UK, and the Bureau of Medical Statistics under the Poor Law Office was set up. The Bureau’s studies found that diseases in the community were directly linked to the surrounding environment, including the air, water supply system and sewage disposal. From 1844 to 1845, Parliament gave the government power to monitor the cities’ hygiene. In 1848, the Board of Public Health was established in the UK.136 As a pioneer in proposing legislation on city hygiene in Britain, Edwin Chadwick had a profound impact on his son, engineer Osbert Chadwick.

In 1881, the UK Colonial Office appointed Osbert Chadwick as a consult- ant to conduct extensive studies on the living environment, sanitary conditions and public health facilities of the City of Victoria in Hong Kong at the time. His reports in 1882, 1890 and 1902,137 which were publicised, remain to this day among the more comprehensive records of the livelihood of the Chinese at the end of the nineteenth century. It could be said that Chadwick had inherited his father’s views and introduced those British ideas into Hong Kong at the time.

Chadwick’s report on his study of Hong Kong’s hygiene situation in 1882 contained criticisms similar to those his father made on English cities in the 1840s. He pointed out that the City of Victoria had poor hygiene, lacked systems for excrement and sewage treatment, and had insufficient clean water supply, polluted air, a much too high population density and too tightly concen- trated housing. In addition, the city’s water supply was very contaminated, and the supply was distributed in wells in low-lying areas, which were close to the surface and lacked depth. Most houses also did not have comprehensive sewage disposal facilities, leading to the accumulation of waste water in populous areas. The residents’ excrement being in close proximity to the water supply meant that the water supply contained a large amount of bacteria and was not suitable for

136 George Rosen, A History of Public Health, New York, MD Publications, 1958, pp.206–223.

137 CO882, Osbert Chadwick, ‘Mr. Chadwick’s Reports on the Sanitary Condition of Hong Kong’, November 1882; Osbert Chadwick, ‘Preliminary Report on the Sanitary Condition of Hong Kong’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., April 1902.

drinking.138 Chadwick examined the water quality of 18 wells in populous areas in the City of Victoria, and found that the water was turbid with a high concen- tration of E. coli, meaning that the well water was highly contaminated by both human and livestock wastes.139 The water pressure of the city’s water supply system was also insufficient, causing those living in mountainous regions to have insufficient fresh water as the result of insufficient water pressure. The bursting and leakage of water pipes were commonplace, and the damaged pipes allowed bacteria, effluent and waste gases to flow to all parts of the city. Houses in low- lying areas faced a high risk of malaria. To improve the living conditions of the City of Victoria, very challenging difficulties would have to be overcome.140

The most significant differences between the houses Europeans lived in and the tenement buildings the Chinese lived in were that the European houses were built with stronger materials, had more windows, usually had corridors that facilitated ventilation, and were more adequately spaced, providing a tranquil environment. To prevent the unsatisfactory living conditions in the Chinese community from influencing the health of Europeans, the government had established dedicated residential areas for Europeans. In 1888, five years after Chadwick severely criticised the city’s hygiene, the government promul- gated the European District Reservation Ordinance, demarcating the Mid-Levels in Central as a European residential district, for fear of the bubonic plague Chadwick warned of actually happening.141 Before 1887, there was no explicit labelling of the residential areas of the Chinese and the foreigners, just a pro- hibition of Europeans from living in areas where the Chinese were active. The European District Reservation Ordinance in 1888 prohibited the Chinese from living in European districts, thus more specifically underlining the separation of the two types of residential areas.

In May 1888 the government passed The European District Reservation Ordinance. On the basis of Europeans living in Hong Kong requiring sufficient space and well-ventilated air, the ordinance drew a line of demarcation east of Pok Fu Lam Road along High Street, Bonham Road, Ladder Street, Caine Road, Chancery Lane, Arbuthnot Road, Wyndham Street, Ice House Street, Battery Path, Queen’s Road, and the nullah in Wan Chai (today’s Stone Nullah Lane), up to Wong Nai Chung Road. To the north of the line, the Mid-Levels area 400 to 450 feet142 above sea level from Conduit Road to south of Bowen Road was reserved for Europeans’ residential use. The western border of the City of Victoria was extended to Kennedy and was better defined (see Figure 1.7).

138 CO882, Osbert Chadwick, ‘Mr. Chadwick’s Reports on the Sanitary Condition of Hong Kong’, November 1882; Staff Surgeon Wilm, Epidemic of Bubonic Plague at Hong Kong in the Year 1896, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1897, p.27.

139 Hugh McCallum's report, see CO882, Osbert Chadwick, Report on the Sanitary Condition of Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., November 1882, p.17.

140 CO882/4, ‘Sanitation of Hong Kong – O. Chadwick’s Report’, 18 July 1882, p.8 para.5, p.26 para.146,

p.30 para.130.

141 CO882/4, ‘Sanitation of Hong Kong – O. Chadwick’s Report’, 18 July 1882.

142 CO129/237, ‘Ordinance No. 16 of European Reservation’, 8 May 1888, pp.398–408; Hal Empson,

Mapping Hong Kong: A Historical Atlas, Hong Kong, Government Information Services, 1992, p.150.

Source: HKRS209-6-2, Hong Kong public Records Office, Reference No. Map MM-0111*, plan of the city of Victoria, Hong Kong 1889.

Figure 1.7 The dividing line of European and Chinese residential districts (1888)

In 1890, the government again invited Osbert Chadwick to Hong Kong for further studies on the health and hygiene conditions in Hong Kong. Unfortunately, this second study did not improve his impressions of Hong Kong. The city’s population had grown exponentially over the previous eight years. According to the census in 1891, Hong Kong’s population was 220,000, a 38 per cent increase from the 160,000 in 1881. The population growth within the city centre reached 37 per cent.143 The water supply, which was hardly clean to begin with, had only deteriorated in quality in the increasingly crowded living environment. However, the government had no comprehensive waste disposal facilities in place. The daily wastes of the residents were simply dumped around their living space, with the residents themselves living amongst their own wastes. In the hot summers, the accumulated waste was prone to give rise to bacteria. Fresh water was both in short supply and came from contaminated sources, posing serious risks to the residents’ health.

In the 1890s, people in Hong Kong often used silt to bury wastes and dis- charge sewage on to the ground close to where they lived. These waste treatment methods not only failed to dispose of waste completely, but were also a form of air pollution. In light of the hygiene situation at the time, Chadwick suggested building new sewerage discharge pipelines: to discharge wastes into the sea by using rainwater and water from streams, and to improve environmental hygiene by handling waste disposal by district.144 This suggestion became the foundation upon which the future sewerage system of Hong Kong would be built. Owing to the complicated nature of the sewerage works, British experts and works would have to be engaged for the construction. With the economic constraints at the time, the commencement of the works was delayed again and again. Before the sewerage system could be built, Hong Kong was hit by the catastrophe of the century – the bubonic plague.

According to official records, from the 1840s to the 1860s, most of those admitted into hospitals were patients with fever, exhibiting symptoms such as yellow fever, continued fever and intermittent fever. In the 1870s to 1890s, most of the patients admitted were suffering from diseases caused by poor environ- mental hygiene, with epidemics such as dysentery, typhoid and malaria being prevalent. However, the rate of death by these diseases could in no way compare to that of the plague that broke out in 1894. In that year, the number of Chinese deaths due to the plague was higher than the number of deaths of Europeans and other ethnicities by 93 per cent.145 The government was almost convinced that the policy of dividing the residential areas of the Chinese and Westerners was working. However, the plague eventually spread to the Europeans’ residential

143 Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Census Reports, 1841–1897.

144 ‘Report on the Sewerage of the High-Level District of the City of Victoria’, Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 1890; ‘Report on the Drainage of the Lower Western and Central District of Victoria’, Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 1890; ‘Report of the Drainage of the Eastern District of Victoria’, Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 1890; Huazi ribao (Huazi Daily), 21 June 1895.

145 ‘Medical Report on the Prevalence of Bubonic Plague in the Colony of Hong Kong during the Years 1895 and 1896’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1897, p.289.

areas as well in 1895. It was as Edwin Chadwick described – diseases would not only occur in the slums, but spread to the entire city.146 In 1896, to effect hygiene governance planning in the city, the Department of Health divided the city into eight health districts, which was increased to ten districts in 1897 (Figure 1.8). The Department of Health became responsible for the registration of the popu- lation in the districts, including records of birth, contraction of infectious dis- eases, hospital admission and death, in order to gain control of the spread of the plague. The borders of the City of Victoria further extended towards the Mid- Levels, while the borders of the European residential districts moved north, cov- ering Districts 2 and 3. The concept of dividing the Chinese from the foreigners and ruling each separately was by then more specifically defined.

In 1895, Hong Kong had ten health districts. Districts 2 and 3 were resi- dential areas of foreigners.
In 1902, the southern border of the City of Victoria at the Mid-Levels in Central was extended to today’s Tregunter Path, 600 feet above sea level.
In 1903, the southern border at the Mid-Levels in Central was further extended to 700 feet above sea level.

Planning from the 1840s to the 1880s had all along avoided the health issues faced by the Chinese. The plague that broke out in 1894 was a turning point for the city’s planning. Before this point, Europeans took the position that they could not understand and did not wish to involve themselves in the livelihood problems of the city. Apart from discriminating against the Chinese for being uncivilised and uneducated, the Europeans proposed no solutions to such prob- lems. The difficulties encountered by migrating Chinese workers who came to Hong Kong looking for work were deemed temporary problems, and these temporary problems gradually became a major obstacle in the city’s continued development. In its early planning when the city was built, the government had failed to make long-term plans for the growth of population, and was biased in its focus on the commercial needs of European businessmen while neglecting the daily life issues faced by the Chinese communities. These factors led to the governing crisis of the city in the 1880s to the 1890s.

Summary

Old postcards of Hong Kong showed the City of Victoria in the second half of the nineteenth century as an elegant European city. The seawalls, piers and roads built from thick granite, the Roman clock towers and Gothic churches and convents erected in Medieval European architectural style, the Baroque pillars and neo-classical semi-circular arch window lintels, the geometric doorframes adorning the government buildings and foreign businesses – all this infrastruc- ture of Western construction techniques allowed the government to showcase

146 George Rosen, A History of Public Health, New York, MD Publications, 1958, pp.208–211.

Notation:

1	District No.1	6	District No.6
2	District No.2	7	District No.7
3	District No.3	8	District No.8
4	District No.4	9	District No.9
5	District No.5	10	District No.10

Source: CO129/313, p.241.

Figure 1.8 Distribution of the ten health districts of the City of Victoria (1897)

its Western governing power taking root in the city, and told a story of the devel- opment of a modern Western city structure in a Chinese community. Important administrative departments such as police stations and magistracies were built around the Governor’s House to form the Government Hill, which served as the political hub; the Harbour Master’s Office and the Post Office were located on the harbourfront to provide assistance to commerce; and education institutions were set up on Morrison Hill in Wan Chai. In addition, the city had gardens that provided recreational space, the City Hall for cultural activities, and the Upper and Lower Bazaars for daily purchases. The city’s overall arrangement revealed the government’s strategy on land use and the distribution of major political and commercial departments. A city with the scale of an entrepôt was thus born in a tumultuous political environment.

The City of Victoria, built on the military stronghold on the northern shore of Hong Kong Island, had to overcome nature’s challenges in order to become an entrepôt. From 1843 to the 1890s, the City of Victoria was ribbon-shaped. The government reclaimed land at the northern shore to open up new space for development and to solve the problem of having too little flat land and too much mountainous land. The foreign firms, piers and godowns set up along the north- ern shore became the focus of commercial activities, and the commercial district expanded towards the east and west along Hong Kong Island’s northern coast. To accommodate the ever growing commercial activities, historical construc- tions all around Hong Kong Island, including roads, piers, reservoirs, typhoon shelters and reclamation projects, were gradually completed after careful plan- ning and with large amounts of human and material resources employed in a prudent manner. At a time when resources were limited, projects had to be pri- oritised, and policy decisions are naturally likely to cause controversies when the supply was simply not able to satisfy the demand. Could we get a sense of such arduous processes and the difficulties involved when we revisit the historical sites and see the various creative works made by hand?

The scope of development of the City of Victoria in the second half of the nineteenth century was reflective of a few characteristics of a city’s early plan- ning. First, the government had to rely on advanced construction techniques to overcome the deficiency in natural resources – by reclaiming land from the sea, and building roads, reservoirs, typhoon shelters and other public facili- ties. Large-scale infrastructure facilities were the foundation on which Hong Kong established itself as a major entrepôt in the Asia-Pacific region. As the construction techniques at the time were not able to completely overcome the unfavourable geographical circumstances, and there was a limited area avail- able for development on both Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula, not to mention the fact that the city centre of Hong Kong Island was located on a slope, most of the city’s buildings had to be constructed on the hillside. The construction projects required a large supply of techniques and materials, leading to high costs in developing Hong Kong’s architecture. Second, the City of Victoria was managed with two completely differently strategies. The Central District was mainly modelled on what was practised in the West. Commercial activities and trade were conducted in a systematic manner, and the enactment

and strict enforcement of laws were key to the implementation of policies. Since 1844, the government had promulgated laws that would complement the city’s development, securing the legitimacy of its governance through the legal system. However, Sheung Wan in the western part of the city, the densely populated area where the Chinese community lived, suffered from poor housing and hygiene conditions as well as high crime rates. There was no proper town planning before the outbreak of the bubonic plague in 1894. Third, the exter- nal political and economic environment also influenced the priority and speed of development of the city’s different districts. Examples of such influence can be seen from the 1840s to the 1860s, when foreign funds were invested in the development of Central, while after the 1870s Chinese capital focused on the development of Sheung Wan and Yau Ma Tei on the Kowloon Peninsula.

2

Expansion of the territory (1898–1941)

Sir Cecil Clementi explained that although the Hong Kong territories were divided into three parts viz, the Colony of Hong Kong, old Kowloon and new Kowloon (i.e. the leased territory) yet for practical purposes they constituted a single entity that of Hong Kong Harbour. The Southern side of the harbour (i.e. the colony) was almost if not quite fully developed; the northern side was beginning to develop and would develop rapidly if security of tenure were assured. Persons and firms interested would take up land for large undertakings only if granted leases beyond the period for which the territory has been leased by the Chinese Government to His Majesty’s Government, i.e. 99 years from 1898. It was pointed out that the lease from Government to Government was not merely a land lease, but a lease

of all sovereign rights: this would include the right to dispose of land and allot leases even beyond the term of the head lease. Sir C. Clementi therefore urged that, in the best interests of the colony and of the new territories themselves, he should proceed to grant leases for periods beyond the balance of the 99 years. Sir V. Wellesley pointed out the danger of seeming to dispose of that which it might not be in our power to give; the danger of encouraging Hong Kong to

think that we were going to keep the New Territories forever . . . (CO129/507/6, ‘Memorandum: Land Leases in the New Territories of Hong Kong’, 7 November

1928)

From the 1840s to the 1860s, the total population of Hong Kong was still below 100,000, so the weaknesses of segregation strategy with urban planning modelled on European experiences in Central District but allowing the Chinese commu- nity to develop in a loose way had not yet been exposed. However, as the Chinese population increased continuously, certain areas such as Sheung Wan, Sai Wan and Wan Chai suffered from overcrowding, unsatisfactory public health and poor law and order. The situation was out of control, and the government’s administra- tion was feeble. The demand for public services was far greater than the original ancillary facilities in the core districts could bear.1 No one could have antici- pated such a rapid population growth when European-style facilities were built in the Central District in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The trading facilities of the port were incapable of solving the problems of housing, water

1 CO129/494, ‘The Land Resumption in the New Territories’, 4 October 1926, p.28.

supply, sewerage, law and order and sanitation in the Chinese communities. The government not only did not deliberately plan for the Chinese communities, but also lacked experience in governing different groups of Chinese. The explo- sion in the grassroots population triggered one livelihood issue after another, while contingency measures were implemented one after another that attempted to provide solutions, but the problems were overwhelming. The lack of coor- dination between departments, coupled with limited land resources and weak economic power, made it difficult for the government to govern rebellious busi- ness elites who possessed economic power and lower classes filled with national hatred. In the late nineteenth century, Hong Kong could be described as a chaoti- cally governed city with poor sanitary conditions.

On the Kowloon Peninsula, only 3 square miles (7.8 square kilometres)2 of land south of Boundary Street could be developed by the government. Land was already very scarce, but most of the area was allocated for military use. In the 1880s, development of the Kowloon Peninsula was still limited and confined to the western coast. Development of the southern coast of the peninsula did not commence until the early twentieth century. The government gradually real- ised that the expansion of the city’s core areas was the solution to the problems caused by rapid population growth. In 1898, the United Kingdom succeeded in leasing the New Territories. From then, land development and planning took centre stage in the city’s growth, which resulted in significant changes for Hong Kong’s development. Signed in June 1898, the Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory expanded the city’s territory and provided it with new land resources to divert the new population. The limited space on Hong Kong Island could no longer cope with the needs of its residents. By the early twentieth century, the government had to resolve disputes involving the land ownership of indigenous residents. The challenges were completely new and different, shift- ing from a technical nature to a personnel one. From the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century, political instability in China and other countries left Chinese immigrants in Hong Kong no choice but to endure hardship, which in turn gave a respite to the Hong Kong government.

Opportunities

The United Kingdom and the Qing government signed the Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory in Beijing on 9 June 1898, in which the Qing government leased more land to the United Kingdom. The area concerned was bounded by Mirs Bay in the east, Boundary Street in Kowloon in the south, the Shenzhen Bay in the west and the Shenzhen River in the north.3 It also included over 200 islands nearby. In the report by James Haldane Stewart

2 Kowloon Peninsula referred to the region to the south of Boundary Street. It differs from today’s concept, which includes the New Kowloon districts. ‘Report on the Census of the Colony for 1931’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1931, p.99.

3 ‘Papers Relating to Extension of Colony of Hong Kong’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1899, p.213.

Lockhart, Colonial Secretary of Hong Kong, the New Territories was estimated to have an area of approximately 376 square miles4 (973.8 square kilometres). After the government had completed the land survey of the New Territories in 1905, it announced that the leased area was only 356 square miles5 (around 922 square kilometres).6 The 99-year lease period was from 1 July 1898 to 30 June 1997.7 The area of the New Territories was estimated to be around 10.2 times that of Hong Kong Island (32 square miles or 82.9 square kilometres) and the Kowloon Peninsula (3 square miles or 7.8 square kilometres) combined (35 square miles or 90.7 square kilometres).

In 1899, Lockhart estimated the total area of arable land in the whole of Xin’an County at 120,000 acres (485.6 square kilometres) based on the amount of land tax that the county collected. As the area of land leased to the United Kingdom was around 60 per cent of Xin’an County’s, the area of arable land in the New Territories was estimated at 72,000 acres (291.4 square kilometres). According to the estimations made when the New Territories was leased, its total area (including uncultivated land) was around 240,640 acres (973.8 square kilometres). If 72,000 acres (291.4 square kilometres) of the area was privately cultivated, the area of Crown land owned by the colonial government could be as much as 168,640 acres8 (682.5 square kilometres). This would offer plenty of land for development.

Land registration

To optimise the newly leased land and facilitate the design of long-term land development strategies, the government first had to sort out land ownership in the New Territories. After the government officially took over the area in 1899, land registration and legislation work immediately commenced.9 The fourth ordinance on the New Territories, New Territories (Land Court) Ordinance, was promulgated on 1 June 1900, by which a Land Court was established10 to regis- ter the land of indigenous New Territories residents11 and resolve land owner- ship disputes in the New Territories.12 On 12 July 1900, the government issued

4 Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 8 April 1899, p.537.

5 Hong Kong Blue Book, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1905, p.U2; Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1931, p.99.

6 The total area of the New Territories published by the Lands Department in 2015 was only 949.42 square kilometres after subtracting 28.58 square kilometres of reclaimed land. Hong Kong Geographic Data, Survey and Mapping Office, Lands Department, February 2015.

7 ‘Papers Relating to Extension of Colony of Hong Kong’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1899, Appendix No. 1, pp.198–199.

8 Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 8 April 1899, p.540.

9 ‘Report on the New Territory during the First Year of British Administration’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1900, p.253.

10 John W. Carrington, The Ordinances of Hongkong, Prepared under the Authority of the Statute Laws (Revised Edition) Ordinance, 1900, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1900, p.607.

11 ‘Report on the New Territory for the Year 1900’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1900, p.4.

12 ‘Ordinance No. 4 of 1900, New Territories (Land Court) Ordinance, 1900’, in John W. Carrington, The

Source: ‘Report on the New territory during the First Year of British Administration’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & co., 1900, pp.271, 277.

Figure 2.1 Land registration form of the New Territories

an announcement in Chinese requiring indigenous New Territories residents to register private land and pay Crown rent to the government.13 Landowners had to fill in forms prepared by the Hong Kong government to declare the land’s location, use, soil fertility, crop type and quantity, and so on.14 (See Figure 2.1.) The Hong Kong government would then determine the amount of Crown rent that the owner had to pay.15

The government announced that the land in the New Territories would be classified into three grades according to fertility. Each grade attracted a

Ordinances of Hongkong, Prepared under the Authority of the Statute Laws (Revised Edition) Ordinance, 1900, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1900, pp.607–608.

13 ‘Report on the New Territory during the First Year of British Administration’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1900, Appendix IV, p.253.

14 ‘Report on the New Territory for the Year 1900’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1901, p.267.

15 ‘Report on the New Territory for the Year 1900’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1901, p.254.

different amount of Crown rent: the first grade referred to fertile agricultural land near water resources, which could support two harvests of rice or one harvest of sugar cane a year; the second grade referred to higher-latitude agricultural land further away from water resources, which could support only one harvest of rice or sugar cane a year; the third grade referred to infer- tile land far from water resources, where only crops like sweet potatoes and peanuts could be grown. Furthermore, owners of fish ponds were required to pay more Crown rent than owners of agricultural land, while owners of burial grounds were only required to pay stamp duty.16 After the New Territories landowners had registered the location of the land, declared the land use and paid the Crown rent or stamp duty, a District Magistrate would issue them with official deeds to recognise their ownership. However, the Crown lease would end on 30 June 1997, as stipulated in the Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory.

Crown rents for the New Territories grade one, grade two and grade three agricultural land were 3, 2 and 1 dollar(s) per acre (4,046.9 square metres) respectively. The location of the land also affected the amount of Crown rent, as land near Kowloon had a higher rate of 5, 3 and 1.5 dollars per acre respectively. Crown rent for land with houses built on it was 50 dollars per acre as a one-off payment or 50 cents per acre per year, while the Crown rent of villages with con- venient transport and better living conditions might reach 100 dollars per acre.17 As Chinese farmers were used to building and living in houses on agricultural land, they did not fully consider the kind of land when registering their land. Some of them had both building land and agricultural land, all of which they declared as agricultural land to avoid paying high Crown rent. They would be required to pay a land premium if they wanted to build on agricultural land later on. The huge difference in price between agricultural land and building land also meant a similar difference in compensation when the government resumed land for development subsequently. The Chinese farmers did not expect any of this. In 1911, the government collected land registration fees for the first time in the New Territories, starting from the New Territories North Yeuk and extending to the New Territories South Yeuk in 1913.18

There were two types of traditional Chinese title deeds for land: ‘red title deeds’, which were officially registered title deeds with Xin’an County’s red seal; and ‘white title deeds’, where the land concerned was exchanged pri- vately. A white title deed was usually a written record with signatures of both the seller and the buyer, signed in the presence of witnesses, and might even state the reason for selling the land. However, since such title deeds did not have the official red seal, their owners had to register with the Qing gov- ernment in exchange for red title deeds. There were also quite a number of

16 ‘Report on the New Territory for the Year 1900’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1901, p.266.

17 ‘Report on the New Territories for the Year 1912’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1912, p.45.

18 ‘Report of Public Works’, Hong Kong Administrative Reports, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1911, p.11.

Table 2.1 Names of districts and villages in the New Territories (1899)

Name of district

No. of villages

Names of villages

Kau-lung 3 Kau Yeuk, Luk Yeuk, tsun Wan

Sha-tau-kok 7 Wo Hang, Lin Ma Hang, Ha po, Luk Keng, Nam Yeuk, Kuk po,

Hing chun

Un Long 8 pat Heung, Kam tin, Shap pat Heung, ping Shan, Ha tsun, tun

Mun, tai Lam chung, Lung Ku tan

Sheung U 9 Lam tsun, San tin, Lung Yeuk tau, Shun Wan, Hap Wo, tsoi

Hang, Sheung Shui, Fan Ling, Hau Yeuk

Luk Yeuk 1 Luk Yeuk

tung Hoi 4 Sai Kung, cheung Muk tau, Ko tong, chik Kang

tung to 6 Kao O, ping chau, tap Mun, pak Lap chau, Kau Sai, Im tin tsz Sai tao 8 tai O, Mui Wo, tung chung, cheung chau, Ni Ku chau, chik

Lap Kok, Ma Wan, tsing I

Source: Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 8 July 1899, p.1069.

deeds signed by owners who used their land as security for loans. After the implementation of land registration, the colonial government discovered that many self-proclaimed tenant farmers were using the land, yet the government did not recognise their legal status owing to their lack of documents to prove their land use rights.19 Owners of white title deeds were treated similarly. Only owners of red title deeds were registered, and they were the ones that the gov- ernment collected Crown rent20 from. After registration, the landowner would receive an officially registered deed issued by a District Magistrate to confirm the land ownership.21 If landowners failed to declare their land ownership to the Land Court, the government could resume the land for a public purpose. On 14 April 1902, the China Mail reported the resumption of Land Lot Nos 1–3 and 12 of Area 73 and Nos 2453 and 2463–2466 of Area 30 in Sha Tau Kok, New Territories. This was to put pressure on indigenous residents, forcing them to declare land ownership.22

The rural organisations of indigenous New Territories residents consisted of various yeuk (alliances), heung (rural townships) and tsuen (villages). There were several heung and tsuen in a yeuk. According to a government survey in 1899, the whole New Territories could be divided into eight yeuk and 46 heung (see Table 2.1). In 1900, Governor Henry A. Blake released a report on the New Territories after he had been Governor for a year, which stated that the whole of

19 ‘Report on the New Territory’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1900, p.267; ‘New Territories: Land Court, Report on Work from 1900 to 1905’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1905, p.146.

20 ‘Report on the New Territory’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1900, p.267.

21 ‘Report on the New Territory’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1900, p.254.

22 China Mail, 14 April 1902.

the New Territories could be divided into eight yeuk, 48 heung and 597 tsuen,23

which was two more heung compared with 1899.

The government had started a cadastral survey of the New Territories as early as November 1899, before the New Territories (Land Court) Ordinance 1900 came into force. The survey started from an area near Boundary Street in Kowloon, bounded by Lai Chi Kok in the west and Lei Yue Mun in the east. In January 1900, the survey extended to the Yuen Long area;24 in late 1900, the survey of the area near Lion Rock (later called New Kowloon), Ma Wan, Cheung Chau and Ping Chau was basically complete; in 1901, the survey extended to areas such as Pat Heung Gap; in 1902, the survey included Sai Kung, Lek Yuen, Pat Heung East and Lantau Island; in 1903, the survey entered the final stage and reached outlying islands such as Lamma Island and Po Toi, and other areas including Tsuen Wan. In June 1903, the New Territories cadastral survey was largely completed.25

In 1903, the Government Gazette published details regarding areas that had been surveyed, of which 40,738 acres (164.9 square kilometres) had already been cultivated by indigenous New Territories residents, with a surprisingly large number of landowners, totalling 328,639 people.26 The report showed the results of the government’s New Territories cadastral survey, such as the number of registered land titles, total number of maps drawn and measured area in each surveyed district. In 1904, the government published a survey report for the out- lying islands. The surveyed land area totalled 40,738 acres (16,486.08 hectares) (see Table 2.2 for the surveyed area of each island). In 1905, the government published the comprehensive data of all surveys undertaken over the years. The measured land area of the New Territories was 175,537 acres (710.4 square kilo- metres); the area of outlying islands was 51,335 acres (207.8 square kilometres); the area of cultivated land in the New Territories was adjusted to 40,709 acres (164.7 square kilometres), which represented 18 per cent of the New Territories’ total area of 226,872 acres (918.2 square kilometres).27 In 1905, the government announced that it owned and managed 186,134 acres (753.3 square kilometres) of Crown land in the New Territories. In 1906 and 1907, the government made some slight amendments to the data. In 1906, the area of cultivated land in the New Territories was adjusted to 40,717 acres (164.8 square kilometres), while the total area of the New Territories was adjusted to 226,880 acres (918.2 square kilometres);28 in 1907, the area of cultivated land in the New Territories was adjusted to 40,789 acres (165 square kilometres), while the total area of the New

23 ‘Report on the New Territory’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1900, pp.252–253.

24 ‘A General Report on the Survey of the New Territory from November 1899 to April 1904’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1904, p.399.

25 ‘New Territories: Land Court, Report on Work from 1900 to 1905’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1905, p.146.

26 ‘A General Report on the Survey of the New Territory from November 1899 to April 1904’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1904, p.403.

27 Hong Kong Blue Book, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1905, p.U2.

28 Hong Kong Blue Book, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1906.

Table 2.2 Cadastral survey report for the New Territories and outlying islands (1904)

District	Number of demarcation districts	Number of maps surveyed	Number of acres surveyed (acre (hectare))	Total number of holdings demarcated
the Mainland including	388	450	37,524.03	281,352
the following islands:			(15,197.23)
Kato, Double Island, tap
Mun, pak Lap chau, Kau
Sai, Im tiu tsz and tsing
I Island
Lan tao	72	75	2,659.96	37,147
			(1,077.28)
chip Lap Kok Island	1	2	24.87	396
			(10.07)
Ni Ku chau	1	3	16.75	426
			(6.78)
peng chau (near Lan tao)	1	2	28.92	239
			(11.71)
cheung chau	1	3	113.90	619
			(46.13)
Mah Wan	1	1	52.26	218
			(21.17)
Lamma	10	12	155.09	4,693
			(62.81)
pu toi	1	6	33.51	1,140
			(13.57)
peng chau (in Mirs Bay)	1	2	128.66	2,409
			(52.11)
total	477	556	40,737.95	328,639
			(16,498.87)

Sources: ‘A General Report on the Survey of the New territory from November 1899 to April 1904’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & co., 1904, p.403; ‘New territories: Land court, Report on Work from 1900 to 1905’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & co., 1905, p.145.

Territories was adjusted to 226,918 acres (918.3 square kilometres).29 The differ- ences in data were minimal following several amendments, and the government’s cadastral survey of the New Territories was basically complete. The survey results showed that the total area of the New Territories was smaller than the 369 square miles (957 square kilometres) indicated in the Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory in 1898,30 but the area of land under the control of the gov- ernment was 10.4 per cent larger than Chief Secretary James Haldane Stewart

29 Hong Kong Blue Book, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1907.

30 CO882/5, J. Stewart Lockhart, ‘On the Extension of the Colony of Hong Kong’, 8 October 1899, p.36.

Lockhart’s estimation of 168,640 acres (682.5 square kilometres). Moreover, much of the land was vast flat land with much potential for development.31 The 1898 Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory gave the government an opportunity to replan Hong Kong’s development.

Promulgation of the Land Resumption Ordinance

Since as much as 186,134 acres (753.3 square kilometres) of land was available for the government to develop, long-term planning for the New Territories had to be carried out. Naturally, the foremost task was to ensure that the gov- ernment could legally develop the land. In 1900, the government formulated the Land Resumption Ordinance. According to Ordinance No. 10 of 1900, the government could resume land ‘for a public purpose’. (The wording in the English text ‘public purpose’ was translated as ‘public welfare’ in Chinese (juban gongyi), but actually was not related to philanthropy.) It was also pro- vided in the ordinance that the government would not need to specifically state the purpose and details of the resumption in the Government Gazette, as ‘resumption for a public purpose’ alone was a sufficient justification. The Police Magistrate was responsible for collecting Crown rents.32 The reasons given by the government for resuming land ‘for a public purpose’ basically covered the following situations:

improving the sanitary conditions of the public environment and buildings;
improving the ventilation of buildings so as not to endanger the lives and safety of the residents;
military or naval needs; and
that the Governor in Council could elaborate on the definition of ‘resump- tion for a public purpose’.33

Of the justifications provided by the government, the fourth one was the most ambiguous, and the government further clarified on it: when the Governor in conjunction with the Executive Council decided to resume land ‘for a public purpose’, the government had to reach a transfer of ownership agreement with the private owner. If the government was unable to determine the ownership of the land, the location of the proposed resumption had to be notified in the Government Gazette. The private owner could raise an objection to the govern- ment’s plan within four months after the notice was gazetted. This meant that any objection raised would be invalid if the original owner found out that the government had developed the land only after the four-month period.

In 1910, the government promulgated Ordinance No. 18, which shortened the period of appeal to one month. The government could resume the land

31 CO129/494, ‘The Land Resumption in the New Territories’, 4 October 1926, p.29.

32 ‘Report of the New Territories’, Hong Kong Administrative Reports, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1909, p.H1.

33 Ordinance No. 10 of 1900, Historical Laws of Hong Kong Online, pp.627–628.

after a month if the owners of the acquired land were not in Hong Kong, could not be found, or could not reach an agreement of resumption with the relevant authority as deemed by the Governor.34 In an attempt to resolve disputes, the government established the Board of Arbitrators to adjudicate on compensa- tion for resumptions.35 The Board of Arbitrators consisted of three members, with the Chief Justice of Hong Kong as the Chairman. The two other commit- tee members were an official appointed by the government (often the Director of Public Works) and a representative appointed by the affected owners. If the affected owners failed to appoint a representative seven days after the notice was gazetted, the government would appoint a representative for them. The govern- ment could also employ someone on a salary basis to act as Secretary to the Board of Arbitrators.36 After the government implemented the land resumption policy, the Board of Arbitrators received a large number of applications from those who were satisfied with the compensation they would receive from the government on land resumptions. To show impartiality, the government pub- lished the lists of members of the Board of Arbitrators and its decisions through the media.37

With the government’s policies on land registration and resumption for a public purpose, land in the New Territories that was not owned by indigenous residents was turned into Crown land. Meanwhile, land originally owned by indigenous residents could also be included in the government’s planning in the name of public purposes. Although such land was only leased, the planning of the New Territories land for long-term development was legitimised by such policies.

Handling land disputes

Prior to the implementation of the land registration policy in 1899, no com- prehensive land registration was performed in the New Territories. Though the Qing government collected land taxes, no on-site inspections were carried out and there were no records of abandoned land, tenant farmers occupying the land of deceased landlords without permission or farmers developing untitled land. Following the cadastral survey in the New Territories in 1899, the afore- mentioned situations began to emerge.38 Therefore, government statistics of 1900 only recognised deeds with an official seal but not land obtained through private loans or unauthorised development.

An unstable political environment and the Hong Kong government’s repeated reiteration of political neutrality had made Hong Kong a paradise for Chinese people escaping from wars since the mid-nineteenth century. Talented

34 ‘Ordinances Passed and Assented to: Crown Lands Resumption, No. 18 of 1910’, Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 1910, p.306.

35 Ordinance No. 10 of 1900, Historical Laws of Hong Kong Online, p.628.

36 Ordinance No. 10 of 1900, Historical Laws of Hong Kong Online, pp.628–629.

37 China Mail, 22 August 1907.

38 CO129/494, ‘The Land Resumption in the New Territories’, 4 October 1926, p.33.

people and capital seeking refuge in Hong Kong thrived under the government’s open attitude. Fluctuations in land prices were affected by the political situation in the Asia-Pacific region, China’s political climate and the local economy. As land was scarce in the populous city, Hong Kong was persistently short of land resources for development. Naturally, there was a potential for land prices to rise. Investors had long noticed that lucrative profits could be earned on invest- ing in land on a long-term basis.

Land speculation was not a new phenomenon; land in Hong Kong saw a wave of speculation as early as the late nineteenth century. In 1888, the govern- ment earned 160,688 Hong Kong dollars on land sales. Not only was this higher than the 1887 sum of 155,238 dollars, but it was also a record high since the 1840s. The government derived much revenue from the sales of land.39 On 23 July 1900, the government actively acquired private land to expand the city’s boundaries.40 In 1903, the price of land in the New Territories rose from 1 cent per square foot the year before to 2.20 dollars per square foot. Speculators began investing in undeveloped agricultural land in New Kowloon.41 Land in New Kowloon continued to change hands at high prices.42 (See Table 2.3.)

The number of immigrants in Hong Kong soared amidst the Guangdong region’s political instability in the 1920s, and the demand for land intensified.43 The government also noticed that some people had become rich through land speculation; for instance, a clerk spent 3,000 Hong Kong dollars on land specu- lation and his fortune grew to 80,000 Hong Kong dollars.44 Back then, the New Territories was the hot spot for speculation, as some Chinese tenant farmers and Chinese agricultural by-product investors migrating to Hong Kong chose to invest in the New Territories or the districts along the railway line in New Kowloon.45 The land price hikes in the New Territories triggered all sorts of problems in the development of the area. The frequent transactions in land drove up land prices. In the 1920s, the government surveyed and conducted planning for land use again, at the same time acquiring land extensively under the Land Resumption Ordinance.46 In the process of resumption, the govern- ment had to pay increasing amounts of compensation to affected landowners. Yet the government was accused of offering compensation lower than market price.

In an attempt to curb land speculation, the Legislative Council discussed

39 ‘Report on the Condition and Prospects of Hong Kong, by His Excellency Sir G. William Des Voeux, Governor’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1889, pp.290–291.

40 ‘Report on the New Territories for the Years 1899–1912’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1912, p.46.

41 CO129/494, ‘The Land Resumption in the New Territories’, 4 October 1926, p.30.

42 ‘Report of the New Territories’, Hong Kong Administrative Reports, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1912, p.I13.

43 CO129/494, ‘The Land Resumption in the New Territories’, 4 October 1926, p.30.

44 CO129/494, ‘The Land Resumption in the New Territories’, 4 October 1926, p.30.

45 ‘Report on the New Territories’, Hong Kong Administrative Reports, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1928, p.2.

46 ‘Report on the New Territories’, Hong Kong Administrative Reports, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1923, p.1.

Table 2.3 Statistics on land auctions, areas and prices in Hong Kong (1899–1930)

Number of lots sold by auction Area (sq. ft)

Year	Hong Kong Island	Kowloon	New Territories	New Kowloon	Sub- total	Hong Kong Island	Kowloon	New Territories	New Kowloon
1899	43	40	–	–	83	640,863	1,358,475	–	–
1900	41	45	–	–	86	1,937,344	774,811	–	–
1901	20	21	–	–	41	665,118	161,948	–	–
1902	6	6	–	–	12	57,861	628,215	–	–
1903	28	1	7	–	36	204,997	44,000	89,359	–
1904	19	8	6	–	33	494,825	537,988	2,077,461	–
1905	21	2	38	–	61	262,252	149,637	15,960,712	–
1906	17	4	128	–	149	320,046	225,582	6,517,547	–
1907	11	1	140	–	152	1,068,038	290,000	5,520,065	–
1908	6	1	231	–	238	1,334,320	–	2,639,143	–
1909	7	2	253	1	263	59,737	105,782	7,976,334	31,836
1910	15	–	203	–	218	147,287	–	1,440,150	–
1911	21	2	176	–	199	452,898	20,806	2,982,069	–
1912	27	1	208	–	236	398,300	5,400	1,896,524	–
1913	29	4	181	–	214	560,821	241,342	3,283,017	–
1914	33	5	241	3	282	2,031,625	64,752	2,183,319	503,784
1915	7	–	256	1	264	73,596	–	4,657,940	9,000
1916	12	3	161	–	176	612,603	51,057	63,525,593	–
1917	7	5	189	–	201	133,776	55,957	1,885,761	–
1918	17	10	205	2	234	353,920	234,675	2,457,547	618,000
1919	30	10	245	1	286	525,767	148,539	2,107,220	3,920
1920	38	11	316	4	369	756,634	49,658	3,113,751	1,526,336
1921	12	15	319	–	346	126,323	622,470	17,375,791	–
1922	82	80	328	9	499	2,396,566	574,119	2,137,127	166,834
1923	19	8	415	–	442	155,944	31,799	75,168,686	–
1924	19	6	483	–	508	192,820	46,609	4,359,045	–
1925	38	9	256	10	313	786,617	213,879	20,027,229	71,874
1926	38	8	211	8	265	7,170,492	1,226,209	946,381	1,227,951
1927	34	7	239	5	285	990,605	45,302	2,296,038	65,775
1928	19	6	312	4	341	1,395,003	17,424	1,482,602	106,722
1929	13	11	334	23	381	465,655	75,794	2,439,149	186,872
1930	8	77	255	113	453	142,441	528,816	5,640,344	1,042,822

Sources: ‘Report of the Director of public Works for the Years 1899 to 1907’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & co., 1890 to 1908; ‘Report of the Director of public Works for the Years 1908 to 1930’, Hong Kong Administrative Reports, Hong Kong, Noronha & co., 1908 to 1930.

amendments to the Land Resumption Ordinance in 1922. It was mentioned that many Chinese hoarded land and drove up land prices, greatly increasing costs in the government’s resumption for public development and hindering development plans. It was thus suggested that the Land Resumption Ordinance should be amended to curb speculation and fight against hoarding so as to tackle land speculation that attempted to convert agricultural land into building

Premium (HK$)

Premiums per sq. ft (HK$)

Sub-total Hong Kong Island

Kowloon New Territories

New Kowloon

Sub- total

Hong Kong Island

Kowloon New Territories

New Kowloon

1,994,338	192,651	361,711	–	–	554,362	0.3	0.3	–	–
2,712,155	451,489	324,119	–	–	775,608	0.2	0.4	–	–
827,066	100,106	94,217	–	–	194,323	0.2	0.6	–	–
686,076	6,460	465,910	–	–	472,370	0.1	0.7	–	–
338,356	457,608	6,652	3,838	–	468,098	2.2	0.2	0.043	–
3,110,274	243,447	168,013	23,325	–	434,785	0.5	0.3	0.011	–
16,372,601	36,328	74,611	17,077	–	128,016	0.1	0.5	0.001	–
7,063,175	57,235	87,968	14,178	–	159,381	0.2	0.4	0.002	–
6,878,093	31,411	72,700	31,341	–	135,452	0.1	0.3	0.006	–
3,973,463	12,914	–	3,932	–	16,846	0.0	–	0.001	–
8,173,689	13,483	15,968	4,580	500	34,531	0.2	0.2	0.001	0.016
1,587,437	12,564	–	4,991	–	17,555	0.1	–	0.003	–
3,455,773	240,190	2,294	5,023	–	247,507	0.5	0.1	0.002	–
2,300,224	126,346	2,160	6,895	–	135,401	0.3	0.4	0.004	–
4,085,180	157,604	68,931	11,710	–	238,245	0.3	0.3	0.004	–
4,803,480	106,725	87,283	12,591	2,723	209,322	0.1	1.3	0.006	0.005
4,740,536	14,750	–	9,806	180	24,736	0.2	–	0.002	0.020
64,189,253	62,992	83,834	66,345	–	213,171	0.1	1.6	0.001	–
2,075,494	47,358	50,087	8,743	–	106,188	0.4	0.9	0.005	–
3,664,142	72,901	83,980	14,894	30,900	202,675	0.2	0.4	0.006	0.05
2,785,446	118,581	75,354	9,763	201	203,899	0.2	0.5	0.005	0.05
5,446,379	168,979	69,845	13,547	204,596	456,967	0.2	1.4	0.004	0.13
18,124,584	21,559	108,328	10,997	–	140,884	0.2	0.2	0.001	–
5,274,646	879,033	269,732	47,958	119,713	1,316,436	0.4	0.5	0.022	0.72
75,356,429	47,317	68,114	138,670	–	254,101	0.3	2.1	0.002	–
4,598,474	43,964	127,978	102,331	–	274,273	0.2	2.7	0.023	–
21,099,599	1,555,742	407,812	14,053	119,279	2,096,886	2.0	1.9	0.001	1.7
10,571,033	750,080	76,018	5,102	60,133	891,333	0.1	0.06	0.005	0.5
3,397,720	1,808,466	127,865	14,003	2,001	1,952,335	1.8	2.8	0.006	0.03
3,001,751	721,838	37,612	7,506	4,928	771,884	0.5	2.2	0.005	0.05
3,167,470	173,290	97,604	9,859	64,836	345,589	0.4	1.3	0.004	0.35
7,354,423	186,756	1,729,505	25,598	311,460	2,253,319	1.3	3.3	0.005	0.3

land.47 The major amendment to the ordinance was that compensation would no longer be paid for original farmland that was subsequently built upon. It pointed out that the construction of buildings on agricultural land changed the use of the land and was inconsistent with the original declaration of it being agricultural land. This was so even though the landowner had already amended the original land

47 China Mail, 10 January 1922.

records and paid a higher amount of Crown rent. The Crown Lands Resumption Amendment Ordinance, 1922 (Ordinance No. 9 of 1922) stated that agricultural land that had changed its use would only qualify for compensation as agricultural land.48 The government’s action caused great repercussions in society.49

Disputes between indigenous New Territories residents and the govern- ment reached a climax in the twentieth century. In the conflicts of the early 1920s, indigenous residents accused the government of not providing reason- able compensation for resumed land in accordance with the provisions of the 1898 Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory when developing the New Territories, while the government countered and stated that most of those who opposed land resumption were land speculators. It therefore pro- posed that compensation for agricultural land should be calculated according to crop yields. From 1921 to 1924, people seeking compensation for their land around Kowloon City could only receive a sum based on the price of agricul- tural land.50

In 1923, indigenous New Territories residents expressed their utmost dis- satisfaction with the government’s newly amended land resumption compen- sation policy. Prior to the amendments, residents who had leased Crown land and wished to convert agricultural land into building land had to pay additional Crown rents and a land premium to make up for the difference in land prices. On the other hand, private owners wishing to build on their agricultural land were only required to pay higher Crown rents but not land premiums. After 1923, the government also required private owners of agricultural land to pay a land premium when they built on their land. This was contrary to previous poli- cies where farmers could build on their own agricultural land by paying a higher Crown rent without having to pay for the difference in land prices.51 Indigenous New Territories residents strongly opposed resumed land not being compen- sated according to the market price, and land premiums and higher Crown rents having to be paid for altering the use of private land. They considered such policies broke the promise made by Governor Henry A. Blake in 1899: residents were entitled to reasonable compensation when their land was resumed by the government for public purposes.52 In 1922, a committee in charge of town plan- ning was established by the government not only to plan for the development of the city, but also to tackle soaring land prices, prevent information leaks con- cerning locations that the government planned to develop, and closely monitor land prices.53

In 1924, private owners of New Territories land, through legal represen-

48 CO129/494, ‘The Land Resumption in the New Territories’, 4 October 1926, p.32.

49 ‘Ordinances Passed and Assented to: No. 9 of 1922’, Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 24 March 1922, p.126.

50 CO129/494, ‘The Land Resumption in the New Territories’, 4 October 1926, pp.34–36.

51 ‘1923 nian shang tiantu guan chengwen’ (Petition to the Land Officer in 1923), in Xinjie xiangyiju, Xinjie nongdi zhuan wudi wenti youguan wenxian (Archives on Conversion of Agricultural Land to Building Land in the New Territories), Hong Kong, Xinjie xiangyiju, 1956, pp.4–5.

52 CO129/494, ‘The Land Resumption in the New Territories’, 4 October 1926, p.9.

53 China Mail, 17 November 1921.

tatives, appealed to the Supreme Court to challenge the colonial government’s power to resume private land. Since the New Territories was only leased to the United Kingdom for 99 years, they questioned if the 1900 Land Resumption Ordinance and the 1910 New Territories Ordinance violated the Convention of Peking.54 In 1925, the Supreme Court ruled that the Land Resumption Ordinance and the New Territories Ordinance were valid, and that the government could resume New Territories land from private owners for public purposes.55 On 29 April 1925, in a 21-point written petition to the government, New Territories residents stated their opposition to the government’s forced resumption of their properties and compelling them to move away. They claimed that the government used public purposes as an excuse to build on their land. They also argued that reasonable market prices should be paid to buy their land if the government wanted to resume private properties to develop roads and other public facilities, but the compensation given at the time was unreason- ably lower, utterly out of line with the market price,56 which was unfair to the indigenous New Territories residents. In June, New Territories villagers peti- tioned the British government to express their dissatisfaction with the govern- ment’s resumption of New Territories land.57 The indigenous New Territories residents established the Association of Workers, Peasants and Merchants (Xinjie gongnong shang yanjiuhui) to oppose the government’s land resump- tion policies. The Association was reorganised as the New Territories Heung Yee Kuk in 1956.58 Since 1925, conflicts between indigenous New Territories residents and the government have arisen from time to time over land sover- eignty issues.

Since its first land auction in 1841, the government had begun to use land as a source of revenue. Land auction income had been a regular source of annual income for the government since the 1850s. In the ten-year period between 1844 and 1854, the Hong Kong colonial government lacked a stable income, and the United Kingdom had to cover the fiscal deficit. It ceased to provide Hong Kong with economic aid from 1855 onwards. To break even, the colonial government had to find more sources of income. From 1853 to 1867, land sales and Crown rents were the most important sources of revenue for the govern- ment. Selling land to boost government coffers and reduce reliance on British financial aid was thus an effective way to enable Hong Kong to achieve finan- cial independence. As the speed and scale of infrastructure construction were dependent on the amount of resources invested, the government could accel- erate the city’s pace of Westernisation with capital from private developers on land development. This was the reason why it did not object to pushing up land prices through auctions (see Table 2.4).

54 Hongkong Telegraph, 22 December 1924.

55 Hongkong Telegraph, 9 January 1925.

56 CO129/489, ‘Memorial from New Kowloon Landowners’, 7 September 1925, pp.30–35.

57 Hongkong Telegraph, 6 June 1925.

58 Xinjie xiangyiju, Xinjie nongdi zhuan wudi wenti youguan wenxian (Archives on Conversion of Agricultural Land to Building Land in the New Territories), Hong Kong, Xinjie xiangyiju, 1956, p.1.

Table 2.4 Hong Kong government revenue (1898–1940)

Year (Jan–Dec)	Duties (HK$)	Fees of Court, etc. (HK$)	Kowloon–Canton Railway (HK$)	Land sales (HK$)	Licences and internal revenue not otherwise specified (HK$)
1898		225,357		133,319	1,459,096
1899		240,084		617,825	1,559,388
1900		285,386		816,223	1,847,273
1901		284,453		240,315	2,270,146
1902		296,709		571,361	2,600,521
1903		352,719		510,166	2,849,936
1904		403,855		486,099	4,509,163
1905		417,417		392,260	4,725,906
1906		470,152		412,941	4,765,228
1907		498,621		159,750	4,530,469
1908		514,790		69,358	4,154,969
1909		538,905		31,596	4,281,133
1910		711,025	25,613	62,686	4,520,428
1911		742,698	153,735	270,006	4,792,952
1912		785,535	251,972	163,785	5,371,420
1913		711,535	325,115	292,286	5,510,561
1914		727,778	381,313	265,186	7,979,440
1915		697,080	316,696	94,278	9,075,359
1916		864,964	366,216	349,572	10,564,180
1917		934,836	428,246	161,014	11,770,514
1918		913,794	433,274	299,289	15,201,189
1919		1,013,208	490,093	263,960	12,865,534
1920		1,126,567	520,176	556,349	10,325,919
1921		1,194,674	603,981	1,634,098	11,644,244
1922		1,412,027	710,296	2,721,804	14,681,056
1923		1,601,281	474,722	3,488,797	16,123,980
1924		1,659,524	420,186	1,909,236	16,701,771
1925		1,571,610	432,847	570,243	17,029,004
1926		1,488,587	538,045	286,342	14,020,851
1927		1,789,799	713,425	143,683	15,248,635
1928		1,945,215	820,995	1,635,236	15,081,430
1929		1,864,955	890,745	1,936,171	14,900,565
1930		2,113,862	973,129	2,864,897	16,169,266
1931		2,621,426	1,095,099	3,177,808	20,934,568
1932	6,597,852	2,296,228	1,295,789	1,370,658	16,503,770
1933	5,833,467	2,210,464	1,630,611	972,861	16,664,799
1934	5,707,389	2,214,627	1,639,775	558,473	14,662,797
1935	5,173,837	2,076,322	1,411,675	244,957	13,781,703
1936	6,928,672	2,261,116	1,245,469	269,231	13,837,183
1937	7,625,411	2,660,076	1,297,940	528,464	14,192,268
1938	9,105,122	2,787,488	1,782,288	1,199,510	15,098,620
1939	11,156,449	3,131,871	912,905	2,139,819	16,454,986
1940	18,261,611	9,049,732	935,356	1,532,438	3,302,879
Total	76,389,810	59,843,397	22,626,982	34,468,179	419,664,534

Note: Details of water revenue for the following years: 1898 ($112,733); 1899 ($126,559); 1900 ($151,035); 1901 ($169,120); 1902 ($171,950); 1903 ($235,960); 1904 ($65,948) and 1905 ($90,022); as well as taxes ($9,229,852), war

revenue ($8,582,730) and water revenue ($2,993,098) for the year 1940 are not shown in this table.

Source: ‘Revenue and Expenditure of Hong Kong for the Year . . .’, Hong Kong Blue Book, Hong Kong, Noronha & co., 1898–1940.

Light dues and light dues (special assessment)

(HK$)

Interest and miscellaneous receipts (HK$)

Post Office (HK$)

Rent of government property, land and houses

(HK$)

Total for the year (HK$)

51,645	197,716	337,180	401,114	2,918,160
52,407	261,484	317,909	434,487	3,610,143
55,379	238,910	325,603	482,777	4,202,586
58,376	280,101	355,913	555,470	4,213,894
66,107	235,075	387,066	572,286	4,901,075
74,960	184,567	414,867	615,683	5,238,858
72,330	174,873	408,459	688,321	6,809,048
74,234	131,565	414,838	672,162	6,918,404
77,722	61,815	420,454	826,699	7,035,011
80,389	77,982	445,421	809,648	6,602,280
79,976	89,592	412,432	783,092	6,104,209
172,811	533,911	444,047	820,564	6,822,967
181,968	107,700	519,067	832,382	6,960,869
175,380	122,004	399,217	841,239	7,497,231
185,904	147,294	401,054	873,733	8,180,697
198,297	136,845	439,189	898,480	8,512,308
194,066	124,416	398,426	936,648	11,007,273
168,484	129,260	371,081	933,869	11,786,107
162,478	148,380	410,931	966,667	13,833,388
148,467	231,781	427,687	955,560	15,058,105
115,923	239,947	451,586	1,010,246	18,665,248
158,518	231,338	460,893	1,041,431	16,524,975
196,835	359,077	541,295	1,063,455	14,689,673
222,127	606,905	663,914	1,158,189	17,728,132
241,166	696,946	695,655	1,132,117	22,291,067
288,554	861,461	761,120	1,183,847	24,783,762
316,328	1,113,604	825,352	1,263,637	24,209,638
265,444	1,417,269	725,246	1,232,704	23,244,367
238,199	2,528,220	766,540	1,264,799	21,131,583
291,142	983,671	890,947	1,283,235	21,344,537
303,842	2,883,624	966,918	1,331,139	24,968,399
319,126	1,227,715	1,003,665	1,411,533	23,554,475
329,313	2,450,903	1,375,207	1,541,896	27,818,473
658,337	1,035,604	2,035,939	1,587,942	33,146,723
	1,992,861	1,964,593	1,527,965	33,549,716
	1,391,151	1,883,655	1,512,270	32,099,278
	1,313,404	1,829,298	1,648,524	29,574,287
	2,335,800	1,759,660	1,646,596	28,430,550
	1,809,453	2,058,886	1,632,974	30,042,984
	1,911,963	3,254,396	1,725,849	33,196,367
	1,945,583	2,918,029	1,899,215	36,735,855
	2,517,156	3,120,759	2,044,107	41,478,052
	9,018,823	4,439,280	2,829,315	70,175,114
5,957,108	43,260,034	42,440,009	47,462,333	774,041,393

It was a challenge for the government to resume land in the New Territories. The rural communities and religions of the indigenous New Territories resi- dents were significantly different from those in the city. The concept of feng shui was important in traditional Chinese society, and it was common for people to oppose development plans based on feng shui and clan customs.59 Such disputes persisted.60 When the colonial government leased the New Territories in 1899, it negotiated with two Qing officials: Tan Zhonglin (1822–1905), then Viceroy of Guangdong and Guangxi provinces, and Lu Chuanlin (1836–1910), then Inspector-General of Guangdong. In October 1899, the Hong Kong government published a notice in the Government Gazette to inform indigenous New Territories residents that the Qing gov- ernment and the United Kingdom had come to an agreement on four main points:61

Indigenous residents were to be treated well.
Houses and land were not to be forcibly resumed.
Ancestral graves on leased land were never to be moved.
Local customs and traditions were to remain unchanged in accordance with the wishes of indigenous residents.

It was evident from the notice that the Qing government understood that indigenous residents greatly valued burial grounds, but it seemed that the colo- nial government was unaware of the importance of burial grounds to them when it developed the New Territories. The colonial government implemented the registration of land but not burial grounds. In the early twentieth century, some villagers were shocked to find their ancestral graves had been demol- ished when they visited the graves in the Ching Ming Festival and the Chung Yeung Festival. In 1909, the government started to register burial grounds in order to prevent future disputes. Indigenous residents had to register at the Tai Po Land Court if they wished to construct, maintain or repair burial grounds. The registration fee for new graves and old graves was 50 cents and 25 cents respectively.62 In spite of registrations, the government did not guarantee that burial grounds would not be resumed for development. As a result, disputes over burial grounds persisted.

It was particularly difficult to develop remote areas. Apart from respecting the customs of New Territories residents, the government also had to over- come geographical challenges. It needed to allocate large amounts of human and other resources to improve the shortcomings of the geographical envi- ronment so that the land would be suitable for development, while the scale and pace of investment also had to be carefully planned. Excessively rapid

59 CO129/494, ‘The Land Resumption in the New Territories’, 4 October 1926, p.28.

60 ‘Report of the New Territories’, Hong Kong Administrative Reports, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1911, p.I3.

61 Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 7 October 1899, p.1599.

62 Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 7 May 1909, p.260.

development would place an undue burden on transport and ancillary facilities of neighbouring areas.

Market response was another aspect of which the government had to be mindful. Owing to a continuously growing population and a lack of land, market demand for land had been increasing since the nineteenth century. To get a head start, speculators often acted before the government announced the areas to be developed. Active development of the New Territories also meant rising land prices. As rent rose along with the market price of properties, the livelihood of residents was greatly affected. The government could not and would not put an end to land speculation, as rising land prices in the newly developed areas could bring it higher profits. Nonetheless, the government could not shut its eyes to speculation either, since increased prices of undeveloped land would also affect the amount of compensation paid to indigenous residents on land resumption. Aware of increasing land prices, indigenous residents were unwill- ing to accept land exchange and compensation. Thus, plans to develop remote areas could not be implemented.63

When developing the New Territories the government not only had to face opposition from indigenous New Territories residents, but also had to make huge investments in infrastructure in the remote areas. However, the land was able to generate significant revenue for the government. After weighing the pros and cons of the two, the government felt that limiting urban expansion in the early twentieth century to New Kowloon near the Kowloon urban area was the best strategy.

New Kowloon

The region which we have come to know as Kowloon today included not only areas south of Boundary Street such as Tsim Sha Tsui, Yau Ma Tei, Mong Kok, Hung Hom and To Kwa Wan, but also Sham Shui Po, Lai Chi Kok, Cheung Sha Wan, Kowloon Tong, Kowloon City, Kowloon Bay, Ngau Tau Kok, Kwun Tong, Cha Kwo Ling and more. As required by the 1898 Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory, the Qing government leased the area north of Boundary Street and south of the Shenzhen River to the United Kingdom with a lease period of 99 years. Thus, the aforementioned areas north of Boundary Street and Kowloon mountain range with an elevation of 500 feet (152.4 metres) above sea level should be a part not of Kowloon but of the New Territories. Why did these areas belong to the New Territories initially but Kowloon later on? When did the government begin to have the idea of including them as part of Kowloon? How did the government’s decision affect overall urban planning in twentieth-century Hong Kong?

It was obvious that the government wanted to expand the Kowloon urban area, but how was it able to include areas that used to be a part of the New Territories as Kowloon? To do so, it was necessary to change the name first.

63 CO129/494, ‘The Land Resumption in the New Territories’, 4 October 1926, pp.31–32.

In 1900, that is, the year after the New Territories was leased, the government established the New Kowloon district in an attempt to expand Kowloon. It was estimated that New Kowloon had an area of 15.7 square miles,64 which had much more potential for development than the mere 3-square-mile Kowloon.

In 1900, the government pointed out in the report on the New Territories that the land south of the Kowloon mountain range, with Lei Yue Mun to the east and Lai Chi Kok to the west, should not come under the jurisdiction of the Local Communities Ordinance, 1899, as the area bordered British Kowloon. Unlike the case in other districts in the New Territories, residents in that area were more familiar with the Hong Kong colonial government’s legal system, police force, sanitary regulations, and so on.65 In the same year, the government promulgated Ordinance No. 8 of 1900,66 giving the name New Kowloon to the area south of the Kowloon mountain range (Beacon Hill and Lion Rock), with Lei Yue Mun to the east, Lai Chi Kok to the west and Boundary Street to the south. After Governor Henry A. Blake signed the Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory, not only did he propose the concept of New Kowloon in writing, but the Hong Kong government also produced maps on 9 January 1900 that explicitly grouped New Kowloon under Kowloon’s urban area.67 The boundaries of New Kowloon on the 1900 map and the statutory maps pro- duced by the government in 1937 were similar, the only difference being that the north-eastern boundaries of New Kowloon were marked along the ridges of the Kowloon mountain range on the 1937 maps (see Figure 2.2), while on the 1900 map New Kowloon included Kau Lung Peak (i.e. Fei Ngor Shan) and Middle Hill, thus with more extensive planning. Such boundaries were still adopted in the 1960s. It can thus be seen that the concept of developing New Kowloon appeared before the comprehensive planning of Kowloon in the 1920s; the idea of expanding the Kowloon urban area dated back to as early as 1900.

On 20 November 1906, the government conducted a by-census on the pop- ulation of New Kowloon. It was estimated that there were 17,836 Chinese people in New Kowloon, the majority of whom were farmers, while the ratio

64 ‘Report on the Census of the Colony for 1931’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1931, p.99.

65 ‘Report on the New Territory’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1900, p.252.

66 ‘Ordinance No. 8 of 1900’, in John W. Carrington, The Ordinances of Hongkong, Prepared under the Authority of the Statute Laws (Revised Edition) Ordinance, 1900, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1900, p.625.

67 MPG 1/796. 1 item (enclosure 1 in despatch number 9 of 9 January 1900 from Governor Sir Henry A. Blake GCMG) extracted from CO129/297. ‘Map of Hong Kong and of the Territory Leased to Great Britain under the Convention between Great Britain and China Signed at Peking on the 9th of June 1898’ showing districts and sub-districts in different colours. Also shows part of Mainland China, with towns, roads, tram- ways, telegraphs, etc. Reference table. Heliozincographed at Ordnance Survey Office, Southampton, 1899. A MS note reads: ‘This map has been compiled from existing Intelligence Division maps of Hong Kong, Admiralty Charts and a map of the Sun On District compiled in 1866 from the observations of an Italian Missionary.’ 1899.

Source: Survey and Mapping Office of the Lands Department.

Figure 2.2 Statutory map of New Kowloon (1937)

between male adults and female adults was 54.3:45.7.68 The more populous vil- lages in New Kowloon included Kowloon City (5,394 people), Sham Shui Po (2,821 people), Cheung Sha Wan (831 people), Kowloon Tsai (761 people) and Kowloon Tong (703 people).69 In the 1911 population census, the gov- ernment deliberately separated New Kowloon from the New Territories and Kowloon and stated in detail the villages included in New Kowloon. New Kowloon was mainly divided into two large districts: Kowloon City District had a population of 7,306 and comprised Kowloon City, Tai Wan, Ngau Tau Kok, Sai Tso Wan, Lei Yue Mun and Cha Kwo Ling; Sham Shui Po District had a population of 6,318 and consisted of Sham Shui Po, So Uk, Wong Uk, Shek Kip Mei, Kowloon Tsai, Cheung Sha Wan, Ap Na Liu, West Point, Kowloon Tong and others.70 The total population in New Kowloon was only 13,624, which was 4,212 people down from the 1906 by-census. The government’s determination to develop New Kowloon was evident from its close monitoring of the region’s population.

Although New Kowloon was a comparatively large area located next to Boundary Street, most of it was rural area without convenient transport and far away from the southern tip of the Kowloon Peninsula or even the City of Victoria. Much of the land was abandoned hilly or low-lying areas infested by malaria-bearing mosquitoes. Land formation would require a great deal of human and other resources and time,71 but it appeared that the government was well prepared for the task. Not only was the area near Kowloon marked out to downplay the impression that it was part of the New Territories, but a series of civil engineering works was initiated to develop New Kowloon. In general, land formation would be carried out first in the area to be developed, followed by construction of roads and the transport network to connect the area with the city’s core districts. The earliest area to be developed in New Kowloon was Sham Shui Po Village in the west. Development then moved eastwards, with planning for areas such as Kowloon Tong, Kowloon City and Kowloon Bay carried out one by one.

Sham Shui Po Village

Sham Shui Po Village was a Hakka village that had a population of around 1,500 in 1899.72 It was evident from government records that the government first resumed private land in the area to construct roads. In 1902, construction works for Lai Chi Kok Road commenced in Sham Shui Po Village, which was

68 ‘Report on the Census of the Colony for 1906’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1906, p.261.

69 ‘Report on the Census of the Colony for 1906’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1906, p.276.

70 ‘Report on the Census of the Colony for 1911’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1911, p.39.

71 CO129/494, ‘The Land Resumption in the New Territories’, 4 October 1926, p.29.

72 ‘Extracts from Papers Relating to the Extension of the Colony of Hongkong’, Hong Kong Government Gazette, 8 April 1899, p.560.

followed by the establishment of government departments in the area, such as the Harbour Master complex and a police station. In 1903, the government made use of the Land Resumption Ordinance and resumed a large amount of land near Sham Shui Po from the indigenous residents, citing ‘public purpose’ as the reason. The residents were moved out from their villages through either mon- etary compensation or land exchange. The agricultural land was then replanned, and land formation works were carried out, which was followed by road plan- ning. The result of the planning in 1905 can be found today in the area north of Boundary Street around the then waterfront, the strip of land from Lai Chi Kok Road, Yen Chow Street and Cheung Sha Wan Road to Boundary Street. In that area, the likes of Kweilin Street, Pei Ho Street, Nam Cheong Street, Shek Kip Mei Street, Wong Chuk Street and Maple Street were perpendicular to Apliu Street, Yu Chau Street, Ki Lung Street and Tai Nan Street, forming a rectangular matrix.

The development of Sham Shui Po reached its peak in the 1910s. In 1912, the government started reclaiming land in the area. The project was implemented in two phases, including 5.03 acres (2 hectares) for phase 1 and 4.64 acres (1.9 hectares) for phase 2, totalling an area of 9.67 acres (3.9 hectares). Following reclamation, the land lots were reassigned new numbers. Road plan- ning was first conducted on the newly reclaimed land, which resulted in a neat network of streets that formed a rectangular matrix. In 1914, the government implemented the Sham Shui Po Improvement Scheme,73 offering to exchange newly reclaimed land for land owned by indigenous residents of Sham Shui Po Village to enable redevelopment.74 As the reclaimed land was fairly close to the original village, the scheme helped the residents to resolve problems that arose when they were forced to leave their village as a result of the new devel- opment plan. The newly reclaimed land was reorganised into 41 land lots, 25 of which were used for land exchange with the indigenous residents, including New Kowloon Inland Lot (NKIL) Nos 64, 68–72, 74, 103–105, 139, 152, 155,

159, 163, 172, 177, 179, 188, 205, 253, 265 and 304. The remaining lots of 26,

46–50, 75, 106–108, 110–113, 176 and 249 belonged to the government and were reserved for other purposes.

After the land planning, indigenous residents of Sham Shui Po Village moved to the newly developed area in five batches. The years and locations of land exchange with the indigenous residents as provided by government records reflected the government’s development priorities in Sham Shui Po District. In 1912, indigenous residents who lived closest to the then waterfront had their land exchanged first. In 1914, indigenous residents who lived near Boundary Street moved to the newly reclaimed area in groups. In 1916, residents who lived in the north of the village also had their land exchanged. (See Figure 2.3.) From 1918 onwards, the village was replanned after the indigenous residents had moved out. With streets and land lot numbers reorganised, the area had a

73 CO129/413, p.436.

74 ‘Report of the Director of Public Works for the Year 1912’, Hong Kong Administrative Reports, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., pp.60–61.

Source: ‘Report on the New territory during the First Year of British Administration’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & co., 1900, pp.271, 277.

Figure 2.3 Distribution and relocation of Sham Shui Po indigenous residents

new look. In 1920, land that was left after the land exchanges was sold by public auctions for private development. The government did not designate the land use in auctions, so investors interested in purchasing land could use the land as they wished. In the early twentieth century, buildings often had three storeys, with the ground floor used as a store and the upper floors as dwellings. Thus, Sham Shui Po District soon became a business-cum-residential area.

Lying in Tai Kok Tsui, Fuk Tsun Heung was located south of Sham Shui Po Village and was formerly a mountain range. The passage between Mong Kok and Sham Shui Po was blocked by mountain ranges. The government removed the hills in 1920,75 which not only improved the transport network connecting Sham Shui Po, but also released land to increase the area of land that could be developed. The rock material obtained from the cutting of hills could also be used for constructing roads. In 1921, the government improved Lai Chi Kok Road, which at the time was located on the waterfront, making it an impor- tant passage for heavy vehicles. In 1922, Lai Chi Kok Road was connected with Castle Peak Road, turning Sham Shui Po District into a hub connecting to north-western New Territories. To expand development space for Sham Shui Po, reclamation was carried out at Lai Chi Kok, which was situated on the water- front. Lai Chi Kok Road was able to reach Kowloon’s urban area directly. (See Table 2.5.)

Before development, the district only had a population of just over 1,500. In the 1921 population census, the government included Sham Shui Po in Kowloon’s Tai Kok Tsui District,76 thus merging Sham Shui Po District, which was originally part of New Kowloon, into Tai Kok Tsui. The population in the area grew to 30,000 in the 1920s. The population of Sham Shui Po and Tai Kok Tsui grew rapidly and reached 67,184 in 1931,77 of whom 37,512 were males and 29,672 were females. The government made handsome profits on the sales of land in Sham Shui Po, as it received not only land premiums, but also Crown rents. The planning of Sham Shui Po gave the government increased confidence to develop other areas in New Kowloon (see Table 2.6).

Kowloon Tong

Learning from the development experience of Sham Shui Po, the government in 1920 hoped to develop a comprehensive community with open spaces and other ancillary facilities, creating a healthy and comfortable living environment for the middle-income class. This was to encourage the middle class to stay in Hong Kong and work, at the same time alleviating the housing shortage in densely populated areas. The government provided a housing loan of 1 million

75 ‘Report of the Director of Public Works for the Year 1920’, Hong Kong Administrative Reports, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., p.Q61.

76 ‘Report on the Census of the Colony for 1921’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1921, p.173.

77 ‘Report on the Census of the Colony of Hong Kong, 1931’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1931, p.104.

94 · MAKING HONG KONG

Table 2.5 Development of Sham Shui Po District (1902–1926)

Year	Type of construction	Details	Cost (HK$)
1902	Road	construction of a road from Sham Shui po to Lai chi Kok	20,000
1903	Building	construction of the Harbour Master complex in Sham
		Shui po, the earliest government building
1903–1908	Land	Land formation works
	formation
1905	Building	construction of Sham Shui po police Station
1908	Building	Sold formed land to the chinese to construct housing
1909–1912	Reclama-	Reclamation on private land lots (NKIL 26, 27, 39, 41,
	tion	46–50) with a total area of 3.05 acres (1.23 hectares)
1911	Drainage	construction of drainage systems	4,374
1912	Road	construction of a temporary road from tai Kok tsui to
		Sham Shui po
1912–1914	Reclama-	the government began reclamation works: 5.03 acres	77,396
	tion	(2 hectares) for phase 1 and 4.64 acres (1.9 hectares)
		for phase 2
1914–1918	Road	construction of roads on newly reclaimed land
1914	public	Installation of street lamps
	facilities
1916	Road	construction of a road from Shanghai Street to Sham	12,500
		Shui po, which was 20 feet wide, 2,400 feet long and
1916–1918	Drainage	connected with major roads in Kowloon construction of sewage outfalls in the new lots
1918	Road	construction of a road from Sham Shui po to castle	16,888
		peak, with the Sham Shui po–Lai chi Kok section being
		1.48 miles long
1918–1920	Water-	Water supply systems in Kowloon reached Sham Shui po	30,415
	works	District. In September 1919, fresh water supply became
		available in the district. Water pipe laying works were
		completed in December 1920
1918–1926	Reclama-	Reclamation works involving an area of 65.24 acres	661,441
	tion	(26.4 hectares) commenced, of which 37.87 acres (15.3
		hectares) were to be used for housing. the project was
1918	Drainage	completed in July 1926 Expansion of the Nam cheong Street drainage system	3,713
1918	pier	from pei Ho Street to Yee Kuk Street Addition of ferry services to Yau Ma tei
1919	Drainage	Expansion of drains in Yen chow Street (from Yu chau	6,986
		Street to Apliu Street), in Yu chau Street (from Yen
		chau Street to Kweilin Street) and in Lai chi Kok Road
1920	public	(from Yen chau Street to Kweilin Street) public latrines were constructed at the junction of Apliu	10,511
	latrines	Street and Kweilin Street and the junction of Yee Kuk
		Street and pei Ho Street. construction was completed in 1921

Table 2.5 (continued)

Year Type of construction

Details Cost

(HK$)

1920 Levelling tai Kok tsui Hill

the hills in Fuk tsun Heung, which stood between tai Kok tsui and Sham Shui po, were levelled. this yielded an area of 42.9 acres (17.4 hectares), and the rock material obtained from the levelling of hills was used to construct tai po Road

325,174

1921 Building construction of the Sanitary Board’s temporary branch

at pei Ho Street

1924 Building Reconstruction of Sham Shui po police Station 1925 Road Improvement of roads in Sham Shui po District 1926 Building completion of Sham Shui po theatre

Sources: ‘Report of the Director of public Works for the Years 1899–1907’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & co., 1900–1908; ‘Report of the Director of public Works for the Years 1908–1925’, Hong Kong Administrative Reports, Hong Kong, Noronha & co., 1908–1925.

Hong Kong dollars to provide 11 bungalows and 29 flats on Hong Kong Island, 67 bungalows and 63 flats in Kowloon, and one bungalow in Fanling.78 Located north of Boundary Street near Tsim Sha Tsui,79 Kowloon Tong was a pilot trial of a comprehensive development model based on the British garden city.80 On 18 November 1920, Chief Secretary A.G.M. Fletcher estimated during a Legislative Council meeting that the monthly rent would be around 25 Hong Kong dollars in the Kowloon Tong residential area, which was tailored for the middle class.81 On 14 November 1921, Chief Secretary Claud Severn reiter- ated in a Legislative Council meeting that the houses in Kowloon Tong would provide low-rental properties.82 In the Legislative Council meeting held on 30 August 1923, Chief Secretary A.G.M. Fletcher stated that some of the houses would be reserved for Chinese and Portuguese senior clerks under the Kowloon Tong Development Project.83

The Kowloon Tong Development Project was also known as the Garden City Project, the concept of which originated from the book Tomorrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform written by British national Ebenezer Howard in 1899.84 The concept was further developed in Garden Cities of Tomorrow in 1902 and attracted much attention. The Garden City Association was estab- lished in 1899. In 1903, Garden City Co. Ltd established the first garden city.

78 Hong Kong Hansard, Hong Kong Government, 28 October 1920, p.51.

79 CO129/520/12, ‘Development of Kowloon Tong Estate’, 16 June 1930, p.10.

80 CO129/494, ‘Land Resumption in the New Territories’, 4 October 1926, p.56.

81 Hong Kong Hansard, Hong Kong Government, 18 November 1920, p.75.

82 Hong Kong Hansard, Hong Kong Government, 14 November 1921, p.174.

83 Hong Kong Hansard, Hong Kong Government, 30 August 1923, p.78.

84 Ebenezer Howard, Tomorrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform, London, Swan Sonnenschein, 1899.

Table 2.6 List of reserve prices and areas in public auctions of Sham Shui Po District (1906–1941)

Year	Lot registry no.	Area (sq. ft)	Upset price	Mean of the	Average price per
			(HK$)	total value of	sq. ft of the land
				the average price	sales (HK$)
				per sq. ft of the
				respective lots
				(HK$)
1906	New Kowloon Inland (NKI) Lot Nos 26, 27	33,810	1,973	0.11	17.14
1914	Survey District 4 Lot No. 1025	1,300	39	0.03	33.33
1920	NKI Lot No. 311	7,887	3,944	0.50	2.00
1921	NKI Lot Nos 323, 333, 337–339, 340, 341, 350	30,026	3012.75	0.71	9.97
1922	NKI Lot Nos 366, 367, 391, 419	149,492	39,848	0.90	3.75
1923	NKI Lot Nos 465, 480	6,327	6,327	2.00	1.00
1924	NKI Lot Nos 570, 583, 636	12,634	12,907	3.08	0.98
1925	NKI Lot No. 991	1,725	5,175	3.00	0.33
1927	NKI Lot No. 1111	5,400	8,100	1.50	0.67
1928	NKI Lot Nos 1122–1123, 1133–1135, 1137–1138, 1143, 1148–1155,	137,561	7,345	1.39	18.73
	1166–1168, 1170, 1184–1185, 1187, 1190, 1193, 1196–1197
1929	NKI Lot Nos 1199, 1202–1205, 1207, 1215, 1218, 1246–1248, 1254,	165,072	9,460	1.47	17.45
	1262, 1268, 1273–1276, 1280–1281, 1284–1285, 1290–1291, 1297
1930	NKI Lot Nos 1299, 1304, 1317–1318, 1327–1328, 1340, 1374, 1387,	194,038	9,576	1.31	20.26
	1395, 1398, 1403, 1406, 1408, 1409, 1412–1415, 1421–1423, 1425,
	1428, 1434–1435, 1441–1442

1931	NKI Lot Nos 1445, 1447, 1460–1461, 1477–1479, 1488–1489, 1492,	192,645	18,358	1.96	10.49
	1500, 1518, 1545, 1556–1559, 1566, 1631, 1664
1932	NKI Lot Nos 1664, 1870, 1889, 1900, 1922–1923, 1927, 1941, 2001,	81,148	21,945	2.77	3.70
	2013, 2014
1933	NKI Lot Nos 2032, 2092, 2175	18,772	16,075	2.67	1.17
1934	NKI Lot Nos 1974, 2263	3,718	5,298	2.75	0.70
1936	NKI Lot Nos 2503, 2506	86,100	26,933	1.33	3.20
1937	NKI Lot Nos 2593, 2601	9,555	10,750	1.69	0.89
1938	NKI Lot Nos 2625, 2627, 2630, 3631, 3632	19,755	9,759	0.49	2.02
1939	NKI Lot Nos 2667, 2680, 2715, 2729, 2749	30,795	10,875	1.95	2.83
1940	NKI Lot Nos 2770, 2774, 2785, 2790, 2791, 2793, 2798, 2803, 2810,	110,398	12,953	1.53	8.52
	2820–2821, 2827, 2830
1941	NKI Lot No. 2850	14,870	22,305	1.50	0.67

Total area of land sold over the years 1,313,028

Total upset prices of land sales over the years 1,995,617

Sources: ‘Report of the Director of public Works for the Years 1906–1907’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & co., 1907–1908; ‘Report of the Director of public Works for the Years 1908–1941’, Hong Kong Administration Reports, Hong Kong, Noronha & co., 1908–1941.

Aiming to preserve the concept of country life of the traditional Victorian era, Howard turned Letchworth, with a total area of 3,822 acres (1,547.9 hectares) and just 35 miles (56,327 metres) away from London’s industrial and com- mercial development zone, into a town that catered for industries and provided local job opportunities, as well as appropriate community life. The houses had gardens, and there were sufficient open space and areas for community activi- ties. It was also a medium-sized industrial and commercial town with green belts. With convenient transport and a population capacity of 35,000 people, the town was most effective in diverting population from the urban areas. Howard’s concept combined a twentieth-century urban lifestyle that facili- tated economic and societal development with a humanised country lifestyle. The concept adopted by Letchworth was acclaimed in Europe and the United States, with many countries striving to follow suit.85 The geographical condi- tions of Kowloon Tong were similar to those of Letchworth and thus had much potential for development.

In 1921, the government planned to invite the private sector to bid for the development of Kowloon Tong. In 1922, Kowloon Tong and New Territories Development Co. was invited by the Hong Kong government to develop a bun- galow residential area near Kowloon Tong Railway Station. The residential area was designed to have schools and sufficient open spaces to cater for the sala- ried class. In 1923, the government resumed 137 pieces of land to develop the area; compensation paid for land resumption amounted to 58,000 Hong Kong dollars. In 1926, it allocated 9.11 acres (3.7 hectares) of land to the Kowloon Tong Garden City Project. Combined with the earlier allocation, the project was given a total of 54.43 acres (22 hectares) of land,86 which was 38.54 acres (15.6 hectares) more than the original plan of 15.81 acres (6.4 hectares) in 1921.87

Owing to the comparatively high elevation of the area, one of the major challenges of developing a comprehensive community in Kowloon Tong was solving the issues of water supply and sewerage systems. As a result, drainage works in Kowloon Tong involved a great deal of human and other resources. Another technical problem to overcome was the excavation of soil from the hills in Kowloon Tong to create land. In 1924, the quantity of soil excavated reached 430,000 cubic yards, with another 250,000 cubic yards excavated in 1925. Most of the excavated soil was placed in low-lying areas88 for land formation purposes. On the other hand, nullahs had to be constructed and sewerage pipes laid in the eastern part of the area,89 while streams in the hilly area north of Kowloon

85 Ebenezer Howard, Garden Cities of Tomorrow, London, Faber and Faber, 1902, 1964 reprint, p.24.

86 ‘Report of the Director of Public Works for the Year 1926’, Hong Kong Administrative Reports, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1927, Appendix Q, Q 105.

87 Hongkong Telegraph, 5 August 1921.

88 ‘Report of the Director of Public Works for the Year 1926’, Hong Kong Administrative Reports, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1927, Appendix Q, Q 105.

89 ‘Report of the Director of Public Works for the Year 1922’, Hong Kong Administrative Reports, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1923, Appendix Q, Q 200.

Table 2.7 Total investment of the Kowloon Tong Garden City Plan (1922–1930)

	HK$
Excavation and fill	372,552
Sewers	120,149
Stormwater drains	158,764
Surfacing roads, etc.	102,271
Extension of roads at Kowloon tsai	39,870
connection of streams east side of estate to main nullah	16,000 (estimated)
connection of stream north of hill area to main nullah	67,668
Sidewall and invert of nullah, east side	191,907
total	1,069,181

Source: ‘Report of Director of public Works’, Hong Kong Administrative Reports, Hong Kong, Noronha & co., 1927–1930, Appendix Q.

Tong had to be connected with the nullahs. Plans for the project also had to be approved.

In 1921, the Public Works Department invited tenders for land formation works,90 and the works were undertaken by Li Hing & Bros. Unfortunately, the seamen’s strike in 1922 and the Canton–Hong Kong strike in 1925 resulted in an economic downturn that adversely affected property prices. Although the developer had actively marketed the project and asked for the government’s approval to accept deposits in advance, land formation works were affected by the strikes and could not be finished on time, thus delaying the project.91 On 4 November 1929, the government signed contract No. 62 of 1929 with Keng Tak Cheong to enable the works to continue.92

It is evident from the detailed expenditure records of the Kowloon Tong Garden City Project (see Table 2.7) that land formation and drainage facilities accounted for a major portion of the costs.

The British garden city project hoped to maintain a country lifestyle in which every household had an independent house and private garden. While other cities were keen to develop the apartment model, the planning of garden cities placed much emphasis on the quality of living. The geographical location and environment of Kowloon Tong Garden City in Hong Kong seemingly met the conditions set by Howard, so both the general public and the developer were confident in the success of the project during its early stage of development, believing that purchasing the properties at cost and reselling them later would generate substantial profits.93 Unfortunately, the seamen’s strike of 1922 and the 1925 Canton–Hong Kong strike led to an economic downturn in Hong Kong, resulting in falling property prices and defaults by individual property

90 Hongkong Telegraph, 5 August 1921.

91 CO129/520/12, ‘Development Kowloon Tong Estate’, 11 December 1929 – 1 August 1930.

92 ‘Report of the Director of Public Works for the Year 1929’, Hong Kong Administrative Reports, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1930, Appendix Q, Q 97.

93 China Mail, 24 May 1924.

owners and hence the bankruptcy of the land developer.94 On 4 November 1926, Director of Public Works H.T. Creasy stated during a Legislative Council meeting that the government was expected to earn 10,000 Hong Kong dollars from Crown rents and 20,000 Hong Kong dollars from rates and other taxes upon the completion of the Kowloon Tong Project. Unfortunately, the govern- ment was unable to collect Crown rents as anticipated.95

Land prices rose after the strikes. As the completed Kowloon Tong residen- tial area imitated the British garden city model, houses had gardens and were larger than those in the urban areas. As a result, they were worth much more than expected. In 1923, the typical monthly rent for a unit in a Wan Chai tene- ment building with one bedroom and one living room was around 8 Hong Kong dollars.96 In 1930, a bungalow in Kowloon Tong was worth over 10,000 Hong Kong dollars. Using an annual interest rate of 4 per cent, the monthly rent for a bungalow would be over 200 Hong Kong dollars, which was only affordable to the upper-middle class. Moreover, the area did not offer suitable jobs for the grassroots. The building of ancillary facilities in Kowloon Tong only began after the mid-1920s, and included primary and secondary schools run by religious bodies such as Diocesan Boys’ School, Maryknoll Convent School and La Salle College, along with public open space such as Essex Crescent Rest Garden and religious facilities such as St Teresa’s Church. Construction of facilities in the area was yet to be finished when the houses were completed. The facilities were unable to meet the daily needs of the new population. The houses were unsuit- able for the ordinary middle class; they were even criticised by labour groups when they were released.

The Kowloon Tong Garden City failed to realise Ebenezer Howard’s concept of a comprehensive community. Besides being impacted by Hong Kong’s politi- cal and economic environment at the time, high land prices meant that the middle class in Hong Kong could only afford a much smaller living space rela- tive to their counterparts in Britain. Nonetheless, the Garden City’s beautiful environment attracted a considerable number of upper-middle-class residents and immediately turned Kowloon Tong into an upmarket residential area, making people forget Kowloon Tong’s location disadvantage as part of the New Territories. Even to this day, most of the general public think that Kowloon Tong is part of Kowloon’s urban areas, and few know that it originally belonged to the remote New Territories.

Extending the lease of the New Territories

The New Territories, which began to develop in the early twentieth century (and was then called New Kowloon), greatly boosted the overall development of Hong Kong. By the 1920s, the area was no longer limited to investments

94 Hongkong Telegraph, 7 November 1930, p.10.

95 CO129/520/12, ‘Development of Kowloon Tong Estate’,16 June 1930, pp.11–12.

96 ‘Report of the Housing Commission’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1923, p.114.

by private enterprises. It was also home to important large-scale infrastruc- ture such as Kai Tak Airport, the Shek Lei Pui Reservoir and the Shing Mun Reservoir. Vibrant trading activities made Hong Kong an all-round economic hub in the Asia-Pacific region, playing a vital role as Britain sought to estab- lish its power in the Pacific.97 On the other hand, the political environment in China had become increasingly unstable since the mid-1920s. In 1927, the Kuomintang government carried out a purge; important officials of the Kuomintang government (such as Hu Hanmin), key figures of the Communist Party and subordinates of Zhang Xueliang became active in Hong Kong. Meanwhile, border issues and disputes were frequent with the neighbouring Xin’an County, which led to a request by the county and five commanders of the Western region to redefine the borders of Shenzhen.98 In 1928, the British Foreign Office expressed concerns about the future of Hong Kong follow- ing the expiry of the lease of the New Territories in 1997, but it did not dare to ask China for an extension of the lease in light of the then circumstances. According to a confidential document of the British Colonial Office which was declassified in 2006, the Foreign Office attempted to offer Weihaiwei in exchange for the New Territories on 8 July 1929. However, Britain did not dare to propose it, as China was firm in upholding territorial integrity, while Britain feared that the request might bring up again the long-shelved issue of sovereignty over Hong Kong.99

In the 1920s and 1930s, a number of Hong Kong governors had secretly discussed the future of Hong Kong with the British Colonial Office. All of them suggested that the British government should negotiate with China for an extension of the lease of the New Territories, or even purchase it with a large sum of money. Such views would still be considered avant-garde nowadays. On 8 November 1928, Governor C. Clementi wrote to the British Colonial Office to discuss the issues concerning the lease. He was the first Hong Kong Governor to propose an extension of the lease, on the ground that the private sector’s desire to invest in Hong Kong had been significantly undermined by the lease period, which hindered the development pros- pects of Hong Kong. He took the initiative to bring up the matter with the Colonial Office and stated the pros and cons. Unfortunately, the Colonial Office delayed meeting with him, claiming that the Colonial Secretary was overseas. After repeated applications, Governor Clementi was finally able to meet Colonial Secretary Victor Wellesley on 28 November 1928. The closed-door meeting was held in Wellesley’s office to discuss extending the lease of the New Territories. It was also attended by Gilbert Grindle, Walter

D. Ellis, Sydney Caine, John Pratt and Frank Ashton-Gwatkin. Clementi told the attendees that the colony generally consisted of three parts: Hong Kong Island, Old Kowloon and New Kowloon. New Kowloon was leased, while Hong Kong Island in the south was almost fully developed. Although New

97 CO129/526/15, ‘Memorandum of Kowloon and the New Territories’, 12 November 1930, p.4.

98 Kung Ping Po (Fair Daily), 13 August 1928.

99 CO129/571/16, ‘New Territories’, 1938.

Kowloon in the north had space for development, the expiry of the lease in 1997 had deterred private investors. The Governor hoped that Britain would negotiate with China and propose an extension of the lease period. At the meeting, Victor Wellesley and other British officials unanimously felt that it was beyond Britain’s power to extend the lease of the New Territories, and such a move might stir up China’s suspicion that Britain wanted to perma- nently annex Hong Kong, which would lead to intervention by the League of Nations. The people of China would then accuse Britain of invading Chinese territory. All the attendees of the meeting suggested that the Governor lease out land in New Kowloon on a short-term basis and state that the leases could be renewed at the end of the lease period.100 Clementi’s suggestion was not accepted, and his efforts were futile.

In 1930, Clementi’s successor, W. Peel, did not give up on solving the lease issue of the New Territories. Peel was also aware that an extension of the lease would involve China’s territorial sovereignty, and the matter was thus very sensitive. To avoid erroneous speculations, Peel decided not to disclose the matter to the League of Nations for the time being and only discussed it pri- vately with Grindle of the Colonial Office. On 10 November 1930, Peel wrote a private letter to Wellesley explaining the importance of the New Territories to the overall development of Hong Kong. The Kowloon Peninsula was only 1,616 yards from Hong Kong Island and could be reached by a boat ride of just a few minutes from Central. Visitors travelling between Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula reached 100,000 in the first half of 1930. Kowloon developed rapidly following the Hong Kong government’s recent investments.101

The functions of Kowloon and the New Territories could be divided into four different aspects: civilian, military, maritime and air transport. The civil- ian aspect covered housing, public services and commerce. Although most Europeans lived on Victoria Peak, the area was saturated and had little suitable land left for residential development. Outbreaks of tuberculosis in the core dis- trict in recent times raised concerns about how easily bacteria could spread in the overcrowded City of Victoria. Kowloon was not far away from Hong Kong Island. As a suburb of the core district, it possessed the qualities to be devel- oped into a residential area. There were a number of public services and facili- ties in Kowloon, such as hotels, youth hostels, the Salvation Army, the Royal Observatory and a prison. Moreover, the New Territories was an important source of fresh water for Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula, as there were large reservoirs in the New Territories. As for commerce, Kowloon was home to important foreign firms such as Hong Kong and Kowloon Wharf and Godown Co. Ltd, the Standard Oil Co., Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co. and C.P.R. Holt’s Co.

Militarywise, the Convention signed on 9 June 1898 stated that, as Kowloon

100 CO129/507/6, ‘China – Position of New Territories’, 8 November 1928.

101 CO129/580/6, ‘New Territories’, 26 January 1939, p.2.

had defence and military purposes, the New Territories, which bordered China, served as an important buffer zone between Hong Kong’s urban areas and China. The New Territories was therefore strategically important in the protection and defence of the colony.102 For the maritime aspect, 23 acres (9.3 hectares) of land was used by the navy for facilities such as warehouses, barracks, shipyards, oil depots, coal depots and typhoon shelters. Hong Kong Island alone was no longer able to provide sufficient land for the military. As for air transport, Kai Tak Airport was developed in the 1920s and served as an important window for transport with the outside world. Kowloon City was chosen as the site for Kai Tak Airport, an area north of Boundary Street that was also part of the New Territories. Available for both military and civil- ian use,103 the airport was vital for enhancing the economic development and international status of Hong Kong. The New Territories was the hinterland of the core district, providing land and food resources. Peel felt that, if Kowloon and the New Territories were to be returned to China, Britain might as well completely give up on Hong Kong. It would disappoint many people who trusted Britain after the government had invested so much in the early twen- tieth century. Peel thus strongly advocated extending the lease of the New Territories.104

Clementi’s and Peel’s proposals showed that since the 1920s the Hong Kong government had been highly concerned with the future of Hong Kong after 1997. Both believed that Britain would not be able to control the future of Hong Kong if the New Territories were to be returned to China in 1997, seriously affecting its status in the Asia-Pacific region. As the Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937, Britain felt it needed to wait and see how the war between the Kuomintang government and Japan turned out before making a decision.

On 26 January 1939, Governor G. Northcote wrote another confiden- tial letter to the British Colonial Office and brought up again what Governor Clementi discussed in 1928: the extension of the lease of the New Territories. On 13 April 1938, Governor Northcote suggested that money be used to solve the concerns about the need to return the New Territories to China in 1997, as the New Territories was critical to the economic development and defence of Hong Kong. Northcote suggested purchasing the New Territories from China, which desperately needed foreign financial aid in the midst of the war, so as not to miss the opportunity of negotiation in the future.105 As the end of the lease period, 1997, drew closer, China would take an increasingly tough atti- tude towards lease extension, and Britain would have to pay China a higher price for the purchase of the New Territories.106 After discussing an appropriate price with experts, the Hong Kong government suggested spending 20 million pounds sterling to acquire the New Territories from China. If China was unwill-

102 CO129/526/15, ‘Memorandum of Kowloon and the New Territories’, 12 November 1930, p.3.

103 CO129/571/16, ‘New Territories’, 26 April 1938, pp.3–4.

104 CO129/580/6, ‘New Territories’, 26 January 1939, p.2.

105 CO129/571/16, ‘New Territories’, 26 April 1938, p.4.

106 CO129/580/6, ‘New Territories’, 6 January 1939, pp.2–3.

ing to sell it, then the Hong Kong government could ask China to consider extending the lease by 100 years.107

In 1939, the British government decided against purchasing the New Territories from China. It felt that it was not yet an appropriate time to negoti- ate extending the lease of the New Territories unless the situation in the Far East changed.108 There were three main reasons why Britain gave up its inten- tion to acquire the New Territories from China. First, the purchase price of 20 million pounds sterling was too expensive. As the political situation was still uncertain, no one knew if China would lose the war and whether the new regime in China would recognise the treaties that the Kuomintang govern- ment signed with other countries. Second, the purchase of the New Territories resulted in the provision of financial aid to China, which might antagonise Japan and cause a political crisis. Should Japan succeed in establishing a puppet regime in southern China, Britain, which held the sovereignty over the New Territories, would have to declare war on Japan, and victory could not be assured. In the midst of the war, Britain might not be able to keep Hong Kong even though it had sovereignty over it. Third, China’s slogan during the Sino- Japanese War was to safeguard its territorial integrity and stand against inva- sion by foreign countries. If Britain proposed negotiating the purchase of the New Territories, it might be accused of taking advantage of Japan’s invasion of China and attract adverse public opinion, especially from the United States.109 Britain’s 20 million pounds sterling investment might ultimately fail to achieve its purpose. In the end, Britain decided to give up on negotiating for the pur- chase of the New Territories.

The importance of the New Territories to the overall development of Hong Kong was evident from the attempts by several governors to extend its lease. The development in Hong Kong, which was then only made up of the Kowloon Peninsula and Hong Kong Island, had reached its limit. What the British people needed was no longer just a small trading place for a temporary stay but an infor- mation and commercial centre in the Asia-Pacific region.

Infrastructure

In the first half of the twentieth century, important infrastructure such as large piers, the railway terminus and the airport districts was located in districts on the Kowloon Peninsula such as Tsim Sha Tsui and Kowloon City, while Chinese traders were active in the area around Yau Ma Tei.

Kowloon–Canton Railway terminus

The idea of constructing the Kowloon–Canton Railway first came about in 1864 as British engineer Rowland MacDonald Stephenson and M.A. MacLeod,

107 CO129/571/16, ‘New Territories’, 4 August 1938, p.2.

108 CO129/580/6, ‘New Territories’, 26 January 1939, p.2.

109 CO129/571/16, ‘New Territories’, 4 August 1938, pp.1–2.

a partner of Jardine, Matheson & Co., attempted to construct a railway network in China, with part of it running from Guangzhou to Kowloon. The proposal was openly discussed in the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce on 7 March 1864. Companies in Hong Kong hesitated over the immense scale of the project, and the proposal was shelved as a result. In the 1890s, Western powers were vying for interests in China, and the proposal of building the Kowloon–Canton Railway was put on the agenda again. On 28 March 1899, China and Britain signed an agreement on the construction of the railway. In 1899, P.T. Somerville Large drafted the first survey report for the railway and proposed that the terminus be located at Blackhead’s Point in Tsim Sha Tsui, Kowloon. In the summer of 1904, a consensus was reached between China and Britain, with the Hong Kong government responsible for the building, funding and operation of the Shenzhen–Kowloon section of the Kowloon– Canton Railway.

In 1905, the Viceroy of Hubei and Hunan signed a loan agreement of

million pounds sterling with Britain in Wuchang to redeem the rights to operate the Canton–Hankow Railway. The Wuchang government agreed to repay the loan over ten years at an interest rate of 4.5 per cent per annum. Britain signed the loan agreement with the Wuchang government in the name of the Hong Kong government, which in turn received over 110,000 pounds sterling from the Wuchang government’s repayment each year. The British government allowed the Hong Kong government to defer handing over the sums. Loan repayments by the Chinese side for the Canton–Hankow Railway were thus used by the Hong Kong government to build the Hong Kong section of the Kowloon–Canton railway.110 In 1905, the Hong Kong government assigned J.C. Bruce of the Public Works Department to lead the survey team and complete the preliminary survey. Designed to cross five tunnels and 48 bridges, the 22.25-mile-long railway had a construction cost of 5 million Hong Kong dollars.111 The sum included the construction of a railway terminus on reclaimed land in Kowloon’s Tsim Sha Tsui, as proposed by William Chatham, Director of Public Works. The Kowloon–Canton Railway was completed in 1910 and formally opened in October. The total costs for the construction of the railway were around 12.3 million Hong Kong dollars (equivalent to 75,000 pounds sterling per mile), representing an overrun of 146 per cent over the original estimates.112
Even though the railway had opened, the government’s plan to build the Kowloon terminus in Tsim Sha Tsui was still only in an early stage. Several issues were involved in the construction of the Kowloon–Canton terminus in Tsim Sha Tsui:

110 Robert J. Philips, Kowloon–Canton Railway (British Section), Hong Kong, Urban Council, 1990, pp.15–23.
111 Robert J. Philips, Kowloon–Canton Railway (British Section), Hong Kong, Urban Council, 1990, pp.27–28.
112 Robert J. Philips, Kowloon–Canton Railway (British Section), Hong Kong, Urban Council, 1990, p.31.
1. Taking into account cargo and passenger flows, it would be better for the railway terminus to be located at the waterfront. Most of the marine lots around Tsim Sha Tsui, on the southern tip of the Kowloon Peninsula, were already privately owned. The government had to reach agreement with the owners of the original marine lots and offer appropriate com- pensation to those affected by construction works, such as through land exchange or monetary compensation.
2. The government had to carry out reclamation to increase the area of land on the waterfront.
3. The risks associated with the construction were quite high, as the concept of the terminus was based on the situation after reclamation, which was pure speculation.113
It was determined at the end of 1909 that reclamation works in Hung Hom would require 5 million cubic feet of fill. The government planned to construct the Tsim Sha Tsui terminus on Marine Lot Nos 618 and 1140. It proposed a land swap with what was then known as ‘match factory lots’, part of the newly reclaimed land located next to lots owned by the China Light & Power Co., so that the compensation would be limited to buildings only.114 Reclamation works were undertaken by contractors in September 1910, but the motion to construct the railway terminus in Tsim Sha Tsui was not formally passed until 1912. A warehouse near the Tsim Sha Tsui Marine Police Headquarters that used to belong to Hong Kong and Kowloon Wharf and Godown Co. Ltd was leased and converted into a temporary station.115 Located at Hung Hom Bay, Tsim Sha Tsui, the completed railway terminus had an area of around 41 acres (16.6 hec- tares), with Holt’s Wharf and Blackhead’s Point to the east, the harbour to the south, Star Ferry Pier and Hong Kong and Kowloon Wharf and Godown Co. Ltd to the west, and Salisbury Road to the north. Apart from railway transport, the land obtained from reclamation could be used for other purposes, detailed planning of which was undertaken by the Public Works Department.116 The Tsim Sha Tsui railway station (i.e. Kowloon Station) was demolished in 1975 and only its clock tower remains today.

Kai Tak Airport
Built in 1930, Kai Tak Airport was located in Kowloon City and named after two Chinese nationals, Ho Kai and Au Tak, which led many to mistakenly believe that the airport was founded by these two persons.117 In fact, both of them had

113 CO129/339, ‘Reclamation for Railway Terminus, Kowloon’, 21 March 1907.
114 ‘Kowloon–Canton Railway Annual Report for 1909’, Hong Kong Administrative Reports, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1910, Appendix Q, Q 1.
115 Robert J. Philips, Kowloon–Canton Railway (British Section), Hong Kong, Urban Council, 1990, p.51.
116 ‘Kowloon–Canton Railway Annual Report for 1910’, Hong Kong Administrative Reports, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1911, Appendix R, R1–3.
117 Liu Shuyong and Xiao Guojian, Xianggang lishi tushuo (Illustrated History of Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Qilin shuye youxian gongsi, 1998; Chen Xin and Guo Zhikun, eds, Xianggang quan jilu (Illustrated Chronicle
passed away more than ten years before the concept of the airport emerged; Ho died in 1914 and Au in 1920. The airport was given this name because the area had been called Kai Tak since the 1920s. Two years before Ho passed away, i.e. 1912, he co-founded Kai Tak Land Investment Co. with Au, who was the father- in-law of Ho’s eldest son, Ho Wing Ching. They intended to reclaim land along the coast of Kowloon Bay to construct housing for the relatively well-off migrants who moved from Guangdong to Hong Kong after the Xinhai Revolution. As the government was planning to build a radio transmitting station in Kowloon Bay, it rejected their proposal. Unfortunately for Ho, the project had yet to come to fruition at the time of his death in 1914. On 20 November 1914, the proposal for the Kowloon Bay reclamation was resubmitted to the government by Au Tak, along with other partners such as Ts’o Seen Wan and Cheung Sum Woo. The proposal was officially approved after receiving consent from the British govern- ment on 30 December 1915.
Kai Tak Land Investment Co. reclaimed land along the coast of Kowloon Bay from Kowloon City Ferry Pier to Tai Wan Glass Works, which was estimated to provide 210 acres (85.1 hectares) of land. After deducting 4 acres (1.6 hec- tares) of land reserved for public use and land required for nullahs, roads and seawalls, 4.95 million square feet (113.6 acres or 46 hectares) of land could be used for development. The developer was responsible for the cost of reclamation and the construction of ancillary facilities in the area such as roads and nullahs. Furthermore, it was required to pay a land premium of 75,000 Hong Kong dollars to the government upon completion of the project, as well as an annual Crown rent of 200 Hong Kong dollars per acre for the privately developed land. The developer was also required to spend 500,000 Hong Kong dollars on devel- oping that area within nine years upon completion of the project. The new land had a lease period of 75 years starting from 1 July 1898. Upon its expiration, the lease could be renewed for 23 years and 362 days, which meant that the renewed lease would expire on 27 June 1997. The Public Works Department was respon- sible for laying fresh water pipes and sewerage systems in the new area as well as monitoring the design of the project and the quality of construction materials.
The Kowloon Bay reclamation works were completed in 1920, and the reclaimed area was named Kai Tak – after the name of the developer. Owing to poor sanitary conditions and an economic downturn, the idea of develop- ing Kai Tak as a residential area could not be fully realised. In 1924, a piece of vacant land in the east of the newly reclaimed area was used by the Hong Kong Aero Club for aircraft take-offs and landings. In the same year, American Harry Abbott leased 60 acres (24.3 hectares) of land from Kai Tak Land Investment Co. to establish an aviation school and provide air cargo and passenger services between China and Hong Kong. The Royal Air Force units on board the British aircraft carrier HMS Hermes also used the vacant land in Kai Tak as a temporary base for parking aircraft.

of Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Chunghwa Books (HK), 1997; Liang Tao, Jiulong jiedao mingming kaoyuan (Origins of Kowloon Street Names), Hong Kong, Shizheng ju, 1993, p.734; Lu Yan, Xianggang zhanggu (Hong Kong Anecdotes), Volume 2, Hong Kong, Guangjiao jing chubanshe, 1984.
Table 2.8 Kai Tak Airport construction budget (1929)
HK$’000

Resumption 1,186
Forming of reclamation including completion of seawalls, nullahs, surfacing and drainage
738
covering of nullahs 275
Slipways, filling in camber area, extension of nullah in camber area and contingent works
275
Road 55
total 2,529
Less: Subsidy of £100,000 from the British government (equivalent to HK$990,000)
−990
Net expenditure 1,539
Source: CO129/508/8, ‘Kai tak Aerodrome’, Appendix VI (A), 1929 Draft Estimates Aerodrome Site, 5 October 1928.

In 1927, the Royal Air Force suggested building an airport in the Kai Tak area in view of the problems faced by domestic flight aircraft and amphibious military air- craft during landings and take-offs. Apart from spending money to purchase the land, the government also had to reclaim land to balance military and commer- cial interests, catering for the needs of different stakeholders. On 29 September 1928, British expert J.A. Dawson visited Hong Kong to advise on the location and scale of the airport. He proposed an area of 40 acres (16.2 hectares), 28 acres (11.3 hectares) of which was to be allocated to the Royal Air Force and 12 acres (4.9 hectares) for commercial use. The airport was to have two runways. The cost of construction rose to 2.53 million Hong Kong dollars by 1928. With compensa- tion of 626,000 Hong Kong dollars that Dawson recommended be paid to Kai Tak Land Investment Co. for the purchase of its land, total costs would amount to 3.156 million Hong Kong dollars. The British government would provide a subsidy of 100,000 pounds sterling towards the construction (equivalent to 990,000 Hong Kong dollars at the then exchange rate).118 (See Table 2.8.)
Reclamation works for the airport laid the foundation for Hong Kong’s future development of air transport, enabling the city to become an important player in air transport services in the Asia-Pacific region from 1930.

Institutionalisation
Establishment of the Town Planning Committee
Prior to the 1920s, Hong Kong urban planning was often conducted by the Governor in conjunction with the Executive Council, and there was no

118 CO129/508/8, ‘Kai Tak Aerodrome’, 2 November 1928.
designated department responsible for urban planning. The scale and approach of urban development were thus determined by the thinking and preferences of the management. Of the departments which had urban planning-related responsibilities, the Land Survey Office had a relatively longer history. In 1909, the Land Survey Office was established under the Public Works Department, responsible for managing land development and land resumption among other duties. The government also appointed experts to regulate various matters related to land. The Principal Land Surveyor was responsible for supervising land sales and applications for land leases, preparing permits for temporary occupation of land and licences for temporary piers, and planning of quarries and piers. Furthermore, eight land surveyors were hired to prevent illegal squat- ting and encroachments upon Crown land.119 The Land Survey Branch was not involved in the overall planning of the city.
In the 1920s, the government used public opinion to emphasise that Hong Kong would play a key role in the Pacific region and was increasingly important to Britain politically. The Hong Kong government then hired urban planning experts to review the overall development of the city and allowed the Public Works Department to allocate sufficient resources towards formulating long- term plans for Hong Kong’s future development.120 In 1921, one year before the establishment of the Town Planning Committee that was responsible for urban planning matters, A.G. Stephen, the government’s non-official senior consultant, thought that Hong Kong could be Britain’s most important port in the world both politically and commercially, as well as an important base from which Britain could monitor development in the Northern Pacific region. He also noted that, as urban planning required specialised expertise, funds should be allocated for the setting up of a department to plan for Hong Kong’s devel- opment direction in the next 50 years. Such a responsibility should not fall on works departments, which already had much work to do.121
In 1922, Governor Sir R.E. Stubbs established the Town Planning Committee, responsible for matters pertaining to urban planning. It was tasked with formu- lating a town planning scheme for the city’s development in the next 50 years.122 Members of the Committee included:123
1. T.L. Perkins (Chairman), Director of Public Works;
2. A.G.M. Fletcher, Colonial Secretary;
3. C.M. Messer, Colonial Treasurer;
  
  119 Ho Pui-yin, The Administrative History of the Hong Kong Government Agencies 1841–2002, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 2004, p.131.
  120 Hong Kong Legislative Council, ‘Report on Meeting on 14th November 1921’, Hong Kong Hansard, Hong Kong Government, 14 November 1921, p.167.
  121 Hong Kong Hansard, Hong Kong Government, 14 November 1921, p.167.
  122 Hong Kong Legislative Council, ‘Report on Meeting on 12th October 1922’, Hong Kong Hansard, Hong Kong Government, 12 October 1922, p.110.
  123 ‘Report of Director of Public Works’, Hong Kong Administrative Reports, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1922, Appendix Q, p.108.
4. E.D.C. Wolfe, Captain Superintendent of Police (with P.P.J. Wodehouse, Acting Superintendent of Police, acting);
5. C.W. Davy, Chief Engineer, China Command;
6. Chou Shou-son, Unofficial Member of the Legislative Council and Member of the Sanitary Board;
7. A.F.B. Silva-Netto (of Portuguese nationality), Unofficial Member of the Legislative Council;
8. W.L. Leask, Authorised Architect and Member of the Licensing Committee;
9. A.G.W. Tickle (Secretary), Engineer.
The work of the Town Planning Committee included revising, integrating and coordinating various development schemes planned in the past124 and discussing the future development direction for Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula.125 It was also responsible for coming up with solutions to the difficulties encountered in the development of Hong Kong Island,126 includ- ing the planning of roads, railways, piers, warehouses, sewerage systems, public slaughterhouses, markets and governmental buildings, along with the distribu- tion of offensive trades in various districts, residential areas, forest development areas, coal development areas and recreation areas.127 There was a particular focus on the future development of railways, such as reserving land for railway extensions.128
In 1922, when the Town Planning Committee had just been established, it convened several meetings to discuss the planning of Kowloon.129 The Committee drew up a large number of town planning schemes for Kowloon’s development,130 built models and even conducted site visits. In 1923, the gov- ernment formulated a long-term development blueprint for New Kowloon, with Cheung Sha Wan, Kowloon Bay and Kowloon City included in the areas to be developed. Each area had its own chosen centre of development and road planning. In 1926, the results of the discussions were turned into town planning schemes (see Figure 2.4), where a detailed description was given on the planning for Kowloon City, Cheung Sha Wan, Lai Chi Kok, Kowloon Tsai and Kowloon Bay and other areas. The production of the schemes was based on consolidating the data collected from photos taken at five sites, all of which were located along Boundary Street (the boundary of Kowloon’s urban area).

124 ‘Report of Director of Public Works’, Hong Kong Administrative Reports, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1922, p.28.
125 ‘Report of Public Works’, Hong Kong Administrative Reports, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1922, pp.108–109.
126 ‘Report of Director of Public Works’, Hong Kong Administrative Reports, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1922, Appendix Q, p.109.
127 Hong Kong Legislative Council, ‘Report on Meeting on 12th October 1922’, Hong Kong Hansard, Hong Kong Government, 12 October 1922, p.110.
128 ‘Report of Director of Public Works’, Hong Kong Administrative Reports, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1922, p.30.
129 ‘Report of Director of Public Works’, Hong Kong Administrative Reports, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1922, Appendix Q, p.109.
130 CO129/494, ‘Land Resumption in the North New Territories’, 1926.

Source: CO129/494, ‘Land resumption in the New territories’, 1 September 1926, pp.2–57.

Figure 2.4 Town planning schemes for Kowloon and New Kowloon (1926)

These sites were: 1) the intersection of Ma Tau Chung Road and Prince Edward Road; 2) the intersection of Fuk Wing Street and Pratas Street in Cheung Sha Wan; 3) the intersection of Castle Peak Road and Hing Wah Street in Lai Chi Kok; 4) Chester Road in Kowloon Tong; and 5) the intersection of Nathan Road and Sai Yeung Choi Street North in Mong Kok. Cheung Sha Wan and Kowloon Bay were the focus of planning.
The town planning schemes clearly marked the suggested reclamation areas and important traffic arteries. Large-scale reclamation works were to be conducted along the coast of Lai Chi Kok, with Sham Shui Po continuing its seaward expansion. The idea of constructing Tung Chau Street and Tai Kok Tsui Road to connect Tai Kwok Tsui with Sham Shui Po emerged. Also, plans were afoot to carry out large-scale reclamation in Kowloon Bay. Apart from des- ignating areas for reclamation, there was a clear description of how the principal traffic arteries were distributed, which included Nathan Road, Prince Edward Road and Waterloo Road. A railway that ran across the Kowloon Peninsula from the coast of Lai Chi Kok to Kowloon City was proposed. Designated green belts included King’s Park, Kowloon Tong’s rest gardens and Ma Tau Chung’s sitting-out areas.131 The locations of various facilities such as post offices, public hygiene facilities, schools, open spaces, markets and piers were also clearly stated. It was evident from the formulation of town planning schemes that the focus of urban planning was to select sites for future development and to plan for the distribution of ancillary facilities such as roads and community facilities. This would facilitate the comprehension of overall planning when development was carried out later on. In 1930, the Crown Lands Office and the Survey Office merged and became the Crown Lands, Surveys and Valuation, and Resumption Office. There was now an established mechanism for land development and management, directly under the control of a dedicated department that catered for the needs of overall development.

Promulgation of the Town Planning Ordinance
On 23 June 1939, the government promulgated the Town Planning Ordinance for the purpose of systematically preparing and approving the layout design of existing and to-be-developed land in urban areas and plans for the types of buildings suitable for those areas, and devising general welfare programmes for community health, safety and comfort. The ordinance, for the first time, author- ised the Town Planning Board to prepare town planning layout plans.132 When it was first established, the Town Planning Board openly invited those oppos-

131 Extracted from CO129/494. China and Hong Kong. 15 sheets of maps and plans. Detailed descriptions are given at item level. (1)–(18) originally enclosed in Governor Sir C. Clementi’s despatch number 387 con- cerning land resumption in the New Territories, 1926; subsequently placed in Colonial Office file number C 18677 of 1926. (19)–(24) originally enclosed in a despatch from Governor Clementi to Lieutenant-Colonel
L.C.M.S. Amery, MP, Secretary of State for the Colonies, concerning the recognition of governments in China, 1926; subsequently placed in Colonial Office file number C 21189 of 1926. 1898–1926.
132 ‘Ordinance Passed and Assented to: Town Planning, No. 20 of 1939’, Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 23 June 1939, p.581.
ExpANSION OF tHE tERRItORY (1898–1941) · 113

ing the draft plans to submit written statements regarding those plans within two months.133 In the course of drawing up plans, the Town Planning Board had to carry out investigations and make arrangements as required by those plans, including conducting surveys with the occupants of buildings or users of roads and streets or venues. Draft layout plans prepared by the Town Planning Board in 1939 show: a) roads, railways and other major transport facilities; b) areas or districts of residential, commercial, industrial or other uses; c) land reserved for government use; and d) parks, recreation grounds and open spaces. If necessary, the Town Planning Board could recommend that the Governor in Council should resume land for ‘a public purpose’, as provided for under the Land Resumption Ordinance of 1900.134 In June 1939, the Town Planning Board had the following members:135
1. Ronald Ruskin Todd (Chairman), Chairman of the Urban Council;
2. Richard McNeil Henderson (Vice-Chairman), Director of Public Works;
3. a senior officer of the Corps of Royal Engineers;
4. Henry Robert Butters, Labour Officer;
5. Thomas Stodart Whyte-Smith, Land Officer;
6. Wilfred Herbert Owen, Member of the Housing Committee, with Richard John Vernall acting in his absence;
7. Colin Brown Robertson, Engineer;
8. Leo d’Almada e Castro, Jr, Unofficial Member of the Legislative Council and Member of the Education Department;
9. Alexander Somerled Mackichan, Member of the Sanitary Department and the Building Department;
10. William Ngartwse Thomas Tam, Unofficial Member of the Legislative Council and Member of the Transport Committee;
11. Joseph Mow-lam Wong, Member of the Mui Tsai Committee.
The Secretary to the Urban Council acted as the Secretary to the Town Planning Board. On 4 July 1939, Nicol Campbell MacLeod, Deputy Director of Health Services, was appointed as the 12th member, with Thomas Walter Ware acting in his absence.136
The Town Planning Board had a total of 12 members in 1939. Led by the Chairman of the Urban Council, the Board attached great importance to par- ticipation by works departments. Apart from government officials and engi- neers responsible for projects, unofficial Chinese members of the Legislative

133 ‘Town Planning Ordinance, 1939, No. 20 of 1939’, Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 23 June 1939, p.582.
134 ‘Ordinance Passed and Assented to: Town Planning, No. 20 of 1939’, Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 23 June 1939, pp.581–582.
135 ‘Town Planning Board’, Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 30 June 1939, p.621.
136 It was published in the Government Gazette on 4 July 1939 that the Deputy Director of Health Services was a member of the Town Planning Board, and it was considered a new post. ‘Report of the Chairman, Urban Council’, Hong Kong Administrative Reports, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1939, Appendix M(1), p.8.

Council who were familiar with the livelihood issues were also invited to serve as members. However, Chinese representatives were still a minority. Urban planning in the late 1930s could be considered as implementation of the government’s intention to expand, with an aim of evaluating the feasibility of plans. This was in contrast with post-war urban planning, where the focus was to formulate regulations for town planning and it became increasingly complicated. With the Town Planning Board, urban development shifted from one that gave priority to commerce and trade to one that was more comprehensive, altering the mode that was guided by individual government officials.
Despite the many difficulties faced in developing New Kowloon, the govern- ment’s determination to include the New Territories and New Kowloon in the planning for Hong Kong did not diminish. Overcrowding had been a tremen- dous burden on the living environment and public hygiene in the urban areas since the late nineteenth century. In May 1935, the Hong Kong government established the Housing Commission, responsible for coming up with solutions to the problems of housing and population overcrowding in Hong Kong.137 In 1938, W.H. Owen, Secretary of the Commission, released a report on housing development and recommended that the Hong Kong government set up reset- tlement areas in various districts of the New Territories, such as Sha Tin, Tsuen Wan, Yuen Long, Tai Po and Fanling, to divert the population in the crowded urban areas.138 To develop remote districts, however, the government first had to overcome problems such as fresh water, transport, flood control and sewer- age systems. Certain districts even required reclamation to obtain suitable land for development. As a result, the government kept on postponing the develop- ment of the New Territories. In 1939, the government formulated a planning blueprint based on the overall pace of development in Hong Kong, which was a successor to the town planning schemes of the 1920s. The development of New Kowloon was explicitly divided into two phases, with the first phase focused on Sham Shui Po, Lai Chi Kok, Kowloon Tong and Kowloon City, while the focus of the second phase was on Tsuen Wan, Kwai Chung, Tsz Wan Shan, Ngau Chi Wan, Jordan and Kwun Tong (see Figure 2.5). The districts to be developed gradually extended northwards. In 1939, the government enacted the Town Planning Ordinance (Ordinance No. 20 of 1939) and was ready to develop the New Territories as residential areas for civilians. Unfortunately, the Japanese army occupied Hong Kong in 1941, and plans to develop the New Territories had to be shelved. The rapid influx of migrants after the war resurrected that idea.

137 ‘Report of the Housing Commission 1935’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1938, No. 12/1938, p.259.
138 Memorandum by W.H. Owen, ‘Report of the Housing Commission 1935’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., No. 12, 1938, pp.282–283.

Source: CO129/580/6, ‘New territories’, 6 January 1939.

Figure 2.5 Map of Hong Kong’s urban areas and districts for future development

Summary
Under the Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory signed in 1898, the land north of Boundary Street and south of the Shenzhen River was leased for a period of 99 years. This greatly increased the area of Hong Kong and func- tioned as a military barrier for the two core regions: the southern tip of the Kowloon Peninsula and the City of Victoria on the northern coast of Hong Kong Island. Not only did the government position the New Territories as the hinterland of the city’s core districts by promoting agriculture and fisheries to meet the needs of the urban areas, but it also actively developed land south of the Kowloon mountain range and north of Boundary Street. Originally belonging to the New Territories but later referred to as New Kowloon, this area covered districts such as Sham Shui Po, Kowloon Tong, Wong Tai Sin, Kowloon City, Cheung Sha Wan, Lai Chi Kok and Kwun Tong. It is today a part of Kowloon, and few people remember that it was in fact a part of the New Territories. From the early twentieth century onwards, New Kowloon provided much space for development, which included housing, industrial land, and public facilities such as the airport, railway stations, piers and open spaces. Apart from entrepôt trade, Hong Kong also attracted abundant capital and talent that left China as a result of wars. Hong Kong was no longer a temporary base to allow Britain to trade in Asia, but an important commercial and trading city for the British in the Asia- Pacific region as well.
As the land available for development increased, so did the city’s popula- tion. More systematic and long-term urban planning was needed to manage and utilise the land. Established in 1922, the Town Planning Committee was com- mitted to formulating urban planning schemes for Hong Kong for the follow- ing 50 years. The government also promulgated the Town Planning Ordinance in 1939, departing from the previous short-term strategies of merely respond- ing to the needs of situations as the government attempted to develop Hong Kong as Britain’s bridgehead in the Asia-Pacific region. Apart from government officials from relevant departments, Chinese representatives participated in long-term planning, indicating the colonial government’s acute awareness of Chinese people’s significant influence on Hong Kong’s long-term development strategies. This was also the reason why Britain insisted on regaining the right to govern Hong Kong after the Sino-Japanese War.
The agreement on the future of Hong Kong upon the expiration of the lease in 1997 under the Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory was not initiated by Governor MacLehose, who put forward the concept of giving up British sovereignty over Hong Kong in exchange for the right to administer the territory. Since the late 1920s, three governors of Hong Kong – Clementi, Peel and Northcote – had never overlooked the issue of the return of Hong Kong’s sovereignty in 1997. The various proposals made by them, such as extending land leases without reaching agreement with China and purchasing the New Territories for 20 million pounds sterling, all reflected the colonial gov- ernment’s goal of conducting long-term planning. The British Colonial Office highly valued the political and economic benefits that Hong Kong brought to
ExpANSION OF tHE tERRItORY (1898–1941) · 117

Britain, but it was more important to prevent the Hong Kong issue from dam- aging Britain’s international reputation. Faced with a choice between politics and economic interests, Britain chose national prestige over economic develop- ment, which showed that the British were in no way more focused on economic interests than the Chinese. In 1941, Hong Kong was occupied by the Japanese. The city’s development entered a new stage, and the New Territories lease issue was no longer an obstacle to development.
3
Experiencing the war (1941–1945)

Whereas Hongkong is Eastern territory seized by Britain, who in an enlightened age has for the past hundred years been nibbling at our East Asia, so now one morning the place was captured by our faithful, loyal and brave Imperial Army to become the territory of Japan’s Emperor. All you people, if you can root out
the bad old habits and brace yourselves up to your strength, you will accomplish much towards creating a flourishing Greater East Asia. I will know how to treat those who do so. As for those who transgress the path of right and do not keep within their right places, there are the enemies of East Asia’s millions and are not members of our Kingly Way. Irrespective of their nationality or race, I will deal with these according to military law, without mercy. (Hongkong News, 22 February
1942, p.1)

Hong Kong fell into Japanese hands on 25 December 1941. From December 1941 to August 1945, Japan occupied Hong Kong for three years and eight months, and the Japanese military government ruled the city by martial law. According to the government’s pre-war estimates and the post-war Report of Medical and Health Conditions in Hong Kong of Doctor Percy Selwyn Selwyn- Clarke, Hong Kong’s population before the occupation of the Japanese in 1941, including transient refugees, was about 1.63 million.1 Discounting the refugees staying temporarily, a rough estimate of the resident population then was some
million.2 The rapidly growing population exacerbated the housing, transport, infrastructure and industrial and commercial ancillary facility problems that were already unsolvable owing to the lack of land resources. An overly dense population was no longer a concern for the Japanese ruling over Hong Kong, as the city’s development took a direction different from that under the Hong Kong colonial government. In order to become a hub of the Japanese-occupied areas in the South Pacific region and a city within the resource sphere of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, Hong Kong had emerged with a dif- ferent facade. The discussion below makes use of rarely mentioned Japanese

1 Hong Kong Air Raid Wardens, Report on Census of the Colony of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 13–15 March 1941; P.S. Selwyn-Clarke, Report on Medical and Health Conditions in Hong Kong, for the Period 1st January, 1942 – 31st August, 1945, London, HMSO, 1946.

2 Ho Pui-yin, Xianggang gongshui yibai wushi nian lishi yanjiu baogao (A Study of Historical Development of Water Supply in Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Water Supplies Department, 2001, p.168.

materials as well as new materials recently uncovered. Through an analysis of the strategies employed by the Japanese military government in ruling Hong Kong, it seeks to gain a deeper understanding of the importance of planning in a city’s development. It differs from the analysis found in the existing literature, which is concerned with the economic conditions and people’s livelihoods during the Japanese occupation.

Resource port of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere

After the Japanese invasion of China began in 1937, Hong Kong, with its location at the throat of South China and its political neutrality and refusal to cooperate with the Japanese army owing to its status as a British colony, served as a resource supply and intelligence centre for China. The colonial government, well aware of Hong Kong’s importance as the transport hub of the Asia-Pacific region, deliber- ately maintained Hong Kong’s position as a centre for the international exchange of intelligence as well as an entrepôt.3 Upon the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong at the end of 1941, there was a major shift in Hong Kong’s development strategy. Hong Kong became a military stronghold with important strategic value for the Japanese in terms of establishing contact with its other occupied areas in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as sealing China off completely from any foreign aid. In fact, the plan to develop Hong Kong as a military port was resolved at the Imperial Liaison Conference on the Administration of Occupied Territories, which was held on 20 November 1941 to draw up the ‘Details for the Execution of Administration in the Southern Occupied Territories’,4 before the full-scale offensive against Hong Kong was carried out.

Division and management of districts

On 29 December 1941, Hong Kong, which was situated at the heart of the Pacific, was declared by the Japanese military as the core around which the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere would be established.5 On the fourth day after the British colonial government’s surrender to the Japanese military, the Japanese army set up a provisional military government at the Peninsula Hotel in Tsim Sha Tsui, Kowloon. The press office of the Governor’s Office of the Occupied Territory of Hong Kong stated that ‘Hong Kong, as an important area in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, is an important Japanese military, political and economic stronghold, and must be governed by harsh military rule’.6 The human as well as material resources of Hong Kong were

3 David J. Owen, Future Control and Development of the Port of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1941.

4 Takagi Ken’ichi and others, eds, Xianggang junpiao yu zhanhou buchang (Hong Kong Military Notes and Post-war Reparations), translated by Wu Hui, Hong Kong, Mingbao chubanshe youxian gongsi, 1995, p.26.

5 Robert S. Ward, Hong Kong under Japanese Occupation: A Case Study in the Enemy’s Techniques of Control, Washington, DC, 1943.

6 Honkon senryōchi sōtobu hōdōbu, ed., Zaihon Nihonjin no sankō (Reference to the Japanese in Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Horiuchi Shoten, 1943, p.1.

employed in the war7 – thus the war was self-sustaining. On 1 January 1942, the Japanese military established the ‘local administrative office’ in Hong Kong. The Official Notice of 20 February 1942 by Rensuke Isogai read:

Therefore Hongkong, under military rule, should hereafter co-operate, with the full effort of all sections of the people, to reconstruct its position and to help in the attainment of victory in the Great East Asia War. The previous condition of Hongkong must be swept clean before it can take its place in the East. The present strength and culture of the place must be elevated to the same spiritual stream in order to attain the Kingly Way, which will shine upon the eternal basic prosperity of East Asia.8

On 12 February 1942, after occupying Hong Kong for a mere two months, the Japanese military government began planning the next 15 years’ devel- opment of the resources of occupied areas. Japan, Manchuria, China and the South-western Pacific region served as the empire’s resource sphere, while areas such as Australia and India were to be its supply sphere.9 The Hongkong News, a member of the Japanese official media, stated that the manner in which the Japanese military governed Hong Kong was different from that in Korea and Taiwan. Not only was Hong Kong the Japanese army’s fortress for defending the South China region,10 but it also served to seal off China. As a member of the resource sphere, Hong Kong also provided the Japanese army with resources, and facilitated the transit of military supplies for the Japanese army with its advantageous geographical position.11 Therefore, Hong Kong could no longer be opened up for free trade.

According to the memoirs of the then Lieutenant Governor of the occupied territory of Hong Kong, Hirano Shigeru, Japanese Prime Minister and Army Minister Tojo Hideki had sent a message12 pointing out that the reason for Hong Kong becoming a member of the resource sphere was that

7 Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha, ed., Gunseika no Honkon: shinseisita Dai Tōa no chūkaku (Hong Kong under Military Rule: The Newborn Nucleus of Greater East Asia), Hong Kong, Honkon Tōyō Keizaisha, 1944, Ch.5, s.1.

8 Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha, ed., Gunseika no Honkon: shinseisita Dai Tōa no chūkaku (Hong Kong under Military Rule: The Newborn Nucleus of Greater East Asia), Hong Kong, Honkon Tōyō Keizaisha, 1944, Ch.5,

s.1. The English version can be found in Hongkong News, 22 February 1942, p.1.

9 Fudan daxue lishixi (Fudan University Department of History), ed. and trans., Riben diguo zhuyi duiwai qinlüe shiliao xuanbian, 1931–1945 (A Collection of Historical Materials on Japanese Imperialism’s Aggression, 1931–1945), Shanghai, Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1975, p.394; Xie Yongguang, Zhanshi Rijun zai Xianggang baoxing (Atrocities of the Japanese Army in Wartime Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Mingpao chu- banshe, 1991, p.87.

10 Ye Dewei et al., comps and eds, Xianggang lunxian shi (History of the Fall of Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Guangjiaojing chubanshe youxian gongsi, 1982, p.117.

11 Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha, ed., Gunseika no Honkon: shinseisita Dai Tōa no chūkaku (Hong Kong under Military Rule: The Newborn Nucleus of Greater East Asia), Hong Kong, Honkon Tōyō Keizaisha, 1944, Ch.5, s.1.

12 Hirano Shigeru, ‘Women zai Xianggang de kezheng yu baoxing’ (Our Tyranny and Atrocities in Hong Kong), in Ling Ming, trans., Riben zhanfan huiyilu (Memoirs of Japanese War Criminals), Hong Kong, Sihai chubanshe, 1975, pp.47–48.

Hong Kong is where Britain stored up a large amount of resources. Although the British had skilfully hidden them away, the Japanese army must thoroughly search for these resources and transport them back to Japan. The Japanese army must not be lenient towards enemy captives. They are not to be given good food, and should only be treated such that they would remain alive. The land in the New Territories should be actively cultivated to produce food so as to achieve self-sufficiency.13

The Japanese army looked to Hong Kong for the provision of resources.

By the end of 1941 the Japanese military government set-up in Hong Kong was ruling by martial law. Modelled on the organisation of the Japanese 23rd Army, five departments – general affairs, home affairs, economic affairs, judici- ary and marine – were set up. These provisional organisations illustrated the characteristics of military and political rule. As the number of Japanese occupied areas in the South Pacific region increased, Hong Kong became the core of the development of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, its political and economic role in the development of the entire region growing more impor- tant. The Governor’s Office of the Occupied Territory of Hong Kong thus put forward ideas for the long-term development of military rule in Hong Kong.14

On 20 February 1942, the Tokyo government officially declared Hong Kong an occupied territory of Japan. The military government was dissolved, and the Governor’s Office of the Occupied Territory of Hong Kong was established at the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation in Central.15 Rensuke Isogai was appointed Governor. Under the Governor were the General Staff Department (overseeing the Hong Kong Defence Force and the Hong Kong Kempeitai) and General Affairs (overseeing the Departments of Home Affairs, Finance, Transport, Economic Affairs, Press, Management and External Affairs). The Chinese Representative Council was also established, with Robert Kotewall, Lau Tit-shing, Li Tse-fong and Chan Lim-pak as members. The Chinese Cooperative Council consisted of recognised Chinese representatives from various sectors including commerce, industry, finance, education, charity, technical, medicine, construction and labour. Chow Shou-son was the Council’s Chairman, Li Koon-chun the Vice-Chairman, and its members included Tung Chung-wei, Ip Lan-chuen, Ng Wah, Lo Man-kam, Kong Kai-tung, William Ngartse Thomas Tam, Wong Tak-kwong, Fung Tse-ying, Tang Siu-kin, Cheung Suk-shun, Lam Kin-yan, Ling Hong-fat, Li Zou, Li Chung-po, Luk Ngoi-wan, Kwok Chan, Chau Tsun-nin, Wong Tung-ming, Ngan Shing-kwan, Li King- hong and Wong Yin-ching (who joined the Council in August 1943).16 Local elites with a good reputation were thus used to create the impression of peace

13 Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 29 January 1943, p.2.

14 Takagi Ken’ichi and others, eds, Xianggang junpiao yu zhanhou buchang (Hong Kong Military Notes and Post-war Reparations), translated by Wu Hui, Hong Kong, Mingbao chubanshe youxian gongsi, 1995, pp.26–27.

15 Ye Dewei et al., comps and eds, Xianggang lunxian shi (History of the Fall of Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Guangjiaojing chubanshe youxian gongsi, 1982, pp.117–118.

16 Xie Yongguang, Sannian lingbageyue de kunan (Three Years and Eight Months of Suffering), Hong Kong, Mingpao chubanshe, 1995, pp.63, 66; Takagi Ken’ichi and others, eds, Xianggang junpiao yu zhanhou buchang

and to reassure the general public.17 Martial law decrees were implemented, and any action obstructing martial law, as well as any acts of collaboration with the enemy or destabilisation or causing any suspicion of such acts, was punish- able. An air-defence decree also took effect from September 1942, by which any household caught with light emitting from their residence after dusk would be referred to the martial law court to be sentenced.18

Functions of the districts

Before the 1940s, apart from assigning Admiralty and Tsim Sha Tsui as mili- tary bases, and Central as the political and economic centre, Hong Kong’s division of districts was primarily in accordance with the needs of economic development and the settlement characteristics of Chinese communities. The government had not deliberately interfered with the livelihoods of dif- ferent professions or immigrants of different birthplaces. The division of dis- tricts was therefore a natural grouping of settlements of different ethnicities or trades. In April 1942, the Governor’s Office of the Occupied Territory of Hong Kong divided Hong Kong into districts with an aim of imposing strict military rule. The Japanese first changed the original names of Hong Kong Island and Kowloon Peninsula, and turned Wan Chai and Kowloon Tong into completely Japanese areas. Hong Kong Island was divided into 12 districts, and Kowloon into six districts. Each district was managed by a District Affairs Bureau (see Figure 3.1). From 6 July 1943, outlying islands including Lantau Island, Cheung Chau and Ping Chau were placed under the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong District Affairs Bureau. There was no District Affairs Bureau for Cheung Chau, Ping Chau, Mui Wo and Tai O – they were each managed by a self-governing council, which was organised and funded by residents.19 On 20 July the same year, the Chinese name of the District Affairs Bureau was changed, and Hong Kong was divided into a total of 28 districts – Hong Kong Island remained at 12 districts, while the number of districts in Kowloon was increased to nine, and the New Territories had seven districts.20 From 21 July 1943 on, the Sai Kung District, with an approximate population of 10,800, was moved from the New Territories District Affairs Bureau, where it origi- nally belonged, to the jurisdiction of the Kowloon District Affairs Bureau.21 Owing to its remote location, the New Territories was not labelled as an activ- ity or residential area for the Japanese, and the names in the area were mostly unchanged. (See Table 3.1.)

(Hong Kong Military Notes and Post-war Reparations), translated by Wu Hui, Hong Kong, Mingbao chu- banshe youxian gongsi, 1995, pp.27–28.

17 Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 18 February 1943, p.2.

18 Hirano Shigeru, ‘Women zai Xianggang de kezheng yu baoxing’ (Our Tyranny and Atrocities in Hong Kong), in Ling Ming, trans., Riben zhanfan huiyilu (Memoirs of Japanese War Criminals), Hong Kong, Sihai chubanshe, 1975, pp.53–54.

19 Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 7 July 1943, p.4.

20 Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 7 July 1943, p.4.

21 Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 15 July 1943, p.4, 22 July 1943, p.4.

Source: External Affairs Department, Office of the taiwan Governor-General, Investigation Report on Hong Kong Waterworks 《香港水道調查報告書》, taipei, External Affairs Department, Office of the taiwan Governor- General, 1942.

Figure 3.1 Full map of Hong Kong and the New Territories (1942)

Table 3.1 Distribution of district bureaus under the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong (1942–1945)

18 district bureaus

(20 April 1942 – 19 July 1942)

28 district bureaus

(20 July 1942)

Name in Japanese Original name

Hongkong central Area District Nakaku central

District Affairs Bureau

Kowloon District Affairs Bureau

New territories District Affairs Bureau

Sheung Wan District Nishiku Sheung Wan (Western)

Sai Ying pun District Mizukiku Sai Ying pun

Sanno-dai Sanoku Kennedy town

Shek tong tsui Kuramaeku Shek tong tsui (West point)

Wan chai Higashiku Wan chai

Bowrington canal Kasugaku Bowrington

Aobadani Aubaku Happy Valley

causeway Bay Dorawanku causeway Bay

Shaukiwan Shokiwanku Shau Kei Wan

Motohonkon Motonminkaiku Aberdeen

Stanley Sakichiku Stanley

– Kashimaku Kowloon tong

Kowloon city (No. 1 District Bureau) Motoku Kowloon city Shamshuipo (No. 2 District Bureau) Aoyamaku Sham Shui po Mongkok (No. 3 District Bureau) Daikakuku tai Kok tsui and Mong

Kok Yaumati (No. 4 District Bureau) Katoriku Yau Ma tei

tsimshatsui (No. 5 District Bureau) Yonatoku tsim Sha tsui Hunghom (No. 6 District Bureau) Yamashitaku Hung Hom

Sanwanku tsuen Wan
Keitokuku Area covered from Ngau chi Wan to Lei Yue Mun
taipoku tai po
Genroku Un Long
Shadenku Shatin
Shatoku Sha tau Kok
Sardenku Sun tin
*Saikoku Sai Kung
Josuiku Sheung Shui

Note: * Sai Kung was part of the New territories originally, and then became part of Kowloon from 21 July 1943.

Source: Xiangduling teji 《香督令特輯》 (Special Issue for the Order of the Governor of the captured territory of Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Yazhou Shangbao, 1943, pp.25–29.

The Central District (Central) was the heart of military administration. The Japanese Kempeitai headquarters was established at the Legislative Council Building (now Court of Final Appeal Building) on Des Voeux Road Central in Central. The headquarters of the Central District and Western District

Kempeitai was set up at the Central Police Station on Hollywood Road. The marine Kempei headquarters was set up on the ground floor of St George’s Building on Connaught Road Central.

In August 1942, the Eastern District (Wan Chai) was designated a Japanese residential area, and the 2,000 residents in the area were forced to move out within three days.22 The Japanese army cordoned off Arsenal Street to Fleming Road with barbed wire and barriers. Lieutenant Governor Hirano Shigeru noti- fied Okada Umekichi of the Hong Kong Defence Command that 500 comfort stations were to be set up near a Japanese company Daibutsu – an area around Lockhart Road in Wan Chai.23 The Japanese army sealed off and appropriated some 160 houses.24 The more modern buildings were all expropriated as broth- els, taverns or teahouses.25

The French St Paul’s Convent Church in Causeway Bay became the head- quarters for the Eastern District Kempeitai.26 The Kuramae District (Shek Tong Tsui) was designated as the prostitution district, with low-end brothels, taverns, gambling houses and opium dens popping up in the district. Shek Tong Tsui thus became another red light district outside of Wan Chai.27

The Kajima District (Kowloon Tong) was designated as the ‘special dis- trict’, and was the high-end Japanese residential area for Japanese business- men, and high-ranking officers and senior personnel of the Japanese army. To ensure the safety of the special district, the Japanese army built concrete walls on four sides, sealed off passages and set up sentry points at the entrances on all four sides, guarded by soldiers round the clock. Local residents who entered the district without approval and a permit from the Japanese authorities could face capital punishment. During the occupation of Hong Kong, members of the public who wished to go to Mong Kok or Yau Ma Tei from Kowloon City did not dare take Waterloo Road. Instead, they had to go to Yau Ma Tei via To Kwa Wan and Hung Hom. The Kempeitai also had sentries posted at the junction that led from Boundary Street to Kowloon City, keeping an eye on passers-by.28

22 Ye Dewei et al., comps and eds, Xianggang lunxian shi (History of the Fall of Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Guangjiaojing chubanshe youxian gongsi, 1982, p.105.

23 Yuan Bangjian, comp. and ed., Xianggang shilue (A Brief History of Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Zhongliu chubanshe, 1987, pp.175–176.

24 Takagi Ken’ichi and others, eds, Xianggang junpiao yu zhanhou buchang (Hong Kong Military Notes and Post-war Reparations), translated by Wu Hui, Hong Kong, Mingbao chubanshe youxian gongsi, 1995, p.41.

25 Xie Yongguang, Zhanshi Rijun zai Xianggang baoxing (Atrocities of the Japanese Army in Wartime Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Mingpao chubanshe, 1991, pp.126–127.

26 Xie Yongguang, Zhanshi Rijun zai Xianggang baoxing (Atrocities of the Japanese Army in Wartime Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Mingpao chubanshe, 1991, p.105. The Kowloon headquarters for the Kempeitai was established at the Kowloon Magistracy (also known as the South Kowloon District Court) in Gascoigne Road.

27 Li Shu-fan, Xianggang waike yisheng: liushi nian huiyilu (Hong Kong Surgeon: A Memoir of 60 Years), Hong Kong, Li Shufen yixue jijin, 1965, pp.116–117.

28 Xie Yongguang, Zhanshi Rijun zai Xianggang baoxing (Atrocities of the Japanese Army in Wartime Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Mingpao chubanshe, 1991, pp.169–170.

Districts on Hong Kong Island with large areas of wasteland, such as Pok Fu Lam, were developed as grazing grounds,29 while the planting of crops and keeping of livestock were also conducted in the New Territories and on outlying islands like Lantau Island to increase local production.

From the change of the districts’ roles, it can be seen that, during the Japanese occupation, the urban districts saw more significant changes, primarily in serving the Japanese army and Japanese citizens living in Hong Kong. Core districts such as Central and Tsim Sha Tsui were the centre of military administration, and the areas surrounding the military administrative organs such as Wan Chai, Sai Wan and Kowloon Tong became districts where Japanese lived or carried out their activities. The New Territories became the production ground of food required in the daily life of those living in urban areas. The pre-war activities of the Chinese ceased almost entirely.

Neighbourhood watch system

The traditional Chinese ‘neighbourhood administrative system’ (baojia system) was also utilised by the Japanese in keeping local public order. In order to convey central policies and orders, register the Hong Kong population, maintain local public order, prevent crime, set up air defences, and report on the details of the livelihood of the public including public hygiene, first aid after air strikes, rice rationing and employment, the government established a neigh- bourhood watch monitor system (which was similar to the ‘neighbourhood administrative system’) under the jurisdiction of the District Affairs Bureaus. From 4 to 18 September 1942, the neighbourhood watch monitors appointed for each street assisted with conducting the first census. They registered the population living in the three regions of Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and the New Territories, monitored the public living in their respective streets and became the enforcers in enhancing the District Affairs Bureaus’ governing effectiveness. On 18 September 1942, the Rules on Managing and Registering Households were promulgated, requiring that ‘all births, deaths, relocations etc. must be reported. Those who fail to do so would be subject to less than three months’ imprisonment or a fine of less than 500 dollars.’ Each household of every building had to record the name of the head of that household and the number of people in that household on a wooden sign hung on the door. The Japanese called this the ‘household sign’; there were two types: No. 1 was used for a single household, while No. 2 was used for multiple households in the same house.30

On 2 December 1942, in order to enhance the governing power of neighbourhood watch monitors, the neighbourhood watch monitors were appointed by District Affairs Bureaus, and a liaison officer was added for every

29 HKRS No. 211, D & S No. 2/6, ‘Long Term Policy Prospects in Hong Kong’, 14 March 1945 – 15 June 1946.

30 Xie Yongguang, Zhanshi Rijun zai Xianggang baoxing (Atrocities of the Japanese Army in Wartime Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Mingpao chubanshe, 1991, p.204.

ten neighbourhood watch monitors. This liaison officer was responsible for relaying orders from District Affairs Bureaus, allowing neighbourhood watch monitors to execute orders from their superiors more effectively.31 In April 1944, to suit strategic needs, the original system of monitors and liaison offic- ers was repealed. Instead, every 50 households were grouped into a class with one neighbourhood watch monitor, and a monitor representative was elected by every ten classes.32 In June 1944, the neighbourhood watch monitors were ordered to prepare name lists of each class. At the same time, the District Affairs Bureaus were under strict orders to supervise monitor representatives in holding regular meetings to keep in contact with the neighbourhood watch monitors and ensure execution of decrees. The local offices employed military rule methods to enhance the work of neighbourhood watch monitors, so as to gain full control of the daily life of the general public.33 There were a total of 777 neighbourhood watch monitors for the 12 districts in Hong Kong, and 1,428 neighbourhood watch monitors for the nine districts in Kowloon. Up to July 1944, there were a total of 2,151 neighbourhood watch monitors in the various districts in the whole of Hong Kong.34

Population policy

Repatriation to home towns

The Japanese population policy in Hong Kong in the early days of its occupation was to reduce the resident population, employ all resources in the war, and turn the city into a military port. On 28 March 1942, Order No. 9 of the Governor of the Occupied Territory of Hong Kong (order governing the arrival, departure, residence, import and export of resources, enterprises, commercial activities, firms and so on in the area under the purview of the Governor of the Occupied Territory of Hong Kong (previously British owned and leased territory)) restricted the arrival in and departure from Hong Kong of Chinese people,35 and repatriated the Chinese back to their home towns in droves. According to Hong Kong under Military Rule, the repatriation policy at the time was threefold:36 induced repatriation (free repatriation), self-funded repatriation and forced repatriation. The policy repatriated vagrants, the unemployed and the impover- ished back to their home towns. The Kowloon–Canton Railway was the main passage to Mainland China before the war. During the war, part of the railroad,

31 Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 2 December 1942, p.3.

32 Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 23 July 1944, p.4.

33 Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 23 July 1944, p.4.

34 Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 2 December 1942, p.3.

35 Hirano Shigeru, ‘Women zai Xianggang de kezheng yu baoxing’ (Our Tyranny and Atrocities in Hong Kong), in Ling Ming, trans., Riben zhanfan huiyilu (Memoirs of Japanese War Criminals), Hong Kong, Sihai chubanshe, 1975, pp.50–54.

36 Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha, ed., Gunseika no Honkon: shinseisita Dai Tōa no chūkaku (Hong Kong under Military Rule: The Newborn Nucleus of Greater East Asia), Hong Kong, Honkon Tōyō Keizaisha, 1944, Ch.5, s.1.

the bridges and the tunnel between Kowloon Tong and Sha Tin were severely damaged. In 1942, the railway was partially restored to operation. However, only the portion in the New Territories continued to carry passengers. The rest of the railway was reserved for military use. On 25 March 1942, after the railway was restored in full, there were six trains a day. And from 24 June that year there was also a special train every day at three o’clock in the afternoon repatriating the Chinese back to China. This became the main means of transport for expel- ling the Chinese.37

In September 1942, the Japanese conducted a census of the population of Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and the New Territories.38 The results showed that the population of Hong Kong fell sharply from 1.63 million in 1941 (includ- ing refugees) to 980,000, a reduction of 650,000 (40 per cent). According to the records of the Japanese government in 1942, 554,000 people left the city that year. Deducting those who were repatriated, an estimated 100,000 people died in the war. Although there was a reduction of 40 per cent in the size of the population, the number was still some distance away from the ceiling of 750,000 set by the government.39 After a vigorous push of its repatriation policy, the government conducted another census in 1943. The population of Hong Kong had decreased further to a total of 860,000. Despite the 120,000 reduction, the number was still off target. The government reported that 419,000 people returned to their home towns in 1943. A total of 973,000 people left the city in the two years of 1942 and 1943. (See Table 3.2.)

In 1944, according to a report in the Xin Shiming (New Mission), a magazine published in the Nationalist-controlled Chongqing, the population of Hong Kong was down to 800,000,40 close to the 750,000 target. On 27 March 1945, the Japanese government promulgated Public Notice No. 15, making the identity card a compulsory requirement for Hong Kong citizens41 in an attempt to exert further control on Hong Kong’s resident population. The new order required that Hong Kong residents bring their identity cards when going out, or they might be detained.42 Those leaving the city or moving home had to return their identity cards to the District Affairs Bureaus.43 On 28 April 1945, the govern- ment announced that, out of the 513,902 residents who applied for an identity card, only 411,553 had received their cards. In other words, of those registered,

37 Robert S. Ward, Hong Kong under Japanese Occupation: A Case Study in the Enemy’s Techniques of Control, Washington, DC, 1943, pp.73–74.

38 ‘Public Notice No. 12’, in Honkon senryōchi sōtobu, Zongdubu gongbao (Gazette of the Governor’s Office of the Captured Territory of Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Honkon senryōchi sōtobu, No. 21, 10 October 1942.

39 Hirano Shigeru, ‘Women zai Xianggang de kezheng yu baoxing’ (Our Tyranny and Atrocities in Hong Kong), in Ling Ming, trans., Riben zhanfan huiyilu (Memoirs of Japanese War Criminals), Hong Kong, Sihai chubanshe, 1975, p.57.

40 Mai Zhenting, ‘Ribenren ruhe tongzhi xianggang (lunxianqu baodao)’ (How the Japanese Ruled Hong Kong (Report of the Occupied Area)), in Xin Shiming (New Mission), Volume 1, No. 7, July 1944.

41 Hongkong News, 27 March 1945.

42 Hongkong News, 11 May 1945.

43 Hongkong News, 7 June 1945.

Table 3.2 Hong Kong population (by district and nationality) (September 1942 – September 1943)

	18 Sept – 8 Oct	End of Oct	End of Nov	End of Dec		End of Jan	End of May	End of Sept	decrease (Sept 1942 – Sept 1943
Hong Kong chinese	452,096	452,951	449,370	443,138		440,729	–	–	–
Island Japanese	1,460	1,961	2,322	2,590	2,788		–	–
Foreigners and others	4,073	4,824	4,032	3,996	3,914		–	–
Sub-total	457,629	459,736	455,724	449,724	447,431		397,922	392,269	−65,360
Kowloon chinese	414,973	422,701	418,082	423,947	422,540		–	–	–
(incl. chinese boat population)	(19,299)	(19,431)	(20,746)	(20,741)	(21,443)		(15,448)	(18,732)	(−567)
Japanese	867	1,065	1,217	1,372	1,605		–	–	–
Foreigners and others	3,248	3,273	3,184	3,239	3,153		–	–	–
Sub-total	419,088	427,039	422,483	428,558	427,298		365,323	375,739	−43,349
New chinese	103,311	102,836	103,709	105,061	105,265		–	–	–
territories
Japanese	21	37	40	40	41		–	–
Foreigners and others	24	26	28	29	29		–	–
Sub-total	103,356	102,899	103,777	105,130	105,335		100,154	91,917	−11,439
Hong Kong chinese	970,380	978,488	971,161	972,146	968,534		851,412	846,633	−123,747
Japanese	2,348	3,063	3,579	4,002	4,434		5,022	6,037	3,689
Foreigners and others	7,345	8,123	7,244	7,264	7,096		6,965	7,255	−90
total	980,073	989,674	981,984	983,412	980,064		863,399	859,925	−120,148

Nationality 1942 1943 Population increase/

Sources: ‘public Notice No. 12’, in Honkon senryo- chi so- tobu, Zongdubu gongbao 《總督部公報》 (Gazette of the Governor’s Office of the captured territory of Hong Kong), No. 21, Hong Kong, Honkon senryo- chi so- tobu, 10 October 1942; ‘public Notice No. 16’, in Honkon senryo- chi so- tobu, Zongdubu gongbao 《總督部公報》 (Gazette of the Governor’s Office of the captured territory of Hong Kong), No. 25, Hong Kong, Honkon

senryo- chi so- tobu, 20 November 1942; ‘public Notice No. 19’, in Honkon senryo- chi so- tobu, Zongdubu gongbao 《總督部公報》 (Gazette of the Governor’s Office of the captured territory of Hong Kong), No. 29, Hong

Kong, Honkon senryo- chi so- tobu, 31 December 1942; ‘public Notice No. 3’, in Honkon senryo- chi so- tobu, Zongdubu gongbao 《總督部公報》 (Gazette of the Governor’s Office of the captured territory of Hong Kong), No. 2, Hong Kong, Honkon senryo- chi so- tobu, 20 January 1943; ‘public Notice No. 4’, in Honkon senryo- chi so- tobu, Zongdubu gongbao 《總督部公報》 (Gazette of the Governor’s Office of the captured territory of Hong Kong), No. 5, Hong Kong, Honkon senryo- chi so- tobu, 20 February 1943; to- yo- Keizai Shinpo- sha, ed., Gunseika no Honkon: shinseisita Dai to- a no chu- kaku 《軍政下の香港：新生した大東亞の中核》 (Hong Kong under Military Rule: the Newborn Nucleus of Greater East Asia), Hong Kong, Honkon to- yo- Keizaisha, 1944, p.102.

102,349 had yet to claim their identity cards.44 Most researchers assessing the total population of Hong Kong in 1945 used this as a standard and concluded that Hong Kong’s population in 1945 was around 500,000.45 Such an estimate probably failed to cover all the residents of Hong Kong, as people such as those who were not willing to apply for an identity card, those whose work was secret in nature and the elderly were not able to or would not apply for an identity card. The ‘General Report on Hong Kong’, written by Brigadier MacDougall after the war in 1945, estimated that the population of Hong Kong was around 600,00046 in that year. This would appear to be more accurate. In just three years, Hong Kong’s population (including refugees) reduced by more than a million, achieving the target of the Japanese at the beginning of the occupation of attempting to cap the population at 750,000. This illustrated the effectiveness of the harsh measures employed by the Japanese in turning Hong Kong into a military port.

Population distribution

The districts were divided into four grades according to the size of their popula- tion: Grade 1 districts had over 100,000 residents, Grade 2 districts had 50,000

to 100,000, Grade 3 districts had 10,000 to 50,000, and Grade 4 districts had under 10,000 residents.47 There were only two to three Grade 1 districts in the whole of Hong Kong, one of which was the Central District on Hong Kong Island. Sheung Wan and Wan Chai, which used to be densely populated areas, only had some 40,000 residents. In Kowloon, Sham Shui Po was a Grade 1 district, while Yau Ma Tei was listed as a Grade 1 district in 1942, but became Grade 2 when its population was reduced to under 100,000 in 1943. There were not that many Grade 2 districts either, and they included Wan Chai on Hong Kong Island, and Mong Kok and Kowloon City in Kowloon. The remaining districts were Grade 3 or 4 districts, with a population of under 50,000. The total population of the New Territories was also around 100,000, and there were no Grade 1 or Grade 2 districts there. (See Table 3.3.)

The reduction in the resident population meant a corresponding decrease in demand for food and water resources. To make Hong Kong, where natural resources were lacking, self-sufficient in daily life, the Japanese also had to actively implement policies to raise the output value of fishery, agriculture and forestry.

44 Hongkong News, 28 April 1945.

45 R.G. Horsnell, ‘The MacIntosh Cathedrals’, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch, Volume 35, 1995, p.171.

46 CO129/592/24, Brig. MacDougall, ‘General Report on Hong Kong’, Future Policy – Immigration Control Policy, 2 November 1945.

47 Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 14 June 1942, p.2.

Table 3.3 The statistics on Hong Kong’s population by district (September 1942 – January 1943)

	District Bureau	Location	Sept 1942 (no. of persons)	Jan 1943 (no. of persons)	Grade
Hong	Nakaku	central	110,023	108,443	Grade 1
Kong	Higashiku	Wan chai	75,323	73,217	Grade 2
Island	Nishiku	Sheung Wan	47,214	45,883	Grade 3
	Shokiwanku	Shau Kei Wan	46,852	48,124	Grade 3
	Mizukiku	Sai Ying pun	43,776	42,763	Grade 3
	Kasugaku	Bowrington	34,350	32,083	Grade 3
	Kuramaeku	Sai Ying pun and	25,537	23,160	Grade 3
		Shek tong tsui
	Dorawanku	causeway Bay	23,451	21,774	Grade 3
	Motonminkaiku	Aberdeen	20,869	23,786	Grade 3
	Sanoku	Western	14,082	13,349	Grade 3
	Aubaku	Happy Valley	11,121	10,028	Grade 3
	Sakichiku	Stanley and Shek O	5,031	4,821	Grade 3
	Sub-total		457,629	447,431
Kowloon	Aoyamaku	Sham Shui po	112,321	107,820	Grade 1
	Katoriku	Yau Ma tei	103,475	99,612	Grade 1/2
	Daikakuku	Mong Kok	69,632	68,881	Grade 2
	Motoku	Kowloon city	57,186	58,117	Grade 2
	Yamashitaku	Hung Hom	24,474	26,279	Grade 3
	Yonatoku	tsim Sha tsui	14,850	13,784	Grade 3
	Keitokuku	Kowloon East	–	13,560	Grade 3
	Sanwanku	tsuen Wan	10,029	10,681	Grade 3
	Kashimaku	Kowloon tong	7,822	7,121	Grade 4
	Boat population		19,299	21,443
	Sub-total		419,088	427,298
New	Genroku	Un Long	37,955	38,184	Grade 3
territories	taipoku	taipo	18,430	18,303	Grade 3
	Josuiku	Sheungshui	15,058	14,874	Grade 3
	Shatoku	Shtaukok	11,672	11,717	Grade 3
	Saikoku	Saikung	8,900	10,853	Grade 3/4
	Sardenku	Sun tin	5,799	5,641	Grade 4
	Shadenku	Shatin	5,542	5,763	Grade 4
	Sub-total		103,356	105,335
total			980,073	980,064

Sources: public Notice No. 12, No. 19, No. 21, No. 25, No. 29, No. 31 of 1942, public Notice No. 2, No. 3 of 1943, in Honkon senryo- chi so- tobu, Zongdubu gongbao 《總督部公報》 (Gazette of the Governor’s Office of the captured territory of Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Honkon senryo- chi so- tobu, 1942, 1943.

Resource management

After occupying Hong Kong, the Japanese conducted a full assessment of mate- rials under the control of the British colonial government. On 20 July 1942, the Japanese Governor’s Office promulgated the Warehouse Act (also known as ‘The Regulations Governing Applications Concerning the Rights of Persons with Goods in Godowns Controlled by the Governor of the Occupied Territory of Hongkong’, Public Notification No. 46) claiming ownership of the materi- als in all the warehouses in Hong Kong, confiscating such supplies arbitrarily.48 According to the memoirs of Hirano Shigeru,

Hong Kong, as a huge warehouse for Britain’s trade in Asia, had stored up a copious amount of goods, materials and equipment from places such as Britain and Australia. The materials confiscated from the warehouses in Hong Kong

and Kowloon were rare and worth a total over one billion Japanese yen of the time. Radium was an expensive and rare element. A gram of radium was worth 2,000

Japanese yen, and Hong Kong stored an ample supply. Warehouses in Hong Kong were tightly packed and spanned two kilometres in length. There were in fact five times more warehouses in Hong Kong than from Tokyo to Yokohama. Once he became aware of this, Tojo Hideki immediately ordered the materials be sent back to Japan.49

The Japanese army then promptly enacted the Rules on Transporting Materials to and from Hong Kong, exerting strict control over the export of materials and thus control over resources.50

Agricultural arrangements

The Governor’s Office paid much attention to enhancing Hong Kong’s produc- tivity to avoid reliance on foreign materials, and strongly criticised the colonial government’s neglect of fertile land on Hong Kong Island and in Kowloon as unreasonable. On 2 August 1942, Chan Tiu-kum, the New Territories district officer, pointed out in an interview with a reporter that,

as the traffic was not completely restored to normal after the war, Hong Kong Island and Kowloon almost entirely relied on the New Territories for the supply of vegetables for a period of time. At the time, the population of the New Territories was 117,181, with 57,604 males and 59,581 females, and a total of 24,294

48 Xie Yongguang, Zhanshi Rijun zai Xianggang baoxing (Atrocities of the Japanese Army in Wartime Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Mingpao chubanshe, 1991, p.88.

49 Hirano Shigeru, ‘Women zai Xianggang de kezheng yu baoxing’ (Our Tyranny and Atrocities in Hong Kong), in Ling Ming, trans., Riben zhanfan huiyilu (Memoirs of Japanese War Criminals), Hong Kong, Sihai chubanshe, 1975, pp.52–53.

50 Hirano Shigeru, ‘Women zai Xianggang de kezheng yu baoxing’ (Our Tyranny and Atrocities in Hong Kong), in Ling Ming, trans., Riben zhanfan huiyilu (Memoirs of Japanese War Criminals), Hong Kong, Sihai chubanshe, 1975, pp.50–51.

households. Before the war, it was worthless for farmers to be engaged in farming

. . . because the British used the city as the centre. The post-war New Territories was transformed. Farmers no longer had to worry about selling the agricultural products they worked hard for, as they were in demand and commanded high prices. As a result, enhancing production and speeding up cultivation was the unanimous demand of farmers. Enhancing production and establishing the economic foundation of the New Territories is an important part of the policy for that area, and is also one of the objectives in building a new Hong Kong.51

In November 1942, official estimates placed the annual demand for vegetables in Hong Kong at around 50 million catties, more than half of which came from the Guangdong region. A five-year plan was thus drawn up to actively plant vegetables in the New Territories – with a budgeted planting of 600 jongbo (one jongbo equals roughly one hectare) per month – in the hope that the city would become self-sufficient in terms of vegetables within five years. There were also plans to plant sweet potatoes and the like on 1,000 jongbo of wasteland to be used as livestock feed,52 in order to promote the output value of animal husbandry. As residents from the city were purchasing rice from farmers in the New Territories, this caused a price hike for rice and resulted in the government forbidding the transport of rice out of a district. As for intra-district transport, a transport permit had to be obtained from the District Affairs Bureau first, or the rice in question would be confiscated by the Kempeitai and police and the persons involved severely punished.53 After a year of aggressive promotion of the agricultural industry, there were still newspaper reports on the import of food by the government by sea to satisfy Hong Kong’s needs in early 1943.54 As transport on the water was not yet fully restored after the war, food shortage remained a serious problem in 1945.

In 1942, Hong Kong’s water supply was clearly laid out in the Investigation Report on Hong Kong Waterworks compiled and written by Haraga Subaru.55 The Japanese military government was of the view that the British did not prop- erly manage water resources, which led to the abandonment of agriculture, and that this should be actively remedied. In February 1943, in order to improve farming practices, the Governor’s Office hired agricultural experts from Taiwan to conduct field studies in Hong Kong. The Governor’s Office also promoted plans for forestry planting in the New Territories and the nearby islands. These plans were implemented by the Home Affairs Department56 in order to achieve self-sufficiency in agricultural products. In July 1943, Toshimichi Asaeda, Head of the Division of Forestry and Fisheries of the Home Affairs Department, said:

51 Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 6 August 1942, p.2.

52 Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 8 November 1942, p.2.

53 Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 30 November 1942, p.2.

54 Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 29 January 1943, p.2.

55 Haraga Subaru, Honkon suidō chōsa hōkokusho (Investigation Report on Hong Kong Waterworks), Taiwan, Taiwan Sōtokufu Gaijibu, 1942.

56 Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 23 February 1943, p.3.

Agriculture in Hong Kong had been in a slump due to inferior farming methods. The issue of water source alone was a failure – utter reliance on rainfall meant it became helpless if there was no rain. Inappropriate application of fertilisers, a lack of attention on hoeing depth and no improvement on plant species were all factors

hampering development. From now on, the development of agriculture and forestry would be planned anew. The key focus will be on storage of water, application of fertilisers, and improvement of farming tools and plant species. There are plans to set up some sort of agricultural guidance occasions, where farmer representatives would receive onsite guidance. Agricultural clubs or groups in the villages are also planned for, where personnel sent by District Affairs Bureaus would teach farmers on the spot, so that these representatives could learn agricultural knowledge and return to their villages to provide guidance to other farmers.57

Measures that improved agriculture were then implemented based on the ideas of the Head of the Division of Forestry and Fisheries. In July 1943, the division set up an Agricultural Guidance Office in Fanling, where senior officer Kosawa taught residents about rice planting and fertilisation methods, as well as using cattle for ploughing. The office also provided necessary fertilis- ers to farmers. The Governor’s Office commissioned the Taiwan Development Company Ltd to operate the Tai Po Farm, converting some of the farmland used for growing fruits into paddy fields. The Governor’s Office also appointed Fukuoka Kanji, director of general affairs of the Nikko Development Farm, to develop some 60 to 70 acres (around 0.6 to 0.7 hectares) of farmland in Kam Tsin Village to demonstrate vegetable growing and keeping different kinds of livestock.58 The government also encouraged winter farming in the whole of the New Territories,59 storing up manure and cultivating wasteland.60 The race- course and the golf course in the New Territories, the airfield in Kam Tin61 and other private gardens were all converted into farmland to boost food production. This policy of so-called agricultural self-sufficiency was actually aimed at sat- isfying the basic needs of the Japanese living in Hong Kong. For instance, the planting of agricultural products required by the Japanese in their daily life was encouraged. From mid-1943, experimental farming stations were set up in the New Territories and on outlying islands to promote the growing of Japanese calrose rice.62 On 21 June 1943, a seminar on growing calrose rice was held in Fanling in the New Territories by the New Territories Farming, Husbandry and Gardening Group, Fanling Branch Office. Keisaburo (Head of the Division of

Agriculture of the Governor’s Office) said at the time that

the current problem of food shortages bears a significant relationship with agricultural production, which is a responsibility of the farmers. How then should

57 Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 10 July 1943, p.4.

58 Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 30 March 1943, p.4, 27 July 1943, p.4.

59 Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 14 October 1942, p.3.

60 Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 2 February 1943, p.2.

61 Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 27 July 1943, p.4.

62 Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 27 March 1944, p.4.

the agriculture industry develop? How can farmers increase production? These are all issues worth studying. This calrose rice planting activity greatly helps the development of the industry. At the same time, hopefully the farmers would studiously learn Japanese agricultural techniques with passion so as to widely promote the new method of planting calrose rice.63

Districts on Hong Kong Island, except commercial districts such as Central District and Western District, were all engaged in the development of agricul- ture. These districts covered areas including Causeway Bay, Shau Kei Wan, Chai Wan, Stanley and Aberdeen, and the planting of forests, grains, vegetables and calrose rice was introduced and promoted. With such policies actively encour- aging the development of the agricultural industry, there was indeed a slight increase in the harvest of agricultural products. However, it still proved insuf- ficient to meet local demand. In 1944, the harvest of ‘early crops’ failed to meet expectations, and this was blamed on bad weather.64

Afforestation plans

The Japanese set up a seedling nurturing authority in 1942, with the aim of developing Hong Kong into a model woodland zone of South China.65 In June 1943, Oyama was named the Head of the Department of Agriculture and Forestry. He implemented afforestation plans in the District Affairs Bureaus throughout Hong Kong and Kowloon,66 and transported a large number of sap- lings and seeds from Taiwan to Hong Kong. It was hoped that the effect of such measures would be seen within a year.67 Shau Kei Wan was chosen as the first district where afforestation was implemented, as it had a large amount of waste- land suited for this purpose.68 The saplings would then be distributed from Shau Kei Wan to other District Affairs Bureaus for test planting. It was planned that, within a decade, an area of 300 square miles around the hills would be planted with pines.

Government figures of 28 July 1943 showed that a total of 40 litres of seeds had been planted, among which were: 15 litres of acacia seeds, with 60,000 sap- lings for each litre, thus yielding a total of 900,000 acacia trees; 10 litres of silk tree seeds, with 6,000 saplings for each litre, yielding a total of 60,000 silk trees; and 15 litres of teak seeds, with 1,000 saplings for each litre, yielding a total of some 15,000 teak trees. Thus the 40 litres of seeds meant planting saplings of about 975,000 trees.69 Especially the acacia, where 900,000 trees would yield from 15 litres of seeds, proved to be most cost-effective. Even today, acacia trees can be seen everywhere, and yet the reasons for transplanting these trees from

63 Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 22 June 1943, p.2.

64 Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 17 August 1944, p.4.

65 Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 8 November 1942, p.2.

66 Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 20 June 1943, p.4.

67 Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 23 February 1943, p.3.

68 Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 20 June 1943, p.4.

69 Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 28 July 1943, p.4.

Taiwan to Hong Kong were neglected. In 1944, the Japanese military govern- ment initiated another afforestation campaign. In April that year, in support of the campaign, the staff of all District Affairs Bureaus were mobilised to lead by example in an intense afforestation operation. Different locations in various districts were also designated for the planting of seeds of white popinac trees. The plan was that, from the end of April to the end of May, a total of 40 litres of white popinac seeds (amounting to 240,000 trees) would be planted at various locations.70 Not only did the trees have a greening effect on the environment, but the timber was an important resource. Tree-planting in the districts was promoted for the purpose of increasing natural resources. However, before the trees grew up, the limited timber could only be reserved for military use, and the citizens of Hong Kong were prohibited from cutting down trees for wood.71 As firewood and charcoal were daily necessities for people at the time, the prohibi- tion order was controversial.

Transport hub

Transit hub for sea transport

As Hong Kong was a military port, its transport to the outside world was under the complete control of the Japanese military. Commercial vessels could not sail freely into or out of Hong Kong. The Japanese army also prohibited Chinese fishing boats (sampans) from undertaking maritime activities, allowing fishing boats to fish only at designated locations. On 10 December 1942, to cut off the smuggling of food and medicine between some fishing boats and Macao or through refugee repatriation vessels, the Japanese established the Sailing Vessel Trading Company to monitor trade between Hong Kong and neighbouring Mainland China.72

The Japanese set up warehouses and shipyards in Hong Kong, hoping to swiftly rebuild harbour facilities and restore the port’s transport functions,73 and to gain full control over incoming and outgoing goods. In 1942, Governor Rensuke Isogai stressed that ‘Hong Kong would become the central distribution point of resources in the south’.74 On 19 January 1943, while speaking through a Domei broadcast on the objectives in rebuilding Hong Kong, Rensuke Isogai noted that, as Hong Kong could not rely on Japan for human and other resources, the rebuilding had to be achieved by making use of local materials and human resources. Hong Kong also had to fulfil its role as a central distribution point of resources in the South Pacific through the use of locally made wooden

70 Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 13 April 1944, p.4.

71 Hirano Shigeru, ‘Women zai Xianggang de kezheng yu baoxing’ (Our Tyranny and Atrocities in Hong Kong), in Ling Ming, trans., Riben zhanfan huiyilu (Memoirs of Japanese War Criminals), Hong Kong, Sihai chubanshe, 1975, pp.53–54.

72 Robert S. Ward, Hong Kong under Japanese Occupation: A Case Study in the Enemy’s Techniques of Control, Washington, DC, 1943, p.79.

73 Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 19 December 1942, p.2.

74 Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 13 October 1942, p.2.

transport vessels and the appropriate allocation of materials. Therefore, the issue of shipbuilding had to be solved first, to be followed by improvement in harbour and warehouse facilities.75

Before the war, the large-scale shipyards in Hong Kong relied on steel imported from the East Asia region. During the Japanese occupation, the Hong Kong Governor’s Office was unable to obtain steel for building steel ships, and had to import rosewood from the Philippines and teak from Thailand and Burma (today’s Myanmar) to develop the shipbuilding industry.76 In October 1942, the government began building a large number of wooden motor sailing boats, while at the same time training sailors to handle these wooden boats by establishing seafarer training schools. Generally a ship could be built in 40 to 63 days. The plan was to build a few 150- to 250-tonne ships,77 and gradually develop Hong Kong into a transit terminal for goods as well as a shipbuilding hub.78 By the end of 1942, under the direct supervision of government depart- ments, wooden boats began transporting raw materials and commodities (such as oil, timber and rice) to the South Pacific region to assist in reconstruction.

From 1 April 1943, as the transit hub for the East Asia region, Hong Kong coordinated the trans-shipment of goods to and from northern and eastern China as well as South-east Asia: the routes of the East Asia Sea Transport Company’s ships sailing along the coast of China all ended at Hong Kong. The Dalian–Guangdong route, Tianjin–Guangdong route and Shanghai– Guangdong route were all abolished with effect from 1 April; all routes sailed to Hong Kong instead.79 Other small connected ports around Hong Kong, such as Shantou, Guangdong and Xiamen, had small vessels sailing to and from Hong Kong.80 Ships sailing along the south–north route, such as those travel- ling to Vietnam and Thailand with rice and to northern China with coal, would first berth at Hong Kong to save transport resources. The goods would then be loaded on to smaller vessels in Hong Kong and transported to their intended destination. Thus the idea of making Hong Kong a cargo hub port along the north–south route of the Pacific region was realised.

Expansion of the airport

The Kai Tak Airport, which was for both military and civilian use by 1930, had also increased in size, from 60 acres (24.3 hectares) in 1925 to 205 acres (83 hectares), and could accommodate the landing of larger planes and seaplanes.81 By the end of the 1930s, Kai Tak Airport, in preparation for the war, with fighter aircraft hidden nearby, anti-aircraft machine gun bunkers and air-raid shelters, was an important

75 Robert S. Ward, Hong Kong under Japanese Occupation: A Case Study in the Enemy’s Techniques of Control, Washington, DC, 1943, pp.79–80.

76 Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 19 December 1942, p.2.

77 Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 25 November 1942, p.2.

78 Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 18 December 1942, p.2.

79 Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 20 March 1943, p.3.

80 Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 1 April 1943, p.4.

81 CO129/511/13, ‘Extracts from Hong Kong Daily Press’.

military base in Hong Kong. In 1941, in order to enhance the combat capabili- ties of the airport, the British planned to build a concrete runway dedicated for military aircraft use. The runway was to be built in the vicinity of the large aircraft hangar on the waterfront, beside the take-off and landing ramp for seaplanes, and was to sit at 130 degrees and 500 yards (457.2 metres) long. Coincidentally, on the day that works were to begin, the Japanese attacked Hong Kong.

During the period of attack on Hong Kong by the Japanese, the airport was spared from major damage. After the fall of Hong Kong, Japanese military air- craft began taking off and landing in Kai Tak Airport. In mid-1942, after the Japanese army had successfully occupied many countries in South-east Asia, Hong Kong became an important transport hub for the deployment of resources for the Japanese army82 and for connecting Japan to the South-east Asia region,83 owing to its geographical location and air transport facilities. After occupying Hong Kong, the Japanese started fully testing the aviation facilities based on the official records of the colonial government by assessing existing flight control towers, airline offices, short- and medium-wave radio devices, direction finders, aviation weather stations, oil storage levels, night flight equipment and water landing gears,84 and proposed an expansion plan for the airport. The Japanese army was of the view that Kai Tak Airport, situated in the north-east of Kowloon Peninsula with only one south-facing runway, with the sea in front and hills behind, was too small to satisfy transport demand. They also thought that the air defence in the east and west corners was deficient, calling into question the airport’s ability to defend against enemies. It was therefore proposed that a new east–west runway, sitting at 70 degrees (almost perpendicular to the north– south runway), be built. The airport was to expand in size and be installed with control towers and radar transmission stations, with enhancement in aircraft’s take-off and landing efficiency as well as the monitoring of airspace.

The airport’s expansion plan necessitated the demolition of the original ter- minal building. It also required the expropriation of a large area of land, result- ing in the demolition of many houses and the displacement of occupants. At least some 20 villages – some 2,000 households of around 20,000 residents – were affected. In April 1942, buildings and hundreds of factories around Prince Edward Road and Sung Wong Toi, as well as villages in the vicinity of Sai Kung Road, were also designated as within the area of the airport and therefore required to be taken down.85 Kowloon City was quite severely affected, with 16 villages in the district being forced to move by 10 August 1942. In June 1942, the Japanese military ordered the residents and commercial establishments around

82 Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha, ed., Gunseika no Honkon: shinseisita Dai Tōa no chūkaku (Hong Kong under Military Rule: The Newborn Nucleus of Greater East Asia), Hong Kong, Honkon Tōyō Keizaisha, 1944, Ch.1, s.1.

83 Robert S. Ward, Hong Kong under Japanese Occupation: A Case Study in the Enemy’s Techniques of Control, Washington, DC, 1943, pp.74–75.

84 ‘Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of Colony of Hong Kong, 1938’, Hong Kong Administration Reports, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1939.

85 Ye Dewei et al., comps and eds, Xianggang lunxian shi (History of the Fall of Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Guangjiaojing chubanshe youxian gongsi, 1982, pp.103, 353.

the airport to organise a Kai Tak Airport Expansion Works Committee for Post- relocation Assistance to Residents and to form a Model Village Construction Guidance Committee, in order to help the Japanese military complete its ‘great airport’ construction project. Local residents were forced to relocate to residen- tial areas designated by the Japanese military.86

The Japanese government built two new villages in Kowloon Tong and Sheung Shui – New Kowloon Tong Model Village and New Lo Wu Model Village – to rehouse residents of Kowloon City. The New Kowloon Village was constructed under the purview of Yamashita Ichikawa, former Deputy Director of the Kowloon District Affairs Bureau. Occupying an area of some 380 acres87 (about 3.8 hectares), the village housed 106 households of around 700 resi- dents. On average, each household was entitled to three acres (about 297.5 square metres) of land for farming. It was reported in the official Japanese news- paper that, ‘as harvest could come easily, the residents should use half of the land to plant taros and potatoes for food, and the other half for vegetables’. Apart from farming, they raised chickens and ducks.

The New Lo Wu Village was also known as the New Territories New Village or the New Territories Model Village, and was situated at the old British barracks at Lo Wu in Sheung Shui, New Territories. The village occupied an area of 200,000 tsubo, equivalent to 1.2 million Chinese square feet. Each household was allocated fields where they could farm for food, and they were described by the Japanese as ‘pioneers in developing the wasteland in the New Territories’. On 27 February 1943, residents officially moved into the village upon completion of works on water and electricity facilities. As the affected residents were prioritised for rehous- ing, it was difficult to accommodate all applicants. Applicants therefore had to reg- ister and be vetted by the Model Village Construction Guidance Committee. Only those who had an actual residence or business in the demolished areas would be eligible for registration. The residents were reviewed based on two criteria. First, only those who were already on the local register would be eligible. And those on the local register were divided into full farmers and semi-farmers, with full farmers having priority over semi-farmers. Second, the number of properties owned by applicants would be considered when determining their eligibility.88

In September 1942, although the housing issue of residents affected by the demolition and relocation remained unresolved, the military government went ahead and began the expansion works for the Kai Tak Airport. The Hong Kong Airport Building Committee was set up, with Arisue, Chief of Staff of the Governor’s Office, appointed as chairman, and 21 officials from various departments as well as army and navy officers as committee members. On 10 September 1942, Chief of Staff Arisue presided over the ground-breaking cer- emony for the airport expansion. The expansion works began on 15 September,

86 Xie Yongguang, Zhanshi Rijun zai Xianggang baoxing (Atrocities of the Japanese Army in Wartime Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Mingpao chubanshe, 1991, p.128.

87 1 acre in Japanese or Taiwanese units of measurement is equivalent to 0.99174 hectares in the metric system.

88 Xianggang ribao (Hong Kong Daily), 27 February 1943, p.3, 13 June 1943, p.4.

with Dolly Gray leading 800 prisoners of war from the Sham Shui Po camp to start on the works. By 25 September, the number of civilian workers had risen to 1,600. Owing to the arduous nature of the work, more and more workers were engaged in the project. By 1 October, a total of 4,000 workers were taking part in the expansion works.89 In early 1944, the airport was attacked by the American military while the expansion works were in progress. The expansion works were completed in 1945. The airport area more than doubled in size to 376 acres (152.3 hectares). The airport runway had a weight-bearing capacity of 70,000 pounds, allowing large aircraft such as Skymasters and Lancastrians to take off and land. The 4,580 feet (1,386 metres) long, 321 feet (98 metres) wide, 13/31 runway was busier than the 4,730 feet (1,442 metres) long, 221 feet (67 metres) wide, 07/25 runway.90 Apart from the two runways, the airport’s new construc- tions included the control tower for the Japanese air force on a small hill north of the airport, the U-shaped mobile hangars on the eastern, western and north- ern sides of the airport, the Japanese air force hangars north of the airport’s perimeter (today’s Tai Hom Village), the concealed machine gun bunkers, and the Kai Tak Nullah and road facilities built in coordination with the airport’s development91 (see Figure 3.2). Expanded with military purposes in mind, Kai Tak Airport nevertheless failed to reverse the fortunes of the Japanese army. The Japanese surrendered unconditionally in August 1945.

Summary

In just three years and eight months, the Japanese rejected Hong Kong’s pre-war development experience, making drastic changes to the city in order to forge Hong Kong into Japan’s transport hub in the Pacific region, as well as a resource supply station for its Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Faced with the dif- ficulty of lacking natural resources in Hong Kong, the Japanese had to employ two-pronged measures that would tap new resources and reduce expenditure. In terms of tapping new resources, local resources such as the agriculture and for- estry industry were aggressively developed. As for economising on expenditure, the Japanese tackled this by reducing the resident population. The Japanese mili- tary rule was criticised both locally and internationally. Before the Japanese occu- pation, Hong Kong was an important economic and trading base for Britain in the Pacific region. When the British ruled Hong Kong, they held British interests in the Pacific region as the priority. They handled Hong Kong’s economic devel- opment issues with caution, employing a policy of appeasement to allow tradi- tional Chinese culture to continue to survive in Hong Kong. There was hardly

89 ‘Work on Kai Tak Airfield Breaking the Sod Ceremony’, Hongkong News, 11 September 1942, p.3; Charles Eather, Airport of the Nine Dragons: Kai Tak, Kowloon, Surfers Paradise, QLD, Chingchic Publishers, 1996, p.47.

90 Charles Eather, Airport of the Nine Dragons: Kai Tak, Kowloon, Surfers Paradise, QLD, Chingchic Publishers, 1996, p.53.

91 Wu Bangmou, comp. and ed., Zaikan qide: cong rizhanshiqi shuoqi (Looking again at Kai Tak: Starting from the Japanese Occupation Period), Hong Kong, ZKOOB, 2009, pp.54–56.

Source: HKRS115-1-43, ‘Airport – Kai tak – General Layout (1948)’, enclosure 50.

Figure 3.2 Layout plan of Kai Tak Airport after expansion (1948)

any concerted civilian effort to oppose the British colonial government. The gov- erning strategy of the Japanese, however, was not economy-based, but was aimed at the swift unification of the Greater East Asia region. It was therefore necessary for the Japanese to employ military means. The oppressive military rule utterly strangled local culture and failed to consider whether they succeeded in winning the minds of the local people. During the three-year, eight-month period under the rule of the Japanese, countless documents and files were burnt, and numerous monuments and cultural relics were irreparably damaged.

Of the harsh policies of military rule forcibly implemented by the Japanese, the population policy was certainly the most effective – solving the thorny gov- ernance problems in densely populated communities simply by massacre or expulsion. The policy over-achieved its target in just a few years. The distribu- tion of districts also applied no consideration other than ensuring the safety and satisfying the daily needs of the Japanese. The daily life issues of the local popula- tion were neglected, with the locals treated as second-class citizens. Japan did not consider the economic and reputational loss that the country would suffer as a result of the damage caused to an invaded territory, because Japan’s aim at the time was to make use of occupied Hong Kong to gain control of the whole of South-east Asia. Using Hong Kong’s advantageous geographical location to develop trade was no longer the focus of the city’s development. As opening up to foreign trade would make the situation difficult to control, commercial activi- ties were completely forbidden. Even Hong Kong’s transport with the outside world was subject to absolute control.

To make the city self-sufficient in resources, the forestry and agricultural industry was vigorously promoted. Although the effort was ineffective, the push presented an alternative development possibility. After the war, the colonial government actively developed agriculture in the New Territories, hoping to develop the New Territories into the hinterland for the urban areas. This was to a certain extent influenced by the Japanese military government. To increase resources, the Japanese engaged Taiwanese forestry and agricultural experts and planted acacia trees and silk trees in all the districts on Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and the New Territories. To this day, these trees are spread all over different districts in Hong Kong. Of all the Japanese infrastructure investments in Hong Kong, the Kai Tak Airport in Kowloon City stood out as the most significant one. By forcibly displacing residents of various districts, the airport expansion project was given ample space for development. When develop- ing the aviation industry after the war, the government naturally drew refer- ence from the Japanese expansion blueprint for Kai Tak Airport. The airport remained Hong Kong’s centre of air transport until 1997.

For Hong Kong, the greatest damage brought about by the war was of course casualties. Those who survived were left destitute and homeless, while the city lived in fear under an oppressive tyranny. It was difficult for post-war reconstruc- tion work to begin. The city was burdened with indelible and painful memories of this period of history.

4

High-density development planning (1945–1979)

Hong Kong is built on a steep rock, which means that Town Planning there presents problems of considerable interest as well as difficulty. There was need, even before the war, for the redevelopment of the old part of Victoria when Chinese housing conditions were recognized as bad, and in other places, the damage caused by the war offers a notable opportunity, of which we are anxious to take the fullest advantage, for carrying out improvements. It is, of course, also essential that the Colony’s natural harbour, and port facilities should be

preserved and developed on the right lines, since Hong Kong is the focal point of our trade in the Far East and its entrepôt trade plays a large part in the economy of the territory. (CO129/614/2, Despatch from Colonial Office to Sir Patrick Abercrombie, in ‘Appointment of Town Planner, Visit of Sir P. Abercrombie’,

No. 54298/1/47, 24 March 1947)

The scale of Hong Kong as a city in the early twenty-first century widely differs from that in the mid-nineteenth century. And yet the efforts of early post-war town planners working to modernise Hong Kong can be seen everywhere. Tracing the source of such efforts, it is apparent that the long-term planning blueprints from the early years after the war proved to have far-reaching effects. In 1948, an urban development proposal for the second half of the twentieth century that was prepared by Patrick Abercrombie, a British town planning expert, discussed in comprehensive detail the future development potential of the city. Faced with post-war problems including turbulent political circum- stances, economic crises and a lack of resources, as well as the livelihood needs of society and ceaseless political bickering, was the ideal blueprint realised in time? How much of this ideal blueprint was substantially altered, or completely abandoned? The unravelling of the early post-war planning blueprint, analysis of how planning influenced the city’s development in the following decades, and consideration of how the government amended the planning blueprint made by town planning experts according to the circumstances at the time could perhaps allow us to ponder the significance of the planning experience half a century ago for the future development of Hong Kong, thus strengthening our understand- ing of the city’s long-term planning.

Long-term planning

Post-war reconstruction efforts had been difficult, given political issues such as the independence of colonies around the world, the Chinese Civil War and the Cold War, as well as the challenges brought on by a lack of economic resources and the incessant influx of immigrants into Hong Kong. In November 1946, in order to solve the housing and public health issues that had long plagued the city’s development, Governor Mark Aitchison Young, together with the Post-war Building Reconstruction Advisory Committee, applied to the British Colonial Office to use the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund (established in 1945) to invite British town planning experts to Hong Kong and prepare the development blueprint of Hong Kong for the next 50 years. In March 1947, the British Ministry of Town and Country Planning considered that five town plan- ning experts were qualified to advise on the post-war town planning of Hong Kong. These five experts were: William G. Holdford; James A. Stewart, chief engineer of the Calcutta (now known as Kolkata) Improvement Trust; Clifford Holliday, a planner of Haifa, Ceylon (now known as Sri Lanka) and Gibraltar; Max Lock, a young engineer; and Patrick Abercrombie (1879–1957) from the University of London. Stewart and Abercrombie had previously participated in the Greater London planning project and had a wealth of experience to offer. In particular, Abercrombie had experience in planning for different areas, even other colonies such as Cyprus, and compared favourably against the other nomi- nees in terms both of qualifications and of reputation. It was also more costly to hire him than the other nominees. Governor Young did not let cost dictate his choice, and decided to appoint Abercrombie as the consultant.1

In March 1947, when Abercrombie was officially engaged as a consultant for Hong Kong’s long-term town planning, the Colonial Office clearly stated the two issues that he had to contend with: 1) in light of Hong Kong’s rugged terrain and old and damaged pre-war houses, the problems caused by the rapid rise in the population; 2) a strategy for Hong Kong to become Britain’s trade strong- hold in the East Asia region. It was hoped that Abercrombie could formulate long-term development strategies in view of these characteristics and elevate Hong Kong’s international status. In March of the same year, Abercrombie held detailed discussions with Governor-Designate Sir Alexander Grantham, and promised to come to Hong Kong in the autumn to advise on the development of the harbour and the city. In October 1947, 1,250 pounds sterling was allo- cated from the 1 million pounds sterling reserve of the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund to invite Abercrombie to come to Hong Kong for a six-week visit. As the government attached great importance to this town planning work, it established for the first time a Town Planning Office under the Public Works Department before Abercrombie’s arrival to coordinate with his brief visit. Human resources were allocated to conduct field studies and collect data in various districts in preparation for planning work.

1 CO129/614/2, ‘Appointment of Town Planner, Visit of Sir P. Abercrombie’, July 1946.

Abercrombie’s planning blueprint

The long-term planning report issued by Abercrombie in 1948 was only 23 pages long. Yet each word of the report was a gem and hit the nail on the head. Abercrombie first stated that, as resources were limited after the war and given the unique geographical environment of Hong Kong, planning had to first focus on resolving the most urgent needs of the time. He pointed out that the planning of a district had to take both short-term and long-term needs into consideration, and could be readjusted in the future according to the amount of resources. As an entry point, the report addressed the two main problems of urban develop- ment raised in the letter of the Colonial Office in March 1947 – housing and population. The report agreed that, with a severe lack of land in the core districts and a continuous influx of population, Hong Kong’s town planning could not draw reference from the experience of other major cities, such as the develop- ment of suburbs in London, the development of land outside the peninsula of New York City, and the design patterns of other cities such as those of Sri Lanka. The planning approaches of these cities were not able to solve Hong Kong’s problem of an ever increasing population. In order to enhance Hong Kong’s trading position in the East Asia region and strengthen its advantages as an entrepôt, while at the same time diverting the population of the urban areas to somewhere else, the report suggested three focuses: 1) to improve the city’s internal and external transport, including port facilities, road networks, tunnels and railways; 2) to develop the suburbs and expand the space available for development in the city, as well as to solve the problems of housing, public space distribution and inadequate ancillary facilities brought on by the popula- tion increase, so as to achieve a reasonable population density; 3) to improve urban planning legislation and mechanisms, design the distribution of govern- mental, commercial, industrial and residential land uses, and rationally face the city’s inherent deficiencies, in order to bring the city forward. Abercrombie’s proposals, based on his abundant experience in town planning and drawing on the development experience of different regions around the world, were fully endorsed by government departments at the time. His ideas thus became the basic concepts of the city’s development in the decades that followed.2

Further analysis of Abercrombie’s designs revealed that the proposal to improve harbour transport was primarily based on David Owen’s harbour plan of 1941, which focused on the piers and ancillary facilities on both sides of Victoria Harbour. Of the piers connecting Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula, apart from those connecting Central and Tsim Sha Tsui, the piers connecting North Point with Hung Hom and Kowloon City, as well as those connecting Wan Chai and Jordan, were all focuses of development, as the majority of industrial and commercial activities would be expanded to the above districts. As for railways, it was proposed that the section from Kowloon Tong to

2 CO129, Memorandum of 25 August 1950 from the Financial Secretary to the Deputy Colonial Secretary in BL/1/5281/50, PRO, Hong Kong.

Tsim Sha Tsui be abolished, and a line running along Nathan Road, Reclamation Street in Yau Ma Tei and Public Square Street in the west of the Kowloon Peninsula be constructed to tie in with the development of the area around Yau Ma Tei and Jordan. Among Abercrombie’s proposals, the construction of a cross-harbour tunnel was one of the more forward-looking. Although the pro- posed design of the road networks at the exits on both sides of the harbour was different from what we have today (the proposed exit on Hong Kong Island was in Central, while the proposed exit in Kowloon was in Tsim Sha Tsui, diverging into Hung Hom and Yau Ma Tei), the exits and the road networks were concen- trated on the northern coast of Hong Kong Island and the southern end of the Kowloon Peninsula. The future development of harbour transport was to centre around the pre-war urban districts, and it would not be necessary to actively develop the New Territories.

Dispersing the population was a centrepiece of Abercrombie’s urban planning. In the 1944 Greater London Plan, Abercrombie proposed measures to disperse the population in overcrowded districts, including adding public space, moving industrial areas to transport interchanges, and redistributing the population and industries.3 The long-term planning he devised for Hong Kong in 1948 showed all the above characteristics. According to Abercrombie’s estimates, Hong Kong had a total population of about 1.5 million in 1948, with around 1 million on Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula, approximately 300,000 in the New Territories, and a floating population of about 200,000. It was estimated that by 1961 the population of Hong Kong would grow to 2 million, and that the Kowloon Peninsula and New Kowloon would be the sources of land supply that would bring the density of urban population down to a reasonable level in the following few decades.

The natural appearance of the land from north of the mountain ranges in Kowloon to south of the Shenzhen River was kept to serve as the city’s hinter- land, providing the urban areas with food, water sources, and leisure grounds and space for outdoor activities. It would not be densely developed. It was proposed that a few districts would be chosen in the New Territories to be developed as satellite cities, which included Tsuen Wan and Gin Drinkers Bay. Districts which were within the New Territories but had since been renamed as New Kowloon, including Kwun Tong, east Ho Man Tin, east Kowloon Tsai, west Kowloon Tong, Castle Peak Road and the northern part of Kai Tak dis- trict, could accommodate additional population. Hung Hom on the Kowloon Peninsula, with its land area expanded by reclamation, could also contribute to the dispersion of people from overcrowded districts. It was estimated that the nine development districts in Hong Kong could provide about 1,993 acres (807.17 hectares) of land for development and support some 600,000 people, of whom around 500,000 would be new population, and 100,000 would be those diverted from densely populated districts on Hong Kong Island. This would alleviate overcrowding in densely populated districts such as the stretch from

3 Patrick Abercrombie, The Greater London Plan 1944, London, HMSO, 1945, p.v.

Table 4.1 The area and population capacity of the major development areas assessed by Abercrombie (1961)

District Area

(acre (hectare))

Population capacity (million)

East of Ho Man tin	200 (81.0)	5.7
Kau Lung tsui East	325 (131.63)	9.27
Kowloon tong West	275 (111.38)	7.85
castle peak Road area	125 (50.63)	3.56
Kun tong Reclamation	175 (70.88)	5
Hung Hom Reclamation	150 (60.75)	7.5
Gin Drinkers Bay	200 (81.00)	5.7
tsuen Wan	193 (78.17)	5.5
Overspill north of Kai tak	350 (141.75)	10
total	1,993 (807.17)	60.08

Source: patrick Abercrombie, Hong Kong Preliminary Planning Report, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1948, p.6.

Hennessy Road to Gloucester Road in Wan Chai, where the population density could reach as high as 2,000 people per acre (0.405 hectares),4 and reduce the population density of Hong Kong to 300 people per acre. Three-quarters of an acre (0.304 hectares) of public space was to be reserved for every 1,000 people for use as shops, recreation space, schools and medical facilities. The aim of these proposals was to improve the overcrowded living environment and allow for a more reasonable level of living space. (See Table 4.1.)

Abercrombie’s population dispersion plan was still based upon the city’s core districts. The main purpose for developing New Kowloon and satellite cities in the New Territories was to complement the then existent core districts. This was partly due to the fact that Abercrombie had not foreseen the rapid population growth of the 1950s and 1960s. In fact, by 1961, the population of Hong Kong had grown to 3.13 million. (See Figure 4.1.)

Abercrombie also gave careful consideration to the distribution of land use by the government, commerce, light and heavy industries and even the offensive trades. Central remained the political and commercial centre, fulfilling its leading cultural and political role in the city. Exuding the characteristics of a modern metropolis, the district had landmark buildings that would aim to accentuate the city’s style. Industries could be developed in East Point, North Point and Shau Kei Wan at the eastern end of Hong Kong Island, while slaughterhouses and offensive trades could be set up in Sai Wan.5 On the Kowloon side, Ma Tau Kok in east Kowloon could also be used for the development of industries, with Tai Wan in Hung Hom serving as a distribution centre for transport and

4 Dr Fehily’s study pointed out that, in some densely populated areas, the population density was as high as 2,268 per acre. Patrick Abercrombie, Hong Kong Preliminary Planning Report, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1948, p.7.

5 Patrick Abercrombie, Hong Kong Preliminary Planning Report, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1948, p.10.

Source: The Shape of Things to Come: An Overview of the Role of Harbour Reclamations in the Future Development of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, planning, Environment and Lands Branch, 1995, p.39.

Figure 4.1 Abercrombie’s plan for Hong Kong planning (1948)

logistics, and Yau Ma Tei as a light industry and commercial district. Lai Chi Kok and Cheung Sha Wan in west Kowloon could be used to develop indus- tries, with Cheung Sha Wan acting as a base for offensive trades. On the basis of population distribution and number of factories in different districts in the future, traffic flows would be formulated and assessment be made on the air pol- lution problems caused by industrial production. Planning in the districts would be more effective in controlling land use and population distribution than the mixed commercial and residential development approach employed before the war, and would stimulate economic growth.

Although Abercrombie’s forecasts and his proposed countermeasures were not completely realised, the issues and solutions he raised were excellent points of reference for the city’s future planning work. In particular, the method of using basic information for long-term planning assessment continues to be adopted to this day.

The Planning Department and its predecessors

In 1947, to tie in with Abercrombie’s work on town planning, the Public Works Department established the Town Planning Office to start gathering infor- mation. This heralded the organisation of town planning work in a systematic manner. The responsibilities of the Town Planning Office included formulating the land uses, development blueprints and reclamation plans of the districts, such as the industrial development plan for Kwun Tong in New Kowloon, as well as the development blueprints of the New Territories (such as Tsuen Wan) to be provided to the New Territories District Offices.6 These plans were more suited to the city’s long-term development needs than the focus on notions of safeguarding public health, safety and interests that were current before the war. In 1953, the Public Works Department reorganised the Town Planning Office and established a Planning Branch under its Crown Lands and Surveys Office for the first time. The branch would be responsible for town planning affairs, with a new responsibility of coordinating the views of various govern- ment departments and drafting blueprints for future urban development. In 1953, Hong Kong’s urban areas (including Hong Kong Island and Kowloon) were divided into 32 planning districts,7 and, by 1954, 18 of the districts had development blueprints formulated. In 1957, the number of urban planning dis- tricts increased to 37, of which 33 were undergoing planning by 1959. The draft planning blueprints for all the districts in Hong Kong were mostly completed by the 1970s, and the distribution of the planning districts is as shown in Table 4.2. In the 1960s, there was an avid demand for industrial land. To cater for long- term planning and development, the Crown Lands and Surveys Office under the Public Works Department used statistics from the Commerce and Industry

6 ‘Industrial Lay-outs Were Prepared for an Area at Tsun Wan and Kun Tong (1st Section)’, Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1947, p.42.

7 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1952, p.20.

Table 4.2 Distribution of the planning areas in the urban area of Hong Kong (1953–2015)

Planning area no.

Distribution in 1953–1970s Distribution in 2015

Hong Kong planning area:

HKpA No. 1 Kennedy town HKpA No. 2 Sai Ying pun HKpA No. 3 Sheung Wan HKpA No. 4 central District HKpA No. 5 Wanchai HKpA No. 6 causeway Bay

HKpA No. 7 Wong Nai chung HKpA No. 8 North point HKpA No. 9 Shau Kei Wan

HKpA No. 10 Mount Davis (1962–1963)/pok Fu Lam (1969–1970)

HKpA No. 11 Mid-Level 1 (1972–1973)

HKpA No. 12 Bowen Road Area

HKpA No. 13 tai Hang Road and Jardine’s Lookout

HKpA No. 14 the peak Area

HKpA No .15 Aberdeen and Ap Lei chau

HKpA No. 16 Little Hong Kong (Wong chuk Hang)

HKpA No. 17 Wong Nai chung Gap HKpA No. 18 tai tam and Shek O HKpA No. 19 Stanley

HKpA No. 20 chai Wan HKpA No. 21 Quarry Bay HKpA No. 22 –

HKpA No. 23 – HKpA No. 24 – HKpA No. 25 –

Kowloon planning area:

KpA No. 1 tsim Sha tsui KpA No. 2 Yau Ma tei

KpA No. 3 tai Kok tsui

KpA No. 4 Shek Kip Mei and Kowloon

tong (1963–1964)/Shek Kip Mei (1969–1970)

KpA No. 5 cheung Sha Wan

KpA No. 6 Mong Kok and Yau Ma tei (East) KpA No. 7 Mong Kok

KpA No. 8 Kowloon city (1960–1961)/Kowloon

tong and Kowloon city (1969–1970)/ Wang tau Hom and tung tau (1970–1971)

Kennedy town and Mount Davis HKpA No. 2 merged into HKpA No. 3 Sai Ying pun and Sheung Wan central District

Wanchai causeway Bay Wong Nai chung North point

Shau Kei Wan pok Fu Lam

Mid-Levels West Mid-Levels East

Jardine’s Lookout and Wong Nai chung Gap

the peak Area

Aberdeen and Ap Lei chau HKpA No. 16 merged into HKpA No. 15

Shouson Hill and Repulse Bay tai tam and Shek O

Stanley chai Wan Quarry Bay

Siu Sai Wan* Mount Butler**

central District (extension)

Wan chai North

tsim Sha tsui Yau Ma tei Mong Kok Shek Kip Mei

cheung Sha Wan Ho Man tin

KpA No. 7 merged into KpA No. 6 Wang tau Hom and tung tau

Table 4.2 (continued)

Planning area no.

Distribution in 1953–1970s Distribution in 2015

KpA No. 9 Hung Hom Hung Hom

KpA No. 10 Ma tau Kok Ma tau Kok

KpA No. 11 Diamond Hill (1960–1961)/Kai tak

(1965–1966)/Diamond Hill and tsz Wan Shan (1969–1970)/tsz Wan Shan, Diamond Hill and San po Kong

tsz Wan Shan, Diamond Hill and San po Kong

KpA No. 12 Ngau chi Wan Ngau chi Wan

KpA No. 13 Ngau tau Kok Ngau tau Kok and Kowloon Bay

KpA No. 14 Kwun tong K14N: Kwun tong North K14S: Kwun tong South

KpA No. 15 Sam Ka tsuen (1965–1966)/cha

Kwo Ling, Yau tong, Lei Yue Mun (1966–1967)

KpA No. 16 Lai chi Kok and Kau Wa Keng (1965– 1967)/Lai chi Kok (1974–1975)

cha Kwo Ling, Yau tong, Lei Yue Mun

Lai chi Kok

KpA No. 17 Kowloon Bay Reclamation Area KpA No. 17 merged into KpA No. 13 KpA No. 18 Kowloon tong Kowloon tong

KpA No. 20 – South West Kowloon

KpA No. 22 – Kai tak

Notes: * Siu Sai Wan is covered by chai Wan Outline Zoning plan. ** Mount Butler is not covered by any outline zoning plan, as it is located within the country park.

Sources: planning Department internal information; Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works for the Financial Years 1946–1976, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1947–1976; Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 1854–1997; Statutory Planning Portal: http://www.ozp.tpb.gov.hk/.

Department and censuses to enhance the feasibility of planning and design the distribution of industrial and residential areas, the density and construc- tion quality of residential housing, and large-scale infrastructure such as reser- voirs, water supply systems and electricity supply facilities, community service facilities and other ancillary facilities in accordance with the needs of economic development. The aim was to match the labour force supply and daily living needs of different districts. On the one hand, planning required the coordina- tion of the opinions of different government departments. On the other hand, public consultation was needed for affairs including the review of the distribu- tion of offensive trades such as ship-breaking, bleaching and dyeing, and fishing, the proportion of public space, and reclamation works. Town planning work became much more comprehensive and detailed than that before the war.

In 1965, the Crown Lands and Surveys Office had three sections: 1) Urban and South New Territories; 2) Tsuen Wan, Yuen Long and Tai Po; and

3) Colony Outline Planning Section, to assist the government in finding land for building residential housing and satisfying the needs of industrial development. The government also announced the locations of five new towns in the same

year. In 1973, the Public Works Department established the New Territories Development Department internally. In the same year, the Planning Branch was elevated into an independent unit within the Public Works Department, and was renamed the Town Planning Office. In 1980, the Urban Planning and Development Strategy Section was established under the Lands, Survey and Town Planning Department. In 1982, the Town Planning Office was reorganised and became the newly established Town Planning Division under the purview of the Lands Department. In 1986, the Town Planning Division was renamed the Town Planning Office, under the jurisdiction of the then newly established Buildings and Lands Department, while the New Territories Development Department and the Urban Planning Development Division merged and became the Territory Development Department. On 1 January 1990, the Planning Department was established under the Planning, Environment and Lands Branch, merging all planning functions undertaken by the Town Planning Office, the Strategic Planning Unit, and the various development offices under the Territory Development Department as its responsibilities.8 The Planning Department was responsible for drafting all kinds of plans that provided guid- ance on the appropriate use and development of land. The types of plans were numerous, from development strategies for the whole of Hong Kong to detailed development blueprints of individual districts. As cooperation with Mainland China grew, the Planning Department also maintained close contact with neigh- bouring provinces and cities to jointly handle cross-border planning and devel- opment issues. In addition, the Planning Department provided services to the Town Planning Board.

Gaining public support to planning through open discussion and consultation is an important part of the town planning development process, and assumes an important role in a city’s long-term development. The Committee in charge of town planning was established in 1922, and consisted of nine members, with the Director of Public Works acting as Chairman, and the rest of the members being government officers and non-officials. In 1939, the Town Planning Board was established, and the number of members was increased to 12, with the Chairman of the Urban Council acting as Chairman of the Committee. Planning blue- prints had to be reviewed by the Committee before the war. In December 1941, town planning work was forced to a halt because of the war.

In May 1946, less than one year after the war, the Town Planning Ordinance was restored and the work of the Town Planning Board resumed. On 12 July 1947, the government reappointed the members of the Town Planning Board in accordance with the Town Planning Ordinance.9 In 1947, the reactivated Town Planning Board continued to have five members, with the Director of Public Works again appointed as the Chairman and a government official serving as the Secretary. The rest of the members were non-official members, including

8 Hong Kong Planning Department, Planning Hong Kong 50th Anniversary, Hong Kong, Planning Department, 1998, p.63.

9 ‘New Town Planning Board Named’, Hong Kong Sunday Herald, 13 July 1947; Hong Kong Planning Department, Planning Hong Kong 50th Anniversary, Hong Kong, Planning Department, 1998, p.39.

a structural engineer, two surveyors and an architect. The number of members increased with the expanding scale of development of the city. In 1976 there were 16 members, and in 1978 more than half of the Board were non-official members. In the 1990s, the Town Planning Board substantially expanded, and the number of members increased from 15 in 1988 to 23 in 1990 and to 29 in 1991, with the majority being non-official members. Between 2000 and 2002 the number of members rose to 44, 37 of whom were non-official members. For 2010–2012, the Town Planning Board consisted of 36 members, with 30 non- official members and 6 official members. The number of non-official members was reduced to 29 in 2012–2014, with no change in the number of official members. For 2014–2016, the number of non-official members rose back to 30, and the number of official members remained at 6. Non-official representatives far outnumbered official ones.10

The chairmanship of the Town Planning Board had always been held by the Director of Public Works. The Public Works Department was upgraded and became the Lands and Works Branch in 1982. It was reorganised as the Planning, Environment and Lands Bureau in 1998, and since then the chairman- ship of the Town Planning Board has been assumed by the Permanent Secretary in charge of planning, environment and lands. The official members were mainly heads of relevant public works departments serving as representatives, includ- ing the Planning Department, Housing Bureau, Lands Department, Transport Bureau, Environmental Protection Department and Home Affairs Department. The post of Vice-Chairman had been in place since 1961, and would be assumed by the head of one of the units under the Public Works Department. Since 2004, the position of Vice-Chairman has been assumed by a non-official member, instead of the previous practice of the position being occupied by a govern- ment official. Before the 1980s, non-official members were professional archi- tects, surveyors, or professionals well versed in engineering. Since the 1990s, members have been drawn from a wide range of occupations, with academics from tertiary institutions, engineers, architects, surveyors, business leaders and lawyers being the most common. (See Table 4.3.)

Amendments to the Town Planning Ordinance

The Town Planning Ordinance, promulgated in 1939, gave the Town Planning Board full statutory power. Because of the war, the Executive Council only restored the Town Planning Ordinance in 1950 to carry out long-term develop- ment planning in accordance with the government’s economic capacity and societal needs. When development blueprints involved public or private inter- ests, some buffer time would have to be set aside for consultations in order to gain public support for the development plans. Therefore, the Town Planning Ordinance had to be amended from time to time based on the needs of the society.

10 Government Press Release: On 28 March 2014, the Chief Executive appointed six official and 30 non- official members to the Town Planning Board.

Table 4.3 Total number and terms of office of Town Planning Board members (1947–2016)

Year	Total no.	Official	Non-official	Period (no. of years)
1947	5	1	4	–
1954	6	4	2	1
1955–1956	7	3	4	1
1956–1957	7	4	3	1
1957–1958	8	5	3	1
1958–1959	8	5	3	1
1959–1960	8	5	3	1
1960–1961	8	5	3	1
1961–1962	9	6	3	1
1962–1965	9	6	3	3
1965–1968	9	6	3	3
1968–1971	10	7	3	3
1971–1974	9	7	2	3
1974–1976	14	9	5	2
1976–1978	16	9	7	2
1978–1980	15	7	8	2
1980–1982	15	7	8	2
1982–1984	15	7	8	2
1985	18	8	10	1
1986–1988	18	4	14	2
1988–1989	15	4	11	2
1990	23	5	18	2
1991*	29	5	24	1
1992–1994	30	6	24	2
1994–1996	30	6	24	2
1996–1998	31	7	24	2
1998–2000	33	7	26	2
2000–2002	44	7	37	2
2002–2004	40	7	33	2
2004–2006	40	6	34	2
2006–2008	38	6	32	2
2008–2010	37	6	31	2
2010–2012	36	6	30	2
2012–2014	35	6	29	2
2014–2016	36	6	30	2

Note: * total number of Board members included the chairman and the Vice-chairman but not the Secretary.

Sources: Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 1854–1997; Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Gazette, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1997–2015; Hong Kong, Staff List, Hong Kong Government, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1959–1996; Hong Kong town planning Board, Town Planning Board Annual Report 1990– 2005, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1990–2005; Hong Kong town planning Board, Town Planning Board Biennial Report 2006–2011, Hong Kong, Government Logistics Department, 2007–2011; Hong Kong town planning Board, Town Planning Board Report 2012–2014, Hong Kong, Government printer, 2015; ‘New town planning Board Named’, Hong Kong Sunday Herald, 13 July 1947, p.1.

Since the 1970s, civic awareness has been on the rise, and the Town Planning Ordinance had to face the constant pressure of litigation initiated by the public. After each lawsuit, the government would review the contents of the ordinance and amend them accordingly. For example, the Planning Permission System amendments in 197411 were a result of the government’s loss in a lawsuit brought by Hopewell Holdings Ltd, where the company claimed that the government’s plans were not made according to the law.12 The government amended the Town Planning Ordinance so that any diagrams, explanatory notes and so on, once amended, would be considered part of the plans. In 1989, the government lost in a lawsuit involving the operation of a container yard and open air storage yard on agricultural land in the New Territories.13 And, in 1991, the government had to extend the jurisdiction of the Town Planning Ordinance to include rural areas and consulted the public on the review of overall planning.14 In 1996, the gov- ernment issued a town planning white paper, inviting public opinions on overall planning.15 In 2000, an official report, prepared after considering public opinion, was submitted to the Legislative Council. However, owing to the tight schedule, the Legislative Council was not able to pass all the amendments within that term.16 In May 2003, the government invited the Legislative Council to pass those amendments on which consensus had been reached. The amended ordi- nance was finally passed on 4 July 2004.17

Public opinions and the public’s right to know are highly valued. The ordi- nance also provides more opportunities for people to express their views.18 The government publishes plans in the Government Gazette, and the plans are exhib- ited for two months for public inspection. The Town Planning Board publishes notices in two Chinese language newspapers and one English language news- paper, informing the public of the plans. Any individual is able to obtain a copy of the plans upon paying the required fee.19 After the two-month exhibition period, all representations received by the Town Planning Board during the plan exhibition period are published for public inspection for three weeks. After two rounds of consultation, the Town Planning Board considers the representations and comments on the representations received. Any amendments proposed are published for public inspection, and the public may make further representation in respect of the proposed amendments. The Town Planning Board considers the further representations and decides whether to make amendments to the draft plan. The Town Planning Board submits the draft plan, with or without

11 Planning Department website, http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/tech_doc/tp_bill/pamphlet2004/.

12 Interview with Fung Chee-keung, 20 March 2012.

13 Interview with Fung Chee-keung, 20 March 2012.

14 Hong Kong Democratic Foundation website, www.hkdf.org/newsarticles.asp?show=newsarticles&new sarticle=167; Interview with Fung Chee-keung, 20 March 2012.

15 Planning Department website, http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/tech_doc/tp_bill/pamphlet2004/.

16 Planning Department website, http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/tech_doc/tp_bill/pamphlet2004/.

17 Planning Department website, http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/tech_doc/tp_bill/pamphlet2004/.

18 Interview with Director of Planning Peter Pun Kwok-shing, 8 February 2012.

19 Department of Justice, Bilingual Laws Information System website, http://www.legislation.gov.hk/eng/ home.htm.

amendments, together with any representations and relevant documents to the Chief Executive in Council for a decision in respect of the draft plan.20

Today, the Town Planning Board has become increasingly democratic; the civilian appeal process against the government’s changes to plans has also become more open. The Town Planning Board now allows the general public to make representations and comments. This is a change from the previous proce- dure where only the affected persons were allowed to make representations and comments. Plans are only finalised after multiple rounds of review. This reflects that public opinion has an influence on town planning, and it has also made town planning increasingly politicised.21 (See Table 4.4.)

The emphasis of urban development

Under the government’s policies of establishing an organisation and enacting laws that promote planning work, the urban planning blueprint of 1948 was provided with a certain development foundation. With limited resources, how would these plans be implemented? Which of the development projects were prioritised? Which were amended to cope with society’s urgent needs? Which were cancelled as a result of insufficient resources? To examine the actual imple- mentation of long-term planning, we have to verify the specific development status in different districts.

The first problem any plan has to face and resolve is land. According to gov- ernment information, reclamation projects after the war were mainly based on plans made before the war. On this, Abercrombie had already obtained the rel- evant information from the relevant government departments. By the end of the 1940s, districts where reclamation projects had commenced included North Point on Hong Kong Island, Hung Hom Bay in Kowloon and Cheung Sha Wan in New Kowloon; districts with a comparatively large reclamation area included Chai Wan, Wan Chai and Causeway Bay on Hong Kong Island, Ma Tau Kok in Kowloon, and Kai Tak, Kowloon Bay and Cheung Sha Wan in New Kowloon. However, none of them was comparable to Tsuen Wan, Kwai Chung, Tuen Mun and Sha Tin in the New Territories in terms of scale. (For details, see Table 4.5.)

Planning of Hong Kong Island

The new role of Central

The government realised that post-war Central not only should be the political and economic centre, but also could become a cultural and tourism intersec- tion point. The government could well use buildings to create a modern atmos- phere for the city.22 However, since the demolition of the old City Hall in 1933,

20 Department of Justice, Bilingual Laws Information System website, http://www.legislation.gov.hk/eng/ home.htm; http://www.info.gov.hk/tpb/en/plan_making/participate.html.

21 Interview with Peter Pun Kwok-shing, 8 February 2012.

22 Patrick Abercrombie, Hong Kong Preliminary Planning Report, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1948, p.16.

Table 4.4 Years of amendment and amendment contents of the Town Planning Ordinance

(1939–2004)

Year Contents

1939 Enactment of the Town Planning Ordinance. 1950 Restoration of the Town Planning Ordinance.

1956 Amendment of Ordinance No. 26 of 1956 (Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance 1956): Section 5 was amended, providing that a copy of the approved plan has to be supplied to any person who has paid the required fee. Section 10 was amended to provide that a copy of the approved plan certified by the chairman of the town planning Board will be kept in the Land Registry and will be available for free

inspection. this amended ordinance, together with the amended Buildings Ordinance, 1955 (Ordinance No. 68 of 1955), emphasised again the importance of public knowledge of draft and approved plans.

1958 Amendment of Ordinance No. 3 of 1958 (Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance 1958): Section 11 was amended to provide that, where the Governor in council refers an approved plan to the town planning Board (the ‘Board’) for amendment, if only part of the plan requires amendment, there will be no need to replace the old plan with a new plan. the amendments may be made on the original plan.

1969 Amendment of Ordinance No. 59 of 1969 (Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance 1969): Subsection (1) (e) was added to section 4. Section 5 was amended to delete ‘submission to the Governor in council for approval’ and replace it with ‘publication’. the original subsections (3), (4) and (5) under section 6 were deleted and substituted by subsections (3) to (9). Section 6A was added.

1974 Amendment of Ordinance No. 59 of 1974 (Town Planning (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance 1974): Allowing the Board to add appropriate diagrams, explanatory notes etc. in plans. Sections 16 and 17 were added, and provide for the procedures of a planning application. Any diagrams, explanatory notes etc. in plans drafted before this amendment ordinance takes effect will become part of such plans once amended.

1982 Amendment of Ordinance No. 37 of 1982 (Roads (Works, Use and Compensation) Ordinance 1982): Any works authorised under the Roads (Works, Use and Compensation) Ordinance will be deemed to be approved under this ordinance.

1988 Amendment of Ordinance No. 2 of 1988 (Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance 1988): Sections 4A and 19 were added to regulate plans for comprehensive development areas.

1991 Amendment of Ordinance No. 4 of 1991 (Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance 1991): Allowing for the establishment of various committees under the Board and setting provisions for the plans of development permission areas, as well as granting the power of oversight to the Authority (i.e. Director of planning).

Amendment of Ordinance No. 101 of 1991 (Town Planning (Amendment) (No.2) Ordinance 1991): Allowing anyone to file a complaint with the Appeal Board, and allowing the Authority to serve notices and terminate the land development within development permission areas.

1994 Amendment of Ordinance No. 22 of 1994 (Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance 1994): Even if a plan ceases to be effective under section 20 (6), where sections 16, 17 and 17B apply, the Governor in council may extend the time limit for development

Table 4.4 (continued)

Year Contents

permission area plans. In addition, the Authority may take possession, remove, detain and dispose of any property on relevant land according to the notice served.

1996 Amendment of Ordinance No. 14 of 1996 (Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance 1996): providing that ‘public officers’ in the provisions relating to the Appeal Board do not include Judges of the court of First Instance, Recorders of the court of First

Instance, Deputy Judges of the court of First Instance and Judges of the District court. 1998 Amendment of Ordinance No. 16 of 1998 (Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance

1998): the Board may appoint a committee of its members to exercise the Board’s powers under sections 6 (6), (6A), (6B), (7), (8) and (9).

2004 Amendment of Ordinance No. 25 of 2004 (Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance 2004): the aim is to increase the transparency of the planning system and simplify town planning procedures, as well as to enhance enforcement and control over unauthorised developments in the rural areas of the New territories.

Sources: Review of the Town Planning Ordinance of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong Institute of planners, 1990, p.2; Ordinances of Hong Kong for the Year, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1982, 1988, 1991, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2004; planning Department webpage: http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_tc/tech_doc/tp_bill/pamphlet2004; Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance 1956; Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance 1969; Department of Justice, Bilingual Laws

Information System webpage: http://www.legislation.gov.hk/blis_pdf.nsf/6799165D2FEE3FA94825755E0033E532/BA93A4BB4 780F729482575EE003FA8E3?OpenDocument&bt=0.

the importance of cultural facilities to the city’s development had not been reconsidered. Therefore, building Central as a modern cultural centre was a new concept, as well as the first mission in the rebuilding after the war.

The Director of Public Works announced plans for reclamation in Central in his annual departmental report of 1948–1949.23 In the Five-Year Development Plan for 1951–1956,24 Central, Causeway Bay and North Point on Hong Kong Island were all focuses of development.25 The first completed reclamation works in Central yielded 9 acres (3.65 hectares) of waterfront land.26 In the early 1950s, the government established a committee for the planned construction of the City Hall on the then recently reclaimed land neighbouring Statue Square, with budgeted costs of up to 1 million pounds sterling.27 The reclamation works in Central that began in the year 1956–1957 and were completed in 1960–1961 yielded an additional 36 acres (14.58 hectares) of land.

In 1952–1953, the Public Works Department invited Professor Gordon Brown from the Department of Architecture of the University of Hong Kong

23 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1948–1949, p.30.

24 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1951–1952, pp.28–29.

25 Wah Kiu Yat Po, 19 March 1951, p.7.

26 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1952–1953, pp.29–30; Hong Kong Annual Report, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1951, p.11.

27 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1952–1953, pp.29–30; Hong Kong Annual Report, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1951, p.11.

Table 4.5 Overview of reclamation in Hong Kong (1946–1979)

Hong Kong Island Year Area (acre

(hectare))

Kowloon Year Area (acre

(hectare))

New Territories Year Area (acre

(hectare))

North point	1947–1953	22	cheung Sha Wan	1946–1970,	206	tsuen Wan and	1954–1957,	427
		(8.9)		1976–	(83.4)	Kwai chung	1969–1976	(172.9)
central	1951–1977	37.8	Hung Hom	1946–1966	160	tuen Mun	1968–1973	244.5*
		(15.3)			(64.8)			(99.0)
causeway Bay	1951–1971	60	Kai tak	1954–1958,	257.2	Sha tin	1969–1974	147.1
		(24.3)		1970–1978	(104.2)			(59.6)
chai Wan	1956–1972	138.6	Ma tau Kok	1954–1956	8.4	tai po	1976–	95.4
		(56.1)			(3.4)			(38.6)
Naval Yard	1959–1960	3.5	Kwun tong	1955–1965	274
		(1.4)			(111.0)
Aberdeen	1962–1976	28.5	Jorden Road	1961–1963	5.8
		(11.5)			(2.3)
Kennedy town	1964–1975	6.7	to Kwa Wan	1962–1964	17
		(2.7)			(6.9)
Sandy Bay	1964–	6	Sam Ka tusen	1964–1967	19
		(2.4)			(7.7)

Table 4.5 (continued)
Hong Kong Island Year	Area (acre (hectare))	Kowloon	Year	Area (acre (hectare))	New Territories	Year	Area (acre (hectare))
Wan chai 1965–1972	84.2	cha Kwo Ling	1964–1967	16
	(34.1)			(6.5)
Shau Kei Wan 1975–1979	14.6	Kowloon Bay	1964–1970	272.7
	(5.9)			(110.4)
Kennedy town 1976–1979	38.8	tai Wan	1967–1969	6
	(15.7)			(2.4)
Lei Yue Mun Bay 1976–1977	18.5	tai Kok tsui	1969–1971	6.2
	(7.5)			(2.5)
Quarry Bay 1979–	3.7	tong Mi Road	1970–1975	16.4
	(1.5)			(6.6)
		Sham Shui po	1973–1979	34.9
				(14.1)
		Lai chi Kok	1978–1979	17.3
				(7.0)
Sub-total	462.9			1316.9			914
	(187.5)			(533.3)			(370.2)
total	2693.8 (1091.0)

Note: * Reclaimed land included the land obtained by removal of material from the hillsides.

Sources: Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works 1946–1976, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1947–1976; Hong Kong Annual Reports 1946–1979, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1947–1980; Ho pui-yin, Challenges for an Evolving City: 160 Years of Port and Land Development in Hong Kong, Hong Kong, commercial press (HK), 2004, pp.148–150.

to draw up draft plans,28 which initially included a concert hall, a library, a museum, a marriage registry and offices for the Urban Council. After public consultation in the subsequent year, a theatre and an assembly hall were added to the draft plans.29 The financial budget for the project was passed in 1955–1956, and the government immediately appointed Ronald Phillips and Alan Fitch as architects. The project officially commenced in 1959, and the foundation was laid in a ceremony officiated over by the Governor on 25 February 1960.30 The City Hall opened on 2 March 1961.31 The High Block had 11 floors, including a marriage registry, a lecture hall, a museum and a library. The Low Block had a 1,540-seat concert hall, a 470-seat theatre, an exhibition room, a gallery and a memorial garden.32 The City Hall only had a small number of administrative offices, which was different from city halls in foreign countries that would house the offices of the municipal government.33 The outdoor public amenity space was a natural extension of the lowest level of the Low Block,34 and formed part of a visual and spatial harmony with the neighbouring Star Ferry Pier and Edinburgh Place.35 The entire building had a simple exterior look with an exquisite layout, with an attention to lines and light in its design. The architects used patterned grilles to allow the facilities on different floors of the High Block to enjoy a sea view, exhibiting a style of func- tionalism36 that was entirely different from the European classical architectural style before the war.

There were two three-storey car parks in the vicinity of the City Hall. One was in front of Star Ferry Pier and Edinburgh Place (with 400 parking spaces), and another was part of the City Hall itself (with 189 parking spaces);37 both were helpful in alleviating traffic congestion in Central. The planning and design of the City Hall, Star Ferry Pier and Edinburgh Place, as well as of the car parks and pavements, enabled the Central harbourfront to exude the flavour of a modern city.38

28 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1952–1953, p.3.

29 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1953–1954, p.5.

30 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1959–1960, p.8.

31 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1959–1960, p.8.

32 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1955–1956, pp.3–4.

33 Hong Kong City Hall, Hong Kong, Urban Council and Urban Services Department, 1980, p.13; Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1959–1960, p.8.

34 A Platform for the Arts, Hong Kong, Urban Council, 1992, p.6.

35 Hong Kong City Hall, Hong Kong, Urban Council and Urban Services Department, 1980, p.13.

36 A Collection of Memories, Hong Kong, Leisure and Cultural Services Department, 2002, p.102; Hong Kong City Hall, 1962–1982, Hong Kong, Urban Council Public Information Unit, 1983, p.18.

37 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1956–1957, p.4.

38 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1960–1961, p.11.

162 · MAKING HONG KONG

Table 4.6 The area and year built of the East Wing, Main Wing and West Wing of the Central Government Offices

	East Wing	Main Wing	West Wing
Year built	8/1952–12/1954	10/1955–12/1956	1956–1959
No. of floors	6 floors	7 floors	13 floors
Floor area	96,000 sq. ft (8,919 m2)	71,000 sq. ft (6,596 m2)	212,600 sq. ft (19,751 m2)

total: 379,600 sq. ft (35,266 m2)

Source: Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1949–1959.

Apart from the City Hall, another simple modern construction of the 1950s was the Central Government Offices.39 Like the City Hall, the Central Government Offices exuded the pursuit of practicality that was a characteristic of the post- war society, and they were another group of modern buildings in the city. Before the war, the colonial government had insufficient office space, and some departments had to rent private properties, scattering the governing apparatus. After the war, the government conducted replanning for Central and decided to reorganise Government Hill, relocating departments that had been renting private properties to the newly built government offices.40 In 1949–1950, the Public Works Department drew up provisional site layout plans for the Central Government Offices,41 wherein it was proposed that new government offices would be built between Garden Road and Ice House Street, and that the old buildings would be torn down and the new buildings constructed in three phases. The East, Main and West Wings of the new government offices were completed in 1954, 1956 and 1959 respectively (for their scale, see Table 4.6).

In terms of architectural structure, the Main and East Wings were connected, while the West Wing stood separate. As the West Wing was situated on a slope in Ice House Street, it was 13 storeys high at one end and six storeys high at the other. As the buildings were on Government Hill, the height of the three build- ings was all coordinated at six to seven storeys from the angle of Government Hill.42 The layout of the new government offices also embodied the distribu- tion of power in the colonial government,43 in accordance with the tradition

39 ‘Shui taozou le zhengfushan’ (Who Stole the Government Hill), Mingpao Weekly, 10 March 2012, pp.46–73.

40 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1950–1951, p.2.

41 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1949–1950, p.10.

42 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1953–1954, pp.4–5.

43 Architectural Services Department and LWK Conservation, Heritage Impact Assessment for the Former Central Government Offices Relocation of the Department of Justice to the Former Central Government Offices (Main and East Wings) (Final Report), 7 June 2012, p.19, http://www.aab.gov.hk/form/159meeting/AAB% 2040%202011-12%20(Annex%20C).pdf.

that the middle (Main Wing) was pre-eminent, and the right (East Wing) had precedence over the left (West Wing). The Main Wing was the headquarters of government departments (the office of the Colonial Secretary), and housed the Legislative Council Chamber. The East Wing was the offices of government departments, and housed the Executive Council Chamber.44 The West Wing had two exits. The underground exit in Ice House Street also contained the offices of Legislative Council members, as well as the offices of various depart- ments responsible for public affairs.45 In 1961, the government established the Public Enquiry Service,46 with offices also located in the West Wing. These offices all had air-conditioning47 and telephones48 installed. The underground car park had 140 parking spaces.49 The lifts and canteens were also open for public use,50 and this people-friendly image was vastly different from the forbid- den attitude of the colonial government in the past. They were rich in charac- teristics of post-war modern offices,51 and were eagerly imitated by post-1950s commercial buildings.

The Murray Barracks, which was resumed by the government in 1958, was rebuilt as the Murray Building, and became the offices of various government departments. The Parade Ground (next to Murray Barracks) was redeveloped as the Hilton Hotel and a car park in 1962. The Central Government Offices, the Murray Building, the Former French Mission Building (the Court of Final Appeal) and the Government House52 were all closely linked. Central thus lived up to its name as the administrative centre of the city, and its modern buildings became new landmarks of the city. (See Figure 4.2.)

44 ‘The East Wing was mainly used as internal government office and also the ExCo (it relocated into the existing ExCo Chamber next to the New Annex Block of Main Wing when it was completed in 1991)’ (Architectural Services Department and LWK Conservation, Heritage Impact Assessment for the Former Central Government Offices Relocation of the Department of Justice to the Former Central Government Offices (Main and East Wings) (Final Report), 7 June 2012, p.19, http://www.aab.gov.hk/form/159meeting/AAB%2040%20 2011-12%20(Annex%20C).pdf).

45 According to the Hong Kong Government Telephone Directory in 1970, departments in the West Wing at the time included Audit Department (13/F), Urban Council and Urban Services Department (Administration) (12/F), Registrar General’s Department (11/F), Inland Revenue Department (10/F), Treasury (8/F), Civil Aviation Department (5/F); the Public Services Commission (5/F) was in the East Wing. Hong Kong, Hong Kong Government Telephone Directory, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1970.

46 Back then, the office of the Information Services Department was in Beaconsfield House.

47 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1950–1951, p.2, 1953–1954, pp.4–5.

48 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1956–1957, p.3.

49 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1958–1959, p.10.

50 ‘Shui taozou le zhengfushan’ (Who Stole the Government Hill), Mingpao Weekly, 10 March 2012, pp.46–73.

51 ‘Adequate provisions of lifts at the Ice House Street entrance will provide good means of access to the offices for persons approaching from the city.’ Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1950–1951, p.2.

52 Michael Morrison, Central Government Offices: Historic and Architectural Appraisal (Chinese version), September 2009, p.4, http://www.amo.gov.hk/form/research_CGO_c.pdf.

Source: public Works Department, City of Victoria, Hong Kong, Central Area Redevelopment: Report, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1961, plan 5.

Figure 4.2 Concept plan of Central development (1961)

Central’s external traffic

Before the war, the land between Central and Wan Chai, which is today’s Admiralty, was for military use. Traffic between the two places was therefore blocked by military barracks. As early as the 1870s, Governor Kennedy (who served as Governor from 1872 to 1877) proposed building a road to connect Central and Wan Chai, but was met with opposition from the navy. The gov- ernment therefore only managed to build Kennedy Road in the Mid-Levels as the main passage connecting the eastern and western ends of Hong Kong Island.53 After the war, the government’s resolution in improving the traffic at the eastern and western ends of Hong Kong Island remained undeterred. In the 1950s, public opinion that the military land around Admiralty should be returned persisted.54 On 28 February 1958, the War Department reached an agreement with the government,55 whereby the land lots of the Murray Barracks, Parade Ground and Detention Barracks would formally be returned to the government. In the 1970s, the Victoria Barracks and Wellington Barracks were also officially returned to the government one after the other. On 7 October 1959, the British Admiralty accepted a subsidy of 7 million Hong Kong dollars to be provided by the government over seven years, and gave up most of the land (about 962,000 square feet, or 89,373 square metres) of the Naval Yard.56 The bottleneck between the eastern and western ends was thus resolved. The government also conducted replanning on the traffic around Garden Road.57 Harcourt Road, which was built in 1960–1961 close to the waterfront, benefited from the land that used to be a navy shipyard, and ran parallel to Queen’s Road East. It was one of the three main road construc- tions at the time,58 and effectively improved the traffic between Central and Wan Chai.59

Another recommendation contained in Abercrombie’s planning report of 1948 to improve traffic was a cross-harbour tunnel. The cross-harbour tunnel could not only enhance the external traffic of core districts, but also connect Central and Tsim Sha Tsui, the two core districts of the city, and expand the urban areas.60 In 1955, the government commissioned a consultancy firm to

53 Rao Jiucai, Xianggang de diming yu difang lishi (Place Names and Local History of Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Tiandi tushu youxian gongsi, 2011, p.85.

54 G.D. Smart, ‘The Progress of Building in Hong Kong’, in José Maria Braga, Hong Kong Business Symposium, Hong Kong, South China Morning Post, 1957, p.147.

55 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1957–1958, p.27.

56 Hong Kong Annual Report, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1959, p.169.

57 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1957–1958, p.27; Hong Kong Annual Report, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1958, p.157.

58 Three important road construction works were completed that year: Harcourt Road; Lung Cheung Road (connecting Kai Tak with Tai Po Road); and improvement works of the Castle Peak Road Tsuen Wan– Kowloon section.

59 Hong Kong Annual Report, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1960, p.229.

60 Patrick Abercrombie, Hong Kong Preliminary Planning Report, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1948, p.15.

conduct a feasibility study.61 In 1956, the consultants proposed building the tun- nel’s Hong Kong Island exit near Garden Road and its Kowloon exit in Tsim Sha Tsui. As it was costly to build the tunnel and the government still had to consult the military as regards land rights issues62 of the military land lots in Central through which the Hong Kong Island exit would pass,63 the government was not able to implement its cross-harbour tunnel plan in the 1960s. In the 1950s and 1960s, transport between the two core districts remained dependent on ferries. In 1959, the Star Ferry route between Central and Tsim Sha Tsui carried an average of 305,000 passengers per day. By 1965, the average daily number of passengers had risen to 546,000, and the number of ferry routes had risen to 12. In 1970, the average number of passengers further increased to 550,000 per day. It was not until 1972, when the Cross-Harbour Tunnel commenced service, that the ferry’s role as the primary means of transport across the harbour was slowly replaced. (See Table 4.7.)

Planning of Hong Kong Island East

In the conceptualisation of long-term town planning for the city, the fringe areas of Hong Kong Island were considered for more comprehensive devel- opment. One hundred acres (40.5 hectares) of land in North Point could be reserved for residential use, diverting population from the overly dense dis- tricts on Hong Kong Island and providing housing for around 50,000 workers of the Taikoo Dockyard.64 In 1952–1953, reclamation works commenced in North Point, yielding over 320,000 square feet (29,729 square metres) of land.65 Warehouses, factories, woodwork mills and other industries,66 as well as guesthouses, places of entertainment and residences, began to appear in the dis- trict.67 The government planned to expand the scope of reclamation eastwards to Shau Kei Wan. In 1955, the North Point Outline Development Plan (Plan No. L.H. 8.15), as the first development area of eastern Hong Kong Island, was reviewed by the Town Planning Board, whereby North Point would be developed as a district for industries, warehouses, and high- and low-density residential housing. Apart from North Point, the government also proposed in the Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works of 1956–1957 the construction of a resettlement estate in Chai Wan for 80,000 people, to be

61 Cross Harbour Tunnel between Hong Kong and Kowloon: Consultants’ Report, London, Mott, Hay & Anderson, Consulting Civil Engineers, 1955.

62 Report of the Inter-departmental Working Party on the Proposed Cross-harbour Tunnel, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1956.

63 Report of the Inter-departmental Working Party on the Proposed Cross-harbour Tunnel, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1956, p.13.

64 Patrick Abercrombie, Hong Kong Preliminary Planning Report, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1948, p.9.

65 Kung Sheung Daily News (Industrial and Commercial Daily), 19 April 1952, p.5.

66 Kung Sheung Daily News (Industrial and Commercial Daily), 24 August 1950, p.6.

67 Kung Sheung Daily News (Industrial and Commercial Daily), 26 May 1951, p.7.

Table 4.7 Average daily passenger traffic of Cross-Harbour Ferry Services (1959, 1965, 1970, 1977)

Route	1959	1965	1970	1977	Inaugural year
1 central–tsim Sha tsui (Star	101,478	151,894	154,672	128,152	1898
Ferry pier) 2 Wanchai–Jordan Road	59,751	69,905	40,945	13,101	1949
3 central (Jubilee Street Ferry	56,313*	66,486	78,344	53,891	1930
pier)–Jordan Road 4 central (Jubilee Street Ferry	43,819	48,180	48,873	19,026	1924
pier)–Mongkok 5 central (Jubilee Street Ferry	43,556	50,854	50,025	36,825	1924
pier)–Sham Shui po 6 Sheung Wan (Wilmer	27,111	29,026	27,977	20,904	1950
Street)–Jordan Road 7 Wanchai–Kowloon city	18,756	20,734	–	–	1956
8 Wanchai–Hung Hom	–	16,621	27,557	10,613	1963
9 North point–Hung Hom	11,236	28,396	40,065	22,578	1963
10 central–Hung Hom	–	23,793	–	4,809	1965
11 North point–Kowloon city	–	24,284	30,499	16,673	1963
12 North point–Kwun tong	–	16,519	51,954	42,385	1963
13 central–Kwun tong	–	–	–	11,438	1972
14 Shai Kei Wan–Kwun tong	–	–	–	18,514	1973
15 central–Mei Foo	–	–	–	8,365	1974
16 Shai Kei Wan–Kowloon city	–	–	–	2,633	1977
17 Shai Kei Wan–Sam Ka tsuen	–	–	–	8,257	1973
total	305,707	546,692	550,911	418,164

Notes: * First class: 43,970; third class: 12,343. there were 12 and 16 cross-harbour passenger routes in 1965 and 1977 respectively.

Sources: J.O. tresidder, Hong Kong Traffic Survey, 1960: Survey of Traffic in Hong Kong in Order to Determine the Economic Feasibility of a Cross-harbour Bridge or Tunnel, Harmondsworth, Road Research Laboratory, Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, 1961, p.13; E. Dalby, Hong Kong Passenger Transport Survey, 1964–66, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1967, p.99; Hong Kong transport Department, traffic and transport Survey Division, The Transportation Planning Process: A Critical Appraisal

– Using a Problem from Hong Kong as an Example – The Cross-harbour Ferry Study, Hong Kong, 1972, p.iv; Hong Kong transport Department, traffic and transport Survey Division, Cross Harbour Ferry Survey, 1977, Hong Kong, 1972, Figure 1, tables 1, 2.

accompanied by a certain degree of industrial development.68 In 1957–1958, the Chai Wan Outline Development Plan (Plan No. L/H20/1/2) was approved.69

68 ‘Initial planning for development of Chai Wan ultimately to house 80,000 people together with some industry was completed during the year so that engineering works could commence.’ Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1956–1957, p.25.

69 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1957–1958, p.27.

Apart from planning for high-density residential and industrial land lots, the Chai Wan Outline Development Plan planned for public space.

Industrial development was present on Hong Kong Island in the harbour- front of Connaught Road, East Point in Causeway Bay, Wharf Road in North Point, and Chai Wan. The industrial districts were established on the fringes of the core districts, and were clustered along the coast. They therefore benefited from lower land premiums, as well as more convenient loading and unloading of cargo. North Point and Chai Wan were larger than the pre-war Causeway Bay and Shau Kei Wan, in terms of land areas for overall planning, residential use and industrial uses. The industrial land in the two districts accounted for 86 per cent of industrial land on eastern Hong Kong Island. In spite of this, industrial development on Hong Kong Island was not comparable to that in Kowloon or New Kowloon. Industrial land on Hong Kong Island only accounted for 5.8 per cent of the total planned area of Eastern District, and there was much more residential land than industrial land on Hong Kong Island. (See Table 4.8.)

Public space

Post-war long-term town planning concepts especially emphasised the effect of public space on community life. Sports grounds and leisure parks were men- tioned in the report. In the early 1950s, the government had the intention to carry out reclamation at the Causeway Bay Typhoon Shelter for recreational use on Hong Kong Island,70 adding a vast recreational venue on Hong Kong Island on top of the Zoological and Botanical Gardens. In the early 1950s, the govern- ment reclaimed the former Causeway Bay Typhoon Shelter and developed it into Victoria Park, while building a new typhoon shelter north of the park. The project yielded 55 acres (22.28 hectares) of land for recreational purposes on Hong Kong Island. Separately, the newly built typhoon shelter had an area of 65 acres (26.33 hectares). The project commenced on 10 August 1951, and the entire project was expected to be completed by July 1954.71 Although in Abercrombie’s original conception the Causeway Bay Typhoon Shelter was to be planned as an area for heavy industries,72 the government’s development of Victoria Park in the early 1950s complied, to a certain extent, with Abercrombie’s basic ideas. Under the circumstances where the housing issue was severe and it was difficult to move forward, using the land reclaimed for Causeway Bay Typhoon Shelter for leisure purposes was a step of great progress in urban planning.

Following the planning of Hong Kong Island, the population originally

70 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1951–1952, pp.27–28.

71 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1951–1952, pp.27–28.

72 ‘Plan to Illustrate Sir Patrick Abercrombie’s Report on Hong Kong’ (map), in The Shape of Things to Come: An Overview of the Role of Harbour Reclamations in the Future Development of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Planning, Environment and Lands Branch, 1995, p.39.

Table 4.8 Overview of land planning of eastern Hong Kong Island (1960s)

Land use Causeway Bay (1968)

(acre (hectare))

North Point (1965)

(acre (hectare))

Shau Kei Wan

(1967) (acre (hectare))

Chai Wan (1965)

(acre (hectare))

Total (acre (hectare))

Residential	34.8	225	86.9	125	471.7
	(14.1)	(91.1)	(35.2)	(50.6)	(190.9)
commercial/residential	47.6	–	2.4	9	59
	(19.3)		(1.0)	(3.6)	(23.9)
Government, institution	37.7	85	48.6	79	250.3
and community	(15.3)	(34.4)	(19.7)	(32.0)	(101.4)
Industrial	1.1	37	19.2	87	144.3
	(0.4)	(15.0)	(7.8)	(35.2)	(58.4)
Open space	79.8	112	35.8	127	354.6
	(32.3)	(45.3)	(14.5)	(51.4)	(143.6)
Other specified uses	0.4	1	2.9	8	12.3
	(0.2)	(0.4)	(1.2)	(3.2)	(5.0)
Roads, etc.	47	90	57	85	279
	(19.0)	(36.5)	(23.1)	(34.4)	(113.0)
cemetery and	–	–	–	88	88
crematorium				(35.6)	(35.6)
typhoon anchorage	47.2	–	41.9	–	89.1
	(19.1)		(17.0)		(36.1)
Green belt	55.7	–	33.7	–	89.4
	(22.6)		(13.6)		(36.2)
Undetermined	–	82	–	209	291
		(33.2)		(84.6)	(117.9)
total area of planning	351.3	632	328.4	817	2128.7
area	(142.2)	(255.8)	(132.9)	(330.6)	(861.5)
Estimated population on	93,000	400,000	210,000	230,000	933,000

full development

Sources: town planning Board planning Division, Causeway Bay Outline Zoning Plan, Plan No. LH 6/22, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1968; town planning Board planning Division, Chai Wan Outline Zoning Plan, Plan No. LH 20/9, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1965; town planning Board planning Division, North Point Outline Zoning Plan, Plan No. LH 8/32, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1965; town planning Board planning Division, Shau Kei Wan Outline Zoning Plan, Plan No. LH 9/32, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1967.

concentrated in Central and Wan Chai was gradually diverted to North Point, Shau Kei Wan and Aberdeen in the 1960s. Urban areas that were densely popu- lated, such as Central, Sheung Wan, Sai Wan and Wan Chai, showed a down- ward trend in population. Comparing 1966 with 1961, places where the Chinese population traditionally amassed, such as Sheung Wan (−30 per cent) and Wan Chai (−21 per cent), showed a drop in population. In the fringe areas of the City of Victoria, areas showing more prominent signs of a population increase were Aberdeen and Southern District (65 per cent), as well as Shau Kei Wan (44 per cent). By the 1970s, North Point and Shau Kei Wan had the highest population

ratios on Hong Kong Island. The population growth trend in these two districts bore witness to the success of planning. (See Table 4.9.)

Planning of the Kowloon Peninsula

After the war, the replanning of the districts on the Kowloon Peninsula south of Boundary Street was on the whole later than that of Hong Kong Island. Although Tsim Sha Tsui was the most prosperous commercial district on the Kowloon Peninsula before the war and was the second core of the city of Hong Kong, during the Japanese occupation the Japanese military government established Tsim Sha Tsui as the political centre, with the construction of many wartime military facilities such as arsenals and trenches that had to be cleared away as a matter of priority when peace returned. After the war, Tsim Sha Tsui remained the most important commercial district of the Kowloon Peninsula, with many hotels, department stores and entertainment venues. Important transport facili- ties in the district included the Ocean Terminal, the Kowloon–Canton Railway terminus and the Star Ferry Pier.73 In the first year after Hong Kong was liber- ated (1946), the government undertook reclamation at Hung Hom Bay (today’s area around East Tsim Sha Tsui). The project lasted for 20 years and was com- pleted in 1966, yielding 160 acres (64.8 hectares) of land.

In 1967, the government approved the first statutory plan for Tsim Sha Tsui, with a keen view to developing Tsim Sha Tsui as the city’s cultural and transport hub, in tandem with Central across the harbour. The plan was to expand the Hong Kong Technical College (today’s Hong Kong Polytechnic University) on the then newly reclaimed land and design the district’s major traffic routes, such as the location of the Kowloon exit and the traffic-diversion road network of the Cross-Harbour Tunnel,74 and implementing the 1958–1959 plan of relocat- ing the Kowloon–Canton Railway terminus, which was originally at Tsim Sha Tsui, to Hung Hom.75 In 1968, the government designated the land of the new Kowloon–Canton Railway terminus for commercial, residential and other uses, and developed the railway terminus building, a multi-storey car park, an indoor stadium and public transport terminal. In 1975–1976, the government began building roads on the newly reclaimed land at Hung Hom Bay (East Tsim Sha Tsui) to prepare for future development.

Increasing public space could help improve the ecology in Tsim Sha Tsui, and this was also the focus of the planning in 1967. This included building the water- front promenade from the Star Ferry Pier to the new Kowloon–Canton Railway terminus, planning the Signal Hill (Blackhead Point) Garden, extending the road between east of Chatham Road and Austin Road to Salisbury Road, and preserving

73 Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Tsim Sha Tsui Outline Uses Zoning Plan, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1967, p.1.

74 Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Tsim Sha Tsui Outline Uses Zoning Plan, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1967, p.1.

75 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1958–1959, p.39.

Table 4.9 Population distribution of Hong Kong Island (1961–1976)

District 1961 1966 1971 1976

	No.	%		No.	%		No.	%		No.	%
central	47,799	5	41,040		4	22,892		2	17,010		2
Sheung Wan	142,815	14	99,380		10	67,885		7	56,600		6
West (Kennedy town, Shek tong	158,847	16	154,660		15	145,941		15	146,040		14
tsui, Sai Ying pun)
peak						8,235		0.8	8,040		0.8
Mid-Levels and pok Fu Lam Mid-Levels, pok Fu Lam and peak	48,425	5	51,930		5	46,299		4.6	53,740		5.2
Wan chai	186,169	19	146,510		14	142,679		14	124,230		12
tai Hang	97,342	10	100,530		10	94,418		9	104,060		10
North point	132,994	13	151,520		15	175,998		18	193,400		19
Shau Kei Wan	136,184	14	195,910		19	162,525		16	161,030		16
Aberdeen						108,940		11	140,800		14
South Aberdeen and South	54,300	5	89,490		9	20,371		2	21,920		2
total population of the Island	1,004,875	100	1,030,970		100	996,183		100	1,026,870		100
total population of Hong Kong	3,129,648		3,708,920			3,936,630			4,402,990

Notes: In 1971, the area of tai Hang included causeway Bay and Happy Valley, the area of Shau Kei Wan included chai Wan, and the area of North point included Quarry Bay. In 1981, the demarcation of districts for census purposes in Hong Kong Island was changed to three districts: North point and Quarry Bay, Shau Kei Wan and chai Wan, and tai Hang. the area of tai Hang included causeway Bay and Happy Valley. In 1991, Hong Kong Island was divided into four districts: central and Western District, Wan chai, Eastern District and Southern District.

Sources: K.M.A. Barnett, Hong Kong Report on the 1961 Census, Volume II, Hong Kong, census and Statistics Department, 1962; K.M.A. Barnett, Hong Kong Report on the 1966 By-census, Volume II, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1968; census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Population and Housing Census 1971: Main Report, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1972; census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong By-census 1976: Main Report, Volume II, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1979.

8.5 acres (3.44 hectares) of private green belt east of Cox’s Road. One-third of the land of Whitfield Barracks was originally intended to be developed as a commercial and residential area, but was instead handed over to the Urban Council in 1968 to be developed as a leisure park. This eventually became today’s Kowloon Park, adding a dash of inspiration to a district that emphasised cultural development.

In the mid-1970s, after the Kowloon–Canton Railway terminus was relo- cated to Hung Hom, the original site was used for the construction of the Cultural Centre and Space Museum in Tsim Sha Tsui, while the construction of the Museum of History and the Science Museum began after Hung Hom Bay’s traffic network was completed. It could be said that Tsim Sha Tsui becoming the cultural and commercial centre it is today is the fruit of planning after the war.

Planning of Ma Tau Kok and Hung Hom on the eastern side of the Kowloon Peninsula was earlier than that of Tsim Sha Tsui after the war, mainly owing to the housing pressure brought on by the population explosion of the 1950s and the resulting urgent need to develop the district into an industrial and high- density residential area. The earliest comprehensive plan appeared in 1957. The Town Planning Board originally intended to designate the area west of Ma Tau Wai Road for high-density residential use, with the area to the east of the road for industrial or industrial/residential mixed use.76 In the 1960s, with insuffi- cient residential land, a lot of industrial land east of Ma Tau Wai Road was devel- oped for residential use instead.77 In 1969, 30 per cent of the land in the district was for residential purposes, and only 13 per cent for industrial purposes.78 Low- cost housing estates that were completed in the 1960s included the Ma Tau Wai Estate built by the Hong Kong Housing Authority in 1962 and the Chun Seen Mei Chuen Estate constructed by the Hong Kong Housing Society in 1965. In the 1950s when the area was not yet too densely populated, Ma Tau Kok already had public facilities including a clinic, Sung Wong Toi Park, a post office, a fire station and government department offices. In the 1960s, a number of schools, recreational parks and other ancillary facilities that improved the quality of life, such as water supply, drainage, electricity, gas and telephone, were added in tandem with the population growth.79 To increase development space, To Kwa Wan underwent reclamation, yielding 17 acres (6.89 hectares) of land for indus- tries, warehouses, schools and parks.80 Hoi Sham Park, completed in 1972, is a leisure space constructed on reclaimed land, highlighting Ma Tau Kok’s charac- teristic as a high-density residential area.

Hung Hom, neighbouring Ma Tau Kok, had its first statutory plan approved

76 Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Ma Tau Kok Outline Zoning Plan, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1969, p.1.

77 Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Ma Tau Kok Outline Zoning Plan, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1969, p.1.

78 Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Ma Tau Kok Outline Zoning Plan, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1969, p.1.

79 Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Ma Tau Kok Outline Zoning Plan, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1969, pp.2–3.

80 HKRS No. 896, D & S No. 1/75, ‘Town Planning – Kowloon Planning Area No. 9 (Hung Hom District)’, 28 April 1964, p.3.

in 1957, and its second outline zoning plan approved in 1972. In the 1950s and 1960s, the government levelled Tai Wan Shan and Kwun Yam Shan to build public housing, in order to solve the housing problem for new immigrants. The Tai Wan Shan Resettlement Estate and Hung Hom Estate were completed in 1956 and 1968, respectively. In 1972, industrial land accounted for 40 per cent of the district’s area. Large sites included Hong Kong and Whampoa Dock, China Light and Power Co. Power Station and Green Island Cement Works,81 all of which had been in business before the war. In the 1960s, the ground floor of most residential buildings was used as shops, and the commercial-cum-res- idential development mode was common. This laid the foundation for today’s mixed commercial and residential uses in Hung Hom.

Yau Ma Tei, on the western side of the Kowloon Peninsula, had been a place where the Chinese settled and commercial activities thrived before the war. After the war, the restoration of the district was swift. The first statutory plan was approved in 1956,82 and the plan showed that most of the land was reserved for high-density residential buildings, with considerable space designated for public facilities. Industrial and residential land was concentrated on Tong Mi Road.83 From the 1950s to the 1970s, in response to the needs of a dense popu- lation, many public facilities were constructed; some of the important facilities included the expansion of the Yau Ma Tei Police Station (1955–1956), Queen Elizabeth Hospital (1958–1963), a 20-storey-high General Post Office (1967– 1968), a shipyard (1970–1972), King’s Park Fire Station (1971–1972), a leisure park (1969–1970) and a school.

According to the Hong Kong Preliminary Planning Report of 1948,84 Tai Kok Tsui, on the western side of the Kowloon Peninsula, would be developed as an industrial centre as well as one of the districts where offensive trades would be allowed. Owing to the shortage of government resources after the war, the gov- ernment had not conducted comprehensive planning for the district. In order to resettle refugees living in temporary housing, the district, just like Ma Tau Kok, was developed as a high-density residential and industrial district. In the early 1960s, the government formed land for public housing construction, and the Ho Man Tin Resettlement Area (1952) and the Valley Road Estate (1964) were completed one after the other. Tai Kok Tsui kept its pre-war characteristics. By the 1970s, the government had begun to deploy more resources in building public facilities such as schools, public bathhouses, leisure parks, health centres and markets.85 However, the traffic and transport problems brought about by industrial development were also in dire need of solutions. Separately, to tie

81 Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Hung Hom Outline Zoning Plan, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1972, p.1.

82 Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Yau Ma Tei Outline Development Plan, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1957.

83 Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Yau Ma Tei Outline Development Plan, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1957.

84 Patrick Abercrombie, Hong Kong Preliminary Planning Report, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1948.

85 Planning Report: Planning Area No. 3, Hong Kong, Planning Branch of Crown Lands and Survey Office, Public Works Department, 1973, p.2.

in with the comprehensive development of West Kowloon, ferry piers, cargo working areas and car parks were redeveloped. One influential road project that could not be ignored was the West Kowloon Corridor.

Before the war, Ho Man Tin Hill, located in central Kowloon Peninsula, was a cemetery. Shortly after the war, as a large number of immigrants were build- ing temporary houses by the hill with crude materials, the government allowed local organisations to build cottages in Ho Man Tin, to be used as housing for the general public. Man Wa Village, Po Man Village, Chi Man Village, Ho Man Tin New Village, Carmel Village, Faith Hope Village and others were completed one after the other. To tie in with the long-term housing development plan, Oi Man Estate, with a total of 12 blocks, was completed in 1974. The estate was predominantly designed with a mix of ‘twin-tower’ and ‘slab’ blocks. Each block consisted of two square-shaped structures. The twin-tower blocks were 20 storeys tall, with a lift lobby in the middle connecting each floor as well as the two towers. There was a light well between the two towers, with each house- hold’s door facing the light well to enhance lighting and ventilation for each unit and the corridors. This was an improvement on the design of Mark IV resettle- ment blocks, where the central corridor was used for cross-ventilation. Each unit had water and electricity supply, and its own balcony, kitchen and toilet.86 These buildings were more effective in solving the housing problems of the grassroots. From the end of the war to the 1970s, plans for the districts on the Kowloon Peninsula first appeared as early as 1967. These plans showed a roughly similar size, ranging from some 200 acres (81 hectares) to some 400 acres (162 hec- tares). Within Kowloon, Tsim Sha Tsui was to be developed into a commercial and cultural centre. It occupied a relatively large area, and its planning com- menced earlier than that of other districts. Tsim Sha Tsui also had more com- mercial and residential land, government land, public space and road facilities than the other districts. In addition, traffic planning in Tai Kok Tsui was a focus of the Kowloon Peninsula at the time. It is therefore clear that concrete planning for the development of West Kowloon had been set in motion very early. (See

Table 4.10.)

New Kowloon and the New Territories

Post-war development in New Kowloon greatly helped Hong Kong in accom- modating the increased population and developing the processing industry. In the Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory, land to the north of Boundary Street and to the south of the Shenzhen River was referred to as the New Territories, the lease period of which was only 99 years. In order to expand the urban areas, the government called the zone on the fringe of Kowloon’s urban areas New Kowloon (i.e. land to the north of Boundary Street in Kowloon and to the south of Kowloon’s mountain range, which today includes the

86 Hong Kong Housing Authority, Hong Kong Housing Authority Annual Report 1976–77, Hong Kong, Hong Kong Housing Authority, 1977, p.40.

Table 4.10 Overview of land planning of the districts of the Kowloon Peninsula (1967–1979)

Land use	Tsim Sha	Mong Kok	Ma Tau	Hung Hom	Tai Kok	Total (acre
	Tsui (1967) (acre (hectare))	(1968) (acre (hectare))	Kok (1969) (acre (hectare))	(1972) (acre (hectare))	Tsui* (1979) (acre (hectare))	(hectare))
Residential	–	90.5	83.6	14.2	121.8	310.1
		(36.7)	(33.9)	(5.8)	(49.3)	(125.6)
commercial/	186.4	1.5	–	58.8	–	246.7
residential	(75.5)	(0.6)		(23.8)		(99.9)
Government,	92.8	32.1	36.2	17.2	31.2	209.5
institution and	(37.6)	(13.0)	(14.7)	(7.0)	(12.6)	(84.8)
community Industrial	–	–	35.2	99.7	18.4	153.3
			(14.3)	(40.4)	(7.4)	(62.1)
Open space	58.5	13.9	41.0	27.6	49.1	190.1
	(23.7)	(5.6)	(16.6)	(11.2)	(19.9)	(77.0)
Other specified	22.1	1.0	–	–	0.8	23.9
uses	(9.0)	(0.4)			(0.3)	(9.7)
Roads, etc.	119.1	91.4	84.0	30.5	164.1	489.1
	(48.2)	(37.0)	(34.0)	(12.4)	(66.4)	(198.1)
Warehousing	9.4	–	–	–	–	9.4
	(3.8)					(3.8)
Undetermined	0.3	50.8	–	–	–	51.1
	(0.1)	(20.6)				(20.7)
total area of	488.4	281.1	280.0	248.0	385.4	1,682.9
planning area	(197.8)	(113.8)	(113.4)	(100.4)	(156.0)	(681.6)
Estimated	233,000	118,774	200,000	150,000	–	701,774

population on

full development

Notes: * the tai Kok tsui planning Area was covered by Mong Kok and cheung Sha Wan planning Areas after 1987. the statistics of the tai Kok tsui planning Area could not be identified separately, as it was included in the Mong Kok planning Area.

Sources: Hong Kong town planning Board, Tsim Sha Tsui Outline Uses Zoning Plan, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1967; Hong Kong town planning Board, Ma Tau Kok Outline Zoning Plan, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1969; Hong Kong town planning Board, Hung Hom Outline Zoning Plan, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1972; Tai Kok Tsui Outline Zoning Plan, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1979; HKRS No. 337, D & S No. 4/2458, ‘Mong Kok Outline Development plan’, Hong Kong, public Records Office, 26 April 1968.

districts of Sham Shui Po, Wong Tai Sin, Kowloon City and Kwun Tong, among others). In fact, New Kowloon was part of the New Territories.

After the war, the government did not change its immigration policies even though Chinese civil war refugees kept coming to Hong Kong to look for oppor- tunities. The government’s yearbook of 1953 reported that the population of Hong Kong increased from around 860,000 in September 1943 to 1.8 million in

Table 4.11 Statistics of fire victims in Hong Kong (1948–1955)

Year 1948–49 1949–50 1950–51 1951–52 1952–53 1953–54 1954–55

total 1,312 37,957 9,100 8,576 26,410 60,262 53,699

Sources: Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Social Welfare Officer for the Financial Year 1948–54, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1954, p.23, Appendix 14, pp.54–55; Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Social Welfare Officer for the Financial Year 1954–55, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1955, Appendix IV, p.40.

1947 and soared to 2.36 million in the spring of 1950.87 The permanent resident population of Hong Kong increased by 56,000 in just seven months between February and September 1956.88 In the 1950s, refugees constructed hut-type squatters on the edge of the city centre with crude materials, with the number of squatters reaching 300,000. In 1961, the number of hut-type squatters surged to 1 million. From the 1940s to the 1960s, fires broke out frequently in the squatter areas, which could render tens of thousands of squatter dwellers homeless in one night (see Table 4.11).

From resettlement areas to low-cost housing

Safety and sanitary problems in squatter areas became the most challenging problems in urban development. The problem of squatters illegally occupying government land continued to worsen, which severely hindered post-war urban planning. The government realised how urgent it was to address the housing needs of the grassroots. In order to prevent the problem of illegal occupation of land by squatters from becoming aggravated further, the government set up resettlement areas on undeveloped land to monitor the quality and quantity of temporary housing in the resettlement areas, including cottages and huts, while also accommodating fire victims and residents affected by clearance of temporary housing. To better regulate and control the environment in squat- ter areas, the government formulated new policies in July 1951 to divide the resettlement areas into: approved areas, in which the government’s recognised contractors and Hong Kong Settlers Housing Corporation constructed semi- permanent cottages with compliant specifications to accommodate eligible resi- dents; and tolerated areas, where the construction of squatters was allowed and the regulation of structures was more lenient. The roads, fire protection facili- ties, water supply systems and public hygiene facilities in the resettlement area were planned and constructed by the government.

On 25 December 1953, the worst fire since the war broke out at the Shek Kip Mei squatter area in New Kowloon, with the number of victims reaching 58,000.89 Under the urgent circumstances, the government handled the victims’ accommodation problem by referring to pre-war strategies of public housing

87 Hong Kong Annual Report, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1953, p.21.

88 Hong Kong Annual Report, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1956, pp.31–32.

89 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Social Welfare Officer for the Financial Year 1948–54, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1954, Appendix 14, pp.54–55.

construction. In the public housing development blueprint drafted on 6 April 1923, land was granted to private developers at a low price to construct 200 to 300 two-storey cottages that would be rented to the grassroots. The government would provide low-rate loans to contractors and prohibit them from transferring the cottages. However, contractors would be allowed to collect from tenants an annual rent equivalent to 5–6 per cent of the construction costs, i.e. 4,000 to 5,000 Hong Kong dollars. A cottage accommodating 30 people which had an area of 800 square feet (74.32 square metres) per storey and 1,600 square feet (148.65 square metres) for two storeys was estimated to have 0.70 Hong Kong dollars collected per month per person and thus 20 Hong Kong dollars could be collected per cottage each month. In 1935, the government estab- lished the Housing Commission to study Hong Kong’s housing policies. The Housing Commission put forth the 1923 proposal again and strongly stated the importance of assisting citizens who were unable to afford open market rents. It also suggested that the rent paid by the grassroots on housing provided by the government should not exceed one-fifth of their household income, and this concept is still adopted nowadays. In 1937, the Sino-Japanese War broke out and interrupted the work of the Housing Commission.

In 1954, the Urban Council appointed an emergency response team to study the problems of hut-type squatter areas. The team believed that constructing low-rise cottages and squatters on the limited land resources of resettlement areas would not satisfy the housing demand of the residents in the hut-type squatter areas and recommended the construction of six- to seven-storey reset- tlement blocks to increase the living area. It also suggested that the government establish a department responsible for the clearances of squatters and resettle- ment areas. The government resumed the fire site of Shek Kip Mei and the land at Pak Tin Estate in the same year.90 It gradually cleared the hut-type squatters in the area and built resettlement blocks. By the end of 1954, the first eight six- storey, H-shaped (Mark I) resettlement blocks were completed in Shek Kip Mei; construction of 21 seven-storey resettlement blocks followed successively. There were a total of 29 H-shaped resettlement blocks in that resettlement area. The government also officially established the Resettlement Department to be in charge of constructing and managing resettlement blocks, managing existing squatter areas, preventing the building of illegal structures, and squatter clear- ances, among other responsibilities related to resettlement. The Resettlement Department was placed under the management of the Urban Council.

Apart from the two-storey ‘Bowring cottages’ which were completed in 1954, a total of five public housing estates were built in Sham Shui Po District during the 1950s and 1960s:91 the Shek Kip Mei Resettlement Area, built between 1954 and 1967; the Tai Hang Tung Resettlement Area, built between 1954 and 1959; the Lei Cheng Uk Estate, completed in 1955; the So Uk Estate, completed in

90 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1953–1954, p.35.

91 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1953–1954, pp.22–23.

1960; and the Cheung Sha Wan Estate, finished in 1964. At the same time, the government constructed low-cost housing of higher quality in the district, such as the Shek Kip Mei Low-cost Housing Estate built between 1961 and 1966, and the Pak Tin Estate, which was constructed between 1962 and 1970 as a result of redevelopment of the Shek Kip Mei Resettlement Area.

At the end of the 1950s, the government also progressively looked for land in areas near Shek Kip Mei to construct resettlement blocks. In 1958, the Tung Tau Estate in Wong Tai Sin District was the first to have preliminary studies and resettlement planning carried out. Roads had been developed in the area as early as 1952–1953, while small-scale sewerage improvement works had been conducted in 1953–1954. In 1961, the Tung Tau Resettlement Estate was com- pleted. Facilities were built to support development of the area, including roads and footbridges constructed in 1960–1962, along with 175 rooftop primary school classrooms constructed in 1964–1965.

In the 1950s and 1960s, various resettlement and low-cost housing estates were completed successively, such as Lo Fu Ngam (1958), Choi Hung Estate (1962), Wang Tau Hom Estate (1963), Tsz Wan Shan (1965) and Shatin Pass Estate (1968). There were only simple facilities in these housing estates, and they lacked community facilities; after completing initial investigations and plans on Wong Tai Sin, the government immediately constructed resettlement blocks and several public facilities from 1958 to 1963, such as sewerage systems, waterworks and roads. Amenities that facilitated everyday life such as schools, police stations, clinics, post offices and parks not only served residents of the Wong Tai Sin Resettlement Area, but also provided daily necessities for those living nearby.

In the 1950s and 1960s, resettlement policies were utilised to deal with a large number of urgent cases. A vast area was covered and construction time allowed was short, while the design of the buildings had to be cost saving and be able to provide a large amount of housing in a short period of time, so as to meet the pressing needs of victims. The dates of temporary housing clearances were therefore planned beforehand. It was most important that the time of clearance matched the completion time of resettlement blocks so that residents would suffer less pain from homelessness after the clearances of temporary housing while the use of land could be optimised. An estate with dozens of resettle- ment blocks could accommodate tens of thousands of residents. Resettlement policies use multi-storey resettlement blocks to rehouse residents of squatters nearby and thus reduced many unnecessary confrontations.

With poor sanitary conditions and a population density far in excess of a rea- sonable level, public housing was hardly ideal accommodation. Designs of early housing estates were unable to balance between comfort and privacy. It was not until the 1970s that the necessities of daily life were gradually considered from the users’ perspective when constructing public housing. Suitable ancillary facilities and open space would be provided so that residents would feel at home despite a small living space. In the 1950s, residents were happy to accept the crudely designed resettlement blocks. Compared with the multi-storey build- ings that were made of steel and concrete, squatters lacked even basic facilities,

while the residents worried about fires day after day. The squatters were also under the threat of typhoons during the summer, and the lives and safety of residents were at risk. In the 1960s, resettlement blocks with six, seven or eight storeys built in Sham Shui Po District and Wong Tai Sin District accommodated almost 500,000 people, while resettlement areas also became an important part of Hong Kong’s urban development.

Even after it had been implemented for ten years, the resettlement scheme was still failing to solve the squatter problem in Hong Kong. From 1963 to 1964, there were as many as 600,000 people living in squatters. In 1964, the government carried out a comprehensive review of housing policies and released a white paper titled Review of Policies for Squatter Control, Resettlement and Government Low-cost Housing.92 Apart from strict controls over newly built squatters, construction of resettlement areas and government low-cost housing was also accelerated, as over 2 million flats for adults were to be built within ten years. At the same time, eligibility criteria for residing in resettlement blocks were relaxed, while the Temporary Housing Scheme was launched to provide accommodation for those who were currently ineligible for permanent public housing. Under the new policies, the resettlement blocks constructed became taller, and the number of blocks in resettlement areas increased significantly. By the end of the 1960s, the number of public housing residents had surpassed 1 million. Some resettlement areas, such as those in Wong Tai Sin, Tsz Wan Shan and Sau Mau Ping, had a population of over 100,000 each. The housing facilities and living area per resident had also improved. Planning of public housing estates had accelerated urban planning of the city. (See Figure 4.3 and Table 4.12.)

Planning and development of New Kowloon

Lai Chi Kok and Cheung Sha Wan

Post-war industrial development was the driving force behind the economic boom in Hong Kong. Located in the westernmost part of New Kowloon, Lai Chi Kok District and Cheung Sha Wan District had already been developed before the war. After the war, both districts were industrial-intensive and shared a similar approach in development, providing job opportunities for public housing residents nearby. Lai Chi Kok and Cheung Sha Wan were both com- mercial-cum-residential zones before the war, and the area along the coast was developed to accommodate offensive trades after the war.93 Lai Chi Kok Road was the most prosperous spot in Lai Chi Kok. There were dozens of tenement buildings where the ground floors were commercial shops such as tea houses, hair salons, grocery stores, snack shops and herbal shops, while the upper floors

92 Working Party on Squatters, Resettlement and Government Low-cost Housing, Review of Policies for Squatter Control, Resettlement and Government Low-cost Housing, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1964.

93 HKRS No. 115, D & S No. 1/54, ‘Town Planning Report’.

Source: Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works 1970–71, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1971; or HKRS41-2A-34-2, Hong Kong public Records Office, Annual Department Report – public Works Department, 1968–1972.

Figure 4.3 Distribution map of resettlement estates, resettlement blocks and cottage areas in Kowloon District (1970)

Table 4.12 Statistics of population living in different types of housing in Hong Kong (1954–1972)

Year Government-aided housing Private housing

Resettlement Government Housing Housing Resettlement

		housing	estates	estates
1954	8,653	–	–	1,812	45,906	–	–	–	2,364,900
1955	66,598	–	–	5,545	58,224	–	–	–	2,490,400
1956	105,404	–	–	8,824	70,393	–	–	–	2,614,600
1957	139,797	–	–	8,824	73,704	–	–	–	2,736,300
1958	158,662	–	12,265	12,700	77,546	–	–	–	2,854,100
1959	196,958	–	16,157	21,494	81,640	–	–	–	2,967,400
1960	246,821	–	26,688	27,937	82,482	–	–	–	3,075,300
1961	292,371	–	38,488	32,123	87,519	1,608,600	1,004,149	3,063,250	3,168,100
1962	373,274	5,264	56,128	36,907	79,656	–	–	–	3,305,200
1963	462,582	5,715	72,974	45,841	73,377	–	–	–	3,420,900
1964	544,155	25,373	110,198	51,102	82,899	–	1,103,700	–	3,504,600
1965	681,107	57,968	139,890	77,317	74,729	1,562,700	1,002,900	3,596,611	3,597,900
1966	770,869	80,331	146,222	89,563	74,702	1,556,700	931,900	3,650,287	3,629,900
1967	861,213	84,509	149,484	96,205	72,484	1,545,000	910,400	3,719,295	3,722,800
1968	967,184	103,300	153,322	107,878	72,986	1,542,000	864,300	3,810,970	3,802,700
1969	1,030,022	130,357	163,453	107,878	68,058	1,608,400	802,700	3,910,868	3,863,900
1970	1,077,094	176,037	171,905	113,392	57,585	1,594,300	797,800	3,988,113	3,959,000
1971	1,100,277	196,743	209,025	122,321	55,825	1,971,100	405,400	4,060,691	4,045,300
1972	1,154,792	232,217	217,798	124,787	50,293	2,025,200	375,300	4,180,387	4,123,600

estates low-cost authority society cottage areas

Temporary housing

Estimated population

Projected territorial population by Census and Statistics Department

Sources: Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Commissioner for Resettlement for the Financial Year 1967–69, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1968–1969, Appendix 1; Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Commissioner for Resettlement for the Financial Year 1969–73, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1970–1973, Appendix 3; Report of the Housing Board 1964–72, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1964–1973; Colony Outline Plan, Book 1, Volume 2; commissioner for census, Report of the 1961 Census, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1961; Hong Kong census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Statistics, 1947–1967, Hong Kong, census and Statistics Department, 1969; Hong Kong census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Population Projections 1971–1991, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1973; Hong Kong census and Statistics Department, Demographic Trends in Hong Kong 1971–82, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1983.

were used for residential purposes.94 The Hong Kong Preliminary Planning Report of 1948 suggested that offensive trades should be concentrated in the district.95 It was believed that this concept came about because existing facilities such as Mobil Oil’s kerosene rig, Kailuan Mining Company’s storage yard and Lai Chi Kok Prison had already had a negative impact on the residents’ daily life. As Lai Chi Kok was further away from the city centre, there was more space for devel- opment. Before the war, Lai Chi Kok Army Swimming Shed Public Sea Bath and the Chinese YMCA Swimming Area were both immensely popular leisure grounds during the summer.96

Lai Chi Kok lies next to Kwai Chung, and it was only natural to develop transport in the district to connect it with other areas in the New Territories. From 1958 to 1965, the government expanded the Lai Chi Kok Hospital–Lai Chi Kok Valley and Lai Chi Kok Valley–Kwai Chung sections of Castle Peak Road.97 In 1968, the Lai Chi Kok Bridge was constructed, which connects Lai Chi Kok with Kwai Chung. In 1961, the government attempted to develop the area around Au Pui Wan, which lies to the north of Lai Chi Kok, but was unable to fully develop it.98 The government built an incinerator plant in 1963, con- structed a landfill in 1966 and planned to reclaim land within the landfill area in May 1966. Additional public facilities constructed after the war in the district included a fire station (built in 1959–1961) and the new Lai Chi Kok Hospital (built in 1963–1969). In 1967–1968, work began on the construction of Mei Foo Sun Chuen, a private housing estate located in Lai Chi Kok. Industries and housing were developed in parallel in Lai Chi Kok, closely followed by public ancillary facilities. Lai Chi Kok gradually developed into a comprehen- sive development area.

The early post-war development of Cheung Sha Wan followed the pre-war mode. In the 1950s, nearly 80 per cent of Hong Kong’s fir was landed in Cheung Sha Wan. Along the coast were a considerable number of China fir factories and shipyards, which handled 70 per cent of ship repairs in Hong Kong.99 Annual economic benefits reached millions of dollars.100 Cheung Sha Wan was also a place where the grassroots lived; the government constructed the Cheung Sha Wan Resettlement Estate in 1964, which was able to accommodate 48,000 residents, and carried out planning for the Un Chau Street Estate (low-cost

94 Jiangshan guren, ‘Xianggang xinjie fengtu mingsheng daguan jianbaoji’ (Newspaper Clippings of Local Conditions and Scenic Spots of the New Territories, Hong Kong), Wah Kiu Yat Po, 1935–1936, Article 187.

95 HKRS No. 115, D & S No. 1/54, ‘Town Planning Report’.

96 Jiangshan guren, ‘Xianggang xinjie fengtu mingsheng daguan jianbaoji’ (Newspaper Clippings of Local Conditions and Scenic Spots of the New Territories, Hong Kong), Wah Kiu Yat Po, 1935–1936, Article 187; HKRS No. 115, D & S No. 1/54, ‘Town Planning Report’.

97 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1958–1968.

98 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1960–1961, pp.38–39, 1961–1962, p.31.

99 HKRS No. 156, D & S No. 1/4377, ‘Cheung Sha Wan Reclamation – Complete Record of a Special Meeting of Executive Council Held on 15 September, 1960’, 1960, Enclosure II, p.2.

100 HKRS No. 156, No. 1/4377, ‘Letter from the Director of Public Works’, 26 September 1958.

housing) in 1967.101 The active industrial and commercial activities provided plenty of job opportunities for residents of the district. Comprehensive planning is indispensable to converting the increased population into cheap labour, and the development process of Kwun Tong set an excellent example.

Kwun Tong

Kwun Tong was the first industrial area that the government developed in New Kowloon East after the war. It was chosen as the pilot trial for an industrial area for the following reasons:

Kwun Tong had been used as a landfill since the 1930s and had since accu- mulated a considerable amount of new land. Also, only 1,000 people lived in the district in the 1950s,102 the majority of whom lived in Ngau Tau Kok Cottage Area and the local villages.
The hillsides to the north of Kwun Tong consisted of weathered rocks, which made it easier geologically to level. Rocks excavated could be used to reclaim land in Kowloon Bay.
Although not an integrated community itself, Kwun Tong borders Kowloon’s urban areas and could still enjoy other community services from Kowloon’s urban areas.

Freight transport would be quite convenient for warehouses and piers near Kwun Tong after improvements of the road systems.

In 1954 the government established an inter-departmental working group103 that aimed at developing Kwun Tong as a pollution-free industrial area through the planning of various aspects such as reclamation, land use and community facilities.104 The pollution-free policy targeted smoke nuisances that might affect aircraft landings and take-offs at Kai Tak Airport,105 as well as offensive trades such as the shipbuilding industry, soy sauce factories, steel-rolling factories and

101 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1964–1968.

102 Wah Kiu Yat Po, 18 April 1973.

103 ‘An Inter-Departmental Committee was appointed in January, 1954 under the Chairmanship of the Acting Director of Commerce and Industry to investigate the development of new industrial sites’ (Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Commerce and Industry, Hong Kong, Government Press, 1953–54, p.7).

104 HKRS No. 270, D & S No. 1/1, ‘Memorandum from the Colonial Secretary to the Department of Commerce and Industry’, 14 May 1954, item 1, p.2.

105 ‘The Inter-departmental Working Committee on the new industrial area at Kun Tong, under the chair- manship of the Director, continued to function as a planning, co-ordinating and advisory body, and in April, 1956, submitted a revised report to Government. This dealt more fully than the initial report with the prob- lems of preventing a smoke nuisance such as might be a hazard to aircraft using the new airport’ (Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Commerce and Industry, Hong Kong, Government Press, 1956, p.11). HKRS No. 270, D & S No. 1/1, ‘Report of the Working Committee on the New Industrial Area at Kun Tong’, 27 January 1956, item 12.1, p.2; HKRS No. 270, D & S No. 1/1, ‘Memorandum from the Department of Civil Aviation to Director of Commerce and Industry’, 6 January 1956, item 12.2.

foundries.106 The policy also encouraged existing industries to expand and work- shops operating illegally to move to the newly developed industrial sites, thus boosting development of new industries. Development of small-scale industries in the urban areas was not sustainable in the long term, and the development of new industries could help improve the situation. In July 1954, the inter-depart- mental working group suggested increasing the space available for development in Kwun Tong by 140 acres (56.70 hectares) through reclamation. The works were carried out in three phases, with 78 acres (31.59 hectares) reclaimed in the first two phases,107 with a budget of 10 million dollars funded by the Hong Kong Development Funds.108 Kwun Tong Road would be used to separate the industrial area from the residential area; reclaimed land would be developed as an industrial area, and a residential area would be developed close to the hills.

In 1956, the government established the Kwun Tong Advisory Committee, responsible for reporting on the development of Kwun Tong. In May 1956, a Working Committee of the Executive Council suggested the development of 244 acres (98.82 hectares) of land in Kwun Tong, 111 acres (44.96 hectares) of which would be allocated for industrial use by building 19 blocks of indus- trial units with sizes ranging from 930 to 1,860 square metres; 84 acres (34.02 hectares) of land would be used for the construction of 1,080 residential flats; 37 acres (14.94 hectares) would be allocated for the construction of resettle- ment areas; and 12 acres (4.86 hectares) would be reserved for commercial use. Phases I and II of the reclamation works were completed in mid-1959, creating 82 acres (33.21 hectares) of land; Phase III of the reclamation works was carried out in the same year. Between 1956 and 1966, the area of land developed in Kwun Tong reached 274 acres (110.97 hectares), which was 30 acres (12.15 hectares) more than the planned 244 acres (98.82 hectares). In the 1950s, the living environment and transport in Kwun Tong lagged behind those of the more mature and developed urban areas. Advantages of Kwun Tong included lower land prices and more space for development compared with the urban areas. After the government developed it as an industrial area, more land in Kwun Tong was auctioned off than in any other district in Hong Kong in terms of quantity and total area between 1956 and 1961. (For details of Kwun Tong land sales revenue, see Table 4.13.)

In September 1955, the government invited industrialists to invest in the Kwun Tong Industrial Area. Nine hundred and ninety-three applications were received by the deadline date of 31 October 1955.109 Director of Commerce

106 HKRS No. 277, D & S No. 1/4, ‘Minutes of the Seventh Meeting of Kwun Tong Advisory Committee’, 21 December 1959, item 77.1, p.1, Appendix 2.

107 ‘The first two stages of this scheme comprise the reclamation of about 78 acres of land, and it is expected that 59 acres will become available by 1957, as follows: 17.5 acres for allocation early in 1956, an additional 26 acres towards the end of 1956, and a further 15.5 acres in 1957’ (Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Commerce and Industry, Hong Kong, Government Press, 1954–1955, p.12).

108 Guantang jinmao (Kwun Tong Today), Hong Kong, Kwun Tong District Kai Fong Welfare Association, 1969, p.16.

109 HKRS No. 270, D & S No. 1/1, ‘Report of the Working Committee on the New Industrial Area at Kun Tong’, [April 1956(?)], item 12.1, pdf p.17.

and Industry H.A. Angus wrote in a memorandum dated 25 October 1956 that, excluding the Crown rent of 50,000 Hong Kong dollars per year and resi- dential land obtained from levelling the hills, land sales revenue of 20 million Hong Kong dollars would be earned on Phases I and II of reclamation and be transferred to the Development Funds. As buyers paid in instalments, the Development Funds would not be able to collect all the revenue from land sales immediately.110 The first land sale of the Kwun Tong Industrial Area took place in September 1956, and a total of 50 industrial sites had been sold by March 1957.111 Residential sites were auctioned in November 1957.112 The govern- ment retained higher-value land for industrial or commercial use, while prices for residential land were lower, which was significantly different from the situ- ation today. Certain investors did not immediately develop the land lots after successfully bidding for them. The Kwun Tong Advisory Committee thus sug- gested that the government build multi-storey industrial blocks itself and sell them to companies that were interested in operating such buildings. The land use of such lots could be altered for government facilities such as government offices or schools.113 A number of factories were already operating in the area by 1958. In the early period, most workers came from Kowloon’s urban areas, and inadequate transport made it difficult to attract workers to Kwun Tong, which dissatisfied manufacturers. (See Figures 4.4 and 4.5.)

On 27 August 1955, the government released a planning report on Ngau Tau Kok and Kwun Tong,114 in which the Director of Public Works estimated that the population of Kwun Tong would rise to 90,000 in 1960 and to 200,000 by 1965. When conducting planning for residential land in Kwun Tong District, the Committee also made five-year and ten-year housing plans. (According to the 1961 census, Kwun Tong District had a population of 81,293; the popula- tion was 251,680 in 1965. The population density exceeded 3,000 per hectare (i.e. a population density of 1,214 per acre).) It can be observed that the govern- ment intended to adopt the migration approach to increase the labour force in Kwun Tong District.115

When planning in the 1950s, the Kwun Tong Advisory Committee hoped that manufacturers would build dormitories for workers to solve their housing problem. The government’s main role was to provide land for businesses, so it did not desig- nate a housing zone in the plans. Kwun Tong’s development in the early 1950s

110 HKRS No. 270, D & S No. 1/1, ‘Memo from Ag. Director of Commerce and Industry to Hon. Colonial Secretary’, 25 October 1956, item 16, pdf p.10.

111 Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Commerce and Industry, Hong Kong, Government Press, 1956–1957, p.12.

112 Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Commerce and Industry, Hong Kong, Government Press, 1957–1958, p.7.

113 HKRS No. 277, D & S No. 1/4, ‘Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of Kwun Tong Advisory Committee’, 1 August 1958, item 61, p.4.

114 HKRS No. 156, D & S No. 1/4816, ‘Plan No. L.K. 13/26, Planning Area No. 13 Development Plan (Draft Plan of Details in Housing Zones)’, item 10.1, p.1.

115 Guantang jinmao (Kwun Tong Today), Hong Kong, Kwun Tong District Kai Fong Welfare Association, 1969, pp.4–14.

Table 4.13 Overview of land sales in Kwun Tong (1956–1961)

Year	Kwun Tong	New Kowloon	Kowloon	Island	Yau Tong Bay	Aberdeen
	No. of lots
1956	26	–	6	1	–	1
1957	54	–	1	–	–	3
1958	4	–	1	–	14	2
1959	–	1	1	1	21	1
1960	21	11	5	–	–	1
Jan to Sept	12	13	6	1	–	1
1961
total	117	25	20	3	35	9
Average realised value per sq. ft (HK$)
1956	12.98	–	32.21	60.00	–	20.35
1957	14.21	–	59.11	–	–	6.65
1958	12.48	–	77.78	–	6.05	11.76
1959	–	29.96	95.71	64.02	6.99	14.10
1960	48.39	54.87	93.15	–	–	22.63
Jan to Sept	40.43	35.74	64.91	114.09	–	34.96
1961
Average value	25.70	40.19	70.47	79.37	6.52	18.41

Source: Industry in Hong Kong, Hong Kong, South china Morning post, 1962, p.22.

proved that it was infeasible simply to rely on businesses to build accommoda- tion for workers. In the 1956 plan, the Public Works Department designated four zones116 and reserved them for the Housing Authority, the Hong Kong Housing Society and low-cost housing estates operated by commercial enterprises, thereby shifting the responsibility of constructing housing to voluntary organisations and private developers. In 1958, the Hong Kong Housing Society constructed the low- cost housing Kwun Tong Garden Estate. Phase I of the project solved the housing problem for 6,885 people, with the majority of residents being workers.

Construction works for the earliest resettlement area in the district com- menced in 1959. Two government resettlement areas were completed in 1960,

116 HKRS No. 270, D & S No. 1/3/1, ‘Memo from Director of Public Works to Director of Urban Services and Commissioner for Resettlement’, 14 June 1956, item 20, p.1.

Kwun Tong	New Kowloon	Kowloon	Island	Yau Tong Bay	Aberdeen
Area sq. ft (m2)
349,000	–	75,700	20,000	–	10,000
(32,457)		(7,040)	(1,860)		(930)
1,110,500	–	4,500	–	–	40,026
(103,277)		(419)			(3,722)
290,480	–	7,200	–	200,000	28,450
(27,015)		(670)		(18,600)	(2,646)
–	25,870	4,200	6,560	468,380	10,000
	(2,406)	(391)	(610)	(43,559)	(930)
418,780	183,040	39,850	–	–	3,540
(38,947)	(17,023)	(3,706)			(329)
223,310	174,735	40,778	22,700	–	7,150
(20,768)	(16,250)	(3,792)	(2,111)		(665)
2,392,070	383,645	172,228	49,260	668,380	99,166
(222,463)	(35,679)	(16,017)	(4,581)	(62,159)	(9,222)
Average upset value per sq. ft (HK$)
5.00	–	19.49	60.00	–	6.00
5.09	–	25.00	–	–	4.97
5.00	–	35.00	–	2.00	10.00
–	25.00	55.00	4.00	2.00	14.00
15.73	35.85	51.22	–	–	5.00
40.43	32.47	52.87	70.00	–	20.00
14.25	31.11	39.76	44.67	2.00	9.99

namely Kwun Tong Resettlement Area and Jordan Valley Resettlement Area, with a total of 19,124 people moving in that year. In 1965, the population of Kwun Tong District continued to rise as the Sau Mau Ping Resettlement Area and Yau Tong Resettlement Area were completed. The number of people living in subsidised housing came to 123,872, which was a 548 per cent increase on the 1960 figure. From the population growth in Kwun Tong, it can be observed that the population planning was divided into two stages: the first stage was from 1959 to 1960, while the second stage commenced after 1965.

In August 1955, the Public Works Department drew up Kowloon Planning Area No. 13 Development Plan (Plan No. L.K. 13/26), which provided for three housing zones and a commercial centre, while land was reserved for gov- ernment use and community facilities, including district government offices, a clinic, markets, schools, a police station, a bus terminal and playgrounds. Public latrines and a public swimming pool were added in the revised version,

Source: Hong Kong public Records Office, Reference No. Map MM-0624, Kun tong New town (Kwun tong), 1956. Drawn by crown Lands and Survey Office, pWD.

Figure 4.4 Plan of Kwun Tong (1956)

Source: Ho pui-yin’s collection. Ho pui-yin, Ways to Urbanisation: Post-war Road Development in Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University press, 2008, pp.71–72.

Figure 4.5 Kwun Tong in the 1960s

Plan No. L.K. 13/27E. Since some of the factories were ready for operation by the end of 1956, ancillary facilities such as water and electricity supply and drain- age would be ready by the end of the year if residential land could be formed between June and August 1956.117 It can thus be observed that the government tried to tie in housing with industrial developments as far as possible.

Although various community facilities were included in early planning, the implementation dates were delayed considerably. Between 1959 and 1960, Kwun Tong Garden Estate and Kwun Tong Resettlement Area were being occupied in succession. However, construction of public facilities did not com- mence or finish until the early 1960s, including Kwun Tong District Branch Office (1960–1965), the police station (1960–1965) and the fire station (1960–1962). Construction of the public swimming pool did not begin until the late 1960s. When comparing the planning scheme of 1955 and government plans of 1963,118 it can be observed that, although space had been reserved for public facilities in the early plans, their final locations were changed drastically. This reflected that the construction of public facilities was not a primary focus in the early plans. During discussions of early plans, the Committee was most

117 HKRS No. 270, D & S No. 1/3/1, ‘Planning Notes: Kowloon Planning Area No. 13, Draft Layout of Housing Zones North of the Proposed Road to Lyemun’, 9 December 1955, item 4.1, p.1.

118 Hong Kong Crown Lands and Survey Office, The New Town of Kwun Tong, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1963.

concerned about the industrial area (moving in factories) and residential area (moving in people); public facilities merely played a subsidiary role and thus had a lower priority. The government’s policies on housing planning and thin- ning out the population were critical to Kwun Tong’s rise as an important base for the processing industries in the 1960s.

Development of new towns

Hong Kong's population grew to around 2.25 million in 1953, which had not been anticipated in the city’s long-term planning. In view of rapid population growth and a lack of land in the urban areas, the government could no longer carry out reform by strictly adhering to the 1948 planning concepts after the mid-1950s.119 The government had to develop the New Territories to disperse the urban popula- tion. Therefore, districts in the New Territories that were closer to the Kowloon Peninsula were developed as priority satellite cities, including Tsuen Wan, Castle Peak (known today as Tuen Mun) and Sha Tin. Their distinctive feature was inte- grated development, as each satellite city had public facilities regarding aspects such as transport networks connecting them with the urban areas, education, medical facilities, and cultural and leisure activities. The satellite cities were also capable of meeting residents’ daily needs, such as housing and food. Most impor- tantly, much emphasis was put on industrial and commercial development in each district, thus providing job opportunities for its residents. With the process- ing industries in their heyday, it was natural that public housing residents became the labour force supporting these industries. The new towns were also developed as centres for the processing industries and played an important role in urbanis- ing Hong Kong. The government established the New Territories Development Department in 1973 to coordinate the development of the New Territories. It was also at this time that satellite cities were renamed as new towns. The population in the New Territories was only 290,000 in 1961, and it had grown to 2.55 million by 2011. The development of new towns not only dispersed the population in over- crowded urban areas, but also gradually expanded the city’s reach to the eastern and western parts of the New Territories, resulting in a reasonable urban ecology. After the war, the most difficult problem in new town development was not finding suitable sites but coming up with sufficient funding. The government had faced land title disputes before the war when it developed New Kowloon. To avoid paying large amounts of compensation in land resumption and resist- ance from indigenous residents, the new town concept revolved around creating new land through reclamation. Thus the government could solve the land own- ership disputes and fund the development of new towns by auctioning off newly reclaimed land. Released in 1965 by the Kowloon Development Division of the Public Works Department, the Report on Development at Sha Tin described quite elaborately the land, financial and population planning of Sha Tin New

119 HKRS No. 156, D & S No. 1/3425, ‘Memorandum of 24 December 1951 from the Acting Financial Secretary’, BL3/5282/51.

Town,120 the development of which would be carried out in four stages. After completing land forming works and constructing basic facilities, the first stage would mainly develop public housing and industrial areas, so that the grassroots who did not mind living in remote areas could move to the yet-to-be-developed new area. At the same time, the new industrial facilities could provide them with job opportunities. In the first stage, the government’s revenues would come mostly from the proceeds from industrial land auctions. Public facilities in the heart of the new town would be the focus of development in the second stage, involving roads, public spaces and government community facilities. When the community facilities were almost completed, private developers would be willing to invest in the development of private housing estates. The ensuing third and fourth stages would be the development of land for private housing, the auctions of which would generate more lucrative sums for the government. With the help of sufficient funding, not only was the overall new town scheme successfully completed, but revenues from land auctions were also substantial at a time when the property market prospered. The government’s careful planning of the financial budget in different stages reflected that it did not have an abun- dance of funds, which was also the main concern in the development of the new towns. Even to this day, the government has reservations about spending large sums of money to develop new towns. (See Figures 4.6 and 4.7.)

Tsuen Wan

In the 1950s, the rapid population growth resulted in a tight supply of land on Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula. High prices gave rise to a gradual shift of investment targets to the New Territories. Approximately 8 kilometres to the north-west of the Kowloon Peninsula, Tsuen Wan was a hilly area topographically. Known as Gin Drinkers Bay, the peninsula reached 400 feet (121.92 metres) in altitude. There were some old villages in Tsuen Wan as early as the nineteenth century. The population was just over 5,000 in the 1920s and 1930s.121 Although the population was small, there was already industrial development in the district. With various berthing facilities and not a long dis- tance from the city’s core district, Tsuen Wan had convenient water and land transport. As it was close to the Shing Mun Reservoir and the government began supplying electricity to the area in the early period, both the water and the elec- tricity facilities were able to meet the demands of future development. As such, Tsuen Wan was an ideal industrial area and thus a focus for the government.122

Since the town centre of Tsuen Wan was separated by hills, many reclama- tion works were required to develop the district. The government divided the

120 Kowloon Development Division, Public Works Department, Report on Development at Sha Tin, Hong Kong Government, January 1965, pp.26–29.

121 Tsuen Wan District Board, Quanwan erbainian: lishi wenhua jinxi (Two Hundred Years of Tsuen Wan: History and Culture, Past and Present), Hong Kong, Tsuen Wan District Board, 1991, p.4.

122 James Hayes, Canghai sangtian hua Quanwan (Tsuen Wan: Growth of a New Town and Its People), trans- lated by Jiaxi yuwen fanyi zhongxin, Hong Kong, Canghai sangtian hua Quanwan chuban weiyuanhui, 1999, p.77.

Source: Kowloon Development Division, public Works Department, Report on Development at Sha Tin, Hong Kong Government, January 1965, Appendix E.

Figure 4.6 Budget of Sha Tin New Town at various stages (1966)

Source: Hong Kong’s New Town: Sha Tin, Hong Kong, New territories Development Department, public Works Department, 1976, Map 1.

Figure 4.7 Distribution of the first generation new towns (Tsuen Wan, Sha Tin, Tuen Mun)

overall development plan for Tsuen Wan District into three centres: Tsuen Wan, Tsing Yi and Kwai Chung. In 1954, the works divisions under the Public Works Department began reclamation and land forming works in Tsuen Wan Bay. In 1957, 121 acres (49.01 hectares) of land was formed in Tsuen Wan,123 Tai Lam Chung Reservoir was completed in the same year, and aqueducts that carried water to Kowloon were laid, fostering a closer relationship between Tsuen Wan District and the urban areas.124 In 1958, the government commis- sioned engineering consultants to carry out long-term planning. In 1959, the government endorsed the blueprint for Tsuen Wan with the aim of developing Tsuen Wan into a 1-million-strong new town.

The importance of Tsuen Wan was boosted by the colony’s long-term devel- opment plan formulated in 1961. At that time, there were already 247 factories and over 20,000 workers in the district. By the mid-1960s, housing development had lagged behind industrial development, and a large number of workers had to commute from Kowloon to work in Tsuen Wan. The government started to increase the supply of residential land so that workers could live not far from their work.125 Further reclamation was carried out in Gin Drinkers Bay from 1969 to 1976 and created as much as 306 acres (123.93 hectares) of land.126 This increased the overall area of Tsuen Wan to over 6,000 acres (2,430 hectares), which was even larger than the area of the Kowloon Peninsula south of Boundary Street.127

Castle Peak (Tuen Mun)

After developing the Tsuen Wan Industrial Area, the government was very keen on developing more industrial land. In December 1957, the government pre- pared draft plans for large-scale reclamation works in Castle Peak. In 1959, the proposal regarding Castle Peak Bay reclamation works recommended develop- ing Castle Peak into a new satellite city that could support over 285,000 people. In 1960, the demand for residential and industrial land in Castle Peak continued to rise, so the Castle Peak development programme was back on the agenda. In December 1961, the government finished the preliminary development outline for Castle Peak. Bridges and causeways in San Hui Bay, Tuen Mun, 1,700 feet (518.16 metres) of levees and water supply systems in the district were to be developed first in preparation for accelerated development of Castle Peak.

The eventual scale of development at Castle Peak was much larger than the basic works proposed in 1961. In September 1963, the Public Works Department carried out on-site investigations again, the main purposes of which were to evaluate the difficulty of reclamation, look for fill sources and investigate the

123 Roger Bristow, Hong Kong’s New Towns, Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, 1989, p.78.

124 Hong Kong’s Water, Hong Kong, Water Supplies Department, 1996, p.93.

125 Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Tsuen Wan and District Outline Development Plan, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1966, p.1.

126 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1973–1974, p.56.

127 C.S. Liang, Hong Kong: A Physical, Economic and Human Geography, Hong Kong, Cheong Ming Press, 1965, pp.39–42.

soil behaviour of the nearby seabed and hills. In April 1964, the project liaison group even openly solicited views of the development programme at Castle Peak from various related departments. In November 1964, it was suggested that Castle Peak be developed into a new satellite city that could accommodate 1 million residents with a total of 1,041 acres of land, which included 171 acres (69.26 hectares) of existing lowland in Castle Peak, 463 acres (187.25 hectares) of hilly land and 407 acres (164.8 hectares) of land through reclamation. The newly developed 1,041 acres (421.61 hectares) of land would be allocated as follows: 179 acres (72.5 hectares) for resettlement areas, 58 acres (23.49 hec- tares) for other government subsidised housing, 335 acres (135.68 hectares) for residential land, 379 acres (153.5 hectares) for industrial land, 34 acres (13.77 hectares) for the town centre, 31 acres (12.56 hectares) for the government’s community departments and 25 acres (10.13 hectares) for public spaces. The estimated total investment was 432 million Hong Kong dollars, equivalent to an average cost of 9.5 Hong Kong dollars per square foot. It was conservatively estimated that revenues of 470 million Hong Kong dollars would be generated from land sales and the construction would take ten years.128

The development of Castle Peak was carried out almost in tandem with that of Sha Tin. In 1966, Phase I of the reclamation works was carried out in Castle Peak and yielded 220 acres (89.1 hectares) of land.129 On 15 July 1966, the Town Planning Board initiated discussion on the development plans for the two new sat- ellite cities, Sha Tin and Castle Peak. The development of Castle Peak faced greater criticism from indigenous villagers, as the Heung Yee Kuk deemed that the govern- ment had failed to carry out sufficient consultation. Eventually, the government made important amendments to the railway development plan for the district.130

The development of public housing in Castle Peak was considered to be a pilot trial of Hong Kong’s public housing schemes. In 1968, the government began the construction of the San Fat Estate, a public housing estate capable of accommodating 11,000 people. By the end of the 1970s, four major large public housing estates in the district had been completed in succession, in line with the government’s ten-year housing scheme announced in 1973. Flats accom- modating 158,000 people were added to the originally planned housing scheme. Within the district, 344,000 people lived in public housing estates out of a total population of 483,600.

In 1971, the government reclaimed land in Castle Peak Bay and increased the total area of new land to 809 hectares, of which 101 hectares was developed. Transport networks were the focus of the district’s development, the most repre- sentative of which was Castle Peak Road, which connected Tsuen Wan through east Castle Peak. The road that extended westwards from the town centre to Pillar Point (Mong Hau Shek) and Tap Shek Kok also boosted the district’s development. The

128 Kowloon Development Division, Public Works Department, Report on Development at Castle Peak, Hong Kong Government, November 1964, p.1.

129 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1972–1973, p.128.

130 Roger Bristow, Hong Kong’s New Towns, Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, 1989, p.174.

comprehensive road network enabled the development of large-scale infrastruc- ture in the district such as the desalination plant and Castle Peak Power Station.

The development of Castle Peak could be regarded as a pilot trial for early urban planning. The government attempted to integrate the views from experts such as professional engineers, architects and urban planners along with those from related government departments to carry out comprehensive planning and coordination of the district.

Sha Tin

Except for the sea to its north, Sha Tin is surrounded by hills in the other three directions. In the middle is a narrow plain formed by bays and the Shing Mun River banks. The entire district has a hilly landscape. Sha Tin District is located in the south-eastern New Territories. To its south, hills like Beacon Hill, Lion Rock and Tate’s Cairn connect it with districts in Kowloon such as Shek Kip Mei, Kowloon Tong, San Po Kong and Tsz Wan Shan. Sha Tin borders Ma On Shan and Sai Kung to its east, with Tai Po to its north-east, and Kwai Chung and Tsuen Wan to its west.131 The district has a total area of approximately 69.22 square kilometres (6,922 hectares).132

In the 1950s, the government started to include Sha Tin as an area for new development. In 1954, it established an ad hoc group to evaluate Sha Tin’s development potential. It suggested developing the district into a satellite city that could support 270,000 people. In July 1963, the government actively con- sidered how to execute the development of the district. In 1965, it formulated the outline development plan and once again amended the area to be reclaimed. With an upward trend in population growth, the concept of constructing high- density housing was added to the new Plan to meet the needs of society. The development was planned to commence in 1966 and was divided into four phases spanning a total of 15 years. It was estimated that, when the development was completed in 1981, Sha Tin would be able to support 1.09 million people with 2,135 acres (864.68 hectares) of developed area, of which 232 acres (93.96 hectares) would be used for the construction of 540,000 residential flats for low-income households. The estimated population density was 5,560 people per hectare (2,250 people per acre), and around 10 per cent of the district would be reserved for public open space and greenery purposes.

Phase I of the construction works mainly involved the areas around the Shing Mun River in Sha Tin and the feng shui hill in Yuen Chau Kok, with the creation of 243 hectares of land. The major works were drainage, reclamation and fresh water supply. The government had to coordinate the work progress of different aspects and control construction costs. It was estimated that 350,000 people could be accommodated. Phase II of the construction works commenced in

131 ‘District Board Electoral Boundaries Sha Tin District’, in Sha Tin District Board, Shatian quyihui jiebao 1985–88 nian (Sha Tin District Board Annual Report 1985–88), Hong Kong, Sha Tin District Board, 1988.

132 K.M.A. Barnett, Hong Kong Report on the 1961 Census, Hong Kong, Census and Statistics Department, 1962, p.11.

November 1971. In 1973, the government reformulated the ten-year plan for Sha Tin, which included land formation, land resumption, and construction of public facilities such as roads, public housing estates, schools, hospitals and police stations. The investment required was estimated to be 2.396 billion Hong Kong dollars, of which 1.668 billion Hong Kong dollars would be allocated for infrastructure and 728 million Hong Kong dollars for construction costs. The blueprint in 1973 covered 4,063 acres (1,645.52 hectares) of land, 2,500 acres (1,012.5 hectares) of which was located in the town centre and was to be used to build leisure grounds, roads, railway stations, hospitals and a racecourse.

In 1973–1974, the ten-year Housing Programme had just been launched, and the pace of construction works in Sha Tin was rather sluggish. Phase I of the construction works was yet to be completed in 1973. Emphasis was placed on the development of Sha Tin only after 1974, when the government needed a large amount of land to accommodate the increased population. In 1976, the government carried out further planning on the construction of public housing estates, allocation of the other land in the new town, and the overall land devel- opment of the town. It was not until the construction works entered Phase II in 1977 that a plan for Sha Tin’s development similar to the current one gradu- ally appeared. The outline development plan for Ma On Shan’s development was also formulated in the same year. Sha Tin’s development took on a faster pace in the 1980s. By the early 1990s, several industrial areas had been formed, consisting of Fo Tan, Tai Wai, Siu Lek Yuen and Shek Mun.133 Main industries included textiles, clothing, electronics, metal fabrication and toys, along with warehouses and cold storage services, which were concentrated in Fo Tan.134 Sha Tin had developed into a comprehensive district that was home to both industrial and commercial activities and green space.

Early post-war land development was concentrated in New Kowloon and satel- lite cities like Tsuen Wan, Castle Peak (now Tuen Mun) and Sha Tin in the New Territories in an attempt to boost Hong Kong’s potential in industrial develop- ment. Having vast spaces was a prerequisite to accommodating various types of factories, attracting the increased population to join the industrial labour force and achieving an overall balance in population distribution and economic devel- opment among the various districts in Hong Kong. It was not until the end of the 1970s that the overall planning of the city began to mature. When developing the New Territories, the government started to put more emphasis on ancillary facili- ties and the balanced development of a district after the mid-1970s. The rise of new towns expanded the city’s core from the northern coast of Hong Kong Island and the southern tip of the Kowloon Peninsula towards the New Territories, thereby making a more reasonable distribution of population density in Hong Kong.

In October 1972, Governor MacLehose proposed the ten-year Housing Programme, which aimed to improve the living conditions of 1.8 million people living in harsh environments by providing housing with more comprehensive

133 Sha Tin District Council website, www.districtcouncils.gov.hk/st/chinese/welcome.htm.

134 Sha Tin District Board, ed., Shatian gongshang zhinan 92 (Sha Tin Industry and Commerce Directory 92), Hong Kong, Industry and Commerce Group of Sha Tin District Board, 1992, p.12.

ancillary facilities and a more reasonable environment. Promoted by the Programme, the first generation new towns in Hong Kong such as Tsuen Wan, Sha Tin and Tuen Mun developed rapidly. In 1976, the government introduced the Home Ownership Scheme to help low- to medium-income households and tenants of public housing to become owners. Most of the Home Ownership Scheme estates were located in new towns, which made their population struc- ture more diverse and turned them into small communities made up of differ- ent social classes. As the lifestyle became increasingly urbanised, the difference between new towns and the city’s core districts diminished. (See Figure 4.8.)

Shrinking distance

External transport – expansion of Kai Tak Airport

The government was committed to developing Hong Kong as an important trading centre in the Far East. Enhancing Hong Kong’s international status was therefore a key factor when it devised long-term development strategies. After the war, the political situation of many countries involved in the Cold War and those in the Asia-Pacific region was unstable, which prompted a rapid growth in Hong Kong’s re-export trade. The passenger and cargo throughput at Kai Tak Airport increased continuously.135 The number of arriving and departing passengers at the airport in 1948 increased 23-fold, and cargo volume increased almost sixfold compared with ten years previously (see Table 4.14).136 Unfortunately, aircraft of the latest models and those that could carry heavier loads such as jet aircraft were unable to take off or land at Kai Tak Airport, which reflected that the airport fell short of modern inter- national aviation standards.137 As a result, competitors in the neighbouring regions such as Manila were afforded an opportunity to replace Hong Kong’s position in air transport industry in the Asia-Pacific region.138 To maintain Hong Kong’s role as an entrepôt, the government would have to expand Kai Tak Airport or construct a new modern airport. It would be costly to repair and convert the runways at Kai Tak Airport,139 and it would be impossible to bring it up to international standard without committing significant resources.140 The government therefore intended

135 FO371/75923, From the Governor, Hong Kong to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, ‘Proposed Construction of a New International Airport at Deep Bay, Hong Kong. Removal of Chinese National Airways Corporation from Kai Tak Airport, Hong Kong’, 7 February 1949, p.6.

136 FO371/75923, From the Governor, Hong Kong to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, ‘Proposed Construction of a New International Airport at Deep Bay, Hong Kong. Removal of Chinese National Airways Corporation from Kai Tak Airport, Hong Kong’, 7 February 1949, p.6.

137 FO371/75923, From the Governor, Hong Kong to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, ‘Proposed Construction of a New International Airport at Deep Bay, Hong Kong. Removal of Chinese National Airways Corporation from Kai Tak Airport, Hong Kong’, 7 February 1949, p.8.

138 FO371/75923, ‘Hong Kong. Removal of Chinese National Airways Corporation from Kai Tak Airport, Hong Kong’, 21 March 1949, p.21.

139 HKRS No. 163, D & S No. 1/1581, ‘Committees – Kai Tak Airport – Financial and Commercial Implications of the Scheme for a New Airport’, 6 October 1953.

140 HKRS No. 163, D & S No. 1/1581, ‘Committees – Kai Tak Airport – Financial and Commercial Implications of the Scheme for a New Airport’, 6 October 1953.

Tsuen Wan
Sha Tin
Tuen Mun

Source: Hong Kong’s New Town: Sha Tin, Hong Kong, New territories Development Department, public Works Department, 1976, Map 4; Hong Kong’s New Town: Tuen Mun, Hong Kong, New territories Development Department, public Works Department, 1976, Map 4; Hong Kong’s New Town: Tsuen Wan, Hong Kong, New territories Development Department, public Works Department, 1976, Map 4.

Figure 4.8 Land use map of the first generation new towns

202 · MAKING HONG KONG

Table 4.14 Statistics of passenger and cargo traffic by air (1938, 1948)

Year	Aircraft arrivals	Passengers entering and leaving	Freight and mail (metric tonnes)
1938	623	9,969	320.2
1948	9,144	232,558	1,874.8

Source: FO371/75923, From the Governor, Hong Kong to the Secretary of State for the colonies, ‘proposed construction of a New International Airport at Deep Bay, Hong Kong. Removal of chinese National Airways corporation from Kai tak Airport, Hong Kong’, 7 February 1949.

to look for a site on which to construct a new airport. Careful consideration was given by the government to selecting a site for the new airport.

In 1949, three potential sites for the new airport were identified: Deep Bay to the west of the New Territories, south of Ping Shan in Yuen Long141 and Stonecutters Island.142 From a geographical perspective, Deep Bay had a pleasant climate and a flat terrain. Two runways that met the requirements of international airports could be constructed,143 and the location was also suitable for aircraft landings and take-offs.144 While the number of flying boats was increasing, the water depth in Deep Bay was insufficient for them to land, and resources would have to be allocated to improve the depth of the seabed.145 The terrain of the site to the south of Ping Shan in Yuen Long was flat, but it was more technically challenging to develop it into a modern airport. The geological characteristics of Stonecutters Island were unusual, and reclamation works would be complex.146 There was also less space for development, which would allow the construction of only one runway. It would not be possible to develop the site on Stonecutters Island into a first-rate airport. The geographical environment of Deep Bay was therefore superior.147 In terms of construction costs, building an airport in Deep Bay was estimated at 3 million pounds sterling (48 million Hong Kong dollars). The construction period was three years, and fewer than 1,000 affected residents would require rehousing. The government could establish an arbitration commit-

141 HKRS No. 46, D & S No. 1/5, ‘Minutes of a Meeting Held in the Legislative Council Chamber on 19th March, 1947, to Consider the Question of Constructing a Modern Airfield in Hong Kong’, 19 March 1947.

142 HKRS No. 46, D & S No. 1/5, ‘Minutes of a Meeting Held in the Legislative Council Chamber on 19th March, 1947, to Consider the Question of Constructing a Modern Airfield in Hong Kong’, 19 March 1947.

143 FO371/75923, ‘New Airfield at Hong Kong’, in ‘Proposed Construction of a New International Airport at Deep Bay, Hong Kong. Removal of Chinese National Airways Corporation from Kai Tak Airport, Hong Kong’, 21 March 1949, p.20.

144 HKRS No. 46, D & S No. 1/5, ‘Minutes of a Meeting Held in the Legislative Council Chamber on 19th March, 1947, to Consider the Question of Constructing a Modern Airfield in Hong Kong’, 19 March 1947.

145 HKRS No. 46, D & S No. 1/5, ‘Minutes of a Meeting Held in the Legislative Council Chamber on 19th March, 1947, to Consider the Question of Constructing a Modern Airfield in Hong Kong’, 19 March 1947.

146 HKRS No. 46, D & S No. 1/5, ‘Minutes of a Meeting Held in the Legislative Council Chamber on 19th March, 1947, to Consider the Question of Constructing a Modern Airfield in Hong Kong’, 19 March 1947.

147 FO371/75923, From the Governor, Hong Kong to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, ‘Proposed Construction of a New International Airport at Deep Bay, Hong Kong. Removal of Chinese National Airways Corporation from Kai Tak Airport, Hong Kong’, 7 February 1949, p.8.

tee to handle compensation issues.148 It would be less costly, and the works could also provide job opportunities for the local area.149 Constructing an airport on Stonecutters Island would cost around 23 million pounds sterling (368 million Hong Kong dollars) and take ten years, which would be 6.7 times more expensive and six years longer compared with Deep Bay.

When considering further the transport link between the airport in Deep Bay and the urban areas, it was found that the railway connecting Fanling station and Sham Wan would be 12.5 miles (20.12 kilometres) in length at a cost of

18.5 million Hong Kong dollars and would take two years to build. The most challenging part was to handle opposition from indigenous villagers along the railway line;150 a bus ride from Kowloon to the airport in Deep Bay would take a minimum of 1.25 hours, and the airlines might have to bear the one-way fare to or from the airport for their passengers.151 The time and cost spent on rail or road transport thus drew a fair amount of criticism. Besides, Deep Bay bordered Mainland China, and the Chinese government might not accept the proposal for military reasons. The British Foreign Secretary feared that the new airport might damage diplomatic relations between the two countries.152 It can be seen that not even Deep Bay, deemed by the government as the most suitable site, could meet the requirements.

On 14 June 1951, R. Broadbent, representative of the British Civil Aviation Authority, came to Hong Kong for a work visit and submitted the Ministry of Civil Aviation Survey Report: Aerodrome Development at H.K. (Kai Tak Airport) to the government.153 In 1952, the government summed up the discussion on the construction of a new, modern international airport in Hong Kong over the previous few years and decided to redevelop Kai Tak Airport.154 In August 1952, the government accepted Broadbent’s recommendation155 and engaged a consulting firm to evaluate the cost and feasibility of developing the airport. The government received the amended report in June 1953.156 There were four options available for Kai Tak Airport’s expansion (see Figure 4.9):

148 FO371/75923, From the Governor, Hong Kong to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, ‘Proposed Construction of a New International Airport at Deep Bay, Hong Kong. Removal of Chinese National Airways Corporation from Kai Tak Airport, Hong Kong’, 7 February 1949, p.8.

149 FO371/75923, To ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies if he will make a statement regarding the pro- posed new airport for Hong Kong, ‘Proposed Construction of a New International Airport at Deep Bay, Hong Kong. Removal of Chinese National Airways Corporation from Kai Tak Airport, Hong Kong’, 6 April 1949, p.28.

150 HKRS No. 163, D & S No. 1/353, ‘Deep Bay Airport’, 28 January 1949.

151 HKRS No. 163, D & S No. 1/353, ‘Deep Bay Airport’, 28 January 1949.

152 FO371/75923, Telegram from Foreign Office to Hong Kong Governor, ‘Proposed Construction of a New International Airport at Deep Bay, Hong Kong. Removal of Chinese National Airways Corporation from Kai Tak Airport, Hong Kong’, 7 February 1949, p.41.

153 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Civil Aviation, 1952–1953, Hong Kong, Government Printer, p.33.

154 HKRS No. 163, D & S No. 1/1324, ‘Kai Tak Airfield Development Plan’, 1/926/51 Part II, 28 October 1952, p.49.

155 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1954–1955, p.67.

156 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1954–1955, p.67.

Source: HKRS No. 163, D & S No. 1/1324, Hong Kong, public Records Office, enclosure 59.1.

Figure 4.9 Draft plan of Kai Tak Airport expansion

 Option A: Proposed by R. Broadbent, it focused on rebuilding the almost intersecting wartime runways into longer, wider, perpendicular runways, one of which would extend towards the sea.

 Option B: Two parallel runways would be constructed, both of which would extend seawards.

 Option C: A new main runway parallel to the existing 07/25 runway would be constructed in the west, while the 07/25 runway would be lengthened to 2,000 feet.

 Option D: A new runway would be constructed in the west, as it was deemed that one new runway would be adequate to handle aircraft landings and take-offs.157

Option A required the closure of the existing runway158 and the entire airport for four to five weeks. Option B required the construction of a passenger ter- minal building on reclaimed land and hence a longer construction time.159 The runway locations under both these options were more prone to turbulence than for Options C and D,160 while lacking sufficient space to develop passenger areas and facilities. The locations of runways under Options C and D were better than the existing ones and had fewer obstacles on the flight paths.161 There would also be adequate space for passenger areas and future expansion. Options C and D were thus preferred.

The demolition of the old 07/25 runway in 1955 aroused controversy.162 A number of airline operators, including Cathay Pacific Airways, Civil Air Transport, Philippine Airlines and Macao Air Transport,163 were in favour of keeping it. These airline operators were dissatisfied with the government’s adop- tion of Broadbent’s recommendation in the report and a lack of full consultation with the industry before undertaking planning for the airport. They believed that the single-runway option adopted by the government would increase the frequency of flight diversions due to cross-winds,164 and airlines had to incur an

157 HKRS No. 163, D & S No. 1/1324, ‘Notes of Meetings Held on 22nd and 23rd January, 1953 to Discuss Operational Aspects of the Modified Proposals for Aerodrome Development at Kai Tak Aerodrome, Hong Kong’, 1/926/51 Part II, 24 January, p.5.

158 HKRS No. 163, D & S No. 1/1324, From the Governor, Hong Kong, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, ‘Reference My Telegram No. 29 of the 15th January, 1953, Improvement of Kai Tak Airport’, 1/926/51 Part II, 16 January 1953, p.3.

159 HKRS No. 163, D & S No. 1/1324, From the Governor, Hong Kong, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, ‘Reference My Telegram No. 29 of the 15th January, 1953, Improvement of Kai Tak Airport’, 1/926/51 Part II, 16 January 1953, p.3.

160 HKRS No. 163, D & S No. 1/1324, From the Governor, Hong Kong, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, ‘Reference My Telegram No. 29 of the 15th January, 1953, Improvement of Kai Tak Airport’, 1/926/51 Part II, 16 January 1953, pp.2–4.

161 HKRS No. 163, D & S No. 1/1324, ‘Notes of Meetings Held on 22nd and 23rd January, 1953, to Discuss Operational Aspects of the Modified Proposals for Aerodrome Development at Kai Tak Aerodrome, Hong Kong’, 1/926/51 Part II, 24 January 1953, p.5.

162 HKRS No. 163, D & S No. 1/1897, ‘Memo from D.C.A. to D.C.S.’, 1/926/56, 26 January 1956, p.3.

163 HKRS No. 163, D & S No. 1/1897, ‘Estimate of Costs Involved to Modify the Airport Development Plan in Order to Retain 07 Runway in an Operational Condition’, 1/926/56, 7 February 1956, p.1.

164 HKRS No. 163, D & S No. 1/1897, ‘Memo from D.C.A. to D.C.S.’, 1/926/56, 26 January 1956, p.3.

extra cost of 16,000 Hong Kong dollars for each diversion.165 The direction of the old runway was more favourable to flights during strong winds and during the night. They also felt that the old runway experienced less turbulence and had a better field of vision and landing facilities than the new runways.166 Thus the airport should have two runways.167

The government was inclined to support Option D, i.e. abandoning the use of the old runway and building just one new runway, as it was costly to maintain the old runway168 and uneconomic as well.169 The old runway covered an area of over 3 million square feet;170 keeping the old runway would mean giving up approxi- mately 7 acres of saleable land while reclaiming an additional 60 acres of land.171 The proposed passenger terminal building would have to move to the north of the old runway, and both the maintenance department and aprons would have to be relocated. The initial plans for Clear Water Bay Road would have to be altered.172 Land made available following the demolition of the old runway was to be used for the construction of the Kowloon police station and the roads leading to the passenger area. Retaining the old runway would involve a search for space for the roads and the police station. Additional sewerage facilities would also have to be built.173 If the old runway was to remain in operation, compensation would have to be paid to residents affected by building height restrictions. It was estimated that the aforementioned expenditures would amount to around 18 million to 24 million Hong Kong dollars,174 leading to a waste of public funds.175 Eventually, the government approved the implementation of Option D: building just one runway and closing the original 07/25 runway.

The entire development plan was divided into two phases. Phase I included reclamation and road works, which would take around three years; Phase II included the construction of a passenger terminal building, reclamation for the extension of the new runway and alterations to Clear Water Bay Road, which would require one year. In 1955, reclamation was carried out in Kowloon Bay. Reclaimed land was used to build a 7,200 foot long (2,194.56 metres), 795 foot

165 HKRS No. 163, D & S No. 1/1897, ‘Estimate of Costs Involved to Modify the Airport Development Plan in Order to Retain 07 Runway in an Operational Condition’, 1/926/56, 7 February 1956, p.1.

166 HKRS No. 163, D & S No. 1/1897, ‘Memo from D.C.A. to D.C.S.’, 1/926/56, 26 January 1956, p.1.

167 HKRS No. 163, D & S No. 1/1897, ‘Memo from D.C.A. to D.C.S.’, 1/926/56, 26 January 1956, p.2.

168 HKRS No. 163, D & S No. 1/1897, ‘Memo from D.C.A. to D.C.S.’, 1/926/56, 26 January 1956, p.3.

169 HKRS No. 163, D & S No. 1/1897, ‘Estimate of Costs Involved to Modify the Airport Development Plan in Order to Retain 07 Runway in an Operational Condition’, 1/926/56, 7 February 1956, p.1.

170 HKRS No. 163, D & S No. 1/1897, ‘Report on Some Aspects of Cathay Pacific Airways’ Notes on the Proposed Development of Kai Tak Airport – The Retention of Runway’, 1/926/56, 7 February 1956, pp.1–2.

171 HKRS No. 163, D & S No. 1/1897, ‘Estimate of Costs Involved to Modify the Airport Development Plan in Order to Retain 07 Runway in an Operational Condition’, 1/926/56, 7 February 1956, p.1.

172 HKRS No. 163, D & S No. 1/1897, ‘Report on Some Aspects of Cathay Pacific Airways’ Notes on the Proposed Development of Kai Tak Airport – The Retention of Runway’, 1/926/56, 7 February 1956, pp.3–4.

173 HKRS No. 163, D & S No. 1/1897, ‘Estimate of Costs Involved to Modify the Airport Development Plan in Order to Retain 07 Runway in an Operational Condition’, 1/926/56, 7 February 1956, pp.1–2.

174 HKRS No. 163, D & S No. 1/1897, ‘Estimate of Costs Involved to Modify the Airport Development Plan in Order to Retain 07 Runway in an Operational Condition’, 1/926/56, 7 February 1956, pp.1–2.

175 HKRS No. 163, D & S No. 1/1897, ‘Report on Some Aspects of Cathay Pacific Airways’ Notes on the Proposed Development of Kai Tak Airport – The Retention of Runway’, 1/926/56, 7 February 1956, pp.1–2.

(242.32 metres) wide runway, along with a parallel taxiway. The runway was extended by 1,140 feet (347.47 metres) to 8,340 feet (2,542.03 metres) a year later. The new passenger terminal building was located to the west of the old 07/25 runway.176 Phase II works commenced only after the opening of the new runway and the closure of the two existing runways. Phase I of the airport devel- opment works was also the largest engineering contract in Hong Kong’s colonial history at the time.177 The main contractor for Phase I of the development works was Dragages, a French firm,178 with Gammon Construction Ltd as the sub-con- tractor. The contract for the development scheme expired on 26 August 1958.179 The new runway opened in 1958, while the new passenger terminal building was completed and opened in 1962. The runway and the passenger terminal building cost a total of 6.2 million pounds sterling (99.2 million Hong Kong dollars) and 1.1 million pounds sterling (17.6 million Hong Kong dollars), respectively. Of the sums, the British government provided the Hong Kong government with a 15-year interest-free loan of 3 million pounds sterling (48 million Hong Kong dollars).180 In addition, the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund allocated 50,000 pounds sterling (800,000 Hong Kong dollars) to the Hong Kong government in 1950 to improve air traffic communication

systems.181 (See Table 4.15.)

From the conceptualisation in 1949 to the completion in 1962, the airport expansion scheme was implemented only after detailed consideration of the society’s economic capability and actual needs at the time in terms of the geo- graphical location, expenditures and transport to the city’s core districts. The expanded Kai Tak Airport immensely helped Hong Kong’s economic develop- ment from the 1960s to the 1990s. It was world-renowned for its unique loca- tion in the urban areas and the runway which extended seawards.

Internal transport: the Cross-Harbour Tunnel and Mass Transit Railway

After reiterating the great importance of the Cross-Harbour Tunnel to the devel- opment of the two core districts in the 1948 long-term planning report,182 the Planning Department contacted relevant departments to prepare for the con- struction works. In 1956, the government issued a research report on the initial

176 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1954–1955, p.68.

177 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1954–1955, p.68.

178 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1955–1956, p.69.

179 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1956–1957, p.63.

180 Kung Sheung Daily News (Industrial and Commercial Daily), 17 June 1954, p.5.

181 FCO14/75, ‘Expansion of Hong Kong Air Traffic’, 12 January 1968, pdf p.41.

182 Patrick Abercrombie, Hong Kong Preliminary Planning Report, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1948, pp.13–14.

Table 4.15 Expenditures on Kai Tak Airport expansion works (1953–1966)

Year	Item	Expenditures (HK$ million)
1953–1955	Kai tak Airport Development plan	1.7
1955–1958	construction of an 8,340-foot-long runway and a taxiway	85.3
	parallel to it. construction of seawalls with a length of 3.25
	miles with 1,100 cubic yards of filler and reclamation of 179
	acres
1959	construction of the temporary passenger terminal	1.9
1960	Repairing a section of prince Edward Road from Kowloon city	0.8
	Bypass to the airport’s entrance
1961	Repairing roads in the vicinity of the airport	1.15

1961–1962 construction of a new passenger area and terminal building 16

to the west of the old runway. Related works included connecting Kai tak Nullah, connecting clear Water Bay Road and expanding the sewerage system

1962–1963 construction works, furniture and equipment 5.91

1964–1965 construction works 0.06

1965–1966 construction works 0.13

Other 21.82

total expenditures 134.77

Sources: Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works for the Financial Year 1953–62, Hong Kong,

Government printer, 1954–1962; Wu Bangmou, comp. and ed., Zaikan qide: cong rizhanshiqi shuoqi 《再看啓德：從日佔時期說起》 (Looking again at Kai tak: Starting from the Japanese Occupation period), Hong Kong, ZKOOB, 2009, pp.118, 161–169; Annual Report of the Accountant General with the Accounts of the Colony 1953–66, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1954–66, Expenditure.

design of the tunnel. Between 1957 and 1964, preliminary studies were con- ducted on selecting sites for the tunnel’s exits, connecting transport and related ancillary facilities. In the 1967 plans for Tsim Sha Tsui, the exit on the Kowloon Peninsula was to be located in Hung Hom Bay following reclamation.183 (See Figure 4.10.)

In June 1969, The Cross-Harbour Tunnel Company signed a contract with a consortium of international contractors and engaged overseas contractors to undertake the construction of the Cross-Harbour Tunnel. The Cross-Harbour Tunnel Co. Ltd was a local company that was 25 per cent owned by the gov- ernment.184 The build–operate–transfer (BOT) model was adopted for the Cross-Harbour Tunnel to overcome the problem of insufficient funds. The Cross-Harbour Tunnel was the first large-scale project to adopt the BOT model. The BOT franchise period was 30 years as from the date of opening in 1972. The

183 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1956–1968.

184 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1969–1970, p.103.

Source: Cross Harbour Tunnel between Hong Kong and Kowloon: Consultants’ Report, London, Mott, Hay & Anderson, consulting civil Engineers, 1955.

Figure 4.10 Early concept of the Cross-Harbour Tunnel (1955)

Table 4.16 Construction costs of the Cross-Harbour Tunnel

Items Expenditure

(HK$’000)

contract for the construction by the cross-Harbour tunnel company Limited with a consortium of international contractors

270,000

Road connections, Kowloon	14,998
Road connections, Island	5,546
traffic and directional signs	703
Amenity treatment	196
total	291,443

Source: Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works for the Financial Year 1969–74, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1970–1974.

contractor was required to hand back the franchise to the government in 2002. (See Table 4.16 for the construction costs.)

Construction commenced in September 1969. The tunnel was made up of 15 sections of 350-foot-long steel pipeline. The Hung Hom exit was to be built first, and work for the first section pipe was completed in November, which was followed by laying pipes on the seabed and connecting them together. After the pipeline foundation settlement was completed in early 1972, work began on connecting the pipes with the tunnel exits. The tunnel officially opened in August 1972.185 After its opening in 1972, the Cross-Harbour Tunnel soon replaced ferry services.

Hong Kong Mass Transit Railway

Comprehensive evaluation of a city’s internal transport situation and the direc- tion of its future development is the key to the full implementation of long-term plans. Since the 1950s, the government had carried out several studies on trans- port in Hong Kong, and in 1965 it even commissioned the British consulting firm Freeman, Fox, Wilbur Smith and Associates to explore a suitable transport system for Hong Kong for the following 20 years. Using basic elements such as transport cost, quality of service and development potential as the basis of study, Freeman, Fox, Wilbur Smith and Associates prepared the Hong Kong Mass Transport Study in 1967 and completed the Hong Kong Long Term Road Study in 1968. The Hong Kong Mass Transport Study was the first to project the population growth trend, distribution and quality of life in every district in Hong Kong for the coming 20 years based on the 1966 by-census, so as to assess the future demand for public transport and design an approach for its future development.186 (See Figure 4.11.)

185 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1969–1973.

186 Freeman, Fox, Wilbur Smith and Associates, Hong Kong Mass Transport Study (Plans and Cross Sections), Hong Kong, Hong Kong Government, 1967, pp.1–2.

Source: HKRS70-1-430, ‘transport Surveys – Mass transport Systems’, Hong Kong, public Records Office, 1961–1969.

Figure 4.11 Mass Transit Railway System suggested in the Hong Kong Mass Transport Study (1967)

Preliminary estimates in the research report prepared by Freeman, Fox, Wilbur Smith and Associates indicated that Hong Kong’s total population would grow to 6.87 million in 1986,187 which was 1.77 million more than the 1981 population of 5.1 million as projected by the Census and Statistics Department in June 1968. In light of the projections made by the Census and Statistics Department, the firm revised the estimated population to 5.65 million in 1986 (Hong Kong’s population in 1986 was 5.5 million). Using this as the basis, the distribution of Hong Kong’s population in 1986 was divided into eight districts:

1) Tsuen Wan; 2) Castle Peak; 3) Sha Tin; 4) Tai Po; 5) Fanling and Sheung Shui; 6) Yuen Long; 7) other districts of the New Territories; and 8) Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and New Kowloon. It was estimated that the city’s core districts of Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and New Kowloon would remain the most densely populated areas in 1986 with a population of 3.87 million, i.e. 68.5 per cent of Hong Kong’s population. The New Territories would have a popula- tion of 1.78 million, i.e. 31.5 per cent of overall population, with Tsuen Wan set to have the fastest population growth, rising from 187,000 in 1966 to 700,000 in 1986, to be followed by Castle Peak, whose population would grow from 22,000 to 240,000. In third place would be Sha Tin, with a population projected to increase from 18,000 to 260,000. Transport within districts such as Tsuen Wan, Castle Peak and Sha Tin as well as their links with the city’s core districts would therefore be the focus of road development in the 1970s and 1980s.

According to research data, 38 per cent of the time spent by citizens on trans- port was commuting between workplace and home, 23 per cent was for work purposes and 39 per cent for reasons such as shopping, personal matters or leisure activities. The pattern was similar to that of other large cities, but Hong Kong citizens drove to shop less frequently owing to the mixed use of commer- cial and residential land.188 Newly developed districts should therefore provide as many ancillary facilities as possible within the same district to reduce the use of public transport.

In 1968, Freeman, Fox, Wilbur Smith and Associates submitted the Hong Kong Long Term Road Study,189 proposing the construction of a 40-mile-long, four-line Mass Transit Railway (MTR) System to divert transport and provide public transport services that catered for the masses. It was hoped that its pace of development would follow the distribution and growth trend of the population. It was recommended that the system should be completed in six stages.190 The Kwun Tong Line would run from Western Market to Ma Yau Tong, with the majority of the works carried out in Stage 1. The Tsuen Wan Line would run from the Naval Dockyard to Tsuen Wan, with the majority of the works carried out in Stage 2. The Island Line would run from Kennedy Town to Chai Wan, with the

187 Wah Kiu Yat Po, 3 August 1966.

188 Wah Kiu Yat Po, 3 August 1966.

189 Freeman, Fox, Wilbur Smith and Associates, Hong Kong Long Term Road Study (Plans and Cross Sections), Hong Kong, Hong Kong Government, 1968.

190 Freeman, Fox, Wilbur Smith and Associates, Hong Kong Mass Transport Study (Plans and Cross Sections), Hong Kong, Hong Kong Government, 1967, p.75.

Table 4.17 1970 budget for the Mass Railway Transit System

	Initial system	Entire system
	(HK$100 million)	(HK$100 million)
civil construction (including land costs)	14.75	31.329
Mechanical and electrical equipment	4.86	12.579
total	19.61	43.908

Source: Hong Kong Government, Mass Transit Further Studies Final Report: Abstract, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1971, p.3.

majority of the works carried out in Stage 3. The Sha Tin Line would run from Tsim Sha Tsui to Sha Tin, with the majority of the works carried out in Stages 5 and 6. The system was to have 50 stations, eight of which were interchange stations. There would also be transport ancillary facilities connecting the MTR stations. Counting from 1967, it was estimated that the entire system would be open in 1985, requiring a total of 17 years. The budgeted costs were 3.4 billion Hong Kong dollars, equivalent to 200 million Hong Kong dollars per year on average. The allocation of the investment was 6 per cent on land cost, 58 per cent on station construction and 36 per cent on ancillary facilities.

The foremost focus of the whole MTR concept was to divert urban transport in districts such as the northern shore of Hong Kong Island, Kowloon South and Kowloon East, followed by strengthening connections of New Territories districts Tsuen Wan and Sha Tin with the urban areas, so as to match the pop- ulation distribution in various districts as projected in the Hong Kong Mass Transport Study. Development of the various stages had to start with the city’s urgent needs. The pace of development would be dictated by the foremost task of solving transport problems in the city’s core districts, followed by an expan- sion to the new towns. The government held a public tender in July 1972 for the construction of the MTR,191 thereby officially launching the railway project.

The Mass Transit Further Studies Final Report released in 1970 revised the 1968 proposal: adjusting construction costs to 4.491 billion Hong Kong dollars and postponing the year of completion by one year to 1986,192 with the number of stations reduced to 48 and the length of the railway increased to 52.6 kilome- tres.193 (See Table 4.17.)

At a meeting of the Legislative Council in June 1972, Financial Secretary Philip Haddon-Cave stated:

we believe, first, that a substantial sum of public money can be committed to assist in financing the project; secondly, that the railway can be constructed without

191 Hong Kong Mass Transit Railway Provision Authority, Hong Kong Mass Transit Railway: Preliminary Information for Prospective Tenders, Hong Kong, Freeman Fox and Partners (Far East), 1975, pp.1–14.

192 Hong Kong Government, Mass Transit Further Studies Final Report: Abstract, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1971, p.1.

193 Ouyang Ruohua, Gangtie dongle: sanshiliu zai qingyushi (Moving Experience: The MTR’s First 36 Years), Hong Kong, South China Morning Post, 2011, p.32.

undue disruption; and thirdly, that the system can be operated in such a way as to generate a sufficient cash flow to service the investment and cover operating costs.194

To tackle problems such as financing, construction and operation costs, Haddon-Cave established a steering group of which he was the chairman. He also mentioned that the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank would vigorously assist the steering group to undertake research on financing options other than gov- ernmental funding and that the government would do its utmost to get the con- struction started in early 1974.195

In August 1973, four large international consortia started bidding for the MTR Initial System’s construction works. The Mitsubishi Japanese Consortium was the successful tenderer, and its Hong Kong representative, Jardine, Matheson and Co., signed the letter of intent on 16 February 1974. Prices of basic materials soared in 1974 shortly after the outbreak of the oil crisis in 1973. The Japanese Consortium was unable to continue operation as a consequence of inflation; it announced its withdrawal in 1975, and the MTR plan was interrupted.196

The government modified the design of the Initial System and reduced its scale to 15.6 kilometres and just 15 stations connecting major residential areas and industrial areas between Central and Kowloon.197 Governor MacLehose, along with Financial Secretary Philip Haddon-Cave and Baron Sandberg (Chairman of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation), announced the govern- ment’s new financing concept – establishing a company that would operate on prudent commercial principles under the management of the government. Consortia around the world (55 per cent overseas institutions and 45 per cent local ones) would be invited to join the company, with the government respon- sible for a small percentage of funding. Eventually four civil engineering consor- tia agreed to the government’s design and the budget for construction costs and participated in the project.198

The Modified Initial System cost a total of 5.8 billion Hong Kong dollars, of which 5 billion Hong Kong dollars was the contract costs for building and equipping the MTR system (around 4 billion Hong Kong dollars for civil engi- neering works and 1 billion Hong Kong dollars for electrical and mechanical works). Total contract costs of 5 billion Hong Kong dollars and 1 billion Hong Kong dollars of interest and finance costs incurred on the construction of the MTR system were funded by export credits as well as local and overseas loans,

194 Hong Kong Legislative Council, Reports of the Meetings of the Legislative Council of Hongkong, 7 June 1972, p.797, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr71-72/h720607.pdf.

195 Ouyang Ruohua, Gangtie dongle: sanshiliu zai qingyushi (Moving Experience: The MTR’s First 36 Years), Hong Kong, South China Morning Post, 2011, pp.34–35.

196 Ouyang Ruohua, Gangtie dongle: sanshiliu zai qingyushi (Moving Experience: The MTR’s First 36 Years), Hong Kong, South China Morning Post, 2011, p.35.

197 Dixiatielu shouri tongche jinian tekan (Official Souvenir Book to Commemorate the First Day of Running MTRC Trains), Hong Kong, Mass Transit Railway Corporation, 1979.

198 Ouyang Ruohua, Gangtie dongle: sanshiliu zai qingyushi (Moving Experience: The MTR’s First 36 Years), Hong Kong, South China Morning Post, 2011, p.42.

Table 4.18 Total expenditures on construction of the Mass Transit Railway

	Kwun Tong Line	Tsuen Wan Line	Island Line
	(HK$100 million)	(HK$100 million)	(HK$100 million)
construction costs	56	39	104
Interest and Financing costs	17	14	15
total	73	53	119

Source: Mass transit Railway corporation, Mass Transit Railway Fact Sheet, Hong Kong, Mass transit Railway corporation, 1989, pp.2–4.

the majority of which were guaranteed by the Hong Kong government. The government was responsible for the 800 million Hong Kong dollars spent on administration, land and consultancy fees and was compensated by shares of equivalent value in the Mass Transit Railway Corporation. (See Table 4.18 for total construction expenditures.)

The numerous difficulties that MTR construction works encountered were comparable to the current opposition faced by the construction of the Hong Kong section of the Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link. Intense debate was triggered following the publication of the Hong Kong Mass Transport Study in 1967. The headline of the South China Morning Post was ‘Transport Men See Disaster in Railway Proposal’.199 Road traffic was blocked, congested or even halted during construction. When works com- menced on Nathan Road, they were met with much opposition from the public. For them, losses associated with the MTR were felt long before the benefits arrived. They were unable to envisage the benefits that the MTR would bring in the future.200 On the other hand, Hongkong Tramways Ltd worried that its market share would suffer following the opening of the MTR,201 while other transport operators were concerned about falling profits in the future. Construction works for the Tsuen Wan Line required the rec- lamation of 7.4 hectares of land, the resumption of land that was currently occupied by houses, squatter areas and industrial buildings, the resettlement of thousands of residents, the purchase of residential units from 3,000 resi- dents, and the relocation of 153 graves.202

The huge expenditures of the MTR were also called into question. On 14 February 1968, Professor Sean Mackey of the Civil Engineering Department at the University of Hong Kong pointed out that the immense scale of the plan was disproportionate to the MTR’s area of coverage, as it could only serve certain districts of Hong Kong and its passenger traffic would only account for 30 per

199 South China Morning Post, 15 February 1968, p.1.

200 Ouyang Ruohua, Gangtie dongle: sanshiliu zai qingyushi (Moving Experience: The MTR’s First 36 Years), Hong Kong, South China Morning Post, 2011, p.43.

201 South China Morning Post, 15 February 1968, p.1.

202 Ouyang Ruohua, Gangtie dongle: sanshiliu zai qingyushi (Moving Experience: The MTR’s First 36 Years), Hong Kong, South China Morning Post, 2011, p.57.

cent of total passenger traffic. He believed that the system would impose a heavy economic burden on Hong Kong and that it would not be possible for the local economy to support the MTR project for the following 16 years.203

When the Mass Transit Railway Corporation Bill 1975 was voted on 23 April 1975, a considerable number of Legislative Council members voted against it. Although the bill was passed, many members believed that the transport problem could be solved in other ways, such as expanding the Kowloon–Canton Railway to a double-track system or enhancing tram services. The MTR’s con- tinued increases in construction costs were not an isolated case, as many past government construction projects had gone over budget: Airport Tunnel Road (17 per cent over budget), Clear Water Bay Road (22 per cent over budget), High Island Reservoir water supply works (40 per cent over budget) and Plover Cove Reservoir dam (90 per cent over budget). It was estimated that the con- struction and 20-year operation of the MTR would cost 14 billion Hong Kong dollars, which would be 140 per cent higher than the 5.8 billion Hong Kong dollars according to the revised budget. In 1976, the Legislative Council was informed that interest expense would increase by 100 million Hong Kong dollars during the four-year construction of the Modified Initial System.204

The challenges of the construction were not limited to controversies over expenditures. Hong Kong’s granite geology posed an enormous challenge for tunnel boring works. Sir Wilfrid Newton, Chairman of the Mass Transit Railway Corporation from 1983 to 1989, recalled that workers had to bore holes through granite along the sections of the Island Line. There was coarse gravel everywhere, which was a nemesis to tunnel boring. The greatest difficulty was that many tall buildings had already been erected along the sections of the Island Line in the 1970s. If the foundations of nearby buildings were not dug deep enough, they faced a risk of collapse, which would result in temporary evacuation of residents. The construction would require suitable exploratory and protective works for the building’s foundations. Soil properties were tested before adopting various methods to bore tunnels, such as the chilling method that freezes the ground to facilitate boring.205 For the above reasons, the Island Line was built much deeper below the ground than the Kwun Tong Line and the Tsuen Wan Line, demon- strating the difficulty of the works.

As the MTR had a higher passenger carrying capacity than modes of road transport, road traffic congestion problems were solved after the opening of the system. Connections between core districts and districts that were previously considered remote such as Tsuen Wan and Kwun Tong became much closer, while economic activities along the railway station routes prospered. When people use the MTR today, do they ever think how this transport system, which took over ten years in planning and more than a decade in construction, went

203 South China Morning Post, 16 February 1968, p.6.

204 Ouyang Ruohua, Gangtie dongle: sanshiliu zai qingyushi (Moving Experience: The MTR’s First 36 Years), Hong Kong, South China Morning Post, 2011, pp.46–47.

205 Ouyang Ruohua, Gangtie dongle: sanshiliu zai qingyushi (Moving Experience: The MTR’s First 36 Years), Hong Kong, South China Morning Post, 2011, p.61.

over budget by 460 per cent and generated great controversy among the parties concerned during construction, became an important part of Hong Kong people’s everyday life in the twenty-first century and an indispensable element for Hong Kong’s achievement as an international metropolis?

Summary

Post-war urban planning in Hong Kong was arduous and full of challenges: insufficient land resources in the city, shortage of economic resources, countless tasks to be done after the war, an unstable global political situation, and so on, all of which greatly hindered Hong Kong’s long-term planning and develop- ment. Among them, the population problem was the most difficult to tackle, as its growth rate exceeded that of the pre-war period. According to official records, Hong Kong’s population grew from around 860,000 in September 1943 to 1.8 million in 1947, more than doubling within a short period of four years and breaking the record of 1.63 million at the peak of the refugee influx before the Sino-Japanese War in 1938. The figure soared to 2.36 million in the spring of 1950.206 How could a city that already lacked land resources support an exponentially growing population? Faced with the problem of population growth, the government did not opt for policies that suppressed population to relieve the pressure. On the contrary, it viewed population as an important eco- nomic resource and driver for urban development and vigorously absorbed the capital, professional knowledge and human resources brought by the immigrant population.

The government had already felt the pressure of population growth when it hired British experts on urban planning to come to Hong Kong to carry out studies and formulate long-term development blueprints in 1946. After coming to Hong Kong, the urban planning experts were able to experience first-hand the surging influx of refugees. After weighing advantages against disadvantages, the government was unwilling to change its immigration policies and was already psychologically prepared for the refugee influx. The 1948 long-term planning took reference from the measures implemented by other cities to tackle popula- tion growth and compared the benefits and drawbacks of each country, adopted their strong points and gained a deeper understanding of the aspects where Hong Kong had room for improvement. The government formulated preven- tive measures aimed at preparing the city for population growth: developing rural land on the urban fringes; assessing the population distribution and density in districts planned for development; emphasising a reasonable level of popula- tion density, open spaces and green belts that were required by the livelihood of the grassroots and necessary facilities for daily life; and formulating measures to disperse population in urban areas. Facing the problems of dismantling squatter areas and resettling fire victims in the 1950s, the government put back on the agenda the pre-war public housing scheme. The preliminary planning work was

206 Hong Kong Annual Report, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1953, p.21.

a very useful reference for the government in tackling the problem of a surging population in the 1950s and 1960s.

Planning for the political and commercial roles of districts in the urban areas, New Kowloon and the New Territories such as government administrative centres, cultural centres, transport interchanges, distribution of offensive trades, heavy industrial areas, manufacturing industrial areas and distribution of public housing areas was mainly aimed at coordinating with the development of core districts and was formulated according to the respective geographical conditions of each district so that they each could fully realise their potential and fit in with the overall development of the city. Such a macro-perspective was an advantage of long-term planning, which was more comprehensive than the pre-war spo- radic development that relied on private investment. Post-war development of the districts made the best use of their respective geographical characteristics and played to their strengths.

The planning and development of external transport effectively enhanced Hong Kong’s status in entrepôt trade, while the city’s internal transport diverted population from the densely populated urban areas to the suburbs and rein- forced the post-war strategy of developing manufacturing industries with imme- diate impacts. Development of transport systems was an important aspect of people’s livelihoods. It required large economic investments and a long time to bring about; it was thus highly controversial in society. Insistence on the feasibil- ity of a plan has to be backed by solid evidence. On-site investigations carried out and data collected during planning provided an objective and pragmatic view regarding whether the plan should be adopted. They helped the plan to overcome all difficulties and eventually be implemented.

Long-term planning concepts may sometimes encounter hindrances such as insufficient resources, lack of land, and criticism by various stakeholders in society, resulting in the inability to immediately implement a plan based on its original design, while some plans may even be shelved. Organisations and legal systems established to coordinate with development in the implementation of plans were the basis for resolving disputes between various parties. Urban plan- ning was not rendered useless by sudden changes that befell the city; rather, it was well prepared. Through continuous, appropriate refinements to original concepts, the city continued to conquer the numerous challenges that it faced and to thrive in a harsh environment. (See Figure 4.12.)

Source: HKRS41-2A-34-2, ‘Annual Departmental Report – public Works Department’, Hong Kong, public Records Office, 1968–1972; or Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works 1969–70, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1970.

Figure 4.12 Major development schemes in Hong Kong (1969–1970)

5

Approaching the handover (1979–1997)

We have all been forcefully reminded how vulnerable Hong Kong is to developments which occur outside our borders over which we have no control. In May and June, confidence in Hong Kong was badly shaken by the tragic events in China. People became more nervous about their future. Investors have shown signs of being more cautious in assessing the territory’s prospects. So we have a new challenge to meet and new problems to overcome. But this is not the first crisis that Hong Kong has had to confront. When we have faced difficulties in the past we have emerged with new confidence and strength. Already there are ample signs that Hong Kong is showing its usual resilience; that we are facing up to our problems and finding solutions to them. (Governor David C. Wilson’s speech,

Hong Kong Legislative Council, 11 October 1989)

The 1980s were an era filled with controversies, doubts and worries, an era when crises became opportunities. Urban development was at times hindered by political prospects and in others boosted by political turmoil. Many believed efforts to conduct planning for the unpredictable future during uncertain times would only be futile; it was a tough task, but some efforts went ahead and perse- vered. When reviewing the planning process from the 1980s to the 1990s, one realises that, without a long-term planning scheme prepared at an early stage, it is difficult to seize opportunities and realise great ideas when the time is ripe. The Airport Core Programme planned in the early 1980s was an excellent example. As the ten core projects were laid out step by step in the 1990s, outstanding infrastructure immediately made Hong Kong an international metropolis; this showed the importance of long-term planning.

Development strategies in the 1980s

Pursuit of economic growth

As before, conducting long-term planning meant evaluating the future based on current conditions of development. In the early 1970s, the government released the Colony Outline Plan, which started with open discussion on urban planning based on the existing situation and level of development, followed by a pres- entation of ideas on future development. In 1979, the Colony Outline Plan was

renamed the Hong Kong Outline Plan; certain contents were deleted, and empha- sis was given to the foundation of planning. In 1981, the Land Development Planning Committee (LDPC) established the Planning Standards Sub- Committee (PSSC), which was responsible for evaluating planning principles formulated in the Hong Kong Outline Plan. In 1982, the Planning Standards Sub-Committee proposed drafting the Territorial Development Strategy (TDS) for the Hong Kong Outline Plan; the planning principles part was renamed Hong Kong Planning Standards and Guidelines,1 and mainly discussed standards and guidelines for urban planning. Planning of the Territorial Development Strategy commenced in the early 1980s and was released in five parts and eight volumes from 1982 to 1983; its main points included:2

 developing a diversified economy;

 evaluating the future housing demand and improving the living environment;

 developing new towns;

 predicting land supply and demand;

 promulgating an approach for future transport development;

 planning an expansion of port facilities;

 selecting a site to construct a new airport;

 expanding higher education.

Economic diversification

When evaluating the employment situation of the ten years between 1971 and 1981 as the foundation for formulating an approach for future economic devel- opment, it can be seen that the growth rate of manufacturing industry was only 23 per cent, while that of public services reached 65 per cent and that of finance and commerce reached 161 per cent. Manufacturing industry was predicted to decline, while the business and service industry would become relatively sig- nificant. That would result in an economic restructuring. Based on the situation in 1981, it was estimated that the labour force would rise from 2.416 million in 1981 to 3.176 million in 1996 and further to 3.437 million in 2001. (See

Table 5.1.)

The labour force in the city centre dropped from 83 per cent in 1971 to 75 per cent in 1981, while the employment rate in the core district, particularly for white-collar jobs, was still higher than that of the new towns. It was estimated that the employment rates of the first generation new towns such as Tsuen Wan and Kwai Chung would rise.3 Employment rates in Tai Po and Tuen Mun were relatively low, and there was a severe lack of white-collar job opportunities in

1 Hong Kong Planning Department, Hong Kong Planning Standards and Guidelines, Hong Kong, Planning Department, 2011, Ch. 1.

2 Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 1: An Introductory Statement, April 1982, Hong Kong, Strategic Planning Unit, 1982, p.7.

3 Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 3: Demographic Inputs, July 1982, Hong Kong, Strategic Planning Unit, 1982, pp.19–20.

Table 5.1 Evaluation of growth in Hong Kong’s labour force (1981, 1991, 1996, 2001)

	1981	1991	1996	2001
projected population (10,000s)	500	621	669	708.9
total workforce (10,000s)	241.6	292	317.6	343.7
percentage of population in workforce (%)	48.3	47.0	47.5	48.5
Distribution of workforce
	10,000s	10,000s	10,000s	10,000s
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Manufacturing industry	94.2	109.5	117.5	123.7
	(39)	(37.5)	(37)	(36)
Business and other industries requiring a	27.5	43.8	51.5	63.9
central location	(11.4)	(15)	(16.2)	(18.6)
Services associated with population	61.7	75.3	82.6	91.1
concentrations	(25.5)	(25.8)	(26)	(26.5)
Services not dependent on specific	58.2	63.4	66	65
population concentrations	(24.1)	(21.7)	(20.8)	(18.9)
Total	241.6	292	317.6	343.7
	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)

Source: Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 3: Demographic Inputs, July 1982, Hong Kong, Strategic planning Unit, 1982, table 9.

the new towns.4 As the new towns were manufacturing hubs, intensive develop- ment of the transport networks connecting the new towns and the core district was essential. Meanwhile, developing commercial land use at intersections of the Mass Transit Railway (MTR) and the railway could increase the number of non-industrial job opportunities and reduce the burden on the core district.

From the 1950s to the 1970s, manufacturing industry was the core of Hong Kong’s economy and dedicated to producing low-cost products. This took a turn in 1980 when the government decided that developing high-quality, high- technology products could enhance the income of the people of Hong Kong. It then advised industry to convert from a labour-intensive to a capital-intensive mode so as to boost the export of such products. Priority was thus given to expand- ing the capacity of ports and the airport to facilitate the increasing throughputs.

It was predicted that the GDP growth rate in 1982 would reach the minimum requirement of 9 per cent. In view of the importance of sustaining economic growth at a minimum of 9 per cent, ways to encourage economic diversification had to be devised, which could boost the export of goods and labour services.5 Located on the coast of southern China with a prime geographic location, Hong Kong port became an interchange for China and the Pacific region that could

4 Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 3: Demographic Inputs, July 1982, Hong Kong, Strategic Planning Unit, 1982, pp.24–27.

5 Hong Kong Advisory Committee on Diversification, Report of the Advisory Committee on Diversification, 1979, Hong Kong, Advisory Committee on Diversification, 1980, p.109.

be developed into a trade and financial centre. Victoria Harbour was a natural good-quality port with deep waters. In terms of the economy, the international airport in Hong Kong could boost entrepôt trading in the city and help develop it as a commercial and financial centre.

Enhancing the education level for all

Under the economic diversification policy, the labour force would have to possess a certain level of professional knowledge to acquire and apply new technologies. Fields such as business administration, economics, accounting, engineering and data processing were in need of more professionals and tech- nical talents. The government’s social services, urban development and plan- ning required a large number of engineers, architects, lawyers, social workers and doctors. Higher education facilities had to be expanded.6 The two univer- sities could only provide 7,000 extra places based on an annual growth rate of 4 per cent each year. Such measures were expected to be implemented in the University of Hong Kong in 1987/88, while for the Chinese University of Hong Kong it would happen in 1989/90. It was thus necessary to construct the third university in the early 1990s – the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. The Hong Kong Polytechnic would have to add 8,000 places and greatly increase the number of non-degree programmes. Located in Hung Hom, the Hong Kong Polytechnic would need to be expanded to accommodate 13,500 full-time and part-time students. In addition, the government had to prepare to build a second polytechnic that would provide at least 8,000 full- time places. Two additional technical institutes were also suggested in order to nurture more professionals.

Housing and land development strategies

The housing problem was still a focus of long-term planning in Hong Kong in the 1980s. The housing policy under which public housing was constructed to fulfil the needs of the grassroots was revamped with the ten-year housing development programme in 1972. Apart from increasing the public housing supply, the living environment also had to be improved, including improv- ing construction materials for buildings, lowering the population density in public housing, enhancing support facilities for public housing residents and keeping the rent at one-fifth of the grassroots’ household income. In the 1980s, the continuing growth in the number of immigrants and nuclear families resulted in a surge in the demand for small flats with their own kitchens and bathrooms. In view of this, the public housing policy had to be adjusted correspondingly. On the other hand, the demand for purchasing self-occupied flats continued to rise as household income increased. Apart

6 Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 1: An Introductory Statement, April 1982, Hong Kong, Strategic Planning Unit, 1982, pp.11–12.

Table 5.2 Number of different types of flats in Hong Kong (1973/74–1981/82)

Year	Public rental housing	Private housing	Home Ownership Scheme
1973/74	8,500	24,000	–
1974/75	9,800	19,200	–
1975/76	17,100	14,200	–
1976/77	10,100	16,800	–
1977/78	13,500	22,200	–
1978/79	15,300	27,000	–
1979/80	33,000	28,500	2,400
1980/81	36,100	23,400	8,700
1981/82	35,000	32,000	4,400

Source: Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 1: An Introductory Statement, April 1982, Hong Kong, Strategic planning Unit, 1982, Figure 18.

from public housing, the government also had to construct housing for the middle class to purchase.7 (See Table 5.2.)

In 1981, there were 1.24 million households in Hong Kong, 829,000 of which lived in flats built with sturdy materials and equipped with kitchen and bath- room facilities, but around 411,000 households still lived in poor conditions. Among the 1.24 million, 31 per cent were single- or two-person households. According to an evaluation by the Secretary for Housing in 1981, if some of the small families were allowed to share a flat, the shortage of housing with more rea- sonable living conditions could be adjusted to 265,000 flats. With this number, the ratio of demand among public housing, housing for the middle class (includ- ing the Home Ownership Scheme (HOS), Private Sector Participation Scheme (PSPS) and Middle Income Housing Scheme (MIH)) and private housing would be 65:20:15.8 However, the quality of living for residents could not be truly improved if two nuclear families had to share a flat.

The government estimated that the population in Hong Kong would rise to

5.4 million in 1986 and the number of households would rise to 1.487 million, which would represent an increase of 300,000 people and 242,000 households respec- tively.9 In the five years between 1981 and 1986, around 25,000 private housing flats could be supplied each year, and around 40,700 public housing flats, includ- ing those of HOS, PSPS and MIH, were planned to be supplied each year.10 Up to 1986, 328,500 flats could be provided, while the shortage would still be as high as 178,500 flats. There were 480,000 private flats in 1981. This was estimated to rise to

7 Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 1: An Introductory Statement, April 1982, Hong Kong, Strategic Planning Unit, 1982, pp.41–42.

8 Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 1: An Introductory Statement, April 1982, Hong Kong, Strategic Planning Unit, 1982, p.47.

9 Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 1: An Introductory Statement, April 1982, Hong Kong, Strategic Planning Unit, 1982, Figure 12.

10 Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 1: An Introductory Statement, April 1982, Hong Kong, Strategic Planning Unit, 1982, p.47.

624,000 in 1986, while public housing flats equipped with kitchens and bathrooms would increase from 349,000 in 1981 to 540,000.11 Together with the demand for 410,000 flats in 1981, the housing demand would amount to around 710,000 flats. After deducting over 300,000 newly added flats, more than 300,000 households would still be in need of better housing. It was estimated that the Hong Kong popu- lation would grow to 6.2 million in 1996 and the number of households would grow to 1.9 million. An additional 420,000 households would be formed between 1986 and 1996. The government had planned to provide 400,000 to 490,000 flats from 1986 to 1996.12 From the above projection, the government estimated that a total of at least 65,000 public and private flats needed to be provided each year.

To increase the housing supply, the housing development programmes which had already been launched in the urban area and new towns, including Tsuen Wan, Sha Tin, Tuen Mun, Tai Po, Fanling, Sheung Shui and Yuen Long, would continue. Ma On Shan in Sha Tin and Tseung Kwan O would be the key areas for development in the 15 years from 1981 to 1996. For the long-term planning and investments of large-scale transportation systems, the planned population of these two areas would take reference from the MTR’s maximum passenger capacity of 175,000, at an early stage of development.

The Territorial Development Strategy stressed that land available for develop- ment in the urban areas would not be able to meet the population’s needs within a short period of time. In terms of medium-term development, the growth in land supply would decrease gradually from around 1,100 hectares in 1981/82 to 12 hectares in 1989/90. Around 75 per cent of land supply was from the new towns.13 For land in the urban area, it was close to public transport systems and centres of employment, also equipped with comprehensive community facili- ties, and had the potential to be redeveloped for residential use. It was estimated that around 290 hectares of such land could be developed into private housing and over 80 hectares could be developed as Type I or II public housing estates. Additionally, about 450 hectares of land was for squatter use or temporary use. Development of such land would be more efficient in terms of resources and time, compared with new town development,14 and would be available for various social and economic uses after replanning. Based on the evaluation above, it was proposed to replan land in the urban areas. (See Table 5.3.)

The Special Committee on Land Supply proposed to provide sufficient land for light and manufacturing industries in 1990/91 to meet their needs. It was estimated that private high-density housing might reach an equilibrium in 1985/86 but might face a shortfall thereafter; private medium- and low-den- sity housing could meet the long-term demand; public housing and HOS were

11 Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 1: An Introductory Statement, April 1982, Hong Kong, Strategic Planning Unit, 1982, Figure 20.

12 Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 1: An Introductory Statement, April 1982, Hong Kong, Strategic Planning Unit, 1982, p.49.

13 Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 1: An Introductory Statement, April 1982, Hong Kong, Strategic Planning Unit, 1982, p.52.

14 Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 1: An Introductory Statement, April 1982, Hong Kong, Strategic Planning Unit, 1982, p.53.

Table 5.3 Prediction of land supply in Hong Kong (1981–1991)

Year	Urban areas (hectares)	New Territories (hectares)	Total (hectares)
1981/82	733	358	1,091
1982/83	359	222	581
1983/84	564	137	701
1984/85	509	91	600
1985/86	337	145	482
1986/87	259	58	317
1987/88	159	38	197
1988/89	80	20	100
1989/90	12	0	12
1990/91	107	3	110
1991	356	60	416

Source: Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 1: An Introductory Statement, April 1982, Hong Kong, Strategic planning Unit, 1982, Figure 215.

expected to accumulate a shortfall after 1987/88; and PSPS and MIH could meet the medium-term demand.15

Strengthening Sino-Hong Kong trade linkages

In late 1978, China announced the implementation of its economic reform policies, which directly affected the trade linkages between Hong Kong and China. In the early 1980s, the government proposed to develop ‘entrepôt facili- ties’ for long-term planning16 and was concerned about Hong Kong’s interac- tion with southern China, in particular nearby Shenzhen and Shekou.17 The corridor between Hong Kong and Guangzhou became urbanised in the early 1980s, while growth in the Pearl River Delta’s rural economy was substantial. According to the TDS, the continuing growth of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (see Table 5.4) was anticipated to be the driving force for close linkages between China and Hong Kong.18 China planned to accommodate a total popu- lation of 1 million in Shenzhen. There were 720 agreements (with a total value of

2.4 billion Hong Kong dollars) made between Shenzhen and foreign companies and Chinese enterprises from Hong Kong, Macao and overseas, 548 of which had already been implemented. As the labour cost and rent in Shenzhen were

15 Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 1: An Introductory Statement, April 1982, Hong Kong, Strategic Planning Unit, 1982, p.52.

16 Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 1: An Introductory Statement, April 1982, Hong Kong, Strategic Planning Unit, 1982, p.8.

17 Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 1: An Introductory Statement, April 1982, Hong Kong, Strategic Planning Unit, 1982, p.9.

18 Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 1: An Introductory Statement, April 1982, Hong Kong, Strategic Planning Unit, 1982, p.18.

Table 5.4 Development characteristics in various districts of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone

District Characteristics

Shekou Industrial and port development

Lowu commercial area and government offices Shangbu district (today’s Futian district) Light industry and housing development the eastern sector Scientific and cultural area, and tourist zone

Source: Territorial Development Strategy Volume 1: An Introductory Statement, April 1982, Hong Kong, Strategic planning Unit, 1982, p.10.

cheaper than those of Hong Kong, where low-cost industries faced difficulties in operating, Shenzhen could continue to develop low-technology industries. On the other hand, 300,000 people in Shenzhen worked in the agricultural sector, which mainly included chicken farms, fisheries and other forms of agriculture. Agricultural development in Shenzhen could solve the food supply problem in Hong Kong and was crucial to the economy of both Hong Kong and Shenzhen.19 It was thus necessary for the Hong Kong government to maintain close linkages with the southern China region and international business institutions.20

To strengthen linkages between Hong Kong and the Pearl River Delta, the government planned to improve transportation between China and Hong Kong. On the air transport aspect, flights between Hong Kong and Guangzhou Baiyun International Airport were launched in 1979, and more routes connect- ing China were added. At the same time, future development of the new airport in Hong Kong took into account the air cargo services between China and Hong Kong.21

For maritime transport, freight transport between Hong Kong and China increased from 4.8 million tons in 1977 to 8 million tons in 1980, a growth rate of 67 per cent. Net tonnage of registered ocean-going vessels increased from 717,000 tons in 1975 to 3.276 million tons in 1980; net tonnage of registered river vessels increased from 2 million tons in 1975 to 2.2 million tons in 1980. It was estimated that maritime transport between Hong Kong and China would grow by 6–10 per cent per annum over the following five years; the improve- ment of the navigation channel of Ma Wan Channel in Hong Kong was thus planned to facilitate navigation of large trade vessels from Pearl River, and the addition of port facilities was planned.22 In 1979, ferry services between Hong Kong and Guangzhou were relaunched, and a service from Hong Kong

19 Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 1: An Introductory Statement, April 1982, Hong Kong, Strategic Planning Unit, 1982, p.10.

20 Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 1: An Introductory Statement, April 1982, Hong Kong, Strategic Planning Unit, 1982, p.12.

21 Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 1: An Introductory Statement, April 1982, Hong Kong, Strategic Planning Unit, 1982, p.18.

22 Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 1: An Introductory Statement, April 1982, Hong Kong, Strategic Planning Unit, 1982, pp.18–19.

to Qingdao was provided.23 Maritime transport from Hong Kong to the Pearl River Delta was developed, while sea access between Deep Bay and Shekou opened.

For land transport, the Kowloon–Canton Railway carried 500,000 passen- gers between Guangdong and Hong Kong every year. There was also a growth in cargo transportation from 1.5 million tons in 1975 to 1.9 million tons in 1980. According to the Territorial Development Strategy, demand for railway-based passenger and cargo transport on the railway was expected to increase owing to the industrial modernisation in China.24 The Kowloon–Canton Railway had to implement electrification and conversion to a dual-track system so as to meet such an increase in demand.25 (See Figure 5.1.)

Before the late 1970s, goods transported to China by highway were far less significant than those transported by railway. Goods transported to China via Man Kam To increased from 68,500 tons to 309,100 tons in 1980. The cargo volume increased to 5 million tons in 1985; there were thus plans to construct control points at Sha Tau Kok and Man Kam To in the north-eastern New Territories and at Lok Ma Chau in the north-western New Territories.26 It was also expected that highways connecting Hong Kong and Guangzhou would be completed by the late 1980s. By then, the daily volume of cross-boundary vehi- cles would have grown to 8,000 as economic activities in Guangdong Province, particularly Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, increased.27 To strengthen Hong Kong’s role in entrepôt trades, the government actively developed trans- portation facilities at ports, and airport and feeder services for connection with China,28 such as container terminals, the airport, road links between major industrial districts, and business and hotel hubs. Meanwhile, Pearl River trans- shipment and passenger transit facilities were also enhanced to fulfil the ever growing demand. (See Tables 5.5 and 5.6.)

Development of transport between Hong Kong and China not only facili- tated development of the region, but also was beneficial to the development of

23 Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 1: An Introductory Statement, April 1982, Hong Kong, Strategic Planning Unit, 1982, p.19.

24 Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 1: An Introductory Statement, April 1982, Hong Kong, Strategic Planning Unit, 1982, p.19.

25 In 1974, the Kowloon–Canton Railway introduced a ten-year project, with the work involving dou- ble-tracking and electrification of the section from Hung Hom to Lo Wu. Simultaneously, other works began, including the construction of the second Beacon Hill tunnel, the construction of new stations, and reconstruction of existing stations and facilities. The first phase of the project was completed in 1982; the electrification and double-tracking work between Hung Hom and Shatin stations was completed in May. On 16 July 1983, full double-tracking and electrification between Hung Hom and Lo Wu stations was completed, and diesel-hauled passenger trains ceased to run. The diesel locomotives were retained only to haul freight. Kowloon–Canton Railway Corporation website, www.kcrc.com/tc/engtxt/corpo- rate_profile/history.html.

26 Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 4: A Review of Current Development Programmes, Final, May 1983, Hong Kong, Strategic Planning Unit, 1983, pp.4/10–4/11.

27 Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 1: An Introductory Statement, April 1982, Hong Kong, Strategic Planning Unit, 1982, p.20.

28 Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 5: Derivation and Evaluation of Alternative Strategies, May 1983, Hong Kong, Strategic Planning Unit, 1983.

Source: Hong Kong planning Department, Territorial Development Strategy Review – Development Options, Hong Kong, planning Department, 1993, p.15.

Figure 5.1 TDS review of Hong Kong and neighbouring regions (1993)

Table 5.5 Figures on cargo volume of Hong Kong trade with China (1974–1981)

Year By sea By rail By road Total by land

To China (’000

From China

Total (’000

To China (’000

From China

Total (’000

To/from China

(’000

tonnes)

	tonnes)	(’000 tonnes)	tonnes)	tonnes)	(’000 tonnes)	tonnes)	(’000 tonnes)
1974	185	2,256	2,442	1	1,162	1,163	71	1,234
1975	123	2,775	2,898	1	1,481	1,482	69	1,551
1976	75	3,076	3,150	1	1,421	1,422	72	1,494
1977	92	3,160	3,252	1	1,447	1,448	81	1,529
1978	86	3,997	4,083	1	1,832	1,834	71	1,905
1979	215	4,893	5,108	4	1,938	1,942	139	2,081
1980	477	5,673	6,150	7	1,943	1,950	308	2,257
1981	601	6,714	7,315	7	1,773	1,780	525	2,305

Source: Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 1: An Introductory Statement, April 1982, Hong Kong, Strategic planning Unit, 1982, p.19.

Table 5.6 Figures on Hong Kong trade with China (1977–1980)

Year	Value of Hong	Value of Hong	Value of	Total (1980 prices)
	Kong’s exports	Kong’s retained	re-exports from	(HK$ million)
	to China	imports from	China via Hong
	(HK$ million)	China	Kong
		(HK$ million)	(HK$ million)
1977	31	5,590	2,492	8,113
				(11,268)
1978	81	6,891	3,659	10,631
				(13,806)
1979	603	9,467	5,633	15,703
				(17,236)
1980	1,605	13,554	8,394	23,553
(estimate)				(23,553)
1977–1980	+5,077	+142	+237	+190
change (%)				(+109)

Source: Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 1: An Introductory Statement, April 1982, Hong Kong, Strategic planning Unit, 1982, table 1.

oil exploration and related industries as well as economic collaborations with Shenzhen and Zhuhai Special Economic Zones.29

29 Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 1: An Introductory Statement, April 1982, Hong Kong, Strategic Planning Unit, 1982, p.10.

Before and after the Sino-British Joint Declaration

While the government was planning to strengthen trading between Hong Kong and China, China proposed that Hong Kong should be returned to China in 1997. From 22 to 25 September 1982, the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, visited Beijing and began to negotiate with the Chinese government on the issue of Hong Kong sovereignty. On 24 September, the two countries released a joint declaration; the Xinhua News Agency stated that ‘the Chinese government’s stance regarding the sovereignty of Hong Kong is clear and uni- versally known’, while Britain also consented tacitly that the Communist Party of China held the sovereignty over Hong Kong.30 Before the negotiations, Thatcher still wished for an exchange of sovereignty for administrative power but failed to achieve it.. The Sino-British negotiations had significant impacts on the government’s long-term planning for Hong Kong. The site for the new airport had been selected, but the plan was scrapped, and later put on the agenda again. Its eventual implementation was affected by the change in political climate.

Planning of the new airport

In the 1970s, the Hong Kong economy soared as the world economy grew, and air transport facilities at Kai Tak Airport could no longer cope with the demand. The idea of constructing a new airport to cope with the growing demand for air trans- port in Hong Kong emerged as early as 1973. The Civil Aviation Department’s Governmental Steering Group hired the Ralph M. Parsons Co. to investigate the long-term development approach for the city’s air transport system, and 26 sites for the new airport were identified and discussed.31 In January 1975, the Ralph

M. Parsons Co. released the Hong Kong Air Transport System Study on Long Term Planning. The government soon established the Aviation Advisory Board, which was responsible for evaluation of the consultants’ suggestions for future air trans- port development. Focus of the discussion was whether Kai Tak Airport should be rebuilt or a new site should be sought for a new airport.

In 1975, constructing a new airport became the mainstream proposal to cope with the growing air transport industry in the future. For site selection, 13 loca- tions were identified by the Ralph M. Parsons Co. The 13 locations were Ha Tsuen, Brothers Point (in the north of Lantau Island between Tung Chung and Tuen Mun), Discovery Bay on Lantau Island, Sunshine Island (between Peng Chau and Hei Ling Chau), Mang Kung Uk (Clearwater Bay Peninsula), Tide Cove, Shek Kong, Nim Wan near Deep Bay, San Tin, Tolo Channel, Cheung Chau, Lamma Island and Chek Lap Kok near Lantau Island. These 13 loca- tions were compared against four basic criteria to see whether any of them were suitable:

30 Kung Sheung Daily News (Industrial and Commercial Daily), 25 September 1982, p.1.

31 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Civil Aviation 1973–74, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1974; Hong Kong Air Transport System: Long Term Planning Investigation: Alternative Systems Study, Hong Kong, Civil Aviation Department, 1975.

compliance with international aviation safety regulations, including no obstructions on the landing and departure flight paths, suitable wind direc- tions, sufficient space above the flight paths to ensure aviation safety, and sufficient space to construct runways, aprons, passenger terminals, fuel tank farms and aircraft maintenance areas;
level of engineering difficulties and cost-effectiveness of the projects;
transport networks, such as roads and railways, for connection to the airport;
impacts on the planning of nearby districts, for instance whether aircraft noise would be a nuisance to residents, and whether housing supply and community facilities nearby such as commercial car parks could fulfil the demand from employees of the airport and their families.32

The government evaluated the 13 locations and eliminated seven of them: Ha Tsuen, Brothers Point, a site behind the hills of north-eastern Lantau Island, Chau Kung To, Mang Kung Uk, Tide Cove and Shek Kong. Further evaluation was carried out for the remaining six. It was considered that Chek Lap Kok on Lantau Island was most suited, while the other locations failed to meet all the criteria. Further feasibility studies showed not only that the location of Chek Lap Kok complied with international aviation standards but that round-the-clock opera- tion would not affect nearby residents. The engineering feasibility of reclamation, land formation and connecting transport system works was also very high, while negative impacts on the environment during construction were within accept- able limits. Upon completion, the airport would stimulate the development of other districts on Lantau Island and the western harbour. The cost was estimated at 3.6 billion dollars33 including the roads connecting to northern Lantau.

The Lantau Bridge Committee was established in 1976 to explore how con- struction of the bridge would benefit the new Chek Lap Kok Airport. In 1977, the Traffic and Transport Survey Division of the Public Works Department re-evaluated the overall transportation system in Hong Kong assuming that the new Chek Lap Kok Airport would be completed in 1991. In 1979, construction of the new airport to replace Kai Tak Airport was confirmed, and more detailed studies were carried out. Preliminary estimates indicated that land formation and reclamation works along with construction of two parallel 900-metre-long runways would cost around 9.6 billion dollars,34 which was 6 billion dollars more than the first estimation. The area of the new airport was around 760 hectares, which was 3.5 times larger than that of Kai Tak Airport. It would be able to serve 153,000 flights, 24.5 million passengers and 1.2 million tons of goods in 1995.

In 1981, the government spent 185 million Hong Kong dollars35 commission-

32 E.G. Pryor, Hong Kong’s Port and Airport Development Strategy: A Foundation for Growth, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1991, pp.20–21.

33 E.G. Pryor, Hong Kong’s Port and Airport Development Strategy: A Foundation for Growth, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1991, p.27.

34 E.G. Pryor, Hong Kong’s Port and Airport Development Strategy: A Foundation for Growth, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1991, p.28.

35 Hong Kong Hansard, Hong Kong Government, 24 March 1983.

ing the Ralph M. Parsons Co. again to carry out a more detailed study, the Airport Master Planning Study, on the airport’s ancillary facilities, management of the passenger terminal, transport facilities and so on. It was estimated it would take seven years to complete the new airport and the cost would be 15.3 billion Hong Kong dollars, which was 5.7 billion Hong Kong dollars more than the 1979 estimates. On 7 October 1981, Governor MacLehose stated in the 1981–82 Policy Address that there was a need to construct a new airport and planning for land resources and transport facilities that supported its development was required.36

On 24 September 1982, China and Britain released the joint declaration. After the future of Hong Kong had been decided, the Hong Kong government changed its mind about the new airport plan. On 6 October 1982, the new Governor, Edward Youde, stated in the 1982–83 Policy Address that more time should be given to consider the new airport plan in view of the ongoing Sino- British negotiations.37 On 23 February 1983, the Financial Secretary announced the 1983–84 budget, where he pointed out that the Hong Kong economy was under threat from the world’s great economic recession since the 1930s. In view of the tight fiscal position and a highly speculative property market,38 the con- struction cost, which included construction of the new airport at Chek Lap Kok along with related roads, bridges and compensation for land resumption, rose from 15.3 billion to 37 billion Hong Kong dollars. To build the airport, the government would need to reduce the expenditure on other aspects by around 3 billion Hong Kong dollars every year; besides, the future of Hong Kong was still uncertain. In view of the updated situation, it was therefore appropriate to postpone plans to construct the new airport and its associated facilities and road networks.39 On 5 October 1983, Governor Youde confirmed in his Policy Address that the new airport would not be constructed and Kai Tak Airport would be expanded instead.40 On 19 December 1984, China and Britain offi- cially signed the Sino-British Joint Declaration in Beijing, which officially came into effect on 27 May 1985. Hong Kong would be returned to China on 1 July 1997, when the ‘one country, two systems’ would be implemented and Hong Kong would be governed by its people. The grand new airport scheme was sus- pended owing to the political climate, but the government had to solve the over- loading problem at Kai Tak Airport within a short period of time.

Kai Tak Airport expansion

According to the Territorial Development Strategy, arriving and departing passen- gers at Hong Kong Airport were estimated to reach 24.5 million in 1995, while air cargo volume would reach 1.2 million tons. The maximum capacity of Kai Tak

36 Hong Kong Hansard, Hong Kong Government, 7 October 1981, p.14.

37 Hong Kong Hansard, Hong Kong Government, 6 October 1982, p.28.

38 Hong Kong Hansard, Hong Kong Government, 23 February 1983, p.516.

39 Hong Kong Hansard, Hong Kong Government, 23 February 1983, pp.519–520.

40 Hong Kong Hansard, Hong Kong Government, 5 October 1983, p.22.

Airport in 1982 was only 12 million people, and only 30 aircraft could land and take off per hour. The capacity of Kai Tak Airport would be saturated by 1984/85.41

Since the Hong Kong government had decided against constructing a new airport, it was necessary to expand Kai Tak Airport to handle the demand after 1984/85. In late 1984, the Hong Kong government spent around 273 million dollars42 to expand Kai Tak Airport. Works included the addition of four storeys in the east wing of the passenger terminal, transport facilities connecting to the airport, and the expansion of all servicing facilities in the airport such as check- in counters, immigration controls, baggage carousels and the respective back offices for airlines.43 It was estimated that the project could enhance the services to meet the demand of passenger volume to 18 million per year in early 1990.44 The works commenced in late 1985 and were completed in 1988.45

Nevertheless, the expanded Kai Tak Airport could not meet the demand of

24.5 million arriving and departing passengers in 1995 at all. In 1986, Legislative Council member Chen Shou-lum made an enquiry to the Financial Secretary as to whether or not Hong Kong International Airport could cope with the growth in air transport in the following five to ten years if facilities were improved, according to its long-term development scheme. The Financial Secretary replied that the government was not actively planning to construct another airport to replace Kai Tak Airport, but two potential sites – Chek Lap Kok and Deep Bay

– had been retained.46 Apart from its small area and limited space for develop- ment, Kai Tak Airport was located in the urban area, where noise from aircraft landings and take-offs was a nuisance to over a million residents nearby.47 On 22 January 1986, the Financial Secretary answered a question from Legislative Council member Desmond Lee on whether Kai Tak Airport hindered urban development in neighbouring districts or not. The Financial Secretary pointed out that constructing a new airport to replace the current one would clearly vacate a large amount of land for redevelopment in theory, but the new airport and all related development would result in an enormous economic burden. As the Hong Kong government was striving to balance the budget to implement public housing schemes and carry out other important works, it could not afford to consider constructing a new airport at that moment.

On 10 March 1987, the Executive Council passed a proposal to hire consult- ants who would research the potential of further developing Kai Tak Airport.

41 Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 1: An Introductory Statement, April 1982, Hong Kong, Strategic Planning Unit, 1982, p.15.

42 Annual Review of Civil Aviation in Hong Kong by the Director of Civil Aviation for the Financial Year 1983/84, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1984, p.13.

43 Annual Review of Civil Aviation in Hong Kong by the Director of Civil Aviation for the Financial Year 1982/83, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1983, p.12.

44 Annual Review of Civil Aviation in Hong Kong by the Director of Civil Aviation for the Financial Year 1983/84, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1984, p.11.

45 Annual Review of Civil Aviation in Hong Kong by the Director of Civil Aviation for the Financial Year 1984/85, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1985, p.13; Annual Review of Civil Aviation in Hong Kong by the Director of Civil Aviation for the Financial Year 1987/88, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1988, p.13.

46 Hong Kong Hansard, Hong Kong Government, 22 January 1986, p.299.

47 Hong Kong Hansard, Hong Kong Government, 25 June 1986, p.827.

Table 5.7 Budget of Kai Tak Airport improvement works (1989)
Project breakdown	Capital costs (HK$’000)
Airside improvements: terminal complex, aircraft parking bays,	929,200
baggage handling system, etc.
Air traffic control improvements	600
Road access system:
(a) terminal complex	27,100
(b) On-airport access	15,900
(c) Off-airport access	55,400
current programme and other costs:
(a) committed or new projects in public works programme	616,200
(b) Items in civil Aviation Department’s development plan	256,700
(c) Resumption	402,900
(d) Noise insulation	83,200
Total	2,387,200

Source: Hong Kong Legislative council Economic Services Branch, Legislative Council Brief: Hong Kong’s Future Airport Needs Report on the Kai Tak Consultancy, File Ref. ESB cR 15/951/86(88) VII, Hong Kong, Legislative council, 1989, p.8.

The results showed that the facilities of Kai Tak Airport would be saturated in 1992 and only around 18 million passengers could be served per year at most. If the operation system was further improved, the number of passengers that it could serve would increase to 23 million and Kai Tak Airport could operate until 1996.48 On 12 October 1988, the Executive Council accepted the consultants’ proposal.49 The report was completed in January 1989 and was submitted to the Legislative Council. The government launched improvement works at Kai Tak Airport in 1989, which were estimated to cost around 2.3872 billion Hong Kong dollars.50 (See Tables 5.7 and 5.8.)

According to airport usage statistics released by the Civil Aviation Department in 1998, Kai Tak Airport had surpassed 12 million passengers as early as 1987–88 and continued to increase each year. The rate of growth was highest in 1988–89, when it reached 19.9 per cent with almost 16 million pas- sengers. In 1996–97, the number of passengers was as high as 30.08 million; it could be imagined that, if Kai Tak Airport had not been expanded, it would not have been able to handle the ever growing demand for air transport at all. With a cost of 2.3872 billion Hong Kong dollars, the Kai Tak Airport expansion scheme was able to cope with the urgent needs of air transport.

48 Annual Review of Civil Aviation in Hong Kong by the Director of Civil Aviation for the Financial Year 1988/89, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1989, p.18.

49 Hong Kong Hansard, Hong Kong Government, 12 October 1988, p.19.

50 Hong Kong Legislative Council Economic Services Branch, Legislative Council Brief: Hong Kong’s Future Airport Needs Report on the Kai Tak Consultancy, File Ref. ESB CR 15/951/86(88) VII, Hong Kong, Legislative Council, 1989, p.8.

Table 5.8 Statistics of Kai Tak airport usage (1979–1997)

Fiscal year Aircraft Passenger Commercial cargo Mail

	No. of flights	Change (%)	No. of passengers	Change (%)	Tonnes	Change (%)	Tonnes	Change (%)
1979−80	56,222		6,320,044		261,435		8,773
1980−81	53,841	−4.2	7,095,925	12.3	258,627	−1.1	10,097	15.1
1981−82	56,016	4.0	8,393,655	18.3	297,186	14.9	10,189	0.9
1982−83	53,880	−3.8	8,665,949	3.2	312,498	5.2	10,972	7.7
1983−84	54,864	1.8	8,900,588	2.7	386,444	23.7	10,873	−0.9
1984−85	58,815	7.2	9,707,083	9.1	419,415	8.5	12,073	11.0
1985−86	60,662	3.1	9,922,732	2.2	447,681	6.7	13,916	15.3
1986−87	66,484	9.6	11,066,807	11.5	558,691	24.8	15,370	10.4
1987−88	77,222	16.2	13,229,492	19.5	624,405	11.8	17,160	11.6
1988−89	89,605	16.0	15,863,543	19.9	704,574	12.8	18,924	10.3
1989−90	96,788	8.0	16,570,099	4.5	740,081	5.0	21,731	14.8
1990−91	106,507	10.0	18,620,222	12.4	811,493	9.6	23,310	7.3
1991−92	112,194	5.3	19,933,280	7.1	868,227	7.0	25,299	8.5
1992−93	123,945	10.5	22,506,699	12.9	989,676	14.0	26,531	4.9
1993−94	138,152	11.5	24,970,446	10.9	1,174,861	18.7	28,007	5.6
1994−95	145,085	5.0	25,554,891	2.3	1,332,186	13.4	27,011	−3.6
1995−96	151,731	4.6	27,978,569	9.5	1,477,084	10.9	27,359	1.3
1996−97	161,226	6.3	30,081,713	7.5	1,622,234	9.8	27,237	−0.4

Source: Annual Review of Civil Aviation in Hong Kong by the Director of Civil Aviation for the Financial Year 1997/98, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1998, p.66.

Clearance of Kowloon Walled City

There was in fact a piece of land near Kai Tak Airport available for airport devel- opment – Kowloon Walled City; however, neither the colonial government nor China dared to bother this sensitive area. Before its clearance in 1987, Kowloon Walled City had always been known as a region with no governance, i.e. a city within a city over which the Hong Kong government had no control. As required by the Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory, the Hong Kong gov- ernment agreed to respect traditional customs and practices; besides, there was also opposition from the Qing government, the Kuomintang government and the People’s Republic of China. The Hong Kong government was unwilling to clear the Walled City, as it might trigger problems related to the sovereignty of Hong Kong. It hoped to move with the times and for the problem of the Walled City to be resolved by way of negotiations or by diplomatic means. From the perspective of local social and economic development, land prices soared after the war. As there were no clear-cut land titles, residents within the Walled City never paid Crown rent or rates to the Hong Kong government. Operators of businesses and industries within the Walled City were not registered with the government either. Thus, many of those who failed to obtain recognised profes- sional qualifications, such as unlicensed dentists, Western medical practition- ers or even at-risk people whose work involved vice establishments, gambling and drugs, lived in the Walled City where the Hong Kong government could not exert its administrative power. The existence of the Walled City not only reflected the ambiguity of the diplomatic policies between China and Britain, but also exemplified that political issues were also involved in urban planning.

Kowloon Walled City started to take on its military role in 1811 when the Qing government was stationed in Kowloon Bay (near today’s Sa Po Road intersection with Prince Edward Road) to defend against pirates.51 After the opium war, the military role of Kowloon was enhanced as the Qing government constructed Kowloon Walled City at the foot of White Crane Hill in Kowloon Bay.52 Using the citadel walls as the boundary, a Deputy General was stationed to lead the office of the Assistant Military Inspectorate. Barracks, arsenals and the department of explosives were set up within the city.53 According to data in 1847, in the Walled City were two water wells, one pond, a Mo Tai temple, the Deputy General’s office, the Assistant Military Inspectorate office, a pavil- ion where training took place, arsenals, barracks, the department of explosives, two beacons and 14 barracks. Housing was provided in the south-eastern and south-western parts of the Walled City for ordinary people,54 and Lung Tsun

51 Chiu Yu-lok and Chung Po Yin, eds, Jiulongcheng (Kowloon City), Hong Kong, Joint Publishing (HK) Co., 2001, p.55.

52 Liang Binghua, Chengzhai yu zhongying waijiao (Walled City and Sino-British Diplomacy), Hong Kong, Qilin shuye youxian gongsi, 1995, p.8.

53 Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan, Jindaishi ziliao (Materials of Modern History), Volume 74, Beijing, Zhonghua shuju, 1989, pp.5, 20.

54 Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan, Jindaishi ziliao (Materials of Modern History), Volume 74, Beijing, Zhonghua shuju, 1989, pp.5, 20.

School was set up next to the Assistant Military Inspectorate office.55 In 1860, the British army obtained land to the south of Boundary Street, and Kowloon Walled City was even closer to the British border. Yet defence of the city was not reinforced. In 1898, the British army leased the area from the north of Boundary Street and to the south of Shenzhen River from the Qing government, which requested to retain its administrative power over Kowloon Walled City. In the Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory signed by both parties, it was stated that

within the city of Kowloon the Chinese officials now stationed there shall continue to exercise jurisdiction except so far as may be inconsistent with the military requirements for the defence of Hong Kong. Within the remainder of the newly- leased territory Great Britain shall have sole jurisdiction. Chinese officials and people shall be allowed as heretofore to use the road from Kowloon to Hsinan. It is further agreed that the existing landing-place near Kowloon city shall be reserved for the convenience of Chinese men-of-war, merchant and passenger vessels, which may come and go and lie there at their pleasure; and for the convenience of movement of the officials and people within the city.56

In 1899, the British government evicted officials and soldiers from the Walled City and included it in its administrative area.57 In 1899, Chief Secretary Stewart Lockhart carried out researches in the New Territories and gave a detailed description of Kowloon Walled City in the report:

Kowloon Walled City is situated about a quarter of a mile from the sea shore. It is enclosed by a stone wall built in 1847, forming as nearly as possible a parallelogram, measuring 700 feet by 400 feet, and enclosing an area of 6½ acres. The wall is built of granite ashlar facing with 15 feet in width at the top, and averages in height 13 feet. There were six watch towers, at present occupied as family dwellings, and two gateways, with doors made of wood and lined with iron sheeting.58

According to a deputy magistrate, there were 744 people in the Walled City then, 544 of whom belonged to the Qing garrison and 200 were ordinary people. The ordinary people were mostly assistants of the soldiers. There were no shops within the Walled City.59 In 1900, 65 households were registered on the cadastre published by the Hong Kong government.60

In the first half of the twentieth century, residents mostly lived in the south-

55 Li Jinwei, ed., Xianggang bainianshi (One Hundred Years of History of Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Nanzhong bianyi chubanshe, 1948, p.88.

56 The Convention between Great Britain and China Respecting an Extension of Hong Kong Territory, London, Harrison and Sons, 1898.

57 Hong Kong Government Gazette Extraordinary, Hong Kong Government, 20 February 1900, pp.269–270.

58 ‘Report by Mr Stewart Lockhart on the Extension of the Colony of Hong Kong’, Hong Kong Government Gazette, no. 204, 8 April 1899, p.21.

59 Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 8 April 1899, pp.551–552.

60 FO17/1363, p.310, enclosure No. 2., in Liang Binghua, Chengzhai yu zhongying waijiao (Walled City and Sino-British Diplomacy), Hong Kong, Qilin shuye youxian gongsi, 1995, p.72.

eastern and south-western parts of the Walled City. In early 1930, the govern- ment promulgated a large-scale development scheme for the region near Kai Tak Airport, including the region bounded by the southern part of Diamond Hill, the eastern part of Mong Kok and the northern part of Hung Hom. As the Walled City was in the middle of the development scheme, the government decided to demolish squatters in Kowloon Walled City for development.61 At the time, many squatters within the Walled City were in poor sanitary condi- tion, and residents made a living from pig raising.62 On 10 June 1933, the District Office of Southern District in the New Territories officially released a notice that requested residents of the Walled City to move out. The government agreed to compensate them and allocate new land to them for rehousing.63 Residents of the Walled City were dissatisfied with the compensation scheme and refused to move out. They sought help from the Special Delegate for Foreign Affairs for Kuangtung and Kuangsi (Guangdong and Guangxi), reasoning that ‘our country leased Kowloon to Britain during the Guangxu period of the Qing Dynasty. Back then the lease was only effective in areas outside of the Walled City and the inside should still be administered by our country.’64 The Kuomintang government thus interfered. The Chinese and British governments negotiated several times, and the Hong Kong government insisted on the original relocation plan. The Hong Kong government believed that it was entitled to full administrative power over Kowloon Walled City with the Order in Council issued on 27 December 1899.65 In 1935, the new Governor arrived in Hong Kong and assumed his role. He offered a more lucrative compensation scheme to the residents of the Walled City; for instance, the residents’ request to be relocated in Kak Hang instead of the remote Kou Shih Ling (or Kau Shut Ling) was granted.66 As a result, most of the residents agreed to move out, and the Hong Kong government’s plan to

demolish the Walled City could be continued.

Apart from housing, there were also quite a number of public facilities in Kowloon Walled City, which provided basic and charitable services that sup- ported residents living within or near the Walled City. These included several schools, homes for the elderly, public clinics and chapels established by the church. Residents still relied on shops along Kowloon Street outside the Walled City for their daily necessities. In 1940, the District Office of the New Territories demolished most squatters within the Walled City. All that remained was a home for the elderly, Lung Tsun Free School (Longjin Yi Xue) and a residential build- ing.67 Owing to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese government

61 CO129/546/11, pp.95–111.

62 CO129/546/11, pp.95–96; HKRS58/1/51/21.

63 Liang Binghua, Chengzhai yu zhongying waijiao (Walled City and Sino-British Diplomacy), Hong Kong, Qilin shuye youxian gongsi, 1995, p.279.

64 Liang Binghua, Chengzhai yu zhongying waijiao (Walled City and Sino-British Diplomacy), Hong Kong, Qilin shuye youxian gongsi, 1995, p.77.

65 CO129/552/8, p.21.

66 CO129/556/15, p.37.

67 Li Jinwei, ed., Xianggang bainianshi (One Hundred Years of History of Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Nanzhong bianyi chubanshe, 1948, p.87.

was preoccupied and did not raise any other objection. Also because of the war, Britain ceased to develop the Walled City. Therefore, the land was left undeveloped even though most of the structures within the Walled City had been demolished; the problem of administrative power was also left unresolved. During the Japanese occupation in 1942, the Japanese demolished the citadel walls of Kowloon Walled City to construct Kai Tak Airport.68

Kai Tak Airport resumed operation after the war. Owing to their heavy duties, the police in Kowloon City District could not carry out the usual patrols and operation in the Walled City. The police were only stationed at the Walled City again in late 1952. There were only two inspectors, one plain-clothes policeman and seven policemen enforcing the law in the Walled City in 1953.69 As crimes committed in the Walled City were not processed by local courts at that time, the police could only discipline triad leaders by deportation after arrest.70 The police believed that illegal activities in the Walled City such as gambling and drug abuse were all controlled by the triads.71

In 1950s, the enterprise Chan Nam-fat was better known for operating unli- censed dental clinics and real estate businesses; it was owned by Chan Sup from Chaozhou, who took part in triad activities at a certain point. In early 1953, the most powerful triad in the Walled City was the Yee On Triad Society. With Heung Chin as its leader, the triad owned brothels and narcotic divans, while collecting protection money from residents. After Heung Chin lost his power, Chan Sup and Wong Chun Po attempted to replace him. Yee On split into two – Chung Yee led by Chan Sup and Chiu Kwong led by Wong Chun Po. Conflicts often broke out between the two gangs. In September 1953, a serious fight broke out between them owing to conflict over the interests of the protec- tion rackets and illegal activity operations.72 The police interfered eventually, and the two leaders were deported from the city. In addition, in the 1950s, when the 14K Society was one of the triad societies within the Walled City, its leader Chan Hung was finally arrested and deported from the colony.73 According to government reports, over half of the shops in the Walled City operated illegal businesses. (See Table 5.9.)

Most of the people in the Walled City claimed to be neutral, and only a portion claimed to be left-wing. It was estimated that two-thirds of the people in the Walled City supported the Taiwan government and the remaining third

68 Liang Binghua, Chengzhai yu zhongying waijiao (Walled City and Sino-British Diplomacy), Hong Kong, Qilin shuye youxian gongsi, 1995, p.147.

69 CO1030/394, ‘Report of Commissioner of Police – Question of Jurisdiction within Walled City of Kowloon, Hong Kong’, 1955, p.17.

70 CO1030/394, ‘Report of Commissioner of Police – Question of Jurisdiction within Walled City of Kowloon, Hong Kong’, 1955, p.18.

71 FCO21/1268, ‘Kowloon Walled City of China, Hong Kong: Environmental and Political Considerations’, 30 April 1974, p.49.

72 CO1030/394, ‘Report of Commissioner of Police – Question of Jurisdiction within Walled City of Kowloon, Hong Kong’, 1955, p.18.

73 CO1030/394, ‘Report of Commissioner of Police – Question of Jurisdiction within Walled City of Kowloon, Hong Kong’, 1955, p.19.

Table 5.9 Types of shops in Kowloon Walled City (1953–1954)
Store categories	Number
Narcotic divans	120
Brothels	20
Gambling houses	5
Feasting shops	18
Weaving factories	9
Shops dealing in miscellaneous goods	94

Schools 4 (3 right-wing, 1 left-wing)

Source: CO1030/394, ‘Report of commissioner of police – Question of Jurisdiction within Walled city of Kowloon, Hong Kong’, 1955, p.16.

supported the Beijing government. This was because many of the people moved into the Walled City to escape from the Chinese Communist regime in 1949.74

Established on 1 May 1963, the Kowloon Walled City Kaifong Welfare Promotion Committee75 district organisation, formerly the United Kowloon Walled City Residents Anti-Clearance Committee, was responsible for organ- ising community efforts to oppose the government’s plan to demolish the Walled City. After the demolition disputes had been settled, the organisation was renamed Kowloon Walled City Kaifong Welfare Promotion Committee,76 which was not registered with the government until 1973.77 The Committee was formed by left-wing groups. Chairpersons Wong Chung-ping and Cheung Yat-fan were both left-wing, while the Committee was recognised and supported by other left-wing organisations in Hong Kong, the most important of which was Xinhua News Agency.78 The Committee had 100 to 150 members in 1974, all of whom were working or living in the Walled City.79 The Committee col- lected a membership fee of 1 dollar from shops every month to sustain its recur- rent expenditure.80 According to records of the Kowloon Walled City Kaifong Welfare Promotion Committee in 1966, the types of shops in Kowloon Walled City were as shown in Table 5.10.

In October 1983, the Kowloon Walled City Kaifong Welfare Promotion

74 FCO21/1268, ‘Kowloon Walled City of China, Hong Kong: Environmental and Political Considerations’, 30 April 1974, p.49.

75 Jiulongchengzhai jiefang fuli shiye cujin weiyuanhui, Jiulongchengzhai jiefang fuli shiye cujin weiyuanhui chengli nianzhounian jinian tekan (Special Issue for the 20th Anniversary of the Establishment of Kowloon Walled City Kaifong Welfare Association), Hong Kong, Jiulongchengzhai jiefang fuli shiye cujin weiyuanhui, 1983, p.7.

76 FCO21/1268, ‘Kowloon Walled City of China, Hong Kong: Environmental and Political Considerations’, 30 April 1974, p.49.

77 FCO21/1268, ‘Kowloon Walled City of China, Hong Kong: Environmental and Political Considerations’, 30 April 1974, p.49.

78 FCO21/1268, ‘Kowloon Walled City of China, Hong Kong: Environmental and Political Considerations’, 30 April 1974, p.46.

79 FCO21/1268, ‘Kowloon Walled City of China, Hong Kong: Environmental and Political Considerations’, 30 April 1974, p.50.

80 HKRS163/1/2536, ‘Kowloon Walled City – Implementation of Report of Ad Hoc Committee’, General Correspondence Files (Confidential), 5/3371/60 Part III, 1962, pdf p.16.

Table 5.10 Types of shops in Kowloon Walled City (1966)

Types of shops Number

Dental clinics 45

Western medicine clinics 38

chinese medicine clinics 6

Weaving factories 40

Metal factories 23

Garment factories 13

Light plastic factories 13

plastic factories 22

craft factories 10

Schools 20

Stores 100

theatres 2

Hospitals 2

Buildings (around 20 blocks) 2,400

Households 8,500

Residents 35,000

Source: Jiulongchengzhai jiefang fuli shiye cujin weiyuanhui, Jiulongchengzhai jiefang fuli shiye cujin weiyuanhui chengli nian- zhounian jinian tekan 《九龍城砦街坊福利事業促進委員會成立三週年紀念特刊》 (Special Issue for the third Anniversary of the Establishment of Kowloon Walled city Kaifong Welfare Association), Hong Kong, Jiulongchengzhai jiefang fuli shiye cujin weiyuanhui, 1966, p.5.

Committee recompiled statistics for the shops in Kowloon Walled City and discovered that dental clinics were the most common type of business within the Walled City, with a total of 97. There were also 89 medical clinics and 77 stores, most of which were located along Tung Tau Tsuen Road. (See Table 5.11.)

In the 1960s, most residential buildings in the Walled City had only two or three storeys. In late 1960s, the Cultural Revolution broke out in China. Many people escaped to Hong Kong and built hut-type squatters on the hillsides. Constructors seized the opportunity and discussed collaborations on redevelop- ment with the landlords of the Walled City.81 Landlords needed only to provide developers with the land, while developers would fund the construction of housing and carry out related works. After developers had completed the build- ings, some flats in the new buildings would be given to the landlords in return.82 Land developers usually developed on their own; as the amount of investment on constructing or redeveloping buildings was quite high, sometimes they also collaborated on development projects.83

81 Zheng Minhua, Zhuiyi Longcheng tuibian (Recalling the Transformation of Kowloon City), Hong Kong, Kowloon City District Council, 2011, p.54.

82 FCO21/1268, ‘Kowloon Walled City of China, Hong Kong: Environmental and Political Considerations’, 30 April 1974, p.48.

83 FCO21/1268, ‘Kowloon Walled City of China, Hong Kong: Environmental and Political Considerations’, 30 April 1974, p.48.

Table 5.11 Distribution of shops in Kowloon Walled City (1983)

Street	Medical clinics	Dental clinics	Stores	Restaurants	Electrical appliances stores	Real estate	Textile industry	Clothing industry	Hardware shops	Plastics industry	Manufacturing	Meat	Pastry products
tung tau tsuen	71	49	16	10	1	3	10	16	6	6	6	3	7
Road
Lung Shing	5	26	14	6	4	1	3	3	7	4	5	4	4
Road
Kwong Ming			6	3	2		2	4	6	13	2	5	4
Street
Lo Yan Street	5		4		2	2	2	3	7	4	4	6	6
tai chang			5			1	4	3	6	28	6	2	1
Street
West city Road	2		9	1	1	1	2	6	11	4	6	5	2
Lung chung	4	18	11	5	2	1	3	5	6	4	5	3	3
Street
Lung chung	2	4	7	2		1	2	1	3	5	1	2	2
Road
Lung chung			3				2	1	2	3	4	3	3
Lane
Se Gung Street			2	1				2	2	2	2	2	1
Total	89	97	77	28	12	10	30	44	56	73	41	35	33

Source: Jiulongchengzhai jiefang fuli shiye cujin weiyuanhui, Jiulongchengzhai jiefang fuli shiye cujin weiyuanhui chengli nianzhounian jinian tekan 《九龍城砦街坊福利事業促進委員會成立廿週年紀念特刊》 (Special Issue for the 20th Anniversary of the Establishment of Kowloon Walled city Kaifong Welfare Association), Hong Kong, Jiulongchengzhai jiefang fuli shiye cujin weiyuanhui, 1983, p.8.

In the late 1960s, the problem of unauthorised building works was serious in the Walled City. Buildings were converted from three storeys to five storeys and then from five to ten; redevelopment took place continuously. In 1964, a landlord in the Walled City even evicted his tenants in order to reconstruct the building into an even taller one. The newly constructed buildings had structural safety problems. The evicted tenants petitioned the government but received no response.84 Major property developers in the Walled City included Lee Ching- kee, Lee Hung-kee and Chan Sub; the three of them also jointly funded Cheung Hing and Chan Nam-fat.85 In the 1980s, none in the group of western buildings over ten storeys tall had their foundations laid. Local residents described the way constructors erected buildings as ‘playing with toy blocks’, since all the gaps were utilised to construct buildings no matter where they were. As a result, the streets were increasingly narrow, buildings were densely packed, pipework was chaotic,86 and only one or two buildings in the entire Walled City had lifts.87 Mrs Leung, who moved into Kowloon Walled City in the mid-1970s, said that a 300-foot flat in other districts would cost around 70,000 to 80,000 dollars at that time, but a 200- to 300-foot flat would cost only 20,000 to 30,000 dollars in the Walled City. Rent in the Walled City was equally cheap; a 200-foot self- contained flat could be rented for less than 1,000 dollars.88

During the 1967 riots, former chairperson of the Kowloon Walled City Kaifong Welfare Promotion Committee Wong Chung-ping was sent to prison for attacking government officials.89 When the government was demolishing illegal structures in January 1973, Xinhua News Agency warned the Committee not to interfere. The Committee remained silent about the demolition of illegal structures.90

When the government was about to develop New Kowloon in 1960, it prom- ulgated the North-eastern Kowloon Development Scheme beforehand. However, officers of the Resettlement Department faced opposition from residents of the Walled City when they entered Tung Tau Tsuen Road, Lung Shing Road, Lung Tsun Road, Kwong Ming Street and other locations in the Walled City. In 1962, the government distributed a resettlement notice, and the Hong Kong Police Force had to deploy dozens of armed force members for defence.91 In 1963, the Hong Kong government triggered opposition from the residents as it

84 HKRS163/1/2536, ‘Letter from Sg. Residents of Wall City – Kowloon Walled City to Director of Fire Services – Implementation of Report of Ad Hoc Committee’, General Correspondence Files (Confidential), 5/3371/60 Part III, 1 April 1964, pdf p.15.

85 FCO21/1268, ‘Kowloon Walled City of China, Hong Kong: Environmental and Political Considerations’, 30 April 1974, p.42.

86 FCO21/1268, ‘Kowloon Walled City of China, Hong Kong: Environmental and Political Considerations’, 30 April 1974, p.42.

87 Oral interview of the Walled City resident Fang-jei, in Zheng Minhua, Zhuiyi Longcheng tuibian

(Recalling the Transformation of Kowloon City), Hong Kong, Kowloon City District Council, 2011, p.56.

88 Oral interview of the Walled City resident Mrs Leung, in Zheng Minhua, Zhuiyi Longcheng tuibian

(Recalling the Transformation of Kowloon City), Hong Kong, Kowloon City District Council, 2011, p.55.

89 Ta Kung Pao, 19 January 1968, p.5.

90 FCO21/1268, ‘Kowloon Walled City of China, Hong Kong: Environmental and Political Considerations’, 30 April 1974, pp.43–48.

91 Ta Kung Pao, 18 January 1963.

attempted to demolish illegal structures in the outer area of the Walled City.92 In a letter written to J. Murray of the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office dated 1 October 1969, Hong Kong government official A.F. Maddocks mentioned that Kowloon Walled City and its neighbour- ing areas were crowded and unsanitary. However, it did not need to be tackled immediately. The Hong Kong government planned to undertake clearance works and a five-year redevelopment scheme.93

In the 1970s, the government intended to review its policies regarding the Walled City. It planned to demolish and redevelop the Walled City but was hin- dered by the political situation. The government thus cleared the neighbouring areas of the Walled City first and constructed a resettlement estate at Sai Tau Village.94 The scheme was divided into four areas, from A to D; their locations and development plans were as shown in Table 5.12.

Apart from the construction of resettlement estates, there were also plans to

Table 5.12 The development plan of Kowloon North-east (1970)

	Area A	Area B	Area C	Area D
Location	Located west of	Located south of	Located south-	Located north of
	the Walled city,	the Walled city,	east of the Walled	tung tau tsuen
	bounded by tung	bounded by area	city between	Road
	tau tsuen Road	A to the west,	carpenter Road
	to the north,	carpenter Road	and tung tsing
	carpenter Road	to the south and	Road
	to the south and	tung tsing Road
	Junction Road to	to the east
	the west
Situation in	Hut-type squatter	Shops and	Vacant land used	temporary
1970	area, paddy fields	residential areas	as a car park	housing area
	and dumping
	areas
Development	Four resettlement	Five resettlement	One 12-storey	Six four-storey
target	blocks, each with	blocks, each with	resettlement	resettlement
	shops; also a	shops; also two	block with shops,	blocks, each with
	shopping mall,	wet markets and	markets and a	two storeys of
	two markets and	72 shops	school	shops and wet
	88 shops			markets

Source: FCO40/157, ‘Kowloon Walled city and the Adjoining Areas’, 19 September 1969, p.6.

92 FCO21/1268, ‘Kowloon Walled City of China, Hong Kong: Environmental and Political Considerations’, 30 April 1974, pp.38–39.

93 FCO40/157, ‘Letter from A.F. Maddocks to J. Murray: Kowloon Walled City and the Adjoining Areas’, 1 October 1969, p.3.

94 FCO40/157, ‘Revised Layout for Resettlement Estate – The Summary Site Area “A”, “B”, “C” and “D”’, pp.14–21.

expand Tung Tau Tsuen Road and Carpenter Road to relieve traffic congestion at Kowloon City Interchange.95 In the redevelopment scheme, affected work- shops were resettled at resettlement factory buildings in Tsuen Wan, while resi- dents resettled in Sau Mau Ping Resettlement Area and other low-cost housing estates. The biggest problem was the provision of shops, since 750 shops were affected and only 564 shops could be reprovided.

When Deputy Leader of the British Parliament delegation Lord Kennet96 stopped in Hong Kong en route to Beijing for an official visit in November 1973, he visited the Walled City. He then expressed his concern about it to Governor MacLehose and staff of the China Foreign Affairs University. After returning to Britain, he raised two questions with Lord Goronwy Roberts, which triggered a discussion on Kowloon Walled City in the House of Commons.97 In 1974, the City District Office (Kowloon City) wrote two reports, namely The Historical and Political Aspects of the Walled City and Environmental Improvements to the Kowloon Walled City (with Recommendations).98 The City District Office esti- mated that around 17,000 people lived within Kowloon Walled City, while the figure would be around 40,000 if Sai Tau Village was included.99 Owing to dis- putes over land titles of the Walled City, the government could not enforce the Buildings Ordinance in the Walled City.100 Densely packed buildings that failed to comply with the Fire Services Ordinance were common, and the sanitary con- ditions were poor. The best solution was to clear the area for redevelopment, which would not only require compensation and resettlement for residents and factories101 but also trigger opposition from China and parties with vested inter- ests in the Walled City from the political point of view. The reports also pointed

95 FCO40/157, ‘Kowloon Walled City and the Adjoining Areas’, 19 September 1969, pp.6–7.

96 Lord Kennet (1923–2009), Wayland Hilton Young, 2nd Baron Kennet, was a British writer and Labour Party and SDP politician who served in numerous national and international official and unofficial capacities. He took his seat in the House of Lords in 1960 and started his political career in the Labour Party, served as Parliamentary Secretary (Junior Minister) in the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (under Richard Crossman, and later Anthony Greenwood), where he worked on planning and conservation and on devising the soon-to-be-set-up Department of the Environment (Secretary of State, Tony Crosland). He was respon- sible for setting up the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution. According to his 1972 publication Preservation he worked on setting up the ‘Four Towns Report’ and played an important role in establishing the foundations of conservation policy through the Town and Country Planning Act 1968 and his 1970 Kennet Report. After the fall of the first Wilson government in 1970, he was appointed Honorary Fellow of the Royal Institute of British Architects, and became Chairman of the Council for the Protection of Rural England, the Advisory Committee on Pollution of the Sea (ACOPS), and various other organisations. He served as Opposition Spokesman on Foreign Affairs in the House of Lords from 1971 to 1974. He was also a member of the European Parliament, a member of the Western European Union, and a NATO Parliamentarian. Young’s 1972 publication Preservation was an important insight into UK conservation and preservation laws and poli- cies, through the conservation struggles of the late nineteenth century until the 1968 Planning Act (http:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_Young,_2nd_Baron_Kennet).

97 FCO21/1268, ‘Unstarred Parliamentary Question by Lord Kennet: Kowloon Walled City’, 7 June 1974, p.91.

98 FCO21/1268, ‘Kowloon Walled City of China, Hong Kong: Environmental and Political Considerations’, 30 April 1974, p.49.

99 FCO21/1268, ‘Notes for Supplementaries’, p.95.

100 FCO21/1268, ‘Notes for Supplementaries’, pp.98–99.

101 FCO21/1268, ‘Notes for Supplementaries’, p.99.

out that there were no mains water supply systems at all in the Walled City and residents relied on three water wells or water carried home from standpipes near the Walled City.102 There was no electricity supply either, and electricity was mostly obtained illegally.103 Therefore, the government believed tackling the problem of the Walled City could start with improving its environment. It believed improving public facilities,104 including provision of reliable fresh water and electricity supply, repair of drainage facilities, and the improvement of sanitary conditions, could build up the residents’ trust in the government while prompting the community of the Walled City to propose development requests itself.105 As a result, the administration problem of Kowloon Walled City was put on hold again.

The status of the Walled City was unique; legally, China held the sovereignty and administrative power, but it had no intention of restoring sovereignty before 1997, nor of exercising its administrative power. Britain claimed to have admin- istrative power over the area but never truly exercised it. However, it had to exercise it to some extent according to actual needs such as for anti-drug abuse efforts.106

Sino-British relations improved after the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984. In 1986, the Hong Kong government seized the opportu- nity to propose tackling the Walled City to China. It planned to demolish old buildings, resettle residents elsewhere and construct a park at the original loca- tion.107 According to the then Chief Secretary Sir David Akers-Jones,

Looked at objectively, there were persuasive reasons for allowing the British to clear up this disgraceful blemish on Kowloon, and not to leave the problem to be solved by China. The suggestion was put to the officials in the Xinhua News

Agency and they in turn quietly sounded out to the Kaifong (residents) Welfare Association. After rebuffing the British so many times, China now agreed that

they could go ahead.108

On 15 January 1987, the Hong Kong government announced the demolition of the Walled City. On the same day, a spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China delivered a speech, saying that, ‘from the perspective of Hong

102 Jiulongchengzhai jiefang fuli shiye cujin weiyuanhui, Jiulongchengzhai jiefang fuli shiye cujin weiyuanhui chengli nianzhounian jinian tekan (Special Issue for the Third Anniversary of the Establishment of Kowloon Walled City Kaifong Welfare Association), Hong Kong, Jiulongchengzhai jiefang fuli shiye cujin weiyuanhui, 1966, p.4.

103 HKRS163/1/3016, ‘Note on a Meeting Held in the Colonial Secretary’s Office at 10 a.m. on 13 January Concerning Kowloon City Electricity Supplies’, 13 January 1964, enclosure 4, pdf p.3.

104 FCO21/1268, ‘Kowloon Walled City of China, Hong Kong: Environmental and Political Considerations’, 22 March 1974, pp.57–75.

105 FCO21/1268, ‘Notes for Supplementaries’, p.102.

106 HKRS No. 70, D & S No. 8/5042, p.36.

107 Li Hou, Huigui de licheng (The Course of the Handover), Hong Kong, Sanlian shudian (Xianggang) youxian gongsi, 1997, p.187.

108 David Akers-Jones, Shidiantou: Zhong Yijie huiyilu (Feeling the Stones: Reminiscences of David Akers- Jones), translated by Tao Jie, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 2004, p.205.

Kong’s prosperity and stability, we fully understand the British Hong Kong gov- ernment’s decision to clear Kowloon Walled City with appropriate measures and to construct a park at the original location’.109

The then deputy director and spokesperson of the Hong Kong branch of the Xinhua News Agency, Zhang Junsheng, believed that the Walled City problem would have been a ‘troublesome matter’ to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) government. He said:

If we could not come up with better solutions to deal with the Walled City problem and only stressed the sovereignty issues of the area, retaining such a dirty, messy and tumour-like place would certainly be unfavourable to Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability when our country resumed sovereignty. Tackling it earlier is better than later. Tackling it immediately is better than leaving it until or after the handover. After repeated discussion, the parties agreed to demolish the area.110

This reflected that, after the future of Hong Kong had been settled, China no longer needed the Walled City as a hub for intelligence collection. Zhang Junsheng also mentioned that ‘the British Hong Kong government also pro- posed that the area would be used as a park instead of for sale’. China would thus not think that Britain wanted to generate revenue from land sales before the handover. Therefore, land was not redeveloped after the clearance of Kowloon Walled City.

The Sino-British Land Commission was established in 1985 and was respon- sible for handling land sale revenue. Under the provisions, only 50 hectares of land was allowed for land disposal each year from 1 April 1985 to 30 June 1997. Land disposal programmes had to be agreed by the Sino-British Land Commission. Supply of land thus decreased, which resulted in rocketing land price and property price for a period of time. On 1 July 1997, the Sino-British Land Commission was dismissed, and the land disposal limit of 50 hectares was also withdrawn. The HKSAR government had complete control on the scale of land supply.111 According to Zhou Nan, Deng Xiaoping proposed that attention must be paid to five ‘don’ts’, one of which was ‘Don’t abuse revenue from land sales.’

He was worried that the HKSAR government would face a shortage in resources upon the handover if the British Hong Kong government sold all land and spent all revenue on administrative expenditure. Therefore, the Sino-British Land Commission was established according to the instructions of Deng Xiaoping, which aimed to allow both parties to discuss the area of land to be sold each year during the transition period. Half of the revenue would be returned to the British

109 Renmin ribao, 15 January 1987.

110 Youzhi et al., Zhang Junsheng fangtanlu (An Interview with Zhang Junsheng), Hong Kong, Zhonghua shuju, 2011, p.297.

111 Midland University website, http://www.midlandu.com.hk/chi/campus/bcourse/mustread/part1/ lc1.shtml; ‘The Joint Declaration and Its Implementation’, HKSAR Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau website, www.cmab.gov.hk/tc/issues/joint2.htm#5 (accessed 1 July 2007).

Hong Kong government while the other half would be allocated to the Land Fund. China let the Land Fund accrue interest and did not use it. On 1 July 1997, the sum would be used to set up the HKSAR government. Before the handover in 1997, the Land Fund had accumulated around 150 billion Hong Kong dollars.

Together with reserve of the British Hong Kong government, the sum totalled almost 200 billion Hong Kong dollars.112

David Akers-Jones mentioned in his memoirs that he had held meetings in Government House with a tight group of officials who believed in the need for total secrecy. Otherwise the clearance and demolition would have become a local hot topic and the subject of international focus and probably unmanage- able political wrangling. If news of the clearance leaked out, there would be a rush to stake a claim to every spare corner and bed space in the Walled City.113

On 15 January 1987, the Hong Kong government decided to clear the Walled City and construct a park in situ.114 The clearance was divided into three phases spanning three years and was planned to be completed in March 1990. The government suggested a special committee be established under the Housing Authority which would be responsible for the clearance and other duties such as resettlement and compensation.115

On 16 January 1987, the special committee was established to deal with prob- lems related to the clearance. There were seven non-official and four official members. The chairperson was Housing Authority member and Legislative Council member Hu Fa-kuang.116 The four official members included Deputy Secretary for the City and New Territories Administration Lui Hau-tuen, Registrar General Noel Martin Gleeson, Director of Buildings and Lands Chau Cham-son, and Deputy Director of the Housing Department Ian Strachan. Unofficial members included Housing Authority member Leung Wai-tung; Urban Councillor, Kowloon City District Council member and Housing Authority member Pao Ping-wing; Kowloon City District Council member Tang Tai-chuen; Chartered Surveyor Kan Fook-yee; Urban Councillor and Kowloon City District Council member Peter Chan Chi-kwan; and Vice- Chairperson of Kowloon Walled City Kaifong Welfare Promotion Committee Chan Hip-ping.117

On 20 January 1987, the special committee held its first meeting and was immediately confronted with a rather complicated problem – the validity of leases in the Walled City.118 Generally, leases in the Walled City would be vali- dated if a third person testified so; however, the Hong Kong government was

112 Zong Daoyi et al., eds, Zhou Nan koushu: yaoxiang dangnian yushan guanjin (Oral History of Zhou Nan), Jinan, Qi Lu shushe, 2007, p.290.

113 David Akers-Jones, Shidiantou: Zhong Yijie huiyilu (Feeling the Stones: Reminiscences of David Akers- Jones), translated by Tao Jie, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 2004, p.206.

114 Ta Kung Pao, 15 January 1987, p.1.

115 Wah Kiu Yat Po, 15 January 1987, p.1.

116 Ta Kung Pao, 16 January 1987, p.4.

117 Ta Kung Pao, 16 January 1987, p.4.

118 Ta Kung Pao, 21 January 1987, p.4.

not familiar with the principles of deeds in the Walled City and was worried that there might be forgery. Vice-Chairperson of Kowloon Walled City Kaifong Welfare Promotion Committee Chan Hip-ping explained that leases in the Walled City, usually called ‘certificates’, were documents issued by the construc- tors of the buildings. Such ‘certificates’ often belonged to first-hand owners of the properties. If the flats changed hands or were modified, the leases would be more complicated. Generally, in resales, both old and new contracts would be kept by the new owners. It would be highly likely that the new owner would have several leases for the same flat if it had been resold several times.

Assistant Director of Housing Chan Tak-ping stated that clearance of the Walled City and related follow-up works would be completed in three years, during which 14 public housing estates and Home Ownership Scheme estates would be completed and become available for resettling residents affected by the clearance.119 Housing Authority member Leung Wai-tung said there were more than 40,000 residents in the area according to preliminary estimations. If they resettled across a span of three years, over 10,000 people and around 3,000 house- holds would need to resettle each year.120 In the following three years, 140,000 flats would be completed (including temporary housing, public housing and HOS flats), among which 20,000 were located in Kowloon District, including the areas of Tung Tau Estate, Lei Cheng Uk, Chuk Yuen, Wang Tau Hom, Lower Wong Tai Sin, Lok Fu and Kwun Tong. These flats could accommodate eligible residents.121 It was expected that the first batch of residents would move out of the Walled City from late 1987 to early 1988. On 23 May 1987, Governor David Wilson men- tioned that the population of the Walled City was around 33,000, which was 8 per cent of the entire Kowloon City District.122 (See Table 5.13.)

In February 1987, the government announced that a park would be

Table 5.13 Number of registered residents on the eve of clearance of Kowloon Walled City (1987)

Initial registered population statistics (on 15 January 1987)

Registered population statistics (on 20 January 1987)

Registered residential units 8,788 units 8,880 units

Registered households 5,116 households 9,188 households

Registered persons 19,606 persons 32,319 persons No one to answer the door/uninhabited units 3,650 units 430 units Households refused to register 22 households 10 households

Investigated commercial units 760 units 846 units commercial units (no one to answer the door) 56 units 6 units

Sources: Wah Kiu Yat Po, 15 January 1987, p.1, 20 January 1987, p.9.

119 Wah Kiu Yat Po, 15 January 1987, p.1.

120 Wah Kiu Yat Po, 15 January 1987, p.1.

121 Wah Kiu Yat Po, 16 January 1987, p.9.

122 Wah Kiu Yat Po, 23 May 1987, p.5.

constructed after clearance of the Walled City. The Working Group on Image Promotion under Kowloon City District Council proposed building a museum within the park and planned to develop Kowloon Walled City Park as a tourist area.123 Iconic structures in the district included Sung Wong Toi Garden and Carpenter Road Park. As economic resources of the district council were limited, the construction cost was limited to 250,000 dollars.

In 2002, the government compiled data for every phase of the clearance and announced that as many as 10,668 households and 31,408 people were affected. Among them, 28,198 people received resettlement, which was 90 per cent of the people affected; 9,420 households received resettlement, and the compensa- tion amounted to 3.1 billion Hong Kong dollars in the end. (See Tables 5.14 and 5.15.)

Table 5.14 Cost of the clearance of Kowloon Walled City
	(HK$)	(%)
compensation for property owners and tenants	2.68 billion	96.97
Settlement of vacant land after residents had moved out	20.75 million	0.75
Security	3 million	0.11
Demolition works	60 million	2.17
Total costs	2.76375 billion	100

Source: Lu Jin, Jiulongchengzhai shihua 《九龍城寨史話》 (Historical Report of Kowloon Walled city), Hong Kong, Joint publishing (HK) co., 1988, p.185.

Table 5.15 Statistics of property owners and tenants affected by the clearance of the Kowloon Walled City

Property owners Tenants No. of persons rehoused

phase 1

Nov 1987

phase 2

Dec 1988

phase 3

July 1992

phase 4 rehousing

1,297 families/

4,426 persons

1,620 families/

5,777 persons

2,007 families/

7,228 persons

4,924 families/

17,431 persons

1,451 families/

3,473 persons

1,737 families/

4,308 persons

2,556 families/

6,196 persons

5,744 families/

13,977 persons

2,621 families/

7,624 persons

2,212 families/

6,765 persons

2,316 families/

6,994 persons

2,271 families/

6,815 persons

total 10,668 households and 31,408 persons were affected 9,420 families/

28,198 persons

Sources: Hong Kong Housing Authority, Report on the Work of the Special Committee on Clearance of Kowloon Walled City, paper No. HA13/2002, 2002; Lu Jin, Jiulongchengzhai shihua 《九龍城寨史話》 (Historical Report of Kowloon Walled city), Hong Kong, Joint publishing (HK) co., 1988, p.186.

123 Wah Kiu Yat Po, 5 February 1987, p.21.

In 1811, the Qing government constructed Kowloon Walled City to defend against pirates. China and Britain signed the Treaty of Nanking in 1842, the Convention of Peking in 1860 and the Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory in 1898, none of which changed the extraterritoriality of the Walled City for the colonial government. In the 1920s, the Hong Kong government conducted comprehensive planning for New Kowloon before the war; in the 1950s, it attempted to include the Walled City as part of its administrative area when land near Kowloon City was actively developed for public housing. The attempt failed to achieve true governance. Escaping from the chaos of wars and political struggles between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China, refugees hid in the Walled City, while people of dubious background also lived there. From a population of 744 in 1899 to 33,000 in 1987, the Walled City had a story that was a reflection of Hong Kong’s intricate history in this period. People living within the Walled City were deemed illegal by those outside; however, Hong Kong people living outside the Walled City did not realise they were also living under the shadow of unequal treaties that were also deemed illegal. The government seemed to have eliminated the law-and-order problems of the Walled City when it demolished its walls but failed to see that the prob- lems were only moved out of the Walled City instead of being solved com- pletely. From the perspective of urban planning, the government might seem to have included Kowloon Walled City in its scope of planning; nevertheless, more thorough thinking shows that the Walled City did not fit in the development of the neighbouring areas. It only became a park so that it would not trigger dis- putes between China and Britain. Has the government ever conducted genuine planning on this piece of land?

Rose Garden Project

Financing issues and political disputes

Sino-British relations were good in 1986. Apart from solving the problems of Kowloon Walled City, in November of the same year, three of the largest consortiums, Hopewell, Cheung Kong and Hutchison Whampoa, submitted Western Harbour – Strategic Proposal for Lantau Island Development to the Hong Kong government. They planned to fund 25 billion Hong Kong dollars through private institutions to relaunch the new airport scheme. The new airport scheme proposed by the consortiums included reclamation works and construction of a new two-runway airport, cross-harbour bridges, tunnels, and terminals for ocean-going vessels. The three proposed sites for the new airport included Chek Lap Kok, proposed by the government, and two sites off the eastern coast of Lantau Island: one was closer to Green Island, with an orientation identical to that of Kai Tak Airport, and the other was closer to Lamma Island, with an orien- tation identical to that of Chek Lap Kok. It was estimated that 811 acres (328.5 hectares) of new land could be obtained through reclamation, including Green Island reclaimed area (235 acres (95.2 hectares)), an artificial island (150 acres (60.8 hectares)), and Lantau Island and Ma Wan reclaimed area (426 acres

(172.5 hectares)).124 In January 1987, the Hong Kong government established a steering committee led by the Chief Secretary to actively explore the Western Harbour – Strategic Proposal for Lantau Island Development. Members of the steering committee included the Financial Secretary, the Secretary for Lands and Works, the Secretary for Economic Services, the Secretary for Transport, the Deputy Financial Secretary and political consultants.125

In October 1987, Governor David Wilson stated in the Policy Address:

It is critically important for Hong Kong to have a first class international airport. Kai Tak has served us well over the years. But it has limited potential for expansion and must eventually reach its ultimate capacity. Even before that point is reached we must take account of the environmental impact on Kowloon of an airport at Kai Tak developed to full capacity. In looking at possible alternative sites, it is clear that the best sites for a new airport are in the west of the Territory, where new roads and other infrastructure can be built to serve both port and airport developments, as well as, possibly, to provide a new western harbour crossing. We are now commissioning a joint Port and Airport Development Study to advise on the best and most economic solution to these two critical problems. Clearly the resources required for these

developments will be very large. At the same time we shall have to meet continuing demands on public funds for housing and urban renewal and for other substantial projects, such as new hospitals. It may be necessary to seek more private involvement than previously in developing suitable parts of our economic infrastructure.126

From 1988 to 1989, the government conducted exploration works on seven locations in the channel between eastern and south-eastern Lantau Island and western Lamma Island in the search for an ideal location for the new airport.127 On 18 October 1989, Governor David Wilson announced in the 1989–90 Policy Address that the new airport scheme was launched. The scheme was launched after the 1989 June Fourth Incident, which led to people viewing the Tiananmen Incident as a catalyser for the implementation of the new airport scheme. The Policy Address did not mention Hong Kong people’s worries about the political prospects, but much emphasis was put on the scheme’s economic value throughout the address. The scheme was unprecedentedly large in scale and the most comprehensive urban planning scheme in Hong Kong history; it was also called the Rose Garden Project. Highlights of Governor David Wilson’s 1989–90 Policy Address included:

[Hong Kong] is not only home to about 6 million people but also an important regional and international centre. In doing this [building up the physical infrastructure], we will take account both of the requirements of Hong Kong itself and of those areas of southern China with which we now have such close economic

124 Ta Kung Pao, 11 January 1987, p.4.

125 Hong Kong Hansard, Hong Kong Government, 6 May 1987, p.904.

126 Hong Kong Hansard, Hong Kong Government, 7 October 1987, p.16.

127 E.G. Pryor, Hong Kong’s Port and Airport Development Strategy: A Foundation for Growth, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1991, pp.36–37.

links. There is a clear case on economic grounds for building a new airport as

soon as possible. After an exhaustive study of the various options, the Government has decided to build a new Hong Kong International Airport at Chek Lap Kok. It will be a two-runway airport built to the most exacting modern standards and able to operate 24 hours a day. When completed, it will be able to handle 80 million passengers a year – over three times the maximum capacity of Kai Tak. Our aim will be to open the first of the two runways by the early part of 1997. We have to make sure that people can get to it easily and quickly. To do this we plan to build

a high-speed rail system and a six-lane highway which will join north Lantau to Tsing Yi Island and go from there along the new West Kowloon Reclamation to a Western Harbour Crossing and then to Hong Kong Island. We will also have to provide all the facilities needed for servicing a new airport. This means building a new town for at least 150,000 people, plus industrial and commercial facilities, in the Tung Chung valley.

The port now handles 80 million tonnes of cargo a year, an increase of almost 90% in the past five years. Further substantial growth is expected. In planning for the expansion of our port we have looked ahead to 2006. By that time we will need to increase our container throughput by five times; additional land for lorry parking and container storage; on-shore facilities to replace the unloading which is now done in the harbour itself; space to cater for larger numbers of river trade vessels; and space for the various industrial activities which a modern port requires. Our first priority is to build Terminal 8. This will go on reclaimed land at Stonecutters Island. Terminal 9 and its support facilities will be built on reclaimed land at the southeast of Tsing Yi Island. We then plan to move the focus of the port westward. One area for development will be north Lantau, making use of the road facilities being built for the new airport. Another will be the coastal strip west of Tuen Mun. Two more major developments will be the construction of a large breakwater between Lantau and Lamma to increase the amount of sheltered anchorage in the western harbour; and the dredging of a new shipping channel to the west of Lamma.

The cost will be some Hong Kong dollars 127 billion at current prices over the

period up to 2006. The Government believes that many of the individual projects connected with the new airport and the expansion of the port will be commercially viable. It may well be necessary to consider exceptional arrangements to ensure that we have an adequate supply of labour so that they are completed on time

and without causing unacceptable inflationary pressures. Large new areas in the western part of the territory, particularly Lantau Island, will be opened up for industrial and commercial use. The port and airport developments also mean that the West Kowloon Reclamation will need to be completed in the mid-1990s to provide the necessary transport links to the urban area. This reclamation will provide a major source of land in the urban area for commercial and residential development. More badly needed land will be provided by the Central and Wanchai reclamation, where sites will start to be available during 1993. Looking further ahead, we have the possibility of reclaiming the channel between Green Island and Hong Kong Island and the immense opportunities provided by the removal of the airport from Kai Tak.128

128 Hong Kong Hansard, Hong Kong Government, 11 October 1989, pp.24–26.

Upon its announcement, the scheme was supported by many Legislative Council members and the general public. Supporters believed the scheme showed the government’s willingness to take on responsibilities for Hong Kong’s future and could boost the confidence of the Hong Kong people.129 There were also some disputes regarding the new airport scheme among the public. On the aspect of site selection, some believed Kai Tak Airport would not saturate in the short term and thus should continue to be used; some found Deep Bay or the western harbour more suitable for new airport construction; the topography and wind direction of Chek Lap Kok were deemed by some as unsuitable for airport construction; the most heated disputes were about finance and politics.130

According to reports by the government in 1989, the construction cost of the new airport and port works was estimated at around 127 billion Hong Kong dollars. When including other basic facilities to be constructed as proposed in the budget, the scheme would cost around 130 billion Hong Kong dollars, making it the largest scheme ever in Hong Kong. Huang Lianghui and Xue Fengxuan estimated that the actual cost would be 30 to 40 per cent higher than estimated, while the construction cost would increase by 13 per cent each year as a result of inflation. The actual cost would be as high as 400 billion Hong Kong dollars, which was more than three times higher than the original estimation. Even the most conservative estimation would see the cost at around 200 billion Hong Kong dollars. The immense expenditure would lead Hong Kong to a financial crisis.131 In 1990, the Hong Kong government had 71 billion Hong Kong dollars of reserve fund, and the Special Administrative Region Development Fund established in 1989 could allocate 14 billion Hong Kong dollars for the project. It was estimated that the Hong Kong government’s accumulated surplus along with interest and foreign exchange revenue would reach 100 billion Hong Kong dollars in 1995. On 23 April 1991, Legislative Council members revealed the government’s new financial arrangements for the new airport made in October 1990. If the government did not take out a loan, only around 5 billion Hong Kong dollars of Hong Kong’s reserve would be left by 1997.132 If the HKSAR government had to raise money in the financial market, the repayment period would extend beyond the handover of Hong Kong in 1997. Repayment of the loan would be shouldered by the sovereign, China, through the HKSAR gov- ernment. The financial sector hoped that the Chinese government would make its stance clear so that the investment risks could be minimised,133 believing that the Chek Lap Kok new airport scheme should only be launched with the consent of the Chinese government.

129 Hong Kong Hansard, Hong Kong Government, 1 November 1989, p.118.

130 Huang Lianghui and Xue Fengxuan, eds, Xianggang xin jichang de tiaozhan yu zhengyi (Challenges and Disputes on Hong Kong’s New Airport), Hong Kong, Jing Gang xueshu jiaoliu zhongxin, 1990, p.44.

131 Huang Lianghui and Xue Fengxuan, eds, Xianggang xin jichang de tiaozhan yu zhengyi (Challenges and Disputes on Hong Kong’s New Airport), Hong Kong, Jing Gang xueshu jiaoliu zhongxin, 1990, pp.45–76.

132 Wah Kiu Yat Po, 24 April 1991, p.1.

133 Huang Lianghui and Xue Fengxuan, eds, Xianggang xin jichang de tiaozhan yu zhengyi (Challenges and Disputes on Hong Kong’s New Airport), Hong Kong, Jing Gang xueshu jiaoliu zhongxin, 1990, pp.12, 47.

The Chinese government supported the new airport construction but was worried that the financial burden would be too much. On 21 December 1989, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China Jiang Zemin pointed out that the Hong Kong government should act according to its ability and should not ‘invite the guests with others footing the bill’.134 On 10 December 1990, Head of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office Lu Ping stated:

The new airport scheme will continue beyond 1997. Of course most works were said to be completed before 1997, but at least some of them will continue beyond 1997, especially in the financial aspect for which the HKSAR government has to bear some responsibilities. We are forward-looking, not just considering matters of 1997 but beyond, hoping it would not be a burden to the people of Hong Kong.135

On 3 April 1991, Deputy Director of the Hong Kong Macao Affairs Office Chen Zuoer said:

it is hoped that the new Hong Kong airport can be completed as soon as possible while sufficient reserve fund will remain in 1997. Therefore, under no circumstances can we agree to the arrangements that some people are currently making for the HKSAR government in 1997; a heavy burden will remain under a lack of scrutiny.136

On 15 June 1991, Li Peng stated in a public speech that he believed construction of a new airport was necessary to Hong Kong:

We hope the airport will require a small amount of investment on construction and bring numerous benefits while not leaving any burdens for the Hong Kong SAR government and residents in the days to come. Under this principle, we are willing to continue negotiations with Britain to solve this problem in an appropriate manner.137

On 30 June 1991, China and Britain signed the Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Construction of the New Airport in Hong Kong and Related Questions, planning to complete the ten projects of the Airport Core Programme before the handover on 30 June 1997: the airport (the first runway and ancillary facilities); West Kowloon Reclamation; certain reclamation works in Central and Wan Chai related to the new airport; the North Lantau Expressway; the West Kowloon Highway; the Western Harbour Crossing; Route 3 (certain sections); the Airport Railway; the Lantau Link connecting Tsing Yi and Lantau Island (including the railway and Route 3 Interchange); and Phase I of Tung Chung development.138 It was also agreed that the total amount of loan to be repaid

134 Ta Kung Pao, 22 December 1989, p.1.

135 Ta Kung Pao, 11 December 1990, p.12.

136 Ta Kung Pao, 10 April 1991, p.1.

137 Ta Kung Pao, 15 June 1991, p.2.

138 Hong Kong Government Information Services, Hong Kong 1992: A Review of 1991, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1992, p.188.

after 30 June 1997 as a result of the new airport construction would not exceed 5 billion Hong Kong dollars. The Hong Kong government should borrow money by itself and report to the Chinese government; loans of more than 5 billion Hong Kong dollars in total should only be taken out after both sides had reached a consensus. The Hong Kong government should leave behind at least 25 billion Hong Kong dollars to the HKSAR government on 30 June 1997. The Hong Kong government was willing to appoint a permanent Hong Kong person from the Bank of China Group as an official member of the Board of the Airport Authority.139 On 4 July 1991, the government announced that the expenditure of the Airport Core Programme would be around 98.6 billion Hong Kong dollars, of which 54 billion Hong Kong dollars would be governmental expenditure.140 The government would provide 17 billion Hong Kong dollars additionally, the Airport Authority would be responsible for 16.5 billion Hong Kong dollars, and around 11 billion Hong Kong dollars would come from private investments.141 On 13 September 1991, China and Britain established the Hong Kong Airport Committee, of which both the chief Chinese and the chief British representative of the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group were chairpersons.

On 12 June 1992, the Hong Kong government estimated that the total cost of the ten core projects for the new airport would rise to 175.3 billion Hong Kong dollars, which was a huge increase from the 98.6 billion Hong Kong dollars des- ignated in March 1991. On 16 June 1992, this prompted the Chinese govern- ment to express its concern about the financial arrangements of the new airport, worried that the future HKSAR government ‘might be in debt’; meanwhile, the Hong Kong government unilaterally announced that MTR Corporation need not pay dividends to the Hong Kong government for the time being. As the future HKSAR government was entitled to a certain part of such dividends, the Hong Kong government would have to discuss the matter with the Chinese and British governments to seek a solution.142 The total investment cost of the Airport Core Programme ultimately stood at 156.54 billion Hong Kong dollars.

Highlights of the Airport Core Programme

Various major projects launched during the 1990s significantly differed from earlier projects, which concentrated on development of the urban areas. Among major projects in the 1990s, works related to the Airport Core Programme were costliest. The governmental Airport Development Steering Committee was responsible for overall monitoring and guidance of the Airport Core Programme. Its members included the Financial Secretary and heads of

139 E.G. Pryor, Hong Kong’s Port and Airport Development Strategy: A Foundation for Growth, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1991, pp.131–133.

140 E.G. Pryor, Hong Kong’s Port and Airport Development Strategy: A Foundation for Growth, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1991, p.75.

141 E.G. Pryor, Hong Kong’s Port and Airport Development Strategy: A Foundation for Growth, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1991, p.70.

142 Ta Kung Pao, 16 June 1992, p.1.

departments involved in the development and implementation of the Airport Core Programme, including the Secretary for the Treasury, the Secretary for Economic Services, the Secretary for Works, the Secretary for Transport and the Secretary for Planning, Environment and Lands.143 Established in 1990, the Provisional Airport Authority was responsible for construction and operation of the new airport. In 1995, the Authority was restructured and became an official institution wholly owned by the government. MTR Corporation was respon- sible for construction and operation of the Airport Railway; the franchise for the Western Harbour Crossing was granted to a private institution, Western Harbour Tunnel Company Limited.144

The New Airport Projects Co-ordination Office was an executive agency of the Airport Development Steering Committee under the Works Bureau. It was formed by engineering staff members of the government and staff members of International Bechtel Incorporated. Its major duties included overall man- agement of the entire Airport Core Programme, regular reports to the Airport Development Steering Committee, and suggesting measures to tackle problems when necessary.145

The Airport Core Programme Committee played an important role in the implementation of the programme. The Secretary for Works was the chairper- son of the committee, with other committee members including heads of various works departments in the government (the Highways Department, the Territory Development Department, the Civil Engineering Department, the Architectural Services Department and the Water Supplies Department), the Director of Lands, project directors of the Airport Authority and MTR Corporation, and representatives from the New Airport Projects Co-ordination Office.146

The Chief Executive of HKSAR Tung Chee-hwa commented during the opening of the new airport on 2 July 1998 that the new airport project, ‘which is described as a project “beyond 1997”, is the largest investment item in history of Hong Kong. t took seven years to complete and cost about $155 billion.’147

According to figures released by the government in 1999, the Airport Core Programme cost 155.3 billion Hong Kong dollars in total up to November 1997.148 The figure was amended to 156.54 billion Hong Kong dollars in 2005. (See Table 5.16.)

In the Airport Core Programme, 1,669 hectares of land was developed, includ- ing 67 hectares in Tung Chung New Town, 334 hectares in West Kowloon and 20 hectares neighbouring the Central and Western District on Hong Kong Island. The new airport was the largest in area, totalling 1,248 hectares. It was

143 The Airport Core Programme, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1999, p.14.

144 The Airport Core Programme, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1999, p.10.

145 The Airport Core Programme, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1999, p.14.

146 The Airport Core Programme, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1999, p.14.

147 Legislative Council of the HKSAR, Report of the Select Committee to Inquire into the Circumstances Leading to the Problems Surrounding the Commencement of the Operation of the New Hong Kong International Airport at Chek Lap Kok since 6 July 1998 and Related Issues, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1999, Chapter 1, p.10.

148 The Airport Core Programme, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1999, p.92.

Table 5.16 Details of the Airport Core Programme projects

Project	Year of construction	Key programme	Cost estimate in July 1991	Cost estimates in June 1992	Actual expenditure
			(HK$100	(HK$100	(HK$100
			million)	million)	million)
chek Lap Kok	1992−1998	the project consisted of a 1,248-hectare airport apron, a 3,800-metre-long runway,	436	685.0	702
Airport		passenger terminal buildings and other supporting facilities.
central–	1993−1998	the area of the central Reclamation phase 1 was required for the construction	18	28.3	27
Wan chai		of the Hong Kong terminus of the Airport Railway, with the remaining land used
Reclamation		for roads, relocation of ferry piers, pumping stations and other facilities that were
		affected by the reclamation.
West Kowloon	1990−2003	this provided 334 hectares of reclaimed land from tsim Sha tsui northward,	90	125.9	120
Reclamation		including Yau Ma tei, cheung Sha Wan and Mei Foo.
tung chung	1992−1997	this provided 67 hectares of land for the supporting community of the new airport,	26	30.3	24.9
Development		providing an industrial business park, private housing and public housing.
phase 1
Lantau Link	1991−1997	A fixed dual three-lane road and two-track rail crossing linking tsing Yi, Ma Wan	121	171.6	91.9
		Island and Lantau, consisting of the tsing Ma suspension bridge, a viaduct crossing
		of Ma Wan Island, the Kap Shui Mun Bridge, approach roads and a toll plaza on
		Lantau.
Route 3 (part)	1993−1998	the Route 3 tsing Yi and Kwai chung sections and the 1,177-metre-long ting Kau	56	89.2	82.4
		Bridge linking tsing Yi Island and Kowloon.
North Lantau	1992−1997	A 12.5-kilometre-long expressway, connecting with the last section of the transport	43	81.0	63.6
Expressway		network leading to the new airport, including Yam O, tai Ho and tung chung
		sections.

Table 5.16 (continued)

Project Year of

Key programme Cost estimate Cost estimates

Actual

construction

in July 1991 (HK$100

million)

in June 1992 (HK$100

million)

expenditure (HK$100

million)

West Kowloon Expressway

Western Harbour crossing

1993−1997 A 4.2-kilometre-long, dual three-lane expressway, linking Western Harbour crossing and Route 3 from Kwai chung, including the section from Kwai chung Viaduct to the Western Harbour crossing toll plaza, including the interchanges at Yau Ma tei and Mei Foo.

1993−1997 A 2-kilometre dual three-lane tunnel, crossing Victoria Harbour from a portal on the West Kowloon Reclamation at Yau Ma tei to the Western Reclamation at Sai Ying pun on Hong Kong Island, is the important section of Route 3.

17 33.8 26.6

39 65.0 57

Airport Railway 1994−1998 the railway covers 34 kilometres, 20 on ground level, 6 on elevated structures and 8 in tunnels, from chek Lap Kok Airport to central, with six new stations built.

Utilities Various works undertaken for the provision of utility services to the new airport and the tung chung New town, including water, electricity, gas and telecommunications.

125 294.7 340

15 32.6 30

Total 986 1,637.3 1,565.4

Sources: E.G. pryor, Hong Kong’s Port and Airport Development Strategy: A Foundation for Growth, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1991, pp.92–102; Hong Kong Airport core programme homepage: www.info.gov.hk/ archive/napco/index-c.html; civil Engineering and Development Department website: http://www.cedd.gov.hk/tc/achievements/regional/regi_west_kowloon.html; Lands and planning Division website: http://www.devb.gov. hk/reclamation/tc/basic/plans_and_maps/project/; Zhou Bojun, Meigui yuan de gushi: Xianggang xin jichang wenti tantao (Essays on the Hong Kong New Airport), Hong Kong, Qingwen shuwu, 1993, pp.154–158; Jichan hexin jihua (the Airport core programme), Hong Kong, Government printer, 1999, p.92; William Kritzberg, Qing Yu ganxian (the Lantau Link), Hong Kong, Zheng fu zong bu gong wu ju xin ji chang gong cheng tong chou shu, 1998, p.10; Ho pui-yin, Ways to Urbanisation: Post-war Road Development in Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University press, 2008; Details of road construction costs provided by the Highways Department in late 2005.

around 6 kilometres long and 3 kilometres wide, which was more than four times larger than the old airport. Reaching 9 billion dollars, its works contract was the second-largest in the Airport Core Programme and was successfully bid for by a multinational associate. The works began in December 1992 and were completed in January 1996, which was four months earlier than the scheduled time.149 The areas of Chek Lap Kok Island and Lam Chau were 302 hectares and 8 hectares respectively, forming 25 per cent of the airport platform, while the remaining land was reclaimed.150 Construction of the airfield, first runway, passenger terminal, air traffic control tower, air traffic control complex and other important facilities commenced in 1995.151

When the new airport opened in July 1998, one of the two runways, each 3,800 metres long, entered into service. The new airport operates around the clock, unlike Kai Tak Airport in the past, where night-time take-offs and land- ings were restricted. In Phase I of the project, 38 terminal building frontal parking stands suitable for all 747-400 aircraft, 27 apron parking stands and 13 cargo parking stands were constructed. Around 500 passenger and cargo flights could be handled per day.152 After completion of the second runway in late 1998 and expansion works of the Northwest Concourse in the passenger terminal, the number of flights that could be handled per hour increased from the initial 37 to 50, while terminal building frontal parking stands also increased to 48. After completion of the second passenger terminal, the new airport was able to reach the ultimate designed capacity, i.e. servicing 87 million passengers and handling 9 million tons of cargo per year.153

The passenger terminal resembled a ‘Y’ in shape and adopted a wing-like roof inclining at 45 degrees. The design could insulate heat and save more electric- ity than traditional roofs. The terminal was 1.2 kilometres long with an area of 550,000 square metres and eight storeys, three of which were open for public use. There were departure and arrival halls, while facilities in the basement included the automated people mover and the baggage handling system, along with mechanical and electrical apparatuses. The project cost 10.1 billion dollars and was the largest of all the contracts in the Airport Core Programme; it was also the largest construction works contract in scale awarded in Hong Kong history.154

Road works related to the Airport Core Programme from the 1980s to 1990s with the largest investments were (in descending order):

the Lantau Link, construction commencing in 1991 and completed in 1997, with an investment of 11.86 billion Hong Kong dollars in total;
Route 3 (Kwai Chung to Ting Kau sections), construction commencing

149 The Airport Core Programme, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1999, p.28.
150 The Airport Core Programme, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1999, p.30.
151 The Airport Core Programme, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1999, p.30.
152 The Airport Core Programme, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1999, p.24.
153 The Airport Core Programme, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1999, p.24.
154 The Airport Core Programme, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1999, p.26.
in 1993 and completed in 1998, with an investment of over 8.24 billion Hong Kong dollars;155
the North Lantau Highway, constructed from 1992 to 1997, with an investment of 6.36 billion Hong Kong dollars;
the West Kowloon Highway, constructed from 1992 to 1997, with an investment of 2.66 billion Hong Kong dollars in total.

Total investment of the four road works reached 29.12 billion Hong Kong dollars, accounting for 18.6 per cent of the Airport Core Programme’s total expenditure of 156.5 billion Hong Kong dollars. The Airport Core Programme covered a wide array of aspects: it shortened distances between districts, devel- oped remote land in the west of the New Territories, and increased available space in the city, while population distribution also gradually moved westward towards the terminals just as the road network did; the New Territories was transformed with a new look.

Westward shift of ports

Before the Airport Core Programme was launched, the West Kowloon Reclamation was first proposed in the Study on Harbour Reclamation and Urban Growth in 1983. In the report, it was believed that development of West Kowloon could provide land for transport facilities in the Airport Core Project such as the Airport Railway, highways and harbour crossing, while alleviating the crowded- ness of residential and industrial/commercial areas in Kowloon Peninsula. More leisure, cultural and social service facilities could be provided in West Kowloon, in turn improving the living environment of the area, which was in line with the overall development of the government’s Metroplan. In 1984, West Kowloon Reclamation was approved by the Executive Council and officially included in the development strategy. In 1994, land to be developed in West Kowloon also included that of the Stonecutters Island reclamation project. Newly reclaimed land would be used to construct governmental and social service facilities, housing, commercial development buildings and roads connecting to the new airport, such as the third harbour crossing, the West Kowloon Highway and the Airport Railway. It was estimated that the West Kowloon reclamation area would accommodate 159,000 residents.156

West Kowloon Reclamation was the most complicated among the ten pro- jects in the Airport Core Programme and the largest reclamation project ever in the urban area. The reclamation area extended northward from Tsim Sha Tsui, including Yau Ma Tei, Cheung Sha Wan and Mei Foo. About 334 hectares of new land was reclaimed in the entire project, and the area of Kowloon Peninsula increased by a third. Among this, 120 hectares of land was used to construct

155 Data provided by the Highways Department at the end of 2005; the construction cost of Tsing Long Highway and Tai Lam Tunnel is not included.

156 Hong Kong Government Information Services, Hong Kong 1995: A Review of 1994, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1995, p.252.

Source: Mr Lo Yiu-ching’s collection.

Figure 5.2 West Kowloon reclamation area

the transport corridor connecting to the airport – the West Kowloon Highway, the Airport Railway, two stations and land connecting to the Western Harbour Crossing; around 43 hectares of land was designated for government and com- munity services such as schools, clinics, social welfare facilities, indoor sports grounds, police stations, magistracies and public parking lots; seven hectares of land was used to construct the Stonecutters Island Government Dockyard; 59 hectares of land was open area; 33 hectares of land was allocated for indus- trial and commercial use; 20 hectares of land was used to construct new housing; 31 hectares of land near railway stations was designated as integrated develop- ment areas; and 21 hectares of land was used to construct Cheung Sha Wan Wholesale Market.157 (See Figure 5.2.)

The reclaimed area was divided into the northern part and the southern part by Cherry Street. The southern part involved four major work contracts, while the northern part involved two. The southern reclaimed area included New Yau Ma

157 Media Relations Division, New Airport Projects Co-ordination Office, ACP Projects in West Kowloon, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1993, p.2.

Tei Typhoon Shelter, the neighbouring old typhoon shelter, Yau Ma Tei Public Cargo Working Area, Stonecutters Island Government Dockyard and New Jordan Road Ferry Pier. The northern reclaimed area included five cargo handling terminals, Cheung Sha Wan Wholesale Market with 700 lorry parking spaces, the road network connecting to the market, Cheung Sha Wan Shipbuilders, China Resources Warehouse Cargo Handling Area, and transportation works connect- ing to the airport (the West Kowloon Highway, the Western Harbour Crossing, the Airport Railway, and Route 3, which connected Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and north-west New Territories). The Civil Engineering Department planned and monitored the reclamation works of the southern part, while the Territory Development Department was responsible for the northern part, with Mott MacDonald Hong Kong Ltd as consultant. Detailed planning of the southern reclaimed area was carried out in early 1990, and that of the northern reclaimed area was also launched in the second quarter of the same year.158

Reclamation was divided into three phases. With an area of 68 hectares, New Yau Ma Tei Typhoon Shelter was the earliest project, commencing in August 1990 and completed in 1992. Phase II of the project was carried out from late 1992 to 1995, while 13 hectares of land at the southern end of West Kowloon was reclaimed during the last phase of the project starting in 1999.159 There were seven major works, including construction of 8.5-kilometre-long seawalls and breakwaters, 17 kilometres of roads, reconstruction of all affected coastal facilities, drain pipes, seawater chambers and pumping facilities. In the whole reclamation project, 34 million cubic metres of mud was dredged from the seabed, 69 million cubic metres of fill was used, and the coastline was extended by 1 kilometre. The government invested 12 billion Hong Kong dollars in total, which was 3 billion dollars more than the 1993 budget of 9 billion dollars.

West Kowloon Reclamation was a more arduous task than the magnificent Tsing Ma Bridge and reclamation works in Chek Lap Kok. In the project, not only did existing passenger and cargo terminals have to be moved to the new coast along with the warehouses, but also operation of the old Yau Ma Tei Typhoon Shelter had to be maintained. As the existing sewerage system in the old area of West Kowloon was mostly at or even lower than sea level, the gov- ernment had to reconnect the drainage pipes to tie in with the reclamation, which added to the project’s difficulty. Traffic congestion and municipal issues triggered during the works also drew criticism from citizens. In addition, the government had to monitor contractors to ensure they complied with environ- mental protection legislation, while controlling the negative impacts of noise and dust pollution in the project. To accelerate the project, the government allowed as many as three dredging and reclamation contracts along with two highway contracts to operate in parallel at a certain point. In the end, the project was completed in late 2003 as scheduled.160

158 E.G. Pryor, Hong Kong’s Port and Airport Development Strategy: A Foundation for Growth, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1991, p.73.

159 The Airport Core Programme, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1999, p.44.

160 Hong Kong Yearbook 2002, Hong Kong, Information Services Department, 2002, p.169.

The West Kowloon Highway

The West Kowloon Highway was constructed on the newly reclaimed land in West Kowloon. It was a 4.2-kilometre-long dual three-lane highway connecting the Western Harbour Crossing and remaining sections of Route 3 from Kwai Chung. It was constructed from 1993 to 1997, with a total investment of 2.66 billion dollars.161 Major parts of the project included roads connecting Kwai Chung Viaduct and the toll plaza of Western Harbour Crossing, along with interchanges in Yau Ma Tei and Mei Foo.

The Western Harbour Crossing

The Western Harbour Crossing was the only project operated under franchise. In September 1993, the Hong Kong government and Western Harbour Tunnel Company Limited signed a 30-year franchise agreement to develop the Western Harbour Crossing with the ‘build–own–transfer (BOT)’ model. Works com- menced in August 1993, and the crossing began service in April 1997, which was earlier than the scheduled date of completion.162 Three major items were included in the contract: immersed tube works, approach works conducted in West Kowloon, and approach and related works conducted in Sai Ying Pun.163 The immersed tube of the Western Harbour Crossing extended south-west- ward from Kowloon to Hong Kong Island and was 1.3 kilometres long. The entire immersed tube was formed by 12 sections of pre-made concrete com- ponents, each of which was 113.5 metres long, 33.4 metres wide, 8.5 metres tall and around 35,000 tons in weight.164 The first component started to be immersed in the designated position in March 1995, and the entire process took around 716 hours. Installation of the last component was completed in April 1996.165

The Western Harbour Crossing opened on 30 April 1997 and was the first twin-tube dual three-lane harbour crossing in Hong Kong. The tunnel con- nected the southern tip of West Kowloon reclaimed area and Sai Ying Pun on Hong Kong Island. In addition, the Western Harbour Crossing was an impor- tant part of Route 3.166 Maximum daily capacity of the six-lane road tunnel was 180,000 vehicles, which was higher than for the pre-existing four-lane road tunnels.167

161 Data provided by the Highways Department at the end of 2005.

162 The Airport Core Programme, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1999, p.86.

163 The Airport Core Programme, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1999, p.86.

164 Hong Kong Airport Core Programme website, http://www.info.gov.hk/archive/napco/c_p-harcross. html.

165 The Airport Core Programme, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1999, p.88.

166 The Airport Core Programme, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1999, p.86.

167 Hong Kong Airport Core Programme website, http://www.info.gov.hk/archive/napco/c_p-harcross. html.

Planning for the new era

Highlights of Metroplan planning

In the mid-1980s, the development of the new airport had to be reviewed, while the planning of the city core districts had to be adjusted at the same time in response to the westward shift of terminals. The government took the oppor- tunity to improve the structure of the city, allowing it to gradually transform to a key port, an air cargo terminal, a commercial and trade centre in China and a high-tech base for light industry.168 The government announced the Territorial Development Strategy in 1984, providing a summary on the basic domains. The main idea had shifted from the focus on new town development in the past to an emphasis on the development plan on both sides of the harbour, which indi- cated that the focus of planning in the 1990s would return to ‘metropolis’ from ‘new town’. The ‘Metroplan’ planning strategy stated in the 1980s Territorial Development Strategy and the Harbour and Airport Development Strategy would be carried out simultaneously, while taking into account the expansion of the old Hong Kong Kai Tak Airport before the completion of the new airport and the planning of the Kai Tak area after airport relocation.169 The 20-year Metroplan was divided into a number of independent integrated development plans, with a view to fulfilling the plan by 2011.170 (See Figure 5.3.)

On 7 October 1987, Hong Kong Governor David Wilson promoted the Metroplan vigorously in his Policy Address, pointing out that the government had spent over half of its non-recurrent expenditure on the development of new towns since the mid-1970s, while the investment scale in the early-developed urban areas was severely undersized. Although both sides of the harbour were employ- ment hubs, some districts were overcrowded, with a poor living environment and a lack of basic recreational facilities. Improvement was absolutely necessary.

In the late 1980s, the government decided to draw out post-1990s new direc- tions for the main urban areas and forms for the development of seven devel- oped districts: Tsuen Wan and Kwai Tsing, West Kowloon, Central Kowloon, East Kowloon, Hong Kong Island West, Hong Kong Island East and Hong Kong Island South.171 The Lands and Works Branch was reorganised to form a special team that would formulate a comprehensive outline and more detailed district plan for the Metro Area, which would include the redevelopment of spe- cific urban areas and their redevelopment plans.

In 1991, the Governor and the Executive Council endorsed the development strategies of the Metroplan.172 In the same year, the Planning, Environment

168 Hong Kong Lands and Works Branch, Metroplan: The Aims, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1988, p.23.

169 Hong Kong Lands and Works Branch, Metroplan: The Aims, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1988, p.31.

170 Hong Kong Lands and Works Branch, Metroplan: Initial Options, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1988, p.3.

171 Hong Kong Lands and Works Branch, Metroplan: The Aims, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1988, p.5.

172 Hong Kong Yearbook 1994, Hong Kong, Information Services Department, 1994, p.179.

Source: Hong Kong Lands and Works Branch, Metroplan: The Selected Strategy: An Overview, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1991, p.4.

Figure 5.3 Scope of the Metro Area

and Lands Bureau published Metroplan: The Selected Strategies: An Overview to outline focal points of urban development. The ‘metro areas’ included seven dis- tricts, namely Tsuen Wan and Kwai Tsing, West Kowloon, Central Kowloon, East Kowloon, Hong Kong Island West, Hong Kong Island East and Hong Kong Island South. After deciding on the development strategies of the Metroplan, a series of development statements were drafted to ascertain specific planning objectives in each district. Between 1992 and 1997, the Planning Department completed the development statements for four of these seven districts and designed a set of administrative guidelines for guidance and control over the stat- utory zoning and the handling of planning applications from the community.173 The development statements for these four districts were formed in chronologi- cal order: Tsuen Wan and Kwai Tsing (1992), South-eastern Kowloon (1993), West Kowloon (1993) and Island West (1997); in 1999, the development state- ments of Central Kowloon and East Kowloon were completed,174 whereas the research work for Island East and Island South had yet to start in 1999.

The development statements drafted between 1992 and 1997 were mainly about the construction of the new airport and port facilities, such as the Tsuen Wan and Kwai Tsing area, the old airport (Kai Tak) and new development area in south-eastern Kowloon, the opening up of the West Kowloon reclama- tion area, the reclamation project to connect Green Island to the neighbouring Western District, and the redevelopment of the old Sheung Wan district; all these projects were designed to coordinate with the planning of the Airport Core Programme. The development of the old airport surrounding area in Central Kowloon, redevelopment of Kowloon City and To Kwa Wan old area, and the development statements of the old airport surrounding area in East Kowloon were only implemented two years after the handover. (See Figure 5.4 and Table 5.17.)

To solve the problem of land shortage, the Metroplan suggested carrying out reclamation along both sides of Victoria Harbour, such as in Hung Hom, West Kowloon, Central to Wan Chai, Green Island and Kennedy Town, to reduce the development density in some districts and expand the central business district. After the negotiation between China and Britain, the Hong Kong government had to abide by the limitation of selling only 50 hectares of land per year during the transitional period (1984–1997). In 1988, the government set up the Land Development Corporation, which was responsible for conducting, promoting and facilitating the sorting out by private developers of the private housing areas that did not conform to modern land use for comprehensive redevelopment, and assisting private developers to redevelop privately owned land.

In 1991, the Metroplan was endorsed to provide a framework for the restructuring of the Metro Area. The government released the Metroplan: The Selected Strategy: An Overview booklet. After public consultation, one of the

173 Nyaw Mee-kau and Li Si-ming, eds, The Other Hong Kong Report, Hong Kong, Chinese University Press, 1996, p.350.

174 Planning Department website, http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/p_study/prog_s/landscape/ landscape_tech2/app_1.htm.

Source: Hong Kong planning Department, Territorial Development Strategy Review: Foundation Report, Hong Kong, planning Department, 1993, Executive Summary, p.11.

Figure 5.4 Long-term development model of the port

Table 5.17 Population growth estimates in 1993 and 1995

	1993 estimate	1995 estimate	Difference
2001	6,100,000	–	–
2006	6,300,000	7,300,000	+1,000,000
2011	6,500,000	7,500,000/8,100,000	+1,000,000–1,600,000

Source: Hong Kong Government planning, Environment and Lands Branch, Territorial Development Strategy Review 1996: A Consultative Digest, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1996, pp.15–16.

three ‘Metroplan patterns’ was selected, and the land use models were briefly designed. The total population in the Metro Area was set to be 4.2 million. It was suggested that guidelines should be drawn up according to different develop- ment categories, forms and densities, including guidelines for the urban design of the Metro Area (ridgeline protection), landscape strategies, and the open space framework for recreation. The overall land use framework took the main roads and railway as the network backbone to facilitate cargo and passenger transport in the city. As the city was reformed, special attention would be paid to providing new development opportunities in situ after the final relocation of Kai Tak Airport.175

In 1993, the Planning Department released the Territorial Development Strategy Review: Development Options to collect opinions from different organi- sations and the public on the plausible development roadmap in the medium term (to 2006) and long term (to 2011).176 A report was compiled upon collect- ing public opinions, summarising the major issues of concerns and drawing up items to be adjusted and ideas to be introduced in the post-evaluation period.

In 1995, the department prepared the Final Technical Report (divided into three parts) and Integrated Technical Report. In 1998, the Planning Department released the executive report of the Territorial Development Strategy Review, listing the selected development outlines.177

The Territorial Development Strategy Review projected in 1996 that the popu- lation would reach around 7.5 million by 2006; the basic developed areas and planned strategic growth areas would possess enough potential for develop- ment. When the population reached 8.1 million, the authority would explore new development areas in the New Territories to cater to the demand; job opportunities (especially those in tertiary industry) might still be concentrated in the Metro Area, but the authority would have the chance and need to develop commercial activity centres surrounding the high-capacity public transport interchanges. (See Figure 5.5.)

175 Hong Kong Lands and Works Branch, Metroplan: The Selected Strategy: An Overview, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1991, p.2.

176 Hong Kong Planning Department, Territorial Development Strategy Review: Development Options, Hong Kong, Planning Department, 1993.

177 Hong Kong Government Planning, Environment and Lands Branch, Territorial Development Strategy Review 1996: A Consultative Digest, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1996, p.3.

Source: Hong Kong planning, Environment and Lands Bureau, Territorial Development Strategy Review – A Response to Change and Challenges: Final Executive Report, Hong Kong, planning, Environment and Lands Bureau, Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 1998, p.10.

Figure 5.5 ‘Scenario B’ adopted in the Territorial Development Strategy Review

Table 5.18 Estimated population growth in Territorial Development Strategy Review 1996

Estimated population growth

‘Build-back’ through redevelopment and the reuse of vacated flats in the public and private sectors, mainly in the Metro Area

Spare capacity in current development plans, mainly in the new towns in the New territories

290,000

70,000

West Kowloon Reclamation (intensification)	30,000
Kai tak and Kowloon Bay, phase 1 (land-based) and phase 2	230,000
(reclamation-based)
Green Island Reclamation	40,000
tsuen Wan Bay Reclamation	30,000
central–Wanchai Reclamation (remainder)	15,000
tsuen Kwan O phase 3 (remainder) and intensification/extension	125,000
tung chung, phases 2 (remainder), 3 and 4	115,000
Yuen Long South	20,000
Au tau–Kam tin	30,000
Whitehead	5,000

Source: Hong Kong Government planning, Environment and Lands Branch, Territorial Development Strategy Review 1996: A Consultative Digest, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1996, pp.25, 66–68.

In the medium-term strategies developed on this basis, 60.5 per cent of the popu- lation would be distributed in the Metro Area, whereas the population increase in north-west, south-west and south-east New Territories would account for 39.5 per cent of the overall population. The working population in the Metro Area would account for 58 per cent of the total working population in Hong Kong and 74 per cent of the total number of jobs in Hong Kong; the New Territories would account for 42 per cent of the total population in Hong Kong, 13 per cent higher than the 29 per cent of 1991; the number of jobs would increase from 17 per cent in 1991 to 26 per cent; in 1991, the ratio of overall population to job was 3.59/1.00. As the population relocated to the non-central regions, the ratio would change to 3.19/1.00 by 2006, in which the changes in north-west and north-east New Territories would be more obvious.178 (See Table 5.18 and Figure 5.6.)

It was estimated that, by 2001, most of the newly opened up residential land with existing layout and planning in urban areas would be developed, much of which would be for public housing. It was also estimated that, between 2001 and 2006, the annual demand for public and private housing would be around 78,000 units. As estimated by the authority, the overall potential demand for housing units would be around 390,000 units between 2001 and 2006, which

178 Hong Kong Government Planning, Environment and Lands Branch, Territorial Development Strategy Review 1996: A Consultative Digest, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1996, p.69.

Source: Hong Kong planning Department, Consolidated Technical Report on the Territorial Development Strategy Review’96, Hong Kong, planning Department, 1996, p.72.

Figure 5.6 Distribution of potential new strategic growth areas

would be equivalent to the demand generated by 1 million people. Among these 1 million, 700,000 came from population growth, while the remaining 300,000 would be the people who used to live in apartments necessary for rede- velopment, who were affected by demolition, moving out from substandard or overcrowded housing. The authority would also need to make arrangements for the increase of 410,000 jobs.179 Therefore, it was suggested that the Housing Authority should develop a brand-new long-term housing strategy to provide housing for squatter residents, redevelop substandard public housing estates and provide more housing under the Home Ownership Scheme.

Expansion of the transport network

To meet the needs of the planned population in the future, the planning of road networks, as large infrastructure projects, connecting urban areas to the New Territories would be the key to development. Between 1996 and 1999, the Hung Hom Bypass and Princess Margaret Road Link in response to traffic congestion (1.16 billion Hong Kong dollars), the second Tsing Yi South Bridge constructed between 1992 and 1998 (1.12 billion Hong Kong dollars) and the improvement project at Lung Cheung Road and Ching Cheung Road (1.13 billion Hong Kong dollars) were projects of over 1 billion Hong Kong dollars, but they were of a rela- tively smaller scale compared to the Airport Core Programme. (See Table 5.19.) By the mid-1980s, Hong Kong had overcome geographical obstacles to build seven tunnels through the mountains and across the harbour that con- nected Kowloon, Hong Kong Island and the New Territories. In total there were 11 tunnels in Hong Kong, including the Lion Rock Tunnel, Hung Hom Cross Harbour Tunnel, Aberdeen Tunnel and Kai Tak Airport Tunnel, which were completed before 1986. Eastern Harbour Crossing and Western Harbour Tunnel were built to strengthen the connection between Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula, while the remaining new tunnels were all located in the New Territories: the Shing Mun Tunnel and Tate’s Cairn Tunnel in Sha Tin, Tseung Kwan O Tunnel in New Territories east, and Cheung Tsing Tunnel and Tai Lam Tunnel in New Territories west. Therefore, the transportation network in Hong Kong had become more elaborate and efficient. An assessment of the size of the project based on cost shows that Tai Lam Tunnel had involved the highest funding (6.3 billion Hong Kong dollars), followed by Western Harbour Tunnel (5.7 billion Hong Kong dollars); Eastern Harbour Crossing cost 3.4 billion Hong Kong dollars and came in third place. Apart from a high project cost, Tai Lam Tunnel provided more lanes. The scale of the project was much bigger than that of other tunnel projects carried out between the 1960s and 1970s. In terms of the length of the tunnels completed after the 1980s, Tate’s Cairn Tunnel was the longest (3,900 metres), followed by Tai Lam Tunnel (3,800 metres) and Shing

Mun Tunnel (2,600 metres). (See Table 5.20.)

179 Hong Kong Government Planning, Environment and Lands Branch, Territorial Development Strategy Review 1996: A Consultative Digest, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1996, p.52.

Table 5.19	Hong Kong major road projects in 1986–1998
Year	Project	Length of trunk route (km)	Construction cost (HK$100 million)
1991−1997	Lantau Link	3.5	118.6
1993−1998	Route 3 (Kwai chung to ting Kau section)	20.65	82.4
1992−1997	North Lantau Expressway	12.45	63.6
1993−1997	West Kowloon Expressway	4.20	26.6
1986−1990	Route 5	7.00	18.5
1987−1991	Kwun tong Bypass	4.74	17.4
1996−1999	Hung Hom Bypass and princess Margaret Road	2.50	11.6
	Link
1994−1998	Lung cheung Road and ching cheung Road	Lung cheung	11.3
	improvements	Road: 2.6; ching
		cheung Road:
		2.79
1977−1997	West Kowloon corridor	5.00	8.4

Sources: William Kritzberg, Qing Yu ganxian (the Lantau Link), Hong Kong, Zheng fu zong bu gong wu ju xin ji chang gong cheng tong chou shu, 1998, p.10; Hong Kong Government Information Services, Xiang Gang (Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Government printer, 1990, p.191, 1991, p.214; Hong Kong Government Information Services, Hong Kong: The Facts, Hong Kong, Hong

Kong Information Services Department, 1989, 1990, 1992, 2005; Highways Department internal data, Length of trunk Routes; Highways Department, tsing Yi North coastal Road, http://www.hyd.gov.hk/chi/major/majorworks/List_9/index.htm; Item for public Works Subcommittee of Finance committee, Legislative council, 22 July 1998, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr98-99/chinese/fc/ pwsc/papers/pw220708.htm; Highways Department, Hung Hom Bypass and princess Margaret Road Link, http://www.hyd.gov.hk/ chi/major/majorworks/List_15/index.htm; Highways Department, Hung Hom Bypass and Princess Margaret Road Link, pamphlet, 1999; Highways Department, Lung cheung Road and ching cheung Road Improvements, http://www.hyd.gov.hk/chi/major/ majorworks/List_17/index.htm; Jichang hexin jihua (the Airport core programme), Hong Kong, Government printer, 1999, pp.68, 80, 92; Airport core programme, http://www.info.gov.hk/napco/index.html. Accounts of Hong Kong . . . and Annual Report of the Director of Accounting Services from 1970–71 to 1984–85, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1971–1985; Hong Kong treasury, Annual Report of the Director of Accounting Services . . . and the Accounts of Hong Kong for the Year Ended 31 March, from 1986–87 to 1996–97, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1987–1997; Hong Kong treasury, Accounts of the Government for the Year Ended 31 March, from 1997–98 to 2003–04, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1998–2004.

Multi-node development

The rapid growth of the population after the war had exceeded the capacity of the core urban districts. The first generation new towns planned in the 1960s were a great success. In the late 1970s, the Hong Kong government further developed the New Territories to plan for the second generation new towns, including Yuen Long, Fanling/Sheung Shui and Tai Po, to expand the scope of the city to the New Territories north. The government conducted large-scale reclamation or land development near the rural settlements of the New Territories inhabitants to build public housing and ancillary facilities, to carry out railway modernisation projects and to build Tolo Highway, shortening the distance between the New Territories and the central urban areas. With a well-connected transportation system throughout Hong Kong, the new towns could not only provide public housing for the ever growing population, but also develop themselves as self-suf- ficient integrated communities, alleviating the burden of the core urban districts.

Table 5.20 An overview of vehicular tunnels constructed in 1986−1998

Name of tunnel	Construction years	Length × width (m)	No. of lanes	Construction cost (HK$100 million)
Eastern Harbour crossing	1986−1989	1,860 × 6.75	2 × 2	34
Shing Mun tunnel	1986−1990	2,600 × 6.75	2 × 2	7.95
tseung Kwan O tunnel	1986−1990	900 × 7.42	2 × 2	3.6
tate’s cairn tunnel	1988−1991	3,900 × 7.75	2 × 2	21.5
Western Harbour crossing	1993−1997	2,000 × 11	3 × 2	57
cheung tsing tunnel	1993−1997	1,650 × 11	3 × 2	8.6
tai Lam tunnel	1996−1998	3,800 × 11	3 × 2	63

Sources: A.J. Shephard, Hong Kong Departmental Report by the commissioner for transport for the period 1st December 1968 to 31st March 1970, Hong Kong, transport Department, 1970, p16; Highways Department internal data; Wen Wei Po, 28 April 1998; Hong Kong Economic Times, 6 April 2000; Ming Pao, 19 January 1978, 7 November 1990; Wah Kiu Yat Po, 3 August 1972; Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1978, p.130; New Hong Kong tunnel co. Ltd webpage, Eastern Harbour tunnel Annual Report 2004, http://www.easternharbourtunnel.com.hk/nhktc/chi/c-annual-report-2004.pdf; tate’s cairn tunnel co. Ltd webpage: http://www.tctc.com.hk/chi/tunnel_facts.html; Highways Department webpage: http://www. hyd.gov.hk/chi/major/airport/mw_b.htm.

Yuen Long

As early as the 1960s, the government had begun to resume land from Yuen Long villagers for building public housing estates. The oldest public housing estate in the district was Yuen Long Estate, whose first intake took place in 1967 with 5,967 residents. Between 2012 and 2015, there were two public housing estates in Yuen Long (excluding Tin Shui Wai), with a total of 19,300–26,000 residents. The planning of Yuen Long was based on the blueprint of the first gen- eration new towns. The design of public housing estates emphasised environ- mental protection and the provision of public space. The public housing estates in the district offered plentiful recreational facilities, open space, sports facilities and covered pedestrian walkways, as a result of which the residents found their everyday life convenient. Yuen Long used to be connected to the urban areas by the Castle Peak Road only. Since the gradual opening of Tuen Mun Highway in 1978, the traffic was improved. After over 30 years of development, the number of major main roads in Yuen Long has increased. In 1988, the Light Rail started to operate between Yuen Long and Tuen Mun; in 2003, the West Rail Line was opened, connecting the urban areas and Yuen Long.

Tai Po

Since 1976, the government had carried out several large-scale reclamation works, forming over 300 hectares of land for more comprehensive new town planning. The public housing estates in Tai Po were basically built on the reclaimed land. The oldest public housing estate is located around the Tai Po Old Market and along the Tolo Harbour. Given the plentiful space, the adja- cency to the sea and the proximity to nature compared with the urban areas,

urban residents were more willing to move to Tai Po. Tai Yuen Estate was the first public housing estate in Tai Po. The intake started in 1981 with 8,479 resi- dents. Between 2012 and 2015, there were six public housing estates altogether in Tai Po, with a total of 47,600 residents. Public housing takes up a large area, with an emphasis on green space. There are complexes and community facili- ties neighbouring the housing estates. Apart from opening up a vast area of the industrial estate to promote industrial development, there are also education and medical facilities, and recreational facilities like the Waterfront Park and cycling tracks. The environment of the community is graceful.

Sheung Shui/Fanling

Located in the north-east of the New Territories, the North District is divided into four: Sheung Shui, Fanling, Sha Tau Kok and Ta Kwu Ling, collectively known as ‘Sheung Fan Sha Ta’. The public housing estates are mainly clustered around areas close to Sheung Shui and Fanling stations, which are relatively distant from Shek Wu Hui in Sheung Shui and Luen Wo Hui in Fanling, where the indigenous inhabitants live. As a second generation new town, the North District was more systematically planned than the first generation new towns. The concept of ‘bal- anced development’ was introduced to allocate public and private housing, and home ownership and rental in ratios. Since Sheung Shui and Fanling were remote from the urban areas, attention had been paid to the development of the transpor- tation network. The electrification of the railway and the opening up of highways were conducive to solving the cross-district traffic problems. Choi Yuen Estate was the first public housing estate in Sheung Shui, whose first intake took place in 1982 with 14,036 residents. Between 2012 and 2015, there were ten public housing estates altogether in Sheung Shui/Fanling, with a total of 65,100 resi- dents. The housing estates are self-sufficient, and do not rely on external travel for everyday life. There are wet markets, shopping centres and shops in the housing estates; residents can address their basic daily needs within the district.

Between the 1980s and 1990s, the third generation new towns such as Tung Chung, Tseung Kwan O and Tin Shui Wai emerged. The opening up of Tung Chung was to tie in with the development of the new airport. A large amount of public housing was built in Tseung Kwan O and Tin Shui Wai to solve the housing problems of the grassroots. Since the development time of the third generation new towns was relatively short, their planning and facilities were not as good as those in the first and second generation new towns. Hospitals and community facilities have yet to be developed in these districts.

Tseung Kwan O

Tseung Kwan O is located in Sai Kung. In the first phase of the reclamation project in the early 1980s, Po Lam, Tsui Lam and King Lam Estates were built; in the early 1990s, the second phase of development in Hang Hau and Tseung Kwan O town centre had started; the third and current phase of the Tiu King Ling cottage area demolition, which started in the late 1990s, is still under

development. The initial intake of the oldest public housing estates in Tseung Kwan O, which are Po Lam and Tsui Lam Estates, took place in 1989 with 23,216 residents. By 2015, there were nine public housing estates altogether, with a total of 85,500 residents. Given the relatively long distance from the urban areas, the government had to construct the transport facilities to connect the district to the urban areas. Tseung Kwan O Tunnel and the MTR Tseung Kwan O line were completed respectively. To cater for the problem of an ageing population, public housing for the care of the elderly was introduced for the first time; more individual small units were set up, and barrier-free facilities were introduced for the convenience of the disabled. (See Figure 5.7.)

Tung Chung

Located on the northern coast of Lantau Island, Tung Chung is also a new town built on an outlying island. Developing a new town on northern Lantau was part of the Airport Core Programme project in the 1990s. The opening of the airport provided tens of thousands of job opportunities, while the Tung Chung new town had also provided a large labour force to the airport. A number of public and private housing estates have been completed in Tung Chung in the last 20 years. To coordinate with the planning of the Chek Lap Kok International Airport, the oldest public housing estate in the area is Fu Tung Estate. There were only 5,000 residents in its first intake in 1997. By 2015, there were two public housing estates in Tung Chung, with a total of 46,700 residents. Built with the extensive use of prefabricated components, the harmony block housing estates paid consider- able attention to the spatial layout of the living environment and environmental protection. There is a lot of greenery in the housing estates that is managed pro- fessionally, with a view to improving the residents’ quality of life. Other public facilities such as a swimming pool, library and sports ground have been built in the neighbourhood of the housing estates in the past few years. (See Figure 5.8.)

Tin Shui Wai

Tin Shui Wai is located between Tuen Mun and Yuen Long adjacent to Ping Shan in the north-western New Territories. In 1992, the total population in Yuen Long town, Long Ping and the rural areas was around 230,000. The area of the entire Tin Shui Wai development plan was about 448 hectares (5 km2), and the plan was carried out in two phases. Phase 1 focused on the 220 hec- tares of land in the south, which included three public housing estates, two home ownership schemes and one region for private housing, with a planned population of 140,000 people; 260 hectares of land were developed in Phase 2, which was reserved for the expansion plan. The oldest public housing estate in Tin Shui Wai new town is Tin Yiu Estate, with 14,000 residents upon its first intake in 1992. By 2015, there were 13 public housing estates altogether in Tin Shui Wai, with a total of 174,000 residents. The buildings are harmony blocks, allowing the residents of different wings to enjoy different scenes and sunshine. As for community facilities, apart from basketball courts, small football courts

Figure 5.7 Outline concepts for acceleration of housing development at Tseung Kwan

Figure 5.8 Outline concepts for acceleration of housing development at Tung Chung and Tai Ho, North Lantau

and children’s playgrounds, there are community centres, car parks, shopping centres, recreational parks and gardens. The transportation in Tin Shui Wai is rail-based, relying on the MTR system – the Light Rail and the West Rail Line.

Disputes on the use of land in the New Territories

According to the Qing Code, inherited land (yongyetian) owned by indigenous inhabitants in the New Territories may be passed on to their offspring by way of succession. No designation for agricultural, residential or indeed any particu- lar use was made for such land.180 On 9 June 1898, China and Britain signed the Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory, which said: ‘It is further under- stood that there will be no expropriation or expulsion of the inhabitants of the district included within the extension, and that if land is required for public offices, fortifications, or the like official purposes, it shall be bought at a fair price.’181 After the Hong Kong government took over the New Territories in 1898, Governor Blake issued a proclamation in 1900: the indigenous residents’ commercial and landed interests would be safeguarded, and their usage and good customs would not in any way be interfered with.182 From 1899 to 1903, the colonial government measured and registered land in the New Territories. In 1905, Block Crown Leases were issued in exchange for the ‘red deeds’ and ‘white deeds’ previously issued by the Qing government to inhabitants of the New Territories. In these Block Crown Leases, inhabitants were required to register the use of the land, for example for residential use or agricultural use. Subsequently, the government would restrict the landowner’s use of the land on this basis. In order to build houses on agri- cultural land, one would have to apply to the government183 and pay a premium for the difference in value of the land. This was very different from the inherited land known to indigenous inhabitants. Before the return of sovereignty to China in 1997, indigenous inhabitants were very dissatisfied with the colonial government’s policy for handling land in the New Territories, and looked forward to a renewed affirmation of their rights in land by the HKSAR government. After the handover, while the HKSAR government refused to accept the previous unequal treaties, the government also found it hard to dismiss the past land policy entirely. This is why, to this day, issues like the change of use of agricultural land in the New Territories, and compensation for the resumption of New Territories land by the government for public purposes, remain the most challenging facing development of the area.

The problem of building houses on agricultural land

The colonial government required the New Territories land title owners to use their land according to the use declared on the Block Crown Lease. In 1950, if

180 Xinjie xiangyiju baogao (Report of the New Territories Heung Yee Kuk), Hong Kong, p.193.

181 The Convention Between Great Britain and China Respecting an Extension of Hong Kong Territory, London, Harrison and Sons, 1898.

182 Xinjie xiangyiju baogao (Report of the New Territories Heung Yee Kuk), Hong Kong, p.193.

183 Land Registry Order/Copy Separator, Doc. No. SD3L, Block Crown Lease, 1905, pp.2–3.

the New Territories inhabitants built houses on their agricultural land, they had to submit to the government a plan drawn by a surveyor. As required by the gov- ernment, the area of village houses should not be larger than 700 square feet and taller than 25 feet. Indigenous inhabitants had to pay a land premium if they built houses on agricultural land. In 1955, the District Offices of the New Territories announced that 20–30 cents were to be paid per square foot as the premium for concrete-built houses. Between 1954 and 1957, the ratio for exchanging agricul- tural land to residential land was 3 square feet to 1 square foot; no land premium was required if the land exchanger did not build concrete houses. Between 1957 and 1959, the agricultural land to residential land exchange ratio was increased to 5 square feet to 1 square foot, while no land premium was required. Between 1959 and 1963, the ratio was changed to 5 square feet to 2 square feet, but land exchangers had to pay 27.5 Hong Kong dollars per square foot to the govern- ment. In 1964, the exchange ratio was still at 5:2, but the premium per square foot was raised to 60–100 Hong Kong dollars,184 while the government only paid land title owners a dollar and a few tens of cents if the land in the New Territories was resumed for public purposes.

In 1964, the government announced a relaxation of the limit of the area of village houses to 1,000 square feet, while the land premium per square foot remained unchanged; the requirement for surveyor-drawn plans was removed. It was permitted to build two-storey concrete houses in the New Territories, with one-third of the upper floor of these houses left unroofed. In the late 1960s, the New Territories Heung Yee Kuk requested the government to amend the Crown Lands Resumption Ordinance promulgated in 1900 to relax the use requirements for land in the New Territories, reduce the compensation for land exchange, allow payment of the land premium by instalments and allow inhabit- ants to exchange the resumed land for commercial, residential or industrial land use.185

On 22 April 1971, the Heung Yee Kuk organised the New Territories Heung Yee Kuk Special Committee on Striving for Reasonable Rights and Interests for Residents, which reasoned with the New Territories District Magistrate Denis Campbell Bray. The indigenous inhabitants protested that the land resumption policy did not take into account the potential value of the land, which was differ- ent from how land was handled in Britain and was unfair to the New Territories indigenous inhabitants. They requested the government to consider not only the potential value but also the benefits that could be generated at the time of land resumption. In April 1972, the New Territories inhabitants protested; apart from the request for relaxation of restrictions on building village houses, and compensation for land resumption and exchange, the Heung Yee Kuk

184 Xue Fengxuan and Kuang Zhiwen, comps and eds, Xinjie xiangyiju shi: You zujidi dao yiguoliangzhi (History of the New Territories Heung Yee Kuk: From Leased Territory to One Country, Two Systems), Hong Kong, Joint Publishing (HK) Co.; Advanced Institute for Contemporary China Studies of the Hong Kong Baptist University, 2011, pp.201–202.

185 Liu Chong, ed., Xinjiae zhuanbian de niandai (An Era of Change in the New Territories), Hong Kong, Xinjie zhanwang she, 1972, p.40.

requested the government to allow landowners to change the land use from that in the blueprint.186 The government made concessions based on the requests and implemented the New Territories Small House [known as male house] Policy on 1 December 1972, stipulating that male indigenous inhabitants in the New Territories would be allowed to build a Small House with roofed-over area no bigger than 700 square feet and no taller than 29 feet, and no land premium should be paid to the government.187

Compensation issues on land resumed by the government

Indigenous inhabitants wished to decide the direction of land development themselves, and thus requested the government to allow them to change the use of the land. However, the government had to resume a large amount of land in the New Territories for public purposes as a result of new town develop- ment. Both parties thus wished to take the leading role in land development. In the 1960s, the disputes between both parties turned tense, as the government wanted to develop new towns in the New Territories. Before 1960, the gov- ernment would provide cash compensation to landowners if private land was resumed for public purposes.188 In the mid-1960s, to reduce the expenditure on land resumption in New Territories, the government replaced cash compensa- tion with the issue of land exchange entitlements between 1960 and 1983 as the authority resumed land in the New Territories: there were two types of land exchange entitlements, Letter A and Letter B, issued to the landowners whose land was resumed in the New Territories.189 Letter A holders were entitled to exchange 1 square foot of residential land for 1 square foot of building land, while Letter B holders were entitled to exchange 5 square feet of agricultural land for 2 square feet of building land. The value of the land resumed would be credited with reference to the market value at the time of land resumption.190

Between the 1970s and 1980s, property developers in Hong Kong spotted the rising trend in land prices in the New Territories, and thus hired real estate brokers with good interpersonal networks in the New Territories to actively purchase the land exchange entitlements. In the mid-1970s, there were about 36 million square feet of the land exchange entitlements yet to be redeemed, which were mainly owned by the leading property developers such as Sun Hung Kai Properties, Henderson Land Development, Nam Fung Development, and Chinachem Group in Hong Kong. Since the comprehensive planning of new towns required a lot of public land, the amount of land exchange entitlements redeemable for private development was thus reduced; the amount of land in

186 South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, 3 March 1972.

187 Xinjie xiangyiju baogao (Report of the New Territories Heung Yee Kuk), Hong Kong, p.193.

188 Xinjie xiangyiju baogao (Report of the New Territories Heung Yee Kuk), Hong Kong, p.193.

189 Legco Panel on Planning, Lands and Works, ‘New Territories Land Exchange Entitlements (Redemption) Bill’, 1996, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr95-96/chinese/panels/plw/papers/pl2506-6.htm#1.

190 Legco Panel on Planning, Lands and Works, ‘New Territories Land Exchange Entitlements (Redemption) Bill’, 1996, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr95-96/chinese/panels/plw/papers/pl2506-6.htm#1.

the New Territories for selling in open auction was even smaller. Property devel- opers had the advantage because of their well-stocked land exchange entitle- ments in hand.

Since the government formulated the policy on acquiring land through land exchange entitlements, the New Territories District Office prioritised the exchange for land of substantial area with land exchange entitlements. Indigenous inhabitants who held a small amount of land exchange entitle- ments had little chance of successful land exchange. They found their interests neglected by the government, and thus opposed the government’s policy of resuming land by land exchange entitlements.191 Land exchange entitlement holders could decide the land use and time of exchange to stay close to the market trend. The higher the land price, the more the profit yielded from land exchange entitlements. Although some agricultural land might belong to the ‘Agriculture’ zone under the statutory outline zoning plan with no development value, land exchange entitlement holders could apply for rezoning192 to change the agricultural land to residential or other purposes. Land premiums were only to be paid to the government for a change in land use. The successive increase in land value in the New Territories made the government bear an increas- ingly heavy burden on land supply. Therefore, the government stopped issuing land exchange entitlements in March 1983. In the early 1980s, the government allowed property developers to replace cash with land exchange entitlements when bidding for Crown land under public offer, and for payment of the land premium in deed amendment. In the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984, the Chinese and British governments agreed to solve the problems of all unre- deemed land exchange entitlements before June 1997; the Hong Kong govern- ment had to repurchase the unredeemed land exchange entitlements as soon as possible.

Indigenous inhabitants striving for interests in land

Indigenous inhabitants considered the compensation for land resumption provided by the government to be too low, and the quantity of land exchange entitlements held by individuals to be too small to compete with property developers. The land premium for changing land use was very high, while the indigenous inhabitants lacked capital for this purpose. Since 1971, the govern- ment had reviewed the land premium to be paid in exchange for land exchange entitlements twice a year. However, the land value declared upon the issue of land exchange entitlements was not reviewed, and the government even refused to make reference to the land prices of neighbouring districts.193 Indigenous

191 Liu Runhe, Xinjie jianshi (A Brief History of the New Territories), Hong Kong, Joint Publishing (HK) Co., 1999, p.87.

192 Alice Poon, Land and the Ruling Class in Hong Kong, translated by Yan Shi-min, Hong Kong, Enrich Professional Publishing; Hong Kong Economic Journal Co., 2010, p.83.

193 Xinjie xiangyiju gongbao (Bulletin of the New Territories Heung Yee Kuk), Volume 7, Hong Kong, New Territories Heung Yee Kuk, September 1975, p.2.

inhabitants even thought that the government was delaying the compensation for land resumption.194

In February 1974, the Heung Yee Kuk appealed to Hong Kong Governor MacLehose about the discontent of indigenous inhabitants on the govern- ment’s land policies, stating their position that land exchange entitlements could not safeguard the interests of the inhabitants, and requesting cash compensa- tion instead of land exchange entitlements. In September 1975, the govern- ment agreed to replace land exchange entitlements with cash payments for land resumption. Indigenous inhabitants requested that the government provide more land for land exchange entitlement holders to exchange for so as to reduce the waiting time. They also urged the government not to focus only on the exchange of land of substantial area, but to provide more land of small areas for small landowners to apply for, but the government did not change its method of land resumption and compensation calculation.195

In March 1977, the Heung Yee Kuk spent 120,000 Hong Kong dollars to hire a barrister to compose the Common Submission, pointing out the reasons why the land policies of the New Territories were unfair, and describing to the British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Labour Party members and others the constraints inhabitants had in using land in the New Territories.196

Indigenous inhabitants pointed out in the Common Submission how unfairly the government was handling the New Territories land policies. The colonial government forbade any landowners who had acquired their land before the signing of the Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory to enjoy their entitled rights, although inherited landowners should be able to use their land freely; the government even required indigenous inhabitants to pay a huge amount of land premium when they changed the restricted terms. In 1900, when Hong Kong Governor Blake issued the Advance Notice, he promised to allow villagers to freely use their land. The government-issued Block Crown Lease lacked sufficient legal basis: the deed was expressed in the form of a Crown lease with the government as the approver, but the grantee column on the Crown lease was never signed.197 The government authority concerned had not for- mulated and passed any legislation to make the terms concerned valid, while Article 17 of the New Territories (Land Court) Ordinance did not state that the

194 Xinjie xiangyiju, Xinjie xiangyiju nianjian, dishijiujie, 1970–1972 (Yearbook of the New Territories Heung Yee Kuk, 19th Term, 1970–1972), Hong Kong, Xinjie xiangyiju, 1972, pp.6–7.

195 Xue Fengxuan and Kuang Zhiwen, comps and eds, Xinjie xiangyiju shi: You zujidi dao yiguoliangzhi (History of the New Territories Heung Yee Kuk: From Leased Territory to One Country, Two Systems), Hong Kong, Joint Publishing (HK) Co.; Advanced Institute for Contemporary China Studies of the Hong Kong Baptist University, 2011, p.206.

196 New Territories Heung Yee Kuk, Xianggang zhimingdi zhengzhi xia de Xinjie shehui (The Society of the New Territories under Hong Kong’s Colonial Political System), Hong Kong, New Territories Heung Yee Kuk, 1977, p.8.

197 Xue Fengxuan and Kuang Zhiwen, comps and eds, Xinjie xiangyiju shi: You zujidi dao yiguoliangzhi (History of the New Territories Heung Yee Kuk: From Leased Territory to One Country, Two Systems), Hong Kong, Joint Publishing (HK) Co.; Advanced Institute for Contemporary China Studies of the Hong Kong Baptist University, 2011, p.210.

government-issued Crown lease was bounded by the deed unilaterally devel- oped by the government.198

The Common Submission pointed out that the land use stated on the Block Crown Lease was only a description of the land use at that time, but not a record of what the land on the lease was used for. Villagers filled out the forms to provide information for facilitating the government survey without realising that the declared information would determine the use of the land they owned. The fourth column on the Crown lease was titled ‘Description of Lot’ and did not mention post-lease land use.199 The public purposes stated in the Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory referred to ‘public offices, fortifications or the like official purposes’, and both parties had no plan to carry out industrial or new town development when they signed the Convention. Therefore, the ‘public offices, fortifications or the like official purposes’ were just general governmen- tal or defence purposes.200 The government forcibly resumed land from indig- enous inhabitants for purposes not stated in the Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory. The government did not offer reasonable compensation as opposed to the ‘fair price’ stated in the Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory. The government violated the stipulation of buying land ‘at a fair price’ in the Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory. In Clause C of Article 12 of the Crown Lands Resumption Ordinance formulated in 1900, the potential value of land was excluded, but it was stated in Clause D that land would be resumed at market price; these two statements were contradictory and a violation of principles. The government only considered the land resumed as agricultural land and calculated the rent as the basis of compensation without taking into account the geographical location of the land and the value of non- agricultural land.201

The government did not respond to the accusations in the Common Submission, but reiterated the provisions in section 8 of the New Territories Ordinance: ‘All land in the New Territories is hereby declared to be the property of the Crown from 23 July 1900. Therefore, the value of land shall be the value obtained in official assessment and must depend on official standards.’ In 1972, the government reiterated that the estimated value of the resumed land would not be based only on the market price, and also would not be based on the

198 Xue Fengxuan and Kuang Zhiwen, comps and eds, Xinjie xiangyiju shi: You zujidi dao yiguoliangzhi (History of the New Territories Heung Yee Kuk: From Leased Territory to One Country, Two Systems), Hong Kong, Joint Publishing (HK) Co.; Advanced Institute for Contemporary China Studies of the Hong Kong Baptist University, 2011, p.210.

199 New Territories Heung Yee Kuk, Xianggang zhimingdi zhengzhi xia de Xinjie shehui (The Society of the New Territories under Hong Kong’s Colonial Political System), Hong Kong, New Territories Heung Yee Kuk, 1977, p.9.

200 New Territories Heung Yee Kuk, Xianggang zhimingdi zhengzhi xia de Xinjie shehui (The Society of the New Territories under Hong Kong’s Colonial Political System), Hong Kong, New Territories Heung Yee Kuk, 1977, pp.10–11.

201 New Territories Heung Yee Kuk, Xianggang zhimingdi zhengzhi xia de Xinjie shehui (The Society of the New Territories under Hong Kong’s Colonial Political System), Hong Kong, New Territories Heung Yee Kuk, 1977, p.12.

‘potential benefits of land’.202 The resumed land price determined by the gov- ernment was based on three principles: transaction cases in neighbouring areas recorded by the District Office, Crown rent in terms of grains, and information on public land auctions.

In September 1977, District Magistrate of the New Territories David Akers- Jones believed that the Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory, Block Crown Leases and the promises the government had made to indigenous inhabitants since 1898 hindered the government in resuming a large amount of private land in the New Territories for the new town development plan. It would also be difficult for the government to realise the land exchange promise agreed on the land exchange entitlements in the short term. Even if the govern- ment could interpret the validity of the Crown Lands Resumption Ordinance in a way that could comply with its authority, the government and Heung Yee Kuk would still argue over how to determine land prices. To placate indigenous inhabitants, it was suggested the Executive Council give up the land exchange entitlement policy. In order to solve the problem of land exchange entitlements and compensation for land resumption, it was suggested that the government should set up a seven-member committee formed by a president, two govern- ment officials, two unofficial members of the Legislative Council and two rep- resentatives from the New Territories, one of whom should be from the Heung Yee Kuk, to discuss the issues of land exchange entitlements.203

The suggestions were passed in the Executive Council. In November 1977, a senior unofficial member of the Legislative Council and Chairman of Bank of East Asia Kan Yuet-keung was appointed to lead the Working Group on New Territories Urban Land Acquisition to study land issues in the New Territories. On 20 April 1978, the Working Group submitted a report to the government, stating that there would not be enough land at present and in the future to fulfil all demands in both Letter A and Letter B within a reasonable time.204 Since the current land exchange entitlement policy could not meet practical needs, the government should review its land compensation policy.205

The suggestions, which included compensation of 27 Hong Kong dollars per square foot and an ex gratia payment of 55 Hong Kong dollars per square foot, were implemented in April 1978; the compensation amount was to be adjusted every half-year. Half land compensation and half land exchange entitlement would also be accepted.206 The government then decided to review the compen- sation amount for the first time on 1 October 1978, raising the compensation for agricultural land to 39 Hong Kong dollars per square foot, and the ex gratia

202 Liu Runhe, Xinjie jianshi (A Brief History of the New Territories), Hong Kong, Joint Publishing (HK) Co., 1999, p.97.

203 FCO40/1011, ‘The “Land Problem” in the New Territories’, 24 August 1977, p.3.

204 Report of the Working Group on New Territories Urban Land Acquisitions, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1978.

205 Report of the Working Group on New Territories Urban Land Acquisitions, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1978.

206 South China Morning Post, 15 July 1977.

compensation for residential land to 79 Hong Kong dollars, an increase of over 40 per cent.207

In 1983, the Hong Kong government stopped issuing Letter A and Letter B land exchange entitlements, as it was increasingly difficult to realise a promise that was equal to 138 hectares of building land. From 1 April 1984, holders of Letter A and Letter B could exchange them for cash based on the monetised value table amended and published in the Government Gazette twice-yearly. The mentioned monetised value was determined with reference to the changes in property prices in the New Territories.208 In 1997, the government formulated the New Territories Land Exchange Entitlements (Redemption) Ordinance, stating that thereafter all the unredeemed land exchange entitlements could only be redeemed for cash instead of land.209 Therefore, there were no transactions of land exchange entitlements in the market any more.

Change of land use litigation

The Melhado Investment Ltd case In 1981, Melhado Investment Ltd under Lau Wong-fat, chairman of the Heung Yee Kuk, rented land in So Kwun Wat for storing construction materials on a two-year short-term contract. The government stated that Melhado Investment Ltd had changed the land use stipulated in the Block Crown Lease, triggering the company to level a charge against the government in the High Court.

In July 1982, the High Court stated that the lot was described as ‘paddy fields’, ‘wasteland’, ‘burial grounds’ and ‘upland fields’ in the Block Crown Lease and that Melhado Investment Ltd did not violate any regulations by placing construction materials on wasteland. The company also did not put any materi- als on the burial grounds. As for Melhado Investment Ltd storing construction materials on agricultural land, the judge believed that the company had only signed a two-year contract and had no plan to build any houses there, while the definition of changing land use involved a certain duration, thus deciding in favour of the company.210

The government refused to accept the verdict and filed an appeal, stating that the Block Crown Lease had implied regulations on land use. The appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal in March 1983. The verdict from the Court of

207 South China Morning Post, 1 October 1978.

208 Legco Panel on Planning, Lands and Works, ‘New Territories Land Exchange Entitlements (Redemption) Bill’, 1996, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr95-96/chinese/panels/plw/papers/pl2506-6.htm#1.

209 ‘New Territories Land Exchange Entitlements (Redemption) Bill’, http://www.legislation.gov.hk/ blis_pdf.nsf/CurAllChinDoc/1D7265CFBB65ADE8482575EF000F6F87/$FILE/CAP_495_c_b5.pdf.

210 HKRS597-1-42, ‘District Office Yuen Long Land Conference Notes’, 6 September 1979 – 7 July 1980; HKRS597-1-43, ‘District Office Yuen Long Land Conference Notes’, 28 July 1980 – 28 April 1981; HKRS597- 1-44, ‘District Land Conference, Yuen Long’, 1 June 1981 – 4 March 1982; HKRS597-1-45, ‘District Land Conference, Yuen Long’, 30 March 1982 – 8 December 1982; HKRS597-1-46, ‘District Land Conference, Yuen Long’, 8 December 1982 –25 July 1983; HKRS597-1-47, ‘District Land Conference, Yuen Long’, 8 August 1983 – 26 March 1984; ‘Attorney General v. Melhado Investment Ltd.’, Hong Kong Law Reports 1983, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1983, p.327.

Appeal was: the land use stated in the appendix of the Block Crown Lease served only as a record of the land use at the moment instead of restricting the land use: ‘the land use stated in the Crown Lease was of descriptive nature but not the implied deed category claimed in the dispute’. The court adjudicated that only industries producing noise and odour, as well as the offensive trades, could not be in operation on the land regulated by a Block Crown Lease, and that unper- mitted buildings and structures should not be constructed on the land in ques- tion. After the issue of the verdict, multiple unexploited areas of agricultural land in the New Territories were changed to different land uses such as open storage, vehicle abandonment, vehicle repair workshops, container depots and car parks to meet market demand.211

The Winfat case From 1974 to 1976, Winfat Enterprises (Hong Kong) Limited bought land in Tuen Mun. The lots were all stated as agricultural land in their Block Crown Lease. Winfat Enterprises (Hong Kong) Limited planned to develop the lots into a high-class residential area in 1977 and submitted plans to the District Magistrate. The District Magistrate rejected the application, quoting insufficient infrastructure in the area as the reason. The company made another application in 1978 and was declined again on the grounds that other government departments could not provide sufficient facilities. The company made a third application and was rejected by the government for the third time in July 1980, the reason being that ‘the government has no plan to build houses in the district and that the government considers the land should be used for agricultural purposes’. The company’s application in January 1981 was declined for the same reason.

After four failed applications, the company received a short-term waiver to lease the land to another company for running a car park. That company started operating there soon after land formation. The lease lasted for three years. In October the same year, the government suddenly announced the resumption of the lots for constructing temporary housing and that it would provide 15,299,620 Hong Kong dollars as an ex gratia payment on condition that the lots should be empty land upon handover to the government. Winfat Enterprises (Hong Kong) Limited thought that it was contradictory for the government to quote insufficient infrastructure and facilities as the reason to deter the development of low-density residential housing in the area while at the same time planning to build a temporary housing area which could accommodate a large population. The government also intentionally announced it would resume the land after the company had leased out the lots, rendering the company unable to receive the ex gratia payment. The company levelled a charge against the government, claiming that the Crown Lands Resumption Ordinance was unfair to title owners and requesting more compensation.212

211 Legislative Council Panel on Planning, Lands and Works, Planning for Open Storage and Port Back-up Uses in the Rural New Territories, April 2007, p.1, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/plw/ papers/plw0424cb1-1410-5-e.pdf.

212 ‘Winfat Enterprises (HK) Co. Ltd. v. Attorney General’, Hong Kong Law Reports 1983, Hong Kong, Government Printer, pp.213–215.

From the High Court’s verdict on the Winfat case, there was a tribunal ‘Tenth Statement’ agreed by the Privy Council to affirm the verdict of the Winfat case, that the land could be used for warehouses or a car park before resumption without the need to seek approval from the government.213

On the closing day of the Winfat case, the government spokesperson stated that a lot of agricultural lands in the New Territories would apply to change their land use if the government lost the case. Therefore, the government ‘would consider whether to use legislation to maintain how the government has been controlling land use in the New Territories’. The spokesperson also stated that there were town planning ordinances in most countries and that it would be ‘a feasible measure’.214

This discussion of the above disputes on changing land use in the New Territories has explained the difficulty in opening up the New Territories. The government could not afford the time and investment capital needed to resume land for development. Apart from the opposition from indigenous inhabitants, the involvement of property developers had to be taken into account. The results of the appeal forced the government to amend the Town Planning Ordinance to provide a legal basis for New Territories planning in the future.

Amending the Town Planning Ordinance

In 1987, the government conducted a comprehensive review of the Town Planning Ordinance. In early 1988, the government had established an advisory committee to facilitate the review, and had decided to redraft the statute on town planning using the Town Planning Ordinance of 1939 as a blueprint. In June 1990, the gov- ernment published the Consultative Document on Interim Amendments to the Town Planning Ordinance, and began a six-month public consultation from July 1990. The Document listed out controversial issues at the time, such as the Town Planning Ordinance’s lack of power over areas outside urban districts. There was an urgency to enact laws that govern land in the New Territories so as to regulate private development outside of the new towns.215 Without strengthened govern- ing measures, it was difficult to achieve planning goals.216 The statute itself did not confer the Town Planning Board with such power. Moreover, the Town Planning Board itself already had a heavy workload. Should its work extend to the rural areas in the New Territories, the Town Planning Board would need to hand over part of its work to the committees under it or the Director of Planning to ensure effi- ciency.217 The Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance of 1991, which was passed

213 Roger Nissim, Land Administration and Practice in Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 2012, p.20.

214 Hong Kong Standard, 30 April 1983.

215 Planning Department, Consultative Document: Interim Amendments to the Town Planning Ordinance, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1990, p.2.

216 Planning Department, Consultative Document: Interim Amendments to the Town Planning Ordinance, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1990, p.2.

217 Planning Department, Consultative Document: Interim Amendments to the Town Planning Ordinance, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1990, p.2.

on 23 January 1991, gave the Town Planning Board power to make plans and des- ignate certain areas as ‘development permission areas’. Unless otherwise specified or provided in the plans, any development within these areas would have to apply for permission in accordance with section 16 of the Town Planning Ordinance.218 According to section 20(5) of the ordinance, a ‘development permission area’ plan would be valid for three years, and its validity might be extended by one year with the Governor’s permission. The planning of land uses included village-type development, agricultural or other designated rural uses, areas or regions of open storage, country park, coastal protection area, Site of Special Scientific Interest, green belt or other specified uses for promoting environmental conservation or protection.219 The ordinance contained enforcement provisions against unauthor- ised developments within a development permission area,220 which aimed to stop incompatible and inappropriate land uses in rural areas in the New Territories from spreading. Section 22 of the ordinance provided that the Director of Planning might, without warrant or notice but at a reasonable time, and with the consent of the occupier or person in charge of the premises, enter land and any premises on it for the purposes of posting a notice and verifying an unauthorised development. Where a magistrate was satisfied that there was unauthorised development, the magistrate might issue a warrant authorising entry into such land or premises, and the relevant individuals of such land or premises must offer assistance.221 The Director of Planning (the Planning Authority) was empowered by the ordinance to take enforcement action against unauthorised development.222

Before the amendment of the ordinance in 1991, areas for which the Town Planning Board had prepared outline zoning plans were mainly new towns, including Tsuen Wan, Kwai Chung, Tsing Yi, Sha Tin, Ma Wan, South Lantau Coast, Tai Po, Tuen Mun, Fanling, Sheung Shui, West Tsuen Wan, Yuen Long, Ma On Shan, Tseung Kwan O and Tin Shui Wai. After the 1991 amendment, the Governor gave directions on 10 March 1991 authorising the Town Planning Board to prepare 30 draft development permission area plans for areas that had been covered by interim development permission area plans previously (in 1990). The government had consulted the relevant district councils, rural com- mittees and village representatives on the preparation of these draft plans in April, May and June of 1991, and had subsequently conveyed such opinions to the Town Planning Board. The draft plans were gazetted on 12 July 1991 for the public’s inspection. These plans covered 14,300 hectares of rural land,223

218 Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Town Planning Board Annual Report 1991, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1992, p.14.

219 Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Town Planning Board Annual Report 1991, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1992, p.14.

220 Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Town Planning Board Annual Report 1991, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1992, p.14.

221 Ordinances of Hong Kong for the Year 1991, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1992, p.A28.

222 Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Town Planning Board Annual Report 1991, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1992, p.15.

223 Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Town Planning Board Annual Report 1991, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1992, p.28.

and some 30 areas: Kwun Yam Shan and Fa Sum Hang, Ho Chung, Pak Kong, Sha Kok Mei, Pak Sha Wan, Tseng Lan Shue, Shap Sze Heung, Fu Tei Au and Sha Ling, Ting Kok, Luk Keng and Wo Hang, Man Uk Pin, Lung Yeuk Tau and Kwan Tei South, Ping Che and Ta Kwu Ling, Kwu Tung North, Kwu Tung South, Ping Kong, Kau Lung Hang, San Tin, Ngau Tam Mei, Pat Heung, Lam Tsuen, Mai Po and Fairview Park, Nam Sang Wai, Kam Tin North, Kam Tin South, Shek Kong, Lau Fau Shan and Tsim Bei Tsui, Ha Tsuen, Tai Tong, and Sheung Pak Nai and Ha Pak Nai. Up to 2015, the Town Planning Board had exhibited 76 development permission area plans, most of which had since been replaced by outline zoning plans. (See Figures 5.9 and 5.10.)

Before the Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance 1991 was passed, the Town Planning Board’s jurisdiction only covered the current urban areas as well as regions that could be developed into urban areas.224 All of the government’s control over land uses in rural and village areas was effected through the conditions in Crown leases and the government’s administrative measures. According to the Block Crown Lease, any farmland owner might change the land’s use without obtaining the permission of others (the owner’s neighbours, the local village head and the Land Office), provided that the user did not carry out building works, employ offensive or noxious substances, or undertake illegal activities.225

After the amendment of the ordinance, new development permission area plans were made for rural areas in the New Territories, providing interim plan- ning control and development guidance for areas pending the preparation of outline zoning plans. Any development on land falling within the boundaries of these development permission area plans must first obtain permission from the Town Planning Board unless otherwise specified or provided in the plans. The land use zonings specified in development permission area plans were not as detailed as those in outline zoning plans, with many areas marked as ‘Unspecified Uses’.226 As the development permission area plans were only meant to be a form of interim control measure, they were valid for only three years, after which they would have to be replaced by outline zoning plans.227 This was the government’s provisional measure for exerting control over land use in the New Territories.

On 18 July 1991, the Town Planning Ordinance was again amended,228 to introduce an appeal mechanism. An Appeal Board was established, in place of petitions to the Governor in Council, to process appeals against decisions made by the Town Planning Board in relation to planning applications. Any person who was aggrieved by a decision on a review by the Appeal Board under section

224 Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Town Planning Board Annual Report 1991, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1992, p.28.

225 Hong Kong Hansard, Hong Kong Government, 31 October 1990, p.199.

226 Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Town Planning Board Annual Report 1994, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1995, p.18.

227 Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Town Planning Board Annual Report 1991, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1992, p.28.

228 Ordinances of Hong Kong for the Year 1991, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1992, pp.A745–A748.

Source: Hong Kong town planning Board, Town Planning Board Annual Report 1991, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1992, p.33.

Figure 5.9 Area covered by development permission area plans in the New Territories (1991)

Source: town planning Board, ‘coverage of OZps and DpA plans’, http://www.info.gov.hk/tpb/tc/list_of_plans/coverage_enlarge.html (accessed 4 December 2015).

Figure 5.10 Area covered by statutory plans in Hong Kong (2015)

17 might lodge, within 60 days after notification of the Board’s decision under section 17(6), a notice of appeal.

After this, no major amendment was made to the relevant statutes. In 1995, the fine for unauthorised developments was raised from 100,000 to 500,000 Hong Kong dollars on first offence and 1 million Hong Kong dollars on repeated offenc- es.229 In 2004, regulatory functions were enhanced by giving greater enforcement powers to the Director of Planning, who acts as the planning authority, allowing the Director of Planning to intensify enforcement actions. The time required to act on unauthorised developments was also reduced, as the Planning Department no longer had to wait for the planning application process to be completed before taking enforcement or prosecution actions. As a result, the number of unauthor- ised developments gradually fell, and the area of land used by unauthorised devel- opments also fell, from 185 hectares in 1995 to 125 hectares in 2006.230 In 2007, around 603 hectares of land was designated for open storage and port back-up use to address the demands of the industry. Of this, 372 hectares of land was located in the north-west of the New Territories (primarily in Ngau Tam Mei, Pat Heung, San Tin and Ha Tsuen), while the rest (231 hectares) was situated in the north- east of the New Territories (primarily in Ping Che and Ta Kwu Ling).231

The New Territories have a greater area than urban areas, possessing land resources that would allow the city to expand its borders. Before the handover, the indigenous residents had hoped that the HKSAR government would rein- state the rights of owners of New Territories land according to Qing law, includ- ing the freedom to decide on land use, and that, even if it were necessary to apply for a change in land use, there would not be a high additional premium. As New Territories land became commercialised, its price had been on the rise since the 1920s. The owners of such land were also no longer limited to indigenous resi- dents of the New Territories. Private developers with financial resources over time began to own large amounts of New Territories land by way of land exchange enti- tlements and found themselves becoming part of New Territories land use dis- putes, thus further complicating the issues regarding New Territories land.

Summary

Hong Kong’s planning at the end of the 1970s was at first a response to the implementation of the reform and opening-up policy in China, adjusting Hong Kong’s economic structure and transforming the post-war focus on develop- ment of manufacturing industry to the enhancement of entrepôt trade and financial activities. The planning and construction of the new airport by the

229 Ordinances of Hong Kong for the Year 1995, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1996, p.B1342.

230 Legislative Council Panel on Planning, Lands and Works, Planning for Open Storage and Port Back-up Uses in the Rural New Territories, April 2007, p.3, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/plw/ papers/plw0424cb1-1410-5-e.pdf.

231 Legislative Council Panel on Planning, Lands and Works, Planning for Open Storage and Port Back-up Uses in the Rural New Territories, April 2007, p.2, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/plw/ papers/plw0424cb1-1410-5-e.pdf.

296 · MAKING HONG KONG

government was aimed at improving port facilities to promote Hong Kong’s economic development through foreign trade. As Governor Wilson said, it was not a novelty that Hong Kong was affected by its external environment, nor was it something the people of Hong Kong could control.

At the beginning of the 1980s, China and Britain began talks on the return of Hong Kong’s sovereignty to China in 1997. When British hopes for the right to rule in exchange for sovereignty did not come to fruition, the British felt that the efforts they had expended in Hong Kong in the past had gone to waste. If the British could have no further role in what they had considered to be a com- mercial stronghold for Britain in the Far East region, why should they continue to invest in the long-term planning of Hong Kong? The colonial government thus promptly called off plans for building a new airport, opting instead for the expansion of Kai Tak Airport to address short-term needs. The government did indeed realise that the expanded airport would bring tremendous transportation and population pressure to Kowloon. However, it repeatedly refused to develop large-scale infrastructure, using financial deficiency as an excuse.

The democracy movement incidents in May and June of 1989 yet again plunged Hong Kong’s economy into a trough. Many believed that the government had used the Rose Garden Project to roll out large-scale works and regain the confi- dence of the people of Hong Kong as well as the world’s confidence in Hong Kong. This was because not only could the works create a lot of jobs and lower the unem- ployment rate among the lower classes, but the Airport Core Programme also required professional personnel, thus helping with retaining professional talent and alleviating the rapidly escalating wave of emigration, maybe even encouraging emigrants to return. Past experience had shown the government that rolling out large-scale works had been an effective solution when facing an economic crisis. Some also said that the government had had plans to reintroduce the new airport project since as early as October 1987, but that the timing just happened to coin- cide with the political events in China in May and June 1989.

One thing that could not be ignored was the issue of financing. The Airport Core Programme would involve huge expenditure, and the government had been considering how to use private investment to solve the shortage of funds so that, as with previous large-scale works, the government would be able to achieve its objective with minimum investment on its part. In November 1986, the government considered Western Harbour – Strategic Proposal for Lantau Island Development, a proposal submitted to the government by the three major consortiums, Hopewell, Cheung Kong and Hutchison Whampoa, which would mean accepting 25 billion Hong Kong dollars investment from the private sector. On 4 July 1991, the government announced that the planned expendi- ture for the Airport Core Programme would be 98.6 billion Hong Kong dollars, of which 54 billion Hong Kong dollars would come from the government.232 The government would further provide 17 billion Hong Kong dollars, while the

232 E.G. Pryor, Hong Kong’s Port and Airport Development Strategy: A Foundation for Growth, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1991, p.75.

Airport Authority would be responsible for 16.5 billion Hong Kong dollars, with only about 11 billion Hong Kong dollars’ worth of private investment. Not only did the government not accept the proposal of the three consortiums, but it was able to raise over 70 billion Hong Kong dollars in funds within a few years, dem- onstrating a surprisingly robust hidden prowess in arranging financing. From the discussion above, it can be seen that long-term planning required a large amount of funds, and the economic strength of the Hong Kong government at the end of the 1980s should not be underestimated. It also became apparent that, at the time, the British intended to leave a good impression of their colonial governing history in Hong Kong for the people of Hong Kong as well as the world. No matter what the intent of the British, it was Hong Kong’s people who benefited the most. It could be said that politics was what terminated the new airport programme, but it was also politics that gave the new airport programme new life.

With a sizeable transportation network, the city was able to expand in scale. Such an expansion in scale extended the city’s reach from its two cores to the New Territories, and one of the most difficult issues encountered in the process was the issue of land use in the New Territories. After almost a century of development, ownership of New Territories land had changed hands numer- ous times, from indigenous residents to the post-war immigrants, and from the clans to individuals and subsequently to private developers. From the building of Small Houses to private estates and the running of container yards, the issue not only was immensely complicated, but also proved to be the largest obstacle for the city’s long-term planning.

6

Transformation after the return to China (1997–2015)

We believe that in order to meet sustainability challenges, local governments need to re-define their roles by providing an enabling local environment, promoting ethical conduct, transparency and accountability in city administration, fighting corruption and encouraging participation of citizens in policy discussion, decision- making and implementation, and raising awareness of sustainable development through education, taking into account the national and local circumstances. We underscore a functioning legal system as an essential component of effective urban governance and as a solid foundation for ensuring citizen participation. (Hong Kong Declaration on Sustainable Development for Cities, 2004)

Hong Kong returned to China on 1 July 1997 after 155 years of British rule. The political ideas of ‘one country, two systems’ and ‘Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong’ are the governing ideal of the HKSAR Government. Should the long-term planning of the city be adapted to the overall development of China? For urban planning at a historical turning point, what should we change and what should we keep? And what were the principles and development charac- teristics of Hong Kong’s urban planning before 1997? Those questions linger in the minds of Hong Kong people. Roger Bristow, a famous geographer, once asserted that Hong Kong did not have urban planning at all before the Second World War. Many experts believed that the idea of long-term urban planning for the city only started in the 1950s, mainly inspired by the preliminary report of Sir Patrick Abercrombie, a British town planner, in 1948. In the 1950s, the Hong Kong government started systematic field inspections and data collection in various regions. After the views of different departments were coordinated, urban development plans for ten years or more were drafted in line with popula- tion growth and economic development. Be it the Hong Kong Outline Plan in the 1960s or the ten-year Housing Programme and the preparation programme for the new international airport in the 1970s, they all aimed at catering to the needs of population and economic growth. Those plans, intended for a period of more than a decade, focused on the development of land, transportation, housing and other aspects. They were considered the key to the take-off and rapid growth of the city’s economy, featuring the principles and development characteristics of town planning in the territory.

Did the experience in urban planning continue to apply after the 1997

handover? Could planning programmes that were developed one or two decades earlier be implemented step by step? Should town planning be led by the government or driven by the people? Is it positive or negative to have a rapid pace of development? Could pre-war expedient policies keep up with social developments? These were the questions and challenges for the implementation of pre-established programmes in 1997.

Historical turning point

In the 1980s, China and the United Kingdom conducted negotiations on Hong Kong’s handover in 1997. On 19 December 1984, the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed, affirming that the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) would resume the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong with effect from 1 July 1997. The declaration set out, among other things, the basic policies of the PRC regarding Hong Kong. Under the principle of ‘one country, two systems’, the Chinese government ensure that the PRC’s socialist system and policies will not be practised in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) and that Hong Kong’s existing capitalist system and lifestyle will remain unchanged for 50 years. The declaration, however, did not stabilise the political situation in Hong Kong. Instead, it led to Sino-British disputes over Hong Kong’s political reform and the special administrative region’s fiscal reserves after the handover. The philosophy of basing urban planning purely on economic development or people’s livelihood was shaken by political disputes. After Hong Kong’s handover on 1 July 1997, the government of the HKSAR made no significant changes to the city’s direction of development for the sake of political stability.

Economic crisis and long-term housing planning

In the 1980s, the government had two major planning priorities: the Territorial Development Strategy (TDS) and the ten airport core projects. In 1982 the gov- ernment even divided the territory into different sub-regions: North West New Territories, North East New Territories, Tseung Kwan O–Sai Kung (renamed South East New Territories in 1985), Lantau Island (renamed South West New Territories in 1985) and the Urban Area (renamed the Metro Area in 1985). The Lands and Works Branch in 1988 stipulated comprehensive land use plans for the sub-regions in the New Territories. The TDS was revised in 1986 and 1988 after several rounds of public consultations. In 1988, the government published Metroplan: The Aims, which served as the blueprint for Hong Kong’s top ten infrastructure projects and guidelines for the city’s development in the 1990s. On 24 February 1998, the TDS was approved by the Executive Council and became the Territorial Development Strategy Review (TDSR), with further in-depth discussions on metropolitan development and new development area planning. (See Figure 6.1.)

In 1985 the government published Planning for Growth, which assessed the population distribution and employment potential in the five sub-regions by

Source: planning Department, Town Planning in Hong Kong: A Quick Reference, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1995, p.10.

Figure 6.1 Boundaries of the five sub-regions

Table 6.1 Assessment of population distribution and employment potential in the sub-regions

Sub-regions	Estimated population in 1996	Additional population capacity	Overall population capacity	Jobs (No. (%))
	(No. (%))	(No. (%))	(No. (%))
Metropolitan Area	4,055,600	1,341,800	5,397,400	2,426,200
	(66)	(41)	(57)	(75)
North West New	838,700	546,000	1,384,700	324,700
territories	(14)	(17)	(14)	(10)
North East New	1,022,500	554,800	1,577,300	394,700
territories	(16)	(17)	(17)	(12)
South West New	56,700	700,000	756,700	14,300
territories	(1)	(21)	(8)	(0.4)
South East New	206,200	142,000	348,200	75,600
territories	(3)	(4)	(4)	(2)
total	6,179,700	3,284,600	9,464,300	3,235,500
	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)

Source: Hong Kong Lands and Works Branch, Planning for Growth, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1985, pp.10, 19.

1996. According to the estimates, the full development of the sub-regions would provide about 4,400 hectares of new land to accommodate an additional popu- lation of 3.3 million. The planned population in the urban areas and new towns was estimated to be up to 9.5 million.1 (See Table 6.1.)

The figures in Table 6.1 show that the Metro Area remained the focus of development as in previous policies. The planned population in the Metro Area would account for 57 per cent of the total, which, despite a 9 per cent decrease from the initial plan of 66 per cent, would make the sub-region the most densely populated one in Hong Kong. Job opportunities available in the Metro Area would also account for more than 75 per cent of the total. The Metro Area was expected to maintain its leadership in the city’s development. Meanwhile, the figures in Table 6.1 also indicate an ongoing movement of population to the New Territories (especially South West New Territories).

Annual level of housing production

As the population was estimated to continue to increase after 1997, it became the government’s top priority to address the housing problem. After the handover in 1997, the first Chief Executive promptly put forward a long-term housing devel- opment policy in his Policy Address, announcing the construction of a minimum of 85,000 housing units on average per year in the following decade, including

1 Hong Kong Lands and Works Branch, Planning for Growth, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1985, pp.10, 19.

50,000 public housing units. At the same time, the Housing Authority introduced the Tenants Purchase Scheme to enable public rental housing tenants to purchase their own flats, with the aim of boosting economic stability and development with a stable housing supply. In 1998, the government published the White Paper on Long Term Housing Strategy, reaffirming that the production target of 85,000 housing units per annum would be one of its ‘top priorities’ in 1999–2000. The Financial Secretary subsequently set up the Steering Committee on Land Supply to assist the implementation of the housing target. The Committee developed a 13-year rolling programme for flat production, which was even longer than the ten-year Housing Programme launched by Governor Murray MacLehose. The Committee was expected to monitor housing production and land supply, to provide proposed infrastructure related to housing development, and to formu- late measures to monitor the planning of development areas.

In line with the expected housing production requirements of the Long Term Housing Strategy and to fulfil the Chief Executive’s commitment to building at least 85,000 housing units each year, the Planning Department conducted a large- scale integrated planning and development study in North West New Territories, North East New Territories, Hong Kong Island South/Lamma Island and other areas. Tin Shui Wai was one of the areas for which there were changes to the development blueprint. The area covered about 430 hectares, with a development zone of 220 hectares in the southern part to house 200,000 people, and about 210 hectares in the northern part. The Planning Department reserved about 70 hec- tares in Tin Shui Wai for residential housing development.2 According to the 1997 Tin Shui Wai Outline Zoning Plan (OZP), the area was originally intended to house 325,000 people. The Town Planning Board, however, amended the Tin Shui Wai OZP after the government set out the target of 85,000 housing units. The 1998 OZP indicated full-scale development for Tin Shui Wai and set a target population of 349,000. There were 150,000 people in Tin Shui Wai in 1999. The administration planned to spend 30.59 billion Hong Kong dollars on the development of Tin Shui Wai North in order to attract another 199,000 people.3 Unfortunately, before the government amended the development plans for various areas, the target of increasing the annual housing supply became unachievable owing to the Asian financial turmoil.

It all began on 2 July 1997 when Thailand adopted a floating exchange rate system, which led to a significant drop of 17 per cent in the value of the baht against the US dollar. The volatility of the Thai baht also made the Philippine peso, the Indonesian rupiah and the Malaysian ringgit vulnerable targets for international speculators. The financial crisis in South-east Asia quickly spread to Hong Kong. The local stock market plunged in October 1997.4 International

2 Hong Kong Planning Department, Planning Department Annual Report, Hong Kong, Planning Department, 1997, pp.36–37.

3 Tin Shui Wai/Yuen Long Development Programme, 1999/2000 edition, Hong Kong, North West New Territories Development Office, Territory Development Office, 2000, p.1.20.

4 Yuan Qiushi, comp. and ed., Xianggang huigui yilai dashiji, 1997–2002 (Chronology of Hong Kong since Its Return, 1997–2002), Hong Kong, Joint Publishing (HK) Co., 2003, p.37.

speculators attacked Hong Kong’s linked exchange rate system. By massive short-selling of the Hong Kong dollar on the currency, stock and futures markets, they forced the Hong Kong Monetary Authority to squeeze the money market and accordingly pushed up the interbank interest rates, waiting to see a drastic drop in the stock market. Then the speculators built up substantial short positions in the futures market, from which they benefited.5 With the inter- est rate surge caused by the currency crisis, property prices slumped by more than 30 per cent.6 The property market even started a six-year downward cycle and did not hit the bottom until the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2003. Compared with the base value of 100 in July 1997, the Centa- City Leading Index (CCL), which tracks second-hand property prices, dropped to nearly 30 in 2003, when there were more than 100,000 negative equity cases across the territory.

Before the recession in the property market, the Panel on Planning, Lands and Works (PLW Panel) and the Panel on Housing of the Legislative Council focused on ensuring sufficient land supply and steady long-term housing devel- opment so as to keep property prices affordable. After the property slump in 1997, the focus was changed to ensuring the stability of the property market. Some even argued that the government should reposition its policy to stabilise the property market.7

Public confidence in the property market continued to fall after the Asian financial crisis. In view of the additional pressure of the Home Ownership Scheme (HOS) on property sales, the government suspended the sale of HOS flats in September 2001. In November 2002, the government announced it would cease the production and sale of subsidised flats and drastically reduce its share in housing production. It would only continue to provide subsidised rental housing for low-income families and maintain the average waiting time for public rental housing (PRH) at three years. On 13 November 2002, the government even announced that it would stop all scheduled land auctions and suspend the Application List System until the end of 2003, in order to boost public confidence in the property market. In January 2004, the gov- ernment decided to resume the Application List System, which would serve as the only means of triggering new land auctions.8 Despite the preliminary pick-up in the property market in the same year, the government still main- tained a prudent housing policy and was in no hurry to resume the sale of HOS flats. It was not until 2007 that the Housing Authority resumed the sale of the approximately 16,000 remaining HOS flats in phases. Property prices

5 Chen Jingxiang, ed., Xianggang jinrong fengyun 40 zai (40 Years of Hong Kong Finance), Hong Kong, Hong Kong Economic Journal Co.; Enrich Publishing, 2013, p.190.

6 Alice Poon, Land and the Ruling Class in Hong Kong, translated by Yan Shi-min, Hong Kong, Enrich Publishing; Hong Kong Economic Journal Co., 2010, p.79.

7 Hong Kong Legislative Council, ‘Background Brief on Government’s Land Supply Strategy with Particular Reference to the Application List System’, LC Paper No. CB(1)1128/05-06(04), 27 March 2006, p.4, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/chinese/panels/plw/papers/plw0328cb1-1128-4c.pdf.

8 Hong Kong Legislative Council, ‘Information Note: Land Supply in Hong Kong’, 21 March 2006, p.7, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/chinese/sec/library/0506in20c.pdf.

in Hong Kong surged after 2009, which led to increasing public demand for public housing. To meet the aspirations of low- and middle-income families to buy their own homes, in October 2011 the government announced the full resumption of the Home Ownership Scheme and the enhancement of the My Home Purchase Plan,9 which eventually marked an end to the property slump.

In the face of different challenges after the handover, the government’s policy attempt of increasing the supply of residential housing was reduced to passive actions. It just catered and adapted to the demand and supply in the property market, with hardly any breakthrough. After all, Hong Kong’s overall economy has been dependent on the real estate sector since the first land auction in 1841. The property market serves as both an indicator of economic growth and a stable stream of revenues for the government. Therefore, it would be difficult to achieve a steady growth of the overall economy against a substantial fall in the property market. After witnessing a 70 per cent drop in property prices in 2003 compared with 1997 and 100,000 negative equity cases in the territory, the government became more prudent and cautious to avoid any major increase in the supply of public housing. Its long-term housing planning was significantly slowed down as well owing to the impacts.

The Protection of the Harbour Ordinance

Whenever there is economic recession, the government unveils stimulus meas- ures featuring major infrastructure projects. According to past experience, land reclamation not only created jobs but also provided proceeds from land sales. During the property market slump, land reclamation brought in a steady source of revenue for the Treasury despite the low land premiums. The government, however, did not anticipate public objections to reclamation after the hando- ver. In the 1980s, the Town Planning Office listed ten ‘strategic growth areas’ for reclamation projects in the Territorial Development Strategy Review, which were Au Tau/Kam Tin/Yuen Long South, Central/Wan Chai Reclamation, Fanling North/Kwu Tung, Tseung Kwan O, Tung Chung/Tai Ho, Hong Kong Island South, Green Island Reclamation, South East Kowloon, Tsuen Wan Bay Further Reclamation and West Kowloon Reclamation, in order to build more than 470,000 housing units (roughly equivalent to 22 per cent of the number of units in 1998) for about 1.6 million people.10 Some strategic growth areas, such as Kai Tak (South East Kowloon), Green Island, Tseung Kwan O, Tung Chung, Tai Ho, Tsuen Wan Bay Further Reclamation, and Central and Wan Chai Reclamation, would also help address medium-term housing needs and

9 Hong Kong Legislative Council, ‘Updated Background Brief on Re-launching of the Home Ownership Scheme and Tenants Purchase Scheme Prepared by the Legislative Council Secretariat (Position as at 8 March 2012)’, LC Paper No. CB(1) 1259/11-12(04), 8 March 2012, p.3, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/ chinese/panels/hg/papers/hg0314cb1-1259-4-c.pdf.

10 Hong Kong Planning Department, Planning Hong Kong 50th Anniversary, Hong Kong, Planning Department, 1998, pp.57, 80.

traffic problems.11 Among all those areas with needs for site formation and recla- mation, the Metro Area featured a tighter schedule.

In the mid-1980s, the government formulated the Study on Harbour Reclamation and Urban Growth and the TDS. Reclamation of Victoria Harbour was carried out to obtain about 1,000 hectares of new land to accommodate major offices, hotels and residential development as well as major urban parks,12 so that the Metro Area could take on a new look. Details of the reclamation projects in the 1980s and the 1990s were published in the Study on Harbour Reclamation and Urban Growth in 1983, the TDS in 1994, the Metroplan in 1991 and the TDS Review in 1996.13 The projects were subsequently carried out by the Land Development Policy Committee upon completion of the feasibility study in 1989. (See Figure 6.2.)

In 1995, the Society for Protection of the Harbour (SPH) was founded as a non-governmental organisation for the purpose of protecting and preserv- ing Victoria Harbour. It considered Victoria Harbour to be a valuable natural landscape with significant economic and social values. It opposed reclamation works at the harbour, claiming that such works would affect the marine eco- system, undermine maritime traffic safety and turn the harbour into a narrow river. It requested that the government immediately stop all reclamation projects, ushering in the controversies on reclamation. In September 1995, the Planning, Environment and Lands Branch (PELB) tried to communicate the government’s point of view to the public. In December of the same year, it published Land for Urban Growth: The Role of Reclamation, The Quest for Lands, Hong Kong: A City of Vision and The Shape of Things to Come: An Overview of the Role of Harbour Reclamations in the Future Development of Hong Kong. In these publications, the PELB explained that, when carrying out the reclamation projects, the govern- ment needed to consider a number of factors, including the population increase, the rising housing needs, the shortage of land for subsidised housing, the need for land for the sustainable development of Hong Kong as an international centre of finance and information processing, the high costs of land resumption in the New Territories, and the cost-effectiveness of reclamation projects in the Metro Area.14 The government needed to balance all those factors, as well as the inter- ests of various stakeholders in society, without taking any actions in haste.

In 1996, the Protection of the Harbour Ordinance (PHO) was submitted as a private member’s bill by Legislative Councillor Christine Loh to the Legislative Council and was passed in June 1997. Section 3 of the PHO, with the ‘presump- tion against reclamation in the harbour’, stipulates that:

11 Hong Kong Planning Department, Planning Department Annual Report, Hong Kong, Planning Department, 1997, p.34.

12 Nyaw Mee-kau and Li Si-ming, eds, The Other Hong Kong Report, Hong Kong, Chinese University Press, 1996, p.350.

13 Hong Kong Legislative Council, ‘Central and Wan Chai Reclamation: Background Brief’, LC Paper No. CB(1) 921/04-05(02), 21 February 2005, p.1, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/chinese/panels/plw/ papers/plw0222cb1-921-2c.pdf.

14 Nyaw Mee-kau and Li Si-ming, eds, The Other Hong Kong Report, Hong Kong, Chinese University Press, 1996, pp.353, 362.

Source: The Shape of Things to Come: An Overview of the Role of Harbour Reclamations in the Future Development of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, planning, Environment and Lands Branch, 1995, p.7.

Figure 6.2 Reclamation projects committed, proposed and under investigation (1990s)

The harbour is to be protected and preserved as a special public asset and a natural heritage of Hong Kong people, and for that purpose there shall be a presumption against reclamation in the harbour. (Amended 75 of 1999 s.4)
All public officers and public bodies shall have regard to the principle stated in subsection (1) for guidance in the exercise of any powers vested in them.

The enactment of the PHO made it impossible to carry out the pending reclamation projects in the Metro Area as scheduled, including those at Tsuen Wan Bay, Kowloon Point, Tsim Sha Tsui East, South East Kowloon and Green Island, as well as Central Reclamation (CR) Phase III (CRIII) and Wan Chai Reclamation (WR) Phase II (WRII). It also led to the suspension of the origi- nal development plans for Green Island, South East Kowloon (Kai Tak Airport site) and others. However, works which had commenced prior to the enact- ment, including the projects of CRI, CRII and WRI, as well as ancillary facili- ties for the new airport (Airport Express Line) and the development of the Hong Kong Convention and Exhibition Centre, would be completed by 1998 as scheduled.15 And the land reclaimed would account for about 44 per cent of the original total proposed in the Metro Area. Besides, it was necessary to increase the plot ratios for some completed projects owing to the smaller recla- mation areas, in order to alleviate the problem of land shortage.16 (See Tables 6.2 and 6.3.)

Table 6.2 Land reclamation projects implemented as scheduled before 1997

Reclamation project	Area (hectares)
container terminal No. 9	90
West Kowloon Reclamation	334
Stonecutters Island Naval Base	12
Hung Hom Bay Reclamation	35
Belcher Bay Reclamation	13
central Reclamation phase I	20
central Reclamation phase II	5.3
Wan chai Reclamation phase I	7
Aldrich Bay Reclamation	10
total	526.3

Sources: Hong Kong Government Information Services, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Government printer, 1995–1997; Nyaw Mee-kau and Li Si-ming, eds, The Other Hong Kong Report, Hong Kong, chinese University press, 1996, p.362; The Shape of Things to Come: An Overview of the Role of Harbour Reclamations in the Future Development of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, planning, Environment and Lands Branch, 1995, pp.58–59.

15 Central and Wan Chai Reclamation website, last modified 23 March 2012, http://www.devb.gov.hk/ reclamation/tc/basic/plans_and_maps/project/.

16 Nyaw Mee-kau and Li Si-ming, eds, The Other Hong Kong Report, Hong Kong, Chinese University Press, 1996, pp.362–363.

Table 6.3 Land reclamation projects to be suspended in 1997

Reclamation project Area

(hectares)

tsuen Wan Bay Reclamation 30

Kowloon point Reclamation 48

tsim Sha tsui East Reclamation 6

Kowloon Bay Reclamation 300

Green Island Reclamation 186

central Reclamation phase III 32

(reduced to 18 ha in 2003)

Wan chai Reclamation phase 48

(reduced to 12.7 ha in 2009)

total 650

(reduced to 600.7 ha)

Sources: Hong Kong Legislative council, ‘Item for public Works Subcommittee of Finance committee’, paper No. pWSc(2008– 09)51, 15 December 2008, p.1, www.legco.gov.hk/yr08-09/chinese/fc/pwsc/papers/p08-51c.pdf; Hong Kong Legislative council, ‘Item for public Works Subcommittee of Finance committee’, paper No. pWSc(2009–10)53, 10 June 2009, p.1, http:// www.legco.gov.hk/yr08-09/chinese/fc/pwsc/papers/p09-53c.pdf; Nyaw Mee-kau and Li Si-ming, eds, The Other Hong Kong Report, Hong Kong, chinese University press, 1996, p.363; The Shape of Things to Come: An Overview of the Role of Harbour Reclamations in the Future Development of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, planning, Environment and Lands Branch, 1995, pp.58–59.

Central and Wan Chai Reclamation

The project affected the most by the PHO was the Central–Wan Chai Bypass, which was intended to urgently address the traffic congestion problems in Central, followed by the South East Kowloon development plan. Both areas needed redevelopment. The Central and Wan Chai Reclamation drew the most public attention. It allowed the whole community to have an in-depth reflection on the balance between the social values of heritage and the needs of economic development. The proposed Central and Wan Chai Reclamation con- sisted of three development areas separated by parks, namely Central, Tamar and Exhibition Centre. These development works were divided into five phases: three phases for Central and two phases for Wan Chai. The development focus and details are set out in Table 6.4.

On 29 May 1998, the Draft Central District (Extension) OZP No. S/ H24/1, including about 38 hectares of land for reclamation (of which 32 hec- tares under the CRIII and 6 hectares as part of the Wan Chai Development Phase II (WDII)) was gazetted for public inspection. The Town Planning Board (TPB) subsequently received objections in view of opposition from the public, and the government consulted the Legislative Council (LegCo) PLW Panel on the Draft Vision Statement for the Victoria Harbour and Central Reclamation Phase III regarding the scale of reclamation, the approach of planning and the proposed road network on 10 June 1999. However, the implication of the reclamation project for the Star Ferry Pier and Queen’s Pier was not discussed, thus arousing strong repercussions among members of the

Table 6.4 Details of the Central and Wan Chai Reclamation projects (1993–2017)

Project	Central Reclamation	Central Reclamation	Central Reclamation	Wan Chai Reclamation	Wan Chai Reclamation
	Phase I	Phase II	Phase III	Phase I	Phase II
Area (hectares)	20	5.3	Reduced from 32 to 18	7.0	Reduced from 48 to 12.7
cost (HK$)	2,710 million	320 million	5,761.5 million	590 million	4,642.7 million
Date	Sept 1993 – June 1998	Dec 1994 – Sept 1997	28 Feb 2003 – Oct 2011	March 1994 – July 1997	Late 2009 – 2017
Facilities	phase I provided the site	phase II mainly consisted	phase III provided land for	phase I included the	phase II extended along the
	for the Airport Railway	of reclamation of the	construction of transport	formation of an island by	waterfront from the central
	Hong Kong Station. the	tamar Basin. One of the	infrastructure, consisting	reclamation at the northern	Reclamation phase III to
	remaining newly formed	sites was sold in 1995 for	of the central–Wan chai	side of the Hong Kong	North point. It provided land
	land was for reprovisioning	commercial development.	Bypass, the Airport Railway	convention and Exhibition	for the construction of the
	of piers, cooling water		Extended Overrun tunnel,	centre.	central–Wan chai Bypass,
	pumphouses and other		the MtR North Hong Kong		the Island Eastern corridor
	facilities displaced by the		Island Line, the supporting		Link, the Hong Kong Island
	reclamation.		road networks and a		section of the MtR Shatin to
			waterfront promenade.		central Link and the North
					Hong Kong Island Line, and
					a waterfront promenade.

Sources: Hong Kong Legislative council, ‘Item for public Works Subcommittee of Finance committee’, paper No. pWSc(2008-09)51, 15 December 2008, pp.1–2, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr08-09/english/fc/pwsc/papers/ p08-51e.pdf; Hong Kong Legislative council, ‘Item for public Works Subcommittee of Finance committee’, paper No. pWSc(2009-10)53, 10 June 2009, pp.1–3, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr08-09/english/fc/pwsc/papers/ p09-53e.pdf.

public. On 16 July of the same year, the TPB published in the Government Gazette the amendments to the Draft Central District (Extension) OZP No. O/S/H24/1-A under section 6(7) of the Town Planning Ordinance. One of the amendments was to reduce the size of reclamation area to 23 hectares (including 18 hectares under the CRIII and 5 hectares as part of the WDII).17 On 12 April 2000, the PLW Panel received objections relating to the reloca- tion of the Star Ferry Pier. The TPB recognised the historical significance and importance of the Star Ferry Pier as one of the major icons and tourist attrac- tions in Hong Kong and agreed that it should be reconstructed at the new Central waterfront. However, no exact location and specific design of recon- struction works were proposed. On 4 January 2002, the TPB approved the proposal of reprovisioning the clock tower and decoration of the Star Ferry Pier and Queen’s Pier. It was also stressed that the reconstructions would resemble the original design as much as possible.18

On 27 February 2003, the SPH lodged a judicial review against the TPB’s decision regarding the Draft Wan Chai North OZP No. S/H25/1. On 8 July of the same year, the High Court ruled that the TPB had failed to comply with section 3 of the PHO and ordered the TPB to reconsider the draft OZP and related objections. The High Court also ruled that every reclamation proposal should be assessed individually with reference to the three tests of: 1) compel- ling, overriding and present need; 2) no viable alternative; and 3) minimum impairment to the harbour. An appeal was filed by the TPB after the Court handed down the judgment on the WDII, but was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 9 January 2004 on the grounds that the proposed reclamation was unable to fulfil the overriding public need test. As a result, the government had to review the planning of the WDII before resubmitting the relevant OZP for consideration by the TPB.19

On 25 September 2003, the SPH applied to the High Court for an interim injunction over the CRIII and a judicial review on the approval of the Central District (Extension) OZP by the Chief Executive in Council (CE in C). The High Court dismissed both applications on 6 October 2003 and 9 March 2004 respectively. The CRIII works, which had been suspended pending the Court’s decision, resumed in early April 2004.20 The reclamation, with a reduced area

17 ‘Factsheets, Plans and Maps Review Report: Central Reclamation Phase III (CRIII) – Basic Facts’, Development Bureau website, http://www.devb.gov.hk/reclamation/en/basic/basic_facts/central_map_ recl/index.html; ‘Chronology of Events Relating to Central Reclamation Phase III (CRIII)’, Development Bureau website, https://www.devb.gov.hk/reclamation/en/basic/chronology_of_events/central_chronol- ogy/t_index.html.

18 Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Planning, Lands and Works, ‘Background Brief on Planning Arrangements for the Star Ferry Pier and Queen’s Pier in Central’, LC Paper No. CB(1)677/06-07(03), 10 January 2007, pp.1–5, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/chinese/panels/plw/papers/plw0123cb1-677-3-c. pdf; Development Bureau, ‘Chronology of Events Relating to Central Reclamation Phase III’, www.devb.gov. hk/reclamation/tc/basic/chronology_of_events/central_chronology/t_index.html.

19 Hong Kong Legislative Council, ‘Background Brief on Central–Wan Chai Bypass and Wan Chai Development Phase II’, LC Paper No. CB(1)1634/08-09(06), 20 May 2009, p.1, http://www.legco.gov.hk/ yr08-09/chinese/panels/dev/papers/dev0526cb1-1634-6-c.pdf.

20 Hong Kong Legislative Council, ‘Central and Wan Chai Reclamation: Background Brief’, LC Paper No.

of 12.7 hectares21 and a cost of 5.76 billion Hong Kong dollars, was basically completed in October 2011.22

In May 2004, the government set up the Harbour-front Enhancement Committee (HEC), with the objective of better informing the public of the planning of the reclamation area, as well as advising the Housing, Planning and Lands Bureau on the planning, land uses and developments along the exist- ing and new harbourfront of Victoria Harbour. In January 2005, the govern- ment adopted the HEC’s recommendation of enhancing public participation in the course of the review. On 18 August 2005, the Sub-committee on WDII Review convened the Expert Panel Forum on Sustainable Transport Planning and Central–Wan Chai Bypass. In October 2005, it published a report on short- term, medium-term and long-term measures to achieve sustainable transport planning. It considered the construction of the Central–Wan Chai Bypass to be a medium-term solution for improving the east–west link in the transport network of Hong Kong Island and for tackling the problem of deteriorating traffic congestion in the Central and Wan Chai areas. On 20 April 2006, the sub-committee engaged consultants to prepare concept plans for the WDII Review on possible trunk road alignments and harbourfront enhancement, and proposed five ‘character precincts’ for the enhancement. After consider- ing all the feasible proposals on trunk road development, the sub-committee adopted the option involving the smallest area of reclamation while maintaining similar effects of traffic control. In early October 2006, a series of harbourfront enhancement activities were organised, including introduction of the concept plan, roving exhibitions and community workshops. In May 2009, the CE in C approved the Wan Chai North OZP No. S/H25/2, which contained the pro- posed amendments under the WDII Review. (See Figure 6.3.)

In 2007, the Planning Department commenced the Urban Design Study for the New Central Harbourfront (UDS) in order to refine the existing urban design framework of the new Central Harbourfront and to prepare planning and design briefs for key development sites in the area to guide their future develop- ment. The study covered eight key sites, and their respective final recommended planning and design proposals are set out in Table 6.5.

Central Harbourfront military dock

The land uses of the new Central Reclamation area also became controversial. The 1994 Sino-British Defence Land Agreement included the reservation of 150 metres of the waterfront for the construction of a ‘military dock’ after the

CB(1) 921/04-05(02), 21 February 2005, pp.2–3, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/chinese/panels/plw/ papers/plw0222cb1-921-2c.pdf.

21 See Development Bureau, ‘Chronology of Events Relating to Central Reclamation Phase III’, www.devb. gov.hk/reclamation/tc/basic/chronology_of_events/central_chronology/t_index.html.

22 Hong Kong Legislative Council, ‘Item for Public Works Subcommittee of Finance Committee’, Paper No. PWSC(2009-10)53, 10 June 2009, p.1, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr08-09/chinese/fc/pwsc/papers/ p09-53c.pdf.

Source: Development Bureau, ‘central and Wan chai Reclamation’ (last updated 23 March 2012), http://www.devb.gov.hk/reclamation/filemanager/tc/content_29/project_pop.htm.

Figure 6.3 Central and Wan Chai Reclamation

Table 6.5 Urban Design Study for the New Central Harbourfront

Site Location Design concept

Site 1 Adjoining central pier Nos 4 to 6

A civic node and a mixed-use precinct primarily for public enjoyment, including two blocks of +25 mpD* for retail, restaurant and exhibition uses.

Site 2 North of the two ifc A civic node and a mixed-use precinct primarily for

public enjoyment, including one iconic block of +60 mpD* for cultural, retail, restaurant, entertainment, tourism, government, institution or community (GIc) uses and festive activities. Additional 1.5 commercial floors above central pier Nos 4 to 6; extensive landscaped deck and public open space of 1.7 ha for greening, open space and festive events.

Site 3 North of Statue Square Retail and office developments. Larger landscaped

deck with enhancement to pedestrian connections and visual permeability. More at-grade open space with street activities. Reconstruction of Star Ferry clock tower at original location.

Site 4 North of city Hall Waterfront-related commercial and leisure uses

with a theme of ‘Harbour place’. Small and separate building blocks with intimate courtyard spaces.

Alfresco dining and restaurants.

Site 5 North of cItIc tower two blocks for hotel and office uses on a landscaped

podium. possible additional office development south of Site 5 of approximately 21,000 metres gross floor area (GFA) being explored.

Site 6 West end of the Hong Kong convention and Exhibition centre New Wing

Waterfront-related commercial and leisure uses with a marine theme. Further improvement to pedestrian connectivity.

Site 7 Waterfront promenade Waterfront promenade. A hybrid of ‘urban park’ and

‘urban green’ concepts; additional alfresco dining within the area.

Site 8 Adjoining central pier Nos 9 and 10

Reassembly of Queen’s pier by the harbour and refurbishment of central pier Nos 9 and 10.

Improved design of Ferry plaza.

Note: mpD: metres above principal Datum.

Source: planning Department, Urban Design Study for the New Central Harbourfront, http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/p_ study/comp_s/UDS/chi_v1/home_chi.htm.

handover. In 2000, the Central District (Extension) OZP No. S/H24/2 was approved by the CE in C. It designated the Central waterfront area under various land use zonings, including ‘open space’ (‘O’) and ‘other specified uses’ (‘OU’) zones, with a straight line annotated ‘military berth (subject to detailed design)’ along the coastline. In 2002, the government sought funding approval from the

Legislative Council for the Central Reclamation project, including funds for con- struction of the military dock. According to the relevant LegCo document, the Hong Kong Garrison agreed in principle to open the area of the military dock site to the public when it was not in military use. According to planning and urban design proposals of the UDS, the military dock site should be designed to inte- grate with the new waterfront promenade and the open area within the dock and would be open to the public when it was not in use. When the military dock was closed for military use, the public could use the pedestrian walkway to the imme- diate south of the dock area as an east–west connection along the waterfront. The design concept of the military dock (including its access to the Central Barracks to its south) was revealed to the public through public engagement activities of the UDS, and was reported to the Legislative Council at the end of 2009.

Briefings were given about the Advance Promenade of the new Central Harbourfront, including the architectural design of the military dock, at meet- ings of the Central and Western District Council as well as of the Harbourfront Commission’s Task Force on Harbourfront Developments on Hong Kong Island (HKTF) in May and October 2010 respectively.23 As the detailed design and delineation of the military dock had been confirmed and the construction works were in their final stages, the Planning Department, in accordance with the usual practice, proposed to the TPB to make amendments to the OZP on 25 January 2013 to reflect the final delineation and the land use of the military dock.24 On 15 February 2013, the Draft Central District (Extension) OZP No. S/H24/8 was exhibited for public inspection under section 7 of the Town Planning Ordinance. The amendments mainly included the rezoning of a strip of waterfront site to the north of the People’s Liberation Army Hong Kong Garrison Headquarters from ‘O’ to ‘OU’ annotated ‘military use (1)’ (‘OU(MU)1’).25 During the two-month exhibition period and the three-week publication period, a total of 9,815 representations and 9,242 comments were received respectively. In the LegCo Paper No. CB(1)1077/12-13(03) submit- ted to the LegCo Panel on Development for consideration on 28 May 2013 regarding the amendments to the Central District (Extension) OZP in rela- tion to the Central Military Dock (CMD), it was pointed out that the CMD would be handed over to the Garrison for management as a military facility after completion of the construction works and the relevant procedures.26

23 Planning Department, Town Planning Board Paper No. 9491, for consideration by the Town Planning Board on 4 November 2013, Hong Kong, October 2013, http://www.info.gov.hk/tpb/en/9491_ attachments/9491_final_main_paper_eng.pdf.

24 Planning Department, Metro Planning Committee Paper No. 3/13, for consideration by the Metro Planning Committee on 25 January 2013, Hong Kong, January 2013, http://www.info.gov.hk/tpb/en/pape rs/MPC/482-mpc_3-13.pdf.

25 Town Planning Board, ‘G.N. 778: Town Planning Ordinance (Chapter 131) – Amendments to Draft Central District (Extension) Outline Zoning Plan No. S/H24/7’, Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, Volume 17, No. 7, 15 February 2013, https://www.gld.gov.hk/egazette/pdf/20131707/cgn20 131707778.pdf.

26 Hong Kong Legislative Council, ‘Amendments to the Central District (Extension) Outline Zoning Plan in Relation to the Central Military Dock’, LC Paper No. CB(1)1077/12-13(03), 28 May 2013, http://www. legco.gov.hk/yr12-13/chinese/panels/dev/papers/dev0528cb1-1077-3-c.pdf.

From 4 November 2013 to 14 February 2014, the TPB conducted a hearing to consider the representers’ and the commenters’ views on the draft OZP.27 At the same time, representatives of the Central Harbourfront Concern Group organised a ‘Citizen Town Planning Board’ meeting at the G/F lobby of North Point Government Offices to solicit public views on the rezoning of the Central Harbourfront to a military dock with a view to consolidating and submitting views collected to the TPB for consideration. On 14 February 2014, after giving consideration to the representations and comments, the TPB decided not to propose any amendment to the draft OZP but agreed to make amendments to the Explanatory Statement of the draft OZP regarding the ‘OU(MU)1’ zone to indicate that the Garrison had agreed that it would open the area of the CMD site to the public as a part of the promenade when it was not in military use.28

The above decision was mainly based on two principles. The first was the his- torical background of the project. The proposed use of the site as a military dock originated from the 1994 Sino-British Defence Land Agreement. Since 1998, the Hong Kong government has annotated the location of the military dock on the OZP according to the prevailing situation. In 2002, the government applied to the Legislative Council for funding and was given approval for the related construction works, including the construction of the military dock and related facilities. In 2014, as the delineation of the dock and related works entered the final stage, the amendments to the draft OZP were then proceeded with. Given the historical background, the OZP was amended to reflect the final boundary and the use of the military dock.

Second, it was considered that members of the public had always had the opportunity to participate in the planning process. The location of the dock had already been marked on the OZP when amendments to the OZP were initiated in 1998. Since the boundary was not yet determined at that time, it was marked as a straight line annotated ‘military berth (subject to detailed design)’. The CE in C approved the relevant OZP in 2000. There was also an opportunity for public participation when the Legislative Council approved the funding applica- tion in 2002. During the public engagement activities of the UDS in 2008–2010, the government indicated the location and conceptual design of the military dock as well as its future integration with the new Central Harbourfront. In 2010, the government also introduced the CMD design at meetings of the Central and Western District Council and the HKTF.

On 14 February 2014, the Concern Group voiced its opposition to the gov- ernment’s rezoning of the new Central Harbourfront as a military dock site. On 5 March 2014, the Concern Group mobilised members of the public to express their aspiration directly to the CE in C and request the dedication of the har- bourfront to the people.29 As citizens had various views on the zoning of more

27 Hong Kong Daily News, 12 November 2013, p.A04.

28 ‘Full Text of the TPB Chairman to Meet with the Media’, Press Releases, 14 February 2014, http://www. info.gov.hk/gia/general/201402/14/P201402140683.htm.

29 Central Harbourfront Concern Group, ‘Press Release’, http://www.savecentral.hk/260323286231295- press-releases.html.

than 30,000 square feet of area at the Central Harbourfront as a permanent military site, the Central Reclamation project has been affected. On 7 May 2014, Designing Hong Kong, one of the representatives, applied to the High Court for judicial review with a request to overturn the TPB’s decision to amend the OZP for the CMD. As of mid-May 2018, the judicial review is still pending, and the relevant statutory planning procedures have yet to be completed.

Collective memories

Demolition of the Star Ferry Pier and the Queen’s Pier

Efforts made by the HEC did not reduce the public enthusiasm about preserving Central landmarks, while the demolition of the Star Ferry Pier and the Queen’s Pier even raised awareness of defending historical buildings. On 20 September 2006, the LegCo PLW Panel held a special meeting to discuss the planning issues relating to the reprovisioning of the Star Ferry Pier in Central. The meeting was also intended for the exchange of views with community groups regarding the preservation of the building structure and clock tower of the existing Star Ferry Pier. After the meeting, the Panel urged the government to defer the demolition of the Star Ferry Pier and its clock tower, and to incorporate, upon extensive public consultation, the existing clock tower together with the relevant build- ing structures into the future new development plan for Central, with a view to preserving, on a people-oriented basis, the historical traces that formed part of the collective memory.

In a written response on 11 October of the same year, the administration reiterated that public works directly affecting the Star Ferry Pier, including Road P2, the Airport Railway Extended Overrun Tunnel and an existing drain- age box culvert at Man Yiu Street, should be carried out pursuant to awarded contracts as planned and that the Star Ferry Pier should be demolished as scheduled. In a press release issued on 12 December, the government pointed out that the Antiquities Advisory Board (AAB), which was mainly respon- sible for the grading and preservation of antique buildings in Hong Kong, had reviewed the discussion papers and records in 2002 regarding the dem- olition plan for the Star Ferry Pier and expressed no objection to the plan. Accordingly, the demolition of the old Star Ferry Pier commenced on the same day. Although a minimum number of years of history for a building is not a statutory requirement for its declaration as a monument under the Antiquities and Monuments Ordinance, there was still a more conservative view in the early twenty-first century that a post-war building, i.e. one with a history of less than 50 years, would be of lower value compared with a pre-war building. People holding that view would rarely take into account the historical connection with the city, the use of public space and social values when determining the signifi- cance of a historical building, which was substantially different from the opin- ions of the general public intending to preserve the Star Ferry Pier. People held demonstrations at the construction site to protest against the demolition of the building structures and clock tower. They regarded the Star Ferry Pier as a

tribute to general daily life and social movements after the Second World War, thus having its social value.

On 23 January 2007, the PLW Panel discussed with deputations and the administration proposals to relocate the Queen’s Pier. Organisations includ- ing Hong Kong People’s Council for Sustainable Development, the Hong Kong Institute of Architects, Community Cultural Concern, the Hong Kong Federation of Students and Designing Hong Kong Harbour District all sup- ported the in-situ preservation of the Queen’s Pier. The government maintained that a statutory planning process would be necessary for Road P2 realignment to provide for in-situ preservation of the pier, since the alignment had already been specified in the relevant approved OZP. Any changes to the alignment of Road P2 would affect the related land use. Members of the Panel generally agreed that there was no immediate need to construct Road P2; therefore they suggested further discussions on the technical aspects of the preservation.

From March to April 2007, the government held four meetings with four pro- fessional bodies, namely the Association of Engineering Professionals in Society, the Conservancy Association, the Hong Kong Institute of Architects and the Hong Kong Institution of Engineers, to prudently study four feasible options of preservation. On 9 May 2007, the AAB rated the Queen’s Pier as a Grade 1 his- torical building. According to the AAB’s internal guidelines, the Grade 1 status referred to ‘buildings of outstanding merit, which every effort should be made to preserve if possible’. However, the grading system was the AAB’s internal mech- anism and carried no statutory status. The grading by AAB did not affect the decision to demolish the Queen’s Pier. In a press release by the government on 23 May 2007, Dr Patrick Ho, then Secretary for Home Affairs, and on behalf of the Antiquities Authority, remarked that, having thoroughly considered all rel- evant factors and information, he had decided that Queen’s Pier did not possess the requisite historical, archaeological or palaeontological significance for it to be declared a monument under the Antiquities and Monuments Ordinance.30 It was essentially the same as the practice in 2006, when the value of the Star Ferry Pier was determined based on its years of history.

In May and June 2007, the government planned to keep the retainable components of the Queen’s Pier for future reinstatement at the new Central Harbourfront. The most suitable site for relocation would be identified, with the participation of professional bodies and the general public, under the UDS being undertaken by the Planning Department. Final recommendations by the UDS included relocating the Queen’s Pier between Central Pier Nos 9 and 10 to revive its pier function, as well as refurbishing Pier Nos 9 and 10 to integrate with the reassembled Queen’s Pier. Besides, memorial elements should be added at the original site of the Queen’s Pier to commemorate its historical significance.31

30 ‘Government Decides Not to Declare Queen’s Pier a Monument’, Press Releases, 23 May 2007, http:// www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200705/23/P200705230240.htm.

31 Planning Department, Urban Design Study for the New Central Harbourfront: Information Digest, Hong Kong, Government Logistics Department, July 2011, p.17, http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/p_study/ comp_s/UDS/eng_v1/images_eng/pdf_paper/info_digest.pdf.

The controversies over the reclamation projects show that the public had strong aspirations to maintain the existing historical buildings and values of Hong Kong society. The government would be alienating itself further and further from the public if it continued to emphasise only economic benefits and engineering needs.

The Star Ferry Pier and Queen’s Pier were just the tip of the iceberg. Central used to be the core of Victoria City, with a lot of buildings of historical value. On the other hand, Central was in dire need of commercial and office space. After the handover, historical conservation had become a reason for objection to the government’s demolition of historical buildings, which made it impossible for the government to implement the idea of vacating space for new development by demolishing old buildings. Larger historical buildings with a higher rede- velopment value in Central included the Central Police Station Compound, which was declared a statutory monument in 1995, and the West Wing of Central Government Offices, which escaped from being demolished and devel- oped thanks to the public’s aspiration to maintain the historical building. (See Figure 6.4.)

Central Police Station Compound

The Central Police Station (CPS) Compound included three buildings: 1) Victoria Prison, built in 1841. It was the first Western building constructed of durable material in Hong Kong. It was seriously damaged by bombing during the Second World War and was reopened in 1946 after repairs. 2) The Central Magistracy. The construction commenced in 1913 and was completed in 1914. The building was of majestic appearance, with imposing pillars on the facade and other features in the Greek-revival style. The massive retaining walls were constructed with granite blocks. The Central Magistracy was closed in 1979 and had been used by different associations affiliated with the police.32 3) The Central Police Station, which included the three-storey Barrack Block built in 1864 (with a storey added in 1905), the four-storey Headquarters Block com- pleted in 1919, and the two-storey Armoury constructed at the north-west end of the parade ground in 1925. The Compound represented the rule of law as the basis of governance of the city, symbolising the mutual independence and inter- dependence of law enforcement, judiciary and punitive branches.33 Therefore, the Compound was declared a statutory monument in 1995 according to the 1976 Antiquities and Monuments Ordinance (Cap. 53).

In early 2004, the government intended to invite the private sector to protect, restore and develop the CPS Compound into a heritage tourism attraction, by means of open tender. In June of the same year, the Ho Tung family offered to spend 500 million dollars to convert the monument into a heritage and art

32 Antiquities and Monuments Office website, http://www.amo.gov.hk/b5/monuments_54.php, http:// www.amo.gov.hk/b5/monuments_55.php.

33 Central Police Station Revitalisation Project website, http://www.centralpolicestation.org.hk/ch: / historic-cps/index.asp.

Source: Hong Kong planning Department, Urban Design Study for the New Central Harbourfront: Information Digest, Hong Kong, planning Department, July 2011, p.3, http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/p_study/comp_s/ UDS/chi_v1/images_chi/OI04.jpg.

Figure 6.4 Scope and key sites of the Urban Design Study for the New Central Harbourfront

exhibition centre or an educational centre, to be operated in a non-profit-mak- ing manner. The proposal gave rise to much public discussion. Some citizens and volunteers, including university lecturers, lawyers, doctors, social workers and district councillors,34 concerned about the future development of monu- ments in the Central and Western District, established the Action Group on the Protection of the Central Police Station Historical Compound.35 The Action Group, together with other community organisations, proposed giving equal consideration to non-commercial and commercial means in the development in the CPS Compound. They also suggested that, apart from the emphasis on economic and tourism benefits, more emphasis should be placed on community interests such as public access as well as integration with and improvement to the surrounding areas.

In April 2007, the Hong Kong Jockey Club (HKJC) proposed a donation in kind to support the capital cost for renovation and development of the CPS Compound, as well as meeting the management and maintenance cost for the initial years of operation, as a gift for the public to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the HKSAR.36 On 10 October 2007, the Chief Executive announced in his Policy Address the acceptance of the HKJC’s 1.8 billion Hong Kong dollars revitalisation proposal.37 The government would retain the owner- ship of the conserved Compound, while the HKJC would operate the revitalised facilities based on a tenancy agreement with the government. From October 2007 to April 2008, the HKJC carried out a six-month campaign of public engagement by consulting different stakeholders through various channels and activities. It also commissioned Purcell Miller Tritton, a British firm of conserva- tion architects, to undertake a comprehensive study and to prepare a conserva- tion management plan.

In October 2010, the HKJC proposed the preservation of 15 historic build- ings and F Hall, as well as the addition of the Old Bailey Wing to house gallery spaces and the Arbuthnot Wing to house a multi-purpose venue and central plant.38 The revitalisation works started at the end of 2011.39 The gross floor area after revitalisation would exceed 25,000 square metres, including 54 per cent as commercial for retail and catering activities and 46 per cent as non-commercial for arts and cultural facilities.40 Restoration of the antique buildings would be

34 Action Group on the Protection of the Central Police Station Historical Compound, ‘Open Letter to the Chief Executive’, http://www.hkumag.hku.hk/cps/action/action05.pdf.

35 Action Group on the Protection of the Central Police Station Historical Compound website, http:// www.hkumag.hku.hk/cps/action.html.

36 Development Bureau, ‘Gist of Hong Kong Jockey Club’s Proposal of Adaptive Re-use of the Central Police Station (CPS) Compound’, Antiquities Advisory Board Paper No. AAB/33/2007-08, November 2007, p.1, http://www.aab.gov.hk/form/AAB_Paper131_police_annexa_c.pdf.

37 ‘Revitalising Historic Buildings’, in 2007–08 Policy Address, 10 October 2007, http://www.policyad dress.gov.hk/07-08/chi/p51.html.

38 Conserve and Revitalise Hong Kong Heritage website, http://www.heritage.gov.hk/tc/conserve/ central.htm.

39 ‘SDEV’s Speaking Notes (Works Policy Areas) Tabled at LegCo Finance Committee Special Meeting’,

Press Releases, 7 March 2012, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201203/07/P201203070230.htm.

40 Development Bureau, ‘Gist of Hong Kong Jockey Club’s Proposal of Adaptive Re-use of the Central

carried out in stages, from the fourth quarter of 2015 to the first quarter of 2016.41 In the paper submitted to the Economic Services Panel of the Legislative Council, the government considered it necessary to restrict the development to non-profit-making purposes. It maintained that, as long as a proper balance on the weighting regarding the premium and qualitative aspects was struck, the adoption of a proposal both financially sustainable and beneficial to the com- munity would be guaranteed.42 The redeveloped CPS Compound, together with the Government Hill, the Dr Sun Yat-sen Museum, the Sun Yat-sen Historical Trail, the Central School, Man Mo Temple and Tung Wah Hospital nearby, would help shape Central into a cultural area with unique local characteristics.

Central Government Offices

The preservation options announced by the administration from 2007 to 2010 regarding the West Wing of the Central Government Offices (CGO) were dif- ferent from those preferred by conservation groups. Later on, the administration revised the original options in line with public views, so that the conservation work could better respond to public aspirations. The decision to preserve the West Wing reflected the fact that the key to dispute resolution lay in the balance between urban development and collective memories of public space.

In 2005, the government started implementing the Tamar Development Project and relocating the CGO, originally extending from Lower Albert Road to Ice House Street via Battery Path, to Tamar Site in Admiralty. As a result, conservation became a major concern. In February 2009, the government com- missioned Purcell Miller Tritton, a British firm of conservation architects, to assess the historical and architectural value of the CGO. The firm concluded that the Main Wing had the highest historical and architectural value, followed by the East Wing, with the West Wing being of a lower value. It recommended that the Main and East Wings should be preserved for alternative purposes, while the West Wing could be demolished for redevelopment. It suggested that any new development should either respect the footprint and height of the exist- ing buildings or be restricted to the western edge of the site. It also recom- mended extending the St John’s Cathedral garden over a wider area to provide a green link between Battery Path and the Government House Gardens.43 In the 2009–10 Policy Address delivered on 14 October 2009, it was recommended that the Main and East Wings, which were of historical and architectural value, be preserved for use by the Secretary for Justice after the relocation of existing bureaus to the new Central Government Complex at Tamar. As for the West

Police Station (CPS) Compound’, Antiquities Advisory Board Paper No. AAB/33/2007-08, November 2007, pp.1–2, http://www.aab.gov.hk/form/AAB_Paper131_police_annexa_c.pdf.

41 Central Police Station Revitalisation Project website, http://www.centralpolicestation.org.hk/ch/news- resources/news/news.asp?date=26 September 2014.

42 Ming Pao, 5 November 2004, p.D06.

43 Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Development, ‘Redevelopment of West Wing of Former Central Government Offices’, 28 June 2011, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/chinese/panels/dev/papers/ dev0628cb1-2207-8-c.pdf.

Wing, which had little heritage value, it was recommended it be demolished and redeveloped for commercial use. And the land stretching from Lower Albert Road to the business area via Battery Path would be developed into a low-den- sity site for public use.44

In a press release issued on 14 June 2012, the then Secretary for Development, Carrie Lam, announced the reasons for demolishing the West Wing as follows: 1) to construct a public open space in Central; 2) to improve the footpaths and road space nearby; 3) to construct modern Grade A office buildings for financial, legal or non-governmental organisations; and

4) to enhance the greenery from Lower Albert Road to Battery Path and Queen’s Road Central. In the eyes of the general public, the CGO was an important part of the Government Hill, with the Main, East and West Wings connecting and coordinating with each other.45 The West Wing accommo- dated the Office of Members of the Legislative Council, as well as depart- ments in charge of public affairs.46 In 1961 the new Public Enquiry Service of the Information Services Department was established in the building,47 with a positive image, and shared with the community the use of its lifts and canteen,48 which reflected the characteristics of the rule of the colonial gov- ernment after the Second World War.49 For the above reasons, the proposed demolition of the West Wing drew much public attention to the conservation of the Government Hill. On 23 November 2011, the AAB decided to ask its expert panel to accord priority to assessing the heritage value of the CGO and to make a grading recommendation.50 In May 2012, the expert panel recom- mended rating the Main and East Wings as Grade 1 historical buildings and the West Wing as Grade 2. However, it suggested that the three buildings as a complex could be rated as Grade 1.51 On 13 June 2012, the International Council on Monuments and Sites, the International Union of Architects and Docomomo International made the unusual move of issuing a global ‘conser-

44 2009–10 Policy Address website, http://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/09-10/chi/docs/policy.pdf.

45 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works for the Financial Year 1953–54, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1954, pp.4–5.

46 According to Hong Kong Government Telephone Directory of 1970, the government departments which were located in the West Wing included the Audit Department (13/F), Urban Council and Urban Services Department (Administration) (12/F), Registrar General’s Department (11/F), Inland Revenue Department (10/F), Treasury (8/F) and Civil Aviation Department (5/F); on the other hand, the Public Services Commission (5/F) was in the East Wing.

47 At that time, the office of the Information Services Department was located at Beaconsfield House.

48 https://plus.google.com/112492395498279121929/posts/3xbXq8KA6N3.

49 ‘Adequate provisions of lifts at the Ice House Street entrance will provide good means of access to the offices for persons approaching from the city.’ Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works for the Financial Year 1950–51, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1951, p.2.

50 Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Development, ‘Redevelopment of West Wing of Former Central Government Offices’, 28 June 2011, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/chinese/panels/dev/papers/ dev0628cb1-2207-8-c.pdf.

51 Antiquities Advisory Board Historic Buildings Assessment Panel, ‘Notes of Meeting of the Historic Buildings Assessment Panel on 31 May 2012 about the Heritage Assessment of the Post-1950 Former Central Government Offices (CGO)’, 31 May 2012, www.amo.gov.hk/form/notes_of_panel_meeting_20120531. pdf.

vation warning’ calling international attention to the West Wing of the CGO that the Hong Kong government proposed to demolish.52

Prior to an AAB meeting on the morning of 14 June 2012, the then Secretary for Development, Carrie Lam, publicly announced the necessity for demolish- ing the West Wing, together with the following modifications to the original plan:

The West Wing site would no longer be rezoned as a ‘comprehensive development area’ as previously proposed. Instead, the existing ‘govern- ment, institution or community (G/IC)’ areas would be retained to reflect both public and semi-public uses.
Instead of land sale, the ‘build–operate–transfer’ (BOT) mode would be adopted to invite private sector participation. The contract period would be 30 years at the maximum. The developer should construct new build- ings and public open space at its own expense. Immediately upon the com- pletion of works, it should transfer to the government the public open space, as well as governmental and community space within the building,
i.e. the G/IC gross floor area, so that the government could manage it and assign it to non-governmental agencies. Upon the expiration of the con- tract, the developer should return to the government the entire site and the related building, so that the government could retain the ownership of the West Wing site.
The urban design of the project would be enhanced. The exterior design, external walls and choice of materials, among other aspects, should feature government participation, to ensure harmony with the historical ambi- ence of the entire site.

On the afternoon of the same day, 17 AAB members attended the meeting and unanimously rated the entire CGO a Grade 1 historical building. By con- trast, eight members supported a Grade 1 rating for the West Wing and eight others supported a Grade 2 rating. Eventually, Bernard Chan, Chairman of the AAB, cast a decisive vote in support of the Grade 2 rating. A one-month period of public consultation ensued.53 During the consultation period, former Secretary for Works Michael Wright and former Chief Secretary David Akers- Jones advised the government to conserve the Government Hill as a whole and not to demolish the West Wing. There were also 6,000 signatures collected from the public in support of the preservation. On 17 December 2012, another AAB meeting was held to review the West Wing rating, which eventually accorded the Grade 1 status to the West Wing, the same as the East and Main Wings, with 12 votes in favour of the Grade 1 rating, 8 votes in favour of the Grade 2 rating and 2 votes in abstention.54

52 Oriental Daily News, 14 June 2012, p.A06, http://orientaldaily.on.cc/cnt/news/20120614/00176_037. html.

53 The Sun, 15 June 2012, p.A06, the-sun.on.cc/cnt/news/20120615/00407_022.html.

54 Wen Wei Po, 18 December 2012, http://paper.wenweipo.com/2012/12/18/HK1212180039.htm.

On 4 December, Secretary for Development Paul Chan announced the gov- ernment’s decision to reuse the West Wing, which would be preserved and reno- vated for use by the Department of Justice and law-related, non-governmental organisations. Secretary for Justice Yuen Kwok-keung also remarked that the reuse of the West Wing would allow the Department of Justice to consolidate its offices in the Queensway Government Offices and the rented ones in commer- cial buildings nearby. Besides, the Hague Conference on Private International Law decided to set up its Asia Pacific Regional Office in Hong Kong, which would help attract more international legal organisations as well as arbitration and mediation institutions to set up offices in Hong Kong, thus establishing the competitiveness of Hong Kong as an international arbitration and mediation centre.55 The reuse of the West Wing of the CGO added another historic build- ing in Central.

Revitalisation of historic buildings

The public enthusiasm for the preservation of historic buildings was greater than the Government expected, which was very much related to the emphasis on the self-identity of the Hong Kong people after the handover.

In 2007, the Planning Department issued Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy: Final Report, making a statement on the heritage conservation policy. The report stressed that the government would ‘protect, conserve and revitalize as appropriate historical and heritage sites and buildings through rel- evant and sustainable approaches for the benefit and enjoyment of present and future generations’ and that, ‘in implementing this policy, due regard should be given to development needs in the public interest, respect for private property rights, budgetary considerations, cross-sector collaboration and active engage- ment of stakeholders and the general public’.56 In the 2007–08 Policy Address, the Chief Executive even stated:

Cultural life is a key component of a quality city life. A progressive city treasures its own culture and history along with a living experience unique to the city. In recent years, Hong Kong people have expressed our passion for our culture and lifestyle. This is something we should cherish. In the next five years, I will press ahead with our work on heritage conservation.57

The conservation of the CPS Compound shows that the government has become more proactive in promoting heritage conservation since 2007.

55 ‘Opening Remark by Secretary for Development for the Press Conference on the Issues of Central Government Offices West Wing and Ho Tung Gardens’, Press Releases, 4 December 2012, http://www.info. gov.hk/gia/general/201212/04/P201212040534.htm; ‘Opening Remark by Secretary for Justice for the Press Conference on the Issues of Central Government Offices West Wing and Ho Tung Gardens’, Press Releases, 4 December 2012, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201212/04/P201212040567.htm.

56 Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Development, ‘Progress Report on Heritage Conservation Initiatives’, 26 February 2013, p.1.

57 2007–08 Policy Address website, http://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/07-08/chi/p49.html.

According to the government conservation policy announced in 2007, project proponents and relevant works departments for all new capital works projects would be required to consider whether their projects would affect sites or build- ings of historic or archaeological significance. If the answer was affirmative, then a Heritage Impact Assessment would be required. Mitigation measures should be devised and the public should be engaged.58 The said policy came into effect as from 1 January 2008. The Antiquities and Monuments Office (AMO), founded in 1976, conducted a comprehensive survey on buildings completed before 1950 across the territory between 1996 and 2000, and recorded 8,800 such buildings. Between 2002 and 2004, in response to public requirements for the conservation of antique buildings, the AMO selected 1,444 buildings of higher heritage value,59 and graded them based on their historical value, archi- tectural features and community functions. As of 4 March 2015, the AAB had graded 1,307 buildings, including 169 as Grade 1 historical buildings, 349 as Grade 2 and 483 as Grade 3, in addition to 288 buildings with a nil grade status. Besides, 18 buildings were demolished or rebuilt during the assessment period. As at May 2015, there were a total of 108 declared monuments in the territory.60 The government invited non-profit-making organisations to run social enter- prises in historical buildings for the sake of adaptive reuse.61 It also provided appropriate incentives to facilitate the conservation of privately owned his- toric buildings.62 Besides, the government offered to carry out repair and res- toration works of declared monuments, or items deemed by the government to be monuments under private ownership. Starting in 2008, the government expanded the scheme to also assist owners of private graded historic buildings to carry out repairs and regular maintenance works. On 25 April 2008, the gov- ernment created the post of Commissioner for Heritage, who provides a focal point for the government’s heritage conservation work, and local and overseas

networking.

In the 2009–10 Policy Address, the government proposed initiatives for ‘conserving Central’, including:

sites 1 and 2 adjacent to the Central piers: to reduce the development density and to open up public space along the waterfront for recreational and cultural uses;
the Central Market: to remove it from the Application List and hand it over to the Urban Renewal Authority (URA) for conservation and revi- talisation, as this would make the market an ‘urban oasis’ for white-collar

58 Conserve and Revitalise Hong Kong Heritage website, http://www.heritage.gov.hk/tc/heritage/conser vation.htm.
59 Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Development, ‘Progress Report on Heritage Conservation Initiatives’, 28 April 2009, p.3.
60 Antiquities and Monuments Office website, http://www.amo.gov.hk/b5/monuments.php.
61 Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Home Affairs, ‘Built Heritage Conservation Policy’, 20 December 2007, p.2.
62 Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Home Affairs, ‘Built Heritage Conservation Policy’, 20 December 2007, p.2.
workers in the daytime and a new gathering area for locals and tourists in the evenings and at weekends;
the original site of the Central School: to draw up a plan for the renovation of the two former police quarters blocks, and to invite interested organisa- tions and enterprises to submit proposals for operating creative industries;
the Central Police Station Compound: to entrust the Hong Kong Jockey Club with the conservation and the initial operation;
the Central Government Offices: to preserve buildings of historical value;
Murray Building: to recommend converting it into a hotel through open tender; and
the Court of Final Appeal: to conserve the building of the Missions étrangères de Paris as a declared monument, after the relocation of the Court of Final Appeal to the existing Legislative Building.

As noted in the 2007–08 Policy Address, the government launched the Revitalising Historic Buildings through Partnership Scheme,63 allowing non- governmental organisations to apply for adaptive reuse of government-owned historic buildings. The scheme was intended to preserve historic buildings and put them to good and innovative use, to transform them into unique cultural landmarks, to promote active public participation in their conservation, and to create job opportunities at the district level.64 In addition to the Revitalising Historic Buildings through Partnership Scheme, the government cooperated with the HKJC and the URA in revitalisation and conservation.65 There were 16 historical buildings revitalised in 2008–2014. The details of their conservation are specified in Table 6.6.

On 9 January 2015, the AAB completed the policy review on the conserva- tion of historic buildings and proposed four focal points:66

to set up a dedicated fund on the conservation of built heritage, for the sake of funding public education and publicity activities, academic research, public engagement and consultation programmes;
to offer prevailing incentives such as relaxation of plot ratio and land exchange through a more systematic mechanism, for the sake of promot- ing adoption of ‘performance-based’ alternative approaches by owners of historical buildings in related revitalisation works;
to conserve and protect selected building clusters with unique heritage value under the ‘point–line–plane’ approach; and
to arrange thematic surveys or mapping exercises on building clusters with

63 Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Home Affairs, ‘Revitalising Historic Buildings through Partnership Scheme’, 20 December 2007, p.1.

64 Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Home Affairs, ‘Revitalising Historic Buildings through Partnership Scheme’, 20 December 2007, pp.1–2.

65 ‘Opening Remarks by Secretary for Development at the Press Conference on Heritage Conservation Work’, Press Releases, 14 June 2012, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201206/14/P201206140459.htm.

66 ‘Antiquities Advisory Board Releases Report on Policy Review on Conservation of Built Heritage’, Press Releases, 19 January 2015, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201501/09/P201501090533.htm.

Table 6.6 Details of the revitalisation scheme of 16 historic buildings (2008–2014)

Year	Batch of revitalisation scheme	Year built	Grading	Name of the historic building	New use after revitalisation	NPO in charge
2008–09	Batch I	1902	Grade 2	Old tai O police Station	tai O Heritage Hotel	Hong Kong Heritage conservation
						Foundation Ltd
		1920–1930	Grade 3	Fong Yuen Study Hall	Fong Yuen Study Hall – tourism	Social Service Department, Yuen Institute
					and chinese cultural centre cum
					Ma Wan Residents Museum
		1921–1924	Grade 3	Lai chi Kok Hospital	Hong Kong cultural Heritage	Hong Kong Institution for promotion of
						chinese culture
		1931	Grade 1	Lui Seng chun	Hong Kong Baptist University	Hong Kong Baptist University
					chinese Medicine and Healthcare
					centre – Lui Seng chun
		1960	Grade 2	North Kowloon Magistracy	ScAD Hong Kong campus	ScAD Foundation (HK) Ltd
		1954	Grade 2	Mei Ho House	Mei Ho House as city Hostel	Hong Kong Youth Hostel Association
2009–10	Batch II	1899	Grade 1	Old tai po police Station	the Green Hub for sustainable	Kadoorie Farm and Botanic Garden
					living	corporation
				the Blue House cluster:	Viva Blue House	St. James’ Settlement (joint applicants:
		1923–1925	Grade 1	– Blue House;		community cultural concern and
		1922–1925	Grade 3;	– Yellow House;		Heritage Hong Kong Foundation Limited)
		1956–1957	Nil grade	– Orange House
		1937–1957	Grade 3	Stone Houses	Stone Houses Revitalisation	Wing Kwong So-care company Limited
					Scheme	(joint applicant: Wing Kwong pentecostal
						Holiness church Limited)

Table 6.6 (continued)

Year	Batch of revitalisation scheme	Year built	Grading	Name of the historic building	New use after revitalisation	NPO in charge
2011–12	Batch III	1933–1935	Grade 1	Haw par Mansion	Haw par Music Farm	Aw Boon Haw Foundation (cooperating
						organisation: HKAM Foundation Limited)
		1953	Grade 3	Bridges Street Market	Hong Kong News-Expo	Journalism Education Foundation Hong
						Kong Limited
		1960	Grade 3	Former Fanling Magistracy	Hong Kong Federation of Youth	Hong Kong Federation of Youth Groups
					Groups (HKFYG) Institute for
					Leadership Development
2014	Batch IV	1949	Grade 3	No.12 School Street	tai Hang Fire Dragon Heritage	tai Hang Residents’ Welfare Association
					centre
		1887	Grade 1	Old Dairy Farm Senior Staff	pokfulam Farm	caritas–Hong Kong
				Quarters
		1933	Grade 2	Lady Ho tung Welfare	Lady Ho tung Welfare centre	Sik Sik Yuen (cooperating organisation:
				centre	Eco-Learn Institute	IMc of Ho Koon Nature Education cum
						Astronomical centre)

Source: conserve and Revitalise Hong Kong Heritage website: https://www.heritage.gov.hk/tc/rhbtp/about.htm.

heritage value for drawing up appropriate conservation strategies and pro- tection measures if necessary and for future planning.

By 2015, conservation of historic buildings and monuments was no longer just about sporadic cases. Instead, the related policy featured systematic plan- ning to give play to the economic role of such heritage. Clusters of monuments with local characteristics are city landmarks. But, more importantly, permanent preservation of Hong Kong’s history and culture are synchronised with the city’s overall economic development.

Reconstruction and conservation

Since Hong Kong’s return to China, the city has been facing a number of prob- lems, such as the outbreak of avian influenza, the increasing number of new arrivals from the Mainland, the SARS epidemic, the movement to protect Victoria Harbour, defence of heritage and historic buildings, and so on. Those internal conflicts are even more difficult to deal with than external impacts such as the Asian financial crisis. The Territorial Development Strategy (later renamed the Territorial Development Strategy Review) endorsed by the Executive Council on 24 February 1998 alone would not be adequate as the guidelines for Hong Kong’s development after 2000, nor would it be sufficient to cope with the ever changing social development needs. The long-term planning of Hong Kong needs to be adapted to public aspirations, with efforts to improve domestic gov- ernance and to stabilise public confidence. Only by so doing can we keep tabs on the latest global developments and identify new goals of long-term develop- ment. Hong Kong is not only a major city of China, but also an important inter- national city in Asia, having the same prominent status as New York in North America and London in Europe.

The 2030 planning objectives

At the beginning of 2000, the Planning Department reviewed the policy on long-term planning and conducted the study of Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy (Hong Kong 2030) for the city’s long-term development in the following three decades from a new perspective. Although the study still focused on the formulation of long-term strategies on land use, transport and environmental protection, as guidelines for Hong Kong’s future development and strategic infrastructure,67 it also proposed new ideas to assist the govern- ment in meeting the community’s expectations for town planning. The Inception Report of Hong Kong 2030 was published in 2001, followed by public con- sultation as usual, which lasted seven long years, before the Final Report was completed in 2007.

67 Hong Kong Planning Department, Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy: Inception Report, Hong Kong: Planning Department, 2001, http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/p_study/comp_s/hk2030/ chi/inception.

The Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy: Final Report published in 2007 takes sustainable development as the main planning objective, instead of just being trend-based, so as to turn Hong Kong into ‘Asia’s World City’. Related focuses include: 1) providing a good-quality living environment by ensuring that development is undertaken with due regard to the environmen- tal carrying capacity, enhancing the townscape and regenerating the old urban areas; 2) conserving the natural landscape which is of ecological, geological, sci- entific and other significance and preserving the cultural heritage; 3) enhancing Hong Kong’s hub functions by setting aside sufficient land reserves to meet the changing needs of commerce and industry; 4) meeting housing and community needs by ensuring timely provision of adequate land and infrastructure for the development of housing and community facilities; 5) providing a framework to develop a safe, efficient, economically viable and environmentally friendly transport system; 6) promoting arts, culture and tourism to ensure Hong Kong continues to be a world-class destination with a unique cultural experience for visitors; and 7) strengthening links with the Mainland to cope with the rapid growth of cross-boundary interaction. With the concepts of ‘do more with less’ and ‘quality over quantity’, the report concentrates on three broad directions of development, namely providing a quality living environment, enhancing economic competitiveness and strengthening links with the Mainland. Hong Kong 2030 focuses on the planning of ‘sustainable growth’. Related strategies lay emphasis on optimising available development opportunities, leveraging on the existing urban infrastructure, reusing or recycling the old urban fabric, and being prudent in opening up greenfield land for development.

To achieve those seven objectives, the Hong Kong 2030 planning framework lists specific strategies as follows:

Developing information technology and its implications for land use: When formulating development strategies and response plans, priority will be given to the assessment and consideration of IT development trends, high-tech and high-value-added industries, and their implications on the land use demands, with an aim to facilitate the future growth of information technology.
Exploring development opportunities in the New Territories: The potential development capacity of the New Territories will be assessed to explore key constraints in development, such as the lack of infrastructure and dif- ficulties in land assembly owing to fragmented ownership, together with possible solutions. These opportunities will be prioritised for reference in formulating development options.
Predicting population growth and housing land demands: It is necessary to assess the implications for the future population growth of Hong Kong relating to children of Hong Kong residents born on the Mainland, and to assess housing land demands based on different assumptions about popula- tion growth. The target population is set at 10 million or above, which will serve as the basis for planning to meet land and infrastructure needs. In addition, changes in the age structure will be taken into account and prob- lems of population ageing will be evaluated.
Considering the needs for port and other major infrastructure facilities: The Third Port Development Strategy Review (1998) proposed the construction of Tonggu Waterway, with new port facilities located in Tuen Mun West. Future planning will take into consideration the findings of the Study on Port Back-up and Land Requirements (2000), the Feasibility Study for Additional Cross-border Links (2000), the Third Comprehensive Transport Study (1999) and the Second Railway Development Study (2000). For the planning of port facilities, attention will be paid to the implications of intermodal transport links for the further development of Hong Kong as a transport hub in the Asia-Pacific region. Efforts will be made to fully review and examine the future requirements for major infrastructure facilities of territorial significance, such as waste-to-energy incinerators, sludge incinera- tors, other major sewage and waste treatment and disposal facilities, prisons, crematoria, and major territorial public transport facilities and highway and railway networks. Potential locations will be carefully selected to ensure their coordination and compatibility with adjoining land uses.
Promoting the construction of tourist attractions and the preservation of heritage: The tourism industry is one of the traditional economic strong- holds of Hong Kong. It is necessary to consolidate existing tourist facilities and plan for new tourist attractions. Such facilities should be of different sizes and be based on the city’s unique East-meets-West characteristics. They should consist of not only individual tourism projects but also dis- trict- or area-based tourist attractions. A broad physical planning strategy for tourism and supporting facilities will be formulated, so as to maintain Hong Kong as a key tourist destination for visitors from the Mainland, from other Asian countries and from the rest of the world.
Facilitating socio-economic integration with the Mainland: In order to ascertain the impacts of development on Hong Kong and its Mainland counterpart on both sides of the boundary, and to capitalise on the possible opportunities arising from the development of the Mainland, it is recom- mended that the following aspects are studied: patterns of cross-boundary travel; trends of Hong Kong residents residing on the Mainland; socio- economic development trends in Guangdong Province and the implica- tions on strategic planning in Hong Kong; spatial development patterns in the Pearl River Delta (PRD) region, particularly the respective roles of major cities such as Guangzhou, Zhuhai, Shenzhen and Hong Kong; the positioning of Hong Kong in the regional development of the PRD and the strategic planning implications; the need for additional cross-links; the fea- sibility of providing housing and social facilities on the Mainland for Hong Kong residents; tourism and recreational developments in the PRD and their implications for Hong Kong; the potential and opportunities of eco- nomic cooperation with Shenzhen and the strategic planning implications for Hong Kong; the potential and opportunities to strengthen the exist- ing environmental cooperation with Shenzhen and its strategic planning implications; the interface between urban development on both sides of the boundary with Shenzhen; the feasibility of ‘boundary towns’, including
constraints, possible locations, expected functions and the required devel- opment scale.
Giving consideration to environmental factors and nature conservation: To build a better environment, some ‘restricted areas’ will be identified to safe- guard natural heritage and marvellous landscapes. Regional environmental issues covering the PRD will be taken into account when formulating devel- opment strategies and response plans.

These seven objectives show that, for future planning, Hong Kong not only focuses on local economic development, but also gives priority to cul- tural conservation and environmental protection, with the socio-economic integration with the Mainland being a top priority. Since the Metro Area is a development focus for the government, land supply in the urban area can be increased by means of changes in land uses during the process of urban renewal according to the objectives stipulated in Hong Kong 2030. (See Figures 6.5 and 6.6.)

Urban renewal

According to the government’s Planning for Growth published in 1985, the Metro Area would be the engine for the city’s overall development. In 1987, the then Governor, David Wilson, pointed out that earlier-developed parts of the urban area were very crowded, with poor living conditions and a lack of basic amenities. In view of the dire need for improvements, he vigorously promoted the Metroplan. On 15 January 1988, the Land Development Corporation (LDC) was established to be in charge of urban development, which showed the government’s determination in that regard. In the early days of the LDC, the convention of conserving historical buildings had yet to be formed, and striving for economic efficiency was the ideal for urban renewal in the 1980s.

Prior to 1987, urban renewal was mainly driven by private developers, who valued profits over urgency. Owing to the extensive areas and fragmented own- ership involved, it was difficult for private developers to easily assemble all the land in need of redevelopment. Under section 10 of the Land Development Corporation Ordinance (Cap. 15), the LDC should conduct its business accord- ing to prudent commercial principles.68 It could also apply to the Government for recovery of the remaining interests within a specified scope of redevel- opment, so as to improve the efficiency of renewal. The LDC officially com- menced operation on 15 January 1988.69 On 12 November of the same year, the LDC signed letters of intent with four developers, namely Cheung Kong (Holdings) Limited, New World Development Company Limited, Sun Hung

68 Hong Kong Legislative Council, ‘Background Brief on the Urban Renewal Authority’, LC Paper No. CB(1)1947/08-09(04), 16 June 2009, p.1, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr08-09/english/panels/dev/papers/ dev0623cb1-1947-4-e.pdf.

69 Land Development Corporation, Land Development Corporation Annual Report 2000–2001, Hong Kong, Land Development Corporation, 2001, p.48.

Source: Hong Kong planning Department, Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy: Final Report, Hong Kong, planning Department, 2007, p.123.

Figure 6.5 Preferred development option for Hong Kong 2030 (long-term – by 2030)

Source: Hong Kong planning Department, Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy: Final Report, Hong Kong, planning Department, 2007, pp.162–163.

Figure 6.6 ‘Recommended development pattern’ in Hong Kong 2030

Kai Properties Limited and Great Eagle Limited, to launch eight redevelopment projects in Central, Sheung Wan, Wan Chai, Yau Ma Tei and Mong Kok under a public–private partnership (PPP) mode.70

Under the PPP mode and without the use of public money, the LDC com- pleted and sold 16 redevelopment projects between 1988 and 2001, with a total cost of 66 billion dollars. Those projects altogether provided 8,200 residential units and 540,000 square metres of commercial and office space. Moreover, they made available 39,000 square metres of government, institution and com- munity facilities as well as 40,000 square metres of open space.71 Major projects included conservation of Sheung Wan Market (currently known as Western Market) in 1991, redevelopment of Li Chit Garden in 1994, and redevelopment of Yuen Po Street Bird Garden and the Grand Millennium Plaza in Sheung Wan in 1997.72

Since the LDC should conduct its business according to the principle of financial prudence in accordance with the Land Development Corporation Ordinance, it could only select financially viable projects for redevelopment. When the property market was buoyant, the LDC was still able to attract partners for redevelopment. After the 1997 Asian financial crisis, however, Hong Kong’s economy fell into recession and the property market slumped, leading to fewer lucrative redevelopment projects. Moreover, the LDC was required by law to take all reasonable steps to offer ‘fair and reasonable’ terms to property owners in the assembly process, which meant that the LDC had to conduct protracted negotiations with property owners and to make several rounds of offers before it could request the government to resume the remain- ing interests for redevelopment.73 The government only provided a non- revolving interest-bearing loan facility of 100 million dollars, without injecting any funds to assist acquisitions. Even for lucrative redevelopment projects, the returns could not be reaped until the projects were complete. The LDC also did not have sufficient resources to rehouse housing tenants affected by redevelopment.

In 1999 the government conducted a study on urban renewal strategy, and made new recommendations in that regard. In the Policy Address, the Chief Executive announced the establishment of the URA in place of the LDC. In July 2000, the government drafted the Urban Renewal Authority Bill. On 1 May 2001, the URA was established under section 3 of the Urban Renewal Authority

70 Land Development Corporation, The LDC Experience: 12 Years’ Efforts of Urban Renewal, 1988–2000, Hong Kong, Land Development Corporation, 2000, p.14.

71 Land Development Corporation, Land Development Corporation Annual Report 2000–2001, Hong Kong, Land Development Corporation, 2001, p.18. The Land Development Corporation Annual Report 1999– 2000 mentioned that the LDC had ‘either completed or set in motion 30 projects’; see Land Development Corporation, Land Development Corporation Annual Report 1999–2000, Hong Kong, Land Development Corporation, 2000, p.9.

72 Urban Renewal Authority, Towards Urban Renewal v3.0, Hong Kong, Urban Renewal Authority, 2008, pp.25–29.

73 ‘People First Approach to Urban Renewal’, Press Releases, 27 November 2011, http://www.info.gov.hk/ gia/general/200111/27/1127225.htm.

Ordinance (Cap. 563).74 There were three major differences between the URA and the LDC in terms of the urban renewal model:75

The land assembly procedure under the URA model was streamlined. The URA could request the government to resume land without going through a protracted acquisition process.
There would be more rehousing resources to accommodate affected tenants. The Hong Kong Housing Authority and the Hong Kong Housing Society both agreed to become rehousing agents for the URA. Each agency would provide 1,000 public rental units in each of the first five years of the URA’s operation for rehousing tenants affected by redevelopment projects.
Financial and non-financial arrangements would be put in place by the gov- ernment to enhance the viability of URA projects. Private sector participa- tion would be encouraged, in order to provide for a self-financing urban renewal programme in the longer term.

In November 2001, the government published the Urban Renewal Strategy to review the conditions of old buildings in urban areas, pointing out that there were approximately 9,300 privately owned buildings aged 30 years or above in the Metro Area (Hong Kong Island, Kowloon, Tsuen Wan and Kwai Tsing). The URA then developed guiding principles76 and a 20-year urban renewal pro- gramme for the redevelopment of some 2,000 ageing or dilapidated buildings, the improvement of the environmental quality of over 67 hectares of old and run-down urban areas, the rehousing of some 27,000 tenant households, the provision of around 60,000 square metres of open space, the provision of about 90,000 square metres of floor space for use as community and welfare facilities, and the provision of seven new school campuses.77

The government designated nine target areas for redevelopment: Kwun Tong, Ma Tau Kok, Sai Ying Pun, Sham Shui Po, Tai Kok Tsui, Tsuen Wan, Wan Chai, Yau Ma Tei and Yau Tong. It included 200 new projects and 25 uncompleted LDC projects for redevelopment. The 225 project areas covered a total area of 67 hectares, affecting 126,000 persons living in 32,000 flats. Priority was given by the URA to 25 projects which had been initiated but were yet to be completed by the LDC.78 (See Table 6.7.)

From July 2008 to June 2010, the Development Bureau carried out an

74 Hong Kong Legislative Council, ‘Background Brief on the Urban Renewal Authority’, LC Paper No. CB(1)1947/08-09(04), 16 June 2009, p.2, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr08-09/chinese/panels/dev/papers/ dev0623cb1-1947-4-c.pdf.

75 ‘People First Approach to Urban Renewal’, Press Releases, 27 November 2011, http://www.info.gov.hk/ gia/general/200111/27/1127225.htm.

76 Hong Kong Planning and Lands Bureau, Urban Renewal Strategy, Hong Kong, Planning and Lands Bureau, 2001, p.1.

77 Hong Kong Planning and Lands Bureau, Urban Renewal Strategy, Hong Kong, Planning and Lands Bureau, 2001, pp.2–3.

78 Hong Kong Planning and Lands Bureau, Urban Renewal Strategy, Hong Kong, Planning and Lands Bureau, 2001, p.4.

Table 6.7 Geographical distribution of 25 projects initiated by the LDC and prioritised by the URA

District Location of redevelopment project Total number of

redevelopment projects

Sham Shui po po On Road/Shun Ning Road 7

castle peak Road/cheung Wah Street (Hong Kong Housing Society responsible for the project)

castle peak Road/Un chau Street (Hong Kong Housing Society responsible for the project)

Un chau Street/Fuk Wing Street (Hong Kong Housing Society responsible for the project)

castle peak Road/Hing Wah Street (Hong Kong Housing Society responsible for the project)

po On Road/Wai Wai Road (Hong Kong Housing Society responsible for the project)

Fuk Wing Street/Fuk Wa Street

tai Kok tsui cherry Street 4

Bedford Road/Larch Street Larch Street/Fir Street

pine Street/Anchor Street

Mong Kok Reclamation Street 3

Sai Yee Street Macpherson Stadium

Hung Hom Baker court 1

central and Western

peel Street/Graham Street 3

Wing Lee Street/Staunton Street First Street/Second Street

Wan chai Lee tung Street/McGregor Street 3

Johnston Road Queen’s Road East

Shau Kei Wan Shau Kei Wan Road (Hong Kong Housing Society 2

responsible for the project) Sai Wan Hon Street

Wong tai Sin Nga tsin Wai Village 1

Kwun tong Kwun tong town centre 1

Note: In 2001, the redevelopment project at Hanoi Road in tsim Sha tsui, announced for implementation by the Land Development corporation, was undertaken by a private developer.

Sources: Hong Kong planning and Lands Bureau, Urban Renewal Strategy, Hong Kong, planning and Lands Bureau, 2001, pp.1, 4; Ming Pao, 3 January 1998, p.A4; Sing Tao Daily, 3 January 1998, p.A12.

extensive three-stage public consultation to fully review the Urban Renewal Strategy (URS). In February 2011, the Development Bureau published the revised Urban Renewal Strategy, under which the government would fully reju- venate older urban areas by way of redevelopment, rehabilitation, revitalisation

and reservation (the 4R business strategy). It also adopted a ‘people first, district-based and public participatory’ approach. Implementation of the URS should be undertaken by the URA, together with all the other stakehold- ers or participants (including related government bureaus and departments, relevant district councils, the Housing Society, the private sector (property owners and developers), individual owners, professionals and non-govern- mental organisations), with ‘redevelopment’ and ‘rehabilitation’ as the URA’s core businesses.79

In 2004, the URA announced initiatives to help carry out building rehabilita- tion work, including the establishment of a Building Rehabilitation Materials Incentive Scheme and provision of interest-free loans and grants. As of January 2006, about 100 buildings had been restored under the URA’s rehabilitation scheme.80 In 2009 the government launched Operation Building Bright, provid- ing property owners with financial and technical support in the repair and main- tenance of old and dilapidated buildings.

The ages of buildings in urban areas grow over the years. Pursuant to the building collapse at No. 45J Ma Tau Wai Road on 29 January 2010, the Buildings Department once again inspected all old buildings across the terri- tory and discovered that there were as many as 4,011 private buildings aged 50 years or above across the territory, most of which were located in Kowloon City (1,088), followed by Yau Tsim Mong (645), Sham Shui Po (515), Central and Western (493) and Wan Chai (490).81 Buildings aged 50 years or above accounted for 81 per cent of the total in these five districts. The number of buildings aged 30 years or above in 2011 had increased by 50 per cent com- pared with 9,300 in 2001.

On 31 December 2013, the Housing Department tallied the number of old buildings again, and discovered that, excluding New Territories exempted houses, there were about 9,890 private buildings of three storeys or more aged at least 40 years across the territory (Table 6.8). The Buildings Department estimated that the number of buildings aged 40 years would increase annually by about 600 in the following decade.82 Learning from the lesson of the building collapse at Ma Tau Wai Road, the government spent 3.5 billion dollars to help owners of over 3,200 buildings aged 30 years or over to carry out repair works. The scheme was implemented by the URA and the Housing Society in collabo- ration with the Buildings Department.83

79 Urban Renewal Authority website, http://ura.org.hk/tc/about-ura.aspx; Hong Kong Development Bureau, Urban Renewal Strategy, Hong Kong, Development Bureau, 2011, http://www.ursreview.gov.hk/ tch/doc/New%20URS%20(Chi).pdf.

80 Urban Renewal Authority, Towards Urban Renewal v3.0, Hong Kong, Urban Renewal Authority, 2008, pp.31, 33.

81 Buildings Department, Report on the Inspection of Buildings Aged 50 or Above, Hong Kong, Buildings Department, April 2010, Annex 1.

82 ‘LCQ21: Redevelopment of Old Buildings’, Press Releases, 12 February 2014, http://www.info.gov.hk/ gia/general/201402/12/P201402120339.htm.

83 Urban Renewal Authority website, http://ura.org.hk/tc/schemes-and-policies/rehabilitation/opera tion-building-bright.aspx.

Table 6.8 Distribution of private buildings aged 40 years or above in Hong Kong in 2013

District Council district	No. of buildings	District Council district	No. of buildings	District Council district	No. of buildings
Hong Kong Island central and	1,460	Kowloon Yau tsim	1,860	New territories tsuen Wan	300
Western		Mong
Wan chai	1,140	Kowloon city	1,580	North	190
Eastern	580	Sham Shui po	1,200	Yuen Long	150
Southern	440	Kwun tong	370	Kwai tsing	120
		Wong tai Sin	280	tai po	80
				Sha tin	60
				Sai Kung	30
				tuen Mun	30
				Islands	20
Sub-total	3,620		5,290		980
total					9,890

Source: ‘LcQ21: Redevelopment of Old Buildings’, Press Releases, 12 February 2014.

Conservation and reconstruction

It is not easy to demolish old and dilapidated buildings in urban areas for rede- velopment. Compared with owners of ground-floor shops, residents in old buildings have a greater desire for demolition. Old buildings are impaired and pose a safety threat to residents, but shops located in downtown areas enjoy higher pedestrian flows and easy sales. Therefore merchants are mostly against demolition and redevelopment. The government faces great difficulties in redevelopment, since it has to not only compensate property owners but also take into account civil conservation issues. On 13 August 1997, the Planning, Environment and Lands Branch approved the LDC’s proposed redevelopment (H15) at Lee Tung Street/McGregor Street,84 which triggered an eight-year dispute and changed the previous value concept of putting economic benefits first.

The H15 redevelopment project could be traced back to November 1997, when the Land Development Corporation presented the proposal to Wain Chai Provisional District Board.85 In January 1998, the LDC announced Lee

84 University of Hong Kong, Executive Summary of the Study of the Achievements and Challenges of Urban Renewal in Hong Kong, March 2010, p.3, http://www.ursreview.gov.hk/tch/doc/ES%20achievements%20 n%20challenges%20CHI%209-5-10.pdf.

85 Hong Kong Legislative Council, ‘Wanchai District Council Position Paper on Wanchai Redevelopment’, LC Paper No. CB(1)196/04-05(03), October 2004, p.17, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/chinese/ panels/plw/papers/plw1123cb1-196-3c.pdf; Ma Jiewei, Wu Junxiong and Lu Dale, eds, Xianggang wenhua zhengzhi (Hong Kong’s Culture and Politics), Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 2009, p.97.

Tung Street in Wan Chai to be one of the 25 redevelopment projects and for- mulated a development plan according to the Land Development Corporation Ordinance. On 28 August 1998, the TPB approved the draft development plan of Lee Tung Street/McGregor Street. The project was finally approved in 1999 under the Town Planning Ordinance but was then put on hold owing to the financial turmoil. It was not restarted when the URA was established in 2001. In October 2003, the URA carried out the Lee Tung Street project, with a price tag of 3.58 billion dollars, at the request of some Legislative Councillors and affected residents.

Lee Tung Street, commonly known as the ‘Wedding Card Street’, covered an area of about 8,900 square metres. It was built in the 1910s and rebuilt in 1958 with 54 buildings, mostly tenement buildings, but there were also Western-style buildings. The six-storey buildings were similar in style and had interconnected rooftops. It was one of the few streets in Hong Kong with intact buildings from the 1950s and 1960s. Although Lee Tung Street was well known as the ‘Wedding Card Street’, it was not a trading centre of the printing industry in its early days. Prior to the reconstruction in the 1950s, there were tailor shops and barber shops in the street. Later there were also construction firms and hardware workshops. Printing shops did not appear in the street until the late 1950s. Offset printing shops were trend-setters of the time, and there were also workshops printing envelopes, letterheads and busi- ness cards. Shops offering the hot-stamping service or making wedding cards did not appear until the 1980s. The printing shops served an extensive range of customers both at home and abroad, thus bringing international fame to the ‘Wedding Card Street’.

There were 930 households affected by the redevelopment (including about 517 residential tenants) and nearly 100 merchants, with a total of 647 prop- erty interests.86 It was the URA’s biggest redevelopment project before 2005. Residents refused to accept the cash offer and made a ‘flat-for-flat, shop-for- shop’ counter-offer to the URA. They requested properties in nearby Ship Street in exchange as compensation, so that the local characteristics of wedding card printing could be preserved in Ship Street. Residents opting for the ‘flat-for-flat’ approach would voluntarily forgo the URA’s compensations based on the value of a notional replacement flat that was seven years old. Instead, they wanted to move into Project H16 on Johnston Road on a ‘foot-for-foot’ basis and were willing to pay the price difference between a new building and a seven-year one.87 The URA, however, did not give any positive response. In March 2004, the residents set out to design a ‘Dumbbell Proposal’ featuring a phased redevel- opment, hoping to preserve the tenement buildings in the middle of Lee Tung Street, so that tenants and merchants hoping to stay in such buildings could

86 Hong Kong Legislative Council, ‘Wanchai District Council Position Paper on Wanchai Redevelopment’, LC Paper No. CB(1)263/04-05(04), November 2004, p.1, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/chinese/ panels/plw/papers/plw1123cb1-263-4c.pdf.

87 Zhou Qiwei, Du Liji and Li Weiyi, eds, Huangfan fanfei chu: kan women de Lidongjie (Home Where the Yellow Banners Fly), Hong Kong: v-artivist Co., 2007, p.192.

move back to the street after the redevelopment. By so doing, they hoped to pre- serve the characteristics of the community network and the printing industry, as well as an intact street of the 1960s for Hong Kong.

As of 16 November 2004, the URA had successfully acquired 75 per cent of the property interests. It rejected the ‘Dumbbell Proposal’, citing complexity. The residents then submitted the proposal to the TPB for review. In March and July 2005, the TPB rejected the residents’ proposal on two occasions, because, among other things, the URA had acquired a majority of the property interests and it would be difficult for the residents to implement the proposal without the URA’s support. In the meantime, residents and merchants moved out one after another. On 5 August 2005, the URA resumed the remaining unsold proper- ties through the government under the Lands Resumption Ordinance. Residents filed an appeal against the TPB’s decision in September 2005, and some tenants refused to move out. On 5 November 2005, the government resumed all the property interests.

The struggle over Lee Tung Street sparked a strong public outcry for preserv- ing public spaces with collective memories. In the Lee Tung Street project, the URA preserved the pre-war tenement buildings at 186–190 Queen’s Road East. It also retained some buildings in the nearby Johnston Road project, as well as the open-air bazaars in Tai Yuen Street and Cross Street. Those facts, together with later incidents involving Wan Chai Market and the Blue House, were all achievements of community participation.

In response to the public aspiration for conservation, experts were invited to formulate conservation programmes for all future redevelopment projects in the Metro Area. For the redevelopment of Nga Tsin Wai Village in Kowloon (K1 Project) in early 2006, the strategy developed by a UNESCO conservation consultant team was followed. To be specific, efforts were made to preserve the gatehouse, the embedded stone tablet ‘Hing Yau Yu’ and the Tin Hau Temple. In addition, the Central Axis, the lane pattern and eight village houses along the Central Axis with intact historical architectural elements would be conserved.88 A conservation park would also be built centred around and spreading out from the Central Axis, in order to feature the historical elements and other excavated underground relics. Besides, in 2010, owing to the public attention aroused by an award-winning film featuring Wing Lee Street,89 the URA announced that it would excise the Staunton Street/Wing Lee Street Development Scheme (H19 Project) and designate the area as a conservation zone.90 A condition was imposed that any future redevelopment on the site should not exceed four storeys. This would preserve the ambience of Wing Lee Street defined by the proportion of height of the existing buildings to the width of the terrace. Initiatives were taken to rehabilitate the properties acquired at Nos 5, 7, 8 and

88 ‘LCQ7: Nga Tsin Wai Village Redevelopment Project’, Press Releases, 19 June 2013, http://www.info. gov.hk/gia/general/201306/19/P201306190347.htm.

89 Urban Renewal Authority, ‘G7 Centre at Wing Lee Street’, http://www.ura.org.hk/tc/projects/herit age-preservation-and-revitalisation/central/g7%20centre%20at%20wls.aspx.

90 Apple Daily, 17 March 2010, http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/news/art/20100317/13829008.

9 of the street and license them to NGOs and educational institutes for com- munity services.91

‘Flat-for-Flat’ Pilot Scheme

In response to the proposal made by the affected owners and merchants at Lee Tung Street, the government reviewed the 2001 Urban Renewal Strategy between July 2008 and June 2010, and launched the ‘Flat-for-Flat’ Pilot Scheme after public consultation. In other words, apart from the option of cash com- pensation and ex gratia payment,92 owner-occupiers affected by redevelopment projects commencing on or after 24 February 2011 could choose to be relocated to a seven-year-old building in the same district.93 Owner-occupiers opting for ‘flat-for-flat’ could purchase units in URA new development projects built in situ, or those in buildings constructed on earmarked sites for the purpose in Kai Tak Development Area.94

In July 2011, the URA launched the ‘demand-led’ redevelopment model, under which owners of 67 per cent (i.e. two-thirds) or more of the undivided shares of the respective lots of a site might jointly submit an application to the URA to initiate a redevelopment project.95 All applications received would be screened to see if they met the following criteria:

A joint application should be submitted by owners of not less than 67 per cent of the undivided shares in each lot within the site.
Building conditions of all buildings within the Site should be ‘poor’ or ‘varied’.
The site should be larger than 400 square metres. Unless there were special needs or if the site under application could be combined with its adjoining sites for joint development, smaller sites would not be considered.
The proposed project should be one that might be implemented under section 26 of the URA Ordinance and redeveloped into a residential, com- mercial or commercial/residential development.
The site should not consist of buildings or structures of historical, architec- tural or cultural significance unless they could be integrated in the future development.
If there were a District Urban Renewal Forum set up in the related district, the site should be situated within a ‘redevelopment zone’ identified by the

91 Urban Renewal Authority, ‘G7 Centre at Wing Lee Street’, http://www.ura.org.hk/tc/projects/herit age-preservation-and-revitalisation/central/g7%20centre%20at%20wls.aspx.

92 Hong Kong Development Bureau, Urban Renewal Strategy, Hong Kong, Development Bureau, 2011, p.3.

93 Urban Renewal Authority, Urban Renewal Authority, Hong Kong, Urban Renewal Authority, 2012, p.13.

94 Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Development, ‘Updated Background Brief on the Work of the Urban Renewal Authority: Meeting on 24 June 2014’, LC Paper No. CB(1)1623/13-14(04), 17 June 2014, pp.3–4.

95 Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Development, ‘Updated Background Brief on the Work of the Urban Renewal Authority: Meeting on 24 June 2014’, LC Paper No. CB(1)1623/13-14(04), 17 June 2014, p.2.

forum (or at least not situated within a proposed preservation area identi- fied thereby).96

As of September 2015, the URA had received 187 applications over four rounds. Since 1988, the work and the pace of urban renewal have been continu- ously adjusted in line with community aspirations.

Planning and reconstruction

Town plans specifying land uses in different areas and regions served as guidance and regulation after the Second World War.97 Town plans in the 1960s would be directly marked with land uses, such as ‘R’ for residential zones annotated ‘to include residential’ or ‘to include shops’ to indicate the plots could be used for commercial, industrial or residential purposes. But there was no detailed classifi- cation. Starting in the 1970s, the Town Planning Ordinance was constantly under pressure from public opinion. After each lawsuit, the government would review the provisions and make amendments if necessary. For example, the amend- ments in 1974 were related to the addition of the Planning Permission System,98 because the government lost a lawsuit filed by Hopewell Company against the government’s failure to develop town plans according to the ordinance.99 Accordingly, the government needed to add a paragraph stipulating that, ‘for any draft plan prepared before the commencement of the Town Planning Ordinance, any amended diagrams, notes, etc. shall be deemed part of the draft plan’.

Land use zonings other than commercial, industrial or residential started to appear on town plans, such as ‘comprehensive redevelopment area’ (CRA),100 as in the case of Hopewell Centre. In the 1970s, CRA was renamed as ‘other speci- fied uses’ annotated ‘comprehensive redevelopment area’ (OU(CRA)). CRA was introduced because, under subsection (1) of section 4 of the Town Planning Ordinance, land can be planned for residential, commercial, industrial or other specified uses. In 1988, the government amended the Town Planning Ordinance to change CRA to ‘comprehensive development area’ (CDA).

In 1989, the government lost a lawsuit involving the operation of con- tainer back-up areas and open storage space on agricultural land in the New Territories.101 Subsequently in 1991, the government extended the applications of the Town Planning Ordinance to rural areas. In the same year, the government consulted the public on the overall planning review.102 Subsequent amendments included the addition of such land use zonings as open storage, country park,

96 Urban Renewal Authority, ‘Demand-led Redevelopment Project (Pilot Scheme)’, http://ura.org.hk/ tc/schemes-and-policies/redevelopment/ura-implemented-projects/demand-led.aspx.

97 Interview with Ophelia Wong Yuen-sheung, former Deputy Director of Planning, 27 February 2015.

98 Planning Department website, http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/tech_doc/tp_bill/pamphlet2004/.

99 Interview with Fung Chee-keung, 20 March 2012.

100 See http://www.info.gov.hk/tpb/en/forms/Guidelines/pg17_e.pdf.

101 Interview with Fung Chee-keung, 20 March 2012.

102 Hong Kong Democratic Foundation website, http://www.hkdf.org/newsarticles.asp?show=newsarticl es&newsarticle=167; Interview with Fung Chee-keung, 20 March 2012.

agriculture, site of special scientific interest (SSSI) and other specified uses that promote conservation or protection of the environment.

In 1998, the residential (Group E) zone was introduced,103 intended primar- ily for phasing out existing industrial areas through redevelopment or conver- sion for residential use. Such redevelopment projects, however, were subject to application to the Town Planning Board, in order to avoid perpetuation of industrial/residential interface problems. Tai Kok Tsui, for example, used to be a stronghold of cottage factories. The Planning Department ‘rezoned’ the land there for residential use, planning to tear down the factories and redevelop them into residential areas. In response to the transformation of industrial land, the ‘other specified uses’ annotated ‘(business)’ (OU(B)) zone was introduced in 2000, primarily for general business use.

Besides, in response to social changes, the definition of ‘industrial’ use was revised to include many non-traditional industries. The OU(MU) zone was sub- sequently introduced, in place of the previous ‘commercial/residential’ (C/R) use, because land zoned as the commercial/residential category could be used for either or for mixed purposes most of the time. Chungking Mansions in Tsim Sha Tsui is a good example. The OU(MU) concept also allows the coexistence of commercial and residential uses, provided that they are on separate floors of the same building, or in separate buildings of the same development. It is differ- ent from the C/R zone of the past, which allowed residential and non-residential uses on the same floor of the same building.

One of the purposes of land use planning is to control the future land use. When a piece of land is planned for redevelopment, the current use of an exist- ing building on the land can be preserved until there is a change in use or the building is redeveloped.

Planners may specify public spaces in accordance with social needs. In some cases, it is expected that the site can be converted into a public space after the demolition of the existing old building, because the area is too crowded or there are problems with the land lease. If the owner applies for a renewal with the Lands Department upon the expiry of the land lease, the Planning Department may raise an objection citing that the site has been reserved for public space, pending the decision of the Lands Department.

The transformation of industrial zones started in the mid-1980s. At that time, the then Town Planning Office conducted a study on the uses of industrial build- ings and proposed the concept of industrial/office buildings (I/O buildings), featuring higher standards under the Buildings Ordinance for either industrial or office use. However, the problem of a large number of vacant industrial build- ings arising from the relocation of industries to the Mainland in the 1990s could not be addressed merely by conversion of individual buildings. In 2000, 2005, 2009 and 2014 respectively, the Planning Department undertook four rounds of Area Assessments of Industrial Land in the Territory in order to examine the usage of the existing industrial buildings in industrial areas and to consider their

103 See the Hong Kong Place website, http://www.hk-place.com/view.php?id=402.

future planning to satisfy market needs and to better utilise the land resources. On that basis, proposals were made on rezoning the land use and relaxing con- trols on suitable old industrial areas, in particular for those in the Metro Area, so as to expedite the transformation of old industrial areas into business areas104 to meet the needs of the society.105

Revitalisation of industrial buildings can be carried out in two scenarios. For industrial or industrial-office buildings within an OU(B) zone, provision of an office therein only requires submission of an application under section 16 of the Town Planning Ordinance to the Town Planning Board for approval, without the need to amend the OZP. For open-air development or for a building other than an industrial or industrial-office building in an OU(B) zone, ‘office’ use is already permitted. However, application for amendments to OZPs would be required for development of a hotel within an ‘industrial’ zone or an OU(B) zone (for industrial buildings or industrial-office buildings).

When a property owner submits building plans for redevelopment, the Buildings Department will consult the Planning Department and will only approve the building plans with the latter’s vetting. It is not necessary to pay a land premium for changing the land use in sites with an unrestricted lease. For a lease with a user clause restricted for industrial purposes, a premium is required for changing the user clause to residential purposes. The land premium is calcu- lated based on the price difference per square foot of the land area.106

In Hong Kong 2030, the Planning Department suggests that it is not nec- essary to demolish all industrial buildings for redevelopment. Instead, existing resources can be optimised by change of use, such as the conversion of the former Shek Kip Mei Flatted Factory Building into a creative arts centre.107 According to the Planning Department, in conversion of industrial buildings to lofts, attention should be paid to the Building Regulations and financial viability. It also proposes converting industrial buildings into residences for senior citizens with related facilities. The success of such a proposal will depend on the identification of oper- ating agency and availability of appropriate financial options in the market to help liquidise the assets of the elderly.108 The community generally supports the idea of providing lofts or elderly housing at vacant industrial buildings through con- version. However, the best development mode of such initiatives should be led by the private sector, while the government should maintain its facilitating role.109

104 Hong Kong Planning Department, Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy: Final Report, Hong Kong, Planning Department, 2007, p.139.

105 Hong Kong Government Planning, Environment and Lands Branch, Territorial Development Strategy: A Response to Change and Challenges: A Digest of Key Points, Hong Kong, Planning, Environment and Lands Branch, 1998, p.30.

106 Interview with Wilson Chan Wai-shun, Assistant Director of Planning, 27 February 2015.

107 Hong Kong Planning Department, Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy: Final Report, Hong Kong Planning Department, 2007, p.139.

108 Hong Kong Planning Department, Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy: Final Report, Hong Kong Planning Department, 2007, p.135.

109 Hong Kong Planning Department, Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy: Final Report, Hong Kong Planning Department, 2007, p.135.

Starting from April 2010, the Development Bureau promulgated the Policy of Revitalising Industrial Buildings in order to encourage redevelopment and wholesale conversion of old industrial buildings for other purposes. By the end of January 2016, there had been a total of 180 applications for conversion and 22 applications for redevelopment, of which 103 conversion applications and 20 redevelopment applications were approved by the Lands Department. Most of them were located in Kwun Tong and Kwai Chung, and the major proposed new uses for the converted buildings included office, eating place, shop and services, and hotel. For the approved applications for redevelop- ment, they were mainly situated in Kwun Tong, Yau Tong, Cheung Sha Wan, Kwai Chung and Wong Chuk Hang, and the proposed new uses after redevelopment included residential, commercial and hotel.110 The expected results of optimising the use of industrial buildings have been achieved under the policy, and the vacancy rate of industrial buildings has dropped steadily to a low level over the past few years. Therefore the policy was ended at the end of March 2016.111

Rural conservation

It was not until the beginning of the twenty-first century that conservation of the natural environment in Hong Kong gradually became an indispensable goal in town planning for the general public. The awareness of nature conservation was weak among the public in the 1990s, when the related work was promoted by the Government alone. The New Territories, with a large area, would easily cause disputes over property interests and land uses in development projects by individuals or private companies. And there are more projects in the New Territories involving nature conservation compared with the urban area. The Government not only has to bear legal costs, but faces delays in its conservation work as well. In the meantime, related problems are yet to be solved. A case in point was the legal actions taken by the Government and a private company against each other in 1994–96 regarding the disputes over nature conservation in Nam Sang Wai, Yuen Long. It showed the disputes over the relations between conservation and development.

Ecological protection of wetland conservation areas

In 1993, in order to protect the natural environment in Mai Po and Inner Deep Bay, with a total area of 2,000 hectares, the TPB promulgated guidelines on plan- ning permission applications for developments in Deep Bay Buffer Zone.112 The move soon faced legal challenges by a private developer. In 1994, Henderson

110 Optimising the Use of Industrial Buildings to Meet Hong Kong’s Changing Economic and Social Needs website, http://www.devb.gov.hk/industrialbuildings/chi/implementation_progress/index.html.

111 http://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/2016/chi/p117.html.

112 Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Town Planning Board Annual Report 1994, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1995, p.78.

Real Estate Development Agency Limited applied to construct a large residen- tial and golf course project in Nam Sang Wai and Lut Chau within a conserva- tion area of Deep Bay Buffer Zone. After the application was rejected by the TPB, an appeal was lodged by the applicant and allowed by the Town Planning Appeal Board in August 1994.113 It turned out that, on the relevant development permission area plan, most parts of the area were zoned for ‘unspecified use’, while a small portion was zoned as ‘residential (Group C)’ zones or ‘sites of special scientific interest’.114 According to the TPB, Henderson’s development proposal would destroy the nature conservation and planning in Mai Po and Inner Deep Bay, so the TPB decided to apply for a judicial review115 and imme- diately revised the guidelines for planning permission applications for develop- ments in Deep Bay Buffer Zone. The revised version stipulated the planning objectives and principles for Deep Bay Buffer Zone, and requested developers to provide an ecological study report for a minimum period of 12 months.116 Besides, it proposed the establishment of an official or semi-official institution to properly manage Deep Bay Buffer Zone and to assemble vulnerable land within the zone. It also proposed designating Mai Po Nature Reserve and Deep Bay Buffer Zone as a wetland of international importance (as waterfowl habitat) under the Ramsar Convention.117

The judicial review applied by the TPB was rejected by the High Court in April 1995. The TPB filed an appeal. In January 1996, the Court of Appeal allowed the TPB’s appeal and revoked the High Court’s order.118 Henderson Real Estate Development Agency Limited objected to the ruling by the Court of Appeal and subsequently appealed to the British Privy Council, the Judicial Committee of which ruled in favour of Henderson by a majority of votes119 in December of the same year, which placed the government’s conservation work into difficulties.

After that, the government amended the relevant town plan. In 1997, the Planning Department submitted the results of the Study on the Ecological Value of Fish Ponds in Deep Bay Area to the TPB. In 1998, the TPB adopted the TPB guidelines for developments within Deep Bay Area and recognised the need for a balance between nature conservation and other planning factors, so that ecological preservation could be achieved without impeding necessary public

113 Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Town Planning Board Annual Report 1994, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1995, p.79.

114 Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Town Planning Board Annual Report 1995, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1996, p.68.

115 Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Town Planning Board Annual Report 1994, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1995, p.79.

116 Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Town Planning Board Annual Report 1994, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1995, p.78.

117 Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Town Planning Board Annual Report 1994, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1995, p.80.

118 Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Town Planning Board Annual Report 1995, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1996, pp.69–70.

119 Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Town Planning Board Annual Report 1996, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1997, pp.65–66.

infrastructure projects or conventional development needs in the area.120 In 1999, the TPB revised the TPB guidelines for planning applications for devel- opments within Deep Bay Area to exert control on land use planning. Existing active or abandoned fish ponds were designated as wetland conservation areas and wetland buffer areas, any uses of which would need to be supported by eco- logical impact assessments with wetland compensatory measures as necessary as well as the approval of the TPB.121 Those measures were adopted for the benefit of ecological protection of wetland conservation areas.

Conservation of Sha Tau Kok FCA

Impacts of the incident involving Nam Sang Wai and Lut Chau in Yuen Long further spread to the 2,800-hectare frontier closed area (FCA) between Hong Kong and Shenzhen. The FCA, accessible only to holders of special permits in the past, saw its role significantly weakened after Hong Kong’s return to China. In January 2008, the government announced a three-phase reduction of the FCA to 400 hectares. The first phase, implemented on 15 February 2012, covered the Mai Po to Lok Ma Chau Boundary Control Point section and the Lin Ma Hang to Sha Tau Kok section, with a reduction of 740 hectares.122 The second phase, implemented as from 10 June 2013, covered the Lok Ma Chau Control Point to Ng Tung River section, with a reduction of 710 hectares.123 The FCA had always been an area prohibited for development. So what purpose would the freed-up land serve after the FCA reduction? After learning a lesson from the disputes involving rural developments in the 1990s, the government carried out active land planning for the FCA. The Planning Department conducted a study on this, and its recommendations were incorporated by the TPB into the statutory plan. In July 2010, the Planning Department completed the Study on the Land Use Planning for the Closed Area and formulated a development plan featuring ‘a belt of conservation, cultural heritage and sustainable uses between Hong Kong and Shenzhen’.124 It was proposed to conserve the western part of the FCA, including the wetlands and the fish ponds at San Tin and Hoo Hok Wai. It was also proposed to build Hong Kong’s first eco-lodge development on the hill slopes of Ma Tso Lung, with views overlooking the picturesque wetlands. For the eastern part, Robin’s Nest would be designated as a country park, which would

120 Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Town Planning Board Annual Report 1998, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1999, p.56.

121 Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Town Planning Board Annual Report 1998, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1999, p.58; ‘Guidelines for Deep Bay Area Developments Revised’, Press Releases, 9 April 1999, http:// www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/199904/09/0409179.htm.

122 Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Development, ‘Land Use Planning of the Frontier Closed Area’, LC Paper No. CB(1)1312/12-13(02), June 2013, p.1, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr12-13/chinese/panels/ dev/papers/devcb1-1312-2-c.pdf.

123 Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Development, ‘Land Use Planning of the Frontier Closed Area’, LC Paper No. CB(1)1312/12-13(02), June 2013, p.1, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr12-13/chinese/panels/ dev/papers/devcb1-1312-2-c.pdf.

124 Planning Department, Planning Department Annual Report 2010, Hong Kong, Planning Department, 2010, https://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/press/publication/ar_10/tradchi/focus2.html.

then form a continuous ecological link between Pat Sin Leng in North East New Territories and Wutongshan in Shenzhen. For the central part, the recommen- dation was to preserve and strengthen the agricultural land and villages of herit- age value, together with leisure farming, recreational activities and low-density housing developments. Besides, there would be a 30-kilometre hiking trail and a cycling track to link the ecological attractions, buildings of architectural and his- toric interest and activity nodes, in order to promote eco- and cultural tourism in the area. It was also proposed to establish three development corridors, so as to take advantage of the direct connection to the existing boundary control points at Lok Ma Chau and Man Kam To, as well as to the proposed one at Liantang/ Heung Yuen Wai. Such corridors would be developed for commercial, retail, entertainment and wholesale centres in the future.125 (See Figure 6.7.)

There are different views in society as to land development. Some prefer turning green land into an area for houses, saying that developing just 1 per cent of the country park areas for residential projects would be sufficient to provide homes for 90,000 people. Others think country parks should be off limits and even ask for more green space. Disputes relating to conservation and development continue and remain an eternal topic in planning. Ling Kar-kan, Director of Planning, remarks that land is a precious resource for Hong Kong and land development should be subject to rigorous research and reasoning. Integrated planning and high-density orderly development would be the most efficient way to use the limited land resources in Hong Kong and to achieve the best social benefits. To serve a large number of intensive population and economic activities, it is necessary to construct traffic and infrastructure facili- ties of large capacities, which often means huge public investments and the use of substantial public money. Their operation even involves costs of long-term management and maintenance. Planning should be optimised, so that both government and public resources can be utilised in the most rational way. The government’s current review of green belts, for example, focuses on urban areas or the fringes of new towns already with road access and infrastructure facilities. Through careful planning research, plots with a relatively low buffering effect and conservation value are identified for development. Good use can be made of the existing infrastructure in such areas, avoiding investment in the construc- tion of new roads. Roads are very important in that they are not just traffic channels but, more importantly, infrastructure service corridors as well. Many public utility facilities, such as water pipes, drainage pipes, wires and so on, are distributed evenly under roads. For new development zones located in remote mountainous areas, the costs of road construction are even higher than those of site formation. Therefore, trade-offs and analysis are required in planning.

Owing to their remoteness, the boundary areas have been free from the impacts of urbanisation, with the original villages and natural environment there

125 Planning Department Annual Report 2010, http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/press/publication/ ar_10/tradchi/focus2.html.

Source: Hong Kong planning Department, ‘Land Use planning for the closed Area – Feasibility Study’, July 2010, http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/misc/FcA/frontier_chi/frontier_c_study.htm.

Figure 6.7 Coverage of the FCA

being intact. They are important assets of Hong Kong and have aroused much public attention.

New trends in planning

Planning policies in the first few years after Hong Kong’s return featured envi- ronmental protection and sustainable development as the new direction.126 The strategic land use planning study in the TDSR published in February 1998 changed the ‘land use–transport’ duo to the ‘land use–transport–environment’ trio.127 In the face of global climate anomalies, natural ecological imbalance, shortage of resources and other problems, both the community and the govern- ment have attached greater importance to environmental protection in order to strike the right balance between development and environmental protection. People in Hong Kong started to reflect on the impacts of pursuing rapid eco- nomic development and luxury living on the environment and the ecology, and subsequently became active in promoting environmental protection. The TDSR estimated that the local population would increase to 8.1 million by 2011 with the city’s increasingly important status as a regional hub, and that the acceler- ated process of urbanisation would pose a greater pressure on the environment. (Although the actual population of Hong Kong was only 7.07 million in 2011, it meant an increase of 2.07 million and 1.4 million compared with 5 million in 1981 and 5.67 million in 1991, respectively.) The government enacted the Environmental Impact Assessment Ordinance in 1998 to monitor the adverse environmental impacts of large construction projects. Environmental impact assessment (EIA) requirements started to apply in Hong Kong in the 1980s, but only to public works projects. To minimise environmental pollution and even damage from urban activities, it is vital to properly address problems such as air quality, water quality, noise level, solid waste disposal and potentially hazardous installations.128

Environmental protection

Resources are limited. To strike a balance between environmental protection and development, the policy review focused on measures to address problems in the 1990s. For the improvement of air quality, for example, decisive measures were taken to restrict and manage the use of cars and to introduce and imple- ment stringent vehicle emission standards. Efforts were made to expand the proposed schemes of using fuel gas and liquid petroleum gas (LPG) in lieu of

126 Hong Kong Planning Department, Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy: Final Report, Hong Kong, Planning Department, 2007, p.3.

127 Hong Kong Planning Department, Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy: Final Report, Hong Kong, Planning Department, 2007, p.3.

128 Hong Kong Government Planning, Environment and Lands Branch, Territorial Development Strategy: A Response to Change and Challenges: A Digest of Key Points, Hong Kong, Planning, Environment and Lands Branch, 1998, p.3.

352 · MAKING HONG KONG

diesel, and to better encourage the use of more eco-friendly means of transport, such as passenger railway and electric vehicles. Besides, land uses were coordi- nated with transportation planning with a view to reducing the amount of traffic derived. As for the improvement of water quality, efforts were made to ensure the timely completion of works under the Strategic Sewage Disposal Scheme (SSDS), so as to significantly improve the harbour water quality, together with the comprehensive review on all the district-based sewerage master plans. In terms of noise treatment, related root causes were tackled in order to minimise noise and other negative impacts on the environment. There were also protec- tive measures to reduce noise nuisance whenever necessary. As for solid waste management, it was proposed to construct large-scale waste-to-energy facilities as soon as possible.

On 1 April 1998, the government formally enacted the Environmental Impact Assessment Ordinance, making EIAs statutory for designated projects in both the private and public sectors.129 EIAs are required for all major infrastructure projects in order to assess the impact of imminent projects on the environment. Related projects may not proceed without the environmental permits issued by the Director of Environmental Protection. EIA studies involve a wide range of professional disciplines and issues. Hence, the Environmental Protection Department must take advice from relevant authorities on specific issues and matters.130

In July 2002, the Planning Department took further measures to expand Chapter 4 of the Hong Kong Planning Standards and Guidelines (HKPSG) on Recreation and Open Space so as to incorporate planning guidelines on green- ing.131 The purpose was to improve the environment through active planting, proper maintenance and preservation of trees and other vegetation.132 The 1989 HKPSG133 recommended at least 20 hectares of public open space for every 100,000 people, or 2 square metres for each person, including 1 square metre of district open space (within medium-size sites providing facilities for core activities and passive recreation to meet the needs of a district population) and 1 square metre of local open space (featuring more passive recreation and pro- viding sitting-out areas and children’s playgrounds to serve the neighbourhood population).134 The planning objectives for ‘open space’ in various districts fol- lowed the established criteria in the HKPSG. (See Table 6.9.)

129 Environmental Protection Department website, http://www.epd.gov.hk/epd/tc_chi/environmentinhk/ eia_planning/eia_maincontent.html.

130 Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Environmental Affairs, ‘Interface between the Environmental Impact Assessment Ordinance (Cap. 499) and the Air Pollution Control Ordinance (Cap. 311)’, LC Paper No. CB(1)567/12-13(01), Discussion Paper, 25 February 2013, p.2.

131 ‘Hong Kong Planning Standards and Guidelines Revised’, Press Releases, 26 July 2002.

132 Hong Kong Planning Standards and Guidelines website, http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_tc/tech_ doc/hkpsg/full/ch4/ch4_text.htm#2.

133 Hong Kong Planning Department, Hong Kong Planning Standards and Guidelines, Hong Kong, Planning Department, 1989, p.4.21.

134 Planning Department website, http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_tc/tech_doc/hkpsg/full/ch4/ch4_ text.htm#1.8.

Table 6.9 Sizes of ‘open space’ and ‘green belts’ planned for various districts in 2010

District council district Area (hectares)

population Land zoned as ‘open space’ Land zoned as ‘green belt’ Area of open space

recommended by

total area

(hectares (%))

private land

included (hectares)

total area

(hectares (%))

private land

included (hectares)

Hong Kong planning Standards and Guidelines (hectares)

1. central and Western	1,255	252,000	66.3	1.7	238.6	1.8	50.4
			(5.3)		(19.0)
2. Wan chai	996	153,000	34.6	1.5	246.4	4.3	30.6
			(3.5)		(24.7)
3. Eastern	1,900	588,000	90.6	9.3	314.4	5.4	117.6
			(4.8)		(16.6)
4. Southern	4,000	279,000	73.5	1.4	992.4	27.1	55.8
			(1.8)		(24.8)
5. Yau tsim Mong	700	308,000	70.3	1.4	2.2	0.0	61.6
			(10.0)		(0.3)
6. Kowloon city	1,000	377,000	165.5	0.5	48.2	0.2	75.4
			(16.6)		(4.8)
7. Kwun tong	1,130	622,000	129.0	0.6	150.6	0.9	124.4
			(11.4)		(13.3)
8. Wong tai Sin	926	420,000	64.2	0.5	199.8	0.6	84
			(6.9)		(21.6)
9. Sham Shui po	1,047	381,000	92.2	0.6	107.6	0.7	76.2
			(8.8)		(10.3)

Table 6.9 (continued)

District council district Area (hectares)

population Land zoned as ‘open space’ Land zoned as ‘green belt’ Area of open space

total area	private land	total area	private land
(hectares (%))	included (hectares)	(hectares (%))	included (hectares)

recommended by Hong Kong planning Standards and

							Guidelines (hectares)
10. Kwai tsing	2,237	511,000	156.9	2.2	676.0	8.6	102.2
			(7.0)		(30.2)
11. tsuen Wan	6,000	305,000	140.7	4.5	1,046.4	574.2	61
			(2.4)		(17.4)
12. Sha tin	6,940	630,000	302.7	12.9	1,343.4	55.7	126
			(4.4)		(19.4)
13. tai po	14,800	297,000	67.2	1.7	1,569.6	230.5	59.4
			(0.5)		(10.6)
14. North	13,670	304,000	58.3	7.9	1,697.1	196.9	60.8
			(0.4)		(12.4)
15. tuen Mun	8,200	488,000	122.9	4.6	1,189.2	74.0	97.6
			(1.5)		(14.5)
16. Yuen Long	14,430	579,000	146.6	36.4	1,315.7	377.2	115.8
			(1.0)		(9.1)
17. Sai Kung	12,680	437,000	189.0	0.2	1,276.7	118.3	87.4
			(1.5)		(10.1)
18. Islands	17,600	141,000	94.1	15.5	1,389.8	281.1	28.2
			(0.5)		(7.9)
Grand total	109,511	7,072,000	2,064.6	103.4	13,804.1	1,957.5	1,414.4
			(1.9)		(12.6)

Sources: For areas of land zoned as ‘open space’ and ‘green belt’: Hong Kong Legislative council, Official Record of Proceedings, 10 March 2010, pp.5821–5827, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/counmtg/hansard/ cm0310-translate-e.pdf; District councils website: http://www.districtcouncils.gov.hk/. For areas of district council districts: Home Affairs Department website: http://www.had.gov.hk/tc/index.htm. For population of district council districts: 2011 population census, http://www.census2011.gov.hk/tc/.

Country parks

Planning green belts in urban areas is as important as conserving the natural ecosystem in rural areas, but the difficulties encountered are very different. In fact, in the 1960s, there was already advocacy for opening up country parks to balance the city’s development ecology.

At that time, different countries around the world were dedicated to devel- oping country parks on a large scale. In 1962, the first World Parks Congress and the eighth Commonwealth Forestry Conference were held in the USA and Kenya, featuring the themes of ‘Establishing National Parks’ and ‘Nature Conservation’, respectively.135 In early 1965, the Agriculture and Fisheries Department invited US environmental scientists Lee and Martha Talbot to conduct research on the situation in Hong Kong.136 Based on Conservation of the Hong Kong Countryside: Summary Report and Recommendation by the Talbots,137 the government established the Provisional Council for the Use and Conservation of the Countryside on 1 March 1967.138 In June 1968, the Provisional Council published The Countryside and the People: Report of the Provisional Council for the Use and Conservation of the Countryside, stating, in the aftermath of the 1967 riots, that country parks would help alleviate the stress of the urban population and provide young people with appropriate amenities.139

Disputes relating to land development on the outskirts existed as early as 1863 during the construction of Hong Kong’s first reservoir to collect rainwater to address the drinking water problem in the city. The government needed to identify a catchment area near the reservoir to channel rainwater in or out as the case might be. Such catchment areas not only became the city’s green belts, but also greatly reduced land available for commercial/industrial or residential development. Fifty-five years after the construction of Pok Fu Lam Reservoir,

H.W. Bird, a member of the Legislative Council, still requested the government to convert the relevant catchment area for residential use.140 The Pok Fu Lam Reservoir Catchment Area was 416 acres (168.5 hectares) in size,141 while the Tai Tam Catchment Area was 680 acres (275.4 hectares).142 As the amount of rainwater in a catchment area would directly affect the storage level of the reservoir, and the stable supply of drinking water would be far more important

135 Yang Jiaming, Jiaoye sanshiniang (30th Anniversary of Country Parks), Hong Kong, Friends of the Country Parks, 2007, p.30.

136 Lee M. Talbot and Martha H. Talbot, Conservation of the Hong Kong Countryside: Summary Report and Recommendation, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1965, p.1.

137 Lee M. Talbot and Martha H. Talbot, Conservation of the Hong Kong Countryside: Summary Report and Recommendation, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1965, p.1.

138 Hong Kong Hansard, Hong Kong Government, 1 March 1967, p.76.

139 The Countryside and the People: Report of the Provisional Council for the Use and Conservation of the Countryside, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1968, pp.4–13.

140 Huazi ribao, 4 October 1918; Hong Kong Hansard, Hong Kong Government, 3 October 1918, p.64.

141 Francis A. Cooper, ‘Report on the Water Supply of the City of Victoria and Hill District’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1896, p.255.

142 Francis A. Cooper, ‘Report on the Water Supply of the City of Victoria and Hill District’, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1896, pp.255–256.

than real estate development, the government further expanded the catchment areas instead of reducing their sizes, giving top priority to water supply. The government planted trees within the reservoir catchment areas to change the rural landscape. It planted water-absorbing trees in fertile areas to reduce rain- water run-off. For places with poorer soil condition, Chinese red pines, slash pines, forest grey gums or lemon-scented gums were planted to prevent soil erosion. Apart from balancing water distribution, afforestation could also reduce the rapid erosion of surface soils due to sunshine, wind or rain, thus protect- ing the environment near a reservoir. It also breathed new life into some parts of the forests which had been cut down or burnt by the indigenous inhabit- ants for the purpose of cultivation. As the government replanned the ecologi- cal environment near the reservoirs, the indigenous inhabitants were forced to move away. Fortunately, their number was small in the early days. The natural environment near the reservoirs changed drastically after the replanning. Most catchment areas are where country parks are nowadays. We may say that the lack of natural water resources has instead helped Hong Kong preserve vast green belts, the ecological environment of which shows the city’s critical need for water resources.

The Country Park Ordinance was enacted on 11 March 1976 and came into force on 16 August of the same year.143 The Director of Agriculture and Fisheries served as the head of the Country Park Authority, in charge of designating park areas, protecting local vegetation and wildlife and, where appropriate, providing recreational and educational facilities at suitable locations.144 A Country Parks Board was also established to propose on related policies and programmes.145 The boundary of a country park was measured and delineated by surveyors. Nearby villages would not be included in the park boundary. A draft plan would be devel- oped after discussions among the district office/district council, village repre- sentatives, rural committee and relevant government departments before being gazetted for public consultation for 60 days. Only after any objections were coor- dinated would the boundary of the park be designated according to the law. Once gazetted, the boundary became statutory, and no development works should be carried out inside unless with the approval of the Country Parks Board.146

In 1991, the Town Planning Ordinance was amended, and there was the addi- tion of a new subsection 4(1)(g), which conferred on the TPB the powers to prepare statutory town plans, as well as to designate country parks, coastal pro- tection areas, sites of special scientific interest, green belts and so on for the sake of nature conservation147 and the protection of ecologically sensitive sites from development and incompatible land uses.148 In 1998, the Territorial Development

143 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Agriculture and Fisheries for the Financial Year 1976–77, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1977, p.51.

144 Hong Kong Country Parks, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1981, p.2.

145 Hong Kong Country Parks, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1981, p.2.

146 Hong Kong Country Parks, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1981, p.6.

147 Ordinances of Hong Kong for the Year 1991, Hong Kong, Government Printer, p.A26.

148 Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department website, http://www.afcd.gov.hk/tc_chi/conser- vation/con_nncp/con_nncp_prce/files/ch2.rtf.

Strategy Outline promulgated by the Planning Department proposed the protec- tion of country parks, marine parks, and other major conservation areas desig- nated outside the areas for urban uses.149

In 2003, the government conducted a review and public consultation on nature conservation policy and announced a new conservation policy and imple- mentation plan on 11 November 2004. Under the New Nature Conservation Policy, the Environmental Protection Department implemented two schemes: the Management Agreement Scheme, which provided financial support for non- governmental organisations by means of the Environment and Conservation Fund, so that they could conclude management agreements with landowners to promote the nature conservation of the related sites;150 and the Public–Private Partnership Scheme, under which the government would assess related pro- posals with due consideration to the net benefits in enhancing conservation of the sites, possible adverse environmental impacts arising from the proposed developments, the sustainability of the proposals, long-term commitments of the proponents, and so on.151

In 2007, about 6,600 hectares of land was under conservation zonings,152 and about 43 per cent of Hong Kong’s land area was under statutory protec- tion.153 According to the strategic planning for environmental protection as stated in Hong Kong 2030 prepared in 2007, it was important to regulate, protect and manage natural resources that are important for conservation of the biodiversity of Hong Kong in a sustainable manner, taking into account social and economic considerations, for the benefit and enjoyment of the present and future generations of the community.154 In this way it can be ensured that the city’s development is undertaken with due regard to the environmental carrying capacity, enhancing the townscape and regenerating the old urban areas. And, in such a way, the natural landscape of ecological, geological, scientific and other significance can be conserved and cultural her- itage preserved.155

Owing to the opposition of indigenous villagers and the existence of private land, it was very difficult for the government to include nearby enclaves in the boundary of a country park. There are a total of 77 ‘country park enclaves’ across

149 Hong Kong Government Planning, Environment and Lands Branch, Territorial Development Strategy: A Response to Change and Challenges: A Digest of Key Points, Hong Kong, Planning, Environment and Lands Branch, 1998, p.22.

150 Environmental Protection Department website, http://www.epd.gov.hk/epd/tc_chi/environmentinhk/ conservation/conservation_maincontent.html.

151 Environmental Protection Department website, http://www.epd.gov.hk/epd/tc_chi/environmentinhk/ conservation/conservation_maincontent.html.

152 Environmental Protection Department website, http://www.epd.gov.hk/epd/tc_chi/environmentinhk/ conservation/conservation_maincontent.html.

153 Environmental Protection Department website, http://www.epd.gov.hk/epd/tc_chi/environmentinhk/ conservation/conservation_maincontent.html.

154 Hong Kong Planning Department, Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy: Final Report, Hong Kong, Planning Department, 2007, p.136.

155 Hong Kong Planning Department, Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy: Final Report, Hong Kong, Planning Department, 2007, p.17.

the territory, with a total area of about 2,076 hectares. In 2010, the govern- ment included 23 of such enclaves in the OZPs.156 In June 2010, excavation works were carried out in the country park enclave of Tai Long Sai Wan in Sai Kung for the sake of developing private and government land, which prompted the government to re-examine that land. In the 2010–11 Policy Address, the government undertook either to include the remaining 54 enclaves in country parks or to determine their proper uses through statutory planning to meet con- servation and social development needs.157 The Planning Department and the Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department assume different duties in the handling of country park enclaves. The Planning Department prepared 22 development permission area plans (DPA plans) for 30 enclaves as scheduled in 2014, and took steps to prepare OZPs to replace the DPA plans in a progres- sive manner. As of mid-November 2015, 14 DPA plans had been replaced by OZPs.158 According to the Town Planning Ordinance, the Planning Authority (i.e. the Director of Planning) may take enforcement and regulatory actions against unauthorised developments in areas covered by DPA plans or the subse- quent OZPs that replace them.159 In 2014, there were a total of 24 country parks in Hong Kong, covering an area of 43,455 hectares. Of those parks, 21 were planned between 1977 and 1979.160

As we can see, for the sake of striking a balance between development and ecological conservation, it is necessary to delineate country parks, special areas and conservation zonings by means of statutory town plans and the Country Park Ordinance, with prudent uses of undeveloped land, as well as to avoid intrusion into protected and conservation areas. In 2014, about 43 per cent of the land area across the territory was under statutory protec- tion. Urban green belts have so far taken up about 21 per cent of the city’s land area, and 23 per cent of rural settlements.161 According to the Planning Department’s estimates in Hong Kong 2030, a further opening-up of about 2 per cent of the city’s total land area will be sufficient162 to meet the develop- ment needs involving new areas and major infrastructure projects over the next years leading to 2030.

156 ‘LCQ2: Country Park Enclaves’, Press Releases, 9 October 2013, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/gene ral/201310/09/P201310090470.htm.

157 ‘LCQ2: Country Park Enclaves’, Press Releases, 9 October 2013, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/gene ral/201310/09/P201310090470.htm.

158 Planning Department website, http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_tc/press/exam14/pdf_c/PL1094- 209c.pdf.

159 ‘LCQ2: Country Park Enclaves’, Press Releases, 9 October 2013, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/gene ral/201310/09/P201310090470.htm.

160 Hong Kong Country Parks, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1981, p.33; Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department website, http://www.afcd.gov.hk/tc_chi/country/cou_vis/cou_vis_cou/cou_ vis_cou.html.

161 Hong Kong Planning Department, Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy: Final Report, Hong Kong, Planning Department, 2007, p.107.

162 Hong Kong Planning Department, Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy: Final Report, Hong Kong, Planning Department, 2007, p.136.

Building height and density

In the nineteenth century, the government’s regulation on building construc- tion in Hong Kong was on public hygiene and building safety. From 1905 onwards, the government divided land located north of Boundary Street into house lots, agricultural lots, barren land and so on according to the Block Crown Lease, with applications required for buildings on agricultural lots.163 It could be deemed the beginning of land use restrictions. In 1939, the government for- mulated the Town Planning Ordinance, conferring on the TPB the powers to formulate OZPs for the clear differentiation of land uses.164 However, the imple- mentation of the ordinance was held up by the Japanese invasion in 1941 and did not resume until after the war in 1950. In 1951, the TPB was reconvened and continued with the formulation of OZPs. In 1956, the government promul- gated several OZPs,165 starting with Yau Ma Tei and North Point.166 Since then, building design has had to be in line with the land uses in OZPs.

Building height and density restrictions

In 1957, the government promulgated the Hong Kong Airport (Control of Obstructions) Ordinance, with height restrictions on new buildings in Kowloon, so as to ensure the safe operation of aircraft take-offs and landings at Kai Tak Airport. The building height restrictions varied depending on different areas in order to prevent problematic moves by developers. With the Hong Kong Principal Datum (HKPD) being 1.23 metres below the mean sea level,167 the height restriction was 6.1 metres (25 feet) to 42.7 metres (140 feet) above the HKPD for buildings in Ma Tau Kok,168 51.8 metres (170 feet) above the HKPD for those around Boundary Street, and 76.2 metres (250 feet)169 above the HKPD for those on Argyle Street. The height restrictions were inversely propor- tional to the distance of the related buildings to the airport.

In view of the advancements in navigation technologies, the government relaxed the building height restrictions for different areas in Kowloon in 1989, setting the restrictions at 25 to 74.99 metres above the HKPD for Ma Tau Wai and Kowloon Tong, 25 to 99.99 metres above the HKPD for Mong Kok and Tai Kok Tsui, 50 to 99.99 metres above the HKPD for Kwun Tong, Yau Ma Tei and Hung Hom, and 75 to 124.9 metres above the HKPD for Tsim Sha Tsui.170

163 Land Registry Order/Copy Separator, Doc No. SD3L, Block Crown Lease, 1905, pp.2–3.

164 Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 23 June 1939, p.582.

165 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works for the Financial Year 1955–56, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1956, p.28.

166 Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works for the Financial Year 1955–56, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1956, p.28.

167 Survey and Mapping Office of the Lands Department website, http://www.landsd.gov.hk/mapping/ tc/publications/map.htm.

168 HKRS No. 835, D & S No. 1/104, ‘Memorandum for Executive Council’, BL 4/3220/65, 23 May 1967, p.2.

169 HKRS No. 337, D & S No. 4/2458, ‘Mong Kok Outline Development Plan’, 26 April 1968, p.1.

170 Shankland Cox Asia, Jiulong ji xinjiulong jianzhi midu he gaodu xianzhi jiantao zhaiyao (Summary

Even after the relaxation, most buildings in Kowloon were not allowed to exceed

124.99 metres above the HKPD.

It was generally expected that the height restrictions would be removed fol- lowing the relocation of the airport in 1998. In 1993, the Planning Department conducted the Review of Building Density and Height Restrictions in Kowloon and New Kowloon, calculating the threshold of development density for Kowloon and New Kowloon, and assessing the capacities of large-scale traffic and infrastructure facilities. Eventually the maximum plot ratios of 7.5 and 12 respectively for residential and commercial uses were recommended, involving changes to all 16 of the OZPs covering Kowloon and New Kowloon, including those of Cheung Sha Wan and Lai Chi Kok, adding the plot ratio controls, which was quite an undertaking. Without plot ratio controls and the flight path height restrictions, developers would have been able to construct taller and taller build- ings, which would then have led to serious traffic congestion on Waterloo Road, Prince Edward Road and others, as well as overwhelmed sewage loads. The TPB received more than 300 objections at that time (47 per cent of which were related to the plot ratios). The recommended plot ratio controls were already approved before the relocation of the airport.

After the airport was relocated from the urban area on 10 July 1998, the gov- ernment amended the Hong Kong Airport (Control of Obstructions) Ordinance, removing all airport height restrictions in Kowloon. Since then, the plot ratio restrictions in Kowloon have basically relied on the 16 OZPs as the statutory basis for such control.

Builders may be eligible for exemptions on plot ratios with the construction of public passages. As early as 1955 when the Building Regulations were formu- lated, the Building Authority was conferred the power to grant exemptions.171 Therefore, depending on actual needs, such as the construction of public pas- sages, environmental protection facilities, public transport services and others, the Building Authority could provide bonus or exempted gross floor area (GFA) in the building approval process, which would result in an increase in build- ing bulk.172 For instance, the Building (Planning) Regulations in 1962 specified that the plot ratio and site coverage requirements could be partially exempted if a portion of the lot of the new building was dedicated for public passage.173 The overall heights of buildings could be increased, by means of constructing public facilities such as multi-storey car parks and rest gardens or by increasing the ceiling height of each floor. The Harbourfront Landmark in Hung Hom as well as Highcliff and The Summit on Stubbs Road were examples of skyscrapers not compatible with the surrounding environment. The 2007 Policy Address

Review of Building Density and Height Restrictions in Kowloon and New Kowloon), Hong Kong, Planning Department, 1992, p.2.

171 Ordinances of Hong Kong for the Year 1955, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1955, pp.331–332.

172 Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Development, ‘Background Brief on the “Wall Effect” of Developments and Measures to Control Development Intensity’, LC Paper No. CB(1)232/08-09(11), August 2008, p.3.

173 Regulations of Hong Kong for the Year 1962, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1962, pp.379–380.

particularly mentioned the problem of ‘wall-effect buildings’, which led the Planning Department to review the building density. The Planning Department started by examining building heights and subsequently, in order to avoid the incompatibility and disharmony of skyscrapers or super-tall buildings with the surrounding environment, building height restrictions were formulated.

In October 2000, the government announced a plan to promote the construc- tion of environmentally friendly buildings.174 In February 2001, the Buildings Department, the Lands Department and the Planning Department released a joint practice note on green and innovative buildings. Fulfilling certain con- ditions, green features constructed by developers in housing estates could be excluded from GFA and/or site coverage (SC) calculations stipulated in the Buildings Ordinance (Cap. 123). This was to encourage developers to improve the environmental performance of buildings. Eligible features included balco- nies, wider common corridors and lift lobbies, communal sky gardens, com- munal podium gardens, acoustic fins, sunshades and reflectors, wing walls, wind catchers and funnels.175

According to government statistics, from the issue of the joint practice note relating to green and innovative buildings in February 2001 to July 2002, the Buildings Department approved 97 development projects with green fea- tures. The total GFA thus exempted under the Buildings Ordinance (Cap. 123) amounted to 114,261 square metres.176

According to the government’s response, where lease modification conferred an increase in land value, a premium would be payable regardless of the GFA exemption under the Buildings Ordinance. There was no land premium exemp- tion for green features, and the provisions of the joint practice note relating to green and innovative buildings did not depart from the said land administration policy. However, if there was no increase in land value arising from the green features, the premium would not be required. In respect of certain green and innovative building features, such as common corridors or mail delivery rooms, no increase in land value could be identified and hence a premium was not required for such features.177

Developers did not have to pay land premiums if they increased floor areas by constructing green features. As a result, there came the so-called ‘inflated buildings’, with increases in the bulk and the height of many new buildings after 2001. According to an investigation conducted by Green Sense in 2009, 302 housing estates completed between 2000 and 2008 had ‘inflated areas’ of more than 10 million square feet (929,000 square metres) owing to the construction of green balconies and clubhouses, equivalent to a total value of 53.5 billion dollars. Among those housing estates, One Madison in Cheung Sha Wan was ‘inflated’ by as much as 26 per cent. Developers also increased the building height

174 Hong Kong Hansard, Hong Kong Government, 30 January 2002, p.3459.

175 ‘Government Offers Incentives for Green Buildings’, Press Releases, 27 February 2001, http://www.info. gov.hk/gia/general/200102/27/0227099.htm.

176 Hong Kong Hansard, Hong Kong Government, 3 July 2002, p.8231.

177 Hong Kong Hansard, Hong Kong Government, 3 July 2002, pp.8231–8232.

by constructing car parks. For example, The Legend in Tai Hang, developed by Cheung Kong (Holdings) Limited, was originally allowed to have 39 residential storeys. With an 11-storey car park, however, the project eventually claimed to be 57 storeys in height.178 Some developers even made use of the ‘split level’ design to turn one storey into two, with one storey being used as the living room and the other as bedrooms but, with a void in between, they were regarded as only one storey. Thus a building with more than 70 storeys and nearly 200 metres in height in reality would be considered to have just about 30 storeys under the Buildings Ordinance. The administration considered it impossible to control the building height by limiting the number of ‘storeys’; therefore restrictions in terms of metres above Principal Datum (mPD) was adopted.

In the year of Hong Kong’s return to China, property prices surged and con- tinued rising. Flats on higher storeys were sold at even higher prices for better views. Skyscrapers built with expensive materials, while increasing the costs, could bring in even higher profits. For example, a building with a construction cost of 2,000 dollars per square foot might only be sold at 5,000 dollars per square foot, while a so-called luxury building with a construction cost of 5,000 dollars per square foot could be sold at over 10,000 dollars per square foot. Flats on higher storeys, with great views, were much sought after in the market. As a result, developers would resort to every means and legal loopholes to make their buildings as tall as possible.

‘ Wall-effect’ buildings’

The lots in urban areas are generally small and separated by lanes. Developers, however, with increasing financial strength are able to acquire adjacent prop- erties and combine the lots. Plots sold at government land auctions have also become larger and larger. To provide their housing estates with beautiful views, buildings would be arranged in a straight line facing the sea for units to capture the sea view rather than having them facing each other, which in turn increased the property prices.179 The term ‘wall-effect buildings’ came up in 2001 to describe tall buildings with such a disposition within luxury housing estates. Development of buildings in this way would severely obstruct the views of the older buildings and also air ventilation in the area.

In December 2006, a community body listed six characteristics of wall-effect buildings180 and suggested that, if a building has three or more such characteris- tics, it is likely to be a wall-effect building. These characteristics are:

a building separation of less than 15 metres in a housing estate;
an average building height of more than 35 storeys (podiums included) within a housing estate;

178 Apple Daily, 21 July 2010, p.A09.
179 Interview with Phyllis Li Chi-miu, Deputy Director of Planning, 27 February 2015.
180 Green Sense, Wei Gang: cong pinfenglou kan Xianggang de chengshi guihua (Encircling Hong Kong: From the Wall-effect Buildings Issue to Hong Kong Town Planning), Hong Kong, Warrior Books, 2009, p.99.
the layout of buildings in a near straight line within a housing estate;
a location at the seaside, in the town centre or along breezeways, which affect district or area development;
the prevailing wind at the wider side of the buildings or the housing estate; and
the existence of lower buildings nearby.

The government issued guidelines and technical circulars in order to address the problem of wall-effect buildings. In 2000 and 2001, the government con- ducted two rounds of public consultations for the Study on Urban Design Guidelines for Hong Kong, which was completed in mid-2003. In November 2003, the relevant guidelines were included in the HKPSG. They covered massing and intensity in urban fringe areas and rural areas, development height profiles, waterfront sites, public areas, streetscapes, heritage, breezeways, view corridors and specific major land uses.181 After the outbreak of the SARS epi- demic in the first half of 2003, there was an increasing community demand for a more health-conscious living environment, including concerns on the effects of development layout and building design on air circulation and pollutant dis- sipation.182 To improve the city’s sanitation, the government issued the Team Clean report in August of the same year, examining the feasibility of stipulat- ing air ventilation assessment (AVA) as one of the considerations for all major development or redevelopment proposals in future planning.183

In May 2005, the government promulgated the First Sustainable Development Strategy for Hong Kong, with special regard to issues such as buildings affect- ing view corridors or restricting air flow.184 In November 2005, the Planning Department completed the Feasibility Study for the Establishment of Air Ventilation Assessment System (the AVA Study). A set of design guidelines for the improvement of air ventilation was formulated on the basis of the AVA Study findings. The guidelines included the creation of major air paths and open space, appropriate street layout, reference for building design and disposition, and the adoption of a varying building height profile and distribution to avoid wind blockage,185 with an aim to improve air ventilation.

In 2006, guidelines on air ventilation were introduced in the chapter on ‘Urban Design Guidelines’ of the HKPSG.186 In July of the same year, the

181 ‘Government Formulates Guidelines for the Urban Design’, Press Releases, 27 November 2003, http:// www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/brandhk/1127176.htm.

182 Hong Kong Planning Department, Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy: Final Report, Hong Kong, Planning Department, 2007, p.20.

183 Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Development, ‘Addressing the “Wall Effect” in Developments’, LC Paper No. CB(1)605/07-08(04), January 2008, p.2.

184 Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Development, ‘Addressing the “Wall Effect” in Developments’, LC Paper No. CB(1)605/07-08(04), January 2008, p.2.

185 Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Development, ‘Background Brief on the “Wall Effect” of Developments and Measures to Control Development Intensity’, LC Paper No. CB(1)232/08-09(11), August 2008, p.2.

186 ‘LCQ15: Wall Effect’, Press Releases, 13 June 2007, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200706/13/ P200706130205.htm.

government issued a joint technical circular to provide clear guidelines on matters concerning AVA. Departments, bureaus or authorities responsible for major government projects were required to undertake AVA and ensure that air ventilation impact was given due consideration in the planning and design of major development and redevelopment proposals. The technical circular served as a guideline for AVA for major government projects. For land available for sale, if it met the category/categories for AVA, which included having a site area of 2 hectares or above and a total plot ratio of five times or more, or for a lot with a GFA of 100,000 square metres or above, the government would conduct AVA for the sites to assess the impact of development on pedestrian wind environment.187 In April 2012, the government after collaboration with the Council for Sustainable Development put forward the Sustainable Building Design Guidelines against inflated and wall-effect buildings, stipulating that the related exemption should not exceed 10 per cent of the GFA and should comply with BEAM Plus requirements. In addition, the government issued guidelines stating that intervening spaces should be provided for buildings with a projected facade of 60 metres or above in length, so as to avoid a congested environment. Developers were prohibited from arranging their buildings in a straight line. The facade width was also regulated, so as to prevent any increase in the floor area resulting in an increase in the building height by means of constructing more public spaces.

Scenery on both sides of Victoria Harbour

Starting from 2006, the government has controlled the building height and density by means of OZPs and conditions of sale. The TPB reviews the OZPs of various districts in a progressive manner and revises the relevant planning parameters in order to exert appropriate control on the development density, including building heights. Priority is given to areas with potential land sale sites, areas subject to high development or redevelopment pressure, and areas of special settings and characteristics (e.g. those around Victoria Harbour and within view corridors to important ridgelines), incorporating non-building areas, building height restrictions, and so on. Depending on individual site con- ditions, the government may also add appropriate development parameters in the conditions of sale, such as site coverage, maximum gross floor area, plot ratio, building height, podium size, non-building area, building set-back, and others.188

Towering skyscrapers have mushroomed on both sides of Victoria Harbour since 1997. Among them, Two International Finance Centre (IFC) completed in 2003 is 420 metres tall with a total of 88 storeys. International Commerce

187 Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Development, ‘Background Brief on the “Wall Effect” of Developments and Measures to Control Development Intensity’, LC Paper No. CB(1)232/08-09(11), August 2008, p.2.

188 Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Development, ‘Addressing the “Wall Effect” in Developments’, LC Paper No. CB(1)605/07-08(04), pp.4–5.

Centre, completed in 2011, is currently the tallest building in Hong Kong, with 118 storeys and a height of 490 metres. A TPB member recalls the review of the IFC planning application: ‘Members obviously had diverged opinions on the towering skyscraper which would encroach the Victoria Peak ridgelines. Some members considered the provision of additional publicly accessible open space at the retail podium a planning merit. As more members agreed to the develop- ment proposal, so the project was eventually approved.’189 The TPB eventually approved the planning application, and the building plans were approved after planning permission was obtained.

Of the large-scale residential and commercial development projects approved by the government between 2001 and 2003, over 60 per cent did not require planning permission from the TPB. In 2003, the government introduced urban design guidelines into the HKPSG, indicating that ‘a building free zone below the ridgelines would need to be maintained when viewing from key and popular vantage points’.190

The TPB is responsible for vetting planning projects across the territory. However, except for comprehensive development areas, the TPB is only respon- sible for considering the planning/development brief, i.e. the planned uses and development approach, but not including the detailed architectural design. If the TPB does not stipulate restrictions such as the building height and the plot ratio in the relevant OZPs, it does not have the power to monitor the height of buildings on residential or commercial land. Patrick Lau, the then Legislative Councillor representing the architectural, surveying and planning sector, said the TPB could do nothing about Harbourfront Landmark because the land lease did not specify any building height restriction and the land was not a CDA. In his opinion, Harbourfront Landmark is obviously too tall and incompatible with the surrounding environment.

Developments on the north shore of Hong Kong Island should respect the ridgeline of Victoria Peak and the ridgelines of other peaks when viewing from Kowloon (in particular from the proposed West Kowloon Cultural District, the Cultural Complex in Tsim Sha Tsui, and the proposed water- front promenade in South East Kowloon). Efforts should be made to avoid developments with excessive building height or encroachment into the ‘building-free zone’ within the view corridors.191 On the Kowloon side, there is an uninterrupted stretch of ridgelines from Lion Rock to Kowloon Peak. It is important to preserve the view corridor to Kowloon Peak and major Kowloon ridgelines from the Hong Kong Convention and Exhibition Centre in Wan Chai, from Central Pier No. 7, from Sun Yat Sen Memorial Park in

189 Planning Application Case No. A/H4/40, 2 August 1996, https://www2.ozp.tpb.gov.hk/gist/apply/ en_tc/A_H4_40_TC.pdf; see Town Planning Board website, http://www.info.gov.hk/tpb/en/plan_appli- cation/records.html; Town Planning Board, Statutory Planning Portal 2 website, www2.ozp.tpb.gov.hk/gos/ default.aspx; Oriental Daily News, 11 July 2003, p.A47.

190 Planning Department website, http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_tc/tech_doc/hkpsg/full/ch11/ch11_ text.htm#6.2.5.

191 Planning Department website, http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_tc/tech_doc/hkpsg/full/ch11/ch11_ text.htm#6.2.5.

Sai Ying Pun, and from Quarry Bay Park in Quarry Bay. Development heights within the view corridors of those vantage points should avoid intrusion into the ‘building-free zone’.192 The TPB gradually started to translate such guidelines by stipulating building height requirements and restrictions and to introduce them into OZPs. For example, the OZPs incorporating building height restrictions for business areas in Kowloon Bay and Kwun Tong were gazetted in 2005.

In Hong Kong 2030 published in 2007, the Planning Department summed up a number of problems in building design and ventilation after the reloca- tion of the airport in 1998. In Hong Kong, years of rapid development have transformed the urban landscape many times in the general absence of stringent controls on the built form, other than controls provided under the Building (Planning) Regulations, and planning/lease restrictions catering for specific sites. Such a process has led to problems like tall buildings in a low-density area, wall-effect development along the waterfront, ‘podium-type’ building mass (with full site coverage to construct buildings with podiums of 15 metres high), and the lack of view corridors and breezeways.

In Hong Kong 2030, the Planning Department notes that better design for buildings allows visual permeability, facilitates air ventilation and creates points of interest. It maintains that individualistic architectural design or a distinctive frontage in the lower part of buildings is also important to enhance interest at the street level and turn the massive structure into a more people-centred devel- opment.193 The conventional form of high-rise developments may no longer be welcomed unless coupled with good urban design, a better local environment and higher visual amenity. Planning needs to be three-dimensional to foster a good sense of space, which is about how the urban fabric is balanced and har- monised, rather than simply tidied and organised.194

Public participation

Amendment of the Town Planning Ordinance

The government carried out a comprehensive review of the Town Planning Ordinance in September 1987 in order to strike a balance between the gov- ernment’s planning powers and the public’s right of participation. In 1991, the Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance 1991 was enacted,195 with new sections 20 to 26, thus extending planning controls to rural areas. The TPB might desig- nate any rural areas development permission areas (DPAs) and accordingly for-

192 Planning Department website, http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_tc/tech_doc/hkpsg/full/ch11/ch11_ text.htm#6.2.5.

193 Hong Kong Planning Department, Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy: Final Report, Hong Kong, Planning Department, 2007, p.21.

194 Hong Kong Planning Department, Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy: Final Report, Hong Kong, Planning Department, 2007, p.23.

195 Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Town Planning Board Annual Report 1991, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1992, p.13.

mulate development plans.196 To curb the expanding disorganised uses of open storage and port back-up in the rural New Territories, the Planning Authority (i.e. Director of Planning) might take enforcement actions against unauthorised developments within DPAs according to the Town Planning Ordinance.197

In order to improve the existing appeal mechanism, Ordinance No. 101 of 1991 was enacted with the addition of new sections 17A, 17B and 17C. ‘Petitions to Governor in Council’ was changed to ‘Appeals to Town Planning Appeal Board’.198 An independent Town Planning Appeal Board was estab- lished to handle appeals against TPB decisions on planning applications. The Appeal Board officially came into operation on 18 November 1991. According to section 17B of the Town Planning Ordinance, any person who is aggrieved by a decision made by the Town Planning Board on review under section 17 may appeal by lodging, within 60 days after the date of notification by the Town Planning Board’s decision under section 17(6), a notice of appeal. The scope of appeals was also expanded to include decisions by the Appeal Board to grant planning permissions. Appeal and hearing procedures were governed by the Town Planning (Appeal) Regulations 1991.199 Appeal procedures and consti- tution of the Appeal Board were supplemented in Amended 22 of 1994 and Amended 14 of 1996.

As for the appeal mechanism under the Town Planning Ordinance, Ordinance No. 16 of 1998 was enacted with section 2A of 1998 in the first year after Hong Kong’s return to China, empowering the TPB to appoint committees from among its members to exercise its powers under sections 6(6), 6A, 6B, 7, 8 and 9. Section 6 was amended, authorising the TPB to deal with any objection made under subsection (1) in respect of the same draft plan or, as the case may be, received under subsection (8) at the same meeting. If the objector or the objector’s authorised representative did not attend the meeting, the TPB might proceed with the meeting and deal with the objection or adjourn it, and such a meeting might not be adjourned more than once. Section 8 was amended, renumbered as section 8(1) and added with subsection (2), which stipulates that the submission of a draft plan to the Chief Executive in Council must be made before the expiration of a period of nine months after the expiration of the period of two months mentioned in section 5. In the case where the Town Planning Board does make amendments to the draft plan under section 7, the submission must be made before the expiration of a period of nine months after the expiration both of the period of two months mentioned in section 5 and of the period of three weeks mentioned in section 7.

In May 2003, the Government presented the Town Planning (Amendment)

196 Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Town Planning Board Annual Report 1991, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1992, p.13.

197 Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Town Planning Board Annual Report 1991, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1992, p.15.

198 For details, see the record of appeals and petitions in Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Town Planning Board Annual Report 1991, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1992, pp.64–66.

199 Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Town Planning Board Annual Report 1991, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1992, p.15.

Bill 2003 to the Legislative Council for consideration. The Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance 2004 was officially published in the Government Gazette on 23 July 2004200 and came into effect on 10 June 2005.

The newly added section 12A of the Town Planning Ordinance stipulates that any person may apply for amendment of plans. The TPB must consider the application within three months after receipt. The applicant is entitled to attend the Town Planning Board meeting and to be heard. Besides, new provisions were added in sections 12A, 16 and 17, further enhancing the transparency in the formulation of plans and the handling of planning applications. They were also intended to offer more opportunities for public participation while main- taining the efficiency of the planning application system. The original section 6 was repealed and replaced by new sections 6 and 6A to 6H.

All new plans, amendments to approved plans or amendments to draft plans must be exhibited for two months for public inspection. During this two-month exhibition period, any person may make representation (either supportive or adverse) to the Town Planning Board. The TPB must publish the representations for three weeks for public comments and make avail- able all representations for public inspection. During the first three weeks of the public inspection period of the representations, any person may make a comment on the representations (either supportive or adverse). The TPB must hold a hearing to consider the representations and comments. The persons who have submitted representations or comments may attend the hearing and be heard by the TPB. After the hearing, the TPB will decide whether to propose amendments to the draft plan to meet the representa- tions. If the TPB decides to propose amendments to the draft plan, such proposed amendments will be published again for further representations. During the first three weeks of the public inspection period of the proposed amendments, any person (other than the persons who have submitted repre- sentations and comments related to the proposed amendments) may make further representation in respect of the proposed amendments (either sup- portive or adverse) to the Town Planning Board. If opposing further repre- sentations are received, the TPB must hold another hearing to consider all the further representations, at which the persons who have submitted the rel- evant representations, comments and further representations may attend and be heard by the TPB. After the further hearing, the TPB will decide whether to make amendments to the draft plan. Upon completion of the represen- tation consideration process, the TPB is required to submit the draft plan incorporating the amendments together with the representations, comments

200 Review of the Town Planning Ordinance of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong Institute of Planners, 1990, p.2; Ordinances of Hong Kong for the Years 1982, 1988, 1991, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2004, Hong Kong, Government Printer; Planning Department website, http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_tc/tech_doc/tp_bill/ pamphlet2004; Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance 1956; Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance 1969; Department of Justice, Bilingual Laws Information System website, http://www.legislation.gov.hk/blis_pdf. nsf/6799165D2FEE3FA94825755E0033E532/BA93A4BB4780F729482575EE003FA8E3?OpenDocum ent; ‘Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance 2004’ (information pamphlet), http://www.pland.gov.hk/ pland_tc/tech_doc/tp_bill/pamphlet2004/index.html.

and further representations to the Chief Executive in Council for approval within nine months of the expiry of the plan exhibition period (or within such a further six-month period as may be extended by the Chief Executive).

As for planning enforcement, sections 22 and 23 were amended and a new section 24A was added. The amended ordinance empowers the Planning Authority (i.e. the Director of Planning) to enter or to have access through any land or premises (except domestic premises) for investigation of a suspected unauthorised development (UD). A notice may be served under section 22 to request information relating to the suspected UD. Failure to comply with the notice served under section 22 is an offence and will be liable to a fine of up to 100,000 Hong Kong dollars. A notice may be served under section 23 to request discontinuation of a UD if the Authority is of the opinion that there is a UD. In forming an opinion on whether there is a UD, the Authority must have regard to aerial photographs taken by the Lands Department, the relevant statutory plans and other relevant information. Upon the service of a notice under section 23(1), the notice recipient will be required to discontinue the UD within a specified period. Under the amended ordinance, the submission of a planning application for regularising the UD will not be taken as a reasonable step to comply with the notice. Technical amendments were made to section 23(9), and a section 24A was added to clarify the burden of proof on the defendant and the prosecution.

Implementation of the Amendment Ordinance

On 8 June 2005, the then Director of Planning, Bosco Fung, said that the Amendment Ordinance 2004 would mean a more transparent planning system and more opportunities for public participation in the town planning process.201 It would also strengthen the planning enforcement control over unauthorised developments in the rural New Territories. To facilitate the implementation of the amended ordinance, the TPB promulgated eight sets of TPB guidelines on the new procedures and requirements.

Members of the public have attached more and more importance to their participation in town planning. They hope the planning process can be more democratic and feature greater public engagement. Since the amended ordi- nance was enacted in 2004, ordinary citizens still think that the current town planning process is too exclusive and the TPB members are not neutral enough. Besides, they feel excluded because of the professional jargon and believe that urban spaces are being monopolised by the rich.202

Members of the planning and construction sectors, on the other hand, think

201 ‘Ordinance to Make Planning System More Transparent’, Press Releases, 8 June 2005, http://www.info. gov.hk/gia/general/200506/08/06080249.htm.

202 Shadow Long Term Housing Strategy Steering Committee and Land Justice League, Chongduo Xinjie dongbei: goujian chengxiangjiao gong shengde 6 zhong xiangxiang (Regain the North East New Territories: Six Visions for Building Symbiosis of Urban, Rural and Suburban Areas), Hong Kong, Shadow Long Term Housing Strategy Steering Committee and Land Justice League, 2014, p.30.

that the planning system still has room for improvement.203 In the opinion of some critics, the TPB lacks representativeness and transparency. All the 36 Board members are appointed by the Chief Executive. The public has no right to participate in the selection process or object to the member list. For instance, Francis Lui, Vice Chairman of K. Wah Group, and Tony Tse, former General Manager of the Sales Department of Henderson, are both prominent figures of the real estate industry, but both of them used to serve as TPB members as well. Both Legislative Councillor Lee Wing-tat and Patrick Lau, a lawmaker representing the architectural, surveying and planning sector, point out that the government should not appoint real estate developers to the TPB for fear of con- flicts of interest. The Housing, Planning and Lands Bureau explains, however, that TPB members come from different sectors of society and that the govern- ment regularly reviews the TPB’s composition, so as to ensure that the overall interests of the community are fully reflected.

A ruling by the Court of First Instance of the High Court in February 2015 reflected the difficulties faced by the TPB in carrying out its duties. When pre- paring OZPs for Wan Chai, Mong Kok, Yau Ma Tei, and Ngau Tau Kok and Kowloon Bay, the TPB imposed building height restrictions and the require- ment for better ventilation with an aim to improve the living environment and to reduce wall-effect buildings. But the Real Estate Developers Association of Hong Kong (REDA) sought judicial review of the decision. The Court main- tained that the TPB had a legal right to impose development restrictions, but the TPB had violated procedural justice in making the decision without fully considering the views of the REDA. Therefore the Court ruled in favour of the REDA. The TPB was right in principle but was found wrong in procedures. Both sides had their ups and downs. The TPB was dissatisfied with the ruling and appealed to a higher court. The case lasted four years, and the decision went against the Town Planning Board in 2015.204 While the judge’s mentioning of violation of procedural justice may help the TPB improve its procedures, it may also compromise the TPB’s effective functioning and even cause a chain reac- tion. As a result, the TPB’s decisions on other projects may also face challenges. The judge also criticised the TPB for not circulating developers’ objections among its members until the day of the meeting, and questioned whether the members had had enough time to digest the information before making a fair decision. The judge suggested that the TPB required any written comments to be submitted to members for inspection one or two weeks before hearing. Thus TPB members could avoid making hasty decisions as they had in the past and would no longer be regarded as ‘rubber stamps’. These criticisms by the judge are based on the ideal scenario, because it would be demanding for all members

to attend every meeting with full concentration.

The representation hearing meetings are lengthy, and many TPB members

203 School of Journalism and Communication, Chinese University of Hong Kong, U-beat Magazine, Volume 69, May 2005, www.com.cuhk.edu.hk/ubeat_past/050569/story10.htm.

204 Sing Tao Daily, 4 February 2015, p.A04. See http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201502/03/ P201502030981.htm.

have busy schedules. It is difficult for them to attend each and every meeting. It is also impractical to request that the final decision be made with full attention and complete attendance. In the long term, it would become difficult to attract talented members of society to join the TPB. The court ruling highlighted the TPB’s dilemma. Apart from considering filing an appeal, the TPB may also take the opportunity to streamline the existing decision-making process.

In recent years, many interest groups, concern groups and individuals have abused the appeal mechanism in town planning and resorted to filibus- tering to serve their agenda. They insist on verbally repeating each and every argument, even though such arguments are similar. That was the case for the Central Military Dock and the conversion of the site of the former Lee Wai Lee Technical Institute to residential use. The special meeting on representations against the NENT New Development Areas Project lasted several months, with unfortunate incidents of clashes and injuries in the process. The TPB won the case in April 2015. When TPB members have to hear repeated opinions by opponents, especially when such opinions have been adequately expressed in the written representations, the efficiency of the approving process is affected.

To avoid more filibustering and so as not to discourage community leaders from assuming public office, the government, based on the opinions of some TPB members, agrees it is necessary to address the issue by requesting commenters to provide their identity and contact information. Approval by the Legislative Council is required for any amendment to the Town Planning Ordinance, which seems difficult against the current political backdrop. Therefore the government will study the possibility of implementing administrative measures and stream- lining procedures, such as shortening the time of speeches by members of the public, and requesting representatives to confirm their attendance at hearings in order to avoid any impact that their absence may cause.

Since the implementation of the Amendment Ordinance 2004, the planning system has become more transparent and provides more opportunities for public participation. However, hearings have also become events for members of the public to vent their anger at the government’s governance. On the positive side, the government can hear the voices of NGOs and solicit public opinions. From a negative point of view, however, the government is facing a lot more variants and difficulties in carrying out its planning ideas and work.

Summary

Since Hong Kong’s return to China in 1997, the direction of urban planning has been constantly adjusted and adapted to the aspirations of society. In the early days after the return in 1997, the administration continued the practice of government-led formulation of blueprints for the future with economic devel- opment as the focus. After the global financial crisis, international speculation on the Hong Kong dollar, the avian flu outbreak, the property market slump and many other challenges, Hong Kong’s economy fell into recession. The develop- ment policy, which had been otherwise effective, seemed to be ineffective and failed to swiftly address problems. On the other hand, there were significant

changes in social values. The usual practice of increasing urban land areas by means of reclamation, especially when it was related to both sides of Victoria Harbour, was being questioned. The demolition of the Star Ferry Pier and the Queen’s Pier even caused controversy. Members of the public have attached unprecedented importance to the conservation of historic buildings, the preser- vation of collective memories and the inheritance of cultural values.

With the advent of the new millennium, the preservation and revitalisa- tion of historical buildings were strengthened in urban renewal projects at the request of the community. The cases involving the Central Police Station, the West Wing of the Central Government Offices, and the tenement buildings and markets in Central and Sheung Wan all reflected the government’s swift change in policy. The complete demolition of old buildings and the construction of new modern skyscrapers became synonymous with lack of cultural qualities. There were strong calls from society for the conservation of historical relics. When reviewing urban design guidelines, the government not only needed to include assessment for the conservation and revitalisation of historic buildings, but had to introduce new standards as well. To be specific, the overall development of the city should take into account a number of factors, such as air quality, noise, visual impact on both sides of Victoria Harbour, building heights and public space. The development in rural areas, with the goal of redistributing the urban population, was also constrained by the calls to improve urban life.

In the rather short time span of two decades since Hong Kong’s return, public participation in town planning has become far more enthusiastic. Looking back at the difficulties, incidents and reforms in town planning in recent times, we find that planning tasks are becoming more and more arduous. While the gov- ernment reviews the alignment of the existing system with the public interest from time to time, this does not necessarily gain complete public recognition. Fortunately, among the noisy disputes, we still see that the system is constantly improved and that the humanistic spirit is more and more cherished in the city’s development, which no longer focuses solely on economic benefits, as it did in the early post-war days. More importance is attached to the living quality of each member of society, as well as to the interests of the region and even humankind as a whole. It is something that everyone in Hong Kong can be proud of.

7

Challenge of sustainable development (1997–2015)

Town Planning aims at shaping a quality living and working environment, facilitating economic development, and promoting the health, safety, convenience and general welfare of the community by guiding and controlling development and the use of land. Based on the principle of sustainable development, town planning seeks to bring about an organised, efficient and desirable place for the community to live and work in. Given the limited land resources in Hong Kong, there is a need to strike a balance in land utilization to meet the competing demands for housing, commerce, industry, transport, recreation, nature conservation, heritage preservation and other community needs. (Hong Kong: The Facts (Town Planning), Information Services

Department of the Government of the HKSAR, 2015)

More than two decades after the handover, Hong Kong is undergoing social transformation while facing global warming, scarce resources and environmen- tal degradation. The basic philosophy and strategies of urban planning must be adapted to the changing social environment accordingly. Apart from adjust- ments made by balancing economic, social, environmental and resource needs, it is important to enhance community engagement in the development process, which is different from the previous economy-driven approach. Since the hand- over, the Hong Kong government has been proactive in developing new core districts, cultural centres, development areas, boundary crossings and transpor- tation networks, among other things. These novel concepts involve new plans based on the government’s sustainable development strategies, shaping the vision for the city’s future growth.

New core districts

As new core districts of the city, West Kowloon and South East Kowloon (cur- rently known as Kai Tak Development or KTD) play a vital role in economic growth, housing development, population decentralisation and the expansion of the central business district. They will also contribute to the city’s new image with culture, sports and tourism elements. In recent years, consensus has been reached on the planning of the two districts despite heated debates. There are concerns that public participation will delay the planning process. The Town Planning Board (TPB), however, respects public opinion and lets Hong Kong

people take part in the city’s future development so that they will have a greater sense of belonging. Urban planning has turned a new page.

Cultural mix in West Kowloon

As early as 1986 when the Metroplan was introduced, the government planned to carry out reclamation works in five areas with development potential around Victoria Harbour, namely Aldrich Bay, Hung Hom Bay, West Kowloon, the Central–Wan Chai waterfront and Green Island. Under the plan, about 640 hectares of land would be made available to accommodate more than 400,000 people and to meet the territory’s future development needs. ‘West Kowloon’ today is considered part of the Kowloon Planning Area No. 20 – South West Kowloon Outline Zoning Plan (OZP), covering the West Kowloon Reclamation and part of the former waterfronts in Sham Shui Po and Yau Ma Tei. The first South West Kowloon OZP was formulated in 1992 and had been amended 29 times as of 2014. (See Figure 7.1.)

The West Kowloon Reclamation Project in 1996 created more than 330 hectares of land, from Lai Chi Kok and Stonecutters Island in the north to Yau Ma Tei in the south. It provided land for private and public housing, commercial and industrial developments, the government, private organisa- tions, the community, recreational facilities, transport infrastructure and other purposes. According to the Metroplan, the newly created land would reduce the development density in the hinterland of West Kowloon and enable the construction of major links to the new airport, such as the Western Harbour Tunnel, the West Kowloon Expressway, a section of Route 3 and the Airport Railway. In 1999, the government broke through the established framework and planned to develop a world-class integrated arts, cultural and entertain- ment district. Therefore, the use of the southern part of the West Kowloon Reclamation, with about 40 hectares of land involved, was reviewed. The origi- nal planning was revised and some proposed road works1 were cancelled. As a result, the Planning Department formulated ‘Cultural Facilities: A Study on Their Requirements and the Formulation of New Planning Standards and Guidelines’ to investigate the future planning of the West Kowloon Cultural District (WKCD).2

In 2001, the government launched an international concept plan competition to invite proposals from the architecture sector for the development of an inte- grated arts, cultural and entertainment district in West Kowloon.3 A total of 161 entries were received, with 71 from local participants and 90 from 30 overseas

1 Hong Kong Yearbook, Hong Kong, Information Services Department, 1999.

2 See http://paper.wenweipo.com/2004/12/09/PL0412090006.htm or http://www.arch.cuhk.edu.hk/ server1/resch2/livearch/projects/westkowloon/article/4c.pdf.

3 Consultative Committee on the Core Arts and Cultural Facilities of the West Kowloon Cultural District, Recommendation Report of the Consultative Committee on the Core Arts and Cultural Facilities of the West Kowloon Cultural District, Paper No. WKCD-398, 12 September 2007, p.1, http://www.legco.gov.hk/ yr04-05/english/hc/sub_com/hs02/papers/hs020912wkcd-398-e.pdf.

Source: planning Department, West Kowloon Development Statement: Consultation Digest, Hong Kong, planning Department, 1994, p.12.

Figure 7.1 West Kowloon Reclamation Project

countries.4 In 2002, a proposal featuring a giant canopy was selected as the winner. The government drafted a master plan for future development based on the design and set up the Steering Committee for Development of WKCD to promote the project. Hard hit by the Asian financial crisis as well as the SARS epidemic in 2003, the financially strapped government decided to introduce market-driven private sector financing to take forward the WKCD project, with a community- led approach involving a partnership between the business and cultural sectors. Hence, an invitation for proposals (IFP) was widely sent out. In mid-2004, the government conducted consultation on the IFP related to the development of West Kowloon, and the public began to express their views on various aspects of the project. The single development approach, the mandatory provision of a huge canopy and the future role of the arts and cultural sector aroused controversy. There was a general preference for a dedicated non-profit-making statutory body to oversee the project. On 6 December 2004, the then Chief Secretary, Donald Tsang, proposed the slogan of ‘An Icon for Culture and Leisure’, expressing the government’s hope of developing the WKCD into ‘a world-class arts, cultural and leisure district’, so that Hong Kong could become ‘one of the cities that don’t just follow, but set global standards of excellence in the fields of art and culture’.5

In order to address the public concern about the WKCD being a real estate development in disguise, the government established several mechanisms, including these three:

The proponent chosen would be required to build core arts and cultural facilities (CACFs) and operate them for 30 years. It would need to involve top professionals in the arts and cultural field in managing such facilities.
The government had set a plot ratio parameter for the site, and any depar- ture from the parameter should be robustly justified. The government would reserve the right to accept or reject any proposal.
Public consultations would be required in the assessment of related pro- posals. The draft OZP would be subject to approval by the TPB, mainly consisting of members of the community, and be submitted to the Chief Executive in Council for final review before it could be implemented.

In the Draft South West Kowloon Outline Zoning Plan No. S/K20/14, the southern part of the area was rezoned to ‘other specified uses’ annotated ‘arts, cultural, commercial and entertainment uses’ to facilitate future planning.

In the face of public debate in February 2006, the Hong Kong government announced it would give up the initial development framework and scrap the canopy design, and that the WKCD would be redesigned.6 In April of the

4 Hong Kong Planning Department, Planning Department Annual Report, Hong Kong, Planning Department, 2003, p.13.

5 Donald Tsang, ‘New Concept, New Thinking’, 6 December 2004, news.gov.hk website, http://archive. news.gov.hk/isd/ebulletin/en/category/ontherecord/041205/print/041205en11002.htm.

6 ‘West Kowloon Cultural District’, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/West_Kowloon_Cultural_ District.

same year, the government appointed the Consultative Committee on the Core Arts and Cultural Facilities of the West Kowloon Cultural District and its three advisory groups (the Performing Arts and Tourism Advisory Group, the Museums Advisory Group and the Financial Matters Advisory Group) to re-examine and reconfirm the need for CACFs in West Kowloon. On 12 September 2007, the consultative committee accepted the previous recom- mendation by the Legislative Council for government subsidy and private sector involvement, considering that operation, maintenance and construction costs could not be recovered through CACFs. The consultative committee pro- posed a prudent and transparent financing approach which would separate the arts and cultural facilities from the commercial and residential developments in the WKCD, whilst enabling the WKCD to develop and operate on a financially self-sufficient basis.7

The consultative committee recommended the establishment of the West Kowloon Cultural District Authority (WKCDA), which, after developing the WKCD Master Layout Plan and laying out the footprint for the CACFs and res- idential, hotel and commercial developments, would only develop and manage the CACFs as well as the retail, dining and entertainment facilities which should be integrated with the CACFs. The WKCDA, however, would not be involved in the disposal of the residential, hotel and office sites, which would be disposed of by the government in accordance with the established land sale procedure. The estimated land revenue would be appropriated by the Legislative Council as an upfront endowment in order to finance the capital costs. The WKCDA would rely on rental proceeds as a source of recurring income to meet the operating deficits of the CACFs.8

According to studies and estimations by the Government Economist, the WKCD would bring to Hong Kong’s economy a cumulative value-added con- tribution of 71 billion Hong Kong dollars (at present value) in the first 46 years of operation; construction works for the WKCD would be able to create over 11,000 job opportunities in the construction industry; and the number of job opportunities created would grow steadily to more than 21,500 after 30 years. Moreover, some 4.5 million tourists are expected to be attracted to the WKCD every year, bringing additional tourism revenue of 3.7 billion Hong Kong dollars to the territory each year.9

In February 2008, the government presented a bill in the Legislative Council

7 Consultative Committee on the Core Arts and Cultural Facilities of the West Kowloon Cultural District, ‘Recommendation Report of the Consultative Committee on the Core Arts and Cultural Facilities of the West Kowloon Cultural District’, Press Releases, 12 September 2007, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/ general/200709/12/P200709120230.htm.

8 Consultative Committee on the Core Arts and Cultural Facilities of the West Kowloon Cultural District, Recommendation Report of the Consultative Committee on the Core Arts and Cultural Facilities of the West Kowloon Cultural District, June 2007, pp.96–97, http://d3fveiluhe0xc2.cloudfront.net/media/_file/zip.zip.

9 Consultative Committee on the Core Arts and Cultural Facilities of the West Kowloon Cultural

District, ‘Recommendation Report of the Consultative Committee on the Core Arts and Cultural Facilities of the West Kowloon Cultural District’, Press Releases, 12 September 2007, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/ general/200709/12/P200709120230.htm.

for the establishment of the WKCDA, a statutory body responsible for promot- ing and developing the project. On 11 July, the Legislative Council enacted the West Kowloon Cultural District Authority Ordinance and approved funding of 21.6 billion Hong Kong dollars for the development of the WKCD. The WKCDA was established on 23 October 2008.10 In 2009–10, two rounds of public consultation were launched. In 2011, a development plan based on the ‘City Park’ concept by Foster + Partners, with desirable features of the two proposals by Rocco Design Architects Ltd and the Office for Metropolitan Architecture (OMA), was introduced to the public. In March 2012, the Draft West Kowloon Cultural District Development Plan No. S/K20/WKCD/1 was gazetted by the TPB and exhibited for public inspection. According to section 21(9) of the West Kowloon Cultural District Authority Ordinance, the develop- ment plan replaced relevant parts in the South West Kowloon OZP and served as parameters for the development of the WKCD. In September of the same year, the TPB considered representations and comments in respect of the devel- opment plan and decided not to uphold them. In January 2013, the develop- ment plan was approved by the Chief Executive in Council and renumbered as S/K20/WKCD/2.

According to the Draft West Kowloon Cultural District Development Plan No. S/K20/WKCD/2,11 the WKCD would be located at the south of Austin Road West and the Western Harbour Tunnel Toll Plaza, occupying a total area of 40.91 hectares, with a planned resident population of 4,000. Arts and cultural venues include the Mega Performance Venue/Exhibition Centre, Amphitheatre, Freespace, M+ Museum, Lyric Theatre, Great Theatres, the Musical Theatre, Music Centre, Centre for Contemporary Performance, two medium-sized theatres, Xiqu Centre, arts groups in residence, art academy and art education centres. There would also be different types of retail, dining, enter- tainment, office, hotel and residential facilities. As part of the vehicle-free and pedestrian-friendly design, the auxiliary access for vehicles, car park and loading areas would be located in the basement to achieve low carbon emissions, low energy consumption and low-cost maintenance, making creative use of the har- bourfront and adjoining areas for public enjoyment. As for transport arrange- ments, the WKCD would connect to neighbouring old areas, so it could be reached from different parts of the territory. People could get close to Victoria Harbour as part of their daily routine. The planning and design would be adap- tive to arts, cultural and social and economic needs in future, highlighting the concept of sustainable development planning.

Construction of buildings in the WKCD is subject to the following restrictions:12

10 ‘West Kowloon Cultural District’, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/West_Kowloon_Cultural_ District.

11 Hong Kong Town Planning Board, West Kowloon Cultural District Development Plan No. S/K20/ WKCD/2, Hong Kong, Town Planning Board, 2013.

12 Hong Kong Town Planning Board, West Kowloon Cultural District Development Plan No. S/K20/ WKCD/2, Hong Kong, Town Planning Board, 2013, p.1.

Table 7.1 Distribution of land uses and GFAs in WKCD

Land use Maximum GFA

(square metres)

‘Open space’ 11,200

‘Other specified uses’ annotated ‘arts, cultural, entertainment and commercial uses’ (OU(AcEcU))

358,850

‘Other specified uses’ annotated ‘mixed uses’ (OU(MU)) 366,900 ‘Other specified uses’ annotated ‘electricity substation’ (OU(ESS)) 3,400 total 740,350

Source: Hong Kong town planning Board, West Kowloon Cultural District Development Plan No. S/K20/WKCD/2, Hong Kong, town planning Board, 2013, p.9.

According to the Approved West Kowloon Cultural District Development Plan No. S/K20/WKCD/2, the WKCD is subject to a maximum plot ratio of 1.81, which allows a maximum gross floor area (GFA) of 740,350 square metres based on the total area of approximately 40.91 hectares.13 To comply with the maximum GFA allowed for the entire district, the maximum GFA of each land use zoning has been planned accordingly. The restrictions for various land and development mixes are as shown in Table 7.1.
Residential use will not exceed 20 per cent of the total plot ratio. For the land designated for ‘other specified uses’ annotated ‘mixed use’, the maximum GFA for residential use will be 148,070 square metres.
There will be public open space of not less than 23 hectares (including 3 hectares of piazza areas and a waterfront promenade of not less than 20 metres in width). In the OZP, the land designated for ‘open space’ would cover an area of 17.23 hectares, including 3 hectares of piazza areas and a waterfront promenade of not less than 20 metres in width. In addition, the sub-areas designated for ‘other specified uses’ annotated ‘arts, cultural, entertainment and commercial uses’ would provide not less than 57,700 square metres open space, which is interconnected and easily accessible. The ‘public open space’ in the above zonings would cover a total area of not less than 23 hectares.

Building height restrictions

The Approved West Kowloon Cultural District Development Plan No. S/ K20/WKCD/2 maintains the general building height profile of 50 mPD/70 mPD/100 mPD as stipulated in the South West Kowloon OZP for the WKCD. The height profile was set based on the following urban design principles:

13 Hong Kong Town Planning Board, West Kowloon Cultural District Development Plan No. S/K20/ WKCD/2, Hong Kong, Town Planning Board, 2013, pp.8–9.

preservation of public views from Sun Yat Sen Memorial Park at the seaside of Sai Ying Pun towards the Kowloon Peak, Tsz Wan Shan and Lion Rock ridgelines to maintain a 20 per cent building-free zone below the ridgelines;
preservation of public views from the Star Ferry Pier at the Central water- front towards the Lion Rock ridgeline to maintain a 20 per cent building- free zone below the ridgeline;
preservation of an open vista and green corridor from the ‘government, institution or community’ heritage sites consisting of the declared mon- uments of Hong Kong Observatory, the former Kowloon British School (now Antiquities and Monuments Office) and the Grade II St Andrew’s Church, through Kowloon Park and along the WKCD waterfront prom- enade towards the western Victoria Harbour;
avoidance of unduly tall buildings with the wall effect and enhancement of visual permeability from the harbour by the lowering of building height at waterfront locations;
introduction of variation in building height for a coherent building height profile across the WKCD; and
introduction of visual relief to soften the building masses clustering around Kowloon Station.

Notwithstanding the building height restrictions, a stepped height profile descending towards the waterfront was proposed to create height variation.

To optimise the development potential, the WKCDA proposed a minor relaxation of the GFA (from 740,350 square metres to 851,400 square metres) and the building height restrictions (by relaxing the height by 7–14 mPD within the range of 50–70 mPD) of the WKCD in 2015. The application for planning permission was conditionally approved by the TPB on 14 November 2015.14

Great importance is attached to external transport in the WKCD. Located along the West Kowloon Expressway, Western Harbour Tunnel, Airport Railway and West Rail Line, the WKCD is the planned terminus of the Express Rail Link. Various traffic improvement schemes, including the Lin Cheung Road–Austin Road West Underpass, the upgrading of the elevated Nga Cheung Road, the new connection from Hoi Po Road to West Kowloon Expressway (Northbound), the new link from the elevated Nga Cheung Road to West Harbour Tunnel, the new road linking West Kowloon Expressway (Southbound) to at-grade Nga Cheung Road, and the Canton Road/Austin Road West Junction Improvement,

14 Planning Application No. A/K20/121: The maximum GFA of the whole West Kowloon Cultural District is relaxed from 740,350 square metres to 851,400 square metres (the plot ratio was increased from

1.81 to 2.08). The maximum GFA of zonings for art and cultural facilities, retail/dining/entertainment and government, and institution or community is 484,780 square metres in total. The maximum GFA of hotel/ office zoning is 366,620 square metres. The residential use of zoning is retained at a maximum 20 per cent of the total GFA of the whole district, i.e. 170,280 square metres. For the ‘open space’ zone, 23 hectares is retained. In addition, in the zonings remarked ‘other specified uses’ annotated ‘arts, cultural, entertainment and commercial uses’ and ‘mixed uses’, the building height restrictions within the height bands of 50 mPD and 70 mPD as stipulated on the WKCD Development Plan were relaxed by 7–14 mPD. For details, see http:// www1.ozp.tpb.gov.hk/gos/download.aspx?type=apply&caseno=A/K20/121&lang=0.

would be subsequently in place. Facilities for easy access to the WKCD would include footbridges connecting the district to Kowloon Station, Kowloon Park and the west of Elements, the extension of the Austin Road West subway, the connection to the landscape deck at Austin Station, and a bridge to the China Ferry Terminal (CFT). In addition, upon further investigation and a feasibility study, two piers may be built at the southern and western edge of the WKCD to facilitate water sports, subject to the Protection of the Harbour Ordinance (Cap. 531). The existing fireboat berth located at the north of the CFT along the West Kowloon waterfront promenade may also be relocated if a suitable site is found. Table 7.2 shows that, in the 1990s, most of the land in South West Kowloon was used for comprehensive developments, or residential or industrial purposes. The residential area in 2009 was significantly larger than that in 1998, while indus- trial area and open space became much smaller because some plots were rezoned for ‘other specified uses’ or the later WKCD. The ‘comprehensive development area’ (CDA), including residential developments, retail stores, office buildings, hotels, public transport interchanges and other ancillary facilities, has remained

at around 30 hectares, representing 9 to 11 per cent of the total area since 1992.

New central business district in South East Kowloon

The government’s Metroplan in the 1990s included planning for the redevel- opment of Kowloon City, with balanced allocation for commercial, residen- tial, industrial, leisure, governmental, institutional and community facilities as well as maritime activities. The government also formulated a concept plan for the Kai Tak Development and intended to turn it into a new community for over 285,000 people. The main idea was to build residential properties on the 50-hectare former apron area of Kai Tak Airport. The first residents were expected to move in by 2003. By the end of 2008, the project would provide accommodation for about 130,000 people.15 To meet the daily needs of resi- dents, there would be the Metro Park covering approximately 50 hectares, and the underground railway would be extended to there.

In 1998, the government combined about 270 hectares of Kai Tak Airport with some 300 hectares of the adjacent reclamation area into the South East Kowloon Development Area for comprehensive planning. Approximately 100 hectares of land in Cha Kwo Ling was reserved for the reprovisioning of the Kowloon Bay Typhoon Shelter and the cargo working area. The surrounding 270 hectares of land covering Hung Hom, To Kwa Wan, Ma Tau Kok and Kowloon City would be used for urban renewal to accommodate an estimated population of 285,000 to 310,000. In November 1999, a feasibility study was conducted on the overall development of South East Kowloon. It was proposed to reduce the reclamation area to 133 hectares and the total development area to about 410 hectares. Apart from housing and transportation purposes, it was

15 Hong Kong Planning Department, Planning Department Annual Report, Hong Kong, Planning Department, 1997, p.35.

Table 7.2 Comparison of planning of South West Kowloon over the years

Land use 1992

	Area (hectares)	(%)		Area (hectares)	(%)		Area (hectares)	(%)		Area (hectares)	(%)		Area (hectares)	(%)
commercial	8.88	2.75	8.41		2.61	5.37		1.67	3.54		1.07	3.54		1.06
comprehensive development	30.92	9.57	30.92		9.57	36.49		11.34	31.01		9.35	33.43		10.05
area
Residential (Group A)	28.62	8.85	28.62		8.86	26.41		8.21	47.99		14.47	52.20		15.69
Industrial	18.35	5.68	18.35		5.68	17.54		5.45	1.85		0.56	1.85		0.56
Government, institution or	26.01	8.05	25.11		7.77	25.47		7.92	30.60		9.23	29.82		8.96
community
Open space	44.79	13.86	46.16		14.29	46.95		14.60	23.24		7.01	26.54		7.98
Other specified uses	43.87	13.57	43.72		13.53	43.56		13.54	78.84		23.77	29.45		8.85
Major road, etc.	121.75	37.67	121.75		37.69	119.88		37.27	114.62		34.54	114.94		34.55

OZP No. S/K20/1

1996

OZP No. S/K20/3

1998

OZP No. S/K20/4

2009

OZP No. S/K20/22

2014

OZP No. S/K20/30

Western Kowloon cultural District Development plan area

Zoned as various land uses Zoned as ‘other specified

uses’

40.91 12.30

total development area	323.19	100.00	323.04	100.00	321.67	100.00	331.69	100.00	332.68	100.00
typhoon shelter	70.66	–	70.66	–	70.19	–	70.19	–	70.19	–
total planning scheme area	393.85	–	393.70	–	391.86	–	401.88	–	402.87	–

Sources: Hong Kong town planning Board, South West Kowloon Outline Zoning Plan No. S/K20/1, Hong Kong, town planning Board, 1992; Hong Kong town planning Board, South West Kowloon Outline Zoning Plan No. S/K20/3, Hong Kong, town planning Board, 1996; Hong Kong town planning Board, South West Kowloon Outline Zoning Plan No. S/K20/4, Hong Kong, town planning Board, 1998; Hong Kong town planning Board, South West Kowloon Outline Zoning Plan No. S/K20/22, Hong Kong, town planning Board, 2009; Hong Kong town planning Board, South West Kowloon Outline Zoning Plan No. S/K20/30, Hong Kong, town planning Board, 2014.

proposed to construct buildings for government departments, community facil- ities and tourism-related facilities. The population estimate was subsequently reduced to 250,000. Moreover, there was an idea of building ‘a city within a city’ equipped with territory-wide facilities. In addition to a mass transit system for the five new residential areas as well as a large commercial centre in the central area of the waterfront, there would be a 50-hectare Metro Park and a 2-kilo- metre waterfront promenade. Recreational and tourism facilities would include an aviation training school, a museum and a stadium, whereas public facilities would include a hospital, a railway depot, a helipad, a refuse transfer station and a public filling barging point.

In May 2000, the government consulted the public on the Preliminary Layout Plan (PLP). In September 2001, the feasibility study was substantially com- pleted. Based on the study results the government prepared an outline master development plan, which was translated into two OZPs, roughly the same as the PLP, except that the Metro Park area was reduced to 24 hectares while the waterfront promenade was lengthened to 5.4 kilometres. The planned popula- tion of 250,000 and the proposed supply of 75,000 jobs remained unchanged. The two OZPs were approved in July 2002.

In January 2004, the Court of Final Appeal interpreted the Protection of the Harbour Ordinance and ruled that an overriding public need was required for any proposed reclamation. As a result, the KTD was subject to thorough review and planning revision to ensure compliance. In July 2004, the Planning Department commissioned the Kai Tak Planning Review and created a new development concept and preliminary outline development plan (PODP). With the com- ments collected from the first round of public consultation between September and November 2004, the Planning Department drafted three outline concept plans (OCPs), each focusing on different land uses, in order to provide distinc- tive directions of development for public discussion. The two-month second round of public engagement was carried out in November 2005 to solicit public opinion on the OCPs. After that, the third round of discussion was conducted to seek consensus.

In 2007, the KTD was officially published as a major infrastructure project in the Policy Address. The development area was reduced to about 328 hectares covering the old Kai Tak Airport site and adjacent areas, with no reclamation involved. The objective was to develop Kai Tak into a distinguished, vibrant, attractive and people-oriented community by Victoria Harbour. Apart from the new cruise terminal, major KTD projects included a multi-purpose sports complex, government offices, a 24-hectare Metro Park, and commercial and residential development. The company of renowned British architect Norman Robert Foster also took part in the design of the Kai Tak Cruise Terminal, focus- ing on flexibility, sustainability, environmental protection and intelligence. The terminal building would be extended from the tip to the middle of the Kai Tak runway, along with the cruise terminal, which would be able to accommodate the world’s largest vessels. Upon completion, the terminal building would cover an area of 7.6 hectares, with four storeys from the ground to the rooftop, total- ling 70 metres in height. On the ground level there would be road and transport

facilities, while the mezzanine floor would be used as parking and office space. The immigration clearance hall would be located on the first floor and the Kai Tak Cruise Terminal Park on the rooftop. As a practical and efficient establish- ment, the terminal building would adopt a series of eco-friendly installations and energy-saving facilities. The streamlined curved structure would effectively introduce natural light for the interior and enhance ventilation and thus comfort. The whole building would have a commercial floor area of 5,600 square metres, with a capacity to handle 3,000 passengers per hour. There would be a visitor service centre operated by the Tourism Board. An at-grade cross-boundary heli- port would be established at the tip of the Kai Tak Airport runway,16 so that tourists could enjoy a sight-seeing tour above Victoria Harbour. The terminal building was designed with a number of eco-friendly elements, including a pho- tovoltaic system, a solar hot water system, and a rainwater and air-conditioning condensate recycling system for irrigation purposes.

The KTD would be completed in three phases by 2013, 2016 and 2021, respectively. The first phase, including the construction of two roads, site for- mation works for the cruise terminal at the former runway, the cruise terminal building, the first berth, the first stage of a district cooling system, public housing development and advance infrastructure works, commenced in 2009 and was substantially completed in 2013. The second phase, which commenced in mid- 2011, includes the Trade and Industry Tower, the second stage of infrastruc- ture works at the north apron, the first stage of Kai Tak Runway Park, the Kai Tak Approach Channel, the bioremediation treatment at Kwun Tong Typhoon Shelter, and radar works at the cruise terminal building rooftop.

On 12 October 2011, the then Chief Executive, Donald Tsang, introduced the ‘Energizing Kowloon East’ slogan in the Policy Address 2011–12, stressing that traditional core business districts could no longer satisfy the growing demand for office space driven by economic growth and that it would be necessary to develop Kowloon East into another core business district. He pointed out that, over the preceding decade, the total floor area of Grade A office space in Kwun Tong and Kowloon Bay had surged 2.5 times to 1.4 million square metres. With the development of the office area and tourism and leisure facilities at Kai Tak as well as revitalised industrial buildings, Kowloon East was poised to become a premium business district providing additional office space of 4 million square metres. East Kowloon includes the new Kai Tak Development Area (KTDA), Kwun Tong and Kowloon Bay, so the government would need to enhance con- nectivity within East Kowloon, such as improving pedestrian access networks, considering building an environmentally friendly linkage system through the entire district, and strengthening external connectivity through the MTR Kwun Tong Line and the future Sha Tin to Central Link.

On 7 June 2012, the Energizing Kowloon East Office (EKEO) was estab- lished, with an aim to coordinate resources allocation and take forward the

16 Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Kowloon Planning Area No. 22 Kai Tak Outline Zoning Plan No. S/ K22/4, Hong Kong, Town Planning Board, 2012, http://www2.ozp.tpb.gov.hk/plan/ozp_plan_notes/tc/S_ K22_4_c.pdf.

Energizing Kowloon East policy. Adhering to connectivity, branding, design and diversity (collectively known as ‘CBD2’) as the planning principle, the EKEO was to convey the message of transforming Kowloon East into Hong Kong’s second central business district. In 2013, the government proposed the connection of the KTD to Kwun Tong and Kowloon Bay, with monorail as the environmentally friendly link system (EFLS), so as to facilitate the transforma- tion of Kowloon East into a core business district. In October of the same year, the Civil Engineering and Development Department (CEDD) sought public views and suggestions in respect of a detailed feasibility study on the link system. On 18 November 2012, Liber Research Community, the Professional Commons and Harmonic HK Concern Group proposed the development of the KTDA into ‘Kai Tak for the People’, suggesting that the Development Bureau shift the secondary stadium of Kai Tak Sports City to the south of the main stadium. The 8-hectare spare plot could be used to build another 11,000 public housing units, so that the public/private housing ratio in the KTDA could reach 6:4.17 The loss of land for the Metro Park would be compensated for with the cancellation of the ‘low-density residential site with 1,300 flats’. As a result, the proposed park could be extended southwards and the commercial area for hotel development would be moved eastwards. After meeting and negotiating with government departments, the three organisations held a joint press con- ference on 27 January 2013 to make recommendations on the land use of Kai Tak. In early April of the same year, an application was submitted to the TPB to propose amendments to the OZP based on the ‘Kai Tak for the People’ pro- posal. Two weeks later, the organisations met for discussion with the Secretary for Development and members of the Legislative Council. The proposal, includ- ing the layout of the stadium complex, crowd control in major sports events, the Metro Park design, the impact of removing the hotel and other technical factors, was not supported by the authorities. The rezoning application was also rejected

by the TPB.

The Policy Address on 16 January 2013 mentioned three key points for the development of Kowloon East: Energizing Kowloon East (to develop a core business district providing an additional 4 million square metres of office space); Kai Tak Development (to review the planning of the area and explore the pos- sibility of increasing office space and housing supply); and Kai Tak Fantasy (to build an urban park called Kai Tak Fantasy at the runway tip and develop it into an ‘edutainment’ destination).18 The proposal took environmental protection and greening into consideration, adhering to the principle of sustainable devel- opment as well as the establishment of the EFLS.

Kowloon East, as an alternative core business district for Hong Kong, had the potential to supply an additional commercial/office floor area of about 5 million square metres. The government was considering relocating or consolidating the

17 ‘Kai Tak for the People’: A Citizen’s Alternative Plan website, www.procommons.org.hk/wp-content/ uploads/2012/11/kaitakmap.pdf.

18 RTHK website, 16 January 2013, http://rthk.hk/rthk/news/expressnews/20130116/ news_20130116_55_896050.htm.

existing government facilities in the two action areas of Kowloon East. Starting from 2014–15, suitable plots in the action areas would be made available to the market. The government also developed the concept of a ‘walkable’ Kowloon East in the Kowloon Bay and Kwun Tong Business Areas to improve the pedes- trian environment and address traffic issues. Among other things, the govern- ment studied arrangements to facilitate the construction of elevated walkways by private property owners and examined the feasibility of face-lifting back alleys and linking them to the pedestrian network. The 2015 Policy Address announced a review of the planning and development density of the KTDA to facilitate the transformation of Kowloon East. The KTDA was expected to provide at least another 6,800 flats (including some 1,000 flats already approved at the time) and at least 430,000 square metres of additional commercial floor area.19 Moreover, the government would continue to take forward the Kai Tak Fantasy project and carry out studies on the planning, engineering and imple- mentation approach to enhance the progress of developing by phases a world- class tourism, entertainment and leisure attraction.20 An acute general hospital would be built in the KTDA to offer in-patient and ambulatory services. In addi- tion, the Hospital Authority planned to provide approximately 250 new hospital beds and increase the service quota to cope with escalating demand.21 The Kai Tak Multi-purpose Sports Complex would be the largest sports facility in Hong Kong. In May 2017, the Public Works Subcommittee of the Legislative Council approved the funding for construction works valued at 31.9 billion Hong Kong dollars,22 and in December 2017 the construction tender for the Kai Tak Sports Centre entered the second phase.23 (See Table 7.3.)

According to the Kai Tak OZP, Kai Tak is planned to be developed into a ‘Culture, Sports, Tourism and Green Hub of Hong Kong’, featuring sports, peo- ple-oriented, sustainable, eco-friendly elements in a distinguished and attractive urban form. There would be six sub-areas, namely Kai Tak City Centre, Sports Hub, Metro Park, Runway Precinct, Tourism and Leisure Hub and South Apron Corner. Kai Tak would become another landmark of Hong Kong.

New development areas (NDAs)

North East New Territories (NENT) and North West New Territories (NWNT)

In 1990, the government conducted the Territorial Development Strategy Review (TDSR) and proposed a study of the strategic growth potential of NENT, NWNT, Hong Kong Island South and Lamma Island. In early 1998,

19 2015 Policy Address website, www.policyaddress.gov.hk/2015/chi/p76.html.

20 2015 Policy Address website, www.policyaddress.gov.hk/2015/chi/p86.html.

21 2015 Policy Address website, www.policyaddress.gov.hk/2015/chi/p186.html.

22 See https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr16-17/chinese/fc/pwsc/papers/p17-02c.pdf; http://orientaldaily.on.cc

/cnt/news/20170624/00176_030.html.

23 See http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201712/29/P2017122900630.htm.

Table 7.3 Land use distribution in the approved Kai Tak OZP No. S/K22/4

Land use Area

(hectares)

% of total area

commercial	14	4
comprehensive development area	9.62	3
Residential (Group A)	10.43	3
Residential (Group B)	17.70	5
Residential (Group c)	6.56	2
Government, institution or community	37.85	12
Open space	99.38	31
Other specified uses	57.72	18
Including:
(i) ‘Arts and performance related uses’ zone	1.16
(ii) ‘cruise terminal to include commercial development with	7.73

landscaped deck above’ zone

(iii) ‘tourism related uses to include commercial, hotel and entertainment’ zone

5.93

(iv) ‘Stadium’ zone	20.93
(v) Zones other than those above	21.97
Road and other utility services other than the above land uses	69.94	22
total area	323.20	100

Source: Hong Kong town planning Board, Kai Tak Outline Zoning Plan No. S/K22/4, Hong Kong, town planning Board, 2012.

the Planning Department and the CEDD jointly commissioned the Planning and Development Study on NENT and the Planning and Development Study on NWNT, designating Kwu Tung North, Fanling North and Ping Che/Ta Kwu Ling (the Three-in-One Scheme) and Hung Shui Kiu as NDAs. The gov- ernment estimated that the population would increase to about 8.3 million by 2001 and believed the NDAs could provide more land for an additional popula- tion of 1.5 million. Owing to slower growth in population and housing demand, however, the government subsequently shelved the development proposals. In Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy: Final Report, published in 2007, the Planning Department estimated an increase of 1.6 million in population by 2030, so the plans of NENT and NWNT NDAs were once again on the agenda. However, the government reiterated that it would not develop large new towns as it had from the 1970s to the 1990s. Instead, it proposed planning smaller NDAs in northern New Territories to supply land for comprehensive housing, employment, tertiary education, special industries involving high-value-added and pollution-free industries, and temporary port back-up and storage uses. NDAs would be more diverse in terms of density, design and architectural form. They would also provide convenient public transport and community facilities. The focus would be placed on quality living space, so that users would be able to enjoy a better-designed environment as well as an alternative way of living. It was assumed that the NDAs would be able to accommodate 350,000

people.24 Later, the NDAs were included as one of the ten major infrastructure projects in the 2007–08 Policy Address by the Chief Executive.

Planning of North East New Territories new development areas (NENT NDAs)

In 2008, the government commissioned the NENT NDAs Planning and Engineering Study (covering Kwu Tung North, Fanling North and Ping Che/ Ta Kwu Ling districts), and carried out the Stage One Public Engagement (PE), soliciting public views on the vision and aspirations for the NDAs. The Stage Two PE was carried out at the end of 2009, consulting the public on the PODPs. The Stage Three PE was carried out in 2012 to gauge public views on the recommended outline development plans (RODPs). In mid-2013, the government revised and finalised the RODPs.25 In view of the absence of a mass transit system, the original proposal of Ping Che/Ta Kwu Ling for lower- density residential and special industrial developments needed to be reviewed and replanned.26 On 20 December 2013, the TPB exhibited the OZPs for Kwu Tung North and Fanling North for public inspection. On 27 June 2014, the Legislative Council Finance Committee approved the funding proposal regard- ing the advance site formation and engineering infrastructure works at Kwu Tung North NDA and Fanling North NDA.27 In November 2014, the CEDD conducted a detailed study of the advance site formation and infrastructure works, which would commence subsequently. After considering the collected representations and comments, the TPB agreed on 29 April 2015 that the draft OZPs would be submitted to the Chief Executive for review. The draft OZPs were approved by the Chief Executive in Council on 16 June 2015.

The Kwu Tung North and Fanling North NDAs would be included as an extension of the Fanling/Sheung Shui New Town. Combined with the existing new towns, the NDAs would become the Fanling/Sheung Shui/Kwu Tung New Town.28 The two NDAs, covering a total area of 612 hectares, would provide about 60,000 residential units for some 170,000 people, as well as 37,700 new jobs.29 There would be a new hospital, specialist clinics, standard swimming

24 Hong Kong Planning Department, Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy: Final Report, Hong Kong, Planning Department, 2007, pp.99–104.

25 Planning Department and Civil Engineering and Development Department, North East New Territories New Development Areas Planning and Engineering Study: Information Digest, Hong Kong, Planning Department and Civil Engineering and Development Department, July 2013, p.4.

26 Planning Department and Civil Engineering and Development Department, North East New Territories New Development Areas Planning and Engineering Study: Information Digest, Hong Kong, Planning Department and Civil Engineering and Development Department, July 2013, p.4.

27 Legislative Council of Hong Kong website, http://www.legco.gov.hk/database/chinese/data_plw/plw- nentnda.htm.

28 Planning Department and Civil Engineering and Development Department, North East New Territories New Development Areas Planning and Engineering Study: Information Digest, Hong Kong, Planning Department and Civil Engineering and Development Department, July 2013, p.4.

29 Planning Department and Civil Engineering and Development Department, North East New Territories New Development Areas Planning and Engineering Study: Information Digest, Hong Kong, Planning Department and Civil Engineering and Development Department, July 2013, p.12.

pool complex, district police station, open space, new schools and employment clusters to serve the existing and new residents, whilst the existing facilities in Fanling/Sheung Shui could provide services to the entire new town.30 The Fanling/Sheung Shui/Kwu Tung New Town would have a total population of about 460,000 upon full development, comparable to other new towns such as Tuen Mun and Tseung Kwan O.31

In the two NDAs, there would be about 186 hectares of ‘green belt’ and ‘open space’. Housing, work, leisure and public facilities would be located mainly in the vicinity of the railway station and the public transport hub (with about 80 per cent of the Kwu Tung North residents living within 500 metres of the Kwu Tung Station). There would also be established walkways and a cycle track network of about 18 kilometres to facilitate easy mobility by residents, reduce carbon emissions from vehicles and promote healthy living. (See Figure 7.2.)

Planning of Hung Shui Kiu New Development Area

According to the Planning and Development Study on NWNT completed in 2003, Hung Shui Kiu, located between Tuen Mun and Tin Shui Wai New Towns, was planned as an NDA, but Tin Shui Wai was excluded from the plan- ning. The Hung Shui Kiu NDA covered an area of about 450 hectares.

There would be highways and railways linking to the new towns in the West New Territories and the main urban areas. The proposed Northern Link, Tuen Mun Western Bypass and Tuen Mun–Chek Lap Kok Link could further enhance connection of the area with the North East New Territories, North Lantau, Hong Kong International Airport (HKIA) and the planned Hong Kong– Zhuhai–Macao Bridge Hong Kong Boundary Crossing Facilities. The proximity of the area to the Kong Sham Western Highway would create synergy with exist- ing and planned developments in Shenzhen.32 Therefore, it was proposed that the area be developed into a ‘gateway town’ to accommodate 160,000 residents and provide 48,000 jobs. The 2007–08 Policy Address announced the planning for the Hung Shui Kiu NDA and the NENT NDAs as one of the ten major infra- structure projects for economic growth.33 (See Figure 7.3.)

Hung Shui Kiu had a population of about 25,000 in 2011. The land uses had a mixed urban–rural character with predominantly village, low-density private residential, agricultural and open storage/port back-up uses. About 511 hectares

30 Planning Department and Civil Engineering and Development Department, North East New Territories New Development Areas Planning and Engineering Study: Information Digest, Hong Kong, Planning Department and Civil Engineering and Development Department, July 2013, p.8.

31 Planning Department and Civil Engineering and Development Department, North East New Territories New Development Areas Planning and Engineering Study: Information Digest, Hong Kong, Planning Department and Civil Engineering and Development Department, July 2013, p.8.

32 Planning Department website, http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/p_study/prog_s/hsk_nda/St_ b5.html.

33 Planning Department website, http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/p_study/prog_s/hsk_nda/St_ b5.html.

Source: planning Department, civil Engineering and Development Department, Agreement No. CE 61/2007 (CE) North East New Territories New Development Areas Planning and Engineering Study – Investigation: Executive Summary, Rpt Ref. 179-01, July 2014, Figure 4, http://www.nentnda.gov.hk/doc/techreport/FR_c.pdf.

Figure 7.2 Final master urban design plan of Kwu Tung North and Fanling North NDAs

Source: planning Department and civil Engineering and Development Department, Hung Shui Kiu New Development Area Planning and Engineering Study: Stage 3 Community Engagement Digest, June 2015, p.8, http://www.hsknda.gov.hk/files/ce3/HSK_NDA_cE3_Digest.pdf.

Figure 7.3 Strategic location of Hung Shui Kiu New Development Area

(62 per cent) of land was under private ownership and about 315 hectares (38 per cent) of land was owned by the government. In 2011, the CEDD and the Planning Department jointly commissioned the Hung Shui Kiu New Development Area Planning and Engineering Study to develop a viable land use framework for the Hung Shui Kiu NDA. Community engagement was carried out in three stages, with Stage 1 from November 2010 to February 2012, Stage 2 from July to October 2013,34 and Stage 3 from 17 June to 16 September 2015.

34 Planning Department and Civil Engineering and Development Department, Hung Shui Kiu New Development Area Planning and Engineering Study: Stage 2 Community Engagement Digest, Hong Kong, Planning Department and Civil Engineering and Development Department, July 2013, p.1.

According to the RODP published in June 2015, the Hung Shui Kiu NDA, covering a total area of about 714 hectares, would be a next generation new town in Hong Kong which could accommodate 215,000 people. In addition to medium- and long-term supply of land for housing and other uses, the NDA could be developed into a ‘Regional Economic and Civic Hub’ for NWNT due to its proximity to Tin Shui Wai, Tuen Mun and Yuen Long. About 150,000 new jobs could also be provided. Many sites in the area were used as open car parks and storage yards, which were operated in a haphazard manner. Therefore, replanning was needed. By improving the overall environment, the government would be able to attract investments in such sectors as logistics and research and development. The new infrastructure as well as government, institution and com- munity facilities, such as the specialist clinic/polyclinic, sports centres, elderly homes and primary and secondary schools, could also serve residents nearby.

The town centre would be developed around the proposed Hung Shui Kiu Station and complemented with a regional plaza. The Hung Shui Kiu NDA would become a ‘Regional Economic and Civic Hub’ for NWNT in the future. A secondary hub would be located near the West Rail Tin Shui Wai Station to form a ‘District Commercial Node’. Mixed commercial and residential develop- ments and higher-density residential developments would cluster around the 500-metre catchment of the railway station. The north-west part of the NDA, located near the Kong Sham Western Highway and the Shenzhen Bay Control Point, would be the ‘Logistics, Enterprise and Technology Quarter’ for special industries (including modern, non-polluting industries which support inno- vation and technology as well as testing and certification). Areas in the east and north of the NDA would be the residential areas, with various community facilities, and integrated with Tin Shui Wai New Town and Lau Fau Shan. The employment area would be located in the north-west of the NDA, with direct access to the Kong Sham Western Highway, so that heavy vehicles would not need to drive into the residential areas. In the Hung Shui Kiu NDA there were 20 indigenous villages and nine non-indigenous villages. Existing village clusters would be retained wherever possible, whereas the historical relics and monu- ments would be preserved.

This would be a green new town integrating natural, cultural and landscape resources. There would also be a network of footpaths and cycle tracks, a river- side promenade, eco-heritage routes, feng shui lanes and view corridors, among other facilities. Natural landscapes within and near the NDA, such as hills, Yuen Tau Shan, forests, San Sang San Tsuen Egretry flight paths, and the wetland compensation area for the Deep Bay Link project, would also be conserved.

Owing to their proximity to Qianhai, Shenzhen and the Pearl River Delta (PRD) region, the NDAs in NWNT, NENT, Hung Shui Kiu and Yuen Long South are considered to be a belt of opportunities.

New Territories North

In early 2014, the CEDD and the Planning Department jointly commis- sioned the Preliminary Feasibility Study on Developing the New Territories

North (NTN Study) mainly to examine the development potential of the New Territories North and strategic infrastructure provision required for the devel- opment. The aim was to develop a modern new town there of a scale similar to that of the Fanling/Sheung Shui New Town. The study area was approximately 5,300 hectares, covering the land to the north of the hill ranges of Kai Kung Leng, Pak Tai To Yan and Pat Sin Leng. It is bounded by San Tin Highway and Ngau Tam Mei in the west and the NENT Landfill and the surrounding hill ranges in the east.

The NTN Study is a preliminary feasibility study, aiming at formulating a comprehensive strategic plan for the NTN through optimising the development potential of the vast tracts of land released from the closed area and other unde- veloped areas in the region, conserving worthy natural and cultural heritage, capturing opportunities that may be brought by new transport infrastructure under planning, and addressing environmental issues caused by brownfield sites. The planning concept of the NTN development features green and low- carbon design, and an integrated development within the area in such a way that urban development could be integrated with the rural and nature to minimise the impact of urban development on the natural and rural environments as well as the living or rural settlements, fostering a modern, integrated community.

In view of the suggestion of developing the Fanling Golf Course area, the gov- ernment, upon consideration, included the golf course and its peripheral area in the NTN Study to examine their development potential from the technical per- spective. Since the Fanling Golf Course is held under a private recreational lease (PRL) and is subject to the Review of Policy on PRL currently undertaken by the Home Affairs Bureau, the government would take into account the results of the policy review when considering future use of the golf course.

Lok Ma Chau Loop (LMC Loop)

The LMC Loop is located in the Hong Kong–Shenzhen boundary district, cov- ering an area of about 87 hectares. It is in the vicinity of LMC Boundary Control Point (BCP) and LMC Spur Line BCP, with the Huanggang Port and Futian commercial area on the other side of the Shenzhen River. The LMC Loop has a strategic cross-boundary location that offers opportunities for enhancing Hong Kong–Shenzhen cooperation. The LMC Loop is not only close to the Kwu Tung North NDA and potential development areas in NTN, but is also adjacent to the highly urbanised areas in Shenzhen. The Kwu Tung North NDA would provide commercial, community and ancillary facilities to the LMC Loop. The surrounding rural community near Lok Ma Chau Road could also provide resi- dential and related service facilities.35

In mid-2008, Hong Kong and Shenzhen collected public views on the future development of the LMC Loop. In June 2009, the government conducted the

35 Planning Department and Civil Engineering and Development Department, Planning and Engineering Study on Development of Lok Ma Chau Loop: Executive Summary, February 2015, p.7, http://www.lmcloop. gov.hk/pdf/FR%20ES/LMC%20Loop_Final%20Report_ES%20-%20TCN_20150209.pdf.

Planning and Engineering Study on Development of Lok Ma Chau Loop. From November 2010 to January 2011, Hong Kong and Shenzhen carried out the Stage One Public Engagement concurrently to collect public views on the PODP for the LMC Loop. The Stage Two Public Engagement was conducted from May to July 2012. The study results and the RODP were announced in July 2013. Under the general principle of sustainable development, the LMC Loop would be developed for higher education purposes, complemented by high-tech research and develop- ment (R&D) as well as cultural and creative (C&C) industries. Detailed design of advance works commenced in June 2014. The advance works included land decon- tamination within the LMC Loop, as well as provision of construction access and environmental mitigation works to pave the way for the subsequent site forma- tion and infrastructure works. In February 2015, the Planning Department and the CEDD published the Planning and Engineering Study on Development of Lok Ma Chau Loop: Executive Summary.36 Officials from Hong Kong and Shenzhen met several times to exchange views in respect of the areas of cooperation (including innovation and technology as well as finance), platforms of cooperation (includ- ing the Shenzhen Free Trade Zone, Qianhai, Shekou and the LMC Loop in Hong Kong), and interaction channels such as cross-boundary facilities and handling between the two sides.37 This shows how the LMC Loop would become a major hub for future cooperation between Shenzhen and Hong Kong. (See Figure 7.4.)

The formulation of urban design principles and concepts for the LMC Loop is based on the geographical location, ecological environment, planning vision and guidelines, featuring the characteristics below:38

Layout: The urban design and building layout will respond to the develop- ment of the adjacent Shenzhen area. The flexible design layout will allow diverse building typologies to fulfil the needs of different functions and activities, such as open space, higher education, high-tech R&D and C&C industries, together with the emphasis on landscape design, so as to make the LMC Loop a vibrant area for ‘production, education and research’.
Structural framework: Provision of various types of corridors: visual cor- ridors, wind corridors and activity corridors, as well as three different types of open space (i.e. pedestrian boulevard, ribbon park and courtyard spaces) and the riverside promenade, would help to avoid the wall effect and to create a comfortable environment.
Building height profile with gradation: It is proposed to adopt a building height profile which gradually descends towards the Shenzhen River and Ecological Area/Old Shenzhen River Meander so as to allow wider views.

36 Planning Department and Civil Engineering and Development Department, Planning and Engineering Study on Development of Lok Ma Chau Loop: Executive Summary, February 2015, http://www.lmcloop.gov. hk/pdf/FR%20ES/LMC%20Loop_Final%20Report_ES%20-%20TCN_20150209.pdf.
37 ‘Transcript of Remarks by CE at Media Session in Shenzhen’, Press Releases, 10 July 2015, http://www. info.gov.hk/gia/general/201507/10/P201507100610.htm.
38 Planning Department and Civil Engineering and Development Department, Planning and Engineering Study on Development of Lok Ma Chau Loop: Executive Summary, February 2015, p.9, http://www.lmcloop. gov.hk/pdf/FR%20ES/LMC%20Loop_Final%20Report_ES%20-%20TCN_20150209.pdf.

Source: planning Department and civil Engineering and Development Department, Planning and Engineering Study on Development of Lok Ma Chau Loop: Executive Summary, February 2015, p.31.

Figure 7.4 Recommended outline development plan for Lok Ma Chau Loop
Accessibility: A north-east–south-west running ‘pedestrian boulevard’ will be developed across the LMC Loop to serve as a prime activity corridor, so as to create a diverse and vibrant public space. The design focus is to attract people, enhance greenery and facilitate knowledge and culture exchange. The courtyard space between buildings will provide a pleasant environment conducive to interactions among users.
Eco-friendliness: A low-carbon economy will be achieved through integrat- ing with surrounding settings, protecting natural ecology, maintaining bio- diversity and adopting environmental protection measures.

Planning of the LMC Loop The LMC Loop, which is to be developed mainly for higher education purpose complemented by high-tech R&D and C&C industries, is divided into five functional zones:

Education Zone: Located in the middle part of the LMC Loop, it will provide teaching and research facilities, a library, offices and other ancillary facilities for higher education.
Innovation Zone: Located along the waterfront in the north-east and south- west parts of the LMC Loop, it will be a hub for high-tech R&D and C&C industries, providing offices, research, lecture and exhibition facilities, and so on.
Interaction Zone: Located in the central core, it will be an open-air public space to facilitate interactions among users of the Knowledge and Technology Exchange Zone. It will provide a platform for exchange of ideas and cultural performance through organising various activities.
Ecological Zone: Located in the south/south-east, it will be a landmark of the LMC Loop. Apart from compensating for the reed bed affected by the development and for preservation of the biodiversity of the area, it pro- vides a buffer contributing to a transition between the surrounding rural landscape and the LMC Loop so as to further mitigate the potential impact generated by low-rise buildings on ecologically sensitive areas.
Riverside Promenade Zone: With a length of two kilometres, it will provide a pleasant waterfront environment for educational, high-tech R&D and C&C users. It will also echo the future riverside area across the Shenzhen River.39 (See Table 7.4.)

Since Shenzhen, to the north of the LMC Loop, is highly urbanised and the area to the south is the rural development and proposed development of the Kwu Tung North NDA, consideration should be given to a number of factors, including the use of land resources, the balance for environmental/ecologi- cal aspects, the overall vision, and the different townscapes of Hong Kong and

39 Planning Department and Civil Engineering and Development Department, Planning and Engineering Study on Development of Lok Ma Chau Loop: Executive Summary, February 2015, p.10, http://www.lmcloop. gov.hk/pdf/FR%20ES/LMC%20Loop_Final%20Report_ES%20-%20TCN_20150209.pdf.

cHALLENGE OF SUStAINABLE DEVELOpMENt (1997–2015) · 397

Table 7.4 Land use planning of Lok Ma Chau Loop

Area

(hectares) (%)

Education 22.8 26

High-tech R&D/cultural and creative industries	8.6	9.9
Open space	10.6	12.1
Amenity/activity corridor	15.9	18.1
Ecological area	12.8	14.6
Government	3.3	3.8
Road	9.9	11.2
District cooling system/electricity sub-stations	2.6	2.9
commercial	1.2	1.4
total area	87.7	100

Source: planning Department and civil Engineering and Development Department, Planning and Engineering Study on Development of Lok Ma Chau Loop: Executive Summary, February 2015, p.11.

Shenzhen when deciding the development scale. The LMC Loop has a total land area of 87.7 hectares. The maximum GFA proposed in the RODP is 1.2 million square metres, with the total plot ratio of 1.37 on average. A total of 720,000 square metres of the GFA will be reserved for higher education use, 411,000 square metres for high-tech R&D and C&C use and 60,000 square metres for commercial use. About 29,000 jobs are expected to be provided.

Various technical and environmental impact assessments show that the LMC Loop can meet the objective of sustainable development, both techno- logically and environmentally. It is expected to achieve synergy with adjacent potential areas, including Huanggang, Shenzhen, Kwu Tung North, Fanling/ Sheung Shui and NTN. Moreover, this project will be greatly conducive to nurturing local talents, developing high-value-added activities, promoting the creative economy and strengthening economic cooperation with the PRD region.

South West New Territories (SWNT)

The Lantau Development Advisory Committee was established in 2014 to examine the position and the short-, medium- and long-term economic and community development in Lantau in line with the development of HKIA’s third-runway system, the Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macao Bridge (HZMB) and strategic infrastructure in the area, and to generate synergy with the Greater PRD development. Short-term efforts put in place by the government in Lantau include the revitalisation of Tai O and Mui Wo, construction of mountain bike trails, improvements to narrow road bends along Keung Shan Road and South Lantau Road, review of arrangements for closed roads and issuance of closed road permits for Lantau, and planning and engineering studies for major

development projects. In the medium term, the government will continue the Tung Chung New Town Extension, and proceed to the commercial develop- ment at the top of the Hong Kong boundary crossing facilities of the HZMB, Sunny Bay Reclamation and Siu Ho Wan development. In the long run, an arti- ficial island will be constructed near Kau Yi Chau for developing the East Lantau Metropolis as the third core business district, with a population of 400,000 to 700,000. It will connect Hong Kong Island, Lantau and the New Territories West. Priority of development will be given to building transport infrastructure and a low-carbon smart city.40 (See Figure 7.5.)

In 2015, the North Lantau New Town covered about 253 hectares of land in Tung Chung East and West. According to the Port and Airport Development Strategy formulated in 1989, Tung Chung New Town Phase I was one of the ten projects of the Airport Core Programme. It was designed as a supporting com- munity for the airport, with open space, government departments, community facilities, a sewage treatment plant, refuse transfer stations, and industrial and commercial sites. Only 70 hectares of land would be developed, with a budget of 2.6 billion Hong Kong dollars and a planned population of about 20,000.41 In the original planning, Siu Ho Wan, located at the east of Tung Chung, would play a different role. The centre of Tung Chung would be the retail, commercial and cultural core of the new development. Siu Ho Wan, on the other hand, was planned for large public facilities, such as sewage treatment works, a railway depot, a refuse transfer station and water treatment works, with land set aside for future expansion.42 According to the North Lantau Development Study com- pleted in 1992, the area of North Lantau New Town significantly increased to 830 hectares to include Tung Chung and Tai Ho. Development would be carried out in several stages, and the population was expected to increase to 260,000 by 2011. According to the Territorial Development Strategy Review pub- lished by the Planning Department in 1996, the planned population would be raised to 320,000 by 2011 upon completion of the final phase of the develop- ment plan in order to cope with the medium- and long-term housing needs of Hong Kong and to enhance the development potential of new towns in Lantau.43 According to the ‘Pamphlets on Planning for New Territories: Islands’ published by the Lantau and Islands District Planning Office of the Planning Department in 2002, the North Lantau New Town would cover about 916 hec- tares of land from Tung Chung to Tai Ho/Siu Ho Wan. It would become one of the key strategic growth areas for large-scale housing development for the

40 2015 Policy Address website, www.policyaddress.gov.hk/2015/chi/p96.html.

41 E.G. Pryor, Hong Kong’s Port and Airport Development Strategy: A Foundation for Growth, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1991, pp.92–102; see also ‘Airport Core Programme’, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Airport_Core_Programme (accessed 17 October 2014).

42 Hong Kong Yearbook 1998, Hong Kong, Information Services Department, 1999, http://www.yearbook. gov.hk/1998/cwww/13/1313/index.htm.

43 Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel of Planning, Lands and Works, ‘PWP Item No. 667CL – North Lantau Phase 3 Development in Tung Chung, Engineering Works and PWP Item No. 668CL – North Lantau Phase 3 Development in Tai Ho, Engineering Works’, 18 May 2010, p.1, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr99-00/ chinese/panels/plw/papers/a1562c03.pdf.

Source: planning Department, Planning for Longer-term Sustainable Development 2014–15 Outreach Programme, http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/press/educational/OR_panel/2014_15/p11-20_2014.pdf.

Figure 7.5 Preliminary concept of transport links to East Lantau Metropolis

twenty-first century, with a 60:40 split ratio for private and public housing. It was recommended to increase the development density to accommodate about 330,000 people.

In 2004, the government launched a new planning for the development of North Lantau. According to the Concept Plan for Lantau44 as well as the ‘Annex

– Conservation Strategy for Lantau’ in the revised Concept Plan in 2007, about 2,360 hectares of land in North Lantau was planned for country park extension, mainly covering the upland surrounding Tung Chung and Tai Ho, as well as the hillsides to the north and south of Discovery Bay, consisting of mountains and upland valleys covered with natural woodland and unspoiled stream courses. Major habitats include secondary woodlands, montane forests and fresh water streams, which are of high conservation and landscape value. The development plan for Tai Ho was changed, and that for North Lantau New Town would focus only on Tung Chung,45 with the planned population reduced to 220,000.46 The existing and committed developments in Tung Chung Central would remain unchanged, whereas the extension of North Lantau New Town would focus on Tung Chung West and East.

In 2011, the Development Bureau proposed to carry out reclamation at Tung Chung East and West in order to increase the land supply for housing. The pro- posed scale and feasibility of reclamation and development were decided based on environmental impact assessment (EIA) findings and the study results. The existing and committed developments on formed land in Tung Chung Central would be retained.47

In 2012, the CEDD and the Planning Department jointly commissioned the Tung Chung New Town Extension Study, with the aim of developing Tung Chung into a larger community. According to the 2011 Population Census, Tung Chung had a population of about 78,000. Three stages of public engage- ment were completed between 2012 and 2014, followed by the formulation of an RODP on the future land use of the proposed new town extension in Tung Chung East and West. Proposed reclamation works would include about 120.5 hectares in the east for development purposes, as well as 8.6 hectares for the con- struction of Road P1 (Tung Chung–Tai Ho section). Upon expansion, Tung Chung New Town would have an additional population of 144,400 (118,900 in Tung Chung East and 25,500 in Tung Chung West), and was expected to accommodate about 268,400 people in total.

According to the RODP, approximately 49,400 additional flats would be pro- vided, with a split ratio of 63:37 for public and private housing. The proposed domestic plot ratio would vary between 1 and 6.5. About 877,000 square metres

44 It was under the steering of the Lantau Development Task Force led by the Financial Secretary.

45 ‘North Lantau New Town’, Wikipedia, http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%8C%97%E5%A4%A7%E5

%B6%BC%E5%B1%B1%E6%96%B0%E5%B8%82%E9%8E%AE (accessed 20 November 2014).

46 Hong Kong Yearbook 2005, Hong Kong, Information Services Department, 2006, http://www.yearbook. gov.hk/2005/tc/12_12.htm.

47 Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Development, ‘PWP Item No. 7712CL – Planning and Engineering Study on the Remaining Development in Tung Chung’, LC Paper No. CB(1)2205/10-11(03), May 2011, p.2, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr10-11/chinese/panels/dev/papers/dev0524cb1-2205-3-c.pdf.

commercial GFA would be provided for office and district/regional retail and hotel uses (with the proposed non-domestic plot ratio varying between 2 and 9.5). It was estimated that some 40,000 jobs would be created. In addition, there would be sufficient community, recreational and tertiary education facilities, clinics and other government, institutional and community facilities to meet the residents’ needs in the future. In addition, there would be a waterfront prom- enade of more than 5 kilometres along the Tung Chung coast, creating an attrac- tive, vibrant and pleasant environment, providing land for various recreational activities, and enhancing connectivity within the area. As for transport develop- ment, it was proposed to add two railway stations in Tung Chung East and West respectively, so as to improve external connectivity. It was also proposed to improve the road network and local traffic conditions.

To preserve the natural environment and the fishing village, no reclamation would be carried out at Tung Chung West, but there was a plan to revitalise Ma Wan Chung Village. For the conservation of Tung Chung River, which has high ecological value, a 30-metre buffer area on both sides would be provided and zoned ‘conservation area’ to conserve the Tung Chung River. A section of the Tung Chung River would be revitalised as a riverside park, with the concept of revitalis- ing water bodies to promote water-friendly culture and improve the environment. The Tung Chung New Town Expansion will be carried out and completed in phases. Site formation and infrastructure works were scheduled for commence- ment in phases by the end of 2017, so that the residents will be able to move in by the end of 2023 at the earliest. The entire project is expected to be completed

by 2030.

HKIA is the gateway to the world. It is directly connected to urban areas through the North Lantau Highway, the Airport Express and the MTR Tung Chung Line. Upon completion of the HZMB, the Tuen Mun–Chek Lap Kok Link and the third runway, Lantau Island will become a hub linking Hong Kong, Macao and the PRD with the multi-transport network. Capitalising on its unique geographical advantage, Lantau is full of opportunities for development in Hong Kong. The government intends to develop artificial islands by means of reclamation in the central waters between Lantau Island and Hong Kong Island. Detailed planning and related engineering studies are under way. The aim is to establish the third CBD and a high-value-added industrial park, with the provi- sion of nearly 240,000 jobs.48 The possibility of building a railway and a tunnel linking the area to Hong Kong Island will also be studied.

Exchange with the Mainland

The relationship between Hong Kong and the Mainland has been increasingly close since China implemented the reform and opening-up policy at the end of 1978. Cross-border trade and investment have also been booming. In 2013, the Mainland accounted for 51.1 per cent (or 3,891.4 billion Hong Kong dollars) of

48 Exclusive interview, Hong Kong Economic Times, 15 May 2015, http://ps.hket.com/content/603438.

Hong Kong’s global trade, an increase of 41.8 per cent over the 9.3 per cent in 1978, becoming Hong Kong’s largest trading partner. Hong Kong became the Mainland’s second largest trading partner, following only the USA. The two-way trade volume accounted for 9.6 per cent of the Mainland’s total trade. From 1979 to the end of 2013,49 Hong Kong was also the Mainland’s largest source of ‘foreign’ investment, accounting for 47.7 per cent of the national total, with the cumulative value reaching 5,161.6 billion Hong Kong dollars.50 The Mainland has also become a major investor in various economic projects in Hong Kong in recent years. Hong Kong had a population of 6.489 million in 1997, which reached 7.222 million by the end of 2013, an increase of 733,000 over 16 years.51 From 1997 to 2013, there were 822,000 Mainlanders residing in Hong Kong.52 Passengers travelling between the two places are on the rise as well.

Cross-boundary travel

Cross-boundary passenger and vehicle traffic has surged as the social and eco- nomic ties between Hong Kong and the Mainland are getting closer. Results of the Cross-boundary Travel Survey 2013/14 show that the average daily cross- boundary passenger trips (including those for travelling to Hong Kong and Macao) increased from 304,000 in 1999 to 658,000 in 2014, representing an increase of 116 per cent.53 According to immigration records, cross-boundary land-based passenger traffic in 2015 was 27 times that of 1980. (See Table 7.5.) The New Territories, boundary of Hong Kong and Shenzhen, has aroused heated discussions in the community owing to the growing number of travel- lers in recent years. From 1999, the Planning Department conducted a two- week Cross-boundary Travel Survey in the territory every two or three years, so as to study cross-boundary passenger and vehicle traffic at control points as well as the purposes of arrivals and departures. Statistics show that the number of passengers travelling between Hong Kong and the Mainland is increasing from year to year. The number of cross-boundary travellers in 2014 increased

49 Luo Jinyi and Zheng Yushuo, eds, Zhongguo gaige kaifang sanshi nian: bian yu chang (Thirty Years of China’s Reform and Opening Up: Change and Continuity), Hong Kong, City University of Hong Kong Press, 2009, p.44; Tian Suhua, Waishang zhijietouzi jinru zhongguo de jiegou biandong yu xiaoying yanjiu (A Study of Structural Changes and Effects of Foreign Direct Investment in China), Beijing, Zhongyang bianyi chu- banshe, 2013, p.1.

50 Hong Kong Trade and Industry Department website, http://www.tid.gov.hk/tc_chi/aboutus/publica tions/factsheet/china.html.

51 HKSAR Census and Statistics Department website, http://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hkstat/sub/sp150_tc. jsp?tableID=001&ID=0&productType=8.

52 Census and Statistics Department, 2006 Population By-census Thematic Report: Persons from the Mainland Having Resided in Hong Kong for less than 7 Years, Hong Kong, Census and Statistics Department, 2007, pp.79–80; Census and Statistics Department, 2011 Population Census Thematic Report: Persons from the Mainland Having Resided in Hong Kong for less than 7 Years, Hong Kong, Census and Statistics Department, 2012, pp.83–84; Home Affairs Department and Immigration Department, Statistics on New Arrivals from the Mainland (Fourth Quarter of 2013), Hong Kong, Home Affairs Department and Immigration Department, 2014, p.8.

53 Planning Department, Northbound Southbound: Cross-boundary Travel Survey 2013/14, Hong Kong, Planning Department, 2014, Table 1.1.

Table 7.5 Annual arrivals and departures at Hong Kong land control points (1980–2015)

Arrival (millions)

Departure (millions)

Total (millions)

1980	4.1	3.8	7.8
1981	4.5	4.3	8.8
1982	4.3	4.1	8.5
1983	5.2	5	10.3
1984	7.7	7.3	15
1985	10.6	10.1	20.7
1986	11.5	10.9	22.4
1987	13.5	13	26.5
1988	16	15.5	31.5
1989	14.7	14.3	28.9
1990	16	15.6	31.6
1991	18.2	17.7	35.9
1992	20.5	20	40.4
1993	21.9	21.3	43.3
1994	23.2	22.7	45.9
1995	25.1	24.7	49.9
1996	27.6	27.3	54.9
1997	32.6	32.3	64.9
1998	38.6	38.4	77
1999	45.3	45	90.3
2000	51	50.7	101.7
2001	53.6	53.1	106.6
2002	59.2	58.4	117.6
2003	58.2	57.4	115.5
2004	68.4	67.4	135.8
2005	72.4	71.4	143.8
2006	75.8	75	150.8
2007	81	80.2	161.2
2008	83.4	82.7	166.1
2009	85.3	84.7	169.9
2010	91.3	90.5	181.8
2011	95.8	94.8	190.6
2012	102	100.6	202.6
2013	105.1	103.6	208.7
2014	110.6	108.4	219
2015	112.3	110.4	222.6

Source: Hong Kong census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics, Hong Kong, Hong Kong census and Statistics Department, 1980–2015.

by 116 per cent compared with that in 1999. It was closely related to the Individual Visit Scheme (IVS), which was first introduced in four Guangdong cities, namely Dongguan, Zhongshan, Jiangmen and Foshan, on 28 July 2003. (See Table 7.6.)

Table 7.6 Average daily cross-boundary passenger trips between Hong Kong and the Mainland (1999–2014)

Year	Between Hong Kong and the Mainland	Compared with previous survey
1999	284,600
2001	333,200	+17%
2003	382,800	+15%
2006	448,100	+17%
2007	490,900	+10%
2009	504,600	+3%
2011	562,400	+11%
2014	604,900	+8%

Source: http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_tc/p_study/comp_s/nbsb2013-2014/table_cbts2013-14_ch1.xls.

The IVS was first introduced under the Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement.54 As a result, Mainland residents of related cities no longer had to travel to Hong Kong on business visas or in group tours. In April 2009, the measure of one-year multiple-entry IVS endorsement to Hong Kong was implemented in Shenzhen. In 2015, the measure was adjusted to ‘one trip per week’ for Shenzhen permanent residents. In 2015, residents of 49 Mainland cities could visit Hong Kong under the IVS.55 The number of cities under the IVS with multiple-entry endorsement has been constantly on the rise over the past few years, which has not only strengthened the economic coop- eration between the two places, but also boosted cross-boundary passenger and vehicular traffic.

In 1999, ordinary residents in Hong Kong accounted for 90 per cent of the frequent cross-boundary trip makers. But in 2014 the percentage dropped to 64 per cent, while those normally residing in the Mainland accounted for 36 per cent. (See Table 7.7.)

With the increasing volume of cross-boundary trips, services at bound- ary control points and supporting facilities play a key role in easing passenger and vehicular flows between Hong Kong and the Mainland. As of 2017, there were a total of ten boundary control points in Hong Kong, namely Lo Wu, Lok Ma Chau Spur Line, Hung Hom, Lok Ma Chau, Man Kam To, Sha Tau Kok, Shenzhen Bay, China Ferry Terminal, Macao Ferry Terminal and HKIA. (See Table 7.8 and Figure 7.6.)

54 Planning Department, Northbound Southbound: Cross-boundary Travel Survey 2013/14, Hong Kong, Planning Department, 2014, p.8.

55 These were all 21 cities of Guangdong province, together with Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongqing, Nanjing, Suzhou, Wuxi, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Taizhou, Fuzhou (municipal district), Xiamen, Quanzhou, Chengdu, Jinan, Dalian, Shenyang, Nanchang, Changsha, Nanning, Haikou, Guiyang, Kunming, Shijiazhuang, Zhengzhou, Changchun, Hefei and Wuhan.

Table 7.7 Number of frequent trip makers between Hong Kong and the Mainland (1999–2014)

Year Living in Hong Kong Living in the Mainland Total Compared

	(No.)	(%)	(No.)	(%)	(No.)	(%)	previous survey (%)
1999	332,200	90	36,400	10	368,500	100
2001	447,500	90	48,800	10	496,300	100	+35
2003	501,700	84	97,800	16	599,500	100	+21
2006	560,900	84	108,500	16	669,500	100	+12
2007	540,800	82	121,600	18	662,400	100	−1
2009	547,100	82	123,600	18	670,700	100	+1
2011	532,600	76	170,200	24	702,800	100	+5
2014	475,800	64	261,900	36	737,700	100	+5

with

Source: http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_tc/p_study/comp_s/nbsb2013-2014/table_cbts2013-14_ch3B.xls.

Liantang/Heung Yuen Wai boundary control point

In view of the constantly increasing number of cross-boundary passengers, the government of HKSAR and Shenzhen Municipal People’s Government set out to study the feasibility of building a boundary control point at Liantang/Heung Yuen Wai, in order to strengthen cross-boundary facilities and to promote long- term economic development and regional cooperation. In December 2006, the two places carried out the Shenzhen–Hong Kong Joint Preliminary Planning Study on Developing the Liantang/Heung Yuen Wai BCP, to investigate the possibility of building the Liantang/Heung Yuen Wai BCP between Robin’s Nest and Man Kam To in north-eastern Hong Kong. The study also assessed the BCP functions, cargo volume, passenger flow, and resources to be invested. In January 2007, the Planning Department conducted an analysis of matters relating to the proposed construction of Liantang/Heung Yuen Wai BCP in Hong Kong, including its connection with the local road network, uses of the land released after the reduction of the frontier closed area,56 environmental and engineering considerations, and so on.

In September 2008, the Hong Kong–Shenzhen Joint Task Force on Boundary District Development convened its second meeting. The govern- ments of Shenzhen and Hong Kong subsequently decided to construct a new BCP at Liantang/Heung Yuen Wai, which is expected to be completed in

56 Chan Chun-kwong, ‘Urban Planning in Hong Kong and Macao and Development in the Pearl River Delta Region’, in Leung Kit Fun Beatrice and Lo Shiu Hing Sonny, eds, Zhujiang sanjiaozhou fazhan yu gangao zhi ronghe (Pearl River Delta and Its Integration with Hong Kong and Macao), Hong Kong, City University of Hong Kong Press, 2014, p.278.

Table 7.8 Average daily passenger trips between Hong Kong and the Mainland (by control point used)

	(No. of	(%)		(No. of	(%)	(No. of	(%)		(No. of	(%)		(No. of	(%)	(No. of	(%)	(No. of	(%)		(No. of	(%)
	trips)			trips)		trips)			trips)			trips)		trips)		trips)			trips)
Lo Wu control 217,300		76.3 253,600			76.1 242,900		63.5 249,800			55.7		252,500	51.4 237,300		47.0 254,400		45.2	235,400		38.9
point
Lok Ma chau – Spur Line		–		–	– –		–		–	–		36,800	7.5 71,000		14.1 98,900		17.6	136,200		22.5
control point Hung Hom 6,200			2.2	5,900	1.8 7,600			2.0	9,000		2.0	9,000	1.8 8,500		1.7 11,300		2.0	11,800		1.9
control point
Lok Ma chau 26,300		9.2		37,000	11.1 86,800		22.7 134,000			29.9		115,200	23.5 94,000		18.6 81,900		14.6	72,700		12.0
control point
Man Kam to 2,900			1.0	3,000	0.9 6,500			1.7	8,300		1.9	5,500	1.1 6,200		1.2 600		0.1	8,500		1.4
Sha tau Kok 3,200			1.1	3,600	1.1 5,200			1.4	7,500		1.7	7,000	1.4 6,800		1.4 7,800		1.4	8,300		1.4
Shenzhen Bay –		–		–	– –		–		–	–		25,100	5.1 48,300		9.6 68,500		12.2	92,500		15.3
control point

Control point 1999 2001 2003 2006 2007 2009 2011 2013/14

control point control point

14,600	5.1		15,900	4.8	17,100	4.5		15,900	3.6	13,300	2.7	9,100	1.8	10,600	1.9		10,700	1.8
4,900	1.7		5,100	1.5	6,200	1.6		6,800	1.5	7,200	1.5	4,200	0.8	5,200	0.9		5,700	0.9
–	–		–	–	–	–		700	0.2	#	#	#	#	#	#		–	–
9,300		3.3	9,200	2.8	10,500		2.7	16,100	3.6	19,500	4.0	19,100	3.8	23,100		4.1	23,200	3.8

Hong Kong– china Ferry terminal

Hong Kong– Macau Ferry terminal

tuen Mun Ferry terminal

Hong Kong International Airport

total 284,600 100 333,200 100 382,800 100 448,100 100 490,900 100 504,600 100 562,400 100 604,900 100

Note: # represents a number less than 50 or percentage less than 0.05.

Source: ‘table 3A.1c: Average Daily passenger trips between Hong Kong and the Mainland by control point Used’, http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_tc/p_study/comp_s/nbsb2013-2014/table_cbts2013-14_ch3A.xls.

Source: planning Department, Northbound Southbound: Cross-boundary Travel Survey 2013/14, Hong Kong, planning Department, 2014, p.158.

Figure 7.6 Locations of Hong Kong immigration control points

2018.57 The new control point would not only help Shenzhen realise its ‘East in, East out’ transport planning principle, which means directing cross-bound- ary traffic through the proposed Shenzhen Eastern Corridor to Huizhou and other parts of eastern Guangdong Province, but help expand Hong Kong’s economic hinterland in eastern Guangdong as well.58 As of 2017, there were two BCPs in New Territories East (NTE), namely Man Kam To and Sha Tau Kok, which, because of geographical restrictions, it would be difficult to expand and which would not be able to cope with the estimated cross- boundary traffic needs in the future. The new BCP will help redistribute cross- boundary traffic in NTE and alleviate the frequent congestion at Man Kam To BCP, thus enhancing the overall operational efficiency of BCPs in NTE. (See Figure 7.7.)

A new road will be constructed to link up the new BCP with Tolo Highway via Fanling Highway. It will be about 11 kilometres in total length, compris- ing three sections of tunnel (with a total length of about 3.5 kilometres) and a viaduct of about 6.5 kilometres.59 The design features minimum intrusion into the ground area and is intended to reduce the pressure on the existing traffic network in eastern New Territories. In June 2015, the construction of a dual two-lane road connecting the Liantang/Heung Yuen Wai BCP with the pro- posed Sha Tau Kok Road Interchange commenced. The connecting road will include 0.6 kilometres on the at-grade level, 3.3 kilometres of viaducts and a 0.7-kilometre tunnel. The works, with an investment of up to 6.518 billion Hong Kong dollars, are expected to be completed by the end of 2018.60 Shenzhen has already completed the expressway on the east. Now vehicles may enter Hong Kong via Heung Yuen Wai without going through central Shenzhen. And the BCP layout has also become complete. Eastern Guangdong is of great potential for development. Huizhou, for example, is four times the size of Hong Kong but has only 4 million people.

The new BCP will be the seventh land control point between Hong Kong and Shenzhen. It will connect directly with the Eastern Corridor in Shenzhen, an expressway which links up the eastern part of Guangdong (including Shantou, Shanwei, Chaozhou, Jieyang and others) and adjacent provinces like Fujian and Jiangxi, via the Shenzhen–Huizhou and Shenzhen–Shantou Expressways. It will reduce the travelling time from Hong Kong to eastern Shenzhen, eastern Guangdong and nearby provinces, thus facilitating future development in those areas and extending the economic hinterland of Hong Kong and Shenzhen. It will also strengthen the connection of Hong Kong and Shenzhen with eastern Guangdong, with strategic significance for regional integration and cooperation.

57 Planning Department, ‘Liantang/Heung Yuen Wai Boundary Control Point’ website, http://www. pland.gov.hk/pland_en/p_study/comp_s/LTHYW/tc/c_lthyw_01.htm.

58 Hong Kong Planning Department, Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy: Final Report, Hong Kong, Planning Department, 2007, p.149.

59 Planning Department, ‘Liantang/Heung Yuen Wai Boundary Control Point’ website, http://www. pland.gov.hk/pland_en/p_study/comp_s/LTHYW/tc/c_lthyw_01.htm.

60 ‘CEDD Awards Contract for Liantang/Heung Yuen Wai Boundary Control Point Project’, Press Releases, 12 June 2015, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201506/12/P201506110780.htm.

Source: Hong Kong planning Department, ‘Liantang/Heung Yuen Wai Boundary control point’, July 2010, http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/p_study/comp_s/LtHYW/tc/c_lthyw_01.htm, http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_ en/p_study/comp_s/LtHYW/images/5.jpg.

Figure 7.7 Cross-boundary traffic distribution

Improvement of the cross-boundary transport network

In the years between 1999 and 2014, most cross-boundary passengers made their trips on land and only 2–4 per cent did so by air. Those travelling by ferry across the boundary accounted for 2–7 per cent. These figures show the impor- tance of land BCPs for travellers between the two places. To cope with the rapid growth in traffic, the transport connections between Hong Kong and the PRD region are in great need of improvement.61 (See Table 7.9.)

Since the handover, the Hong Kong government has enhanced cross-bound- ary transport facilities in order to promote closer ties between Hong Kong and the Mainland, with such new facilities as the Shenzhen–Hong Kong Western Corridor (SWC), Lok Ma Chau Spur Line, Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link, HZMB, and Liantang/Heung Yuen Wai BCP and its con- necting road.

The Shenzhen–Hong Kong Western Corridor

The Planning Department completed the Crosslinks Study in 1996, which was to preliminarily explore the feasibility of the SWC62 for the sake of enhancing transport links between Shenzhen and Hong Kong. In 2000, in view of the close economic ties between Hong Kong and the Mainland, the Hong Kong and Shenzhen governments decided to jointly construct the SWC.63 According to the Planning Department’s Feasibility Study for Additional Cross-border Links in 2000, the connecting road, namely the Deep Bay Link (DBL), was expected to alleviate the nearly saturated existing land boundary crossings at Lok Ma Chau, Man Kam To and Sha Tau Kok. It was also intended to enhance trade between Hong Kong and southern China, facilitate Hong Kong’s economic development, and enable Hong Kong to become the business hub of the Pearl River Delta area.64 Shenzhen, on the other hand, already had three cross-boundary crossings covering central areas in 2000. Over 80 per cent of the cross-boundary traffic had to go through the main roads within Shenzhen city centre, causing serious traffic congestion and environmental impacts. On account of this, the Shenzhen author- ity hoped that the SWC as the fourth land boundary crossing could be completed as soon as possible. Construction of the SWC commenced in August 2003 and

61 Planning Department, Feasibility Study for Additional Cross-border Links Stage 1: Investigations on Traffic Demand: Executive Summary, March 2000, www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/p_study/comp_s/cbl/CBLstudy_ stage1_chin/ch01_c.htm.

62 Planning Department, Feasibility Study for Additional Cross-border Links Stage 1: Investigations on Traffic Demand: Executive Summary, March 2000, www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/p_study/comp_s/cbl/CBLstudy_ stage1_chin/ch01_c.htm.

63 Transport Bureau, ‘Shenzhen Western Corridor and Deep Bay Link’, Paper for Panel on Transport of Hong Kong Legislative Council, 31 August 2001, p.1, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr01-02/english/panels/tp/ papers/tp-1026-cb1-1946-1e.pdf.

64 Transport Bureau, ‘Shenzhen Western Corridor and Deep Bay Link’, Paper for Panel on Transport of Hong Kong Legislative Council, 31 August 2001, p.1, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr01-02/english/panels/tp/ papers/tp-1026-cb1-1946-1e.pdf.

Table 7.9 Average daily passenger trips between Hong Kong and the Mainland (by transport mode)

Transport mode	1999	2001	2003	2006	2007	2009	2011	2014
	(No. (%))	(No. (%))	(No. (%))	(No. (%))	(No. (%))	(No. (%))	(No. (%))	(No. (%))
Boundary train	214,800	249,900	239,600	246,200	267,400	264,800	292,000	295,000
	(75.5)	(75)	(62.6)	(55)	(54.5)	(52.5)	(51.9)	(48.8)
coach	22,200	19,900	49,600	61,300	57,300	58,000	54,700	69,500
	(7.8)	(6)	(13)	(13.7)	(11.7)	(11.5)	(9.7)	(11.5)
private car	400	7,300	10,000	12,700	12,400	22,900	25,600	27,100
	(0.2)	(2.2)	(2.6)	(2.8)	(2.5)	(4.5)	(4.5)	(4.5)
Shuttle bus	9,600	16,300	38,800	75,900	62,900	47,100	40,500	26,700
	(3.4)	(4.9)	(10.1)	(16.9)	(12.8)	(9.3)	(7.2)	(4.4)
Air	9,300	9,200	10,500	16,100	19,500	19,100	23,100	23,200
	(3.3)	(2.8)	(2.7)	(3.6)	(4)	(3.8)	(4.1)	(3.8)
Ferry	19,500	21,000	23,300	23,400	20,400	13,400	15,800	16,400
	(6.8)	(6.3)	(6.1)	(5.2)	(4.2)	(2.7)	(2.8)	(2.7)
through train	6,200	5,900	7,600	9,000	9,000	8,500	11,300	11,800
	(2.2)	(1.8)	(2)	(2)	(1.8)	(1.7)	(2)	(1.9)
Franchised bus/green	– – – –				30,800	55,200	78,200	113,400
minibus/taxi					(6.3)	(10.9)	(13.9)	(18.7)
Others	2,500	3,800	3,300	3,600	11,200	15,600	21,200	21,700
	(0.9)	(1.1)	(0.9)	(0.8)	(2.3)	(3.1)	(3.8)	(3.6)
total	284,600	333,200	382,800	448,100	490,900	504,600	562,400	604,900
	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)

Source: ‘table 3A.1b: Average Daily passenger trips between Hong Kong and the Mainland by transport Mode’, http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_tc/p_study/comp_s/nbsb2013-2014/table_cbts2013-14_ch3A.xls.

was completed in July 2007. The SWC stretches approximately 5.5 kilometres (3.5 kilometres in Hong Kong and 2 kilometres in Shenzhen), spanning Deep Bay from Ngau Hom Shek in north-western New Territories to the HKSAR’s boundary, and links up to Shekou in Shenzhen.65 The construction of the Hong Kong Section (excluding the DBL) cost 3.2 billion Hong Kong dollars.66

Issues with co-location arrangements for customs clearance

As Hong Kong lacked sufficient land for the co-location of customs, immigration and quarantine facilities for both Hong Kong and the Mainland, and the issue of reclamation was vigorously debated in the local community during the prepara- tions for the SWC construction, it was decided that a 117.9-hectare customs clearance zone would be built by the Shenzhen government by way of reclama- tion, of which 41.6 hectares of land was used by the Hong Kong authorities and

76.3 hectares by the Shenzhen authorities.67 Alongside this, the Hong Kong government was facing additional financial burdens for the construction of the DBL to connect the SWC’s Hong Kong Section with Yuen Long and nearby areas. In 2001, the cost of the DBL was estimated to be up to 7.723 billion Hong Kong dollars.68 Besides, with Deep Way being an ecological conservation area, an alignment would have to be carefully selected for any transport facility. The structural form and construction methods should also comply with the EIA Ordinance so as to maintain noise, air quality, landscape, water quality and so on within established standards and guidelines. The government would also plant trees to compensate for loss during construction and would avoid damage to concerned archaeological heritage.69

As the fourth vehicular crossing between Hong Kong and the Mainland, the Shenzhen Bay Port (SBP) alleviates the nearly saturated existing land bound- ary crossings at Lok Ma Chau, Man Kam To and Sha Tau Kok and boosts trade between Hong Kong and southern China. Its current capacity is second only to Lok Ma Chau. However, the utilisation of the SBP was not as good as expected in its early days. The daily two-way vehicular flow at the SBP had been estimated to be 29,800 trips before the construction began. But in fact it was only around 1,400 trips in July 2007 when the SBP was put into operation and

65 Highways Department, Hong Kong–Shenzhen Western Corridor and Deep Bay Link brochure, second edition, Hong Kong, Government Logistics Department, December 2004.

66 Highways Department, Hong Kong–Shenzhen Western Corridor website, www.hyd.gov.hk/tc/ road_and_railway/road_projects/6759th/.

67 ‘Xibu tongdao kouan tianhai qu za jia buchang cheng shengang zhengyi xin jiaodian’ (Compensation for Cost Overruns in the Construction of the Western Corridor Boundary Crossing Reclamation Area Becoming a New Focus of Disputes between Shenzhen and Hong Kong), www.singtaonet.com , 27 August 2006, www. singtaonet.com:82/china/20060827_309723.html.

68 Transport Bureau, ‘Shenzhen Western Corridor and Deep Bay Link’, Paper for Panel on Transport of Hong Kong Legislative Council, 31 August 2001, p.3, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr01-02/english/panels/tp/ papers/tp-1026-cb1-1946-1e.pdf.

69 Transport Bureau, ‘Shenzhen Western Corridor and Deep Bay Link’, Paper for Panel on Transport of Hong Kong Legislative Council, 31 August 2001, p.3, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr01-02/english/panels/tp/ papers/tp-1026-cb1-1946-1e.pdf.

Table 7.10 Cross-boundary vehicle traffic in Hong Kong, 2007–2014 (average daily trips inward/outward)

Year	Man Kam To	Sha Tau Kok	Lok Ma Chau	Shenzhen Bay	Total
2007	6,901	2,297	30,989	3,103	43,290
2008	5,823	2,402	27,883	5,899	42,007
2009	5,216	2,176	25,514	7,451	40,357
2010	4,606	2,250	27,368	8,792	43,016
2011	4,234	2,429	26,582	9,529	42,774
2012	4,178	2,491	25,876	9,893	42,438
2013	4,367	2,642	25,536	10,042	42,587
2014	4,762	2,190	24,752	9,970	41,674

Sources: transport Department, Annual Transport Digest, 2008–2014, http://www.td.gov.hk/tc/publications_and_press_ releases/publications/free_publications/annual_transport_digest/index.html; transport Department, Monthly Traffic and Transport Digest, April 2015, http://www.td.gov.hk/filemanager/en/content_4700/1504.pdf.

subsequently climbed to 3,256 trips in September 2007.70 By 2013, the two-way vehicular flow at the Shenzhen Bay BCP was 10,042 trips per day,71 well below the government’s estimate. Some members of the cross-boundary freight trade attributed this to the ancillary facilities around the Shenzhen port area not being fully developed, and Hong Kong freight companies could not set up offices near the control point to provide support to cross-boundary goods vehicle drivers on customs declaration and clearance of goods. They also mentioned the fact that the BCP was not operating on a 24-hour basis. The number of daily cross- boundary vehicle trips increased from 30,000 in 1999 to 41,600 in 2014, an increase of about 39 per cent.72 (See Table 7.10.)

At the end of 2006, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) authorised a lease of the SBP Hong Kong Port Area (HKPA) for a 50-year period, subject to renewal upon consultation after its expiry. By way of an ordinance, Hong Kong is authorised to extend its jurisdiction to designated areas in the SBP.73 The laws of Hong Kong are applicable within the HKPA, and Hong Kong officers are authorised to take enforcement actions as from 1 July 2007.74 Under the co-location arrangements, border officials from Shenzhen and Hong Kong handle relevant formalities at the Joint Inspection Building in Shenzhen, and passengers are cleared at one location.75 Passengers only have to get on and off once instead of twice for clearance procedures, thereby

70 ‘LCQ7: Hong Kong–Shenzhen Western Corridor’s Throughput’, Press Releases, 31 October 2007, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200710/31/P200710310141.htm.

71 Transport Department, Annual Transport Digest 2014, 2014, www.td.gov.hk/mini_site/atd/2014/tc/sec tion5_14.html.

72 Planning Department, Northbound Southbound: Cross-boundary Travel Survey 2013/14, Hong Kong, Planning Department, 2014, Table 5.1b.

73 Hong Kong Commercial Daily, 9 January 2007, p.B05.

74 Southern Weekly, 20 December 2007, p.B10.

75 Hong Kong Commercial Daily, 9 January 2007, p.B05.

shortening the clearance time by about five to ten minutes for each traveller.76 The co-location arrangements faced a judicial dilemma at first. The HKPA, located within Shenzhen, is naturally within the jurisdiction of the Immigration Ordinance and the Customs and Excise Service Ordinance of Hong Kong; but how about the other laws of Hong Kong? Should Mainland laws be applicable? And who should enforce those laws? Finally it was decided that Hong Kong officers would be authorised by the NPC to take enforcement actions within the HKPA located in Shenzhen, with detailed legal arrangements to be agreed between Hong Kong and Shenzhen.77 Another problem was that local insurance compa- nies were reluctant to provide related services at first, citing the fact of the Joint Inspection Building being outside the Hong Kong territory. Eventually, most insurers agreed to extend the scope of vehicle third-party insurance and other private insurance policies to the HKPA by means of market agreements, without any extra charge.78 As for maintenance, the HKPA does not include the waters and airspace near the bridge. In terms of emergency rescue arrangements, there is an established mechanism to facilitate cross-boundary search and rescue oper- ations between Hong Kong and the Mainland.

Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macao Bridge

Prior to 1995, Zhuhai first proposed the Lingdingyang Bridge (LDYB) to be built from the city across the mouth of the Pearl River Estuary to the NWNT.79 The Planning Department initiated the Crosslinks Study in September 1995, which was subsequently completed in May 1996. The study examined various options for landing points for the two bridge proposals, as well as route options for connecting the road bridges into the existing and planned future road network of Hong Kong. Lan Kok Tsui in Tuen Mun was preliminarily pro- posed as the landing point.80 In 1999, the government issued the Feasibility Study for Additional Cross-border Links, including the cross-harbour bridge connecting Zhuhai and Hong Kong (Lingdingyang Bridge) in its longer-term planning.81 On 20 September 2002, it was agreed at the third Mainland/HKSAR Conference on the Coordination of Major Infrastructure Projects that a joint study should be conducted on the transport linkage between Hong Kong and Pearl River West.82 In January 2003, the National Development and Reform

76 Wen Wei Po, 7 February 2007, p.A12.

77 Wen Wei Po, 1 July 2007, p.A64.

78 Ming Pao, 12 April 2007, p.A29.

79 Planning Department, Feasibility Study for Additional Cross-border Links Stage 1: Investigations on Traffic Demand: Executive Summary, March 2000, www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/p_study/comp_s/cbl/CBLstudy_ stage1_chin/ch01_c.htm.

80 Planning Department, Feasibility Study for Additional Cross-border Links Stage 1: Investigations on Traffic Demand: Executive Summary, March 2000, www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/p_study/comp_s/cbl/CBLstudy_ stage1_chin/ch01_c.htm.

81 Legislative Council of Hong Kong website, http://www.legco.gov.hk/database/chinese/data_tp/tp- zhuhzi-macao-bridge.htm.

82 Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Transport, ‘Updated Background Brief on Hong Kong–

Commission (NDRC) and the Hong Kong government jointly commissioned the Institute of Comprehensive Transportation to conduct a study entitled ‘Transport Linkage between Hong Kong and Pearl River West’. The study con- firmed the strategic significance of and urgent need for the construction of a land transport link between the HKSAR and Pearl River West. On 4 August 2003, the State Council approved the report of the study and agreed that the governments of Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao should set up an HZMB Advance Work Coordination Group and press ahead with the advance work for the construction of the bridge. (See Figure 7.8.)

In 2003, the governments of Guangdong Province, Hong Kong SAR and Macao SAR set up the HZMB Advance Work Coordination Group to start preparations for the HZMB. The Hong Kong government also engaged con- sultants to carry out investigation and preliminary design of the HZMB Hong Kong Section and North Lantau Highway Connection for linkage to the local road network. In February 2004, the Coordination Group commissioned China Highway Planning and Design Institute (HPDI) to conduct a feasibility study on the HZMB, covering a number of topics such as navigation clearance, hydrol- ogy, environment, traffic, economic benefits and financial viability. The study was substantially completed in 2005. Various alignment options had been put forward by the HPDI for evaluation, and a decision was made in 2005.

In April 2005, the NDRC organised an Expert Panel Meeting on HZMB Alignment in Zhuhai. The Expert Panel unanimously recommended the Northern bridge-cum-tunnel alignment option, with landings at San Shek Wan of HKSAR, Gongbei of Zhuhai, and A Pérola of Macao SAR.83 Geographically, the HZMB has to land in north-western Lantau, in view of its lesser environmental impact and closer proximity to HKIA and Disneyland, which could directly bring cross-bound- ary traffic to those destinations through a shorter connecting infrastructure.84

In 2008, the Legislative Council approved funding for site investiga- tion and preliminary design. In May 2009, the LegCo Finance Committee approved funding of 9,046.5 million Hong Kong dollars for the detailed design and construction of the HZMB Main Bridge.85 Following the State Council’s endorsement of the Feasibility Study Report for the HZMB project in October 2009, the construction of the Main Bridge commenced on 15 December 2009 and was planned to be completed by 2016.86 On 22 January

Zhuhai–Macao Bridge’, LC Paper No. CB(1)133/11-12, Paper for Special Meeting on 26 October 2011, October 2011, p.1.

83 Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Transport, ‘Updated Background Brief on Hong Kong– Zhuhai–Macao Bridge’, LC Paper No. CB(1)407/08-09, 17 December 2008, p.2.

84 Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Transport, ‘Updated Background Brief on Hong Kong– Zhuhai–Macao Bridge’, LC Paper No. CB(1)407/08-09, 17 December 2008, p.2.

85 Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Transport, ‘Updated Background Brief on Hong Kong– Zhuhai–Macao Bridge’, LC Paper No. CB(1)133/11-12, Paper for Special Meeting on 26 October 2011, October 2011, p.3.

86 Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Transport, ‘Updated Background Brief on Hong Kong– Zhuhai–Macao Bridge’, LC Paper No. CB(1)133/11-12, Paper for Special Meeting on 26 October 2011, October 2011, p.3.

Source: planning Department.

Figure 7.8 Cross-boundary transport infrastructure: west axis

2010, a Tung Chung resident applied for leave for judicial review to the Court of First Instance regarding the EIA reports approved and the environ- mental permits granted by the Director of Environmental Protection (DEP). The High Court handed down its judgment on 18 April 2011. The court judgment quashed the Director of Environmental Protection’s approval of the EIA reports for the HZMB and the environmental permits of the projects. The DEP appealed against the court’s judgment. The Court of Appeal handed down its judgment on 27 September 2011, allowing the DEP’s appeal and confirming the validity of the environmental permits previously granted by the DEP.87 In November 2011, the Legislative Council approved additional funding of 48.53 billion Hong Kong dollars for the construction of Hong Kong Boundary Crossing Facilities and other link roads.88 In October 2014, the government submitted another funding application to the LegCo and estimated that the completion of the works would be delayed to 2017, with 5 billion Hong Kong dollars in cost overruns. When attending a meeting of the Legislative Council Panel on Transport on 16 January 2015, the Secretary for Transport and Housing pointed out that the Joint Works Committee of the Three Governments (JWC) had advised that it would be very dif- ficult to complete the entire HZMB project by the end of 2016. The Hong Kong Boundary Crossing Facilities (HKBCF) and Hong Kong Link Road (HKLR) projects would not be completed in time by the end of 2016. The Highways Department was reviewing the anticipated completion dates. As for the Tuen Mun–Chek Lap Kok Link, the completion time of its Southern Connection will dovetail with that of the HZMB Main Bridge, whilst its Northern Connection is anticipated to be completed by 2020.89

The HZMB Main Bridge runs from the artificial island off Gongbei of Zhuhai to the eastern artificial island for the tunnel section just west of the HKSAR boundary. The project includes a 29.6-kilometre dual three-lane carriageway in the form of a bridge-cum-tunnel structure, including a tunnel of about 6.7 kilometres. There will also be two artificial islands for the tunnel landings west of the HKSAR boundary. The total contribution of the three places (Hong Kong, Mainland and Macao) will be RMB15.73 billion, of which Hong Kong will con- tribute RMB6.75 billion. The Legislative Council has approved funding of 9.28 billion Hong Kong dollars. The Hong Kong Link Road will be 12 kilometres in length, comprising a 9.4-kilometre-long viaduct section from the Hong Kong– Guangdong water boundary to Scenic Hill on the Airport Island, a 1-kilome- tre tunnel section through Scenic Hill, and a 1.6-kilometre-long at-grade road section on the reclamation to the east of HKIA, with a total cost of 25.047 billion

87 Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Transport, ‘Updated Background Brief on Hong Kong– Zhuhai–Macao Bridge’, LC Paper No. CB(1)133/11-12, Paper for Special Meeting on 26 October 2011, October 2011, p.6.

88 Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Transport, ‘Updated Background Brief on Hong Kong– Zhuhai–Macao Bridge’, LC Paper No. CB(1)268/13-14(02), 15 November 2013, p.3.

89 ‘Tuen Mun–Chek Lap Kok Link (TM-CLKL)’, Highways Department website, https://www.hyd.gov. hk/tc/road_and_railway/hzmb_projects/tmclkl/index.html.

Hong Kong dollars. The Hong Kong Boundary Crossing Facilities will provide clearance facilities for goods and passengers respectively using the HZMB. The HKBCF will be located on an artificial island of about 150 hectares (about 130 hectares for the HKBCF and about 20 hectares for the Tuen Mun–Chek Lap Kok Link Southern Landfall) reclaimed from the open waters off the north- east of HKIA, with a project cost of 30.4339 billion Hong Kong dollars. (See Figure 7.9.)

The landing of the bridge will be next to HKIA and Tung Chung New Town. With a variety of public transport modes available in the proximity, the HKBCF will become a multi-modal transportation hub (including HKIA, SkyPier, the Airport Express Line and the Tung Chung Line). From HKIA, passengers will be able to go directly to the urban areas via the North Lantau Highway Connection, or else to Tuen Mun via harbour crossings. Hong Kong’s trans- port network can be extended northwards to connect with the road network of Shenzhen, so as to form a ring road network in the PRD region. The western PRD will fall within a three-hour commuting radius from Hong Kong.

The project will not only release some capacity of the existing roads (including Tuen Mun Road, Ting Kau Bridge and others), but also offer strong support to the logistics industry in Lantau. The travelling time between Zhuhai and the Kwai Chung Container Port and HKIA will be reduced by more than 60 per cent and 80 per cent respectively through the HZMB.90 And the travelling time from the new economic hinterland of Zhuhai to Hong Kong will be shortened from the current four hours to 45 minutes. The HZMB will reinforce HKIA as an inter- national and regional aviation hub by providing an alternative route to HKIA.91

Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link (XRL)

In 2000, the government proposed the construction of the Hong Kong Section of the XRL (initially referred to as ‘Regional Express Link’) in the Rail Development Strategy 2000. On 22 April 2008, the government invited the MTR Corporation Limited (MTRCL) to proceed with the further planning and design of the XRL Hong Kong Section. On 8 July of the same year, the LegCo Finance Committee approved the funding for the design and site inves- tigation of the XRL Hong Kong Section. In October 2008, the proposed Hong Kong Section of the XRL was announced as one of the ten major infrastructure projects. The railway scheme of the Hong Kong Section was gazetted under the Railways Ordinance (Cap. 519) on 28 November and 5 December 2008. Detailed design commenced in January 2009.92 The scheme was approved on

90 Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macao Bridge Related Hong Kong Projects website, http://www.hzmb.hk/tchi/ benefits_transportation.html.

91 Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macao Bridge Related Hong Kong Projects website, http://www.hzmb.hk/tchi/ benefits_transportation.html.

92 Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Transport Subcommittee on Matters Relating to Railways, ‘Background Brief on Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link (Hong Kong Section)’, LC Paper No. CB(1)2582/08-09(02), 17 September 2009, p.1.

Source: Ho pui-yin, Ways to Urbanisation: Post-war Road Development in Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University press, 2008, p.297.

Figure 7.9 Plan for the HZMB

20 October of the same year, with an estimated cost of 62.4 billion Hong Kong dollars. On 16 January 2010, the LegCo Finance Committee approved funding of 66.9 billion Hong Kong dollars,93 including the railway construction cost (65 billion Hong Kong dollars), non-railway construction cost and special ex gratia payments in relation to the XRL project (1.9 billion Hong Kong dollars). The works of the XRL Hong Kong Section commenced at the end of January 2010 and were expected to be completed in 2015.94 On 11 August 2014, the MTRCL announced that the construction cost would increase from the original 65 billion Hong Kong dollars to 71.52 billion Hong Kong dollars,95 with an extra amount of around 6.5 billion Hong Kong dollars.96

There was an uproar in society when the government applied for funding from the Legislative Council for the construction of the XRL in 2009 and 2010. The sustainability assessment conducted by the government identified various potential environmental and ecological problems in the short term, including noise impacts during construction, air and water pollution from works sites, construction and demolition wastes from tunnel excavation, loss of natural habitats, impacts on historic and archaeological sites, and landscape and visual impacts.97 However, the EIA report concluded that the environmental impacts of the project could be controlled to within established standards and guide- lines through mitigation measures implemented during construction and operation.98

Under the project, an emergency rescue station and stabling sidings would be installed at Choi Yuen Tsuen (CYT) in Shek Kong, causing strong opposition from the villagers. There were about 150 households in CYT broadly spread- ing across an area of about 27 hectares. Apart from a few households living in houses on privately owned building land, most villagers in CYT had their houses erected on private agricultural land, and about ten households were on unleased government land.99 They were not eligible for compensation, since they were

93 Ming Pao, 17 January 2010, p.A02.

94 Express Rail Link (Hong Kong Section) website, http://www.expressraillink.hk/tc/database/xrl-in-hk. html.

95 Express Rail Link (Hong Kong Section) website, http://www.expressraillink.hk/tc/project-details/key- information.html.

96 Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Transport Subcommittee on Matters Relating to Railways, ‘Progress and Financial Situation of the Construction of the Hong Kong Section of the Guangzhou– Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link’, LC Paper No. CB(1)260/14-15(04), November 2014, pp.2–3.

97 Transport and Housing Bureau, ‘Hong Kong Section of Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link Funding Arrangement and Special Rehousing Package’, Hong Kong Legislative Council Brief, October 2009, p. 21, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/panels/tp/tp_rdp/papers/tp_rdp1022-thb200910a- e.pdf.

98 Transport and Housing Bureau, ‘Hong Kong Section of Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link Funding Arrangement and Special Rehousing Package’, Hong Kong Legislative Council Brief, October 2009, p. 20, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/panels/tp/tp_rdp/papers/tp_rdp1022-thb200910a- e.pdf.

99 Transport and Housing Bureau, ‘Hong Kong Section of Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link Funding Arrangement and Special Rehousing Package’, Hong Kong Legislative Council Brief, October 2009, p. 11, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/panels/tp/tp_rdp/papers/tp_rdp1022-thb200910a- e.pdf.

not landowners. To settle the turmoil, the government approved a special ex gratia rehousing package for CYT villagers and other parties affected by land resumption and clearance of sites required under the XRL Hong Kong Section project, with higher compensation amounts.100 It also assisted the villagers in identifying land for agricultural resite.

The urban section of the XRL would run by the side of Lin Cheung Road, passing Hoi Wang Road, Tai Kok Tsui district and Sham Mong Road, before entering Kam Shan via Lai Chi Kok Interchange. Some residents in Tai Kok Tsui were worried that the foundations of their old buildings might be affected by the works. The MTRCL conducted pre-construction condition surveys and monitoring in a comprehensive manner, and executed a third-party risks insur- ance policy to cover any liability incurred.101

On 15 April 2014, the government and the MTRCL announced that the Hong Kong Section of the XRL would be completed by the end of 2016 instead of within 2015, and the formal completion would be postponed to the end of 2017.102 According to the MTRCL report, the delays occurred at three locations,

i.e. the West Kowloon Terminus North, the Yuen Long tunnel section between Tsat Sing Kong and Tai Kong Po, and the cross-boundary tunnel section.103 Unforeseen and unfavourable ground conditions were a common primary cause for the delays, affecting tunnel boring machine (TBM) tunnelling, drill-and-blast tunnelling, diaphragm wall construction and excavation. Other causes included contractors’ resources, workmanship and logistic problems, interfacing issues and coordination problems of contractors, utility diversions, temporary traffic diver- sion constraints, inclement weather and so on.104 On 30 June 2015, the Secretary for Transport and Housing quoted the MTRCL’s latest assessment as saying that the Hong Kong Section of the XRL would not be completed by the end of 2017 and that the commissioning target would be delayed to the third quarter of 2018, including a six-month contingency period.105 As of the end of May 2015, the overall progress of the project was 70.4 per cent completed, indicating a delay

100 Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Transport Subcommittee on Matters Relating to Railways, ‘Background Brief on the Hong Kong Section of the Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link’, LC Paper No. CB(1)1581/09-10, Meeting on 16 April 2010, p.5.

101 Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Transport Subcommittee on Matters Relating to Railways, ‘Background Brief on the Hong Kong Section of the Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link’, LC Paper No. CB(1)1581/09-10, Meeting on 16 April 2010, p.6.

102 Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Transport Subcommittee on Matters Relating to Railways, ‘Updated Background Brief on the Latest Position of the Construction of the Hong Kong Section of the Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link’, LC Paper No. CB(1)1328/13-14(04), Meeting on 5 May 2014, p.7.

103 Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Transport Subcommittee on Matters Relating to Railways, ‘Construction and Commissioning of the Hong Kong Section of the Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link’, LC Paper No. CB(1)1354/13-14(01), MTR Corporation, May 2014, pp.4–5.

104 Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Transport Subcommittee on Matters Relating to Railways, ‘Updated Background Brief on the Latest Position of the Construction of the Hong Kong Section of the Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link’, LC Paper No. CB(1)1328/13-14(04), Meeting on 5 May 2014, p.12.

105 ‘Transcript of STH’s Meet-the-Media Session on XRL Hong Kong Section (1)’, Press Releases, 30 June 2015, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201506/30/P201506300850.htm.

of 5.8 percentage points compared with the planned progress of 76.2 per cent stipulated in the MTRCL’s revised schedule for the end of 2017, or a further delay of 0.8 percentage points compared with the overall progress as at the end of March 2015 reported by the administration on 19 May of the same year.106 The cost to complete (CTC) was revised by the MTRCL to 85.3 billion Hong Kong dollars, including a revised total project cost of 83.2 billion Hong Kong dollars and a sum of 2.1 billion Hong Kong dollars for contingency. The revised CTC was 31.23 per cent more than the original entrustment fee of 65 billion Hong Kong dollars in January 2010, and 19.3 per cent higher than MTRCL’s revised CTC of 71.5 billion Hong Kong dollars announced in the previous August.107

In 2014, the government indicated that the co-location arrangements would be adopted at the West Kowloon Terminus of the Hong Kong Section of the XRL, which would truly unleash the potential of a time-saving express railway. Under the co-location arrangements, passengers boarding the XRL trains in Hong Kong would only have to pass through the immigration control points of Hong Kong and the Mainland at the West Kowloon Terminus once before boarding and taking the train to all the cities along the national XRL network. Similarly, XRL passengers embarking in any Mainland city would be able to travel non-stop to Hong Kong, and pass through the two immigration control points only upon arrival. In other words, passengers could complete immigra- tion clearance for both Hong Kong and the Mainland in one go without the need to disembark for immigration checks en route. This would realise the con- venience and speediness of the XRL. Additionally, when passengers boarding in Hong Kong could get off at any XRL station in the Mainland, train deployment could be more flexible to maximise the benefits of XRL services.

The concept of implementation of the co-location arrangements at the West Kowloon Terminus is to let Mainland inspecting officers enforce the Mainland’s immigration and clearance procedures and the related Mainland laws at the station. The prime concern of implementing the co-location arrangements at a designated area within the territory of Hong Kong is enabling Mainland officers to smoothly carry out their inspection duties under the Mainland law (including those relating to customs, immigration and quarantine matters) within the con- stitutional framework. The Department of Justice, the Transport and Housing Bureau, the relevant policy bureaus and departments are actively studying the above issues and discussing them with their Mainland counterparts. As the work is rather complex, it takes a longer time to deliberate and examine the related issues. The relevant work is still under way.108

The XRL will operate in tunnels, which will be constructed by tunnel boring, or by drill-and-blast methods. The West Kowloon Terminus as well

106 ‘STH’s Opening Remarks on XRL Project at LegCo Transport Subcommittee’, Press Releases, 3 July 2015, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201507/03/P201507030389.htm.

107 ‘Transcript of STH’s Meet-the-Media Session on XRL Hong Kong Section (1)’, Press Releases, 30 June 2015, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201506/30/P201506300850.htm.

108 ‘LCQ6: Hong Kong Section of Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link’, Press Releases, 3 December 2014, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201412/03/P201412030567.htm.

as facilities like Shek Kong Stabling Sidings and Emergency Rescue Siding will be constructed by the cut-and-cover method. The tunnel between Ngau Tam Mei and Tai Kong Po in San Tin and that between Tse Uk Tsuen in Pat Heung and Mei Lai Road in Sham Shui Po (via Shek Yam in Kwai Chung) will be constructed by the drill-and-blast method. The main tunnels in Yau Tsim Mong, Sham Shui Po and Yuen Long districts will be constructed by tunnel boring machines.109 Dedicated tunnels can minimise the impacts on the neighbouring communities, without hindering either existing domestic services (for example the Airport Express Line, Tung Chung Line and West Rail Line) or the future XRL.110 The maximum operating speed can reach 200 kilometres per hour, with the maximum frequency of one train every three minutes, and the capacity to carry up to 10,000 passengers per hour in each direction.111

The XRL will connect Hong Kong with the largest high-speed rail network in the world. It is estimated that a population of at least 60 million will reside within a four-hour journey zone from the West Kowloon Terminus. The social and cultural exchanges with the Mainland as well as the economic development in Hong Kong will be greatly enhanced. The XRL will have a total length of about 140 kilometres linking up Hong Kong with Guangzhou via Futian and Longhua in Shenzhen and Humen in Dongguan. Its terminus in Guangzhou will be located at Shibi, the centre of the Guangzhou–Foshan metropolitan area. The Mainland section of the XRL will start from Shibi and enter Hong Kong via Huanggang.112 The XRL will facilitate the connectivity of Hong Kong with cities in the PRD region as well as other major cities in the Mainland, thus enhancing Hong Kong’s position as a regional hub. The XRL will significantly reduce the travel time between Hong Kong and Mainland cities. For example, the railway journey time between Guangzhou and Hong Kong will be halved from 100 minutes to 48 minutes. The XRL will serve a number of major cities in the Mainland with frequent and fast through train services. The XRL will greatly reduce the travel time of Hong Kong residents. More Mainland cities and regions will be included in the daily commutable area of Hong Kong. The concept of a one-hour living circle within the PRD region will be realised, which will also help promote social, economic, cultural and academic exchanges with the Mainland.

The Hong Kong Section is approximately 26 kilometres long, which will run from the boundary at Huanggang to West Kowloon Terminus, a commercial,

109 Express Rail Link (Hong Kong Section) website, http://www.expressraillink.hk/tc/construction/cons truction-methods.html.

110 Express Rail Link (Hong Kong Section) website, http://www.expressraillink.hk/tc/project-details/alig nment.html.

111 Express Rail Link (Hong Kong Section) website, http://www.expressraillink.hk/tc/project-details/key

-information.html.

112 Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Transport Subcommittee on Matters Relating to Railways, ‘Background Brief on the Implementation of the Hong Kong Section of the Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link project’, LC Paper No. CB(1)2170/10-11(01), Paper for Special Meeting on 20 May 2011, May 2011, p.1.

retail, hotel and residential hub located at the north of the West Kowloon Cultural District, and between the Airport Express Kowloon Station and the West Rail Austin Station. The terminus will be well connected to the city-wide MTR system and a public transport interchange that will provide links to des- tinations throughout the city via bus, minibus, taxi and so on.113 It is estimated that, during the first year from the commencement of passenger services of the XRL, around 30 per cent of the local population (2.1 million) and almost half of the workforce (1.7 million) will be within 5 kilometres of the West Kowloon Terminus. From there, one can change to the MTR and reach commercial districts such as Tsim Sha Tsui and Central in around 15 minutes by MTR, and residential districts like Taikoo Shing, Shatin, Tsuen Wan and Yuen Long in around 30 minutes.114 With the terminus of the XRL Hong Kong Section nearby, the West Kowloon Cultural District will become easily accessible and attract more visitors from the Pearl River Delta for arts and cultural activities. The WKCD will, in turn, increase the passenger volume and enhance the cost- effectiveness of the XRL.115

The XRL will create approximately 11,000 employment opportunities during the peak of construction. It will also facilitate growth in other industries such as catering and retail, tourism, professional services and more, generating numer- ous employment opportunities for Hong Kong and Mainland cities during its operation. It is estimated that the XRL will save approximately 42 million hours of travelling time annually for citizens, bringing up to 87 billion Hong Kong dollars in economic benefits in 50 years of its operation (based on the time savings of passengers alone). Besides, the XRL is more environmentally friendly in terms of energy conservation and reduction in gas emissions. It will also enhance the sustainable development of Hong Kong.116

Greater Pearl River Delta planning

The Hong Kong–Guangdong Cooperation Joint Conference was set up in 1998 to strengthen the multifaceted cooperation between the two places. In 2001, China joined the World Trade Organization and fully opened itself to the world. Hong Kong ceased to be the only channel by which international funds could enter the Mainland. After the SARS outbreak in 2003, Hong Kong entered into the Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) with Mainland China.117 In 2008, the central government promulgated the Outline

113 Express Rail Link (Hong Kong Section) website, http://www.expressraillink.hk/tc/project-details/alig nment.html.

114 Express Rail Link (Hong Kong Section) website, http://www.expressraillink.hk/tc/project-details/alig nment.html.

115 Express Rail Link (Hong Kong Section) website, http://www.expressraillink.hk/tc/project-details/alig nment.html.

116 Express Rail Link (Hong Kong Section) website, http://www.expressraillink.hk/tc/project-details/ benefits.html.

117 Chan Wing-kit, ‘Planning Vision and Realistic Challenges of Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macao Integration’, in Leung Kit Fun Beatrice and Lo Shiu Hing Sonny, eds, Zhujiang sanjiaozhou fazhan yu gangao zhi ronghe

of the Plan for the Reform and Development of the Pearl River Delta, which, for the first time, included its close cooperation with Hong Kong and Macao in the devel- opment planning for the PRD region. The Outline stated that Guangdong Province should develop a system of modern service industries to facilitate Hong Kong as an international financial centre. It also discouraged vicious competition among similar sectors in Guangdong Province, especially the PRD region, and Hong Kong or Macao, while supporting the development of complementary sectors with a view to expanding the Hong Kong–PRD economic zone. In 2010, the Framework Agreement for Hong Kong–Guangdong Cooperation was signed,118 with a view to promoting closer cooperation between the two places.

In the Seventh Plenary of the Hong Kong–Guangdong Cooperation Joint Conference held in 2004, both sides agreed that stepping up the coordination in regional planning would be key to realising the full economic potential of the Greater PRD Region. Both sides agreed to exchange information and views on city planning and regional development in the process of conducting an advance study on planning and development and cross-boundary infrastructure projects. Joint studies were agreed upon on areas of mutual concern. As a result, an Expert Group on Hong Kong/Guangdong Town Planning and Development was set up, with a first task of carrying out the Planning Study on the Coordinated Development of the Greater Pearl River Delta Township (the Greater PRD Study).119 The Greater PRD Study, as a joint effort between the Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao authorities, commenced in early 2006. The study exam- ined the latest land use pattern, railway and highway proposals, and port and airport facilities within the Greater PRD Region with the intention of deriv- ing a development strategy beneficial to the entire region. Important issues of concern to the governments within the region were addressed, including cross- boundary infrastructure, environmental quality management, and the coopera- tion and coordination mechanism. The study also served to provide a platform for Hong Kong and Guangdong to exchange views on future planning and development issues.120 The study was completed in 2009 and provided clear def- initions of the Greater PRD and the PRD. To be specific, the PRD refers to the cities of Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Zhuhai, Foshan, Huizhou, Zhaoqing, Jiangmen, Dongguan and Zhongshan, while the Greater PRD also includes Hong Kong and Macao. On 28 October 2009, the Development Bureau and the Planning Department of Hong Kong, together with Guangdong Provincial Department of Construction and the Secretariat for Transport and Public Works of Macao,

(Pearl River Delta and Its Integration with Hong Kong and Macao), Hong Kong, City University of Hong Kong Press, 2014, p.239.

118 Chan Wing-kit, ‘Planning Vision and Realistic Challenges of Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macao Integration’, in Leung Kit Fun Beatrice and Lo Shiu Hing Sonny, eds, Zhujiang sanjiaozhou fazhan yu gangao zhi ronghe (Pearl River Delta and Its Integration with Hong Kong and Macao), Hong Kong, City University of Hong Kong Press, 2014, pp.239–240.

119 Planning Department, ‘Planning Study on the Coordinated Development of the Greater Pearl River Delta Township’, Introduction, http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/misc/great_prd/outline_c.htm.

120 Hong Kong Planning Department, Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy: Final Report, Hong Kong, Planning Department, 2007, p.168.

Table 7.11 Land area and population of the Greater Pearl River Delta (2014)

Pearl River Delta

Hong Kong Macao Total

Land area (km2)	54,643	1,110	29	55,782
Resident population	57,633,800	7,240,000	636,200	65,510,000

Notes: the pearl River Delta includes Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Zhuhai, Foshan, Huizhou, Zhaoqing, Jiangmen, Dongguan, Zhongshan and other cities. the Greater pearl River Delta includes the HKSAR, the Macao Special Administrative Region, and the cities of the pRD Economic Zone.

Sources: Guangdong Statistical Year Book 2015, Beijing, china Statistics press, 2015; ‘population’, Hong Kong: The Facts, Hong Kong SAR Government Information Services Department, 2015, http://www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/factsheets/docs/ population.pdf; ‘Demographic Statistics 4th Quarter 2014’, Government of Macao Special Administrative Region Statistics and census Service, http://www.dsec.gov.mo/c/demo.aspx; http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/%E4%B8

%AD%E5%9c%8B%E7%B6%93%E8%B2%BF%E8%B3%87%E6%96%99/%E7%8F%A0%E4%B8%89%E8%A7%92% E7%B6%93%E6%BF%9F%E6%A6%82%E6%B3%81/ff/tc/1/1x000000/1x06BW84.htm.

held a joint seminar in Macao for the promulgation of the outcome of the Greater PRD Study121 and proposed the goals for the three places as follows:

Hong Kong should continue to strengthen its position as an international metropolis in Asia and develop into one of the world’s most important centres of modern service industries and a global city with good living quality; Pearl River Delta should be developed into a world-class base of advanced manufacturing and modern service industries as well as an important economic centre of China; and Macao should be developed as the world’s most attractive tourism and recreation centre as well as commercial and trading services platform.

To achieve these objectives, the study set out a number of cooperation pro- posals and imminent major tasks in the areas of cross-boundary transportation, development of cross-boundary areas, ecological/environmental protection, and coordination mechanisms, with a view to strengthening the coordinated development among the three places. The town planning authorities of Hong Kong and Guangdong exchanged information and opinions in the course of the study. (See Table 7.11.)

In 2008, the State Council promulgated and implemented the Outline of the Plan for the Reform and Development of the Pearl River Delta (2008–2020). In February 2009, the governments of the three places jointly undertook the Study on the Action Plan for Livable Bay Area of the Pearl River Estuary (Bay Area Study),122 a conceptual regional planning study under the established town planning cooperation mechanisms between Guangdong and Hong Kong and between Guangdong and Macao. The Bay Area Study was launched in April 2010 to explore ways of facilitating the development of the Bay Area of the Pearl

121 ‘Promulgation of the Outcome of the “Planning Study on the Coordinated Development of the Greater Pearl River Delta Townships”’, Press Releases, 28 October 2009, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/gene ral/200910/28/P200910270167.htm.

122 http://www.prdbay.com/UploadFile/2015221359494443.pdf.

River Estuary into a core area of quality living as well as economic prosperity in the Greater PRD Region.123 The first and second stages of public engagement for the Bay Area Study were carried out in January 2011 and January 2014, respectively, for the purpose of public consultation. The Bay Area Study was completed in December 2014 and proposed focus actions for conservation such as the ‘Blue Network’ and ‘Green Network’, as well as the provision of a ‘Leisure and Cultural Bay’ and the promotion of ‘Livable Communities’.

On 31 December 2014, the State Council officially approved the estab- lishment of the China (Guangdong) Pilot Free Trade Zone (GDFTZ). The 116.2-square-kilometre GDFTZ includes three areas: the Nansha New Area of Guangzhou of 60 square kilometres (including the Guangzhou Nansha Bonded Port Area of 7.06 square kilometres); Qianhai and Shekou in Shenzhen, having an area of 28.2 square kilometres (including the Shenzhen Qianhai Bay Bonded Port Area of 3.71 square kilometres); and the Hengqin area of Zhuhai, covering 28 square kilometres. As the GDFTZ was further opened up on 21 April 2015, Hong Kong, capitalising on CEPA concessions, gained an early step into the Mainland market in terms of services incidental to manufactur- ing, telecommunication services, financial services, legal services, and technical testing and analysis services.124 In the 13th Five-Year Plan promulgated by the central government in November 2015, the paragraphs relating to the HKSAR stated that regional cooperation should be strengthened and Guangdong–Hong Kong cooperation would be of the utmost importance in this regard. On the principle of achieving mutual benefits through active participation and joint planning, Guangdong Province intends to draw on Hong Kong’s experience in economic development and social management services when establishing the Guangdong–Hong Kong in-depth cooperation zone in Nansha. The Hong Kong government will provide advice on planning concepts and other areas to Guangdong.125

Vision for the city

Sustainable development strategy

In 1972, representatives from industrialised and developing nations around the world were brought together at the UN Conference on the Human Environment

123 Housing and Urban–Rural Development Department, Guangdong Province, Development Bureau and Planning Department, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and Secretariat for Transport and Public Works, Macao Special Administrative Region, Study on the Action Plan for Livable Bay Area of the Pearl River Estuary: Summary of Recommendations, December 2014, http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_tc/p_study/com p_s/pearl_river_stage2/Summary_tc.pdf.

124 China (Guangdong) Pilot Free Trade Zone website, http://www.china-gdftz.gov.cn/zwgk/qygl/ qyjj/#zhuyao; HKTDC Research website, http://economists-pick-research.hktdc.com/business-news/artic le/%E7%A0%94%E7%A9%B6%E6%96%87%E7%AB%A0/%E5%BB%A3%E6%9D%B1%E8%87%AA%E8

%B2%BF%E5%8D%80%E7%9A%84%E9%A6%99%E6%B8%AF%E6%A9%9F%E9%81%87/rp/tc/1/1X00 0000/1X0A2FJ8.htm.

125 2016 Policy Address website, www.policyaddress.gov.hk/2016/chi/.

in Stockholm. The conference explored the rights people could expect in regard to a healthy and productive environment, and proposed the concept of sustain- able development.126 Fifteen years later, in 1987, a report entitled Our Common Future was published, describing sustainable development as ‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future gener- ations to meet their own needs’.127 This definition has since been widely adopted. In 1989, the Hong Kong government set out a ten-year programme to tackle environmental problems for the first time, with planning policies formulated for waste management, water pollution, air pollution, noise pollution, and environ- mental education.128 It also published a white paper entitled Pollution in Hong Kong – A Time to Act to address environmental problems ignored in the past due to the rapid growth in the economy and population.129 Section 6.14 of the white paper recommended reviewing the Town Planning Ordinance to include envi- ronmental considerations. It was an early experience for Hong Kong of taking

part in sustainable development.

In 1992, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development was held in Rio de Janeiro, which resulted in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development130 and approved Agenda 21, under which participating countries are committed to establishing sustainable development policies suitable for their own circumstances.131 China is one of the 178 countries adopting Agenda 21.132 In 1994, the Chinese central government announced its sustainable development strategies in accordance with Agenda 21.133 In 1997, the Planning Department commissioned a consultancy study on Sustainable Development for the 21st Century in Hong Kong (SUSDEV21). In 1999, the Hong Kong government formed the Council for Sustainable Development to offer advice to the govern- ment and to enhance the public’s understanding of sustainable development. The

126 Sustainable Development for the 21st Century: Executive Summary, Ch. 5, http://www.pland.gov.hk/ pland_en/p_study/comp_s/susdev/ex_summary/final_chi/ch5.htm.

127 Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future, 1987, http:// www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm.

128 Planning, Environment and Lands Branch, Government Secretariat, Heading towards Sustainability: The Third Review of Progress on the 1989 White Paper: Pollution in Hong Kong – A Time to Act, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1996, pp.49–52.

129 Planning, Environment and Lands Branch, Government Secretariat, Heading towards Sustainability: The Third Review of Progress on the 1989 White Paper: Pollution in Hong Kong – A Time to Act, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1996, p.6.

130 For details of the 27 principles of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, see https:// zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E9%87%8C%E7%B4%84%E7%92%B0%E5%A2%83%E8%88%87%E7%99%BC% E5%B1%95%E5%AE%A3%E8%A8%80.

131 Education Bureau, ‘Sustainable Development’ E-learning Teaching Kit, http://cd1.edb.hkedcity.net/ cd/mce/ESD/esd-definition.htm.

132 Sustainable Development in Hong Kong for the 21st Century: Information Digest, Hong Kong, Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 1998, p.5; Post Sustainability Institute, ‘List of the Nations Who Attended and Agreed to the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Agenda 21)’, http://www.postsustainabilityinstitute.org/which-nations-signed-agenda-21.html.

133 Sustainable Development in Hong Kong for the 21st Century: Information Digest, Hong Kong, Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 1998, p.5.

government also planned to spend over 30 billion Hong Kong dollars in the fol- lowing decade to implement various programmes of environmental protection.134 In August 2000, the Planning Department completed the SUSDEV21 Study based on the opinions of the UN World Commission on Environment and Development as well as the actual situation in Hong Kong. The goal of sustain- able development in Hong Kong is to balance social, economic, environmental and resource needs, for both present and future generations, simultaneously achieving a vibrant economy, social progress and a high-quality environment, locally, nationally and internationally, through the efforts of the community and the government.135 Therefore, sustainable development is more than environ- mental protection. It involves a balance between economic, social and environ- mental considerations. SUSDEV21 became an important part of Hong Kong’s urban planning, with the focus of planning strategies being shifted from social

demands to sustainable development.

The SUSDEV21 Executive Summary136 integrates the concept of sustainable development into the decision-making process. Starting in 2001, all govern- ment bureaus and departments were required to comply with the Eight Guiding Principles for Sustainable Development137 in sustainability assessment. The Executive Summary has a significant influence on town planning in the twenty- first century. (See Table 7.12.)

The Council for Sustainable Development was established in 2003 and received a report from the Planning Department in June of the same year. The report stated sustainable development as the prime goal for the Hong Kong 2030 Study. It said that sustainable development requires the balancing of economic, social, envi- ronmental and resource needs, and community engagement in the development process. The report also noted that Hong Kong’s future development would be essentially driven by four key forces, namely the increasing population, economic restructuring, aspirations for a better living environment and increasing socio- economic interaction with the Mainland. The Planning Department recom- mended that the government formulate various proposals to address development needs in line with the goal of sustainable development and assess such proposals based on established criteria, so as to derive a development option that would max- imise social benefits and minimise adverse environmental impacts.138

On 26 February 2004, the Hong Kong Declaration was made at the United

134 1999 Policy Address website, http://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/pa99/chinese/part5-2c.htm#p122.

135 Council for Sustainable Development, ‘“Susdev 21” and Principles for the Drawing up of a Sustainable Development Strategy’, Paper No. 02/03, 29 April 2003, www.enb.gov.hk/sites/default/files/susdev/html/ b5/council/SSCPaper02-03t.pdf.

136 Sustainable Development for the 21st Century: Executive Summary, Ch. 5, http://www.pland.gov.hk/ pland_en/p_study/comp_s/susdev/ex_summary/final_chi/ch5.htm.

137 Environment Bureau, Sustainable Development Online Resource Centre, ‘Hong Kong: Eight Guiding Principles for Sustainable Development’ website, http://orc.susdev.gov.hk/tc/what_is_sd/hk_principle/ index.html.

138 Planning Department, ‘Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy’, Council for Sustainable Development Paper No. 11/03, 15 September 2003, www.enb.gov.hk/sites/default/files/susdev/html/b5/ council/Paper11-03t.pdf.

Table 7.12 Summary of the Eight Guiding Principles for Sustainable Development in Hong Kong

Economy Economic return as determined through cost–benefit analysis. percentage change in income less income tax for the upper quartile

household minus the percentage change in income less income tax for the lower quartile.

Gross domestic fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDp.

Expenditure on primary, secondary and tertiary education as a percentage of GDp.

Health and hygiene

In-patient discharges and deaths per 100,000 population due to diseases of the respiratory system.

Natural resources consumption of energy per unit of output.

Quantity of municipal solid waste, public fill and construction and demolition waste requiring final disposal per capita.

the total remaining landfill capacity.

Volume of fresh water supplied per capita and percentage of demand met by fresh water resources.

Area of countryside. Landscape/scenic value.

Society and social infrastructure

Average length of waiting list for public rental housing. Median rent to income ratio for private housing. percentage of households residing in inadequate housing. Living space per person.

Indicator on percentage of population living within a short walk of a community facility.

Waiting lists for residential care homes for the elderly.

Number of student members of civic education and community service organisations.

percentage of students receiving a passing grade or above in the chinese and English languages in the Hong Kong certificate of Education examination.

Biodiversity Area of Hong Kong of high terrestrial/marine ecological value. Area of managed terrestrial/marine habitat for conservation.

Leisure and cultural vibrancy

Environmental quality

Number of recorded archaeological, cultural and historical sites. percentage of population living within districts with a shortfall of required

provision of open space.

Annual ticket sales for major cultural, entertainment and sporting events. composite index for criteria air pollutants based on percentage of the air

quality objectives.

composite index for toxic air pollutants based on percentage of acceptable risk.

Quantity of carbon dioxide emitted per year (or per capita per year). percentage of population exposed to excessive noise.

Number of kilometres of river ranked ‘excellent’ or ‘good’ using the Environmental protection Department river water quality index.

composite index of marine water quality pollutants based on percentage of the water quality objectives.

Table 7.12 (continued)

Number of beach-days per year ranked ‘good’ or ‘fair’. Indicator on indoor air quality.

Mobility Average travel distances: the unit of such a measure is passenger distance travelled, i.e. the distance travelled by passengers to get to work by all major groups of transport modes.

Average network speed: the average network speed of travel across all major groups of transport modes both public and private.

the cost of road-based freight transport: the cost of charges and operating costs as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDp).

Source: Sustainable Development for the 21st Century: Executive Summary, ch. 5, http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/p_study/ comp_s/susdev/ex_summary/final_eng/ch5.htm.

Nations Asia-Pacific Leadership Forum: Sustainable Development for Cities jointly convened by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs and the government of the People’s Republic of China. The Declaration looked at key challenges to sustainable development for cities and their impacts on regional cooperation.

The development model proposed in the Hong Kong 2030 Report in 2007 entails the overall objectives of sustainable development, as well as the concept and functions of spatial planning. In view of the slowdown of population growth and in line with the sustainable development principles, the direction for Hong Kong’s future development is clearly to do more with less. In other words, Hong Kong should strive for a quality life and better efficiency while being prudent on resource utilisation and cautious about embarking on massive construction pro- grammes on undeveloped land. The Hong Kong 2030 Report comprises three planning directions: to provide a quality living environment, to enhance eco- nomic competitiveness, and to strengthen links with the Mainland. A balance between the three is essential to sustainable development, and is a basic compo- nent of long-term planning. (See Table 7.13.)

In terms of land use planning, priorities have been determined in order to maximise the benefits of the land. In line with the Metroplan and new town development in the 1990s, five sub-regions have been identified based on their geographical surroundings and features. Each sub-region plays a different role in alleviating the burdens on the core urban areas.

The Territorial Development Strategy Review, published in February 1998, emphasised land use planning in the form of a land use–transport duo that became a land use–transport–environment trio139 in the Hong Kong 2030 Report, which also introduced the concept of sustainable development.140 The report included a lot of paragraphs on saving global resources and pro-

139 Hong Kong Planning Department, Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy: Final Report, Hong Kong, Planning Department, 2007, p.3.

140 Hong Kong Planning Department, Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy: Final Report, Hong Kong, Planning Department, 2007, p.3.

Table 7.13 Characteristics and planning focuses of the five sub-regions

Sub-region Characteristics Planning focus

Metro Area the pulse of

Hong Kong

to strengthen the hub functions, the business district along the northern shore of Hong Kong Island and the southern part of Kowloon peninsula will continue to be the main economic activity centre of Hong Kong. South-east Kowloon, tsuen Wan and the western and southern parts of Hong Kong Island are all included in the Metro Area for key development. It is home for over 4 million people and provides about 80 per cent of all job opportunities.

the potential of Victoria Harbour will be tapped for the creation of new leisure and business facilities, marine-related facilities (marina for pleasure crafts, cruise terminal, etc.) and new landmarks (a fisherman’s wharf).

Innovative building and urban design will be utilised to enhance the townscape, while heritage buildings will be preserved. civic squares and park areas will be provided and more trees will be planted, in order to give workers, residents and tourists breathing spaces and for public amenity.

South West New territories

South East New territories

North West New territories

A tourist, recreation and leisure centre

Leisure garden and aquatic centre of Hong Kong

Gateway to the pearl River Delta

this sub-region has many beautiful islands and country parks, as well as convenient transport infrastructure.

Lantau presents enormous potential, with well-planned new towns (i.e. tung chung and tai Ho), as well as world-class recreational facilities such as international theme parks, a cable car system and an aquatic centre. It is essential to preserve country parks, beautiful beaches and sensitively designed resort developments in the southern part of Lantau.

the international airport at chek Lap Kok can serve as an international air transport hub in southern china.

the natural beauties in Sai Kung and port Shelter offer great potential for recreational and leisure attractions. It is necessary to conserve the beautiful countryside and explore opportunities for compatible recreational uses. Efforts will be made to explore innovative and creative recreational proposals in harmony with the natural landscape.

tseung Kwan O will serve as a strategic growth area to provide additional land for residential development to meet housing needs.

With the construction of the West Rail and the new cross- boundary links, this sub-region has become a gateway to the pRD region. Upon the commissioning of the West Rail, NWNt has become one of the main sources of land for new strategic growth.

Table 7.13 (continued)

Sub-region Characteristics Planning focus

North East New territories

the technology hub

this sub-region has been subject to intense development pressure, since large tracts of agricultural land and fish ponds have been converted for housing, open storage and port back-up uses. Besides, the proposed construction of

a container port in western tuen Mun will lead to major changes in the role and appearance of this sub-region.

Efforts should be made to protect the natural environment, especially the internationally important wetlands around Mai po.

places like Sha tin, tai po, Fanling and Sheung Shui remain rural in character and are still unspoiled and unpolluted.

to meet housing needs, a new strategic growth area has been identified in Kwu tung. Land can be explored to meet housing needs. this sub-region also has the potential to become a technology hub of Hong Kong.

there are a great number of research institutes along the Kowloon–canton Railway East Rail, such as the polytechnic University in Hung Hom, the city University and Hong Kong Industrial technology centre in Kowloon tong, the chinese University of Hong Kong in Sha tin, the Science park in pak Shek Kok and the Industrial Estate in tai po. these facilities form a cultural and technological hub that strengthens Hong Kong’s status as a regional base for high-technology and high-value-added activities.

Source: planning Department, Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy: Inception Report, 2001, www.pland.gov.hk/ pland_en/p_study/comp_s/hk2030/chi/inception.

tecting the ecosystem. It showed Hong Kong’s determination to become an international city and aroused discussions on a healthy and productive environment. While it was popular to present related concepts in the name of environmental protection at that time, the international community has gradually adopted the concept of sustainable development as a guide for future development.

Efficient use of land resources

The lack of developable land is the biggest obstacle confronting Hong Kong in the formulation of long-term plans. The government should regulate land prices by means of the market mechanism of supply and demand. It should maintain price stability, which has a critical impact on overall economic development. When exploring remote areas to increase land supply, it is necessary to consider the cost-effectiveness of new infrastructure provision. In 2015, the Development Bureau and Planning Department, in collaboration with relevant bureaus and

departments, commenced the updating of the territorial development strategy. The new strategy was named Hong Kong 2030+: Towards a Planning Vision and Strategy Transcending 2030, or Hong Kong 2030+ for short. It basically builds upon the foundation of Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy. In response to global and regional changes and to address relevant planning issues in Hong Kong, Hong Kong 2030+ will focus on planning for a liveable high-density city, embracing new economic challenges and opportunities as well as creating capacity for sustainable growth. It will provide an updated spatial planning framework and broad directions to guide planning, land and infrastruc- ture development of Hong Kong beyond 2030.141

The Planning Department is assessing the future supply and demand of dif- ferent uses of land in Hong Kong, including the floor areas of and the needs for Grade A offices and commercial and industrial uses, so that comprehen- sive strategies of spatial planning can be formulated to meet the anticipated demands. To promote business development, the government will increase the supply of commercial land and strengthen the support for technology start-ups and innovative technologies, together with further efforts to promote creative industries. The Energizing Kowloon East initiative will transform the area into an alternative central business district, by capitalising on potential office floor area of several million square metres.142

Smart city

In 2015, the government proposed the concept of the smart city based on rel- evant experience in Paris, Tokyo, and Tianjin on the Mainland.143 Proposals included enhancing pedestrian and vehicular accessibility and managing district facilities by means of technology, and disseminating information to the public in digital format, with a view to providing a better place for work and play.144

Kowloon East, covering Kai Tak, Kowloon Bay and Kwun Tong, used to serve as a key industrial base and the location of the international airport of Hong Kong. Kowloon East has the potential to supply an additional commer- cial or office floor area of about 5 million square metres. Besides, the govern- ment has relocated or reorganised its existing government facilities in the two action areas in Kowloon East, and it started to put suitable sites on the market in 2014–2015. On 15 January 2015, the Conceptual Master Plan 4.0 was launched for the Energizing Kowloon East initiative, focusing on five priorities, namely ‘“Walkable” Kowloon East, Green CBD, Smart City, Kai Tak Fantasy and the Spirit of Creation’,145 and with the aim of building a convenient, accessible and

141 http://www.pland.gov.hk/hk2030plus/tc/study_F.html.

142 ‘HKETO and HKTB Host Lunar New Year Reception in Toronto’, Press Releases, 26 February 2015, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201502/26/P201502260265.htm.

143 2015 Policy Address website, p.9, http://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/2015/chi/pdf/PA2015.pdf.

144 2015 Policy Address website, p.28, www.policyaddress.gov.hk/2015/chi/pdf/Agenda_Ch2.pdf.

145 Energizing Kowloon East Office, ‘Conceptual Master Plan 4.0’, 2015, http://www.ekeo.gov.hk/tc/con ceptual_master_plan/master_plan_4/CMP4.0_final.pdf.

eco-friendly central business district (‘CBD2’) for Hong Kong. Smart city ini- tiatives will include using mobile apps and the EFLS to integrate resources and provide maps of walkable shortcuts, so as to shorten citizens’ walking time.

In 2015, the concept of a ‘“Walkable” Kowloon East’ was first launched in 18 sets of back alleys suitable for optimisation in Kowloon Bay and the Kwun Tong Business Area, so as to reduce the burden imposed by busy commercial activities and vehicle–pedestrian conflicts in the district. Four sets of the back alleys are located at the junction of Lai Yip and Wai Yip Streets, next to Tsun Yip Street Playground, on Hoi Yuen Road and on Hung To Road. Related works include the resurfacing of some roads, renewal of building walls and addition of signs to attract pedestrians. These initiatives are intended to face-lift back alleys which are dark, dirty and narrow, and alleys of industrial buildings that are used as loading and unloading areas. The back alleys will become walkways to benefit pedestri- ans. In addition to walkway improvements, arrangements are planned to facilitate the construction of elevated walkways by private property owners, to face-lift Hoi Bun Road Park with a view to strengthening the connectivity between the Ngau Tau Kok MTR Station and the Kwun Tong waterfront, and to build an additional pedestrian footbridge near Kowloon Bay MTR Station for the sake of controlling crowded pedestrian links and enhancing transport connectivity.

The concept of a ‘Green CBD’ involves connecting the Kwun Tong Promenade to the space beneath the flyover along Hoi Bun Road. The area underneath the Kwun Tong Bypass will be transformed for arts, cultural and creative uses and integrated with the adjacent landscaped pedestrian network extending to the King Yip Street nullah, which will be transformed into the Tsui Ping River through environmental, ecological and landscaping improvements. Together with the green buildings and environment enabled by the public and private sectors in the district, these will create synergy in turning Kowloon East into a Green CBD.

Energy saving and convenience are the most important objectives of smart cities. Additional smart traffic lights can reduce pedestrian waiting time. Most of the current traffic lights have their signal changed at different intervals depend- ing on the time of the day. New smart traffic lights will be installed with sensors that detect when a pedestrian is standing at a specific spot and send a signal for the traffic light to change faster. These can divert pedestrian flows when installed on roads with smaller vehicular flows in the commercial building area. Besides, drivers can enjoy greater convenience if parking space information is provided by means of computer systems. For energy conservation, smart utility meters will be added in industrial buildings to provide property owners with regular data, so as to reduce waste due to leakage. The Water Supplies Department preliminarily considers the proposal feasible. Bus companies will be consulted for the installation of bus–bus interchanges in the vicinity of Kwun Tong, so as to reduce the number of buses in the commercial area. Published measures also include the Kai Tak EFLS, the district cooling system and the Kowloon Bay Waste Recycling Centre. IT sector lawmaker Charles Mok suggested that an overall planning framework be formulated to strengthen cooperation between the authorities and public and private sector partners. He also proposed that the

government share information with citizens or companies, or encourage compa- nies to share energy.146

The ‘Kai Tak Fantasy’ project is intended to explore the potential of Kwun Tong Typhoon Shelter. The former airport runway tip, Kwun Tong Action Area and the water body in between will be developed into a tourism, entertainment and leisure destination. The ‘Spirit of Creation’ is to seek to understand Hong Kong’s sense of creativity and its inspiration for the future through exploring the traditional industries in Kowloon East. The merging and transformation of industrial culture and architectural designs from the past will drive organic growth in the city.

Railway network

In order to develop the railway network by making good use of land, the govern- ment formulated Hong Kong Moving Ahead: A Transport Strategy for the Future in 1999 and completed the review and update of the Railway Development Strategy 2000 in May 2000.147 When planning a territory-wide transport system, the gov- ernment has already taken into consideration the integration of transport and urban planning, and made it an established policy to develop railways as the backbone of the city’s passenger transport system. The 2014 Policy Address also showed the government’s determination to continue with the develop- ment of a transportation system centred on public transport with railway as the backbone.148 The government would conduct an in-depth study on public transport arrangements across the territory and review the roles of other public transport services in tandem with the railway network expansion, with efforts to alleviate congestion and reduce emissions. It also further assessed the rela- tions between transport and land use, evaluating and prioritising major long- term development opportunities from the transport perspective, with a view to formulating an optimised distribution of population and employment. On 17 September 2014, the government announced the Railway Development Strategy 2014. Seven new railway projects were put forward at the meeting of the LegCo Subcommittee on Matters Relating to Railways on 27 October of the same year. It was also proposed to build a large railway network to connect NDAs and core urban areas between 2018 and 2026. The commencement and completion dates of the railway projects will depend on the housing development progress of and resource assessment for the neighbourhood. (See Table 7.14 for the draft schedule.)

If all proposals are realised, the total length of the railway network in Hong Kong will increase to over 300 kilometres, covering areas inhabited by about 75 per cent of the total population and about 85 per cent of job opportunities.

146 Apple Daily, 2 February 2015, p.A10.

147 Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Transport, ‘Background Brief on Public Transport Strategy in Hong Kong’, LC Paper No. CB(1)238/14-15(07), Meeting on 25 November 2014, 21 November 2014, p.2, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-15/chinese/panels/tp/papers/tp20141125cb1-238-7-c.pdf.

148 2014 Policy Address website, www.policyaddress.gov.hk/2014/chi/p150.html.

Table 7.14 Locations and proposed years of completion of the seven new railway projects

Railway project Proposed years of implementation

Northern Link and Kwu tung Station 2018−2023

tuen Mun South Extension 2019−2022

East Kowloon Line 2019−2025

tung chung West Extension 2020−2024

Hung Shui Kiu Station 2021−2024

South Island Line (West) 2021−2026

North Island Line 2021−2026

Source: Hong Kong Legislative council panel on transport, ‘Background Brief on public transport Strategy in Hong Kong’, Lc paper No. cB(1)238/14-15(07), 21 November 2014, p.4, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-15/english/panels/tp/papers/ tp20141125cb1-238-7-e.pdf.

With the improvement of the public transport system, roadside air pollutants and greenhouse gases will be reduced by 2–4 per cent per year, together with energy savings.149 According to the Energy Saving Plan for Hong Kong’s Built Environment 2015–2025+, the total annual energy consumption of the trans- port sector in 2012 was about 92,512 terajoules or about 32 per cent of the total energy end-use, of which 88 per cent was consumed in vehicular transporta- tion, about 9 per cent in marine transportation and 3 per cent in railway.150 Urban development entails integration of land use, transport and environmental planning. Public transport services should be coordinated and monitored, with railway stations as the core. Related measures should enhance the efficiency of the overall transport network, maintain reasonable fares, relieve congestion and address environmental concerns. Facilities or developments with high traffic demand should be sited within walking distance or reach of short feeder services from railway stations. This addresses the traffic demand and reduces road traffic. In 2011, railways patronage accounted for about 38 per cent of local public transport services. Five new railway projects were under way in 2015, namely the Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong XRL (Hong Kong Section), the West Island Line, the South Island Line (East), the Kwun Tong Line Extension, and the Sha Tin to Central Link, which are expected to be completed by 2020. The ‘rail-based development approach’ proposed in the Hong Kong 2030 Report not only inherits previous principles, but also takes into account population growth and housing development. The approach works along with the environ- mental policy of emission reduction to ease congestion and road traffic. In the process, Hong Kong’s internal transport facilities can become on a par with the facilities of the world-renowned HKIA. With both local and global connectivity,

149 ‘Opening Remarks by STH at Press Conference on Energy Saving Plan for Hong Kong’s Built Environment 2015–2025+’, Press Releases, 14 May 2015, www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201505/14/P201505 140685.htm.

150 Environment Bureau, Development Bureau and Transport and Housing Bureau, Energy Saving Plan for Hong Kong’s Built Environment 2015–2025+, May 2015, p.57, http://www.enb.gov.hk/sites/default/files/ pdf/EnergySavingPlanTc.pdf.

both the economic efficiency and the international image of Hong Kong can be enhanced.151 (See Figure 7.10.)

Brownfield development

In 2015, the government set a target for the provision of 460,000 residential units in the following ten years. Accordingly, the government needs more land to meet the continuous demand resulting from economic activities and busi- ness facilities. Therefore, the government must adopt a multi-pronged strategy comprising short-, medium- and long-term measures to increase the supply of land and development space. Short-term measures include increasing the devel- opment intensity of developable land, rezoning, urban renewals and developing railway properties. Medium- to long-term measures consist mainly of various planning and engineering studies on new development areas and new town extension, including the conversion of sizeable ‘brownfield’ sites and squatter areas in rural New Territories for high-density development (e.g. Kwu Tung North, Fanling North, Hung Shui Kiu and Yuen Long South), as well as the development of rock caverns and underground space.152

A vast amount of agricultural land in rural New Territories, especially the rel- atively flat and more accessible areas, has been occupied by various industrial uses such as open storage, port back-up facilities, industrial workshops, logis- tics operations, recycling yards, storage of construction machinery and materials storage, which are often incompatible with the surroundings. These sites, gener- ally referred to as brownfield sites, can be put to good use through comprehensive planning and development. The government estimated that there are about 190 hectares of brownfield sites in Hung Shui Kiu and about 106 hectares in Yuen Long South, which can be used for producing about 28,000 residential units.

Most brownfield sites are used for port back-up, open storage and rural indus- trial operation. They are polluted to various extents. It is difficult to estimate the costs of decontamination and land remediation as well as the risks of legal liabil- ity involved. Most brownfields are owned by several companies or individuals, making the resumption of such land complicated and time-consuming. Besides, there are different business operations on brownfield sites. Although not really technologically advanced, they play a role in supporting Hong Kong’s various industries, including container terminals, ports and logistics, recycling, trans- port, construction and manufacturing, providing a large number of jobs requir- ing only low skills or low academic qualifications. All these are integral to the livelihoods of many people, and are important elements of various industries in Hong Kong. Therefore, in order to tackle the issue of brownfields while allowing room for these economic activities to continue their operations, the government

151 ‘HKETO and HKTB Host Lunar New Year Reception in Toronto’, Press Releases, 26 February 2015, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201502/26/P201502260265.htm.

152 Legislative Council Secretariat Information Services Division Research Office, ‘Brownfield Development’, 28 April 2015, http://www.legco.gov.hk/research-publications/chinese/essentials-1415ise 10-brownfield-development.htm.

Source: transport and Housing Bureau, Railway Development Strategy 2014, September 2014, p.19, http://www.thb.gov.hk/tc/psp/publications/transport/publications/rds2014.pdf.

Figure 7.10 Hong Kong’s railway network in 2031

is stepping up efforts to explore ways to cope with brownfield operations that are still needed in Hong Kong and the feasibility of consolidating some of these operations into multi-storey buildings. The proposal will improve the environ- ment of rural New Territories and release land for development.153

Globalisation

With globalisation and the rise of China, Hong Kong must embrace globalisa- tion and find a suitable role in China’s development. In the future, Hong Kong will be a cosmopolitan city which can play an important role in China and which can also exert a positive, international influence. For the first 15 years of the twenty-first century, Hong Kong was endeavouring to maintain its status as an international financial centre and to meet the needs of China’s overall develop- ment. In the 2010–11 Policy Address, the government pointed out that it is to Hong Kong’s advantage to be ‘part of China but outside the Mainland’. It will be Hong Kong’s future position and direction to be developed as a global finan- cial centre, asset management centre and offshore RMB business centre attract- ing capital and talent from within and outside the country. On the principle of achieving a win–win situation and contributing to the country’s financial secu- rity, Hong Kong will be actively involved in promoting the modernisation of the Mainland’s financial system, particularly the internationalisation of the RMB. Hong Kong will adapt to China’s development planning, strengthen coopera- tion with Guangdong Province, and help realise the steady market reforms of China’s interest and exchange rate regimes, so that the city will become a highly sophisticated international financial centre.

It is necessary for Hong Kong to understand the challenges brought about by China’s planning, and to take a critical look at its own weaknesses and shortcom- ings, so as to chart the way forward for sustainable development. It is repeatedly stated in China’s planning outline that ‘support will be given to Hong Kong in the development of its service industries such as financial services, logistics, tourism and information services, and the maintenance of Hong Kong’s status as an international centre of financial services, trade and shipping’,154 indicating the role of Hong Kong’s advantages in promoting China’s development.

Hong Kong is unique as compared to other Chinese cities. To be an inter- national city, Hong Kong must closely follow the guidelines for sustainable development proposed by the international community, in terms of air quality management, for example. With the sources of air pollution in Hong Kong being closely related to Guangdong Province, the governments of both places drafted and implemented the PRD Regional Air Quality Management Plan in 2007 in order to reduce air pollution. Accordingly, a 16-station air quality moni- toring network was set up in the PRD. Based on the data collected, the PRD Regional Air Quality Index is released every day on the Internet to keep the

153 2016 Policy Address website, http://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/2016/chi/p123.html.

154 2006–07 Policy Address website, https://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/06-07/chi/p14.html.

442 · MAKING HONG KONG

public informed of the actual air quality in the region. The data collected have also helped assess the effectiveness of pollution reduction measures in meeting emission targets. The Guangdong government has been strengthening its hard- ware and software to reduce pollution. Measures pursued include installing des- ulphurisation systems, using natural gas for power generation, and striving to speed up the introduction of National III motor vehicle emission standards (on a par with Euro III standards) in PRD cities.155 Concerted efforts by the two gov- ernments are indispensable for the improvement of local air quality.

Apart from pollution problems in Hong Kong and the Mainland, future urban planning will also address an issue of global concern: the global warming crisis caused by the greenhouse effect. In 2004, for example, greenhouse gas emissions per capita in Hong Kong were 7 per cent below the 1990 level; yet global warming remained a common challenge for the entire world. In light of their own eco- nomic, social and environmental characteristics, governments around the world have to formulate measures to strike a balance between economic development and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, with a view to achieving sustaina- ble development. In the same vein, Hong Kong has done its part in improving the regional environment. From 1995 to 2005, the energy intensity in Hong Kong, that is, energy consumed per unit GDP, dropped by 13 per cent. As an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) member, Hong Kong is committed to honour- ing its pledge and achieving a reduction in energy intensity of at least 25 per cent before 2030, with 2005 as the base year. To this end, the government has endeav- oured to raise public awareness of climate change and introduced energy-saving measures at different levels. The government has consulted the public on the proposed mandatory implementation of the Building Energy Codes by means of legislation. In 2008, as the legislative work was completed relating to the Energy Efficiency Labelling Scheme (first phase) for household electrical appliances, planning for the second phase was subsequently commenced.156

Hong Kong aspires to be on a par with other world cities and to be trans- formed into a green city. The government has conducted strategic environ- mental assessment and formulated strategic environmental actions regarding environmental concerns in the planning process, so as to ensure an acceptable environment in the future. In 2015, the government protected 24 country parks not far away from urban areas, so that citizens could find a place out of the hustle and bustle. Apart from promoting economic development, the government has used cultural heritage conservation to highlight the local features of the modern metropolis of Hong Kong, so that this international city with historic features and high efficiency can stay abreast of other major cities in the world.

Summary

Hong Kong has been striving to maintain its economic leadership in the world since the turn of the century. The government believes that urban planning and

155 2006–07 Policy Address website, www.policyaddress.gov.hk/06-07/chi/pdf/speech.pdf.

156 2007–08 Policy Address website, www.policyaddress.gov.hk/07-08/chi/docs/policy.pdf.

development are important elements in enhancing the competitiveness of Hong Kong. Starting in the 1990s, the government has committed itself to develop- ing new core areas in the city, so as to alleviate the congestion in Central and Tsim Sha Tsui. West Kowloon and South East Kowloon are focus areas for the city’s development for the first half of the twenty-first century. West Kowloon, built on newly reclaimed land, features new cultural facilities that span a wide green space with a convenient transport network. The district will introduce new development elements to the urban landscape of Hong Kong. The site of the vacated Kai Tak Airport has been used to provide land for commercial and residential development. The concept of the smart city has been introduced, in order to reduce vehicular flows and to enhance traffic efficiency in the local area. The newly developed areas not only help address the problem of expensive and scarce office space in Central, but also encourage a better-distributed popula- tion. The development approaches for West Kowloon and South East Kowloon have laid a solid basis for Hong Kong as an international metropolis.

The satellite towns planned in the mid-1960s and the new towns in the New Territories that were developed in the 1980s have played a significant role in diverting the population and promoting local industrial development. In the late 1990s, the New Territories remained a major source of land to accommodate population growth. In the twenty-first century, North West and North East New Territories are planned as NDAs and given priority in development, in order to capitalise on the existing resources of infrastructure and public services. In today’s NDAs, great importance is attached to the living quality of residents. Consideration should be given to population density and distribution, ratio of green space, air quality, and the protection of traditional agricultural practices and the natural environment.

For the development of the boundary area between the New Territories and Shenzhen, it is necessary to consider the needs of both Hong Kong and the Mainland. Among other things, transport facilities for sea and land networks will need to address the constantly increasing number of cross-boundary pas- sengers. It is advised that a boundary control point should be added, connect- ing to eastern Guangdong Province. All these initiatives will strengthen the ties between Hong Kong and the Mainland. As an economic powerhouse in southern China, Hong Kong has to take into account the needs of neighbouring regions in the expansion of its urban territory and trade activities. This represents a major change in Hong Kong’s development strategy after its return to China. Global climate changes have resulted in a number of crises, such as the frequent occurrence of extreme weather events and the scarcity of natural resources. In view of that, the government has developed policies and guidelines for sustain- able development, with efforts dedicated to conserving natural resources and improving the urban environment. Improving legislation and increasing policy transparency have been included in the agenda of urban planning, and public engagement is an indispensable concept in urban planning in the twenty-first century.

Conclusion

The characteristics of the development of a city are always inseparable from its history. Unlike the history of politics, economy, thoughts or cultures, which observes a city merely from the perspective of persons or things, the history of town planning in Hong Kong analyses the city’s evolution process, the turning points in its transformation and the reasons for its breakthroughs, so that we may grasp the key to promoting the development of the city. A review of the city’s development blueprints allows us to reconstruct our identity as urbanites by revisiting various landmarks, historical places and characteristics of spatial development. By so doing, we modern people may avoid feeling lost or confused in the self-searching journey through different times and spaces. The impacts of the external environment are interactive with the internal response, leading to different results depending on the time and the space. The land utilisation and contingency strategies of urbanites of different periods also varied, and this reflects the characteristics of the city in different eras.

Historical events are the turning points for different eras. Political events, eco- nomic conditions and even the social structure may change with time. The soci- ety’s degree of response to political events and the urgency of countermeasures often affect each other. Is city development affected by the political situation or the other way round? In the past, researchers of Hong Kong’s town planning mostly followed the idea of British scholars, who opined that the city was not very worthy of analysis except for its economic development, owing to its lack of natural resources.1 In their opinion, there could be no long-term urban planning for Hong Kong, since the city was no more than a temporary trading and living place. The experience of small-scale planning in the pre-war era was never regarded as the basis for the large-scale development of later times. In fact, pre-war town planning in Hong Kong was mainly intended to meet different challenges such as climate disasters, public health incidents, economic recessions, social unrest and cultural conflicts. Construction works, spatial designs and even regional functions and traffic flows were used to provide activity space for the new population. As a result, life prospered in this populous city, and urbanisation was promoted in Hong Kong. From the early post-war period to the handover, town planning mainly reflected the city’s internal response to the external environment. During that time, design- ers of cities relied on the prevailing situations and social conditions as the basis

1 G.B. Endacott, an expert on Hong Kong history, believed that Hong Kong history was economic history, as the birth and rise of Hong Kong were shaped by economic forces. The story of Hong Kong was told mainly from the perspectives of the governors and the Colonial Office. There was nothing unique about the history of Hong Kong, which was just a typical example of a British overseas territory of the early Victorian era. See G.B. Endacott, History of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, 1964.

for future projections and visions, with the hope of leading the city forward. If objective conditions did not occur as expected, it would naturally be necessary to modify plans in line with changes in social needs. Therefore, the earliest planning statements could be replaced by later concepts, and old ideas could be considered outdated. Everyone focused on the number of plans actually implemented, while the revised planning concepts would be ignored. Since the handover, members of the public have become more enthusiastic about monitoring planning poli- cies, and their opinions are valued more highly thanks to the electoral system. Consequently, the government’s leading role has been affected. Town planning can no longer be based on the same high level of cost-effectiveness as it was in the 1990s, but instead entails coordinating the interests of various stakeholders. Since the planning work is closely related with the city’s development at different times, it is natural to observe the city’s evolution at different stages. Through the charac- teristics of different phases, readers should be able to have an in-depth understand- ing of the planners’ ideas, factors affecting the implementation of designs, and the reasons and process of the emergence of each district in the city.

From the 1840s to the time when the Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory was signed in 1898, Hong Kong was a very small city, covering only today’s Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula. City of Victoria was even smaller, made up of just the present-day Central and Sheung Wan on the northern coast of Hong Kong Island. In order to develop Hong Kong into a trading port with China, the colonial government overcame geograph- ical constraints and the shortage of natural resources and established a core area in the city. It was a systematic plan based on the British experience, with related feasibility assessment. Water supply projects and transport facilities using widespread Western technology gradually helped the ideas materialise, laying a foundation for Hong Kong’s entrepôt trade and the attraction of new immigrants. The city’s development focus was aligned mainly with Britain’s eco- nomic and trade interests. There was a series of port facilities to meet Europeans’ daily needs, such as religious, recreational and cultural activities, among others. The direction of the city’s development at that time was dominated by British imperialism that considered the Chinese to be ‘uncivilised’ people. In the early 1880s, British engineer Osbert Chadwick published his reports on Hong Kong’s sanitary conditions and sewerage systems. However, to protect the lives of the Europeans from being affected by the Chinese, the government did not immediately address City of Victoria’s public hygiene problems, but instead started setting up residential areas reserved for Europeans in 1888, so that the Europeans would be kept far from Chinese communities with extremely poor sanitary conditions, and excluded Chinese communities from planning. The government’s gross neglect of the problems affecting the living and sani- tary environment of Chinese communities led to the rapid spread of the plague at the end of the nineteenth century, when Hong Kong experienced a tragic catastrophe. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the colonial government redeveloped Taipingshan District and reviewed insufficiencies in previous plan- ning by taking account of the population density, living environment and public facilities. It is an indisputable fact that town planning in the nineteenth century

was tainted with racial discrimination and heavily biased towards the needs of the Europeans and lacked comprehensiveness. Society did not expect the gov- ernment to formulate longer-term development policies, since the residents felt that they were only sojourners. And the government would not have made adap- tive adjustments if not for situational changes both at home and abroad.

The territory of Hong Kong was expanded on two occasions, first from Hong Kong Island to Kowloon south of Boundary Street in 1860, and then to the New Territories south of the Sham Chun (Shenzhen) River in 1898. The territorial expan- sions not only meant a 1,200 per cent increase in the land area compared with 1842, but also required the government to put in more human and other resources to exploit the new territory. Later, China was plunged into political unrest with the fall of the Qing Dynasty, the establishment of the Republic and warlordism. The purported neutrality of the Hong Kong government provided a better investment environ- ment for Chinese industrialists and more jobs for grassroots labourers going down to the south. In 1899, the government began to conceive the development of New Kowloon, which included areas such as Kowloon Tong, Kowloon Bay, Kowloon City, Sham Shui Po and Cheung Sha Wan. Development began to take place in the first half of the twentieth century. As a result, those areas accommodated not only new housing projects to ease the population density, but also factories for new and even obnoxious industries. In the new areas opened up by the government, related tasks were carried out in an orderly manner, such as the relocation of indigenous inhabitants, reclamation works, land formation, construction of basic infrastructure such as road and water supply systems, and then land auctions. The enormous inflows of capital and human resources enabled a more diversified economic development of Hong Kong. And the system and mechanisms of urban development in the West were gradually introduced into the city in the first half of the twentieth century. The Town Planning Committee was established in 1922. Government officials and social elites were appointed to the Committee to conduct comprehensive planning for the districts of Hong Kong. Land use was considered more carefully than in the nine- teenth century. In 1939, the government formulated the Town Planning Ordinance, laying the foundation for a long-term mechanism of town planning.

The focus of town planning in the 1920s and 1930s was on New Kowloon, the urbanisation process of which made the colonial government realise the constraints of the 99-year lease under the Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory. The impacts of short-term land leases on investors as well as on the government’s determination to commit resources for the development of New Kowloon were the main obstacles faced by town planning in Hong Kong in the first half of the twentieth century. Since 1928, three consecutive governors of Hong Kong, namely Cecil Clementi, William Peel and Geoffrey Northcote, proposed to the British Foreign Office that the lease of the New Territories be extended. Geoffrey Northcote even suggested purchasing the New Territories for 20 million pounds sterling. Apparently, town planning in the twentieth century no longer solely focused on Victoria City. A broader territory meant greater leeway for the rulers. Anyone who thinks that these occurrences were the consequences of the prevailing situation may wish to study carefully a complete map of Hong Kong drawn by the colonial government in 1900 after the signing

of the Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory. It clearly shows that all the land south of Kowloon Peak (Fei Ngo Shan) and north of Boundary Street was already included in Kowloon. Britain’s ambition to develop Kowloon can be traced back to here. The prevailing developments just tied in with that ambi- tion. Or perhaps the British had long been aware of the fact that the Republic of China was not militarily strong enough to take back Hong Kong. In the 1920s, the Nationalist government in Guangdong worked with local labourers to launch strikes in Hong Kong, which, although they brought the city’s economy to its knees, did not weaken its political status. After the strikes came to an end, the Hong Kong government was even more confident in the city’s expansion.

With the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in the 1930s, the colonial gov- ernment was deprived of the chance to review the effectiveness of its planning work in the 1920s. Its mode of urban development was completely discarded during the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong between 1941 and 1945. The Japanese looked at Hong Kong in a way that was very different from the British way. They even criticised the British for failing to make good use of the city’s natural resources. After occupying Hong Kong, the Japanese defined the city as a resource port of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Taking advan- tage of Hong Kong’s excellent geographical position, they expanded Kai Tak Airport and strengthened Hong Kong’s role as a trans-shipment centre of mili- tary supplies. Based on their experience in Taiwan, they promoted agriculture and forestry in Hong Kong by extensively planting trees, introducing new agri- cultural products. They made maximum efforts to develop natural resources and enhance agricultural and forestry operations in the territory.

The objective conditions were indeed inadequate for Hong Kong achieving self-sufficiency in terms of agricultural products. When the supply could not be significantly increased, the demand had to be reduced. Measures to reduce the local population included repatriation of the unemployed, iron-fist rule and severe punishment of anti-Japanese individuals. Next, the Japanese redesigned the functions and population distribution of different districts. For example, they replanned the streets and the traffic, designating Central and Tsim Sha Tsui as their military and administrative centre, Wan Chai as a ‘red-light’ district for their compatriots, and Kowloon Tong as the residential area for Japanese political dignitaries, off limits to the Chinese. There were even leaders of District Affairs Bureaus to monitor the daily life of residents, and staple foods were being rationed to them. Under strict military control, the daily food demand of res- idents was forcibly reduced. During the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong of three years and eight months, these iron-fist policies caused great public indignation. We should understand that the planning strategies adopted by the Japanese were not solely intended for Hong Kong’s benefit but instead were based on Japan’s overall interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Agriculture and forestry were vigorously promoted during the short-lived Japanese occupa- tion, and their effectiveness could never be verified. However, Hong Kong was already a trans-shipment centre of military supplies within the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. After the Second World War, the colonial government

resumed control of Hong Kong. Disagreeing with the Japanese, they refocused on industry and commerce.

Town planning in the post-war era was quite different from before. Some scholars even claimed that the city’s development before the war could not be regarded as planning. That is because urban design in the post-war era no longer focused on key districts but instead featured city-wide planning and, more importantly, mutually complementary functions between different districts. The political situation was the main driving force behind heavy investments by the British in this land of political uncertainties. After the Second World War, Britain regained governance of Hong Kong with the support of the United States and other Western capitalist countries. And, with the outbreak of the civil war in China between the Nationalists and the Communists, more and more Chinese people fled to Hong Kong. To showcase respect to the Chinese, the colonial government focused on solving livelihood issues in various ways. It even invited Patrick Abercrombie, a British town planner, to draw up a blueprint for Hong Kong’s development in the following 50 years. This epoch-making idea, which would last as long as half a century, reflected the determination of the British to treat Hong Kong as their bridgehead in the Asia-Pacific region. The city’s long- term economic development was the focus of planning. It involved the distribu- tion of a series of infrastructure works such as roads, piers, the airport and even a cross-harbour tunnel. It also stipulated the economic roles of different districts such as the distribution of industrial and commercial areas. Abercrombie’s plan outlined the functions of every corner of the city and had a direct impact on Hong Kong’s development in the ensuing decades.

Another focus of urban planning was to resolve the housing problem. It went beyond the mere pre-war emphasis on building safety. In the 1950s, resettle- ment blocks were built in the territory to provide shelter for the grassroots. In 1972, Hong Kong launched a ten-year Housing Programme, which changed the focus of housing policies from providing emergency relief and increasing housing supply to proactively improving the quality of grassroots housing and addressing related problems, such as public sanitation, population density, popu- lation distribution, living environment and daily life ancillary facilities. Public housing was also located in line with the needs of the processing industries for a large pool of cheap labour, so as to solve the problem of labour shortage, and enabled breakthrough development of the city’s economy. From the 1950s to the 1980s, the population grew by as many as 1 million every decade, far exceeding Abercrombie’s prediction. And his proposed areas of development would have to accommodate more people. Drawing on the experience of the Garden City Project in the 1920s, the government established satellite towns (subsequently renamed ‘new towns’) in New Kowloon and the New Territories. The new towns were not far from the urban areas and were directly accessible by public transport. In the comprehensive communities there were not only residential buildings, but also facilities for daily needs such as medical care, education, community services, cultural centres and open spaces. Furthermore, land was reserved for industrial investment, so that residents could work in the same districts that they lived in and reduce population movements to and from the core area. Investments in the

new towns were significant, but they were justified, since the city’s population distribution and economic activities became more reasonable.

In 1947, the Public Works Department set up the Town Planning Office to gather relevant information for analysis. In 1953, the Public Works Department reorganised the Town Planning Office and for the first time set up the Town Planning Division under the Crown Lands and Surveys Office, one of its subor- dinate units. The Town Planning Division was responsible for town planning, and its new mission was to coordinate the views of various government depart- ments and formulate draft plans for the future development of the urban areas. Town planning work gradually became systematic. In May 1946, the Town Planning Ordinance and the Committee on Town Planning came back into oper- ation. The Town Planning Ordinance was constantly revised in response to the needs of society.

The development of Hong Kong was always affected by the political and economic situation in China, which implemented the reform and opening-up policy at the end of 1978 and changed its previous political strategies. Its poli- cies towards Hong Kong’s future after 1997 were also different. Accordingly, Hong Kong’s town planning had to make adaptive adjustments and alter its old direction of development. In the 1970s, the government began to have the idea of constructing a new airport and favoured Chek Lap Kok on Lantau Island among a number of candidate sites. It also planned to develop the western part of the harbour and expand the urban core area. From 1979 to 1997, town plan- ning was dominated by the political situation. Planning stalled in the first half of the period owing to the disputes between China and Britain, but the pace accelerated in the second half owing to the political changes in China. In the early 1980s, China and Britain negotiated the return of Hong Kong to Chinese rule in 1997. The British made an offer to return sovereignty in exchange for the right to govern, but it was rejected. The Chinese, on their part, were concerned that Hong Kong’s fiscal reserves could be exhausted by the massive construction works (such as Chek Lap Kok International Airport) undertaken by the colo- nial government. After the Tiananmen Incident in Beijing in 1989, Hong Kong society was worried about its political future after the handover. To stimulate economic development, the government launched the Rose Garden Project, with Chek Lap Kok International Airport as its core, with a view to creating job opportunities and attracting talented professionals by means of infrastruc- ture projects. The ten projects of the Airport Core Programme, with a price tag of 169 billion Hong Kong dollars, were completed one after another around 1997 amidst disputes between Britain and China. The mobilisation of funds for the mega-construction projects, the introduction of new technologies and the supervision of joint ventures from different parts of the world resulted in a large number of breakthroughs. The Tsing Ma Bridge became a new city landmark and the longest double-decked suspension bridge carrying both vehicles and trains in the world, greatly shortening the travel time between the urban area and Chek Lap Kok International Airport. The new expressways and land not only changed the overall urban landscape of Hong Kong, but also linked the urban core area with New Territories West and Lantau Island, further expanding the business

areas of the city. Hong Kong people no longer considered Lantau Island as a remote area, and the New Territories changed and stood at the forefront of the city’s development. Thanks to the ten projects of the Airport Core Programme, Hong Kong people regained their lost confidence and looked forward to pros- perity after 1997. Nevertheless, the relationship with China was always an essen- tial consideration in town planning for the colonial government.

It can thus be seen that the implementation of advance planning is subject to timing, environment and human factors. It may not be possible to carry out a detailed plan if the timing is wrong. The fate of a prepared plan also depends, of course, on the persistence of its designers. When the opportunity presents itself, there may not be sufficient time to deliberate on concepts which are expected to take the city forward. More importantly, planning needs to keep pace with the times, with appropriate and timely reviews and adjustments in light of a rapidly changing environment and different considerations.

After the handover, Hong Kong was hit hard by the financial tsunami in 1997, and the economy was in trouble. The government recorded deficits in each of the years between 1997 and 2004. Property prices plunged by 60 per cent from their peak levels in 1997. The economic downturn also halted a series of large infra- structure projects west of Victoria Harbour, such as those in Western District, West Kowloon and the new development areas in North East and North West New Territories. To alleviate the negative impact of the economic crisis on the city, the previous system of town planning was not given up after Hong Kong’s return to Chinese rule in 1997. Instead, more attention was paid to the analy- sis of data and feasibility studies beforehand. For planning’s internal work, the emphasis is on optimising the system, improving the laws and regulations, and strengthening the monitoring of engineering technologies, among other things, so as to learn from experience and achieve breakthroughs. Of all the changes in the external environment, the most important one is certainly Hong Kong’s return to China and becoming a key city of the country, which requires coop- eration with neighbouring regions. On the other hand, amidst the pursuit of the ideal of sustainable development worldwide, the Hong Kong public’s demand for political participation has increased. Town planning work is also influenced by the wrestling among libertarians, neo-socialists and radicals. The implemen- tation of the Hong Kong Outline Plan depends not only on the government’s guidance but on public support as well. Urban planning has entered a new era.

An ideal city of the twenty-first century not merely adopts housing or land use planning, or policies formulated in response to actual social needs. It draws up blueprints for the city’s future vision. A city is naturally bound by many existing norms and constraints after more than a century of development. To address the housing problem in Hong Kong, for example, it is necessary to estimate the supply of public housing required and coordinate the supply of private housing at the same time. The property market declines in the event of financial turmoil, which affects the investment costs of construction projects and property prices. The principle of sustainable development also has to be taken into account in planning. For instance, it is necessary to monitor the compliance of private housing with environmental principles in terms of building specifications, to

consider the impacts of traffic noise on residential units and the distribution of public spaces, and so on. Another example is transport planning, which requires consideration of not only internal needs, but also connections with the South China region and the entire country, so as to ease cross-boundary traffic flows and plan for future demand. Technical and quality supervision is of paramount importance in large projects, while the use of public money is an issue of public concern. Therefore, there are more and more unpredictable factors in planning, and coordination work is becoming increasingly more important.

With the ageing of the urban core area, post-1997 town planning could no longer focus on opening up new development areas. Urban areas have to be redeveloped as well. When members of the public have a better understanding of such concepts as urban design, architecture and environmental protection, they increasingly aspire to take part in the redevelopment planning. Residents of old districts are tired of the erosion of their traditional values by modern urban development. They have reservations about gradually replacing the ‘good old ways’ with modern urban lifestyles. Social values that emphasise safeguarding the local culture and an awareness of conserving historical buildings oppose assimilation by Western modern cities. Therefore, the redevelopment of old communities should be not just about economic costs. More importantly, the transparency of planning should be enhanced, and public participation should be encouraged. All those factors have added a lot of variables to redevelopment works and changed the previous practice of government-led town planning.

In today’s town planning, it is no longer possible to follow what was done in the 1970s and 1980s, developing land to satisfy economic needs. With greater civic awareness after the handover, members of the public impose stringent requirements on the government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in terms of upholding the principle of ‘one country, two systems’ and adhering to the policies of ‘Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong’ and ‘No change for 50 years’. How Hong Kong maintains the principles of the Sino- British agreement and aligns with the overall development of China is now the focus of town planning. Hong Kong’s civil society uses district council elections and the Legislative Council election system to make the councils change their focus of discussions in response to voters’ demands. People’s livelihoods and the use of public money, as well as the fairness, openness and impartiality of policies, are all issues of concern.

The various types of new problems encountered in town planning in the twenty-first century reflect the very high demand placed by the world on city development in the future. The pursuit of rapid growth, which was the dominant thinking, has been abandoned, allowing for a broader vision in town planning. Attention is now paid not only to the Hong Kong community, but also to envi- ronmental protection and the responsibilities of a member of the global village. With town planning that is supported by a sound legal system, greater tolerance in the government’s administration and enhanced public knowledge, this truly signifies the city’s enlightenment and progress.

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HKRS No. 163, D & S No. 1/1581, ‘Committees – Kai Tak Airport – Financial and Commercial Implications of the Scheme for a New Airport. Appreciation of . . . by an Informal Committee’, Hong Kong, Public Records Office.

HKRS No. 163, D & S No. 1/1897, ‘07-25 Runway at Kai Tak Airport – Question of Possible

Retention of . . . in the Hong Kong Airport Development Plan’, Hong Kong, Public Records Office.

HKRS No. 163, D & S No. 1/2536, ‘Kowloon Walled City – Implementation of Report of Ad Hoc Committee’, Hong Kong, Public Records Office.

HKRS No. 163, D & S No. 1/3016, ‘Electricity Supply Kowloon Walled City’, Hong Kong, Public Records Office.

HKRS No. 211, D & S No. 2/6, ‘Long Term Policy Prospects in Hong Kong’, Hong Kong, Public Records Office.

HKRS No. 270, D & S No. 1/1, ‘Land for Industry – Kwun Tong Ind. Area – Proposed Development, Stage III’, Hong Kong, Public Records Office.

HKRS No. 270, D & S No. 1/3/1, ‘Kwun Tong Industrial Area – Policy Re-housing, Schools and Welfare and Utilities’, Hong Kong, Public Records Office.

HKRS No. 277, D & S No. 1/4, ‘Kwun Tong Advisory Committee – Minutes of’, Hong Kong, Public Records Office.

HKRS No. 337, D & S No. 4/2458, ‘Mong Kok Outline Development Plan’, Hong Kong, Public Records Office.

HKRS No. 597, D & S No. 1/42–1/47, ‘Attorney General v. Melhado Investment Ltd.’, Hong Kong, Public Records Office, 1983.

HKRS No. 835, D & S No. 1/104, ‘Weekly Lands Meeting – Agenda’, Hong Kong, Public Records Office.

HKRS No. 896, D & S No. 1/75, ‘Town Planning – Kowloon Planning Area No. 9 (Hung Hom District)’, Hong Kong, Public Records Office.

Hong Kong Administrative Reports, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1879–1930. Hong Kong Administration Reports, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1931–1939. Hong Kong Blue Book, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1844–1940.

Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong Government, 1842–2013.

Hong Kong Hansard, Hong Kong Government, 1890–2002.

Hong Kong Law Reports 1983, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1983.

Hong Kong Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1884–1940.

Government publications

Abercrombie, Patrick, Hong Kong Preliminary Planning Report, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1948.

Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department, Hong Kong Herbarium, Hong Kong, Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department, 2006.

The Airport Core Programme, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1999.

Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Commerce and Industry, Hong Kong, Government Press, 1948–1972.

Annual Review of Civil Aviation in Hong Kong by the Director of Civil Aviation for the Financial Year, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1982–1995.

Architectural Services Department and LWK Conservation, Heritage Impact Assessment for the Former Central Government Offices Relocation of the Department of Justice to the Former Central Government Offices (Main and East Wings) (Final Report), 7 June 2012.

Barnett, K.M.A., Hong Kong Report on the 1961 Census, Hong Kong, Census and Statistics Department, 1962.

Bell, G.J. and Chin, P.C., The Probable Maximum Rainfall in Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Government Press, 1968.

Carrington, John W., The Ordinances of Hongkong, Prepared under the Authority of the Statute Laws (Revised Edition) Ordinance, 1900, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1900.

Census and Statistics Department, 2006 Population By-census Thematic Report: Persons from the

Mainland Having Resided in Hong Kong for less than 7 Years, Hong Kong, Census and Statistics Department, 2007.

Census and Statistics Department, 2011 Population Census Thematic Report: Persons from the Mainland Having Resided in Hong Kong for less than 7 Years, Hong Kong, Census and Statistics Department, 2012.

Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Census Reports, 1841–1897.

A Collection of Memories, Hong Kong, Leisure and Cultural Services Department, 2002.

The Countryside and the People: Report of the Provisional Council for the Use and Conservation of the Countryside, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1968.

Freeman, Fox, Wilbur Smith and Associates, Hong Kong Mass Transport Study (Plans and Cross Sections), Hong Kong, Hong Kong Government, 1967.

Freeman, Fox, Wilbur Smith and Associates, Hong Kong Long Term Road Study (Plans and Cross Sections), Hong Kong, Hong Kong Government, 1968.

Haraga, Subaru, Honkon suidō chōsa hōkokusho (Investigation Report on Hong Kong Waterworks), Taiwan, Taiwan Sōtokufu Gaijibu, 1942.

Highways Department, Hong Kong–Shenzhen Western Corridor and Deep Bay Link brochure, second edition, Hong Kong, Government Logistics Department, December 2004.

Home Affairs Department and Immigration Department, Statistics on New Arrivals from the Mainland (Fourth Quarter of 2013), Hong Kong, Home Affairs Department and Immigration Department, 2014.

Hong Kong, Hong Kong Government Telephone Directory, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1970. Hong Kong Advisory Committee on Diversification, Report of the Advisory Committee on

Diversification, 1979, Hong Kong, Advisory Committee on Diversification, 1980.

Hong Kong Air Raid Wardens, Report on Census of the Colony of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 13–15 March 1941.

Hong Kong Air Transport System: Long Term Planning Investigation: Alternative Systems Study, Hong Kong, Civil Aviation Department, 1975.

Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Agriculture and Fisheries for the Financial Year 1976–77, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1977.

Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Civil Aviation, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1948–1976.

Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1946–1977.

Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Social Welfare Officer for the Financial Year 1948– 54, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1954.

Hong Kong Annual Report, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1946–1997.

Hong Kong City Hall, Hong Kong, Urban Council and Urban Services Department, 1980. Hong Kong City Hall, 1962–1982, Hong Kong, Urban Council Public Information Unit, 1983. Hong Kong Country Parks, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1981.

Hong Kong Development Bureau, Urban Renewal Strategy, Hong Kong, Development Bureau, 2011.

Hong Kong Geographic Data, Survey and Mapping Office, Lands Department, February 2015. Hong Kong Government, Mass Transit Further Studies Final Report: Abstract, Hong Kong,

Government Printer, 1971.

Hong Kong Government Information Services, Hong Kong 1992: A Review of 1991, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1992.

Hong Kong Government Information Services, Hong Kong 1995: A Review of 1994, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1995.

Hong Kong Government Planning, Environment and Lands Branch, Territorial Development Strategy: A Response to Change and Challenges: A Digest of Key Points, Hong Kong, Planning, Environment and Lands Branch, 1998.

Hong Kong Government Planning, Environment and Lands Branch, Territorial Development Strategy Review 1996: A Consultative Digest, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1996.

Hong Kong Guide, Hong Kong, Lands Department, 2015.

Hong Kong Housing Authority, Hong Kong Housing Authority Annual Report 1976–77, Hong Kong, Hong Kong Housing Authority, 1977.

Hong Kong Lands and Works Branch, Metroplan: Initial Options, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1988.

Hong Kong Lands and Works Branch, Metroplan: The Aims, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1988.

Hong Kong Lands and Works Branch, Metroplan: The Selected Strategy: An Overview, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1991.

Hong Kong Lands and Works Branch, Planning for Growth, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1985.

Hong Kong Legislative Council, Reports of the Meetings of the Legislative Council of Hongkong, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1946–1997.

Hong Kong Legislative Council, Reports of the Meetings of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong Legislative Council, 1998–2016.

Hong Kong Legislative Council Economic Services Branch, Legislative Council Brief: Hong Kong’s Future Airport Needs Report on the Kai Tak Consultancy, File Ref. ESB CR 15/951/86(88) VII, Hong Kong, Legislative Council, 1989.

Hong Kong Mass Transit Railway Provision Authority, Hong Kong Mass Transit Railway: Preliminary Information for Prospective Tenders, Hong Kong, Freeman Fox and Partners (Far East), 1975.

Hong Kong Observatory, Tropical Cyclones in 2014, Hong Kong, Hong Kong Observatory, 2015. Hong Kong Planning and Lands Bureau, Urban Renewal Strategy, Hong Kong, Planning and

Lands Bureau, 2001.

Hong Kong Planning Department, Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy: Final Report, Hong Kong, Planning Department, 2007.

Hong Kong Planning Department, Hong Kong Planning Standards and Guidelines, Hong Kong, Planning Department, 1989.

Hong Kong Planning Department, Hong Kong Planning Standards and Guidelines, Hong Kong, Planning Department, 2011.

Hong Kong Planning Department, Planning Department Annual Report, Hong Kong, Planning Department, 1995–2015.

Hong Kong Planning Department, Planning Hong Kong 50th Anniversary, Hong Kong, Planning Department, 1998.

Hong Kong Planning Department, Territorial Development Strategy Review: Development Options, Hong Kong, Planning Department, 1993.

Hong Kong Planning Department, Territorial Development Strategy Review: Foundation Report, Hong Kong, Planning Department, 1993.

Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Town Planning Board Annual Report, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1990–2005.

Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Town Planning Board Biennial Report, Hong Kong, Government Logistics Department, 2006–2014.

Hong Kong Yearbook, Hong Kong, Information Services Department, 1997–2014.

Hong Kong’s Water, Hong Kong, Water Supplies Department, 1996.

Hui, Desmond, Selected Historic Buildings and Sites in Central District, Hong Kong, Antiquities and Monuments Office of the Leisure and Cultural Services Department, 2004.

Kowloon Development Division, Public Works Department, Report on Development at Castle Peak, Hong Kong Government, November 1964.

Kowloon Development Division, Public Works Department, Report on Development at Sha Tin, Hong Kong Government, January 1965.

Lai, Patrick C.C. and Yip, Joseph K.L., Hong Kong Herbarium: 130th Anniversary, 1878–2008, Hong Kong, Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department, 2008.

Land Development Corporation, The LDC Experience: 12 Years’ Efforts of Urban Renewal, 1988– 2000, Hong Kong, Land Development Corporation, 2000.

Land Utilization in Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1966.

Legislative Council of the HKSAR, Report of the Selected Committee to Inquire into the Circumstances Leading to the Problems Surrounding the Commencement of the Operation of the New Hong Kong International Airport at Chek Lap Kok since 6 July 1998 and Related Issues, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1999.

Legislative Council Panel on Planning, Lands and Works, Planning for Open Storage and Port Back-up Uses in the Rural New Territories, April 2007.

Media Relations Division, New Airport Projects Co-ordination Office, ACP Projects in West Kowloon, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1993.

Meteorological Results Annual Report, Hong Kong Royal Observatory, 1951–1990.

Ordinances of Hong Kong for the Year, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1955–2004.

Owen, David J., Future Control and Development of the Port of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1941.

Peacock, J.E., ed., Hong Kong Meteorological Records and Climatological Notes 60 Years, Hong Kong Royal Observatory, 1951.

Peterson, P., The Rainfall of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Government Press, 1957.

Planning Department, Consultative Document: Interim Amendments to the Town Planning Ordinance, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1990.

Planning Department, Northbound Southbound: Cross-boundary Travel Survey 2013/14, Hong Kong, Planning Department, 2014.

Planning Department and Civil Engineering and Development Department, North East New Territories New Development Areas Planning and Engineering Study: Information Digest, Hong Kong, Planning Department and Civil Engineering and Development Department, 2013.

Planning, Environment and Lands Branch, Government Secretariat, Heading towards Sustainability: The Third Review of Progress on the 1989 White Paper: Pollution in Hong Kong – A Time to Act, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1996.

Planning Report: Planning Area No. 3, Hong Kong, Planning Branch of Crown Lands and Survey Office, Public Works Department, 1973.

A Platform for the Arts, Hong Kong, Urban Council, 1992.

Pryor, E.G., Hong Kong’s Port and Airport Development Strategy: A Foundation for Growth, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1991.

Regulations of Hong Kong for the Year 1962, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1962.

Report of the Inter-departmental Working Party on the Proposed Cross-Harbour Tunnel, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1956.

Report of the Working Group on New Territories Urban Land Acquisitions, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1978.

Selwyn-Clarke, P.S., Report on Medical and Health Conditions in Hong Kong, for the Period 1st January, 1942 – 31st August, 1945, London, HMSO, 1946.

Sha Tin District Board, ed., Shatian gongshang zhinan 92 《沙田工商指南92》 (Sha Tin Industry and Commerce Directory 92), Hong Kong, Industry and Commerce Group of Sha Tin District Board, 1992.

Sha Tin District Board, Shatian quyihui jiebao 1985–88 nian 《沙田區議會屆報1985–88年》 (Sha Tin District Board Annual Report 1985–88), Hong Kong, Sha Tin District Board, 1988. Shankland Cox Asia, Jiulong ji xinjiulong jianzhi midu he gaodu xianzhi jiantao zhaiyao 《九龍及新九龍建築密度和高度限制檢討摘要》 (Summary Review of Building Density and Height Restrictions in Kowloon and New Kowloon), Hong Kong, Planning Department,

1992.

The Shape of Things to Come: An Overview of the Role of Harbour Reclamations in the Future Development of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Planning, Environment and Lands Branch, 1995.

Subcommittee on West Kowloon Cultural District Development, Recommendation Report of Consultative Committee on the Core Arts and Cultural Facilities of the West Kowloon Cultural District, June 2007.

Summary of Meteorological Observations in Hong Kong, Hong Kong Royal Observatory, 1993–1999.

Sustainable Development in Hong Kong for the 21st Century: Information Digest, Hong Kong, Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 1998.

Talbot, Lee M. and Talbot, Martha H., Conservation of the Hong Kong Countryside: Summary Report and Recommendation, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1965.

Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 1: An Introductory Statement, April 1982, Hong Kong, Strategic Planning Unit, 1982.

Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 2: Broad Methodology and Policy Assumptions, April 1982, Hong Kong, Strategic Planning Unit, 1982.

Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 3: Demographic Inputs, July 1982, Hong Kong, Strategic Planning Unit, 1982.

Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 4: A Review of Current Development Programmes, August 1982, Hong Kong, Strategic Planning Unit, 1982.

Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 4: A Review of Current Development Programmes, Final, May 1983, Hong Kong, Strategic Planning Unit, 1983.

Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 4: A Review of Current Development Programmes, Part 6: Transport, January 1983, Hong Kong, Strategic Planning Unit, 1983.

Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 4: A Review of Current Development Programmes, Part 7: Analysis of Potential Future Expenditures on Capital Works, February 1983, Hong Kong, Strategic Planning Unit, 1983.

Territorial Development Strategy, Volume 5: Derivation and Evaluation of Alternative Strategies, May 1983, Hong Kong, Strategic Planning Unit, 1983.

Tin Shui Wai/Yuen Long Development Programme, 1999/2000 edition, Hong Kong, North West New Territories Development Office, Territory Development Office, 2000.

Tsuen Wan District Board, Quanwan erbainian: lishi wenhua jinxi 《荃灣二百年：歷史文化今昔》 (Two Hundred Years of Tsuen Wan: History and Culture, Past and Present), Hong Kong, Tsuen Wan District Board, 1991.

Urban Renewal Authority, Towards Urban Renewal v3.0, Hong Kong, Urban Renewal Authority, 2008.

Urban Renewal Authority, Urban Renewal Authority, Hong Kong, Urban Renewal Authority, 2012. Water Supplies Department, Key Facts, August 2015, Hong Kong, Water Supplies Department, 2015. Wilm, Staff Surgeon, Epidemic of Bubonic Plague at Hong Kong in the Year 1896, Hong Kong,

Noronha & Co., 1897.

Working Party on Squatters, Resettlement and Government Low-cost Housing, Review of Policies for Squatter Control, Resettlement and Government Low-cost Housing, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1964.

Newspapers

China Mail, Friend of China, Friend of China and Hong Kong Gazette, Hong Kong Standard, Hong Kong Sunday Herald, Hongkong News, Hongkong Telegraph, South China Morning Post.

Apple Daily 《蘋果日報》, Hong Kong Commercial Daily 《香港商報》, Hong Kong Daily

《香港日報》, Hong Kong Daily News 《新報》, Hong Kong Economic Times 《香港經濟日報》, Huazi ribao 《華字日報》, Kung Ping Po 《公平報》 (Fair Daily), Kung Sheung Daily News 《香港工商日報》, Ming Pao 《明報》, Oriental Daily News 《東方日報》, Renmin ribao 《人民日報》, Sing Tao Daily 《星島日報》, Southern Weekly 《南方週末》, The Sun 《太陽報》, Ta Kung Pao 《大公報》, Wah Kiu Yat Po 《華僑日報》, Wen Wei Po 《文匯報》.

English books and articles

Abercrombie, Patrick, The Greater London Plan 1944, London, HMSO, 1945.

Ashworth, William, The Genesis of Modern British Town Planning, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954.

Bristow, Roger, Hong Kong’s New Towns, Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, 1989.

Bristow, Roger, Land Use Planning in Hong Kong: History, Policies and Procedures, Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, 1984.

Chiu, T.N., The Port of Hong Kong: A Survey of Its Development, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 1973.

The Convention between Great Britain and China Respecting an Extension of Hong Kong Territory, London, Harrison and Sons, 1898.

Cross Harbour Tunnel between Hong Kong and Kowloon: Consultants’ Report, London, Mott, Hay & Anderson, Consulting Civil Engineers, 1955.

Dyos, H.J., Victorian Suburb, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1961.

Eather, Charles, Airport of the Nine Dragons: Kai Tak, Kowloon, Surfers Paradise, QLD, Chingchic Publishers, 1996.

Endacott, G.B., Fragrant Harbour: A Short History of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, 1962.

Endacott, G.B., History of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, 1964. Gomme, George Laurence, London in the Reign of Victoria, Chicago, 1898.

Ho, Pui-yin, The Administrative History of the Hong Kong Government Agencies 1841–2002, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 2004.

Ho, Pui-yin, Challenges for an Evolving City: 160 Years of Port and Land Development in Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Commercial Press (HK), 2004.

Ho, Pui-yin, Water for a Barren Rock: 150 Years of Water Supply in Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Commercial Press, 2001.

Ho, Pui-yin, Weathering the Storm: Hong Kong Observatory and Social Development, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 2003.

Horsnell, R.G., ‘The MacIntosh Cathedrals’, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch, Volume 35, 1995.

Howard, Ebenezer, Garden Cities of Tomorrow, London, Faber and Faber, 1902, 1964 reprint. Howard, Ebenezer, Tomorrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform, London, Swan Sonnenschein,

1899.

Jackson, Leonard, The Hong Kong Waterworks, Hong Kong, Local Printing Press, 1949.

Lai, Lawrence Wai-chung, Town Planning in Hong Kong: A Critical Review, Hong Kong, City University of Hong Kong Press, 1997.

Lai, Lawrence Wai-chung, Town Planning in Hong Kong: A Review of Planning Appeal Decisions, 1997–2001, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 2003.

Lai, Lawrence Wai-chung, with Ki Fong, Town Planning Practice: Context, Procedures and Statistics for Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 2000.

Leach, A.J., The Ordinances of the Legislative Council of the Colony of Hongkong, Commencing with the Year 1844, Hong Kong, Noronha & Co., 1890–1891.

Liang, C.S., Hong Kong: A Physical, Economic and Human Geography, Hong Kong, Cheong Ming Press, 1965.

Ling, Kar Kan, ‘Hong Kong 2030 Plus: A Smart Growth Strategy for Our Home’, in The Hong Kong Institute of Surveyors Annual Conference 2014.

Ling, Kar Kan, Hong Kong New Towns – v3.1, Innovative Live–Work Spaces for the New Generation, 2013.

Lo, C.P., ‘Changing Population Distribution in the Hong Kong New Territories’, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Volume 58, No. 2, June 1968.

Mumford, Lewis, City Development, London, Secker & Warburg, 1947.

Nissim, Roger, Land Administration and Practice in Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 2012.

Nyaw, Mee-kau and Li, Si-ming, eds, The Other Hong Kong Report, Hong Kong, Chinese University Press, 1996.

Philips, Robert J., Kowloon–Canton Railway (British Section), Hong Kong, Urban Council, 1990. Platt, Jerome J., The Whitewash Brigade: The Hong Kong Plague of 1894, London, Dix Noonan

Webb, 1998.

Poon, Alice, Land and the Ruling Class in Hong Kong, translated by Yan Shi-min, Hong Kong, Enrich Professional Publishing; Hong Kong Economic Journal Co., 2010.

Rasmussen, Steen Eiler, London: The Unique City, London, Cape, 1948.

Review of the Town Planning Ordinance of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong Institute of Planners, 1990.

Rosen, George, A History of Public Health, New York, MD Publications, 1958.

Sayer, Geoffrey Robley, Hong Kong, 1841–1862: Birth, Adolescence, and Coming of Age, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 1980.

Sayer, Geoffrey Robley, Hong Kong, 1862–1919: Years of Discretion, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 1975.

Smart, G.D., ‘The Progress of Building in Hong Kong’, in José Maria Braga, Hong Kong Business Symposium, Hong Kong, South China Morning Post, 1957.

Summerson, John, Georgian London, Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1962.

Talbot, D. Henry, ‘An Outline of the Urban Development of Hong Kong Island during the Nineteenth Century’, in D.J. Dwyer, ed., The Changing Face of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Ye Olde Printerie, 1971.

Taylor, E.S., Hong Kong as a Factor in British Relations with China, 1834–1860, London, 1967. Tregear, T.R. and Berry, L., The Development of Hong Kong and Kowloon as Told in Maps, Hong

Kong, South China Morning Post, 1959.

Ward, Robert S., Hong Kong under Japanese Occupation: A Case Study in the Enemy’s Techniques of Control, Washington, DC, 1943.

Weale, John, London Exhibited in 1851, London, 1851.

Chinese books and articles

Akers-Jones, David, Shidiantou: Zhong Yijie huiyilu 《石點頭：鍾逸傑回憶錄》 (Feeling the Stones: Reminiscences of David Akers-Jones), translated by Tao Jie, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 2004.

Chen, Jingxiang, ed., Xianggang jinrong fengyun 40 zai 《香港金融風雲40載》 (40 Years of Hong Kong Finance), Hong Kong, Hong Kong Economic Journal Co.; Enrich Publishing, 2013.

Chen, Xin and Guo, Zhikun, eds, Xianggang quan jilu 《香港全紀錄》(Illustrated Chronicle of Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Chunghwa Books (HK), 1997.

Chiu, Yu-lok and Chung, Po Yin, eds, Jiulongcheng 《九龍城》 (Kowloon City), Hong Kong, Joint Publishing (HK) Co., 2001.

Dixiatielu shouri tongche jinian tekan 《地下鐵路首日通車紀念特刊》 (Official Souvenir Book to Commemorate the First Day of Running MTRC Trains), Hong Kong, Mass Transit Railway Corporation, 1979.

Donghua sanyuan gengzi nian dongshi ju, ed., 《香港東華三院發展史：創院90週年紀念》 (A Development History of Tung Wah Group of Hospitals, 1870–1960), Hong Kong, Tung Wah Group of Hospitals, 1960.

Fudan daxue lishixi (Fudan University Department of History), ed. and trans., Riben diguo zhuyi duiwai qinlüe shiliao xuanbian, 1931–1945 《日本帝國主義對外侵略史料選編1931–1945》 (A Collection of Historical Materials on Japanese Imperialism’s Aggression, 1931–1945), Shanghai, Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1975.

Green Sense, Wei Gang: cong pinfenglou kan Xianggang de chengshi guihua 《圍港：從屏風樓看香港的城市規劃》 (From the Wall-effect Buildings Issue to Hong Kong Town Planning), Hong Kong, Warrior Books, 2009.

Guangzhou shi difang zhi bianzuan weiyuan hui bangong shi and Guangzhou haiguan zhi bian- zuan weiyuan hui, ed., Jindai Guangzhou kouan jingji shehui gaikuang: Yue haiguan baogao huiji (1860–1949) 《近代廣州口岸經濟社會概況 – 粵海關報告匯集 (1860–1949)》 (An Economic and Social Overview of Modern Guangzhou Port – A Collection of Reports of Guangdong Customs), Guangzhou, Jinan daxue chubanshe, 1995.

Guangzhou shi difang zhi bianzuan weiyuan hui, Guangzhou shi zhi 《廣州市志》 (Gazette of Guangzhou), Volume 18, Guangzhou, Guangzhou chubanshe, 1996.

Guantang jinmao 《觀塘近貌》 (Kwun Tong Today), Hong Kong, Kwun Tong District Kai Fong Welfare Association, 1969.

Hayes, James, Canghai sangtian hua Quanwan 《滄海桑田話荃灣》 (Tsuen Wan: Growth of a New Town and Its People), translated by Jiaxi yuwen fanyi zhongxin, Hong Kong, Canghai sangtian hua Quanwan chuban weiyuanhui, 1999.

Ho, Pui-yin, Xianggang gongshui yibai wushi nian lishi yanjiu baogao (A Study of Historical Development of Water Supply in Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Water Supplies Department, 2001.

Honkon senryōchi sōtobu hōdōbu, ed., Zaihon Nihonjin no sankō 《在香日本人の參考》

(Reference to the Japanese in Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Horiuchi Shoten, 1943.

Honkon senryōchi sōtobu, Zongdubu gongbao 《總督部公報》 (Gazette of the Governor’s Office of the Captured Territory of Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Honkon senryōchi sōtobu, 1942–1945.

Huang, Lianghui and Xue, Fengxuan, eds, Xianggang xin jichang de tiaozhan yu zhengyi 《香港新機場的挑戰與爭議》 (Challenges and Disputes on Hong Kong’s New Airport), Hong Kong, Jing Gang xueshu jiaoliu zhongxin, 1990.

Jiangshan guren, ‘Xianggang xinjie fengtu mingsheng daguan jianbaoji’ 《香港新界風土名勝大觀剪報集》 (Newspaper Clippings of Local Conditions and Scenic Spots of the New Territories, Hong Kong), Wah Kiu Yat Po, 1935–1936.

Jiulongchengzhai jiefang fuli shiye cujin weiyuanhui, Jiulongchengzhai jiefang fuli shiye cujin wei- yuanhui chengli nianzhounian jinian tekan 《九龍城砦街坊福利事業促進委員會成立三週年紀念特刊》 (Special Issue for the Third Anniversary of the Establishment of Kowloon Walled City Kaifong Welfare Association), Hong Kong, Jiulongchengzhai jiefang fuli shiye cujin weiyuanhui, 1966.

Jiulongchengzhai jiefang fuli shiye cujin weiyuanhui, Jiulongchengzhai jiefang fuli shiye cujin wei- yuanhui chengli nianzhounian jinian tekan 《九龍城砦街坊福利事業促進委員會成立廿週年紀念特刊》 (Special Issue for the 20th Anniversary of the Establishment of Kowloon Walled City Kaifong Welfare Association), Hong Kong, Jiulongchengzhai jiefang fuli shiye cujin weiyuanhui, 1983.

Land Development Corporation, Land Development Corporation Annual Report 《土地發展公司年報》, Hong Kong, Land Development Corporation, 1989–2001.

Leung, Kit Fun Beatrice and Lo, Shiu Hing Sonny, eds, Zhujiang sanjiaozhou fazhan yu gangao zhi ronghe 《珠江三角洲發展與港澳之融合》 (Pearl River Delta and Its Integration with Hong Kong and Macao), Hong Kong, City University of Hong Kong Press, 2014.

Leung, Ping-wa, ed., Xianggang zhongxiqu fengwu zhi 《香港中西區風物志》 (Heritage of the Central and Western District, Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Central and Western District Council, 2011.

Li, Hou, Huigui de licheng 《回歸的歷程》(The Course of the Handover), Hong Kong, Sanlian shudian (Xianggang) youxian gongsi, 1997.

Li, Jinwei, ed., Xianggang bainianshi 《香港百年史》 (One Hundred Years of History of Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Nanzhong bianyi chubanshe, 1948.

Li, Shu-fan, Xianggang waike yisheng: liushi nian huiyilu 《香港外科醫生：六十年回憶錄》

(Hong Kong Surgeon: A Memoir of 60 Years), Hong Kong, Li Shufen yixue jijin, 1965.

Liang, Binghua, Chengzhai yu zhongying waijiao 《城寨與中英外交》 (Walled City and Sino- British Diplomacy), Hong Kong, Qilin shuye youxian gongsi, 1995.

Liang, Tao, Jiulong jiedao mingming kaoyuan 《九龍街道命名考源》 (Origins of Kowloon Street Names), Hong Kong, Shizheng ju, 1993.

Ling, Ming, trans., Riben zhanfan huiyilu 《日本戰犯回憶錄》 (Memoirs of Japanese War Criminals), Hong Kong, Sihai chubanshe, 1975.

Liu, Chong, ed., Xinjiae zhuanbian de niandai 《新界轉變的年代》 (An Era of Change in the New Territories), Hong Kong, Xinjie zhanwang she, 1972.

Liu, Runhe, Xinjie jianshi 《新界簡史》 (A Brief History of the New Territories), Hong Kong, Joint Publishing (HK) Co., 1999.

Liu, Shuyong and Xiao, Guojian, Xianggang lishi tushuo 《香港歷史圖說》 (Illustrated History of Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Qilin shuye youxian gongsi, 1998.

Lu, Yan, Xianggang zhanggu 《香港掌故》 (Hong Kong Anecdotes), Volume 2, Hong Kong, Guangjiao jing chubanshe, 1984.

Luo, Jinyi and Zheng, Yushuo, eds, Zhongguo gaige kaifang sanshi nian: bian yu chang 《中國改革開放30年：變與常》 (Thirty Years of China’s Reform and Opening Up: Change and Continuity), Hong Kong, City University of Hong Kong Press, 2009.

Ma, Jiewei, Wu, Junxiong and Lu, Dale, eds, Xianggang wenhua zhengzhi 《香港文化政治》

(Hong Kong’s Culture and Politics), Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 2009.

Mai, Zhenting, ‘Ribenren ruhe tongzhi xianggang (lunxianqu baodao)’ 《日本人如何统治香港 (淪陷區報導)》 (How the Japanese Ruled Hong Kong (Report of the Occupied Area)), in Xin Shiming 《新使命》 (New Mission), Volume 1, No. 7, July 1944.

New Territories Heung Yee Kuk, Xianggang zhimingdi zhengzhi xia de Xinjie shehui 《香港殖民地政制下的新界社會》 (The Society of the New Territories under Hong Kong’s Colonial Political System), Hong Kong, New Territories Heung Yee Kuk, 1977.

Ouyang, Ruohua, Gangtie dongle: sanshiliu zai qingyushi 《港鐵動力：36載情與事》(Moving Experience: The MTR’s First 36 Years), Hong Kong, South China Morning Post, 2011.

Rao, Jiucai, Xianggang de diming yu difang lishi 《香港的地名與地方歷史》(Place Names and Local History of Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Tiandi tushu youxian gongsi, 2011.

Shadow Long Term Housing Strategy Steering Committee and Land Justice League, Chongduo Xinjie dongbei: goujian chengxiangjiao gong shengde 6 zhong xiangxiang 《重奪新界東北：構建城鄉郊共生的6種想像》 (Regain the North East New Territories: Six Visions for Building Symbiosis of Urban, Rural and Suburban Areas), Hong Kong, Shadow Long Term Housing Strategy Steering Committee and Land Justice League, 2014.

‘Shui taozou le zhengfushan’ 《誰偷走了政府山》(Who Stole the Government Hill), Mingpao Weekly, 10 March 2012, pp.46–73.

So, C.L., Xianggang dili 《香港地理》 (Geography of Hong Kong), Guangzhou, Guangdong keji chubanshe, 1985.

Takagi, Ken’ichi and others, eds, Xianggang junpiao yu zhanhou buchang 《香港軍票與戰後補償》 (Hong Kong Military Notes and Post-war Reparations), translated by Wu Hui, Hong Kong, Mingbao chubanshe youxian gongsi, 1995.

Tian, Suhua, Waishang zhijietouzi jinru zhongguo de jiegou biandong yu xiaoying yanjiu 《外商直接投資進入中國的結構變動與效應研究》 (A Study of Structural Changes and Effects of Foreign Direct Investment in China), Beijing, Zhongyang bianyi chubanshe, 2013.

Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha, ed., Gunseika no Honkon: shinseisita Dai Tōa no chūkaku 《軍政下の香港：新生した大東亞の中核》 (Hong Kong under Military Rule: The Newborn Nucleus of Greater East Asia), Hong Kong, Honkon Tōyō Keizaisha, 1944.

Wu, Bangmou, comp. and ed., Zaikan qide: cong rizhanshiqi shuoqi 《再看啓德：從日佔時期說起》 (Looking again at Kai Tak: Starting from the Japanese Occupation Period), Hong Kong, ZKOOB, 2009.

Wu, Hao and Zhang, Jianhao, eds, Xianggang laohuajing zhi shenghuo jiumao 《香港老花鏡之

生活舊貌》 (Hong Kong Reading Glasses – Old Memories of Livelihood), Hong Kong, Huangguan chubanshe (Xianggang) youxian gongsi, 1996.

Xianggang shangye huibao, ed., Xianggang jianzao ye bainian shi 《香港建造業百年史》 (One Hundred Years of Building Construction in Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Xianggang shangye huibao, 1958.

Xie, Yongguang, Sannian lingbageyue de kunan 《三年零八個月的苦難》 (Three Years and Eight Months of Suffering), Hong Kong, Mingpao chubanshe, 1995.

Xie, Yongguang, Zhanshi Rijun zai Xianggang baoxing 《戰時日軍在香港暴行》 (Atrocities of the Japanese Army in Wartime Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Mingpao chubanshe, 1991.

Xinjie xiangyiju, Xinjie nongdi zhuan wudi wenti youguan wenxian 《新界農地轉屋地問題有關文獻》 (Archives on Conversion of Agricultural Land to Building Land in the New Territories), Hong Kong, Xinjie xiangyiju, 1956.

Xinjie xiangyiju, Xinjie xiangyiju nianjian, dishijiujie, 1970–1972 《新界鄉議局年鑒，第十九屆，1970–1972》 (Yearbook of the New Territories Heung Yee Kuk, 19th Term, 1970– 1972), Hong Kong, Xinjie xiangyiju, 1972.

Xinjie xiangyiju baogao 《新界鄉議局報告》 (Report of the New Territories Heung Yee Kuk), Hong Kong.

Xinjie xiangyiju gongbao 《新界鄉議局公報》 (Bulletin of the New Territories Heung Yee Kuk), Volume 7, Hong Kong, New Territories Heung Yee Kuk, September 1975.

Xue, Fengxuan and Kuang, Zhiwen, comps and eds, Xinjie xiangyiju shi: You zujidi dao yiguo- liangzhi 《新界鄉議局史：由租借地到，國兩制》 (History of the New Territories Heung Yee Kuk: From Leased Territory to One Country, Two Systems), Hong Kong, Joint Publishing (HK) Co.; Advanced Institute for Contemporary China Studies of the Hong Kong Baptist University, 2011.

Yang, Jiaming, Jiaoye sanshiniang 《郊野叁十年》 (30th Anniversary of Country Parks), Hong Kong, Friends of the Country Parks, 2007.

Ye, Dewei et al., comps and eds, Xianggang lunxian shi 《香港淪陷史》 (History of the Fall of Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Guangjiaojing chubanshe youxian gongsi, 1982.

Yiu, Chung-yim, Xianggang shuyi weisheng huanjing yu jianzhu 《香港鼠疫，衛生環境與建築》 (Hong Kong’s Bubonic Plague, Environmental Health and Architecture), Hong Kong Historical Photo Research Competition, organised jointly by the Hong Kong Museum of History and We Love Hong Kong Association, 2007.

Youzhi et al., Zhang Junsheng fangtanlu 《張浚生訪談錄》(An Interview with Zhang Junsheng), Hong Kong, Zhonghua shuju, 2011.

Yuan, Bangjian, comp. and ed., Xianggang shilue 《香港史略》(A Brief History of Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Zhongliu chubanshe, 1987.

Yuan, Qiushi, comp. and ed., Xianggang huigui yilai dashiji, 1997–2002 《香港回歸以來大事記，1997–2002》 (Chronology of Hong Kong since Its Return, 1997–2002), Hong Kong, Joint Publishing (HK) Co., 2003.

Zheng, Minhua, Zhuiyi Longcheng tuibian 《追憶龍城蛻變》 (Recalling the Transformation of Kowloon City), Hong Kong, Kowloon City District Council, 2011.

Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan, Jindaishi ziliao 《近代史資料》 (Materials of Modern History), Volume 74, Beijing, Zhonghua shuju, 1989.

Zhou, Qiwei, Du, Liji and Li, Weiyi, eds, Huangfan fanfei chu: kan women de Lidongjie (Home Where the Yellow Banners Fly), Hong Kong, v-artivist Co., 2007.

Zong, Daoyi et al., eds, Zhou Nan koushu: yaoxiang dangnian yushan guanjin 《周南口述：遙想當年羽扇綸巾》 (Oral History of Zhou Nan), Jinan, Qi Lu shushe, 2007.

Maps

Empson, Hal, Mapping Hong Kong: A Historical Atlas, Hong Kong, Government Information Services, 1992.

Hong Kong Crown Lands and Survey Office, The New Town of Kwun Tong, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1963.

Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Hung Hom Outline Zoning Plan, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1972.

Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Ma Tau Kok Outline Zoning Plan, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1969.

Hong Kong Town Planning Board, South West Kowloon Outline Zoning Plan No. S/K20/21, Hong Kong, Town Planning Board, 2008.

Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Tsim Sha Tsui Outline Uses Zoning Plan, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1967.

Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Tsuen Wan and District Outline Development Plan, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1966.

Hong Kong Town Planning Board, West Kowloon Cultural District Development Plan No. S/K20/ WKCD/2, Hong Kong, Town Planning Board, 2013.

Hong Kong Town Planning Board, Yau Ma Tei Outline Development Plan, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1957.

Interviewees

Mr Wilson CHAN Wai-shun (陳偉信先生), Mr FUNG Chee-keung (馮志強先生), Mr Jimmy LEUNG Cheuk-fai (梁焯輝先生), Ms Phyllis LI Chi-miu (李志苗女士), Mr LING Kar-kan (凌嘉勤先生), Mrs Ava NG Tse Suk-ying (伍謝淑瑩女士), Dr Peter PUN Kwok-shing (潘國城博士), Ms Ophelia WONG Yuen-sheung (黃婉霜女士).

Online resources

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Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department website, www.afcd.gov.hk/cindex.html. Antiquities Advisory Board Historic Buildings Assessment Panel, ‘Notes of Meeting of the Historic

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Antiquities and Monuments Office website, www.amo.gov.hk/b5/main.php.

Buildings Department, ‘Practice Note for Authorized Persons, Registered Structural Engineers and Registered Geotechnical Engineers: Sustainable Building Design Guidelines’, January 2011, www.bd.gov.hk/sc/documents/pnap/APP/APP152.pdf.

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Development Bureau, ‘Gist of Hong Kong Jockey Club’s Proposal of Adaptive Re-use of the Central Police Station (CPS) Compound’, Antiquities Advisory Board Paper No. AAB/33/2007-08, November 2007, www.aab.gov.hk/form/AAB_Paper131_police_annexa_c.pdf.

Development Bureau website, www.devb.gov.hk/tc/home/index.html.

Education Bureau, ‘Sustainable Development’ E-learning Teaching Kit website, cd1.edb.hked- city.net/cd/mce/ESD/esd-definition.htm.

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Environment Bureau, Sustainable Development Online Resource Centre website, http://orc. susdev.gov.hk/tc/home/index.html.

Environmental Protection Department website, www.epd.gov.hk/epd/tc_chi/top.html. Express Rail Link (Hong Kong Section) website, www.expressraillink.hk/tc/home/index.html. Highways Department website, www.hyd.gov.hk/tc/road_and_railway/.

Historical Laws of Hong Kong Online website, http://oelawhk.lib.hku.hk/exhibits/show/oelawhk/ home.

HKSAR Census and Statistics Department website, www.censtatd.gov.hk/hkstat/sub/so20_tc.jsp. HKSAR Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau website, www.cmab.gov.hk/tc/issues.

HKSAR Government, Press Release website, www.isd.gov.hk/pr/chi/.

HKTDC Research website, http://economists-pick-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article

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Hong Kong Airport Core Programme website, www.info.gov.hk/archive/napco/index-c.html.

Hong Kong Democratic Foundation website, www.hkdf.org/newsarticles.asp?show=newsarticle s&newsarticle=167.

Hong Kong Observatory website, www.hko.gov.hk/cis/statistic/erank13.htm. Hong Kong Place website, www.hk-place.com/.

Hong Kong Town Planning Board, ‘Town Planning Board Guidelines for Designation of “Comprehensive Development Area” (“CDA”) Zones and Monitoring the Progress of “CDA” Developments’, May 1999, www.info.gov.hk/tpb/en/forms/Guidelines/pg17_e.pdf.

Hong Kong Trade and Industry Department website, www.tid.gov.hk/tc_chi/aboutus/publica tions/factsheet/china.html.

Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macao Bridge Related Hong Kong Projects website, http://www.hzmb.hk/ tchi/benefits_transportation.html.

Hong Kong Zoological and Botanical Gardens website, www.lcsd.gov.hk/tc/parks/hkzbg/.

‘Kai Tak for the People’: A Citizen’s Alternative Plan website, www.procommons.org.hk/wp- content/uploads/2012/11/kaitakmap.pdf.

Kowloon–Canton Railway Corporation website, www.kcrc.com/tc/engtxt/corporate_profile/ history.html.

Lee, Lai-kuen, Wei xijiulong wenyu yishu qu zixun gongzhong 《為西九龍文娛藝術區諮詢公眾》 (Public Consultation for the West Kowloon Cultural District), www.arch.cuhk.edu.hk/ server1/resch2/livearch/projects/westkowloon/article/4c.pdf.

Legislative Council of Hong Kong website, www.legco.gov.hk/.

Midland University website, www.midlandu.com.hk/chi/campus/bcourse/mustread/part1/lc1. shtml.

Morrison, Michael, Central Government Offices: Historic and Architectural Appraisal 《中區政府合署歷史及建築價值審評》, September 2009, in Chinese, http://www.amo.gov.hk/ form/research_CGO_c.pdf.

news.gov.hk website, www.news.gov.hk/tc/index.shtml.

Optimising the Use of Industrial Buildings to Meet Hong Kong’s Changing Economic and Social Needs website, www.devb.gov.hk/industrialbuildings/chi/implementation_progress/index. html.

Planning Department, Feasibility Study for Additional Cross-border Links Stage 1: Investigations on Traffic Demand: Executive Summary, March 2000, www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/p_study/ comp_s/cbl/CBLstudy_stage1_chin/ch01_c.htm.

Planning Department, ‘Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy’, Council for Sustainable Development Paper No. 11/03, September 2003, www.enb.gov.hk/sites/default/files/ susdev/html/b5/council/Paper11-03t.pdf.

Planning Department, Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy: Inception Report, 2001, www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/p_study/comp_s/hk2030/chi/inception.

Planning Department, Hong Kong 2030+ website, http://www.pland.gov.hk/hk2030plus/tc/ study_F.html.

Planning Department, Hong Kong Planning Standards and Guidelines website, www.pland.gov. hk/pland_tc/tech_doc/hkpsg/full/.

Planning Department, ‘Hung Shui Kiu New Development Area Planning and Engineering Study’ website, www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/p_study/prog_s/hsk_nda/St_b5.html.

Planning Department, ‘Liantang/Heung Yuen Wai Boundary Control Point’ website, www.pland. gov.hk/pland_en/p_study/comp_s/LTHYW/tc/c_lthyw_01.htm.

Planning Department, Metro Planning Committee Paper No. 3/13, for consideration by the Metro Planning Committee on 25 January 2013, Hong Kong, January 2013, http://www.info. gov.hk/tpb/en/papers/MPC/482-mpc_3-13.pdf.

Planning Department, Planning for Longer-term Sustainable Development 2014–15 Outreach Programme, www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/press/educational/OR_panel/2014_15/P11-20_ 2014.pdf.

Planning Department, ‘Planning Study on the Coordinated Development of the Greater Pearl River Delta Township’ website, www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/misc/great_prd/outline_c.htm. Planning Department, Town Planning Board Paper No. 9491, for consideration by the Town Planning Board on 4 November 2013, Hong Kong, October 2013, http://www.info.gov.hk/

tpb/en/9491_attachments/9491_final_main_paper_eng.pdf.

Planning Department, Urban Design Study for the New Central Harbourfront: Information Digest, Hong Kong, Government Logistics Department, July 2011, http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_ en/p_study/comp_s/UDS/eng_v1/images_eng/pdf_paper/info_digest.pdf.

Planning Department and Civil Engineering and Development Department, Hung Shui Kiu New Development Area Planning and Engineering Study: Stage 2 Community Engagement Digest, Hong Kong, Planning Department and Civil Engineering and Development Department, July 2013, www.hsknda.gov.hk/files/CE2_Digest.pdf.

Planning Department and Civil Engineering and Development Department, Planning and Engineering Study on Development of Lok Ma Chau Loop: Executive Summary, February 2015, www.lmcloop.gov.hk/pdf/FR%20ES/LMC%20Loop_Final%20Report_ES%20-%20 TCN_20150209.pdf.

Planning Department and Civil Engineering and Development Department, Tung Chung New Town Extension Study: Stage Two Public Engagement, May 2013, www.tung-chung.hk/tung- chung_PE2-digest_final%20output_20130520.pdf.

Planning Department website, www.pland.gov.hk/.

Post Sustainability Institute website, http://www.postsustainabilityinstitute.org/which-nations- signed-agenda-21.html.

RTHK website, news.rthk.hk/.

School of Journalism and Communication, Chinese University of Hong Kong, U-beat Magazine, Volume 69, May 2005, www.com.cuhk.edu.hk/ubeat_past/050569/story10.htm.

Sha Tin District Council website, www.districtcouncils.gov.hk/st/chinese/welcome.htm. Shenzhen Municipal Planning Bureau, Hong Kong Planning Department, Shengang xingjian lian-

tang/xiangyuanwei kouan qianqi guihua yanjiu – yanjiu chengguo 《深港興建蓮塘/香園圍口岸前期規劃研究 – 研究成果》 (Shenzhen–Hong Kong Joint Preliminary Planning Study on Developing the Liantang/Heung Yuen Wai Control Point: Research Result), September 2008, www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/p_study/comp_s/LTHYW/pdf/Joint_Study_tc.pdf.

Survey and Mapping Office of the Lands Department website, www.landsd.gov.hk/mapping/tc/ publications/map.htm.

Sustainable Development for the 21st Century: Executive Summary website, www.pland.gov.hk/ pland_en/p_study/comp_s/susdev/ex_summary/final_chi/index.htm.

Town Planning Board, Statutory Planning Portal 2 website, www2.ozp.tpb.gov.hk/gos/default.aspx.

Transport Department, Annual Transport Digest 2014, 2014, www.td.gov.hk/mini_site/ atd/2014/tc/section5_14.html.

UN Documents website, http://www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm.

University of Hong Kong, Executive Summary of the Study of the Achievements and Challenges of Urban Renewal in Hong Kong, March 2010, www.ursreview.gov.hk/tch/doc/ES%20achieve- ments%20n%20challenges%20CHI%209-5-10.pdf.

Urban Renewal Authority, Urban Renewal Authority Annual Report, 2001–2015, www.ura.org.hk/ tc/download-centre/publications/annual-report.aspx.

Urban Renewal Authority website, www.ura.org.hk/tc/. Wikipedia website, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page.

‘Xibu tongdao kouan tianhai qu za jia buchang cheng shengang zhengyi xin jiaodian’ 《西部通道口岸填海區造價補償成深港爭議新焦點》 (Compensation for Cost Overruns in the Construction of the Western Corridor Boundary Crossing Reclamation Area Becoming a New Focus of Disputes between Shenzhen and Hong Kong), www.singtaonet.com 《星島環球網》, 27 August 2006, www.singtaonet.com:82/china/20060827_309723.html.

Yahoo Hong Kong News website, hk.news.yahoo.com/.

Land registration records

Land Registry Order/Copy Separator, Doc. No. SD3L, Block Crown Lease, 1905.

Index

Abercrombie, Patrick, 143–9, 156, 165, 168,

298, 448

Action Group on Protection of Central Police Station Historical Compound, 320

Advance Promenade of the new Central Harbourfront, 314

Agenda 21, 429

Agriculture and Fisheries Department, 355

Agricultural Guidance Office, 134

Airport Core Programme, 220, 256–62, 268,

274, 278, 296, 398, 449–50

Airport Core Project, 262

Airport Development Steering Committee, 257–8

Airport Express Line, 307, 419, 424 Airport Master Planning Study, 233

Airport Railway, 256, 258–60, 262–4, 309, 316,

374, 380

Akers-Jones, David, 247, 249, 287, 323

Aldrich Bay, 307, 374 d’Almada e Castro Jr, Leo, 113 Angus, H. A., 185

Annual Departmental Report by the Director of Public Works, 166

Antiquities Advisory Board (AAB), 316 Antiquities and Monuments Office (AMO),

325, 380

Antiquities and Monuments Ordinance, 316–18

Antiquities Authority, 317 Application List System, 303

Architectural Services Department, 258 Area Assessments of Industrial Land in the

Territory, 344

Ashton-Gwatkin, Frank, 101 Asia Pacific Regional Office, 324

Association of Engineering Professionals in Society, 317

Association of Workers, Peasants and Merchants (also Xinjie gongnong shang yanjiuhui), 83

Au Tak, 106, 107

Aviation Advisory Board, 231

Bank of China, 15, 257

baojia system, 126

Belilios, Emmanuel R., 12, 44 Bills

Mass Transit Railway Corporation Bill 1975, 216

Town Planning (Amendment) Bill 2003, 368

Urban Renewal Authority Bill, 335 Bird, H. W., 355

Blake Garden, 44, 46

Blake Pier, 19–21

Blake, Henry Arthur, 19, 47, 74, 82, 88, 281,

285

Block Crown Lease, 281, 285–9, 292, 359 Board of Arbitrators, 78

Board of Public Health (UK), 61 Botanical Gardens, 14, 34, 168

Boulton, J. F., 19, 38

Boundary Street, 4, 7, 70, 75, 87–8, 90–91, 95,

103,110, 116, 125, 170, 174, 194, 238,

359, 446–7

Bowring cottages, 177 Bray, Denis Campbell, 282 Bristow, Roger, 298

British Civil Aviation Authority, 203

British Colonial Office (see Colonial Office) British Foreign Office, 101, 446

British Privy Council, 290, 347

British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 285

Broadbent, R., 203, 205

Brown, Gordon, 158 Bruce, J. C., 105,

bubonic plague, 40, 46, 62, 64, 68

Building Department, 113

Building (Planning) Regulations, 360, 366 Building Reconstruction Advisory Committee,

144

Building Rehabilitation Materials Incentive Scheme, 338

Buildings and Lands Department, 152 Buildings Department, 338, 345, 361

Buildings Ordinance, 157, 246, 344, 361–2

Bureau of Medical Statistics (UK), 61 Butters, Henry Robert, 113

C. P. R. Holt’s Co., 102

Cadastral Survey Report for the New Territories and Outlying Islands (1904), 76

Caine, Sydney, 101

Caine, William, 15, 50–51

Canton-Hankow Railway, 105

Captain Superintendent of Police, 34, 110

Census and Statistics Department, 22, 212 Centa-City Leading Index (CCL), 303 Central and Western District Council, 314–15 Central Government Offices (CGO), 162–3,

318, 321, 326, 372

Central Harbourfront, 161, 311, 313–17 Central Harbourfront Concern Group, 315 Central Reclamation (CR), 259, 272, 304,

307–11, 314, 316

Central-Wan Chai Bypass, 308–9, 311 Central-Wan Chai Waterfront, 374 Chadwick, Edwin, 61, 65

Chadwick, Osbert, 61–2, 64, 445 Chan Chi-kwan, Peter, 249 Chan Hip-ping, 249–50

Chan Hung, 240

Chan Lim-pak, 121

Chan Nam-fat, 240, 244

Chan Sub, 244

Chan Sup, 240

Chan, Bernard, 323

Chan, Paul, 324 Chapel, L. M. S., 29 Chater, Paul, 30

Chatham, William, 105, 170

Chau Cham-son, 249

Chau Tsun-nin, 121

Che-cheong, 28

Chek Lap Kok Airport, 232, 259–60

Chen Shou-lum, 234

Chen Zuoer, 256

Cheung Hing, 244

Cheung Kong (Holdings) Limited (also Cheung Kong), 252, 296, 332, 362

Cheung Suk-shun, 121 Cheung Sum Woo, 107 Cheung Yat-fan, 241

Chief Executive in Council (CE in C), 156, 310, 367, 369, 376, 378, 388

Chief Superintendent of Trade of British subjects in China, 6

China Ferry Terminal, 381, 404

China (Guangdong) Pilot Free Trade Zone (GDFTZ), 428

China Highway Planning and Design Institute (HPDI), 416

China Light & Power Co., 106 China Mail, 60, 74

Chinachem Group, 283

Chinese Cooperative Council, 121 Chinese Representative Council, 121

Chinese University of Hong Kong, 223, 434 Chiu Kwong, 240

Chow Shou-son (also Chou Shou-son), 121 Chung Yee, 240

City and New Territories Administration, 249 City District Office, 246

City Hall, 14–15, 20, 30, 34, 67, 156, 158,

161–2, 313

City of Victoria (also Victoria City), 2, 6, 7,

10, 12, 16, 19, 24, 30, 34–5, 44, 49, 52–6,

61–2, 65–7, 90, 102, 116, 169, 318, 445–6

Civil Aviation Department, 231, 235 Civil Engineering and Development Department (CEDD), 385

Civil Engineering Department, 215, 258, 264

Clementi, Cecil, 69, 101–3, 116, 446 Collison, R. E., 8

Colonial Development and Welfare Fund, 144, 207

Colonial Office (UK), 60, 61, 101–3, 116,

143–5

Colony Outline Plan, 220

Colony Outline Planning Section, 151 Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces

Overseas Hong Kong, 14

Commerce and Industry Department, 149 Common Submission, 285–6

Communist Party of China (also Chinese Communist Party), 4, 101, 231, 252, 256

Community Cultural Concern, 317, 327 Concept Plan for Lantau, 400 Conservancy Association, 317

Conservation of the Hong Kong Countryside Summary Report and Recommendation, 355

Conservation Strategy for Lantau, 400 Consultative Committee on the Core Arts and

Cultural Facilities of the West Kowloon Cultural District, 377

Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory, 4, 70, 73, 76–7, 82, 87–8, 116,

174, 237–8, 252, 281, 285–7, 445–7

Convention of Peking, 83, 252 Cooper, F. A., 44

Corps of Royal Engineers, 113

Council for Sustainable Development, 317, 364, 429–30

Country Park Ordinance, 356, 358 Country Parks Board, 356

Court of Appeal, 288, 347, 418

Court of First Instance, 158, 370, 418 Creasy, H. T., 100

Cross-boundary Travel Survey, 402

Cross-Harbour Tunnel Company (also Cross- Harbour Tunnel Co., Ltd), 208

Crosslinks Study, 411, 415

Crown Lands and Surveys Office (CL&SO), 149, 151, 449

Crown Lands Office, 112

Crown Lands Resumption Ordinance (Ordinance No. 10 of 1900), 77

Crown Lands Resumption Amendment Ordinance, 1922 (Ordinance No. 9 of

1922), 82

Crown Lands Resumption Ordinance, 282, 286–7, 289

Crown Lands, Surveys and Valuation, and Resumption Office, 112

Cultural Facilities: A Study on Their Requirements and the Formulation of New Planning Standards and Guidelines, 374

Cultural Revolution, 242

Customs and Excise Service Ordinance, 415

Davis, John Francis, 51–2 Davy, C. W., 110

Dawson, J. A., 108

Deep Bay Buffer Zone, 346–7

Deep Bay Link (DBL), 392, 411, 413

Deng Xiaoping, 248

Department of Agriculture and Forestry, 135

Department of Health, 65 Department of Justice, 13, 324, 423

Des Voeux, George William, 17, 34, 124

Development Bureau, 336–7, 346, 385, 400,

426, 434

Development Permission Area Plan(s) (DPA Plan[s]), 291–3, 347, 358, 366–7

Development Permission Areas (DPAs), 157, 291, 366

Director of Environmental Protection (DEP), 352, 418

Director of Kew Gardens, 14

Director of Public Works, 34, 78, 100, 105, 109,

113, 152–3, 158, 166, 185

Disraeli, Benjamin (Earl of Beaconsfield), 12 District Affairs Bureau(s), 122, 124, 126–8,

133–6, 139, 447

District Council, 249, 251, 314–15

District Magistrate, 73–4, 282, 287, 289

District Office(s), New Territories, 149, 239,

282, 284, 287, 356

Division of Agriculture of the Governor’s Office, 134

Division of Forestry and Fisheries, 133–4 Dongguan, 403, 424, 426–7

Dongjiang (East River), 24

East Asia Sea Transport Company, 137 East India Company, 8, 52

East Lamma Channel, 8, 9 East Lantau Metropolis, 398–9 Economic Services Panel, 321 Education Department, 113

Eight Guiding Principles for Sustainable Development, 430–31

Elliot, Charles, R. N., 6 Ellis, Walter D., 101

Energizing Kowloon East, 384–5, 435 Energizing Kowloon East Office (EKEO),

384–5

Energy Saving Plan for Hong Kong’s Built Environment 2015–2025+, 438 environmental impact assessment (EIA),

351–2, 397, 400, 418, 421

Environmental Impact Assessment Ordinance, 351–2, 413

Environmental Improvements to the Kowloon Walled City (with Recommendations), 246

Environmental Protection Department, 153, 352, 357, 431

European District Reservation Ordinance (1888), 62

Executive Council, 77, 108, 153, 163, 184,

234–5, 262, 266, 287, 299, 329

Expert Group on Hong Kong/Guangdong Town Planning and Development, 426

Expert Panel Forum on Sustainable Transport Planning and Central-Wan Chai Bypass, 311

Express Rail Link (XRL), 215, 380, 411, 419,

421–5, 438

Fan Ah Wai, 60

Fanling Golf Course, 393 Fanling Highway, 409

‘Flat-for-Flat’ Pilot Scheme, 342

Far Eastern Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 245

Feasibility Study for Additional Cross-border Links, 331, 411, 415

Feasibility Study for the Establishment of Air Ventilation Assessment System (the AVA Study), 363

Finance Committee, 388, 416, 419, 421

Financial Secretary, 213–4, 233–4, 253, 257,

302

Fire Services Ordinance, 246

First Sustainable Development Strategy for Hong Kong, 363

Fitch, Alan, 161

Fitzmaurice, Maurice, 21

Five-Year Development Plan for 1951–1956, 158

Fletcher, A. G. M., 95, 109

Ford, Charles, 14

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), 245

Foshan, 403, 424, 426–7

Framework Agreement for Hong Kong- Guangdong Co-operation, 426

Freeman, Fox, Wilbur Smith and Associates, 210, 212

Frontier Closed Area (FCA), 348, 405

Fuk Tsun Heung, 93, 95

Fukuoka Kanji, 134

Fung Bosco, 369

Fung Tse-ying, 121

Garden Cities of Tomorrow, 95 Garden City, 95, 98–100, 448 Garden City Association, 95 Garden City Co. Ltd, 95

Garden City Project (see Garden City) Garden for the Chief of Soldiers, 14 General Affairs Department, 121 General Report on Hong Kong, 130 General Staff Department, 121

Gibb, Livingston & Co., 28–9, 35

Gin Drinkers Bay, 146–7, 191, 194 Gleeson, Noel Martin, 249 Gloucester Road, 9, 147

Gongbei (Zhuhai), 416, 418

Gordon, Alexander T., 10–12, 28, 49–50

Government Gardens, 14–15

Governor in Council, 77, 113, 157, 292, 367 Governor’s Office of the Occupied Territory of

Hong Kong, 119, 121–2

Grantham, Alexander, 144

Gray, Dolly, 140

Great Eagle Limited, 335

Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, 4, 118–19, 121, 140, 447–8

Greater London Plan 1944, 144, 146 Greater Pearl River Delta (GPRD), 5, 425–7 Green Sense, 361

Grindle, Gilbert (Grindle), 101–2 Guangdong, 15, 41–2, 47, 52, 79, 86, 107, 133,

137, 228, 239, 331, 403, 409, 416, 418,

425–8, 441–3, 447

Guangdong Provincial Department of Construction, 426

Guangxi, 52, 86, 239

Guangzhou, 40, 46–7, 105, 215, 226–8, 331,

411, 419, 424, 426–8, 438

Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link, 215, 411, 419, 438

Gutzlaff, Charles, 14, 50

Haddon-Cave, Philip, 213–14

Hague Conference on Private International Law, 324

Haraga Subaru, 133

Harbour and Airport Development Strategy, 266

Harbour Master, 18–19, 34, 91, 94

Harbour Master’s Office, 13, 67 Harbourfront Commission’s Task Force on

Harbourfront Developments on Hong Kong Island (HKTF), 314–15

Harbour–front Enhancement Committee (HEC), 311, 316

Harmonic HK Concern Group, 385 health district(s), 4, 58, 65–6 Henderson Land Development, 283

Henderson Real Estate Development Agency Limited, 346–7

Henderson, Richard McNeil, 113 Heritage Impact Assessment, 325 Hermitte, A., 14

Heung Chin, 240

Heung Yee Kuk, 83, 195, 282, 285, 287–8

Heung Yuen Wai, 349, 405, 409, 411

heung, 74–5

High Island Reservoir, 23, 27, 216

Highways Department, 258, 418

Hirano Shigeru, 120, 125, 132

HKTF, 314–15

HMS Hermes, 107

Ho Kai, 106

Ho Tung, 318, 328

Ho, Patrick, 317 Holdford, William G., 144 Holliday, Clifford, 144

Home Affairs Department, 153

Home Affairs Department (Governor’s Office of the Occupied Territory of Hong Kong), 133

Home Ownership Scheme (HOS), 198, 224,

250, 274, 278, 303–4

Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy, 324, 329–30, 332–4, 345, 357,

366, 387, 430, 432, 438

Hong Kong 2030+: Towards a Planning Vision and Strategy Transcending 2030, 435

Hong Kong Aero Club, 107

Hong Kong Air Transport System Study on Long Term Planning, 231

Hong Kong Airport (Control of Obstructions) Ordinance, 359–60

Hong Kong Airport Building Committee, 139 Hong Kong Airport Committee, 257

Hong Kong and China Gas Works, 16, 30, 37 Hong Kong and Kowloon Wharf and Godown

Co. Ltd, 30, 102, 106

Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, 256 Hong Kong Boundary Crossing Facilities

(HKBCF), 389, 418–19

Hong Kong Club, 15, 58

Hong Kong Declaration on Sustainable Development for Cities (“Hong Kong Declaration”), 298, 430

Hong Kong Defence Command, 125 Hong Kong Defence Force, 121 Hong Kong Development Funds, 184

Hong Kong Federation of Students and Designing Hong Kong Harbour District, 317

Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce, 15, 37, 105

Hong Kong Housing Authority (also Housing Authority), 172, 186, 249–50, 274,

302–3, 336

Hong Kong Housing Society, 172, 186, 336–8 Hong Kong Institute of Architects, 317

Hong Kong Institution of Engineers, 317 Hong Kong International Airport, 5, 234, 254,

389, 407

Hong Kong Jockey Club (HKJC), 320, 326

Hong Kong Link Road (HKLR), 418

Hong Kong Long Term Road Study, 210, 212 Hong Kong Mass Transport Study, 210–11,

213, 215

Hong Kong Monetary Authority, 303 Hong Kong Moving Ahead: A Transport

Strategy for The Future, 437 Hong Kong Observatory, 23, 31, 380

Hong Kong Outline Plan, 221, 298, 450 Hong Kong People’s Council for Sustainable

Development, 317

Hong Kong Planning Standards and Guidelines (HKPSG), 221, 352–4, 363, 365

Hong Kong Polytechnic, 170, 223 Hong Kong Port Area (HKPA), 414–15 Hong Kong Principal Datum (HKPD),

359–60

Hong Kong Settlers Housing Corporation, 176 Hong Kong under Military Rule, 127

Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 223

Hong Kong: The Facts (Town Planning), 373 Hong Kong-Guangdong Cooperation Joint

Conference, 425–6

Hong Kong-Shenzhen Joint Task Force on Boundary District Development, 405

Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge (HZMB), 389, 397–8, 401, 411, 415–16, 418–20

Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, 214

Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, 12, 15, 121, 214

Hooker, Joseph, 14

Hopewell Company, 343 Hopewell Holdings Ltd, 155 Horsburgh, James, 8

Hospital Ordinance (1869), 60

Housing Authority (see Hong Kong Housing Authority)

Housing Bureau, 153, 423

Housing Commission, 114, 177

Housing Committee, 113

Housing Department, 249, 338

Housing, Planning and Lands Bureau, 311, 370

Howard, Ebenezer, 95, 98–100

HPDI, 416

Hsinan, 238

Hu Fa-kuang, 249

Hu Hanmin, 101

Huang Lianghui, 255

Huanggang, 393, 397, 424

Huizhou, 409, 426–7

Humen, Dongguan, 424

Hung Shui Kiu New Development Area Planning and Engineering Study, 391

Hutchison Whampoa, 252, 296

Ice House Street Pier, 21 Immigration Ordinance, 415 Individual Visit Scheme (IVS), 403–4

Information Services Department, 322, 373 Inspector-General of Guangdong, 86 Institute of Comprehensive Transportation,

416

International Council on Monuments and Sites, 322

International Union of Architects and Docomomo International, 322

Investigation Report on Hong Kong Waterworks, 133

Ip Lan-chuen, 121

Jardine Matheson, 15, 105, 214 Jardine, Matheson and Co., 214 Jardine’s Lookout, 9, 150

Jiang Zemin, 256

Jiangmen, 403, 426–7 jiazhang (see kapcheong) Johnston House, 11–12 joint practice note, 361

Joint Works Committee of the Three Governments (JWC), 418

Jongbo, 133

Kai Tak Airport, 101, 103, 106, 108, 137–42,

183, 198, 203–4, 207–8, 231–7, 239–40,

252, 255, 261, 266, 270, 274, 296, 307,

359, 381, 383–4, 443, 447

Kai Tak Development (KTD), 373, 381, 383–5 Kai Tak Development Area (KTDA), 342,

384–6

Kai Tak Land Investment Co., 107–8 Kai Tak Planning Review, 383

Kai Tak, 107–8, 146–7, 151, 156, 159, 253–4,

266, 268, 272, 304, 383–7, 435–6

Kan Fook-yee, 249

Kan Yuet-keung, 287

kap, 57

kapcheong (see jiazhang), 54, 57 Kau Shut Ling (see Kou Shih Ling) Keisaburo, 134

Kempei, 125

Kempeitai, 121, 124–5, 133

Kennedy, A. E., 35, 165

Kennet, Lord, 246

Kong Kai-tung, 121

Kong Sham Western Highway, 389, 392

Kosawa, 134

Kotewall, Robert, 121

Kou Shih Ling (also Kau Shut Ling), 239 Kowloon City District Council, 249, 251 Kowloon Development Division, PWD, 190 Kowloon Planning Area No.13 Development

Plan (Plan No. L.K. 13/26), 187 Kowloon Tong Development Project (see

Garden City Project)

Kowloon Tong Garden City Project (see Garden City Project)

Kowloon Walled City, 237–52 Kowloon Walled City Kaifong Welfare

Promotion Committee, 241, 244, 249–50 Kowloon Walled City Park, 251

Kowloon-Canton Railway, 17, 84, 104–5, 127,

170, 172, 216, 228

Kuramae District, 124–5, 131

Kwok Chan, 121 Kwong Fook I Tsz, 60

Kwun Tong Advisory Committee, 184–5 Kwun Tong Line Extension, 438

Labour Party, 285

Lam Kin-yan, 121 Lam Tak Kee, 60 Lam, Carrie, 322–3

Lamma Island, 8, 9, 75, 231, 252–3, 302, 386

Lan Kok Tsui, 415 Land Court, 71, 74, 86

Land Development Corporation (LDC), 268, 332, 335–7, 339

Land Development Corporation Ordinance, 332, 335, 340

Land Development Planning Committee (LDPC), 221

Land Disposal Programmes, 248

land exchange entitlement(s), 283–5, 287–8,

295

Land Fund, 249

Land Survey Branch, 109 Land Survey Office, 109

Lands and Works Branch, 153, 266, 299

Lands Department, 152–3, 344, 346, 361, 369 Lands, Survey and Town Planning

Department, 152

Lantau and Islands District Planning Office, Planning Department, 398

Lantau Bridge Committee, 232

Lantau Development Advisory Committee, 397

Lantau Link, 256, 259, 261, 275 Large, P. T. Somerville, 105 Lau Tit-shing, 121

Lau Wong-fat, 288

Lau, Patrick, 365, 370 Leask, W. L., 110

Lee Ching-kee, 244

Lee Hung-kee, 244

Lee Wing-tat, 370

Legislative Council, 12, 20, 37–8, 43, 52, 79,

95, 100, 110, 113, 155, 163, 213, 216,

220, 234–5, 249, 255, 287, 303, 305, 308,

314–15, 321–2, 355, 368, 371, 377–8,

385–6, 388, 416, 418, 421, 451

Letter A, 283, 287–8

Letter B, 283, 287–8

Leung Wai-tung, 249–50

Li Chung-po, 121

Li King-hong, 121

Li Koon-chun, 121

Li Tse-fong, 121

Li Zou, 121

Liantang/Heung Yuen Wai Boundary Control Point (Liantang/Heung Yuen Wai BCP), 405, 409, 411

Liber Research Community, 385 lijia system, 54

Ling Hong-fat, 121

Ling Kar-kan, 349

Lingdingyang Bridge (LDYB), 415 Lo Man-kam, 121

Local Communities Ordinance, 1899, 88

Lock, Max, 144

Lockhart, James Haldane Stewart (also Lockhart, Stewart), 70–71, 77, 238

Loh, Christine, 305

Lok Ma Chau Boundary Control Point, 348 Lok Ma Chau Loop (LMC Loop), 393–7 Lok Ma Chau Spur Line, 404, 406, 411 Long Term Housing Strategy, 302

Longjin Yi Xue (see Lung Tsun Free School) Lower Bazaar, 11–12, 28, 49–50, 67

Lu Chuanlin, 86

Lu Ping, 256

Lu, Francis, 370 Lugg, R. A., 28

Lui Hau-tuen, 249

Luk Ngoi-wan, 121

Lung Tsun Free School (also Lung Tsun School and Longjin Yi Xue), 237–9

Macao Ferry Terminal, 407 MacDonnell, R. G., 60 MacDougall, Brigadier, 130

Mackey, Sean, 215

Mackichan, Alexander Somerled, 113 MacLehose, Murray, 116, 197, 214, 233, 246,

285, 302

MacLeod, M. A., 104 MacLeod, Nicol Campbell, 113 Maddocks, A. F., 245

Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA), 404, 425, 428

Mainland/HKSAR Conference on the

Co-ordination of Major Infrastructure Projects, 415

Marine Department, 13

Mass Transit Further Studies Final Report, 213

Mass Transit Railway (MTR), 207, 210–16,

222, 225, 278, 281, 309, 384, 401, 425,

436

Mass Transit Railway Corporation (MTR Corporation), 215–16, 257–8

Mass Transit Railway Corporation Bill 1975, 216

May, C., 35

May, Francis Henry, 20, 38

McDonaldson, Thomas, 14 Melhado Investment Ltd, 288

Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Construction of the New Airport in Hong Kong and Related Questions, 256

Messer, C. M., 109 Messrs Him Tai, 38

Messrs Kinghorn & MacDonald, 19 Messrs Punchard, Lowther & Co., 38 metre above Principal Datum (mPD), 313,

362, 379–80

Metroplan, 262, 266, 268, 270, 305, 332, 374,

381, 432

Metroplan – The Aims, 299 Metroplan: the Selected Strategies: an

Overview, 268

Middle Income Housing Scheme (MIH), 224, 226

Ministry of Civil Aviation Survey Report – Aerodrome Development at H. K. (Kai Tak Airport), 203

Ministry of Town and Country Planning (British), 144

Missions étrangères de Paris, 12, 326

Mitsubishi Japanese Consortium, 214 Model Village, 139

Mornson, J. G., 29 Mount Parker, 8

MTR Corporation Limited (MTRCL), 419, 421–3

Mudie, J. R., 19

Mui Tsai Committee, 113

My Home Purchase Plan, 304 Mylius, George F., 10, 50

Nam Fung Development, 283 Nathan, Mathew, 17

National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), 415–16

National People’s Congress (NPC), 415 Naval Dockyard, 212

NENT New Development Areas Project, 371 New Airport Projects Co-ordination Office,

258

New Development Area(s) (NDA[s]), 270, 386–93, 396, 437, 439, 443, 450–51

New Kowloon Inland Lot (NKIL), 91, 94 New Kowloon Tong Model Village, 139 New Lo Wu Model Village, 139

New Nature Conservation Policy, 357

New Territories (Extension Laws) Ordinance (Ordinance No. 8 of 1900), 88

New Territories (Land Court) Ordinance, 71, 75, 285

New Territories Development Co., 98

New Territories Development Department, 152, 190

New Territories District Magistrate (see District Magistrate)

New Territories District Office(s) (see District Office[s])

New Territories Farming, Husbandry and Gardening Group – Fanling Branch Office, 134

New Territories Heung Yee Kuk (see Heung Yee Kuk)

New Territories Land Exchange Entitlements (Redemption) Ordinance, 288

New Territories Model Village, 139 New Territories New Village, 139

New Territories Ordinance (1910), 83, 286 New Territories Small House Policy, 283 New World Development Company Limited,

332

Newton, Wilfrid, 216

Ng Wah, 121

Ngan Shing-kwan, 121

Nikko Development Farm, 134

North Lantau Development Study, 398 North Lantau Expressway, 256, 259, 275

North Lantau Highway, 262, 401

North Lantau Highway Connection, 416, 419

North Lantau New Town, 398, 400 North Yeuk (Northern District), New

Territories, 73

Northcote, G., 103, 116, 446

North-eastern Kowloon Development Scheme, 244

Office for Metropolitan Architecture (OMA), 378

Okada Umekichi, 125

Open Door Policy, 3, 5 Operation Building Bright, 338 Ordinances:

An Ordinance for Registration and Regulation of the Chinese People, and for the Population and for other Purposes of Police, 57

An Ordinance to Extend the Duties of Chinese Tepos Appointed under Ordinance No. 13 of 1844 (Ordinance

No. 3 of 1853), 57

An Ordinance to repeal Ordinance No. 16 of 1844 – Registry and Census of the Inhabitants of the Island of Hong Kong, 52

Antiquities and Monuments Ordinance, 316–18

Buildings Ordinance, 157, 246, 344, 361–2

Country Park Ordinance, 356, 358 Crown Land Resumption Ordinance

(Ordinance No. 10 of 1900), 77 Crown Lands Resumption Amendment

Ordinance, 1922 (Ordinance No. 9 of

1922), 82

Crown Lands Resumption Ordinance, 282, 286–7, 289

Customs and Excise Service Ordinance, 415 Environmental Impact Assessment

Ordinance, 351–2, 413

European District Reservation Ordinance (1888), 62

Fire Services Ordinance, 246 Hong Kong Airport (Control of

Obstructions) Ordinance, 359–60

Hospital Ordinance (1869), 60

Immigration Ordinance, 415

Land Development Corporation Ordinance, 332, 335, 340

Local Communities Ordinance, 1899, 88 New Territories (Extension Laws)

Ordinance (Ordinance No. 8 of 1900), 88 New Territories (Land Court) Ordinance,

71, 75, 285

New Territories Land Exchange Entitlements (Redemption) Ordinance, 288

New Territories Ordinance (1910), 83, 286 Ordinance for Establishing a Registry of the Inhabitants of the Island of Hong Kong

and its Dependencies, 51, 54 Ordinance for the Appointment and

Regulation of Native Chinese Peace Officers (Paouchong and Paoukea) within the Colony of Hong Kong, 57 Ordinance for the Preservation of Good

Order and Cleanliness within the Colony of Hong Kong (also Registration Ordinance), 56

Outline Concept Plans (OCPs), 383 Public Gardens Ordinance, 14 Railways Ordinance, 419

The Taipingshan Resumption Ordinance, 1894 (Ordinance No. 8 of 1894), 44 Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance,

157–8

Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance 1991, 158, 290, 292, 366

Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance 2004, 158, 368

Town Planning Ordinance, 112, 152–3, 155,

157, 290–92, 310, 314, 340, 343, 345,

356, 358, 366–8, 371, 429, 449

Town Planning Ordinance, 1939 (Ordinance No. 20 of 1939), 114, 116,

290, 359, 446

Urban Renewal Authority Ordinance, 335–6, 342

West Kowloon Cultural District Authority Ordinance, 378

Outline Development Plan, 166, 168, 196, 197 Outline Master Development Plan, 383 Outline of the Plan for the Reform and

Development of the Pearl River Delta (2008–2020), 427

Outline Zoning Plan(s) (OZP[s]), 151, 173,

284, 291–2, 302, 308, 310–11, 313–17,

345, 358–60, 364–6, 370, 374, 376,

378–9, 382–3, 385–8

Owen, David, 145

Owen, W. H. (Wilfred Herbert), 113–14 Oyama, 135

Pamphlets on Planning for New Territories: Islands, 398

Panel on Development, 314 Panel on Housing, 303

Panel on Planning, Lands and Works (PLW Panel), 303, 308, 310, 316–17

Panel on Transport, 418 Pao Ping-wing, 249

paouchong, 57

Pearl River Delta (PRD), 30, 226–8, 331, 392,

411, 425–7, 433

Pearl River Estuary, 8, 415

Peel, W., 102–3, 116, 446

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co., 102

Perkins, T. L., 109

Pérola, A, Macao SAR, 416 Phillips, Ronald, 161

Pierre-perdue, the method of, 29

Planning and Development Study on NENT, 387

Planning and Development Study on NWNT, 387, 389

Planning and Engineering Study on Development of Lok Ma Chau Loop, 394

Planning Branch, CL&SO, 149, 152

Planning Department, 149, 152–3, 207, 268,

270, 295, 302, 311, 314, 317, 324, 329,

344–5, 347–8, 352, 357–8, 360–61, 363,

366, 374, 383, 387, 391–2, 394, 398, 400,

402, 405, 411, 415, 426, 429–30, 434–5

Planning for Growth, 299, 332

Planning Permission System, 155, 343 Planning Standards Sub-Committee (PSSC),

221

Planning Study on the Coordinated Development of the Greater Pearl River Delta Township (the Greater PRD Study), 426–7

Planning, Environment and Lands Branch (PELB), 152, 305, 339

Po Leung Kuk, 46 Police Magistrate, 77

Policy of Revitalising Industrial Buildings, 346 Pollution in Hong Kong – A Time to Act, 429 Poor Law Office (UK), 61

Port and Airport Development Strategy, 398 Port and Airport Development Study, 253

Pottinger, Henry, 10, 13, 49–50

Pratt, John, 101

Praya Bonham Strand, 28–9

Praya Reclamation Scheme, 29, 30

PRD Regional Air Quality Management Plan, 441

Preliminary Feasibility Study on Developing the New Territories North (NTN Study), 392–3

Preliminary Outline Development Plan (PODP), 383, 388, 394

Price, J. M., 35 Prince Alfred, 14

Prince Arthur, Duke of Connaught and Strathearn, 17

Principal Land Surveyor, 109 Prisons Department, 56

Private Sector Participation Scheme (PSPS), 224, 226

Professional Commons, 385

Protection of the Harbour Ordinance (PHO), 304–5, 307–8, 310, 381, 383

Provisional Council for the Use and Conservation of the Countryside, 355

Public Gardens Advisory Committee, 14 Public Gardens Ordinance, 14

Public Works Committee, 21, 38

Public Works Department (PWD), 19, 38, 99,

105–7, 109, 144, 149, 152–3, 158, 162,

186–7, 190, 194, 232, 449

Purcell Miller Tritton, 320–21

Qianhai (Shenzhen), 392, 394, 428

Qing Code, 281

Queen Victoria, 21

Queen’s Pier (also Queen’s Statue Wharf), 20–21, 308, 310, 313, 316–8, 372

Rail Development Strategy 2000, 419

Railway Development Strategy 2000, 437

Railway Development Strategy 2014, 437

Railways Ordinance, 419

Ralph M. Parsons Co., 231, 233

Ramsar Convention, 347 Rawling, S. B., 22

Real Estate Developers Association of Hong Kong (REDA), 370

Registrar General, 14, 34–5, 50–52, 54, 58, 60,

249

Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1836 (UK), 61

Regulations:

Building (Planning) Regulations, 360, 366 Town Planning (Appeal) Regulations 1991,

367

Rensuke Isogai, 120–21, 136

Report of Medical and Health Conditions in Hong Kong, 118

Report on Development at Sha Tin, 190 Resettlement Department, 177, 244 Review of Building Density and Height

Restrictions in Kowloon and New Kowloon, 360

Review of Policies for Squatter Control, Resettlement and Government Low-cost Housing, 1964, 179

Revitalising Historic Buildings Through Partnership Scheme, 326

Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 429

Ripon, 41

Roberts, Goronwy, 113

Robin’s Nest, 348, 405

Robinson, Hercules, 17

Robinson, William, 41–2

Rocco Design Architects Ltd, 378

Rose Garden Project, 5, 252–3, 296, 449

Rosmead, Lord, 14

Route 3, 256, 259–61, 264–5, 275, 374

Rowlock, H., 35

Royal Air Force, 107–8 Royal Asiatic Society, 14 Royal Observatory, 102

rural committees, 291

Ryrie, P., 35

Salvation Army, 102

Sandberg, Baron, 214

Sanitary Board, 40, 42, 46–7, 95, 110

Sanitary Department, 113

Scheme for the Improvement of the Resumed Area in the district of Taipingshan, 44

Second Railway Development Study (2000), 331

Secretariat for Transport and Public Works of Macao, 426

Secretary for Development, 322–4, 385 Secretary for Home Affairs, 317 Secretary for Justice, 321, 324

Secretary for Transport and Housing, 418, 422 Secretary for Works, 258, 323

security district(s), 56, 58–9 Selwyn-Clarke, Percy Selwyn, 118

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), 303

Severn, Claud, 95

Sha Tin to Central Link, 384, 438

Sham Shui Po Improvement Scheme, 91 Sham Shui Po, 87, 90–96, 112, 114, 116, 124,

131, 140, 160, 167, 175, 177, 179, 336–9,

353, 374, 424, 446

Shek Tong Tsui, 9, 16, 54–5, 57–8, 124–5,

131

Shekou, 226–8, 394, 413, 428

Shenzhen Bay Control Point, 392, 406 Shenzhen Bay Port (SBP), 413–4 Shenzhen Bay, 70, 404, 414

Shenzhen Eastern Corridor, 409

Shenzhen Municipal People’s Government, 405

Shenzhen River (also Sham Chun River), 4, 7, 70, 87, 116, 146, 174, 238, 393–4, 396,

446

Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (see Shenzhen)

Shenzhen, 101, 105, 215, 226–8, 230, 331,

348–9, 389, 392–4, 397, 402, 404–5,

409, 411, 413–15, 419, 424, 426–8, 438,

443

Shenzhen-Hong Kong Joint Preliminary Planning Study on Developing the Liantang / Heung Yuen Wai BCP, 405

Shenzhen-Hong Kong Western Corridor (SWC), 411, 413

Shibi (Guangzhou), 424 Silva-Netto, A. F. B., 110

Sino-British Defence Land Agreement, 311, 315

Sino-British Joint Declaration, 5, 231, 233, 247,

284, 299

Sino-British Joint Liaison Group, 257 Sino-British Land Commission, 248 Smith, C. C., 35

Society for Protection of the Harbour (SPH), 305, 310

South China Morning Post, 215

South East Kowloon, 304, 307–8, 365, 373,

381, 433, 443

South Island Line, 438

South Yeuk (Southern District), New Territories, 73, 239

Southern District, 22, 169, 171

Special Administrative Region Development Fund, 255

Special Committee on Land Supply, 225

Special Committee on Striving for Reasonable Rights and Interests for Residents, 282

Special Delegate for Foreign Affairs for Kuangtung and Kuangsi (Guangdong and Guangxi), 239

St John’s Cathedral, 13, 15, 321 Standard Oil Co., 102

Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC), 414

Star Ferry Pier, 21, 106, 161, 167, 170, 308,

310, 316–18, 372, 380

Statue Square, 16, 20–21, 158, 313 Steering Committee on Land Supply, 302 Stephen, A. G., 109

Stephenson, Rowland MacDonald, 104 Stewart, Gershom, 20, 37

Stewart, James A., 144

Stonecutters Island, 7, 34, 38, 202–3, 254,

262–4, 307, 374

Strachan, Ian, 249

Strategic Planning Unit, 152

Strategic Sewage Disposal Scheme (SSDS), 352

Stubbs, R. E., 109

Study on Harbour Reclamation and Urban Growth, 262, 305

Study on Port Back-up and Land Requirements (2000), 331

Study on the Action Plan for Livable Bay Area of the Pearl River Estuary (Bay Area Study), 427

Study on the Ecological Value of Fish Ponds in Deep Bay Area, 347

Study on the Land Use Planning for the Closed Area, 348

Subcommittee on Matters Relating to Railways, 437

Sun Hung Kai Properties, 283 Superintendent of the Government Gardens

and Tree Planting Department, 14 Supreme Court, 15, 20, 83

Survey Office, 112

Surveyor General, 12, 14, 28, 34–5, 44, 56 Sustainable Building Design Guidelines, 364 Sustainable Development for the 21st century

in Hong Kong (SUSDEV21), 429–30

Taiping Rebellion, 21, 52

Taipingshan, 11, 19, 28, 40–41, 43–8, 50–51,

54–6, 58, 60, 446

Taiwan Development Company Ltd, 134 Talbot, Lee and Martha, 355

Tam Yik Sam, 60

Tam, William Ngartse (Ngartwse) Thomas, 113, 121

Tamar Development Project, 321 Tan Zhonglin, 86

Tang Siu-kin, 121

Tang Tai-chuen, 249

Temporary Housing Scheme, 179 Tenants Purchase Scheme, 302

Ten-year Housing Programme, 197, 298, 302,

448

tepo(s), 57

Territorial Development Strategy (TDS), 221, 225–6, 228–9, 233, 266, 299, 305,

329

Territorial Development Strategy Review: Development Opinions, 270

Territorial Development Strategy Review (TDSR), 270–72, 299, 304, 329, 351,

386, 398, 432

Territory Development Department, 152, 258,

264

Thatcher, Margaret, 231

The Countryside and the People: Report of the Provisional Council for the Use and Conservation of the Countryside, 355

The Historical and Political Aspects of the Walled City, 246

The Hongkong News, 118, 120

The Taipingshan Resumption Ordinance, 1894 (Ordinance No. 8 of 1894), 44

Third Comprehensive Transport Study (1999), 331

Third Port Development Strategy Review (1998), 331

Thomas, William, 15 Tickle, A. G. W., 110

Ting Kau Bridge, 259, 419 Todd, Ronald Ruskin, 113 Tojo Hideki, 120, 132

Tolo Highway, 275. 409 Tomkyns, R. A., 28

Tomorrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform, 95 Tonggu Waterway, 331

Toshimichi Asaeda, 133

Town Planning (Amendment) Bill 2003, 368 Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance,

157–8

Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance 1991, 158, 290, 292, 366

Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance 2004, 158, 368

Town Planning (Appeal) Regulations 1991, 367

Town Planning Appeal Board, 157–8, 292,

347, 367

Town Planning Board (TPB), 5, 112–14,

152–7, 166, 172, 195, 290–92, 302,

308, 310, 314–16, 340–41, 344–8, 356,

359–60, 364–71, 373, 376, 378, 380, 385,

388

Town Planning Committee, 108–10, 116,

446

Town Planning Division, 152, 449

Town Planning Office, 144, 149, 152, 304,

344, 449

Town Planning Ordinance, 112, 152–3, 155,

157, 290–92, 310, 314, 340, 343, 345,

356, 358, 366–8, 371, 429, 449

Town Planning Ordinance, 1939 (Ordinance No. 20 of 1939), 114, 116, 290, 359,

446

Traffic and Transport Survey Division, PWD, 232

Transport and Housing Bureau, 423 Transport Bureau, 153

Transport Committee, 113

Transport Linkage between Hong Kong and Pearl River West, 416

Treaty of Nanking, 252 Ts’o Seen Wan, 107 Tsang Sin, 15

Tsang, Donald, 376, 384

Tse, Tony, 370

Tsing Ma Bridge, 264, 449

tsuen, 74–5

Tuen Mun Road, 419

Tuen Mun-Chek Lap Kok Link, 389, 401, 418–19

Tung Chee-hwa, 258

Tung Chung Line, 401, 419, 424,

Tung Chung New Town Extension Study, 400

Tung Chung-wei, 121

Tung Wah Hospital, 41, 43, 46–7, 60,

321

United Kowloon Walled City Residents Anti- Clearance Committee, 241

University of Hong Kong, 158, 215, 223

Upper Bazaar, 11–3, 49–51, 67

Urban Council, 113, 152, 161, 172, 177 Urban Design Guidelines for Hong Kong,

363

Urban Design Study for the New Central Harbourfront (UDS), 311, 313–15, 317,

319

Urban Planning and Development Strategy Section, 152

Urban Renewal Authority (URA), 325–6, 335–8, 340–43

Urban Renewal Authority Bill, 335

Urban Renewal Authority Ordinance, 335–6, 342

Urban Renewal Strategy (URS), 336–8, 342

Vernall, Richard John, 113

Viceroy of Guangdong and Guangxi provinces, 86

Viceroy of Hubei and Hunan (also Viceroy of Huguang), 105

Victoria Barracks, 13, 19–20, 165 Victoria City (see City of Victoria)

Victoria Harbour, 9, 36, 41, 145, 223, 260, 268,

305, 308, 311, 329, 364, 372, 374, 378,

380, 383–4, 433, 450

Victoria Park, 365

Victoria Peak, 8, 9, 102

Victoria Prison, 13, 15, 34, 318

Wan Chai Provisional District Board, 339 Wanchai Reclamation (WR), 254, 272, 304,

307

War Department, 165 Wardley Street Wharf, 20 Ware, Thomas Walter, 113 Warehouse Act, 132

Water Supplies Department, 22, 258, 436

Weihaiwei, 101

Wellesley, Victor, 69, 101–2 West Island Line, 438

West Kowloon Corridor, 174, 275

West Kowloon Cultural District (WKCD), 365, 374, 376–81, 425

West Kowloon Cultural District Authority (WKCDA), 377–8, 380

West Kowloon Cultural District Authority Ordinance, 378

West Kowloon Cultural District Development Plan, 378–9

West Kowloon Expressway, 275, 374, 380

West Kowloon Highway, 256, 262–5

West Kowloon Reclamation, 254, 256, 260,

262, 264, 272, 304, 307, 374–5

West Kowloon Terminus, 422–5

West Kowloon, 174, 258–60, 262–6, 268,

373–4, 376–7, 381

West Rail Line, 276, 281, 380, 424 Western Harbour – Strategic Proposal for

Lantau Island Development, 252–3, 296

Western Harbour Crossing, 254, 256, 258, 260,

263–5, 276

Western Harbour Tunnel Company Limited, 258, 265

Western Harbour Tunnel, 274, 374, 380

Western Market, 212, 335

Wetland Conservation Areas and Wetland Buffer Areas, 348

White Paper on Long Term Housing Strategy, 302

Whyte-Smith, Thomas Stodart, 113 Wilm, M., 40, 43

Wilson, David C., 220, 250, 253, 266, 296,

332

Winfat Case, 289–90

Winfat Enterprises (Hong Kong) Limited, 289

Wodehouse, P. P. J., 110 Wolfe, E. D. C., 110

Wong Chuk Hang, 150, 346 Wong Chun Po, 240

Wong Chung-ping, 241, 244 Wong Fung Wan, 60

Wong Mow-lam, Joseph, 113 Wong Tak-kwong, 121

Wong Tung-ming, 121

Wong Yin-ching, 121

Working Group on Image Promotion, Kowloon City District Council, 251

Works Bureau, 258

Wright, Michael, 323

Wuchang, 105

Wuhua of Guangdong Province, 15 Wutongshan, 349

Xin Shiming (New Mission), 128 Xin’an County, 71, 73, 101

Xinhai Revolution, 107

Xinhua News Agency, 231, 241, 244, 247–8 Xinjie gongnong shang yanjiuhui (see

Association of Workers, Peasants and Merchants)

Xue Fengxuan, 255

Yamashita Ichikawa, 139

Yee On, 240

yeuk, 74–5

yongyetian, 281

Youde, 233

Young, Mark Aitchison, 144

yue (district), 54

Yuen Kwok-keung, 324

Zhang Junsheng, 248

Zhang Xueliang, 101

Zhaoqing, 426–7

Zhongshan, 403, 426–7

Zhou Nan, 248

Zhuhai, 331, 415–6, 418–9, 426–8

Zoological and Botanical Gardens, 168

Making Hong Kong. A history of its urban development | 何佩然 | 2018

x · MAKING HONG KONG

xii · MAKING HONG KONG

Duality in planning (1841–1898)

Conception

Construction

Crises

34 · MAKING HONG KONG

Governing

Summary

Expansion of the territory (1898–1941)

Opportunities

New Kowloon

94 · MAKING HONG KONG

Infrastructure

Institutionalisation

Summary

Experiencing the war (1941–1945)

Resource port of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere

Population policy

Resource management

Transport hub

Summary

High-density development planning (1945–1979)

Long-term planning

The emphasis of urban development

162 · MAKING HONG KONG

New Kowloon and the New Territories

Shrinking distance

202 · MAKING HONG KONG

Summary

Approaching the handover (1979–1997)

Development strategies in the 1980s

Before and after the Sino-British Joint Declaration

Rose Garden Project

Planning for the new era

Summary

296 · MAKING HONG KONG

Transformation after the return to China (1997–2015)

Historical turning point

Collective memories

Reconstruction and conservation

New trends in planning

352 · MAKING HONG KONG

Summary

Challenge of sustainable development (1997–2015)

New core districts

New development areas (NDAs)

Exchange with the Mainland

Vision for the city

442 · MAKING HONG KONG

Summary

Government documents

Government publications

Newspapers

English books and articles

Chinese books and articles

Maps

Interviewees

Online resources

Land registration records