FILE No
L
י
70
STAMP
YEAR
E
FIT
SECURITY GRADING
NB
The grading of this file must be the same as that of the highest graded document contained in it UPGRADE AS NECESSARY USING APPROPRIATELY COLOURED LABELS
UNCLASSIFIED
DEPT.
H.M. DIPLOMATIC SERVICE
or POST
FILE No.
Contents becked
for transler to
(Sgd)
Date
DRO,
DROO
11.671
HONG FUNG
HKK 1/25
(Part )
TITLE: DISTURBANCED IN HONG KONG
REFER TO
1967/68 1
REFER TO
REFER TO
DO NOT RETAIN FILES AND PAPERS UNNECESSARILY
RETURN THEM TO REGISTRY FOR BU OR PA
NAME
TO
DATE
{and dept. when necessary}
SEE:
NAME (and dept. when necessary)
TO
DATE
SEE:
NAME (and dept. when necessary)
TO
DATE
SEE:
Regist
Mr Appleyard
Welker Randal 14/8]
M
8 m Saminara
PART_
K271..
FCO 40/263
CLOSED UNTIL
2001
Registry Address
Room No.
1271
King Charles Street
HPW 9903/6/69
SECURITY GRADING
N.B. The grading of this file must be the same as that of the highest graded document contained in 1. UPGRADE AS NECESSARY USING APPROPRIATELY COLOURED LABELS
UNCLASSIFIED
YEAR STAMP
1970
|
Research Department
H.K
ycli
Study on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes
The David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies established some two or three years ago a fairly high-powered Study Group under the co-Chairmanship of Lord Inchyra and Lord Caccia to produce a study on the political and economic aspects of the peaceful settlement of international disputes. The study has been carried out by Professor Northedge and Mr. Michael Donelon of the London School of Economics, and will be published shortly. The F.C.0. have given encouragement and a limited measure of practical assistance to this project.
2. Annexed to the report of the Study Group will be a series of case studies of current or recent international disputes. You may recall that, a year ago, the Institute sent to Sir V. Evans copies of the first six case studies, and that we undertook to have a look at them to check their accuracy (my minute of 9 July, 1969 refers). We subsequently sent our comments on these six case studies to the Institute.
3.
The Institute have now sent us copies of a further 30 case studies. Sir V. Evans would be grateful if the se documents (enclosed herewith) could be checked for glaring errors, omissions or distortions. It would of course be made clear to the Institute, as we have already done in relation to the first six case studies, that we can accept no responsibility for the style or context of the case studies and that no reference should be made to the fact that the case studies have been "vetted" for accuracy by the F.C.O.
4.
I would accordingly be grateful if you would take on this task within the limits suggested in paragraph 3 above. I am attaching a list of the 30 case studies now received, and I am sending a copy of this minute and its attachment, together with copies of the appropriate case study or studies, to the relevant geographical departments, who may also care to comment.
(I.M. Sinclair) 30 July, 1970
/Copies to:
:
Copies to:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
!
6.
American Dept. (with case studies on (a) Cuba - U.S.A.
Relations, 1959-61, and (b) The Dominican Crisis,
1965)
Arabian Dept. (with case studies on (a) South Arabia
and (b) Yemen (1962-68)
Central and Southern African Dept. (with case study
on Angola)
Eastern European and Soviet Dept. (with case studies
Czechoslovakia, 1968
on a
(b The Hungarian Revolution, 1956
The U-2 Incident, May, 1960 Poland, 1941-47)
Far-Eastern Dept. (with case study on the Tibet
Revolt)
Gibraltar and South Atlantic Dept. (with case
study on Gibraltar)
7.✔ Hong Kong Dept. (with case study on Frictions
in Hong Kong, 1967)
8. Near Eastern Dept. (with case study on Palestine)
North African Dept. (with case study on the Suez
Crisis)
9.
10.
South Asian Dept. (with case studies on
(a) Goa and (b) Kashmir)
11.
South-East Asian Dept. (with case studies on
(a) Indo-China and (b) Vietnam)
South-West Pacific Dept. (with case studies on
a) Indonesia/Malaysia Confrontation
Indonesia's Independence
12.
(b
c
13.
14.
The Chinese Minority in Indonesia Indonesia and West Irian, 1950-62)
and
Southern European Dept. (with case studies on
(a) Gibraltar and (b) Greece, 1944-49)
West African Dept. (with case study on the Nigerian
Civil War)
15. Western European Dept. (with case studies on
The South Tyrol (1945-)
BBE
Anglo-Icelandic Fisheries Dispute, 1958-62 The Austrian Question, 1945-55
2
/(a)
1¦
1.
.
The Berlin Blockade, 1948-9
The Trieste Conflict, 1945-54, and Berlin, 1958-62)
- 3·
lel
FRICTION IN HONG-KONG - 1967.
The conflict which developed in Hong-Kong in the spring and summer of 1967 can best be regarded as a situation of friction
rather than a dispute. The issues involved were largely symbolic. Chinese Communists exploited labour grievances in an attempt to ret
the Wong-rong authorities to show deference to the people's Republic
of Chine.
The steady deterioration in Anglo-Chinese relations formed the
background to the situation. The position of Hong-yong, a Pritish Crown colony, has historically appeared acceptable to peking, provided
it maintained a neutral position in the affairs of South Past Asia.
This criterion was fulfilled during the Korean War in spite of the United Kingdom's involvements. British support for the general ins
of mited States policy in Vietnam and, more important, the use of
Hong-Kong as a "Relief and Recreation Centre" for the united states
Seventh Fleet engarod in Vietnam, were seen by the Communists as threatening Hong-Yongis neutral status. The crisis of ray-gurust 1967
has been seen as a Chinese warning against any further involvement of
Hong-Kong in the Vietnam War.
The primary cause of the crisis, however, lay in the political
situation within Communist China and in the "Cultural Revolution" which
had been sweeping the country. The origins of this lay in intra-narty developments and in ao Tse Tungis doctrine of a "permanent revolution" to prevent the Chinese Communist Party committing Pussian bourgeois errors. ky April 1967, it seems that this Revolution was losing momentum and a
new "object of struggle" seemed necessary. Previously the "top people in authority taking the Capitalist road" had fulfilled this scaneroat role. British Imperialism in Hong-Kong seemed an obvious supplement, for to Red Guards "there was nothing so stimulating to self-righteous anger as a chance to humiliate a live Imperiolist.
1
1. The Times. 20th May,1967.
-2-
The Pritish Foreign Secretary, George Trom, recoʻmised that the internal chinese factors lay at the roots of the "ong-Kong crisis, as shown in his reference to it as a spill-over of the Cultural
Revolution.
From April 1967 onwards, the internal situation in the people's Violent outbreaks Reṛublic deteriorated to the verge of civil war.
were reported from many Chinese provinces, with sections of the working class, the peasantry and the army continuing to oppose the Cultural Revoltion. These disturbances seemed to culminate in the crisis at Wuhan, an industrial centre of vital economic and strategic importance controlling the only bridge over the Yangtse for thousands
During the spring and summer of 1967 fighting threatened to reduce the province to anarchy. Poking was believed to have Cantan
This dropped parachutists and to have sent amboats into the area. domestic chaos was an important factor explaining the Hong-Kong conflict. As was pointed out at the time, "riots end demonstrations directed
against the
of miles.
ritish Government in Hong-Kong have in the past occurred when the weaknesses of the Government of the day in China made it necessary to distract attention, or to provide a foreign focus against which national feeling could unite".
2
The Hong-Kong riots were not unique but rather part of a general "revolutionary fervour" that was sweeping pro-Chinese Communists parties throughout Asia. Previously, on the 3rd-4th December 1966, serious rioting by Communists had provoked a crisis in the Portuguese Colony of Hecao, which was eventually settled with the governor of the colony accepting all the Communist demands, including the banning of the Nationalist Chinese organisations and a public apology by the local Portuguese authorities. In several ways Macao resembled a miniature Hong-Kong and it was generally believed that Communist successes would eventually provoke similar action in wong-Kong. In the summer of 1967
2. A.S.B. Olver "Chine and Hong-Kong", p223.
?
3
-3-
Communist-inspired riots occurred in urma. These began with a protest by Chinese students against the ben on wearing ao badren. They broke the Sino-Burmese friendship which had been evident since the Pandung Conference on 1955. Peking's increased new sunmort for the Communists in Thailand, Malaysia, Taos and Vietnam and the practice of handing out !!ao badges and "ao's "little book", caused great offence to incumbent "overnments. Even Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia, usually friendly towards "ao, complained about the activities of Chinese-mupported Communists in his country. It may well have been that these "violent squabbles with (China's) neighbours were unavoidable offshoots of the Cultural Revolution rather then deliberate foreign démarches directed by peking", nevertheless they had a radical effect on China's external relations. As has been pointed out "The degree of self-induced diplomatic isolation attributable to this excess of revolutionary zeal was well illustrated at the National Day celebrations of october 1967, at which the
4 only foreign leader of any status was the head of the Albanian delegation".
The immediate causes of the crisis in Hong-Kong were internal. During April 1967 a labour dispute over wages and working conditions.
concerned and demonstrations began.
conflict changed in character.
who instigated serious rioting. regarded as the mejor cause of the conflict. Of course economic grievances existed but wages and working conditions, especially in the
larger factories, were improving rapidly and, in fact, the plastic flower factory dispute quickly faded into the background. It was really the
overcrowded living accommodation rather than bad labour relations which
created the ready material for demonstration. As was noted at the time
13 July 1967 P128
3. Far Eastern Economic Review,
developed in a plastic flower factory
The management dismissed the employees
on the 11th way this genuine labour It was exploited by Chinese Cormunists
Economic factors cannot, however, be
13th
4. Bell, C, "The Foreign Policy of China" in F.S."orthedge he Foreign
policy of the powers", pl47.
-4-
"the trouble spread quickly from the factory area into one of the
5 most crowded and squalid of rowloonts resettlement districts". Young people, who formed the larger part of the demonstrations,
were giving vent to social frustrations.
It seemed evident that the People's Republic of China was implicated in the rioting. Local aoists seem to have insticated the rioting and although they may not have been directly under Pekin is control, the pekingts people's naily ordered and encouraged violence in the Colony and the rank of China became the headquarters of the demonstratora. observers renorted that the rioting was led
Pekings
by young Communists who had come from ganton and taceo. attitude was aptly summarised in their Five Demands of the 15th "ay 1967 the immediate acceptance by the Hong-vons authorities of the demonstrators demands, the release of all those arrested, the unishment of those res oneible(i.e. the long-Kong police), apologies and compensation for the victims and a guarantee against the recurrence of similer incidents. Such demands were obviously incompatible with the Hong-Kong authorities main aim, the resbration of law and order. any case, they regarded the crisis as a purely domestic one which they had to resolve alone, not in consultation with Peking, although they did recognise the need not to provoke unduly their powerful neighbour.
In
During the summer of 1967 terrorist activities accompanied these Communist demonstrations. On at least one occasion, the shetaukok incident of 8th July, firing took place across the Chinese-Hon"-Kong border. In this incident Communist mechine-gum fire killed five Hong-ong policemen and a mob, estirated at about a thousand, attacked the police post. Leter about five hundred and fifty British troops. including Gurkhas, took up fortified positions astride the border and
the situation rapidly cooled. The whole incident may have boon
provoked without Pekings knowledge.
5. Far Eastern Economic Review, 18th Jay,1967, 420.
·
r
*5-
Throughout, the Hong-Kong authorities handled the situation tactfully. The restraint shown by the police in dealing with the demonstrators was evident to all. The authorities were, nevertheless, determined to maintain order and, on 23rd May, Emergency ordinances were issued which drastically increased the penalties for violent behaviour. They were resolved to avoid a Macao-type humiliation. Talks were held between the Governor, Sir David Trench, and Sir Arthur Galsworthy, at the time Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Commonwealth office, and the rather intransigient attitude towards the demonstrators demands continued. The British authorities probably calculated that the maintenance of the status quo was as much in Peking's interest as their own and that the Communists were trying to humiliate the British rather than either obtain the redress of genuine grievances, or drive them out of the Colony completely. The Macao precedent showed the pointlessness of any unilateral concessions. Even if such calculations could not have been made the Hong-Kong authorities would have had no alterative but to stand firm end attempt to govern rather than allow anarchy to develop.
No explicit settlement was reached. Nevertheless, by the late summer of This 1967 the crisis was fading and China appeared to be dropping the issue.
The vast majority of the retreat can be explained partly by political factors. Colony's population not only refused to support, but proved openly hostile to the Communist demonstrators. As was pointed out "the discipline of the Hong-Kong police and the show of strength by the Commando Carrier Bulwark in the harbour certainly helped. But it was the revulsion of the majority of the people of Hong-Kong more than anything else which made the Communists revise their
6 calculations."
In any case, the acute internal troubles in Canton province in July and August, and the chaos which this caused, would have made it difficult, if not impossible, for ao to have stepped up the campaign on Hong-Kong even if he had
wished to.
The economic importance of the Colony as a Chinese source of foreign exchange must not be overlooked. In 1966 it was estimated that China supplied Hong-Kong with £173 million's worth of goods, mostly perishables and water. In addition, 6. The Economist, 3rd June,1967, p996,
-6-
the People's Republic benefitted from the remittances received from the
Chinese either in, or via, Hong-Kong and from the profits of her commercial undertakings in the Colony. Moreover, if Peking was to take over the colony she "would still have to supply its citizens with food on a large scale and would get little of external value in return with which to maintain her foreign
7 purchases of grain and machinery",
Although Mao has consistently urged his followers to put political considerations before economic ones, it appears as if the latter underlay
Peking's cautious attitude to Hong-Kong throughout the crisis. When it ras clear that the Colony's authorities were not going to give way in face of the
Chinese pressure, retreat was felt to be the only realistic course. Terrorisn
seemed to have been part of this retreat, as seen in the burning down of the British Embassy in Peking in late August 1967, ostensibly in order to obtain the release of Communist journalists imprisoned in Hong-Kong after the riots. "The Embassy attack was olearly a surrogate for tougher action where it would
really count in Hong-Kong itself". It acted as a safety valve for Chinese
xenophobia against Hong-Kong.
8
By the end of the year conditions within the Colony had reverted to normal.
Tensions at a lower level remained, but these were an accepted fact of life.
Throughout the crisis China's deeds had never matched her words.
7. A.S.B. Olver, Ibid, p224.
8. The Economist, 29th August 1967, p705.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Articles & Journals
olver, A.S.B.,
"China and Hong-Kong".
The World Today. June 1967.
The Far Eastern Economic Review.
List of 30 Case Studies enclosed with Mr. Sinclair's Minute to Research Department of 30 July, 1970
Ye/i
1.
Angola
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
The Chinese minority in Indonesia
Goa
Greece, 1944-49
Indo-China
Indonesia/Malaysia Confrontation
Kashmir
8.
The Suez Crisis
9.
South Arabia
10.
The Tibet Revolt
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
Czechoslovakia, 1968
The South Tyrol (1945-)
Friction in Hong Kong, 1967
The Hungarian Revolution, 1956
Vietnam
Anglo-Icelandic Fisheries Dispute (1958-62)
The Austrian Question, 1945-55
The Berlin Blockade, 1948-9
Gibraltar
Indonesia's Independence
21
The Nigerian Civil War
22.
The U-2 Incident, May 1960
23.
The Trieste Conflict (1945-54)
24. Berlin, 1958-62
25.
Yemen (1962-68)
26.
The Dominican Crisis, 1965
1
27.
28.
29.
30.
Indonesia and West Irian, 1950-62
Poland, 1941-47
Cuba-U.S.A. Relations, 1959-61
Palestine
- 2
Cc. Hong Kong Jept.
Mr. I.M. Sinclair,
Legal Advisers.
Study on Peaceful Settlements of Disputes.
Friction in Hong Kong
1967.
(2)
We have seen the comments made by Hong Kong and Far Eastern Departments and are in agreement with them. We have the following additional points to make:-
Page 1, paragraphs 1 and 2.
The background to the outbreak of disturbances in Hong Kong was not a deterioration
There had been no
in Anglo-Chinese relations.
indication of any change in those relations. The background was the Cultural Revolution in China primarily, and the example of its overspill into Macau. Communists in Hong Kong took their cue, it seems spontaneously, from these events and tried locally to develop a revolutionary situation, no doubt in the hope that a situation similar to that in Macau could be achieved. The influence of Macau should be made clear at the beginning of the study.
The Chinese Government inevitably took notice of the disturbances in Hong Kong, and some references were made to Hong Kong being used as a base for United States action in Viet-Nam, but the war was not made a major issue in the Hong Kong crisis. It seems unlikely that the crisis was provoked by China as a warning to Britain against further involvement in the war.
Page 1, paragraph 3.
The Hong Kong situation no doubt provided China with propaganda for internal use in rallying the people, but this does not mean that a new "object of struggle" was deliberately created. As has been pointed out, the troubles in Hong Kong were an overspill of the Cultural Revolution, and, it seems, a follow-up of the earlier outburst in Macau.
Page 2, paragraph 1.
The internal disturbances in China were of varying kinds and did reach serious proportions, but, again, the origin of those in Hong Kong was the example of conducting "atruggle" against authority in Hong Kong "imperialist" authority - rather than the need to distract attention from the internal situation in China.
-
/Page 3, paragraph 1.
¦
Page 3, paragraph 1.
The cause of the crisis in Hong Kong was the spontaneous move by Communists to create a revolutionary situation. They made use of the Trade Unions for this purpose developing "disputes" into demonstrations and eventual confrontation. There had been a series of disputes since the early spring.
Page 4, paragraph 1.
Encouragement for a time was given from China
to the local Communists in their demonstrations,
but this was after the disturbances had started, by which time the Chinese authorities no doubt were obliged to give some support to the overspill of revolutionary enthusiasm.
Page 4, paragraph 2, fourth sentence.
"astride the border" suggests that the British troops were actually in Chinese territory. "along the border" would be better.
(F. Brewer)
Far Eastern Section, FCO Research Department.
14 August, 1970.
Reference...
with o
We have been asked to check with the case study at 1/E/1 for any glaring errors, omissions or dis- tortions.
2. Having due regard to the brevity of the paper I think it presents a fairly accurate account of the events in Hong Kong during 1967.
3.
There are one or two points which I should prefer to have seen dealt with slightly differently:-
(1) Page 1, lines 16 to 18.
"The crisis of May-August, 1967 has been seen as a Chinese warning against any further involvement of Hong Kong in the Vietnam war".
I do not think that this is a view which has ever been taken in this office: however, it is no more than an expression of opinion.
(2) Page 3. lines 26 to 28
"It was really the over-crowded living accommodation rather than bad labour relations which created the ready material for demonstration".
This implies that it was living conditions which caused people to demonstrate. In fact, I think it would be more accurate to say that over-crowded living conditions created a physical situation in which large crowds could very quickly gather for purposes of demonstration.
(3)Page 4,lines 3 and 4
"Young people who formed the large part
of the demonstration were giving vent
to social frustrations."
This again is a matter of opinion. I do not think that it was social frustration so much as an overspill
of fervour from the cultural revolution which caused
the young people to demonistrate.
(4) Page 5, line 8
I do not know why the attitude of the authorities towards the demands of the demonstrators should be described as "intransigent". The nature of those demands was such that they could not be excepted by the authorities without some degree of abdication of responsibility for maintaining law and order and good government of the Colony.
Iticiomo-
I do not think that any of the above err can be regarded as relating to "glaring errors, omissions or distortions" and would not therefore wish
to press them analy
MG.
(A.W. Gaminara) 10 August, 1970
Mu Appleyard
PTO.
Hu Mr Appleyard
T
I
thank
this concerns you
as
much as
it clous
ركت خدماه
2.
I indor
всег
been through
the paper &
Lave
checked it
ад
من
agamist enclosure
12
in envelope behind (2) on
attached
geis)
file. ( you have a cory on your je
(you
My comment
recorded we
art
note.
a love
Have you anythin
thas
11.8.20
راحه ما
Paragraph 1. The intention of the Communists was her to mance the Haykay (wemment Show deference to Pering, though this was undoubtedly are dement. The aim was to force the Hang Kanghwemment to concede the treal Commmmments
in the Weary, a significant part in dies in marking thseize for themselves a privileged position,
to him intiate the Hay havernment and also to justify themselves as Frue revolutionaries in the eyes of Persing (which was them in the throes of the Inltural Partition)
I agree with Hir.
with her. Camimara's point about the
relationship between Hang Kang and the Vietnam trar
Reference..........
The
important factor to remember is that, in our new, the disturbances, were not caused by orders from Pering
They
were the result of a spontaneous outburst by The local Communists who saw in the Cultural
they may have felt
Partition inside China justification for extrement lution in the lding. In some cases they may Antiged to chuan strate their verventionary fervour to as not to be inticized for maction. Nor is it time to
sny the the
the the steady Jay
deterioration in Smo-British
Illallais was the background to the situation, the implication kang that this was are of the causes. Rather the alteriiration in nevllatehio was
the Mault and nor the cause. Hitherto in the 1967
fourvelations were for from cordial. but they were
as a resuer of the IT disturbances
Foverable Ir was only
that Movelations really sume to a very low level
It is a gross oversimplification (no to tay error) to angger that Hangkang
was used as an
altarative target in the cultural rectution. the time the 14 cnsis flared up the thinnere
were alr
already quarrelling wat the Russians,
French, Indian, etc. It is time that they used/their
Reference
their
dispulls with foreign country form a cynical alterupt to achieve national nuity. But this was arly a Side-issue in the main internal Cultural
Herbution while went on in full spate through ant
раде
the Hang Kang crisis. (para. 3).
наукадин
Page 2. Paragraph 2. I presume what is meant in line 5 is that gunboats were fewr to the We han
from Carton (which they were).
area from
Page 3 and 4 I strongly support thr. Gemminara's
buggertians. The reasars why the people were
was because they wished to flow their in the eyes of Perving. The genere
demonstrating
fertiti rany zeal
(non communist) population of His was hotale or apathetic to the demonstrators, who were fan very largely Communist.
"
Page 5 para!. langget simply "and green" histead of " and attempt to govern".
Page 6. The Office in Parking
Raining
the
is van Affice of the
Britik Chargé d'Affaires and is not an
вид
Embaray Fine
The ostens the reason for the destruction of the Office
refusal
was the farture of the H.K. Government (correctly in
сам пишит
(our view) to reopen certain Canmumist newspapers
whill had been closed for flagrant and repeated
subversion, including the increment of
virence
ajamor the price.
Intpreeyor
14/8
FED
Mr. I.M. Sinclair
with
STUDY OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF
DISPUTES
With reference to your minute of 30 July addressed to the Research Department on the above subject, I attach a memorandum setting out the comments of the Far Eastern Department and this Department on the paper enclosed with your minute. I appreciate that we were asked to check only glaring errors, omissions or distortions. However, the paper contains a number of general statements which include opinions which in our view are distorted or inaccurate. We therefore felt bound to record our comments on them, although I appreciate that the Case Study will be published as an entirely private exercise without any official vetting.
(A. W. Gaminara) Hong Kong Department
17 August,1970
C.C. Mr Breww (Research Depres)
L
пада радел
THE DAVID DAVIES MEMORIAL INSTITUTE
OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES. CASE STUDY
OP DISTURBANCES IN HONG KONG IN 1967
file
Comments of Yar Faster Department and Hong Kong Department on Case Study.
Paragraph 1. The intention of the Communists was not to make the Hong Kong Government show deference to Peking, although this was undoubtedly one element. The aim was to force the Hong Kong Government to concede to the local Communists a significant part in decision making in the Colony, to seize for themselves a privileged position, to humiliate the Hong Kong Government and to justify themselves as true revolutionarie: in the eyes of Peking (which was then in the throes of the cultural revolution.
Paragraph 2.first sentence It is not true to say that the steady deterioration in Sino-British relations was the background to the situation. Rather was the deterioration in relations the result and not the cause of the Hong Kong
disturbances,
Paragraph 2. last sentence This is, of course, only an expression of opinion but it is not one which is shared by this office. In our view the disturbances were not caused by orders from Peking, they were the result of a spontaneous disturbance by the local Communists who saw in the cultural revolution inside China, justification for extremist action in the Colony. They may even have felt obliged to demonstrate their revolutionary fervour so as not to be criticised for
inaction.
Paragraph 3 It is an over-simplification to suggest that Hong Kong was used as a reluctant target in the cultural revolution. By the time that the Hong Kong crisis flared up the Chinese were already quarreling with the Russians and other nations. It is true that they used their disputes with foreign countries in an attempt to achieve national unity. But this was only a side issue in the main
international cultural revolution which went on in full
spate throughout the Hong Kong crisis.
Pago 3. last 3 lines It was not overcrowded living
accommodation which caused the demonstrations. It would be more accurate to say that overcrowded living conditions created a physical situation in which large crowds could
/2....
17,
-2-
very quickly gather for the purposes of demonstration.
Page 4. lines 3 and 4 The view that young people demonstrated in order to give vent to social frustrations is not shared by this office. It was an over-spill of fervour from the cultural revolution which caused the young people to demonstrate. The vast bulk of the population of Hong Kong was hostile or apathetic to the demonstrators who were very largely Communist.
Page 5. line 8 It is not known why the attitude of the authorities towards the demands of the demonstrators
should be described as "intransigent". The nature of those demands was such that they could not be accepted by the authorities without some degree of abdication of responsibility for maintaining law, order and good government in the Colony. Page 6. line 13 The office in Peking is the office of the British Charge d'Affaires and is not an Embassy. The ostensible reason for the destruction of the office was legal action taken by the Hong Kong Government to close down certain Communist newspapers for the flagrant and repeated publication of subversive material, including the incitement of violence against the police.
|
Reference
will @
1/5 1
will
Mu Walter. (Research Depot: M,114)
understand that the paper al (1/12
you
for action.
be interested in the comment of
be coming
to
12. You may
the
recorded on
F.E.D
& H.K.D., as
altached white sheets:
the Hong Kong Park's compantione
A
3.
coby of
report on
the 1967 chisturbance
H' Brewer in January, 1969
was sent 15
4. If you agor
with
одне
be best if they
were
your
Jattach
FED May
2.
A
comm wh
it might
included with
in repaying to it" Sinclair.
ARG
12.8.70.
copy of my
сору
Hong Kong
Denu.
comments. You
with is take up on points in the
o
I could refer Reats gourt (EI) commenti be sent separabling to Mr. Sinclair. Would you Kindly arrange
Rest.
IES RD
14/5/70