FCO 40/154 Disturbances 1967-1968

FCO 40/154

1863,9

YEAR

STAMP

DO NOT RETAIN FILES AND PAPERS LÍNNECESSARILY

RETURN THEM TO REGISTRY FOR,B.U. OR P.A.

(N.B. The grading of this jacket must be the same as that of the highest graded document contained in it. The appropriate upgrading ship must be affixed when ever necessary.)

SECRET

FON &'I AND COMMONWEALTH

OFFICA

DET.

Contents checked for transfer

(Sgd.)

D.R.O.

12.970

1926

Date

HC..2 K

FILE NO. HKK1/18

KUNG

(Part )

TITLE: HONG KONG: POLITICAL & ADMINISTRATIVE

AFFAIRS INTERNALI

REFER TO

NAME

(and dept. when necessary) SEE:

Registi

M.N. A Smith D2%

DISTURBANCES 1467/68.

REFER TO

DATE

NAME (and dept. when necessary)

DATE

NAME

DATE

SEE:

(and dept. when necessary)

SEE:

261, 21.

March

Best...

16/6

Bester.

11/6

2011, in Caring

n N. Smid @ 27/12 Begal

Mr. Ganumara NN. A Smitt Mr. Lovell PUSD

29/11 M

3/12

£2.

MR NA Smith

Mr. Lovell PusD

M NA. Silk + 9/12

271

Laminare 1166/

271

Mr. Gammara (3+3 ~/ M Laminers

PART

Regist

14/1 Mi Wicksn

Mr. Samin and

the howell Buse m March

Aum Saminant.

18271

241, 4th Barley

24/1

Rist m Marsh All 241

Me Jaminowa

81/1717H

P'LE No.

1/4

17/5

27/177

Registry Address

K371

King Charles Street.

(N.B. The grading of this jacket must be the same as that of the document contained in it. The appropriate upgrading slip must be affixed when ever necessary.)

graded

(5974)

SECRET

YEAR STAMP

1960,

CS. 41C

2600079

20,000-2/68-13957]

No. CR 51/3371/67

CONFIDENTIAL

É and ?

gkts

COLONIAL SECRETARIAT.

LOWER ALBERT ROAD. HONG KONG,

Dear Gaminara,

20th November, 1968.

file cos an ANNEY

　　　　　　　　　Here are six copies of a comprehensive report on the bomb campaign in Hong Kong in 1967, for such distribution as you may think advisable in Whitehall.

　　　　　　　　　Copies are being distributed through the Services and the London based intelligence agencies here.

　　　　　　　　　We are also sending copies to Hibbert in Singapore and to Wilford in Washington.

your minicarel

A.W. Gaminara, Esq., C.M.G., Hong Kong Department, Foreign and Colonial Office, LONDON S.W. 1

RECEIVED IN Encls ARCHIVES No.31

26 NOV 1958

никую

(J.A. Harrison)

Hr Smart Minite and

draft the

I think this shd. disturbances file. I should ack. recefir with thanks. 12. consido distributia of cop No have has previous Fourt

report on TIAMO

for distilation. for fTIA

كاسة

25.11.68

TOP COPOV

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

26 NOVEMBER 1968

ны

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A

PRIORITY HONG KONG

TELEGRAM NO%205

CONFIDENTIAL

ALDRESSED FCO TELEGRAM NO. 2206 OF 26TH NOVEMBER REPEATED PEKING,

TAMSU1, AND WASHINGTON.

FILI QUOTE THE CHAIRMAN UNQUOTE.

THE LOCAL COMMUNIST PRESS HAS BEEN VIGOROUSLY ATTACKING THE ALLEGED

VILIFICATION OF MAO IN THIS TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM BEING MADE

MAINLY AT PINEWOOD AND IN TAIWAN. A FEW LINK SCENES WERE CUE TO BE

SHOT HERE AT THE WEEKEND, THE ASSOCIATION OF HONG KONG WITH THE

FILM HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF SPECIAL ATTACK.

2. IT IS LIKELY THAT IF THE FILM COMPANY PROCEEDED WITH ITS PLANS

TO SHOOT IN PUBLIC PLACES HERE, THERE WOULD BE DISTURBANCES. WE

ARE THEREFORE INFORMING THE COMPANY THAT FOR THAT REASON WE CANNOT

ALLOW THEM TO SHOOT IN HONG KONG. WE HOPE THE COMPANY WILL ACCEPT

THE DECISION WITHOUT ARGUMENT AND WILL AGREE TO ANNOUNCE THAT IT

HAS CHANGED ITS FLANS BUT IF IT IS NOT CO-OPERATIVE WE SHALL

ANNOUNCE THAT WE CANNOT PERMIT THE PROPOSED SHOOTING.

3. WE HAVE INFORMED THE U.S. CONSULATE-GENERAL WHO DO NOT DISSENT.

FCO PLEASE PASS PRIORITY PEKING TAMSU! AND WASHINGTON.

SIR D. TRENCH

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

H.K.D.

F. EAST. DEPT.

I.P.D.

I.A.D.

NEWS DEPT.

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31

26NOV 1968

AKK1/18

Sto

Reference....With /1

Mr. Gaminara

One

Two copies of the previous bomb report were brought back from Hong Kong by Sir Arthur Galsworthy in January this year. of the two copies is at /681 on HWB 1/17 and the second was retained by the Police Adviser.

As copies of the present report have been distributed through the services and the London based intelligence agencies in Hong Kong there is little distribution left for us to do. I suggest we keep one copy on file and one in the department and send one each to the Police Adviser and Far Eastern Department. The remaining two copies should, I suggest, be destroyed as we do not have unlimited space for the storage of confidential documents.

3. I attach a draft acknowledgment to Harrison.

Norman A. Smith

N.A.SMITH

28 November 1968

Hr Suth

May we please discuss!

ANG

29.11.

WS.

Now see my minute

my minute of 3/12

M'Barin

PA on disturbances

file.

ARG

28.11.

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31 29 NOV 1968

HKKI

ལས་ཀྱི་ས་གནས་གས་བ་

Mr. Carter

Mr. C. H. Godden

HWB1/18

Mi kamyone of..

I am now sending you a draft record of the whole of Lord Shepherd's discussions with Hr. Jackson- Lipkin, covering both interviowo on 13 and 20 November.

The first interview was entirely concerned with legal matters, and I do not believe that it will be necessary to take any action other than that which followed the Minister's previous meeting with Mr. de Basto, Chairman of the Hong Kong Bar Association, during August. Such action as was then necessary has been taken on File HWB 14/61 but there is nothing yet to report.

3. As Mr. Jackson-Lipkin was told on the 20 November, it will be very difficult to follow up his report that a Magistrate sentenced certain spectators at his court summarily for contempt until he, Mr. Jackson -Lipkin, provides us with full details, which he has undertaken to do. I understand that at the time of the disturbances there was a concerted Communist attempt to disrupt proceedings in a Magistrate's Court where the offenders had to be dealt with summarily by contempt procedure, but their misconduct amounted to a great deal more than merely failing to stand up. Hr. Jackson-Lipkin may well have picked up an incomplete or biased account of that or a similar occasion.

Police (Paras 8 and 9 of the record).

It has not been difficult to establish that there is no truth whatsoever in Mr. Jackson-Lipkin's allegation that the Crown Agents recruit British Police Officers without using at opnídidates' interviews the services of any Senior Hong Kong Police Officer who huppene to be on leave at the time and available. According to Mr. Jackson- Lipkin this charge was made at the Police Training School, but in fact it transpires that Senior Superintendent P. T. Hoor, Commandant Designate of the Police Training School is on leave at the moment and has been sitting at candidates' interviews with the Crown Agents. This apart other Police Officers on leave have attended previously and the Police Advisers, FCO, both with very considerable overseas police experience, attend regularly,

5. Although I have not recorded it in the note of the meeting, Mr. Jackson-Lipkin also charged that vacancies in the Hong Kong force vore not properly notified at this end, so that to his knowige Metropolitan Police, who would have applied were unable to do so. I have established that all such yácancies are advertised and that interested Officers from the Metropolitan Force may apply and have on occasions done вo.

/It is impossible

6. It is impossible to take seriously Mr. Jackson- Lipkin's accusation that no Director of Education had ever visited a "roof-top school" simply because, presumably, he was told at the one such school he visited himgalf that the Director had not been there, It is likely that he was given the answer the school authorities thought he wanted. With regard to the relation between the number of primary and secondary school places, I noe that an analysis of the

progression for 1966 (the latest figures available at this stage) of the percentage presing from primary schools to school certifio te courses whol

Government and Aided School

15.6%

Assisted places in Private

Schools

2.5%

Private Schools

50.3%

68.4%

The total percentago progressing from primary schooln to Modern, Tecunical, an. Special Courses, not leading to a school certificate, was higher, 73.6%.

I do not think it is worth commenting on these hardy annu-l com,1/ints against Colonial service. They arise of course from the different conditions which must apply to expatriates and indigenous staff and from the establishment difficulties caused by periods of bone leave for expatriates.

Agricultyre.

Farming subsidies are not paid in the Colony, but there fe excellent arrangements for agricultural credit, financial assistance being rendered to farmers from a number of credit funds administerců by the department, the Government accepting responsibility of bearing such ccuts in addition to supplementing these funds as necessary. Work on improved breeding streing of live-stock is concentrated on pigs end poultry rather than cattle. There is very limited grazing for cattle, and thuse in the Colony are reared and maintained principally for draft purposes.

But there

is a herd of dairy Freeian cttle which has to be maintained in specialised conditions by the Government.

25 November 1968

(II. E. Stewart) Hong Kong Department

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference

Br Badon (Communications Dept.)

Mr. Mackintosh held a meetiu:

verturns to that bei_ner

look into the question of e Lurig Folley Department and, throw. h then the Ministry of herence, wer kpt fully informed of events in the remaining dependent territories, e th: iif

3, trouble looked like: blowing up, wo should Love adv.he warning, or it.

יז

In the course of the dineneaton, 20. Gʻ the former Colonial Office offlers

اب

::/

•

וי

chare of th: drepeticent trily burnt..,

rlier talegres tributi alch ...] Oke of on

"Disturbance. Dintribution" (I was known as understand that Hi: Leckwood, one of the Telegram.

15, 1: acquainted with the details). It

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　tlio Las mong stud that it would be helpful i! dintribution could be resurrected, no 1 h 17 trouble did occur, all those who would be concerned

ith it could be plcnd automatically on the

Centary distribution. It wile only by od in energencies. The recipients would be normally the departa ni dealing with the territory, the Corroaponian politicul depuritats op hung likely to be affected in the FCO, 1.1one Bulic Papartment, Frobably 108D and various individuals in the Hinistry of Def meg. Tharu mi ht also others who should be on the distribution.

I should be grateful for your comment on the

Ther: propel that this should be resurrected. Comme to mu good deal of merit in it, since when

fri- a crisis of this kini arises, one of the culties is to ensure that ll those concerned ord aware of what 1. going on, and can thus attend meetings fully briefed. An automatic distribution would ensure th.3, but there may be technical reasons against it of which I am not aware.

RAJykes

(R.A. Sykes)

29 November, 1968

1.27!

Copies to:

Mr. Mackintosh

Mr. Fairclough (W.I.D. Mr. Jarrom (P.I.O.D.) Mr. Bennett (G.S.A.D) Mr. Bullock (N.A.C.D) Mr. Carter

Mr. Gigam MG. 3/12

(Hong Kong Dept.)

میں

2/12

O'FIDENCI S.

RECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES No.31

- 3DEC 1968

нка

11/18

紫

WIBIL 51-7433

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

た

22/1/63,

Registry

No. HKK 1/18

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.

Secret.

N.A.S

DRAFT

Toftajar

J.A.Harrison L.,

Colonial Secretariat,

Confidential,

28/11

Hong Kong.

Restricted. Unclassified.

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

Type 1 +

From

Mr. A.W.Gaminara

Telephone No, & Ext.

Department

Hong Kong

Thank you for your letter

CR 51/3751/67 of 20 November 1968.

ér

The comprehensive report on the bomb

is being studied

and

campaign has been read with much interest

we are a warrying for cop 16 here, and we shell keep copted date chichibution,

　　durecives be dicebatut given app forial and give one eaek to the Pellee Adviser

and Far Eastern Department,

HKK 1/18

CONFIDENTIAL

29 November, 1968

Thank you for your letter CR51/3751/67 of 20 November, 1968.

The comprehensive report on the bomb campaign is being

studied with interest here, and we are arranging for it to be

given appropriate distribution.

(A. W. Gaminara)

Major J. A. Harrison, Colonial Secretariat, HONG KONG.

Recive to Mr Smith

with my

of 29/00.

minute to him

29.

جب

CONFIDENTIAL

3. 41A

2600077

10,000-2/68-B5987)

Ref. CR 51/3371/67

Dear Gaminava,

CONFIDENTIAL

COLONIAL SECRETARIAT LOWER ALBERT ROAD HONG KONG

28th November, 1968.

Last week I sent you six copies of a Special Branch bomb report.

Immediately thereafter

I was told that there was a chronic shortage of copies here and I am now in some embarrassment to meet demands. I wonder if it would be possible for you to arrange that, of your six copies, one goes to MOD(DIS2), one to the Security Service and one to MI6. This will make it easier for me to satisfy a rather clamorous demand here.

I apologise for this but Special Branch, on whom I bid for extra copies, were too late in confessing their shortage.

yours sincerel

རུའི་རྒྱུངས་དམག་

(J.A. Harrison)

A.W. Gaminara, Esq., C.M.G.,

Foreign and Commonwealth

Office,

Whitehall, London.

на

Mr Smith

Please

ANES

3.12.68

speak.

1.271

CONFIDENTIAL

RaR

velmon f

fie from for Perio.

ANG

34.

RECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES No.31

9DEC 1968

MKK 1/18

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference

with (6

Mr. Lover1

With reference to your minute of

4 December I attach four copies of the Special Branch bomb report. I should be grateful if you could keep one and distribute the rest to MOD(S2), the Security Service and MI6 as requested in Harrison's letter below. If the copy I sent you under my minute of 3 December has already gone to one of these addresses then I should be grateful if one copy could be returned to

me.

Norman A. Smith

N.A.SMITH

Hong Kong Department

4 December 1968

New Smith.

Cafres seat relined herein t

repaded and

Cech AL

5/12/08

Mr. Gaminara

Tall Amply

Two copies are now left.

One copy

to remain on this file The remaining copy I have sent off file to be seen by the Overseas Police Adviser and retained by Far Eastern Department.

Norman A. Smwith

N.A.SMITH

9 December 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

6.000-

with (6

Reference

Mr. Lovell

al 4/12

Please see my minute of 28 November with /1 Mr. Gaminara has agreed with the distribution I have proposed at paragraph 2. of the remaining two copies however he has suggested that you might like one and may be able to suggest a suitable recipient for the remaining one.

Norman A. Smith

N.A.SMITH

Hong Kong Department

3 December 1968

m Smith

I have sent

fant to prople who are

interested and would be guntiful if y

send

the thes

добре в за

A Parf

یه او

could

W.S.CARTER, ES..

HONG KONG FEPT

"1. Smith

hay

Any views?

With the compliments of

COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT

4/12

FOREIGN and COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,

LONDON, S.W.1.

3 December,

1968

HICKI/IS

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Sykes (Defence Policy Department November.

Thank you for your" minūte

The present arrangements for circulating Inward telegrams dealing with troubles in the dependent territories are as follows:-

Advance copies are sent as quickly as possible to:

Defence Opera:ions Centre, .O.D.

Duty Intelligence Staff, .O.D.

Duty Intelligence officer, Cabinet Office No. 10 Downing Street.

Any other outside recipient would be sent copica at the request of the department concerned or the Resident Clerk.

The telegram is given Departmental or FCO/WH Distribution as appropriate, FCO/TH being given to important telegrams of wide interest. For these telegrams these distributions always include the Overseas Police Adviser, the Overscas Labour Adviser, the Emergency Unit, Consular Depart- ment, IRD, and D.1.5. H.O.D. in addition to their noranl recipients.

In addition the telegram is given the "J.I.C.) Additional Distribution. This additional distribution (copy attached) covers the non-> F.C.O. recipients of the old Colonial Office: Disturbancea Distribution the recipients within the Office being covered by Department al or FCO/WH.

Ao an exception to the use of the J.I.C. additional distribution, we are, at the request of the geographical departments concerned sending telegramo about troubles in Fiji and the Bahamas respectively to the recipients on the attached separate sheets. As you will see, these additional distributione are more limited than the J.I.C. additional distribution

In the case of Outward telegrams we follow the instructions of originators as given on the drafta but endeavour to ensure that the same broad lines of policy are followed.

It seems to me that this matter is best dealt with by means of additional distributions but we should be happy to make any changes in the detailed arrangements which you or the other recipients of your minute, to whom I an co; ying this, think would be appropriate. If changes are thought necessary it would be helpful if either your department or one of the dependent territory departments could co-ordinate views and let us have an agreed request.

RECEIVED INV

ARCHIVES No.31 -ODL1968

c.c. Mr. MacKintosh

n. Fairclough

(1.B. Eaden)

Communications Department

her, 1968

FOREIGH OFFICE

CABINET OFFICE

J.1.C. DISTRIBUTION

from E12,

Mr. F.T. Copeland, Information Research Dept.

Riverwalk House.

Secretary J.I.C. (1 copy)

Duty Intelligence Officer, J.I.R.

COUNCIL

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE(WHITEHALL) Lord President of the Council.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

BOX 500, c/o Room 27 903

Forefice, D.St. (East) I games office

Poom Std

(1_cers).

Message Control, Rm.039, D.C.C., Whitehall

Gardens, S.3.1.

(27 copies - DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION ONLY -

indicate for "J.I.C. Distribution")

Miss A. Roberts (2 copies)

Director General, c/o Miss A. Roberts

اعتماد

(2 copies)

Ei Ault - (4 copies)

14/6.

c/o Room S, Foreign Office,

Freig

हूँ

D.St. (ful

• (Est)

Director G.C.H.. for the attention of 2(50)

(2 copies)

G.C.O. (London), c/o G.C.H.Q.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

UNHAGE IN FIJI

Head of D.1.2., Main Bldg.

CABINET OFFICE

D.I.O.

(Miss Heard, P.1.0.Dept.-12/40/57)

BAHAMAS:

DISTURBANCES

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE,

Main Bldg.

D.I.S.

Mr. D.A.J. West, D.S.11, Rm.7353. Mr. T.F. Ronayne, D.S.5, Rm.8386. Assistant Chief of Defence Stafe ( } Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (1 olier)

(Mr. Tansey, W.Indian Dept.)

Tanse

12.11.68

(

W(B)L 51-7433

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry

No. HKK 1/18

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

DRAFT

To:-

Top Secret.

N.A.S

Secret.

Major J.A.Harrison

Confidential, 9/12

Restricted. Unclassified.

PRIVACY MARKING

Colonial Secretariat

Hong Kong

In Confidence

Type 1 +

From

A.W. Gaminara

NxAxi

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

Hong Kong

Mr. Gaminara

Thank you for your letter CR51/3371/67

of 28 November.

Portunately this

arrived before we had made the distribution

mentioned in my letter of the 29th and

we have now distributed copies of the

report as requested in your latest

letter.

Mu Smith

6.1d6

Gammara

i've had better look

at these exchanges

with a views to

Commenting.

co. Hr. Mackintosh

Mr. Eeden

Mr. Jerron Er. Bennett Mr. Bullock

Br. Carter ✓

버스

Sykes

CON

Defence Policy Department

Disturbances in the Dependent Territor;

balegrar Petribution

I have scen Hr. Exden'a minuto af 3 December to you about arrangemanta for the circulation of telograma concerning disturbances in the Dependent Cerritories. It seems from what Hr. Laden anys

that, provided that the successive steps noted in his minute to widen the distribution of telegraSS are taken in good time, the existing arrangements covor the requirements, But 7 as left very much wondering why we need to put Communications Department and ourselves through this "obatnole race". I rezain of the view that the simplest and mout effective way of dealing with this problem - which as we all recognise ona be of very vital importance in an sotāve internal security situation would be for a standard "Disturbances Distribution" to be re-established covering all the addrazagos noted at (2) to (3) in Mr. Enden's minute. A6 I indicated at our meeting with Er, Hackintosh a few days ago, I would have thought that it should be for Refence Policy Department (whether on ita own initiative or on request from the Dependent Territorios Administration Departments concerned) to activate the use of Disturbances Distribution by paosing a request to this effect to Conxunica- tions Department.

RECEIVED V ARCHIVES No.3!

(A. J. Fairclough) West Indian Department 5 December, 1968

Reference.

with 18

Mr. Gaminara

As far as Hong Kong is concerned

a "Disturbances Distribution" or something very like it did exist at the time of the disturbances in Hong Kong last year. I am not sure whether it was a long-standing distribution or whether it was built up ad hoc during the course of the disturbances. Communications department no doubt still have a copy of it and could reactivate it whenever necessary.

Norman A. Smith

N.A.SMITH

9 December 1968

HKK 1/18

CONFIDENTIAL

17 December 1968

Your letter No. CR 51/3371/67

of the 28 November arrived before we had taken the action mentioned in my letter to you of the 29 November.

We have now given the Special

Brench bomb report the distribution for which you ask in your letter of the 28 November.

(A. W. Gaminara)

Major J. A. Harrison,

Colonial Secretariat,

HONG KONG

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Carter

HKK 1/18

Reference...

(10)

With reference to your note on Mr. Fairclough's minute to Mr. Sykes or 5 December, I have looked at the arrangements for the circulation of telegrams concerning last year's disturbances in Hong Kong.

2. At the outset of the disturbances, the distribution was relatively small, but as the disturbances continued the distribution built up until it reached the following maximum distribution which was maintained until the end of the disturbances:

JIC external distribution (I do not know if this is the same as the JIC additional distribution referred to in Mr. Eaden's minute of 3 December)

ent, distribution.

Department

In addition, copies were sent to:

Private Secretary to the Prime Minister.

Cabinet Office - DIO, JIR.

Foreign Office - individual officers in the

Far Eastern Department.

Overseas Labour Adviser.

Overseas Police Adviser.

Treasury.

Exports Credit Guarantee Department

Ministry of Defence - various individual officers

Board of Trade- various individual officers

Australia House Canada House

These addressees received copies of SITREPS only.

additional distribution can Koe made

3. It is clear that additional distributions must be determined on an ad-hoc basis, having regard to the particular circumstances of the territory concerned. It often happens that despite the fact that various departments are included in the general distribution, the individual officers in those departments, the often ask if they may be sent additional Copies of telegrams addressed to them by name. This is apparently because it sometimes takes a very considerable time indeed for officers to receive copies of telegrams if they wait for them to reach them as part of the general distribution.

4. I think there would be a definite advantage in laying down a basic distribution for times of trouble: which can be added to suit the circumstances of individual territories. I am not competent to suggest what the basic distribution should be; can however say that the above distribution was perfectly adequate for the needs of Hong Kong last

year.

20 December 1968

hea

(A. W. Gaminara) Hong Kong Department

}

wich (0)

HKK 1/18

Mr. Sykes (Defence Policy Dept.,)

Disturbances in the Dependent Territories:

Telegram Distribution

I attach a copy of a minute by Mr. Gaminara on telegram distribution during the Hong Kong disturbances of 1967.

2. I agree with Mr. Fairclough (his minute of

5 December) that there is a case for a separate wider basic distribution covering (1) and (3) in para 1 of Mr. Eaden's minute of the 3 December and based, so far as (2) is concerned, on the Departmental distribution. To this basic distribution additions can be made ad hoc, as appropriate, e.g. by giving a FCO/WH distribution, by adding named dep.rtments or named individuals.

30 December 1968

Copies to:

Mr. MacKintosh Mr. Eaden

Mr. Jerrom

Mr. Bennett

Mr. Bullock

Mr. Fairclough

(W.S. Carter) Hong Kong Department

Mr. Sykos (Defonos lolicy r^partment)

ITG 8/1

Pisturbances in Terendant Kerritories: telesnor

mistribution

G.S.A.D. would velcome soɑething in the Laturo of a "Disturbances" distribution based on the first ¡cragraph of Mr. Toan'a simte of 3 December. This would include tho J.I.C. additional distribution together with the E.0.D. rooipients shon for Bahamas disturbances, renely,

"IS 09.11 D3.5

/CLS (CFD) LCIS (Folicy)

To this braid "Disturbinoes" distribution could be câlod the appropriate 0. D.M. roopray ionl Dagartmont - co O.D.L. like to to kept inforzod of dovolo;acnts of this nature - and the other enroʻrieto F.C.0, Wapartments (0.5. Letir. Ineriean reprtant for the Falkland islands, and Southern Furopean Depertaent for Gibraltar, and m on).

3. It is cusco:ted also that the bagio "Disturbances" distribution chauló include the recipients suggested in Mr. Gaminara'a minute of 20 Iovember, the an additional to those at item 2 of jaragrogh i of Er. Ecden's minute of 3 December.

(R. C. Cax) G. 3. A. D. 9 January, 1969

Copies to

Kr. Fairclough (F.I.D.)

Mr. Jarron (1.1.0.D.).

Hr. Bullock (B.A.C.D.)

Hr. Carter (Hong Kong Department) Mr. Baden (Comunications Deportment)

{{..

Ganfinanci Im

K: 271

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31

1 5 JAN 1969

HKK 1/18

14, 1.69

HONG KONG

DISTURBANCES

1967

CONFIDENTIAL

HONG KONG DISTURBANCES

1967

PRINTED BY THE GOVERNMENT PRINTER

HONG KONG

CONFIDENTIAL

HONG KONG DISTURBANCES 1967

This report records the history of confrontation in Hong Kong from its beginnings in May until 31st December, 1967.

This report is being distributed on a restricted basis to Government departments and other official organizations.

It is NOT being published at the present time and must not be released to the Press.

iii

65161-6K-12/68

COLONIAL SECRETARIAT

HONG KONG July 1968

Chapter

Chapter 2

Chapter 3

Chapter 4

HONG KONG DISTURBANCES

1967

INDEX

THE BACKGROUND

THE START OF CONFRONTATION

DISORDERS IN KOWLOON.

DEMONSTRATIONS IN VICTORIA

Chapter 5

STOPPAGES of Work

Chapter 6

THE PORT OF HONG KONG

Chapter 7

THE FOOD SITUATION

Chapter 8

THE NEW TERRITORIES

Chapter 9

FURTHER DISORDERS AND GOVERNMENT

COUNTER-MEASURES

Chapter 10

BOMB ATTACKS

Chapter II

THE WATER SHORTAGE

Chapter 12

COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

Chapter 13

THE ADMINISTRATION

Chapter 14

CONCLUSION

Paragraph

116

136

151

160

171

190

Appendix I

Appendix II

Appendix III

Appendix IV

Appendix V

Appendix VI

A list of Associations that expressed their support for

the Government.

Transportation Used and Import Tonnage of all goods

(including Food Supplies) from China for 1967. Import of Foodstuffs from China.

General Consumer Price Index Figures for each month

from September 1966 to December 1967. Emergency Regulations.

Confrontation Statistics as at 31st December, 1967.

Maps

The New Territories.

Hong Kong Island: Northern shore. Kowloon.

CHAPTER 1

THE BACKGROUND

THE history of confrontation in Hong Kong begins with the inaugura- tion by Chairman Mao Tse Tung of the cultural revolution in China. Hong Kong, because of its geographical position and its history has inevitably been affected by events in China. More than 95% of its population is Chinese by race, almost all of whom have some ties with the mainland and, while there are many who have come to regard the Colony as their permanent home, there are also many who regard their stay here as a temporary interlude until they return to their true home in China. The effects of the cultural revolution therefore, and in partic- ular the intense patriotism and the devotion to Chairman Mao Tse Tung and his teachings that it engendered, were bound to spill over into Hong Kong.

2. One of the main doctrines of the cultural revolution is the over- throw of capitalism; indeed its main target is the 'revisionists' who have been led away from the true revolutionary spirit to take the capitalist road". It was therefore in full accordance with the revolution that action and violent action if necessary-should be taken against capitalist Hong Kong. There were many examples to show the way: in China itself the Red Guards had demonstrated the power of revolu- tionary action; the communists in Macau had at the end of 1966 shown that the precepts of Chairman Mao Tse Tung, backed with a show of force, were able to compel a colonial government to accept the demands of the revolutionary masses; and in Hong Kong itself the same spirit, and the same tactics, had been successful in a dispute with a major shipping line.

3. It seems clear in retrospect that the more fanatical communists in Hong Kong were convinced not only that they should apply the principles of the cultural revolution to the Colony but also that they were certain to carry the population with them. Fully indoctrinated themselves and believing that the "Thoughts of Mao' were invincible, they could not, they thought, fail to convince their 'compatriots' that it was their duty to fight for these ideals. Moreover any move against

what was described as a repressive colonial Government was bound to attract wide popular support. There were however other views. There were many in the Colony who had left or escaped from China because they were fundamentally opposed to the principles of communism; there were many others who had little or no interest in ideologies, who were in Hong Kong to earn a living and who wished only for peace and order to be maintained. There was a divergence of views among the professed communists themselves. Hong Kong is of con- siderable economic advantage to China which draws the better part of its much needed foreign currency through the Colony, either in the form of remittances from overseas Chinese or through the sale of produce exported to Hong Kong and transhipped in its port. The moderate communist view was that, while in revolutionary theory the Colony was an affront to the Chinese people, the valuable benefits it provided to China (and no doubt to themselves) should not in practice be jeopardized.

　　　　　4. The basic aims of both factions, so far as they have been formu- lated, are probably similar: to force the Government into a position of subservience to communist domination. But while the moderates, dragged unwillingly into the struggle, would wish to see this achieved by peaceful means that would not affect the continuing prosperity of Hong Kong, the extremists were prepared to go to any lengths to achieve this result even if it meant the destruction of the Colony as such and its integration with China.

　　　　　5. This dichotomy of views was apparent in the direction of con- frontation which fluctuated between comparatively peaceful demonstra- tions and outright violence as the attitude of one or other of the factions prevailed. It was also apparent that neither the more moderate communists in Hong Kong nor the Chinese Peoples Government, dis- tracted as it has been by its own internal disorders, were able, or willing, to restrain or control the extremist element.

　　　　　6. Despite their expectations of mass support, those who took an active part in confrontation remained a tiny minority of the popula- tion. It was not a popular movement and, after what may be described as the first flush of enthusiasm, the numbers of those supporting the cause progressively dwindled. The events described in this report, which may give the impression of wide-spread disorders, were organized by a comparative handful of men and women who, by the payment of bribes to hooligans, by intimidation and by 'strike pay' to workers, created an

exaggerated picture of their real strength. The overwhelming majority of the population was not involved and has, often at considerable in- convenience, continued to go about its ordinary work.

7. As the record shows, the Government was throughout at pains to use as little force as necessary in dealing with the disorders. It was not engaged in a 'war' with the communists. It is not an offence in itself to be a communist or to study the teaching of Chairman Mao Tse Tung. The ban on the dissemination of inflammatory literature or posters does not include quotations from 'Mao's Thoughts' or the display of his portrait. The Government's sole concern has been the maintenance of law and order and the prevention and punishment of criminal acts whether they are committed by communists or by anyone else.

CHAPTER 2

THE START OF CONFRONTATION

8. At the beginning of 1967 there were 57 unions in the Colony with a paid-up membership of 60,000 under the control of the communist- dominated Federation of Trade Unions. The influence of these unions varied but they had considerable strength, though by no means a majority, in the labour force of many Government departments, essential services, public transport and shipping companies.

9. These unions were basically political associations. They were little concerned to safeguard the interests of their workers although they had gained some success in the improvement of working condi- tions for them. Their main purpose was the political indoctrination of their members by means of propaganda and by intensive courses of study of the works of Chairman Mao. In this they had succeeded to the extent that they had a comparatively small but dedicated core of adherents to the communist cause who had come to regard labour disputes primarily as political issues in which the principles of com- munism and the cultural revolution should, and must, prevail.

10. In this climate, and with the encouragement of the recent events in Macau and the successful confrontation of the shipping company in Hong Kong, it was inevitable that there would be clashes between communist workers and their employers. In the months preceding con- frontation there were major disputes affecting seven undertakings: four taxi companies. a textile factory, a cement works, and a factory pro-

ducing artificial flowers. The course of events was similar in each case. A real or imagined source of grievance, seldom if ever connected with a genuine cause of industrial dispute, was seized upon and exaggerated, political issues were introduced and a series of demands were made that must be accepted 'unconditionally'. Non-communist workers were intimidated and demonstrations were mounted in which groups of com- munists, waving banners and chanting slogans, attempted to overawe their employers by a show of strength.

11. There had been no general deterioration of labour relations at this time and the unrest that was created in these few undertakings was not symptomatic of a general malaise. Its effect moreover was magnified by the noisy demonstrations and the increasingly truculent behaviour of those taking part. They regarded themselves as above authority. They declared that the Police had no right to interfere with their processions; any assistance offered by the Labour Department in settling the disputes was dismissed as 'unwarranted meddling'; when a press photographer took a picture of a procession it was demanded. as of right, that his camera be confiscated.

12. There is no evidence that these outbreaks were co-ordinated or that they formed part of a concerted plan to challenge the Govern- ment; it is more probable that they arose spontaneously as a natural result of the political indoctrination to which the workers concerned had been subjected. It is also probable that the communist leadership in the Colony foresaw the violence to which these actions tended to lead but were unable to exercise sufficient control to prevent them.

　　　　　13. While all these disputes were potentially explosive, it was the one at the Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works that produced the actual spark. This company has a factory at Belcher Street, in Hong Kong Island, employing a staff of 421 and another at San Po Kong in Kowloon with 686 employees. On 13th April 1967 the manage- ment of the company introduced new conditions concerning discipline and rates of pay which affected only the injection moulding section. A series of meetings was arranged between the management and representatives of the employees to discuss the reason for the changes and their implications. After three meetings, which were unproductive, a small but influential group of employees, members of the communist- dominated Hong Kong & Kowloon Rubber and Plastic Workers Union, issued five demands relating to the rates for piece work, the allocation of moulds and the rates to be paid when a worker was idle because of

a defective mould. No demand was made for the hours of work to be altered.

14. Attempts were made to hold a further meeting but these were unsuccessful. The quality of the work at the factory began to deteriorate and, according to the management, cases occurred of wilful damage to the moulds and machines; these led to the dismissal of 23 workers from the Hong Kong factory and 69 from the San Po Kong factory on 28th April. On the following day, as it considered that the situation had deteriorated further, the management closed down the moulding departments of both factories, which resulted in the termination of the services of a further 241 workers in Hong Kong and 325 in Kowloon. At this stage, the Labour Department was informed of the dispute but attempts by officers of the department to assist in its settlement were curtly rejected by the union. An officer calling in person at the union premises was refused admittance and enquiries by telephone were answered by quotations from the works of Chairman Mao Tse Tung.

15. On Saturday 6th May a group of dismissed workers picketing the San Po Kong factory attempted to prevent the removal of goods from the factory. They were warned by the Police that, although peaceful picketing was permissible, it was illegal to offer any physical obstruction. The warning was disregarded and 21 men who continued to obstruct the factory entrance were arrested, among them the chair- man of the union.

16. It was not a serious affair and no one was seriously injured in the clash. The dispute itself could have been settled peaceably; indeed successful discussions were held later, with the assistance of the Labour Department, between the management and employees who were not members of the communist union resulting in the injection moulding sections at both factories being re-opened before the end of the month.

17. The evidence suggests that the incident was not planned as a pretext for confrontation, but it was immediately exploited, possibly against the wishes of the more moderate communist leaders. Headlines appeared in the communist press attacking the Government and accus- ing the Police, in the most violent terms, of brutally attacking unarmed workers. Meetings were held by all communist organizations in support of the San Po Kong workers and posters began to appear protesting

against Police brutality. On 8th May the Rubber and Plastic Workers Union published four demands:

1. the Hong Kong Government must cease its brutality forthwith

and ensure no repetition;

all the arrested persons must be released immediately;

3. compensation must be paid by Government for all injuries and

damage and those responsible must be punished;

there must be no Government interference in labour disputes. The communist Federation of Trade Unions declared its support and published its own demands, in substantially the same form as those already made. Confrontation had begun.

CHAPTER 3

DISORDERS IN KOWLOON

18. Meanwhile demonstrations at San Po Kong continued. The factory was picketed and groups of communists assembled in the vicinity to sing and chant slogans. Pamphlets were handed out extolling the cause of the workers while posters appeared urging the Police to turn against their officers. These demonstrations inevitably attracted a crowd of people, some of whom were merely curious while others were hooli- gans ready to cause trouble. At this time the reputation of the Police was suffering from the after effects of the brief rioting in Kowloon of the previous year. All thinking people had admired the restraint with which they had acted but there were not wanting those who, for reasons of their own, had maliciously spread stories of their alleged brutality; and much of this mud had stuck. At all events, while there was a complete volte face of opinion as confrontation progressed, there were at this stage many who regarded the Police as their enemies and who were quite prepared to jeer and throw stones, or even proceed to more violent action if the occasion arose. These feelings were worked upon by the communists who, as later evidence showed, offered bribes to provoke a disturbance; the going rate was said to be $10 to throw stones and $5 to shout, with rather less for children. The crowds watching the demonstrations grew daily and when the inevitable clash with the Police occurred on 11th May there was a mob at hand ripe for violence.

19. As on 6th May, it was the pickets at the factory that started the incident. Again disregarding the warnings they had been given regarding the limits of legal picketing, they surged towards the factory gates and threatened to break in. As they numbered about a hundred, with an estimated crowd of 1,500 in the offing, the management asked for Police assistance to control the situation. Two companies of Police were sent to the scene shortly after 3.30 p.m. on 11th May but the crowd refused to withdraw or disperse and bottles were thrown at the Police. By 4 p.m. order had been restored: the crowd had been pushed back and, while there was some shouting and waving of 'Red Books', it appeared that the incident would die down. The Police had fired 'baton shells'; these are wooden projectiles discharged from a 'Federal' gas gun which can incapacitate at close range but are not likely to cause serious injury. No tear gas or other weapons were used. The only known casualty was a girl who had been hit on the knee and was slightly injured.

20. The crowd did not, however, disperse and further crowds began to build up in adjacent streets. At the approach of the Police they would melt away only to return to the attack again, often in a more aggressive mood and in larger numbers. At 4.25 p.m. another company of Police was brought into action and they achieved a temporary con- trol of the situation. From experience gained in the disturbances of 1966 it was thought that the presence of the riot police might in itself be a provocation. With this in mind the Police were ordered at 6.20 p.m. to withdraw from the affected area. They were unable to do so and had to fight a rearguard action. The disorders continued: the Kowloon Police companies were mobilized, a helicopter patrol was set up and, finally, at 7.25 p.m., the Police Auxiliaries were called out. It was decided that army units would not be called upon for assistance and they remained in reserve. At 7.30 p.m. the Governor ordered that a curfew be imposed in the area affected, to be in force from 9.30 p.m. until 5.30 a.m, the following morning.

21. By this time rioting had spread from San Po Kong westward to Tung Tau Resettlement Estate and eastward along the Choi Hung Road. Within this area marauding crowds roamed the streets, attacking buses, setting fire to cars and assaulting the Police with stones and bottles. By setting up road blocks and by breaking up the crowds by the use of tear gas the Police gradually brought the situation under control. The main resistance was centred at Tung Tau and, to a lesser

　　　extour Wong Tai Sin Resettlement Estates. These estates, built to re- Asose squatters, are densely populated and provided a natural rallying posent for the rioters. Police action is difficult. They are hampered by ide attendant crowds while the multiplicity and height of the buildings mule them easy targets for bottles and other missiles. A large and Nostik crowd had entrenched itself at the Tung Tau Estate and it was och after cordoning off the centre of resistance and firing several tear gas shells that the Police were able to subdue it.

　　　　22. By 10.30 p.m. the whole area covered by the curfew was generally qeer although there were some isolated incidents during the night.

　　　　　23. The next morning, the 12th May, there was an uneasy calm, Some anxiety was caused by the assembly of a group of textile workers outside a communist-owned cinema and another group demonstrated bedy outside the Green Island Cement Company's premises at Hung Hom, the scene of another dispute; but they both dispersed without bent. One or two groups of children jeered at the Police and threw a few stones. During these days there were large numbers of children about, either alone or mingled with the crowds, and they were a constant source of provocation. Whenever possible the Police took no action against them and did their best to ignore them.

24. Soon after noon, as workers in the factories in the San Po Kong arga came out for their lunch break, crowds again began to build up Choi Hung Road. There was no incident to set off the crowd but, possibly incited by the communist agitators among them, they threw states and bottles at the Police and a general melee ensued. Crowds continued to gather and by 1.30 p.m. the Police were faced by a mob of about 3,000 persons in Choi Hung Road while gangs of youths armed with iron bars were attempting to break into shops in the vicinity. The Police again set up road blocks and had some success in breaking up the crowds by the use of tear gas; but as on the previous day the crowds dis- persed only to reform again and there was renewed violence for the rest of the afternoon and evening. The rioting was confined to the same area as on the previous day, but within this area there were serious disorders. Buses were attacked and set on fire. Traffic signs were pulled down. Private cars were overturned and burnt. The Police were attacked with stones, bottles and iron bars. The resettlement estates were again the centres of the disorder; the resettlement staff quarters at Wong Tai Sin were broken into and looted, and fires were started at Tung Tau.

25. In order to give the Police a better chance of containing and suppressing the rioting, a curfew was imposed at 6 p.m. but it had little immediate effect. Crowds, numbering many hundreds, continued to roam the streets and sporadic attacks were made on Police parties enforcing the curfew. Fires were started and minor incidents occurred throughout the night.

26. By 11 a.m. on the next morning, 13th May, crowds had again begun to gather in San Po Kong and posters appeared condemning the Government for injuring innocent people. By cordoning off the affected arcas and carrying out 'sweeps', the Police dispersed the crowds and kept them off the streets. But they collected in the resettlement estates, where they could not easily be controlled, and rioting and violence continued. At Tung Tau, a mob broke into the estate office and a school; they ran- sacked the resettlement staff quarters and they overturned cars. At Wong Tai Sin the staff quarters were again attacked and were set on fire. At Lo Fu Ngam, fires were started, the Civil Aid Services office was broken into and furniture was dragged out and set on fire. At one estate, Tsz Wan Shan, the situation remained calm; a delegation from the estate Kai Fong or neighbourhood association had visited the Police and had under- taken to maintain law and order themselves. They were as good as their word and throughout the disturbances the estate remained quiet.

27. A curfew was again imposed, to start from 7 p.m. On this night it was effective. There were no further incidents during the night and it appeared that the violence had run its course. The following day, which was Sunday 14th May, there was some stone-throwing but no major in- cident developed and no curfew was imposed.

28. There is little doubt that the riots were inspired and exploited by the communists, both by their own ringleaders who were seen urging the mobs on to further violence, and by the hooligans that they had employed. The majority of those who took part were normally law- abiding people and it is difficult to believe that they were consciously supporting dissident workers in an industrial dispute, or that they were moved by communist ideology or by any discernible cause other than a senseless urge to destruction. The main attacks were against the Police and against Government property which, as the symbols of authority, were natural targets. But there is no reason to suppose that this reflected general discontent or indeed anything more than the excitement of the moment and the effectiveness of the communist agitators. It is signifi- cant that, as the communist aims became clearer, they did not again

succeed in attracting public support. The rioting that took place after these events was virtually confined to dedicated communists and hooligans.

29. The Police and Police Auxiliaries acted with great restraint throughout. Contrary to the allegations in the communist press, they used only tear gas and baton shells in dispersing the crowds. No ball am- munition was used and the sole fatality was a man who was killed at Wong Tai Sin Estate, not by Police action but probably by a brick dropped on his head from a verandah above. Between 11th and 14th May 391 persons were arrested, of whom 367 were subsequently charged, and 32 persons were injured, of whom 7 were admitted to hospital. The Police casualties were 22, of whom 2 were admitted to hospital.

　　　　30. For the next three days there was comparative calm in Kowloon. The number of posters increased, attacking the Police and the Govern- ment. Rumours continued to multiply: the Peking Government was about to take over the Colony; Chinese gunboats had been seen off Castle Peak; electricity and water supplies were to be turned off: the transport companies were about to go on strike. There was a run on some food shops as people laid up stocks as a precaution. Householders filled all available containers with water, and the resulting pressure caused temporary stoppages in some areas-which strengthened the numours of a shortage.

　　　　31. On the 16th May a crowd of about 500 people gathered outside the South Kowloon Magistracy where some of the rioters were being tried. They were kept supplied with refreshments by the communists, who no doubt realized that bottles of mineral water were useful potential weapons and when, at one stage, a group of taxis blocked the road outside the courts it appeared that an incident would develop. There was, however, no violence and the crowd gradually dispersed during the afternoon.

　　　　32. The following day crowds again collected at both the North Kowloon and South Kowloon Magistracies, and by 1 p.m. there were between two and three thousand people near the latter, at the junction of Nathan Road and Gascoigne Road. The crowd refused to disperse and started stoning the Police, who replied with tear gas and baton shells. The crowd then split up into groups which moved into the side streets and gradually worked their way North and South on the line of Nathan Road. There were several clashes with the Police, at Argyle Street, Soy

Street and at various other points along Nathan Road. Stones were thrown at banks, hotels and other prominent buildings. The Post Office at Bute Street was set on fire and there were fires at two other buildings in Nathan Road. Both private and Police vehicles were stoned and two private cars were set on fire. A curfew was imposed at 7.30 p.m. but fires and violence continued until midnight.

33. The next day, 18th May, was quiet. Demonstrations outside the courts continued but they were orderly for the most part and the demonstrators dispersed without incident.

CHAPTER 4

DEMONSTRATIONS IN VICTORIA

34. The scene now shifted to Hong Kong Island. The rioting in Kowloon had provided a pretext for renewed attacks on the Govern- ment, and to back up the poster and press campaign, delegations from various communist organizations made their way to Government House to protest at the Government's 'brutality' and to insist that the com- munist demands be accepted. The first delegation, consisting of four men and a woman from one of the communist newspapers, had appeared at Government House on the morning of 13th May, and they were followed by others on the 14th and 15th.

35. On 15th May a statement was issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Peking protesting at the events in Hong Kong. It referred to the 'sanguinary brutality of the British imperialists', and it expressed full support for the demands made on the Government by the com- munist organizations in Hong Kong and insisted that these demands be immediately accepted. On 19th May the Foreign Secretary delivered an equally strong protest verbally to the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires in London. While the latter did much to raise morale in Hong Kong, the statement from Peking, which was given considerable publicity in the communist press, was taken as evidence of full support for confrontation and gave equal encouragement to the communists.

36. On 16th May it was announced with considerable publicity in the communist press that an 'All Circles Anti-Persecution Struggle Com- mittee' was to be formed. The number of delegations to Government House increased in an organized exercise in intimidation. Groups of people, both men and women, uniformly dressed in white shirts and

and in the vicinity of Pottinger Street. A second crowd moved away to the Star Ferry while the remainder were shepherded eastward by the Police burning the flag at the Fire Services Headquarters in Harcourt Road on the way. By about 6 p.m. the position in the central area was calm and there were no further incidents.

　　　　42. In the midst of these disturbances some communist delegations, including a group of about a hundred school children, passed through to Government House in the small parties permitted by the Police. There were to be further, more or less orderly, delegations in the days that followed but the communists were now plainly seeking a major clash with the Police in order to manufacture a propaganda 'incident',

　　　　43. On the morning of 22nd May crowds again began to gather at Garden Road and at 10 a.m. the Police were faced by about 100 com- munists including students of both sexes. A passer-by who rashly aired his opinion of Chairman Mao was set upon and assaulted. He was rescued by a member of the public, who was later awarded the Belilios Star for his bravery.

44. The demonstrators again demanded to be allowed past the cordon and again shouted abuse and threats when this was refused. To provoke the Police further they made threatening gestures, thrusting their fingers at the eyes of the constables in the leading files opposite them and kicking at their ankles. When this failed to produce the action they wanted, one of them kicked a constable in the groin. The man responsible was arrested; a general melee ensued and the Police used their batons. At once the demonstrators fell to the ground en masse in simulated agony, whether they were hit or not. They produced bandages from their pockets, some already provided with artificial 'bloodstains, and they daubed themselves with the blood of those who had really been injured.

45. The communists had achieved their incident, which was given wide publicity in their newspapers. Its effect however was limited by the fact that the scene was fully covered by non-communist reporters as well as by photographers and television cameramen, while an interested crowd was also watching from the windows of the Hilton Hotel. While the supporters of confrontation might have been con- vinced by the pictures of this play-acting published in the communist press, the true facts of the incident were too well publicized for anyone else to be taken in. The incident tended to prove not the 'brutality' of the Police but their very considerable restraint.

46. By 10.30 a.m. the situation at Garden Road was quiet but crowds began to build up elsewhere, at Statue Square, outside the Hilton Hotel and in the vicinity of Government House. There were demonstrations outside the Causeway Bay Magistracy and a hostile crowd at the Kowloon Star Ferry concourse had to be dispersed by tear gas shells. In Victoria the situation deteriorated. Soon after 2 p.m. the buses stopped running and some buses and taxis were abandoned in the Central area in an attempt to cause traffic jams. The ferry services had been temporarily stopped because of the disorder and some trams were returning to their depots. It was announced that a curfew would be imposed from 6.30 p.m, and the crowds of office workers, many of them resigned to a long walk home, added to the confusion.

47. However, the crowds dispersed without further incident. By 4.30 p.m. most of the office workers had got away and the position was casier. With the onset of the curfew, the central area was quiet and apart from some incidents at Shau Kei Wan the curfew was effective. Although the Central area had been occupied by large and generally hostile crowds throughout the day there was comparatively little violence. 135 persons were arrested, of whom only one had been injured seriously enough to be admitted to hospital. Four policemen were slightly injured. It was during this day that the Police used ball ammunition for the first time since confrontation began. A detective in Statue Square saw a man pouring what appeared to be acid on the back of a riot policeman and fired three rounds from his revolver. The liquid was found to be petrol and the policeman was not injured. The man responsible escaped.

CHAPTER 5

STOPPAGES OF WORK

48. After the disorders of 21st and 22nd May, it was expected that the communists would continue the attack on the following day. In the event the day passed in comparative calm and it became apparent that the communist tactics had changed. The results that they had gained so far in their attempts to win popular support for confrontation were negligible. In the middle of the month the Federa- tion of Hong Kong Students as well as Kai Fong leaders and other prominent members of the community publicly announced their sup- port of the Government in the maintenance of law and order. This lead was immediately followed by similar expressions of support from

a large number of associations and societies representing a complete cross-section of the Colony and an overwhelming majority of its population. (A complete list is given at Appendix 1). On 18th May a group of businessmen in the Colony opened a fund for the higher education of the children of Police officers which in a fortnight reached a total of $3 million, an extraordinary acknowledgment by the people of the debt they owed the Police. In the face of this massive and, to them, clearly unexpected demonstration of opposition to confrontation, the communists turned to an attempt to display their strength by a succession of work stoppages.

　　　　　49. During the preceding days there had been persistent rumours of impending stoppages and during the disturbances some bus and lorry drivers had stopped work in sympathy with the demonstrators. From 23rd May onwards there was to be a wave of stoppages as a form of protest against the Government's refusal to accept the com. munist demands. They affected transport and utility companies, a few textile companies and the staff of some Government departments. In most cases they were planned as token stoppages only some incon- venience was caused but it was not insurmountable nor was it lasting.

　　　　　50. The main effect was on the transport companies. Employees of the China Motor Bus Co., who had been aggrieved by the arrest of three of their colleagues the previous day, stopped work on 23rd and 24th May. Inspite of considerable intimidation this stoppage was not fully effective and some buses continued to run. The Hong Kong Tramway Company had a reduced number of trams on the evening of the 23rd and on the 24th but by the 25th the numbers had returned almost to normal. Kowloon Motor Bus workers, who were among the most militant of all, staged a stoppage on the morning of the 24th and, armed with iron bars, prevented loyal crews from taking buses from the garages. This stoppage was called off at 9 a.m. after discussions with the management and, although many buses carried inflammatory posters, thereafter normal services remained in operation. Communist employees of the two ferry companies confined themselves to brief token stoppages, the Star Ferry for one hour on the evening of 25th May and the Hong Kong and Yaumati Ferry for three hours on the early morning of 28th May.

　　　　　　51. These were not 'strikes' in the ordinary sense of the word as they did not arise from a genuine industrial dispute; they were purely a political manoeuvre. In a meeting with officials of the China Motor

Bus Co. on 24th May therefore the dissident workers were told plainly that if they stopped work they would not be paid. There is no doubt that this action by the company strongly influenced the decision to resume work the next morning, although the strikers gave as their reason that they did not wish to inconvenience the public. Employees in Government departments were warned that absence from duty in these circumstances might lead to dismissal, and absentees in the Marine Department and the Public Works Department were interdicted from duty or discharged. Following this lead, similar action was taken by the other companies affected and it was this, coupled with Police intervention in any cases of intimidation that were reported, that took most of the impetus out of these stoppages.

52. The period of 'token stoppages had been accompanied by a spate of posters that appeared on the premises affected and elsewhere, urging attacks on the Government and support for confrontation. These posters, usually crudely written by hand, had come to be regarded in China as a legitimate expression of the opinion of the masses' and, as such, almost sacrosanct. In Hong Kong they served the double purpose of providing a useful vehicle of propaganda to gain and stimulate the interest of the public and, at the same time, a challenge to the Govern- ment. If this challenge had not been accepted the authorities would to a large extent have abdicated from control of the situation. On Ist June, therefore, emergency regulations were made to strengthen the law relating to the display of inflammatory posters and action began to remove them.

53. The first reaction took place on 1st June, when a senior officer of the Marine Department was forcibly detained by workers at the Yaumati Slipway who stopped work and demanded, in a most hostile manner, that he should apologize for removing posters. The following day the Director of Marine announced that 515 employees out of a total work force of 850 were suspended. Only 70 men reported for duty that day and 90 the following day. A total of 316 men were eventually dismissed.

54. During the next week the 'poster war' continued. A full-scale operation was mounted by the Police to clear posters from buses and ferries and from public buildings; this met with some opposition but no outright violence. However, as soon as they were removed, more posters surreptiously appeared. On 6th June posters appeared again en masse. Every vessel of the Star Ferry had a dozen placards and

There were some absentees in the Post Office but other Government departments were virtually unaffected. There were no further absentees at the Public Works Department Waterworks and Electrical and Mechanical depots. Plans made by drivers of the Urban Services Department to barricade themselves in their garages were called off as their intentions were known in advance to senior officers of the depart- ment who had taken steps to forestall them. The utility companies were not affected. It was only in some sections of the Dairy Farm organiza- tion that work was seriously affected. These stoppages involved the Transport Retail Delivery section, the engineering staff responsible for the ice and cold storage plants and workers at the farm itself. The company immediately announced that anyone who did not return to work immediately would be dismissed. The farm workers returned that afternoon but, of the rest, only six engineers remained on duty. The ice and cold storage plants were kept going by staff lent by the Jardines Engineering Corporation. (It has been suggested that the whole staff was confident that confrontation would succeed and the farm workers only resumed work to ensure that the animals in their charge were kept in good condition until the communists took over). On the 11th June the company took the initiative in dismissing a number of men from the catering section who had not stopped work but were known to be com. munist agitators. At this action, all except 40 of the remaining staff in this section stopped work and were also dismissed.

　　　　　64. Market stall holders and hawkers were urged to stop work on 13th June. There was some response by pork and fish stall holders in some markets but prices remained normal.

65. It was rumoured that there would be further stoppages, by building construction workers and by employees of the Hong Kong & Yaumati Ferry Company: about half the workers at one building site did stop work on the 14th of June but the ferry company was not affected.

　　　　66. It was thought that the communists had planned the token stop- pages as a show of strength and that they had taken care not to in- convenience the public, on whom they depended for support. By about the middle of the month, however, there were growing signs that they were about to stage a major stoppage despite the disruption this would cause and the possible adverse reaction of the public. This change in plan may have resulted from the encouraging press reports and wireless broadcasts that emanated from Peking at this stage. On 3rd June the

People's Daily called on the Chinese in Hong Kong to organize a courageous struggle against the British and to be ready to respond to the call of the motherland to smash the reactionary rule of the British'. The article went on to emphasize, however, that the main force in the struggle was the working class in Hong Kong, in a broad hint that they could not expect physical assistance from China. This qualifica- tion was ignored by the communist press in Hong Kong which pro- minently reprinted the article as evidence of full support of confronta- tion by Peking. A further article in the People's Daily of 10th June urged 'workers, peasants, the People's Liberation Army and the revolu. tionary masses in China' to prepare to support the struggle in Hong Kong with concrete action. At all events, what was termed a 'general strike' was called for 24th June.

67. On the eve of the proposed stoppage there was a serious incident at Canton Road in Kowloon. A Police party engaged in photographing posters outside the premises of the Hong Kong and Kowloon Rubber and Plastic Union was set upon by a gang of men armed with iron bars, bottles and sharpened files. The Police opened fire. In the fracas one of the attackers was fatally wounded and three policemen were injured; the remaining attackers were seen to retreat into the union premises. Police reinforcements were called up and, with some difficulty managed to break in. The premises were defended by some 50 men, armed with choppers and other weapons, who put up a fierce resistance injuring four policemen in the struggle. Seven of the defenders were injured, three fatally. This was the first occasion that the Police had raided the premises of a communist union and the incident disposed of any communist illusions that such premises were inviolate.

68. It was not known at this stage how effective the stoppage would be and to what extent uncommitted workers would, under the impact of communist propaganda, feel obliged to join what was loudly pro- claimed as the winning side. With their finances augmented by a gift of $10 million from the All China Federation of Trade Unions, the communist organizers had also promised lavish payments to those taking part. During the intervening days, therefore, the Government Transport Office held a series of meetings with the transport and utility companies to co-ordinate the action that should be taken and to formulate plans for the maintenance of essential services. Similar action was taken by other Government departments concerned.

69. As with the token stoppages, it was the transport companies that were mainly affected. In the Tramway Company all communist union members stopped work but about half the work force remained loyal and a reduced service continued in operation. The two bus com- panies had a complete stoppage on the night of 23rd June but managed to rally a sufficient number of loyal workers to run reduced services from the morning of the 24th although in Kowloon, with 120 buses operating out of a normal 800, there was little more than a skeleton service. The Star Ferry Company, which had dismissed its dissident employees after the stoppage on 6th June, continued to operate its already reduced services. The Hong Kong & Yaumati Ferry Company which, in consultation with the transport office and the Police, had made comprehensive arrangements to combat intimidation, lost only a hun- dred deck-hands; most of whom were easily replaceable and the services were not vitally affected. About a third of the usual number of taxis remained on the roads.

70. Considerable inconvenience was caused to the public by these stoppages but the majority contrived to get to work somehow, some crowding onto such public transport as was available, others travelling in private cars, lorries and taxis and others on foot. Illegal taxis, or 'pak pais' as they are called, appeared on the scene in swarms and, with the Police turning a blind eye on their activities for the occasion, successfully filled the transport gap.

　　　　71. The utility companies and Government departments affected by previous stoppages had dismissed the communist elements in their work force and were mainly unaffected. There were many absentees at the two electricity companies and at the Hong Kong Telephone Company but services were maintained by the loyal staff remaining. A small proportion of the staff of the Urban Services Department (mainly labourers but including some drivers) failed to report for duty, while a further 200 men stopped work at Tai Koo Dock which had re- opened on 14th June.

　　　　72. The managements affected by these stoppages generally offered reinstatement to any absentee worker, other than those known to have been active in organizing the strikes, provided they applied for re- registration within two or three days. In fact, very few applied for re- registration and the deficiencies in staff had to be made good by new recruitment combined, in the case of the bus companies, by a re-

organization of operations. The two ferry companies and the Tram Company resumed normal operations within a month, except that the Star Ferry Company abandoned its subsidiary route from Victoria to Hung Hom. In the bus companies progress was slower. It has always been difficult to find suitable candidates to recruit and train as drivers and, in Kowloon in particular, the programme of rehabilitation was seriously affected by the attacks on buses and their drivers during the disorders in July (which are described in Chapter 9). By the end of the year the services on Hong Kong Island had been almost fully restored but there was still room for improvement in Kowloon.

73. During the stoppages of May and June a total of over 17,000 men were dismissed including workers in the port, who are referred to in the next chapter. This figure may give an exaggerated impression of communist strength in the Colony. It represents less than one per cent of the total work force and the men dismissed were working in industries where the communist influence was strongest. Moreover, by no means all of those dismissed were supporters of confrontation. In- timidation was widespread and, despite the efforts of the Police and the managements concerned, there were many who absented themselves from work, and declined the offer of re-employment, simply through fear of reprisals by communist agents against their families or them- selves if they did otherwise.

CHAPTER 6

THE PORT OF HONG KONG

74. The general stoppage of work proclaimed by the communists in June included the Port, which because of its importance to the economy of Hong Kong, was naturally a major target. Tallyclerks, crews of lighters and towing launches and about half the operators of mechanical equipment of the Hong Kong and Kowloon Wharf and Godown Com- pany stopped work and there was widespread intimidation of loyal workers in these and other fields. To meet the situation the Marine Department set up a Port Working Committee, which included officers of the department, Police and representatives of the companies using the port; its task was formulate and execute measures to contain the stoppage and to nullify its effects. The Police, both ashore and afloat,

took prompt action in cases of intimidation; lists were prepared and disseminated of contractors willing to work; new licences were freely issued to tallyclerks; acting within his discretionary powers, the Director of Marine allowed some latitude in the professional qualifications required of new crews coming forward to man launches and other craft; officers of the Marine Department visited every ship in port to advise shipmasters and to obtain first-hand information of their needs; reports on the state of the working of the port were publicized in the press and through local and overseas radio stations,

75. By these energetic measures and because the stoppage happened to coincide with a relatively slack period in the port due to the blockage of the Suez Canal, delay in cargo handling was kept to a minimum and users of the port were hardly inconvenienced. By the middle of July the Kowloon Wharf & Godown Company had replaced a number of their absentees, who were dismissed, and most of the lighters were again in operation.

　　　　76. On 17th July the Hong Kong Seamen's Union declared a 'strike' which, as in the previous cases, was a political move and not the result of an industrial dispute. The declared aim of the union was to prevent the transport of goods into and out of Hong Kong; seamen working abroad were instructed to advise the captains of their ships that they would stop work if cargoes were loaded for transport to Hong Kong. The union has never commanded the full support of its members. When the Government set up the Seamen's Recruiting Office, in 1966, the union raised strong objections, ostensibly on the grounds that it was detrimental to the seamen's interests in that it restricted their oppor- tunities for employment. This view was not shared by the seamen themselves who were quick to see the advantages of the system. In spite of an official boycott by the union some 32,000 seamen had registered with the S.R.O. by the end of March 1967, a figure which clearly included many who were ostensibly union members.

77. Despite this previous failure, the union now made the most strenuous efforts to make the stoppage a success. Intimidation was widespread, both in the port and at sea. Union members visited ships with Chinese crews and, when their passes were withdrawn by the shipping companies, they sent women agents to visit seamen's wives and families. Communist agents among seagoing crews were well supplied with newspapers and other literature and made full use of

their opportunity for indoctrination and the dissemination of subversive propaganda. Seamen were also subjected to intensive indoctrination at Chinese ports and at ports in Japan and Australia where there were communist agents. This constant barrage had a considerable effect, particularly on those who were away from Hong Kong, and there were many seamen who were anxious for their livelihood.

78. The Marine Department again acted promptly. Before the stop- page was due to come into effect it issued a firmly worded notice to all seamen reminding them of the probable consequences to themselves if they absented themselves from work. It also set up a team of experienced officers whose job it was to talk to seamen and discuss with them their problems, to disseminate information and to investigate and dispel rumours. The Marine Department made special arrangements to keep the men at sea informed of conditions in Hong Kong. A news- sheet was published and distributed weekly and 16 mm films of recent local newsreels were distributed free to ships with Hong Kong crews. In the port, press conferences were held afloat to enable the foreign press and television representatives to see for themselves what the situa- tion was.

79. As a result of these measures the extravagant claims made by the communist press of the success of the stoppage were shown to be without foundation. In the first ten days 1,222 seamen reported for jobs through the Seamen's Recruiting Office and only two ships (where there were other considerations) were delayed through lack of a crew. Some crew members walked off their ships on arrival in Hong Kong but, with the exception of about a dozen ships that sailed short-handed, the flow of new applicants for berths was sufficient to meet all require- ments.

80. Towards the end of July, the China Ocean Shipping Agency circulated a message to Hong Kong agents that the Seamen's Union's action was supported by labour in Chinese ports. Chinese cargoes awaiting transhipment in Hong Kong were detained by communist shippers in their godowns and no further cargoes arrived from China. Consignees in various parts of the world were advised by communist agents that, because of the 'port strike' in Hong Kong, cargoes could not be shipped.

81. On 12th August a Norwegian ship, the Hoi Kung, arrived at Hong Kong from Whampoa with 918 tons of cargo for local discharge.

The agents of the ship claimed that the crew would stop work if the Hong Kong cargo were discharged and some of the passengers on the ship, who were in transit from Whampoa to Singapore, demonstrated in support of the crew. A police party was put on board to ensure the safety of the ship and the cargo was unloaded. The crew walked off but was replaced through the Seamen's Recruiting Office.

82. This test case, which challenged the effectiveness of the boycott and demonstrated that crews could be replaced in Hong Kong, did much to restore the confidence of foreign shippers.

　　　　83. During the second week of September four non-Chinese flag ships arrived in port from China to discharge cargo consigned to Hong Kong. The arrival of these vessels marked the first break in the boycott. Since then cargoes arriving in the Colony from China have fluctuated from 5,000 tons in August to 49,000 tons in October and 26,000 tons in December. (During December the previous year 238,000 tons of cargo had been imported from China.) As the vast majority of this cargo was being carried by vessels (mainly Greek) chartered to Peking, it would appear that the Chinese were either refusing cargo to non-chartered ships, or that there was a shortage of cargoes and chartered ships were being given preference for loadings. The answer was probably a com- bination of these factors. Reliable reports indicated that conditions at Chinese ports were chaotic, ships were being subjected to lengthy delays and there were shortages of fuel oil, port labour and cargo lighters. Certain British shipping companies continued to claim that their ships were being refused cargo at Chinese ports because these companies failed to observe the boycott of Hong Kong.

　　　　84. At Hong Kong, all cargo requirements were maintained although during the latter eight months of the year the number of ships calling and the amount of cargo moving dropped considerably compared with the same period the previous year. During the period May/December 1967, a total of 4,610,273 tons of cargo was discharged, compared with 4,868,475 tons during the same period in 1966, a decrease of approxi- mately 6%. Cargo loaded during the same eight months in 1967 totalled 1,504,646 tons compared with 2,034,410 tons during the same period in 1966, representing a considerable drop of approximately 35%. Never- theless, the amount of cargo loaded during the whole of 1967, 2,417,344 tons, was the second highest since the Second World War, exceeded only in 1966 when 2,803,443 tons were loaded.

CHAPTER 7

THE FOOD SITUATION

85. Towards the end of May a number of rumours were circulating that communist shops, banks and other local establishments had advised their staff to lay in stocks of food. This led to a minor run on rice retail shops; but it was not serious and assurances by Government that there were large stocks in hand was sufficient to halt the pressure which, as usual, had caused a rise in retail prices.

86. The news of the closure of the Suez Canal on 5th June caused a more serious reaction; the fact that this break in the supply route from Europe would have no effect on rice supplies did nothing to reas- sure the public. Large numbers of people rushed to rice shops to buy as much as they could afford and retail stocks were quickly reduced at a faster rate than they could be replenished from the West Point godowns. By 7th June prices had risen by 90 to 100 per cent and people were driving out to the New Territories to buy. The Government controls rice, to the extent that can be imported only through authorized importers who are required to keep a sufficient reserve con- tinuously in stock. At this time there were in fact some 85,000 tons of rice in the Colony, sufficient for about three months normal consump- tion. To allay the public fears, the Commerce & Industry Department arranged for the press to visit some of the main rice godowns to see the position for themselves and to photograph the stocks. On 8th Junc the Director held a meeting with all rice importers and wholesalers and arranged with them that large firms would be able to buy rice direct from importers to sell to their employees. These measures suc- ceeded in reassuring the public; the demand eased and retail prices quickly returned to normal.

87. It was however clear by mid-June that the communists in Hong Kong were quite prepared to interfere with the public's food supplies, however much hardship was caused, if it suited their purpose; a special interdepartmental committee was formed to co-ordinate measures to meet this threat. Its services were required almost at once to deal with a 'food strike' announced by the communists whereby from 28th June to 1st July all supplies from China would be stopped and at the same time all food shops and market stalls would close. With their large importing and wholesale organizations which normally controlled the flow of supplies from China it was not difficult for the communists

to organize a stoppage of supplies. Retailers were threatened that they would receive no more supplies from China if they refused to shut their shops when the call was made.

88. Supplies from China did stop, and nothing came in by sea, rail or road during the best part of these four days; but most shops did not close and stocks were available for sale in a majority of the shops and stalls during this period. Increased supplies of pigs, cattle, vege. tables, chickens and eggs from New Territories farms helped to ease the shortage and marine fish continued to be available. There were some shortages, with consequent increases in price, but the publicity given to the stoppage had alerted the public and there was no rush to buy scarce supplies. The poorest members of the community were inevitably those worst affected.

89. Supplies from China were resumed on 2nd July and the markets quickly returned almost to normal. To keep the public informed of the position, reports of fresh food supplies arriving from China were published daily. There were rumours that there would be more stop- pages of supplies and a number of attempts, almost entirely unsuccess- ful, were made to incite food shops and stalls to close.

　　　90. In July Chinese supplies to Hong Kong again began to diminish. It quickly became apparent that this disruption was not deliberate but was a direct result of unsettled conditions in China brought about by the cultural revolution which had effected both processing plants and transportation. As can be seen from the table at Appendix II, the transport coming to Hong Kong, already affected by the June stoppage. diminished dramatically during July, August and September. By the end of the year it had still by no means returned to 1966 standards.

　　　91. The commodities most seriously affected were fresh pork, fresh beef, fresh vegetables and eggs; and the scarcity of these items caused prices for other commodities to rise as the pattern of demand changed. People accepted the situation with fortitude and patience and there was no evidence of panic buying as there had been in June. The situation deteriorated seriously throughout August and did not begin to improve until the middle of September; during the month of August the number of pigs imported from China fell to 74,359 against a monthly average for the previous year of 157,711; head of cattle to 1,114 against an average of 9,874; and vegetables to 13,241 tons against an average of 21,726. (Details are recorded in Appendix III.) Happily, despite all

efforts to deter them, Hong Kong's fishermen continued throughout to keep the markets supplied with marine fish, which went a long way to redress the reduction in protein foods imported from China.

92. While there was at no time an inadequate supply of food, the shortages had a considerable effect on prices particularly for meat, vegetables and eggs. As one commodity became scarce the demand for other available commodities increased and prices rose. The index for the food element of the Consumer Price Index rose from 110 in May to 140 in September and then started to fall away reaching 119 in November. The price of rice was unaffected; offtakes from stocks predictably increased but were rapidly replenished. An indication of the effect of these disturbances on the cost of living is given in the table at Appendix IV.

93. Importers of food from other parts of the world were informed of the diminution of supplies from China, and a special mission was sent to investigate the possibility of obtaining increased supplies from Japan, South Korea and Okinawa. The rise in prices encouraged importers to bring in additional quantities from Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia and Cambodia; by the beginning of September these addi- tional supplies of live cattle and pigs were becoming significant. At the same time Hong Kong's farmers made considerable efforts to increase the local supply of poultry, pigs, eggs and vegetables.

94. The situation in Kwangtung in September was still unsettled; indeed some reports reaching Hong Kong at the time described it as chaotic. It was however clear that, despite these difficulties, intensive efforts were being made to resume the normal export of foodstuffs to Hong Kong as soon as possible. The communists attempted to place the blame for shortages on the closure of the border bridge at Man Kam To* which is used for supplies coming by road from China. although it was obvious (as can be seen from Appendix II) that only a small proportion of normal supplies come by this route. The port 'strike' was also blamed although the port was fully capable of accept- ing the cargoes which arrived. Supplies improved quite rapidly, although somewhat erratically, just before the Mid Autumn festival on 18th September which always gives rise to a heavy demand for traditional foodstuffs. This improvement possibly reflected the appreciation by local communists that the shortage of food and its effect on the general

* See paragraphs 111 and 114.

　　public were damaging rather than helping their cause, and a realization that increasing supplies were coming in from overseas. It, no doubt, also reflected the efforts being made in Kwangtung to restore the appearance of normality before the opening of the Canton Fair, scheduled to open on 15th October but in fact postponed until 15th November.

　　　95. By the middle of November food supplies from China had still not returned to the pre-disturbance level, but prices of fresh food, subject to normal seasonal variations, had largely returned to those prevailing in May 1967. The position was then further affected by the devaluation of sterling by the United Kingdom Government, followed by the devaluation and subsequent revaluation of the Hong Kong dollar. It was some days before prices settled down after this fresh disturbance; the change in exchange parities increased the food index by about two points.

CHAPTER 8

THE NEW TERRITORIES

　　　　96. Unlike the urban areas, the New Territories had remained comparatively quiet during May and early June. Apart from the industrial complex of Tsuen Wan, the area is predominantly rural, the communist influence is less manifest and there are few hooligans to fan the flames of unrest. The leaders of the New Territories Heung Yee Kuk (a body which exercises the functions of a rural consultative council) came out strongly in support of the Government and the main- tenance of law and order; although there were some demonstrations and display of posters in the market towns these were on a minor scale. There were also disturbances at Tsuen Wan but, except in the area of the land frontier with China, there was no violence at all comparable with that in the urban areas.

97. The northern boundary of the New Territories marches with that of China, extending from Deep Bay in the West to the village of Sha Tau Kok in the East. Since 1956, when waves of immigration from China threatened to swamp the limited resources of the Colony, the border has been closed. Controlled crossings are permitted at Lo Wu, which is the border station on the Kowloon-Canton railway and the check point for passengers entering or leaving the Colony, and at the road

bridge at Man Kam To over which there is a regular traffic of food- stuffs and other goods entering the Colony. A number of farmers, living in both Chinese and British territory, own land on the other side of the border; by a long-standing arrangement they are allowed to cross the border at various points to cultivate their fields. At Sha Tau Kok, a fishing village on the eastern shore line, the border runs down the middle of a street and there is constant and unchecked movement between the Chinese and British halves of the village.

98. Before the start of confrontation there had been some incidents arising from a chronic dispute over the cultivation of oysters in Deep Bay in the West. The rest of the border area was quiet and, while there was little or no communication between the frontier officials on either side, there was a reasonable modus vivendi in force.

99. Soon after the disturbances at San Po Kong it became evident that the distorted accounts published by the communist press in Hong Kong had succeeded in rousing strong feeling on the Chinese side of the border. A loudspeaker was set up at Lo Wu which regularly broad- cast anti-British propaganda. Mass demonstrations were held within sight of the British frontier posts. Trains arriving from Canton were plastered with anti-British posters. This propaganda was continued with varying degrees of intensity, but there was no overt violence until 24th June.

100. The incident took place at Sha Tau Kok, a village which lies astride the border. During the morning there were signs of activity in the Chinese side of the village. The militia guards increased in strength and three light machine guns were mounted in shops facing British territory. Stones were thrown at the Police patrols. At about 1 p.m. a crowd of some 500 people armed with iron bars and sticks had gathered outside the Rural Committee Office and began to move down the road towards a waiting Police company. They were ordered to disperse but instead they attacked the Police, being at once reinforced by another crowd of about 200 people from the Chinese side. The Police used tear gas and made baton charges and within an hour they gained the upper hand, the greater part of the attackers escaping into Chinese territory. One Police landrover was burnt and another damaged and the tyres of two armoured cars, that had been stationed without being manned near the Police post, were slashed. Nine people were arrested, of whom one was injured through jumping off a roof in an attempt to escape; seven policemen were slightly injured by stones.

101. A crowd of about 300 people remained in sight in the Chinese side of the village but all remained quiet. Later in the evening a Police platoon engaged in recovering the damaged armoured cars received a shower of stones and bottles and was fired at by air guns. There were no casualties and the night passed without further incident.

102. This incident was followed by a protest from the Peking Government (the first official protest since the start of confrontation) which alleged that tear gas shells had been fired into Chinese territory and reiterated that the demands made by the communists in Hong Kong in May must be accepted.

　　　　103. During the following days there was an uneasy calm. The trial of the Sha Tau Kok rioters at the Fanling Magistracy attracted a crowd but there was no trouble. On 27th June a procession which grew to some 5,000 persons, including members of the militia armed with rifles and automatic weapons, demonstrated in the area opposite Lo Wu. They marched through the railway station on the Chinese side and then dispersed. More processions were seen on subsequent days; there was some mild stone throwing at Sha Tau Kok and on 30th June a bomb exploded in front of the Police post producing a loud report and a cloud of smoke but doing no damage.

　　　　104. This period of comparative calm ended on 8th July when the communists returned to the attack in force. During the morning crowds built up in the whole border area. At Lo Wu there were about 600 people shouting and singing and their numbers were increasing; and a mob of about 10,000 people was seen marching South from Shum Chun. There were hostile and menacing crowds during the day at both Lo Wu and Man Kam To but the attack was confined to Sha Tau Kok. More machine guns were set up and an anti-aircraft gun was sited in the Chinese side of the village. Soon after 11 a.m. a mob streamed across the border and, after brief demonstrations during which they shouted, sang and waved banners, attacked the Police post. One company of Police fired tear gas and baton shells and succeeded in dispersing part of the crowd but then came under machine gun fire and had to retreat to the Rural Committee office. Both this company and the company in the Police post were then subjected to a hail of machine gun and rifle fire. The main attack fell on the Police post. An attempt was made to blow up the perimeter wire and an incendiary bomb set fire to some tents behind the post. The Police retaliated with greener guns and killed at least one of the attackers but were immedi-

124

ately fired at as soon as they appeared at the windows of the post. By 11.30 a.m. two policemen had been killed at the post and there were a number of casualties both there and at the Rural Committee office.

105. Shortly before 1 p.m. the army was called upon for assistance and two companies of the 1/10 Gurkha Rifles, with armoured cars of the Life Guards in support, advanced towards the village which they reached at 3.30 p.m. As the army units approached, the attacking crowds fell back; although desultory firing continued, the Gurkhas did not open fire nor did they suffer any casualties. The Police were relieved and the post was taken over by the army. A curfew was imposed with effect from 4.30 p.m. and there were no further incidents. The total Police casualties were five dead and 11 injured.

106. These events attracted wide publicity in the world press and a number of alarmist reports were put out. It was an extremely serious affair but it was not a planned invasion of the Colony. Units of the local Chinese militia took part in the attack (though not in uniform) but no member of the regular Chinese army was involved. The avail- able evidence suggests that the attack was organized and executed by local villagers in the border area, that it was probably not even co- ordinated with the activities of the urban communists in Hong Kong and that it was certainly not planned or even approved by the authori- ties in Canton or Peking.

107. On the following day the Peking Government lodged a strong protest with the Chargé d'Affaires in Peking referring to 'serious armed provocation by the British' and alleging that the Chinese frontier guards had only fired in self-defence. A simultaneous protest was delivered by the Chargé d'Affaires. Neither was accepted.

108. After 8th July the border area remained unsettled, and the army took over from the Police the responsibility for patrolling the area. There were no further major attacks but there were a succession of provocative demonstrations and minor incidents. For a long period stones were thrown almost daily at army patrols in Lo Wu, Man Kam To and Sha Tau Kok as well as at the immigration office at Lo Wu. Much of it was done by children; on 20th July a boy swam across the river at Man Kam To to stone the Police post, to the loud applause of the militia watching from the Chinese side.

109. A number of incidents arose from the display of posters in British territory. It is not an offence to display portraits of Chairman

Mao Tse Tung or extracts from his teachings, and farmers and others crossing into British Territory have taken full advantage of this im- munity. It is an offence to display inflammatory posters but, as in the urban areas, their removal was most strongly resented by the com- munists. It was through this cause that a tense situation developed on 5th August when a group of coolies surrounded the police post at Man Kam To and demanded that any posters put up should be allowed to remain. The District Officer was called in to negotiate and after a dis- cussion lasting for almost an hour the matter was settled. A Chinese military contingent armed with rifles and a machine gun and a Gurkha platoon supported by armoured cars faced each other across the frontier during the incident. Barbed wire defences were erected to protect the police post, which was right beside the bridge crossing into China.

　　　110. Trouble flared up again on 10th August, and armed troops were again deployed on either side of the border at Man Kam To. On this occasion one of the coolies deliberately staged an 'accident' by colliding with the new barbed wire barricades and feigning injury. He was carried off with a great show of concern and the occasion was used to complain again about the removal of posters as well as to demand an admission of guilt for the accident. The District Officer was once more called in to negotiate and the discussions continued until well after nightfall. Under cover of darkness, a large group of coolies forced their way past the wire barriers, entered the police post and surrounded and threatened its occupants, including the District Officer, the Commanding Officer of the Gurkha Battalion, some police officers and some Gurkha soldiers; the latter were disarmed and their weapons taken across into China. Other soldiers, outside the encircling ring of C.T. coolies, were prevented from opening fire because of the danger to their own men held in the police posts and, particularly, the Europeans whose lives were being threatened. Chinese border troops showed signs of intervening in support of the coolies. In the end, to resolve a difficult situation, the District Officer agreed to sign a paper, under duress, accepting the demands about posters and admitting re- sponsibility for the 'accident' to the coolie. The party in the police post was freed and the arms returned from C.T.

　　　111. After this incident the border gate at the Man Kam To was closed by the British authorities for some days and the Police post, which was shown to be dangerously exposed, was demolished and re-sited further back in British Territory.

112. There was a further incident on 11th August. A group of farmers from Chinese Territory, who had climbed through the border fence to till their fields on British Territory and had behaved peacefully. asked to be allowed to return through the border gate at Lo Fong which had been kept locked because of the incident at Man Kam To the previous day. This was agreed but the small police and military party which had gone forward to open the gate, was savagely and without warning attacked by the farmers as they went past; an inspector was badly injured. The farmers were driven off by tear gas and baton shells during which action two machine gun bursts were fired from Chinese Territory into a field on the British side.

113. Towards the end of the month some of the tension at Lo Wu was eased and, possibly because of the imminence of the much publicized Canton Fair, the attitude of the Chinese officials became almost cordial.

114. This relaxation did not, however, last. On 29th September two police constables, who were off duty, inadvertently crossed the border at Man Kam To and were detained. Another constable, also off duty, was forcibly dragged across the border at Sha Tau Kok on 7th October, though he was released the next day after his mother had crossed into China to make a personal appeal. A week later a Senior Police Inspec- tor who was trying to placate a group of villagers near the Man Kam To bridge was seized by them and hustled over the border. After this incident the border at Man Kam To was again closed and remained closed for some weeks in spite of protests from the Chinese side. During this time, tension remained high on the border and there were clashes at both Lo Wu and Man Kam To during which on two occa- sions automatic fire was directed over the heads of our security forces from Chinese soil: it is believed that militia rather than regular P.L.A. forces were responsible. The Inspector later escaped, after being de- tained for 36 days and made his way back to Hong Kong. The two constables were released after prolonged and difficult discussions between British and Chinese border officials at the end of November.

115. Between that date and the end of the year there were no further incidents and, apart from a few isolated cases of stone-throwing, the border remained quiet. The Police and military remained jointly responsible for maintaining order in the closed area along the border.

CHAPTER 9

FURTHER DISORDERS AND GOVERNMENT

COUNTER-MEASURES

116. The events of 8th July at Sha Tau Kok and the protest made from Peking were widely reported in the communist press in Hong Kong, which claimed that they were proof of armed support for con- frontation by the Peking Government. With this encouragement the views of the communist extremists could not be denied and a wave of violence followed. For the next four days, from 9th to 12th July, there were widespread incidents in Kowloon and Hong Kong Island in which Police were attacked, public transport vehicles damaged and set on fire and their drivers assaulted, and public buildings damaged. It was widely rumoured that the communists were offering a reward of $20,000 for killing a Police Officer and $3,000 for killing a transport worker.

117. The main centres of the disorders were communist department stores, schools and trade union offices which offered a convenient assembly point for the rioters and a base for attack or retreat. The tactics used were the same in many incidents: a demonstration was staged, sometimes by school-children, and as the Police arrived to in- vestigate a gang of men emerged from their base to attack them. A typical incident occurred on 9th July outside the Fukien Middle School at Queen's Road West. At 5 p.m. that day a group of children came out of the school and caused a traffic hold-up. When the Police approached they retreated into the school. Half an hour later they emerged again and began demonstrating, under the directions of a teacher. The Police again intervened and they were first assailed by bottles thrown from the school and other adjacent buildings and were then attacked by a gang of men armed with knives, iron bars and cargo hooks. One constable was killed and two others were injured, one seriously. Two of the attackers were killed and one injured by Police counteraction.

　　　　118. There were incidents on every day during this period in the vicinity of the Wah Fung Company's shop at North Point, which was believed to harbour as many as 200 communist trouble-makers at one time. On the 9th July a riotous crowd attacked trams and buses and set fire to a mini-bus. On the night of the 10th, buses and trams were again attacked, some windows in the State Theatre were broken and an attempt was made to set fire to the tram-controller's office. The

Police cordoned off the area but it was three hours before the rioters could be subdued. On the 11th the pattern was repeated. Fires were started and public transport damaged. Police in the vicinity of the shop were attacked and bottles and quick-lime were thrown at them. At 10.35 p.m. the shop itself caught fire; although tear gas shells had been fired into the shop, it was believed that the fire was caused by an elec- trical fault. Some damage was caused to the ground and mezzanine floors but this did not prevent the occupants from making further attacks on the Police the next morning.

119. There was serious rioting in Wan Chai, mainly in the vicinity of Johnston Road. On the night of the 9th a mob attacked and set on fire the Wan Chai Kai Fong premises at O'Brien Road, causing serious damage. This crowd was dispersed but later another mob, which was stoning the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank office in Johnston Road, was engaged by the Police. After tear gas shells had failed to disperse them the Police, after due warning, fired two rounds of carbine killing one rioter and injuring another.

120. The following evening crowds again gathered in the same area. They broke into the Violet Peel Clinic and attempted to set it on fire. Bottles were thrown at the Police, some containing acid, and rubbish fires were started in the streets. During an attack on a tram, which was set on fire, a man was fatally stabbed. It was at first thought that he was the tram driver but he was later identified as an odd-job worker with a history of mental illness; he had been heard to shout, 'Death to the red dogs'.

121. The Violet Peel Clinic was again attacked on 11th July and a bomb was thrown at a Police vehicle, fortunately causing no damage. A curfew was imposed on the area from 10.30 p.m, and this effectively reduced the crowds to 'hard-core' communists. They continued how- ever to throw stones and bottles at the Police and they caused further damage to the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank Building and to the Chartered Bank office in Fleming Road. The Police fired tear gas shells and rounds from carbine and greener guns at the communist New China Products shop in Johnston Road which effectively stopped the barrage of missiles from this building.

122. In Kowloon the disorders were mostly confined to attacks on public and private vehicles. On the 9th July a bus was set on fire and completely destroyed at Lung Cheung Road. On the 10th a mob stopped a bus at the junction of Nathan Road and Salisbury Road

　　and assaulted the driver as well as a soldier in uniform who was pass- ing at the time. On the 11th a bus driver was hit on the head by a missile thrown at him; and a packet containing inflammatory literature -and three live snakes was thrown into the cab of another bus.

　　　123. On the following day there was sporadic rioting during which buses, taxis and private cars were overturned or set on fire. The Post Office at Un Chau Street was damaged by fire but other buildings were not attacked. The Police used gas, baton shells and greener guns and carbines to disperse the crowds; two rioters were killed.

　　　124. During these four days one policeman and seven rioters were killed and over 60 people were injured. Extensive damage was caused to buildings and other property, to public transport vehicles and to Government and private cars. Curfews were imposed on the northern area of Hong Kong Island on the nights of 11th and 12th July and in Kowloon on the night of 12th July. It was perhaps the most vicious rioting that had taken place since confrontation began and it reflects great credit on bus and tram drivers that they kept going in spite of the constant attacks to which they were subjected.

125. On 12th July the acting Colonial Secretary announced in the Legislative Council that the Government was determined to grasp and maintain the initiative. Up to this point the various phases of the com- munist attack had been contained but the Government forces had been on the defensive. The Police had been under a severe strain and public morale had suffered from the constant pressure, both physical and psychological, to which it had been subjected. The announcement that Government intended to counter-attack and the vigorous measures that were immediately put in hand had a tonic effect on both the Police and the general public.

126. On the night of the 12th a strong Police party, backed up by the army, made simultaneous raids on the premises of the Motor Transport General Workers Union at Wan Chai and at North Point. No resistance was offered at either place. A number of persons found on the premises were detained for questioning and many home-made weapons, including 80 spears, were found as well as stocks of inflam- matory documents.

127. A second raid, which was mounted in the early hours of the 14th July against the Kowloon Dock Amalgamated Workers Union and

the Hung Hom Workers Children's School, both at Bulkeley Street in Kowloon, met with fierce resistance. The Police had to cut their way through iron grilles with oxyacetylene burners while under constant attack from stones and bottles, fire bombs and acid. The operation lasted for three hours and the premises yielded a further quantity of weapons and inflammatory literature, as well as two carboys of acid. One person was shot dead while throwing bottles from the roof and two others were seriously injured in the action. The Police sustained minor injuries. 81 persons, including several who were wanted for previous offences, were arrested.

128. Further raids continued almost daily on communist premises and on other places known or suspected to be used for activities con- nected with confrontation. After the initial raids there was little or no opposition to the Police but in many cases they had to break through iron grilles, steel doors and other formidable physical obstacles. On 18th July the Bank of China building was seen to have an anti- helicopter defence system erected on the roof, although up to this time helicopters had only been used for observation, crowd control and com- munications flights.

129. Helicopters were however, used offensively in the raids that took place on 4th August. These were against Kiu Koon Mansions, which houses the Wah Fung stores, and another communist centre, the New Metropole Building, on opposite sides of King's Road. These are both multi-storey buildings. While one detachment of the raiding party gained entry at ground level another, which included members of the army as well as the Police, was dropped on the roof of the buildings from Royal Navy helicopters. This was probably the first time that an operation of this type had been mounted against a multi-storey build- ing and it was eminently successful. There was no human resistance but there were booby traps and other physical obstacles to be over- come. 26 persons found on the premises were arrested and a quantity of weapons, posters and other documents was seized. In the New Metropole Building an unregistered but well-equipped miniature hos- pital was found. There was no indication that it had been used.

130. These raids had considerable effect on communist morale. Apart from the loss of weapons, explosives and propaganda literature seized by the Police, they now realized that the premises of their unions and other centres were no longer safe for meetings. Communist leaders

were driven underground and they were no longer able to co-ordinate and direct the activities of their supporters.

　　　131. However, the results were not immediately apparent and there was intermittent rioting until the beginning of August. In Kowloon vehicles were again attacked and damaged and the Police were obliged to open fire on several occasions to disperse hostile crowds. One rioter was killed on 14th July in Reclamation Street. On Hong Kong Island the Johnston Road area continued to be unsettled and there were a succession of incidents in which fires were started, buildings were stoned and buses and trams attacked. On 17th July a fire was started at the Ying King Restaurant and the Police fired one round from a greener gun to disperse a hostile crowd that had collected, killing one man and wounding two others.

132. There was also rioting in Tsuen Wan in the New Territories. On the 15th July a crowd attacked a party of detectives who had arrested a group of men putting up posters, and two detectives were stabbed. Police reinforcements were called up but hostile crowds built up in Chung On Street and Texaco Road and the Police had to open fire with greener guns and carbines to disperse them. Two rioters were killed and four policemen were injured, one seriously.

　　　　133. On 26th July a communist-organized 'Procession for Patriots' formed up at Nelson Street in Kowloon but quickly deteriorated into a riot. The Police again opened fire to disperse the crowd and one man was killed. For about an hour mobs roamed the streets in the vicinity stoning buses, taxis and private cars. Two taxis were overturned and set on fire.

134. This proved to be the last major incident of its kind and the tactics of confrontation, under the pressure of the Police raids, then turned to a new phase.

135. On 28th July, Emergency Regulations were brought into force which allowed the detention, on the Colonial Secretary's warrant, of person who stimulated and encouraged acts of violence and lawlessness but did not take part in these acts. Such people had been immune from any action under the normal law. The numbers arrested over the following months totalled only 52, but the existence of the regulations served to discourage some of the instigators and to drive others under- ground.

CHAPTER 10

BOMB ATTACKS

136. From the end of July, when the effects of the constant Police raids on communist centres began to make itself felt, communist en- thusiasm for the cause of confrontation steadily deteriorated; soon only the 'hard-core' were left to continue the struggle. Money was running out; in October a fund was set up to meet the continuing commitment of 'strike pay' for those who were dismissed after the stoppages of June, and there were reports of compulsory levies on businessmen with communist interests. There was little hope of assistance from China by way of direct intervention.

137. In August a communist newspaper published a list of prom- inent members of the community who were said to be marked for assassination, Bombs placed in rolled up magazines were delivered through the post to the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank and to Jardine Matheson & Company, but they roused suspicion, were investigated and rendered harmless. A senior Government servant was sent a live bullet through the post. However, the only victim of this terrorism was a popular Chinese commentator on Commercial Radio who had spe- cialized in ridiculing the communist efforts. On 15th August he and his cousin were attacked in a well-laid ambush. His car was stopped by what appeared to be labourers engaged in road repairs, the pair were dragged out of their car, drenched with petrol and set alight. They both died later in hospital.

138. Attacks were also made against individual policemen, mainly with the purpose of stealing their firearms. On 3rd September a Pro- bationary Inspector was stabbed and seriously injured; on 6th November a constable at Yuen Long was over-powered by three men and had his revolver stolen. On 28th November a Police constable on duty at Berwick Street was attacked and killed by three men. On 9th December another constable was killed at Kam Tin in the New Territories.

139. There were also further street demonstrations, which occa- sionally erupted into violence; but the main communist efforts until the end of the year were engaged in bomb attacks. This weapon was first used against the Police in mid July in the form of 'fish bombs' (that is crude explosive devices used, illegally, by fishermen) and from selected targets it gradually spread to the quite indiscriminate planting

　　　of bombs in busy thoroughfares or in public places. The 'bombs' varied in composition. The majority of them were fakes, that is quite harmless but suspicious looking bundles often with such messages on them as 'Compatriots do not touch!' In other cases they were filled with gun- powder extracted from fireworks to produce a substantial report but little damage. In other cases again they were charged with gelignite or other powerful explosive and were often fitted with a timing device or other sophisticated method of detonation, with lethal effect. There was no way of distinguishing one from another and every suspect object had to be treated with the greatest caution. During such operations the surrounding area had to be kept clear, so that in addition to the poten- tial danger there were often frustrating delays to traffic and pedestrians while these objects were rendered harmless.

　　　　140. In August the use of explosives was put under closer supervi- sion by the Government and in September emergency regulations were made prohibiting the possession or discharge of fireworks. Dealers and members of the public were called upon to surrender the stocks that they had in hand; 130 tons of fireworks were handed in but the bombs continued. In August two explosive stores were broken into in successive raids and 743 sticks of gelignite as well as other explosives were stolen. It is not known whether the communists were responsible but it was clear that they could command a sufficient quantity of explosives for their campaign.

　　　　141. Their cowardly attacks did their cause little good. The Police were put under considerable strain. But the main purpose, to undermine the morale of the people, was not achieved. The bombs were generally accepted as an additional hazard of life by the public which continued to go about its normal business in spite of inconvenience and danger. The communists themselves affected to claim that deaths caused by these bombs were not intended and that they were not responsible for all the bombs that were planted. These excuses carried little weight with the public and the deaths of two young children by the explosion of a bomb on 20th August roused intense popular feeling against those responsible. There were demands for the death penalty to be introduced for all who took part in these attacks.

142. A disquieting feature of this phase was the growing employ- ment of school-children to carry on the work of confrontation-pre- sumably to fill the ranks depleted by the retreat of their elders. Most of these children were recruited from the comparatively few communist

dominated schools in the Colony; by their willingness, even eager- ness, to take part in these activities and by their arrogant behaviour and contempt for authority, they have shown that they have been thoroughly indoctrinated. Children, both boys and girls, have been arrested and convicted for possession of real or simulated bombs, for possession of inflammatory posters and pamphlets, for taking part in subversive demonstrations, in short, for all offences that arose from con- frontation. At least one boy was seriously injured by the explosion of a bomb that he was carrying. The total number of children in primary and secondary classes of communist schools in the Colony amounts to no more than about 18,000, that is less than 2% of the total school population, and there was a significant drop in their enrolment after May. However their pupils, imbued with the spirit of militant com- munism, have given an impression of strength far beyond their actual numbers by their street demonstrations and their noisy outbursts in the courts.

143. In many cases school premises were used as centres for con- frontation and Police raids on them uncovered stocks of inflammatory literature as well as home-made weapons and explosives. The com- munist Chung Wah Middle School was closed by the Government on 28th November after a youth was seriously injured by an explosion in the school after normal working hours apparently while manufacturing explosive for bombs. This closure evoked a protest from the Peking Government on the grounds that it was an attempt to prohibit the teaching of Chairman Mao's thoughts.

144. Throughout this period there were demonstrations, in which small groups of communists, often carrying banners inscribed with 'protests' or inflammatory messages, gathered together to sing and chant slogans. Usually these groups dispersed before the Police arrived on the scene, almost always leaving behind them a cluster of bombs, both real and simulated. On other occasions the demonstration was used as an ambush and bombs were thrown at the Police party that was sent to deal with it. There was little mob disorder as such but there were a few incidents in which crowds refused to disperse and the Police had to use tear gas or to open fire.

145. On 1st October a crowd gathered at the water front at Con- naught Road to watch an illegal display of fireworks from a communist river boat in the harbour. They refused to disperse and jeered and threw bottles at the Police. Tear gas was used, but it had little effect, and the

Police opened fire. One man was killed and 79 men and 7 women were arrested.

　　　　146. On 8th November a Police party in Lai Chi Kok Road arrested two men whom they saw placing a suspected bomb on the road. They were surrounded by a hostile crowd and a second bomb was thrown from the crowd which exploded and set off the first bomb as well. All eight of the Police party were injured in the explosion, one of the men arrested was killed and 34 bystanders were injured, one of whom died later in hospital. The other man who had been arrested tried to snatch a policeman's revolver and was shot dead on the spot.

147. In November two bombs were set in the drive of the house occupied by one of the magistrates dealing with confrontation cases, One of the bombs exploded, damaging the magistrate's car, but fortunately causing no personal injury. This incident reflected the attempts that were made to overawe the courts. Since confrontation began the com- munists took the line that their activities were 'patriotic' and not criminal. They held protest demonstrations outside the courts where cases were heard, and on more than one occasion the Police had to use force to disperse the disorderly crowds that resulted. Inside the courts many of the accused, with their supporters, expressed their contempt for authority by refusing to stand when the magistrate or judge entered, by shouting insults and by chanting slogans. The behaviour of school- children brought before the courts was particularly arrogant and pro- vocative. They loudly claimed that they had committed no offence and they openly abused their parents if they offered to pay their fines or to sign bonds for their good behaviour.

　　　　148. These tactics were dealt with firmly and the authority of the courts was maintained. Where necessary the court-room was cleared of spectators and the contempt displayed by the accused was properly punished. Between May and the end of December nearly 2,000 persons were convicted of offences arising from confrontation.

　　　　149. Bomb attacks continued intermittently until December. The visit to the Colony in October of the Minister of State for Common- wealth Affairs, Lord Shepherd, was the signal for increased activity in bomb planting and at the end of the month some attempts were made to disrupt Hong Kong Week by this means. The exhibition had been set up to display for overseas buyers the quality of textiles and other goods produced in Hong Kong. The communist press claimed, quite

erroneously, that it was designed to rival the Canton Fair, which had been postponed for a month because of the unsettled conditions in that city and was then due to start on 15th November. They attempted a counter-display of goods from the Mainland, as much to improve the dwindling sales in their department stores as to draw attention away from Hong Kong Week. But they had little success in their campaign and, despite a noticeable increase in explosions during the period, the various events planned for the Week duly took place, with considerable success. The Silver Jubilee exhibition of the Chinese Manufacturers Association, which opened on 5th December, attracted no bombs and was also well attended.

150. From about the middle of December the number of true bombs noticeably dwindled and there were none at all after Christmas Day. The available evidence suggested that this violent phase had come to an end. Since it began, 8,352 suspected bombs had been reported and checked by explosive experts. 1,420 proved to be genuine: Police and Services bomb disposal teams dealt with 1,167 and there were 253 un- controlled explosions. These caused the death of 16 people; two police- men; an army sergeant investigating a suspected bomb at Lion Rock; an officer of the Fire Brigade who was killed while off duty; eight mem- bers of the public; and four who died from the premature explosion of bombs that they were carrying themselves. 340 people were injured by bombs, of whom 74 were policemen and 28 were members of the Armed Forces or other security units.

CHAPTER 11

THE WATER SHORTAGE

151. There are no sizeable rivers in Hong Kong and the Colony is mainly dependent for its water supply on inwater collected in its reservoirs. At the beginning of 1967 the total combined storage capacity of these reservoirs was 16,800 million gallons. An additional project, involving the construction of a dam across an arm of the sea at Plover Cove in the New Territories, had progressed to the stage that the main dam was closed. By early summer most of the sea water had been pumped out and the reservoir was ready to receive fresh water from the summer rains. In 1960 an agreement was made with China for the supply of 5,000 million gallons of water a year to the Colony from the Shum Chun reservoir, which lies a few miles to the north of the border

of Hong Kong. In 1964 a fresh agreement was negotiated by which the Colony received and paid for a minimum of 15,000 million gallons of water a year brought from the East River through a series of dams, pumping stations and channels. The supply period for this water begins on the 1st October each year, which is the start of the normal dry season, and ends on 30th June, and the water is paid for at the rate of $1.06 for a thousand gallons.

152. The rainfall in the last half of 1966 was well below average and, at a meeting with representatives of the People's Council of Kwangtung Province in November of that year, the Hong Kong Govern- ment's representatives made a formal request under Clause 1.5 of the Agreement for an additional 1,800 million gallons of water during the current supply period. The Government representatives enquired whether additional water could be drawn if it should be needed in July, August and September (that is the three months not included in the normal supply period) and understood that there would be no difficulty pro- vided due notice was given. The dry spell continued into 1967 and as a precautionary measure the hours of supply within the Colony were reduced from 24 to 16 a day after the Lunar New Year, that is in February 1967. The start of the usual rainy season, in May, brought little rain and on the 1st June, when the total water in storage had dropped to 3,000 million gallons, the hours of supply were further reduced to 8 a day.

153. By the 25th of June the total supply due from China, including the additional 1,800 million gallons, had been drawn and a request for a further additional supply remained unanswered. Rainfall continued to be below average and on the 29th June the supply was reduced to four hours every other day.

154. On the 11th July, with nearly half the rainy season past, the total storage stood at 3,277 million gallons and the supply period was reduced to four hours every fourth day. Such essential users as hospitals and power stations continued to get an unlimited supply. The special needs of industry were met by a four hour daily supply, while the crowded squatter areas and resettlement estates, where there were generally less facilities for storing water, were given a supply of four hours a day and four hours on alternate days respectively. By these restrictions the daily rate of consumption in the Colony was reduced to 60 million gallons a day, that is half the daily consumption with an

unlimited supply, but even at this rate there was little more than 50 days supply in hand and the position was critical.

155. Additional pumps were installed in the few local sources of water, with only a marginal improvement of the situation. The possi- bility was considered of importing water from overseas but the prospect was not encouraging. It was no longer practical to bring water by tanker from the Pearl River near Canton, as had been done during the previous drought in 1963, and the use of alternative sources did not appear to be feasible because of their distance from Hong Kong, and because of the scarcity of shipping. Further cuts in the supply periods were considered but it was physically impossible to reduce materially the existing exiguous ration.

156. It was a hot summer and there were many people who were more preoccupied with the water shortage than with the rioting that took place in July. For those living in squatter areas and the poorer tenements without a piped water supply it meant standing for long hours in the queues at the public standpipes. Those who were not fortunate enough to have salt water flushing mains installed in their homes had to eke out their allowance of fresh water to flush their lavatories. It was a sordid time for everybody: it is hardly necessary to add that no exceptions were made in the rationing scheme and that the restrictions applied to everybody from the Governor downwards.

157. The communist press made the most of the opportunity to attack the Government. It claimed that the restrictions were not neces- sary and that this was yet another example of persecution of the masses. It hinted that there were no restrictions in the Peak areas, which are mainly occupied by the more well-to-do Europeans. But these insinua- tions carried little weight and with their usual resilience the people of Hong Kong cheerfully accepted the discomfort and inconvenience of the situation.

158. The long awaited relief came with some smart showers in mid July which resolved the immediate crisis but were not sufficient to allow any improvement in the supply periods. In August there was heavy rain and for a week, from the 22nd to the 29th, a full 24 hour supply was given. The period then reverted to four hours a day which was maintained until the 6th of September. Further rain brought the storage level up to 16,000 million gallons and with some reservoirs overflowing a 24 hour supply was reintroduced. It was not at that stage known

whether the supply from China would be reintroduced on 1st October and as a precautionary measure the supply was again cut to four hours a day from the 26th of September. In fact the Chinese authorities resumed the supply on the due date.

　　　　159. With Chinese water, nearly 16,000 million gallons in the old reservoirs and access to the partially saline water of Plover Cove Reservoir, it was possible to revert to 24 hours supply, and this was continued till the end of the year. The water delivered to consumers had a salty taste and the communist press again seized the opportunity, to proclaim that it was injurious to health and that this 'adulteration' must stop. This campaign had some effect although the water did not in fact exceed a salinity of 900 parts per million, that is it is within the limit of 990 p.p.m. recommended by the World Health Organiza- tion, and the proportions were carefully controlled by Government chemists to ensure that this limit was not exceeded. Salinity at Plover Cove which was 1,250 p.p.m. on October 1st had risen to 1,625 p.p.m. by the end of December and was expected to increase steadily through- out the dry season. However, a substantial reduction was expected with the onset of the 1968 rains and as a result the salt content of the water delivered to the public would be well below the W.H.O. limit.

CHAPTER 12

COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

　　　　　160. In accordance with its tradition of liberalism and free speech Hong Kong has a press that represents almost all shades of opinion. But whereas from the start of confrontation the communist newspapers at once slavishly followed the party line, the remainder, which included a number of vigorous and by no means sycophantic publications, pre- served their independence. They have continued to criticize the Govern ment when they thought criticism was justified but none of them at any time expressed any agreement with the objects and method of the communists confrontation in spite of the volume of propaganda they produced.

　　　　　161. In May the communists had under their control all the machinery required for a full-scale propaganda campaign. Their three newspapers, the Ta Kung Pao, the Wen Wai Pao and the New Evening Post, were well established and had a good circulation; and they were

backed up by about six other papers which not only followed their lead but at times ran to excesses of wild invention of their own. They had ample printing facilities for other propaganda material and the men and the equipment for newsreel production.

162. They also enjoyed considerable encouragement and assistance from the local office of the New China News Agency (Hsinhua) which is owned and directed by the Peking Government. This agency was largely responsible for directing the propaganda campaign in the Colony as could be seen from the identical reports of incidents that regularly appeared in communist newspapers, all attributed to the agency's reporters. It was also responsible for producing distorted accounts of the events in Hong Kong for the consumption of the authorities in Peking. Its highly-coloured and wildly exaggerated reports undoubtedly played a large part in inflaming opinion in China against the Government of the Colony.

163. In their campaign the communists employed every theme and every weapon, from deliberate distortion of facts and falsification of photographs to the spreading of rumours and the fabrication of non. existent incidents. Rumours put about by them ranged from the possible but untruc-rice shortages, power or water stoppages-to the wildly improbable as for example the stories which appeared in minor com- munist newspapers, complete with photographs and maps, of Chinese gunboats approaching the Colony. Communist reporters and photog- raphers were present at every incident to produce their version of events; and in many cases demonstrations were organized solely for publicity purposes. During the phase of street demonstrations in May communist newspapers produced special editions which were distributed free to the crowds and which were designed to incite them to further violence. The same presses produced leaflets and booklets giving lurid accounts of Police 'brutality',

164. To a large extent these activities were countered by the presence and factual reports of the independent press in the Colony, local tele- vision and commercial wireless companies and particularly by the wide coverage given to events by the world press whose leading corre- spondents and photographers were in Hong Kong. To those in Hong Kong some of the reports published overseas may have seemed to lean towards the sensational but they effectively gave the lie to the com- munist distortions. Rumours, by their very nature, are more difficult to

combat but effective use was made of the local wireless transmissions to make known as quickly as possible what was really happening. On one occasion a threatened stoppage of work by employees of a transport company was averted by the continuous broadcast of the true facts of the situation, on which the men had been seriously misled. It was not possible to dispel all rumours, but whenever a rumour could be factually disproved it was dealt with promptly and quickly disposed of.

165. In the campaign of rumour-mongering, considerable use of loudspeakers mounted on communist owned buildings from which were broadcast threats and abuse against the authorities and encouragement to their supporters. The loudest and best known of these was at the Bank of China, the focal point for the disorders at the end of May. To meet this attack the Government set up its own loudspeakers on adjacent buildings whose combined output made the communist tirade unintelligible. The Government programme chosen consisted of selec- tions from Cantonese opera and the resulting din made the area of Statue Square almost uninhabitable for the three days that the contest lasted. In the end the communists gave in and their loudspeakers were not used again. Broadcasts continued intermittently from other build- ings, while communist river boats arriving in the Colony with goods from China, added their contribution while they were in port. These broadcasts tended to attract crowds and led on several occasions to clashes with the Police. There was a further addition to the communist propaganda armoury on 24th June when the Macau broadcasting sta- tion, Radio Villa Verde, passed completely into communist control and was used to direct more propaganda at Hong Kong.

　　　　166. The third medium of propaganda was posters. These appeared from the start of confrontation and continued sporadically throughout, reaching their height at the end of May and the beginning of June. Posters and slogans appeared everywhere, both ashore and afloat. They were pasted or written on every available wall, on ships in the harbour, and on the trains arriving at Lo Wu from China. Slogans were painted on the pavements and on the sides of cattle, while on one occasion a couple of unfortunate dogs were hung about with communist placards. These demonstrations had none of the sublety of the newspaper cam- paign, the message mostly consisting of simple, and crude slogans. But the cumulative effect of such objurgations as 'Blood for Blood', and 'Death to the Running Dogs' was considerable. They were reinforced

on occasions by straw effigies hung on traffic lights or other convenient places and purporting to represent the Governor and other leading members of the community. To discourage removal, these effigies were often decorated with bombs, real and simulated.

167. Many of the leaders of confrontation were drawn from news- paper and film-making circles and newspapermen in particular appear to have enjoyed the special favour of the Peking Government. Com- munist reporters were actively engaged in support of confrontation and in subversive actions which went far beyond what could be accepted as their proper duties. But when they were arrested for these activities there was a sharp reaction. In July the Peking Government protested to Her Majesty's Government over the arrest of an employee of the New China News Agency, who was later convicted of unlawful assembly. The protest was rejected and in retaliation Reuter's representative at Peking was put under house arrest; he was still under arrest and denied all visitors at the end of December. In August other communist reporters were arrested for criminal activities. Later in the month three minor communist newspapers which had been particularly virulent in their attacks on Government were suppressed; five people concerned in edit- ing, publishing and printing them were prosecuted for sedition (one editor evaded arrest) and the papers were suspended for six months. This evoked a further protest from the Peking Government which demanded, on 20th August, that within 48 hours the editors concerned and all communist reporters arrested must be unconditionally released and action against the newspapers withdrawn. This protest was also rejected and retaliatory action was taken, again not against Hong Kong, but against the office of the British Chargé d'Affaires in Peking which was sacked by a mob on 22nd August. There followed the curious incident in London in which the staff of the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires set upon the Police on some trivial pretext. This was presumably intended as an 'incident', complete with feigned injuries, to demonstrate to the people in China that diplomatic staff in other countries as well were liable to attacks.

168. Communist propaganda reached its peak in May and June. One of its main objectives had been to enlist the active support of the Peking Government in the struggle in Hong Kong and the exaggerated reports of the strength of the support for confrontation as well as of the "brutal persecution' by the authorities were designed to that end. Any

statement or protest from the Peking Government or any article in the People's Daily that seemed, or could be made to seem, to support this possibility was given prominent treatment, with banner headlines and extra editions. By the end of July, the tone of the communist press was changing. Its shrill abuse of the Government continued and its exhortations to violence were, if anything, more extreme. But it began to speak increasingly of a long hard struggle ahead and pronouncements from Peking were given only routine treatment. While the protest after the events of 8th July at Sha Tau Kok was followed, at the prompting of the communist press, by widespread violence in the Colony, the ultimatum issued by Peking on 20th August and the subsequent attack on the office of the Chargé d'Affaires passed almost unnoticed in Hong Kong. After the suspension of the three newspapers, a mosquito newsheet campaign began. The newsheets were poorly produced but highly inflammatory and subversive. At first they were distributed widely but the campaign quickly lost its momentum and had died out completely by the end of the year, without achieving anything significant.

　　　　　169. In December the cessation of bomb attacks was reflected in the tone of the communist press, which changed in its attacks on the Government from violent abuse to the appearance of reasoned argu- ments, accompanied by less violent tirades on topics which were likely to appeal to the public at large. During the last weeks of the year the communist newspapers devoted considerable space to two topics, the salinity of the water and the effects on the people of the adjustment of the Hong Kong dollar that followed the devaluation of sterling by Great Britain. Both these themes were of popular interest and concern. The water, though it was harmless, had a strong taste and it was not difficult to persuade the public that it was the cause of any disease from which they might be suffering. The arguments for and against devalua- tion were generally unintelligible to the layman but there were natural reactions to the communist insinuation that, for its own nefarious purposes, the Government had reduced the buying power of the dollar and robbed the poor of their savings.

　　　　　170. It remains to be seen whether this new trend will be main- tained. It is however probable that confrontation will continue in one form or another and that propaganda, whether overt and violent or, as at the end of the year, more devious and insidious, will continue to be one of its main weapons.

CHAPTER 13

THE ADMINISTRATION

171. The Colonial Secretariat, which works under the direction of the Colonial Secretary and his Deputy, is responsible for planning and organization as well as for the co-ordination of the work of other depart- ments. It is divided into branches: Financial and Economic (under the direction of the Financial Secretary) Establishment, Land, Defence, Councils and General.

172. At the outbreak of the riots at San Po Kong on 11th May the Emergency Control Centre, which is supervised by the Defence Secre- tary, was manned by Secretariat officers working in shifts throughout the twenty-four hours. This centre, which is also manned during typhoons and other emergencies, acts as a clearing-house for all informa- tion passed to it by departments and it is responsible for keeping the Governor and other senior officers informed of the progress of events as well as for conveying orders and instructions to departments.

173. The Emergency Control Centre remained in continuous opera- tion until 25th May and for a further month thereafter it was manned by Secretariat officers during the night, the Defence Branch acting as an information and liaison centre during the day.

174. As confrontation continued it soon became apparent that the Defence Branch of the Secretariat, which would normally deal with an emergency of this sort, could not continue to be responsible for co- ordinating the various measures required in addition to its ordinary work. On 22nd May therefore an officer was appointed as Personal Assistant to the Governor with direct responsibility for confrontation matters. On 25th June the title of this officer was changed to Deputy Colonial Secretary (Special Duties) and he was given a staff of three officers. This unit was still in operation at the end of the year and by relieving other Secretariat officers of much of the work arising from con- frontation it enabled them to continue their normal-and heavy- schedules of duties.

175. From the start of the disturbances there were frequent meetings at Government House, attended by senior Government servants and representatives of the Armed Forces, to pool information and to formu- late policy. On 27th October the Governor's Committee, as it was called, was reorganized to meet twice weekly with joint civil and military

secretaries working from the Defence Branch: and in that form still in being at the end of the year.

was

176. On 16th May the Colonial Secretary instituted twice weekly meetings with the heads of all Government departments to keep them informed of the course of events, of possible future trends and of the action that was being taken by the Government. These meetings were supplemented by written situation reports issued to departments. In November the incidence of these meetings was reduced to once a month.

　　　177. A publicity committee was also set up on 16th May to co- ordinate the Government publicity programme, to track down and refute rumours and to keep the public informed of the Government's actions and intentions. This committee at first met daily and in August con- tinued its meetings on a twice weekly basis.

178. A committee was also set up to co-ordinate public relations overseas. The reports published overseas on the events in Hong Kong were on the whole fair and accurate but there were some instances of exaggeration or misinformation which were potentially harmful to the Colony. The committee received considerable assistance from the Information Services Department, the Trade Development Council, the Tourist Association and the Hong Kong Federation of Industries, both in Hong Kong and overseas, in presenting a more balanced picture.

179. An Emergency Food Control Committee, with the Defence Secretary as Chairman, was set up on 14th June to be responsible for the maintenance of an adequate supply of food to the population and to consider measures that would be necessary in the event of a food shortage.

180. Other committees were set up whose membership included, as well as Government servants, members of the Executive and Legislative Councils and leading industrialists and businessmen in the Colony to advise on various problems as they arose. It is not possible in this report to give the full details of their activities, but they met frequently, often at unusual and inconvenient hours, and their work was of the greatest value to the administration.

　　　　181. Confrontation has led to a series of actions which, while not classifiable as offences in normal times, constituted a threat to the stability of the Colony in the special circumstances prevailing. It was also found that the law relating to other offences was insufficiently

precise or too narrow in scope to deal with the types of cases that emerged.

182. To meet these cases a number of emergency regulations were drafted by the Legal Department and made by the Governor in Council, to deal with such matters as the possession and dissemination of inflammatory posters and literature, intimidation, incitement to violence, planting and possession of simulated bombs, and the security of premises used in the provision of essential services. A list of the regula- tions made is given at Appendix V.

183. Chapter 8 of this paper describes the valuable services given by the Armed Forces in the border area. In the urban areas, they provided most of the men engaged in the dangerous task of investigating suspected bombs and rendering them harmless. They took no direct part in actions against the communists but they gave firm support to the Police by cordoning off areas as required and by providing road patrols.

184. The Colony's volunteer units also gave sterling service. 99% of the Auxiliary Police Force reported for duty when mobilization was ordered on 11th May. The Auxiliaries remained fully mobilized for 26 days during which time they worked alongside their Regular Police colleagues and suffered 25 casualties, some serious. When no longer mobilized about 500 Auxiliaries continued for several months to perform voluntary duty for eight hours every day in order to relieve the pressure on the Regulars.

185. The Hong Kong Regiment after a period of alert, was, on 12th July, placed on a state of Limited Call Out and was immediately committed to cordon duties, assisting Police raids and nightly vehicle patrols on the Island, the latter continuing until mid October. The Regiment also deployed rural area patrols in the New Territories in August. Members of the Regiment were particularly adept at this type of work and set a new pattern which the Regular Army followed. During August and September, individual members were deployed with the Regular Army on the border to assist with patrol duties and, in particular, to help in the translation and transmission of broadcast messages across the border at Sha Tau Kok and other sensitive areas.

186. The Auxiliary Air Force was placed on Limited Call Out from 11th May until the end of the month. Their helicopters and Austers were used constantly by Police, Government and, on occasions, the

Military for crowd surveillance, crowd control, general reconnaissance including aerial photography and communication flights. Thereafter, the H.K.A.A.F. continued to give such assistance as Government and Police needed although no longer on Limited Call Out.

　　　　187. Some members of the Civil Aid Services were called out to keep essential services going during the 'strike' phase. In addition they provided security guards on Government buildings and to escort convoys delivering explosives to work sites; they also met other calls on their specialist skills. The Auxiliary Medical Service provided help on several

occasions.

188. To ensure effective liaison between the services Pol/Mil district headquarters came into operation at the start of the disturbances. As the name implies these were staffed by representatives of the Police and the Military; in the urban areas, the Colonial Secretariat or other civil departments were not represented but they were available for consulta- tion or advice if required. In the New Territories there was a head- quarters at Sek Kong which included the District Commissioner, New Territories, as well as representatives of the Police and the Military, and there were also similar liaison centres in each of the New Territories Administration Districts.

189. It would not be appropriate in this paper to describe in detail the work of all the departments of Government. They were all affected by confrontation; for most of them it meant a considerable increase of work; for many of them it brought a number of new problems that had to be considered and solved. Out of some 70,000 Government servants, 1,652 were dismissed for absence from work and 28 were convicted of offences arising from confrontation. The remainder carried on with their duties and many of them cheerfully worked long hours whenever they were required to do so. It was their example as well as the lead given by the administration in planning and executing measures to meet the communist attacks that was mainly responsible for the results that were achieved.

CHAPTER 14

CONCLUSION

190. The violence engendered by confrontation was contained but at a severe cost. Between May and the end of December, 51 persons died and 832 were injured as a direct result. The details of the 16 deaths

resulting from bomb explosions are given in Chapter 10 above. Of the 35 other people who died, eight were policemen who were killed in the course of riots or other incidents and a further four were members of the public who died at the hands of the communists; 17 were rioters shot in the act by the Police; five (including the two men found dead at the China Gas Company's premises-vide paragraph 62) died from injuries received in the course of riots; and one died in Police custody.

191. The man who died in Police custody was Mr. Lee On and a Police corporal and two constables were subsequently charged with his murder. At their trial they were convicted of manslaughter; they appealed and at 31st December the case was still pending.* The decision to take proceedings against these men met with considerable public opposition based on the proposition that the Police had been subjected to such vicious attacks by the communists that they could not be blamed and should not be punished if they overstepped the law in retaliation. It was also claimed that Police morale would be seriously undermined if these men were punished. These arguments were clearly unacceptable: in a charge of such gravity no exceptions could be made if law and order were to be maintained.

192. The morale of the Police was not affected. Between May and December no member of the Police or Auxiliary Police was absent from duty without permission and normal vacancies arising in both forces were filled without difficulty.

193. By the standards of other countries the disturbances in Hong Kong and the casualties they caused were comparatively minor; during the same period 211 persons were killed and 7,098 persons were injured in traffic accidents in Hong Kong. However any needless death is to be deplored and, in the context of Hong Kong where disorders and riots are rare, the number of deaths and injuries that have been caused by confrontation is tragically high.

194. 465 persons were convicted of unlawful assembly, 318 of riot and over 1,000 for other offences arising from confrontation, while 52 people were detained under Emergency Regulation. A curfew was imposed five times in areas in Kowloon, three times in Hong Kong Island and once in the border area of the New Territories.

The appeal was subsequently upheld and all three men were acquitted.

195. Considerable damage was caused to public transport, including taxis, to Government and private vehicles and to buildings and other property. Attacks were made on 35 buses and trams, 30 taxis and public cars, 23 Government vehicles and 66 other vehicles, of which 6 buses and trams, 12 taxis and 20 private cars were seriously damaged or destroyed. Over 100 buildings (including 24 banks and 6 cinemas) were damaged.

196. A summary of the casualties and damage is given at Appendix VI. Damage to Government property is estimated at $320,000.

197. A board was appointed to examine claims for compensation for personal injuries caused during the disorders and claims by depend- ants of those who died from such injuries, and to make recommenda- tions for the payment of ex gratia awards. By 31st December 72 claims had been dealt with and a total of $392,800 paid out in awards from Government funds. Further claims were under consideration.*

198. In the economic field the disturbances of the summer resulted in substantial withdrawals of bank deposits as well as a drop in the number of tourists visiting the Colony. This was however only a tem- porary phase from the end of August the level of deposits with the banks began to increase and the tourist trade, which had not been seriously reduced, returned to normal. Industrial production was not affected at all and exports have continued at substantially higher levels than previous years. The communist campaign against what was de- scribed as the expropriation of the savings of 'the masses' by the adjustment of the Hong Kong dollar following the devaluation of sterling by Great Britain caused some apprehension of a general in- crease in retail prices; but in fact the economy is adjusting itself satisfactorily to the changed conditions. It is still too early to assess the long term results of confrontation but, with confidence in the Colony restored, there is reason to suppose that its prosperity will continue undiminished.

　　　199. It is not possible to make any accurate assessment of the financial losses suffered by the communists themselves through reduced imports to the Colony, the loss of trade in their department stores and the cost of mounting their campaign. It is however believed that in one item alone-the payment of 'strike pay' to the workers who were

* In March 1968 the terms of reference of the board were extended to cover

claims for damage to property arising from the disturbances.

dismissed in May and June-they had by the end of the year expended about $35 million. At the turn of the year groups of workers ap- proached the Labour Department with the demand that 10,000 men, who were described as unemployed or semi-employed, should be found employment. It was believed that the majority of these men had already found suitable jobs; there was in fact a labour shortage; at the time that the demand was made there were 4,000 vacancies reported in in- dustry and a further 1,000 vacancies in non-industrial occupations.

200. This paper records the history of confrontation from its begin- nings in May until 31st December, 1967. It is an incomplete history because, although by the end of the year communist violence had abated, the principles of confrontation have not been abandoned nor can it be concluded that a more violent phase of activity will not be resumed in the future. As the record shows, however, the demonstra- tions, stoppages of work and outright violence which the communists have perpetrated have all been withstood and, by their steadfastness and resilience, the people of the Colony have shown that they can meet any new form of attack that may be launched.

201. Central to the whole course of these events has been the attitude of the overwhelming majority of the people of Hong Kong. At the start of their assault, the Communists undoubtedly expected that considerable numbers could be attracted to their cause, or at least could be kept neutral by a combination of dislike of the authorities, 'patriotism' and intimidation. In the event, the people of Hong Kong rallied strongly behind their Government and openly and freely made clear their opposition to the Communists' activities. Their resolution, fortified by the firm and restrained action taken by the security forces and, in particular, the Hong Kong Police Force, sustained all those who were working to defeat the threat which faced the community. A major factor in the current restoration of the situation, therefore, has un- doubtedly been the dismay of the communists at finding themselves without support and, indeed, subject to the strong disapprobation of the people of Hong Kong as a whole.

APPENDIX I

A LIST OF ASSOCIATIONS THAT EXPRESSED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT

(Paragraph 48)

KAIFONG ASSOCIATIONS

1. Aberdeen Kaifong Welfare Association.

2. Aberdeen Tin Wan Resettlement Welfare Association.

3. Ap Lei Chau Kaifong Welfare Association.

4. Causeway Bay Kaifong Association.

Central District Kaifong Association.

6. Cha Kwo Ling Kaifong Welfare Association,

7. Chai Wan Area Kaifong Welfare Advancement Association Ltd.

8. Cheung Sha Wan Kaifong Association.

9. Happy Valley & Canal Road District Kaifong Association.

10. Ho Man Tin Area Kaifong Association.

11. Hong Kong & Kowloon Kaifong Joint Research Council.

12, Hung Hom Kaifong Committee,

13. Kennedy Town Kaifong Welfare Association.

14. King's Park Kaifong Welfare Advancement Association.

15. Kowloon City Kaifong Association.

16. Kwun Tong District Kaifong Association.

17. Lai Chi Kok Kaifong Welfare Association Ltd.

18. Mong Kok Kaifong Association.

19. Mount Davis Kaifong Association.

20. Ngau Tau Kok Resettlement Area Kaifong Association.

21. North Point Kaifong Welfare Advancement Association.

22. San Po Kong Kaifong Welfare Association Ltd.

23. Sau Mau Ping Resettlement Estate Kaifong Welfare Association Ltd.

24. Sham Shui Po Kaifong Association.

25. Shau Kei Wan Kaifong Association.

26. So Kon Po Resettlement Area Kaifong Association.

27. Stanley Kaifong Welfare Advancement Association.

28, Tai Hang Residents' Welfare Association.

29. Tai Hang Sai Resettlement Area Kaifong Welfare Association.

30. Tai Hom Village Kaifong Welfare Association Ltd.

31. Tai Wo Hau Area Kaifong Welfare Association.

32. Tsim Sha Tsui District Kaifong Welfare Association.

33. Tsz Wan Shan Kaifong Welfare Association Ltd.

34, Wan Chai Kaifong Association.

35. Wang Tau Hom Resettlement Estate Kaifong Welfare Advancement Association.

36. Western District Kaifong Association.

37. Wong Tai Sin Resettlement Estate Kaifong Welfare Association Ltd.

38. Yau Ma Tei Kaifong Welfare Advancement Association Ltd.

39. Yau Tong District Kaifong Welfare Association Ltd.

40. Yuen Ling Kaifong Association.

Total: 40

WOMEN'S ASSOCIATIONS

APPENDIX I-Contd.

1. Youth Campaign, Hong Kong & Kowloon Kaifong Women's Section.

2. Western District Women's Welfare Club,

3. Women's Section of the Clansmen Association.

4. Women's Section of the District Association.

5. New Territories Women's Welfare Club.

6. The Hong Kong Chinese Women's Club.

7. The Kowloon Women's Welfare Club.

8. Women's Welfare Club, Hong Kong East.

9. The Hong Kong Council of Women, 10. Catholic Women's League, Hong Kong.

Total: 10

CLUBS OF AN INTERNATIONAL NATURE

1. The Hong Kong Lion Club.

2. Tsuen Wan, Rotary Club.

3. Rotary Club, Kowloon West.

4. Rotary Club, Hong Kong Island, West.

5. Rotary Club, Hong Kong Island, East.

6. Kowloon Rotary Club.

7. Hong Kong Rotary Club.

8. Y's Men Club of Hong Kong.

9. Lions Club of Tei Ping Shan.

10. Peninsula Lions Club of Hong Kong,

11. Lions Club of Bayview Hong Kong.

12. Lions Club of North Kowloon.

13. Lions Club of Happy Valley.

14. Lions Club of Victoria Hong Kong.

15. Lions Club of Castle Peak, Hong Kong. 16. Y's Men's Club of Tsuen Wan.

Total: 16

APPENDIX I-Contd.

TRADITIONAL CHINESE TRADE SOCIETIES

1. Po Yick Commercial Association.

2. General Chamber of Commerce & Industry of Tung Koon District.

3. Chiu Chow Merchants Mutual Assistance Society.

4. Nam Hoi Traders Association, Ltd.

5. Chung Shan Commercial Association.

6. Shun Tak Traders Association.

7. The Sun Wui Commercial Association.

8. Hong Kong Chiu Chow Chamber of Commerce.

9. Four Districts Commerce & Industry Association.

10. Toi Shan Chamber of Commerce,

11. The Hoi Ping Chamber of Commerce.

12. Five Districts Business Welfare Association,

13. Po On Commercial Association.

14. Chinese Dried Medicine Merchants Association.

15. Chiu Chow Plastics Manufacturers Association.

16. Tsang Shing Commercial Association.

17. The Yun Ping Chamber of Commerce.

18. Leung-Yeung Industrial Commercial Association.

19. Wai Yeung Merchants Association,

Total: 19

ATHLETIC ASSOCIATIONS

1. Hong Kong Football Association.

2. South China Athletic Association.

3. Hong Kong Track & Field Association.

4. Eastern Athletic Association.

Hoi Tin Athletic Association.

6. Hong Kong & Kowloon Youth Football Association.

7. Kowloon Miniature Football Association.

Yuen Long District Sports Association.

9. Ap Lei Chau Young Men's Athletic Association.

10. Kowloon Chuk Yuen Lion Rock Bell-bar Club.

11. The Hong Kong Ladies Football Association.

12. Sik Ying Athletic Association.

13. The Hong Kong Football Referees Association.

14. Morning Star Sport Association.

15. Chinese Amateur Athletic Federation of Hong Kong.

16. Hong Kong Chinese Footballers' Fraternity.

17. Li Pak Lun Shadow Boxing Club.

18. Kwok's Robust Body Academy.

19. The Chinese Football Association Hong Kong.

20. Hong Kong Schools Sports Association,

21. Tsuen Wan Sheung Mo Chinese Pugilists Association.

Total: 21

SCHOOLS

APPENDIX I-Contd.

TRADITIONAL CHINESE CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS

1. Tung Wah Hospital.

Po Leung Kuk.

3. Chung Sing Benevolent Society.

4. Lok Sin Tong.

5. Chung Tak Charitable Society.

Total: 5

1. Houng Kong College.

2. Chu Hai College.

3. Chu Kong School, Tsuen Wan, New Territories.

4. Ching Fung School, Tsuen Wan, New Territories.

5. Tsuen Wan, St. Joseph School,

6. Tsuen Wan, Sun Kwong School.

7. Happy Valley School.

8. Shau Kei Wan Aldrich School.

9. Shau Kei Wan Pui Chi School.

10. Edward Primary School, Shau Kei Wan.

11. Canton College.

12. Tsing Hua College.

13. Tai Tung Middle School.

14. Aberdeen Technical School (Salesian Fathers) Hong Kong.

15, Yuen Pui College.

16. Great China Arts College.

17. Great China Technical & Arts High School.

18. Tak Ming College.

19. Yang Ming Middle School.

20. Chiu Sheung English Middle School.

Total: 20

APPENDIX I-Contd.

POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS

1. The Hong Kong Reform Club.

2. The Hong Kong Civic Association.

3. The Hong Kong Democratic Self-Government Party.

4. Modern Critique Association, Hong Kong.

5. United Nations Association of Hong Kong.

6. Anglo-Hong Kong Parliamentary Group.

Total: 6

APPENDIX I-Contd.

EDUCATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS-Contd.

29. The School of the Alumni Association of New Asia College, The Chinese

University of Hong Kong, Ltd.

30.

Ying Wa College Old Boy's Association, Ltd.

31. Kwangtung Provincial Physical College Alumni Association of Hong Kong.

32. Salesian Old Boys' Federation.

33. In-Service Course of Training of Teachers Kowloon (S.R.B.T.C.) Alumni

Association Ltd.

34. The Old Boys Club of Canton College of Physical Education.

35. The Association of Chinese Medical University's Graduates, Hong Kong.

36. Chu Hai Alumni Association.

37. Harvard Club of Hong Kong.

38. The Hong Kong Federation of Catholic Students.

39. The Confucian Academy,

Total: 39

EDUCATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

1. Hong Kong Private Anglo-Chinese Schools Association.

2. Hong Kong Chinese Private Schools Association.

3. Hong Kong Teachers Association.

4. Federation of Hong Kong Students.

5. Hong Kong University Students' Union.

Subsidized Schools Council.

7. Wen Hua University Alumni Association.

8. Association of Heads of Secondary Schools.

9. Hong Kong & Kowloon Private Chinese & English Schools Federation,

10. National Sun Yat Sen University Alumni Association of Hong Kong.

11. United College Alumni Association.

12. The Canton University Alumni Association, Hong Kong.

13. Overseas Chinese Students of France, Belgium & Sweden Association.

14. Hong Kong University Alumni Association.

15. Kwangtung Provincial Cheung Sha Teachers Training College & Hoi Ping

District Training College Alumni Association of Hong Kong.

16. Bosco Salesian School Alumni Association B Division.

17. Heung Kong College Alumni Association.

18. Chinese University Chung Chi College Students Union.

19. Hong Kong & Kowloon Resettlement Roof-Top Schools Association Ltd.

20. The Great China University Alumni Association Hong Kong.

21. Union Student Council of Great China Arts College.

22. La Salle College Old Boys Association.

23. The Course of Training for Teachers Alumni Association of the New Territories,

Hong Kong, Ltd.

24. Kuo Min University's Alumni Association, Hong Kong.

25. Kowloon Wah Siang Accounting College Alumni Association, Ltd.

26. National Chi-nan University Alumni Association.

27. The Kwangtung Provincial Hsiang Kun University Alumni Association.

28. Northcote Training College Students' Association.

RURAL ORGANIZATIONS

1. Tai Po Rural Committee. 2. Tung Tau "Heung Kung Soh",

3. Sha Po "Heung Kung Soh".

4. Chuk Yuen "Heung Kung Soh".

5. Nga Tsin Wai "Heung Kung Soh".

6. Ngau Chi Wan "Heung Kung Soh". 7. Ngau Tau Kok "Heung Kung Soh".

8. Sai Cho Wan "Heung Kung Soh". 9. Kai Liu "Heung Kung Soh".

10. Cha Kwo Ling "Heung Kung Soh". 11. Lei Yue Mun "Heung Kung Soh".

12. Ping Shek "Heung Kung Soh". 13. Ping Ting "Heung Kung Soh".

14. Tai Hom "Heung Kung Soh".

15. Upper Yuen Ling "Heung Kung Soh".

16. Lower Yuen Ling "Heung Kung Soh".

17. The Sha Tin Rural Committee.

18. The Federation of Associations in Yuen Long.

19. The Yuen Long Traders Co-operative Society.

20. The Tsuen Wan & Sham Tseng Pai Min Kok Village Better Living Co-operative

Society.

21. The Wan Shing Better Living Co-operative Society, Yuen Long.

22. The Yuen Long Small Traders New Villager Better Living Co-operative Society,

Ltd.

APPENDIX I-Contd.

RURAL ORGANIZATIONS-Contd.

23. Lan Nai Wan Residents Association,

24. Tsuen Wan Shan Tsuen Street Residents' Association.

25. Tsuen Wan Chiu Chow Welfare Association Ltd.

26. Tsing Yi Overseas Chinese Fraternal Association.

27. Yuen Long Chamber of Commerce.

28. Hok Tsui Residents Welfare Association.

29. Sing On Village Welfare Association.

30. Tsuen Wan Tsung On Street Part-time Service Society.

31. Shek O Residents Association.

32. The Sai Kung Fellowships' Association Co. Ltd.

33. Heung Yce Kuk.

34. The Kwun Tong Kai Liu Villagers Fraternal Association.

35. Telegraph Bay Residents Association.

36,

37.

Cheung Chow Choi Yuen Hong, Ping-chow Branch.

Wai Chow Un Long Residents' Association Ltd.

38. Cheung Chau Rural Committee.

39. Peng Chau Chamber of Commerce,

40. South Lantau Rural Committee.

41. New Territories Luen Wo Market Traders Association.

Total: 41

CLANSMEN ASSOCIATIONS

1. Kwok Fan-yeung Tong Clansmen Association,

2. Fung Clansmen Association,

3. Ho Clansmen Association.

4. Lai Clansmen Association.

5. Eng Clansmen Association. 6. Tam's Clansmen Association.

7. Yue's Clansmen Association.

8. Chan's Clansmen Association.

9. Yuen's Clansmen Association.

10. The Hong Kong Wong Clansmen Association,

11. Lau's Clansmen Association.

12.

13.

　Lung Kong (Chan Yee) Association of Hong Kong. Hung Clansmen Association,

14. Orr Tsoi Clansmen's Association.

15. Tsui Clansmen Association.

16. Ng Clansmen Association.

APPENDIX Contd.

CLANSMEN ASSOCIATIONS-Contd.

17. Szeto Clansmen Association.

18. Mok Clansmen Association.

19. Yan Clansmen Association,

20. Liu Clansmen Association,

21. Lam Sai Ho Tong Clansmen Association,

22. Hui Clansmen Association.

23. Siu Clansmen Association.

24. So Clansmen Association.

25. Chong Yim Clansmen's Association,

26. Yuen Clansmen Association.

27. Cheung Clansmen Association.

28. Sit Clansmen Association.

29. Ling Clansmen Association.

30. Law Clansmen Association,

31. Ma Clansmen Association.

32. Leung Clansmen Association.

33. The Gee Tuck (Ng, Chow, Choi, Yang, Tsao) General Clans Association.

34. Chow Clansmen Association.

35. Tse Clansmen Association.

36. The Lung Kong World Federation.

37. Chiu Clansmen's Association.

38. Hong Kong Chew Lun Clansmen's Association Ltd.

39. Kong's Clansmen Association in Hong Kong.

40. The Hong Kong Wong Clan Association.

41. The Ip Nam Yeung Tong Clansmens (Hong Kong) Association.

42. Hong Kong Lo Clan's Association,

43. Au, Au-Yeung Joint Lineage Association Ltd.

44. Lee Clansmen's Association.

45. Yeung Clansmen Association.

46. Yen & Tong Clansmen's (Chung Shan Tong) Friendly Association,

47, Hong Kong Leung's (Chung Hau Tong) Association Ltd.

48. Cheng Clansmen Association.

49. The Hong Kong Kwan's Clansmen Association.

50. Tung Koon Wong Wing Sze Tong Clansmen Association.

51. Larm Clansmen Association.

52. Pun Clansmen Association.

53. Chung Clansmen Association,

54. The Hung Clansmen Association.

55. Pang Clansmen Association,

56. Yau Clansmen's General Association.

57. Sam Yick Clansmen Association.

APPENDIX I-Contd.

CLANSMEN ASSOCIATIONS-Contd.

58. The Ngan's Lim Kai Clansmen's Association of Hong Kong Ltd. 59. The Hong Kong Lui Clansmen Association,

60. Lui Fong Kwong Shok Yuen Tong Clansmen's Association.

61. Chu Clansmen Association.

62. Tsang Clansmen Association, Ltd.

63. The Moy Clan's Association, Ltd,

64. Tong Chun Yang Tong Family Society.

65. Hon Clansmen Association, Hong Kong.

66. Hong Kong Toi Shan Tam Kwong Yue Tong Clansmen Association.

67. Hong Kong Shum Clansmen Association.

68. The Cham Clansmen's Association of Hong Kong.

69. Tang Clansmen Association, Hong Kong.

70. Ko's Clans Association.

71.

Lin Tan Lam Clansmen Association.

72. Sun Hing Tso Clan Association.

Total: 72

CULTURAL ORGANIZATIONS

1. Hong Kong Publishers & Distributors Association.

2. Cultural & Educational Association of Chiu-Chow & Swatow Residents, Hong

Kong.

3. The Sun Yat-sen Memorial Association of Hong Kong.

4. Chinese Culture Association,

5. Oriental Humanists Society,

6. Hong Kong & Kowloon Cinema & Theatrical Enterprise Free General

Association.

7. La Sociedad Hispanica de Hong Kong.

Total: 7

MULTI-STOREY BUILDINGS

1. Landlord & Tenants Association of Tak Tung Mansion,

2. Vilot Mansion Owners & Tenants Association.

3. The Kwun Tong Hoi King Mansion Landlords & Tenants Association.

4. The Kwun Tong Szw Hing Mansion Landlords' Tenants Association.

5. The Yuct Wah Mansion Landlords & Tenants Association.

6. The Yuet Wah Lau Landlords & Tenants Association.

7. The On Lok Garden Mansion Owners & Tenants Association.

APPENDIX I-Contd.

MULTI-STOREY BUILDINGS-Contd.

8. The Wah Lai Mansion Owners & Tenants Association. 9. The Chap King Mansion Owners & Tenants Association. 10. The Yuet Ming Mansion Owners & Tenants Association, 11. The Wah Fung Mansion Owners & Tenants Association, 12. The Man Wo Mansion Owners & Tenants Association. 13. The Ho King Mansion Owners & Tenants Association. 14. The Koon King Kok Mansion Owners & Tenants Association. 15. The Yuet King Mansion Landlords & Tenants Association,

16. The Fung King Mansion Landlords & Tenants Association.

17. The Kiu Yip Mansion Owners & Tenants Association,

18. The Dor Hay Mansion Owners & Tenants Association.

19. The Chiu Kwan Mansion Owners & Tenants Association.

20. The Kwun Tong Multi-storey Buildings Landlords Committee.

21. The Wun Tung Multi-storey Buildings Landlords co-operation Society.

22. The Tin Heung Mansion Management Committee.

23. The Hing Yan Mansion Landlords & Tenants Association.

24. Kai King Building Landlords & Tenants Association, Kwun Tong.

25. Yen Yuen Mansion Owner & Tenants Association, Kwun Tong.

26. Federation of Landlords & Tenants Association in Kwun Tong.

27. Federation of Multi-storey Buildings Landlords & Tenant Association in

Kowloon,

28. Kingland Apartment Landlords & Tenants Association.

29. Peony House East Block Purchasers Association.

30. Tai Kok Tsui Building Landlords & Tenants Association.

31. Cornwall Court Landlords & Tenants Association.

32. Fa Yuen Building Residents & Owners Association.

33, Kwong Hing Building Landlords & Tenants Association. 34. Peony House 'West Block' Management Committee. 35. United Mansion A Block Landlords & Tenants Association.

36. United Mansion B Block Landlords & Tenants Association.

37. Jordan Mansion Landlords & Tenants Association. 38. Booman House Landlords & Tenants Association.

39. Tung Hing Building Owners & Tenants Fraternal Association, 40. Hung Wan Building Landlords & Tenants Association. 41. Lady Grantham Villa Association Ltd.

42. Companion Court Landlords & Tenants Association. 43. Chung Shun Building Landlords & Tenants Association. 44. Yuen On Building Landlords & Tenant Association, 45. Wah Tak Building Landlords & Tenants Association. 46. Wing Hong Mansion Owners & Tenants Association. 47. Tung Fong Mansion Owners & Tenants Association. 48. Po Tuck Mansion Landlords & Tenants Association, 49. Landlords & Tenants Management of

Man Sing Building, Man Wai Building, Man Ying Building, Man Yuen Building, Man Fai Building, Man Wah Building. 50. Lucky Building Landlords & Tenants Fraternity Association. 51. Tack Lee Mansion Landlords & Tenants Association.

APPENDIX I-Contd.

MULTI-STOREY BUILDINGS→→→Contd.

52. Cheung Yuen Mansion Landlords & Tenants Association,

53.

Overseas Chinese Building Landlords & Tenants Association.

54. Residents of New Lucky Mansion.

55. Hong Kong Housing Authority North Point Estate Residents Association.

56. Han Yee Building Landlords Association,

57. Wai Lai Building Landlords Association.

58. Western Court Owners Association.

59. Multi-storey Buildings Joint Association in Kowloon,

Total: 59

SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS

1. Hong Kong Council of Social Services.

2. Social Welfare Advisory Committee.

3. Society for the Aid & Rehabilitation of Drug Addicts,

4. Hong Kong Housing Society.

5. The Kowloon Shek Kip Mei Residents Health Promotion Association.

6. The Hong Kong and Kowloon Residents Association.

7. The Hong Kong Ex-Volunteers' Club.

8. The Endeavourers,

9. Hong Kong Economic Housing Society.

10. Road Safety Association Ltd.

11. Hong Kong Ex-police Officers Association,

12. Chung Wah Recreation Club.

13. The College Club.

14. The Far East Journalists Association.

15. Hong Kong Association of Birds & Animals.

16. Hong Kong Chess Association.

17. Victoria Recreation Club-Deep Water Bay.

18. Hong Kong Youth Club.

19. Hong Kong Club,

20. Nav Bharat Club.

21. Hong Kong Residents Association.

22. Kowloon Residents Association.

23. Hong Kong Rennie's Mill Refugee Camp Relief Committee.

24. Hong Kong & Kowloon Inhabitants Main Association Inc. Ltd.

25. American Friends Service Committee, Hong Kong Unit.

26. Community Relief Trust Fund Raising Committee.

27. Former Canton News Correspondents Fraternal Association, Hong Kong.

28. Boy Scouts Association, Hong Kong Branch.

29. Girl Guides Association, Hong Kong Branch.

30. New Territories Girl Guides Local Association,

Total: 30

APPENDIX I-Contd.

COMMERCIAL/INDUSTRIAL ASSOCIATIONS

1. The Federation of Hong Kong Industries.

2. Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce.

3. The Chinese Manufacturers' Association.

4. The Hong Kong Exporters' Association,

5. Hong Kong Trade Development Council,

6. Kowloon Chamber of Commerce.

7. South Chinese Paper Merchants Association.

8. Shau Kei Wan Chamber of Commerce.

9. Hong Kong Cotton Weaving Guild.

10. Hong Kong Textile Manufacturers' Association.

11. Hong Kong Clothes Making Association.

12. Hong Kong Clothes Manufacturers' Association.

13. Hong Kong Cotton Weaving Association.

14. Hong Kong Pawn Shops Association.

15. Hong Kong & Kowloon Real Estate Association.

16. The Hong Kong Clocks & Watches Dealers Association.

17. Hong Kong Woollen Knitting Manufacturers' Association Ltd.

18. Hong Kong Productivity Centre.

19. The Hong Kong & Kowloon Jewellers' & Goldsmiths' Association.

20. Hong Kong & Kowloon Fruit & Jam Traders Association.

21. Dried Bean Curd Skins Traders Association.

22, Hong Kong Cotton Spinners Association.

23. The Hong Kong & Kowloon Importers & Exporters Foreign Goods Association.

24. Hong Kong & Kowloon Art Carved Furniture & Camphorwood Chests Merchants

Association,

25. Hong Kong Plastics Manufacturers Association.

26. Hong Kong & Kowloon Plastics Products Merchants United Associated Ltd.

27. Hong Kong & Kowloon Furniture and Decorators Association.

28. Kowloon Jewellery and Goldsmiths Traders Association.

29. The Hong Kong Boarding House Kwong Luen Association,

30, Hong Kong Flowers Dealers and Workers' Association.

31. Ship Builders & Carpenters Association.

32. The Building Contractors Association, Ltd. Hong Kong.

33. Shanghai Tailoring Merchants in Hong Kong & Kowloon.

34. Kwan Yick Letter Pad Association.

35. The Diamond Importers Association Ltd.

36. Hong Kong Woollen Knitwear Exporters & Manufacturers (W. Germany)

Association.

37. The Hong Kong and Kowloon Electric Trade Association.

38. Hong Kong Hotel Trade Association.

39. The Hong Kong Cotton Textile Manufacturers' Export Group.

APPENDIX I-Contd.

COMMERCIAL/INDUSTRIAL ASSOCIATIONS-Contd.

40. Hong Kong Booksellers' & Stationers' Association.

41. Hong Kong & Kowloon Ivory Manufacturers Association Ltd,

42.

The Firewood Dealers' Co. Ltd.

43. Hong Kong Metal Merchants Association.

44. Tsuen Wan Chamber of Commerce.

45. Kowloon Boarding House General Association.

46. Hong Kong Sing Fat Building Merchants Association.

47. Hong Kong & Kowloon Oxy/Acety Electro Welding Traders Association Ltd.

48. Hong Kong & Kowloon Mahjong Manufacturers Association Ltd.

49. New Territories Taxi Owners Association.

50. Hong Kong Chinese Textile Mills Association.

51. Hong Kong Rubber Manufacturers Association.

52. The Hong Kong Management Association.

53. New Territories Tourists Association.

54. Hong Kong Tourist Association.

55. The Indian Chamber of Commerce.

56. Hong Kong Junior Chamber of Commerce.

Total: 56

APPENDIX I-Contd.

PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

1. The Hong Kong Dental Society.

2. Chinese Herbalists Association.

3. Kowloon Learner-Drivers Tutor Association,

4. Hong Kong Chinese Medical Association.

5. Chinese Engineers Institute.

6. Hong Kong Social Workers Association.

British Medical Association, Hong Kong Branch,

8. Hong Kong Nurses Association.

9. The Pharmaceutical Society of Hong Kong.

10. Council of the Engineering Society of Hong Kong.

11.

Hong Kong Bar Association.

12. Kowloon Chinese Herbalists Association Ltd.

13. Hong Kong & Kowloon Free Medical Practitioners Association Ltd.

14. Society of Practitioners of Chinese Herbal Medicine.

15. The Hong Kong Artists Association.

16. Radio Association of Hong Kong.

17. Hong Kong & Kowloon Private Detectives' Association.

18. Hong Kong Physiotherapy and Occupational Therapy Association,

19. Hong Kong Economic Association.

20. Association of Practitioners of Societies Clinics Ltd.

Total: 20

RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

1. The Hong Kong Buddhist Association.

2. Hong Kong Lutheran Church Protestant Association.

3. Hong Kong Christian Council,

The Hong Kong Taoist Association,

5. United Hong Kong Christian Baptist Churches Association.

6. The Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod.

7. St. Anne's Parish Council,

8. Christian Truth Fellowship.

9. The Church of Christ in China.

10. China Free Methodist Mission,

11. International Christian Leadership, Hong Kong.

12. Christian Nationals' Evangelism Commission (Hong Kong) Ltd.

13. Tin Tak Religion General Association Ltd.

14. The Evangelical Lutheran Church of Hong Kong.

15. The Confucius Hall,

16. The Confucius Society.

17. The Dharmalakshana Buddhist Institute.

18. Christian Overseas Evangelism Mission.

19. The Council of Young Men's Christian Association of Hong Kong.

20. The Li Kau Ching Shin Tong, Happy Valley, Hong Kong.

Total: 20

DISTRICT ASSOCIATIONS

1. Tsung Ching General Association.

2. Sun Hing District Association,

3. Hopei & Shantung Natives Association.

4. Yun Ping District Association.

5. Hoi An District Association.

6. Hok Shan District Association.

7. Tung Koon District Association.

8. Wai Chow 10 District Association.

9. Association of Natives of Ngoi Hoi Village, Sun Wui.

10. Hong Kong & Kowloon Yung Kong Welfare Association.

11. Sam Sui Natives Association.

12. Nam Hoi Ha Kau Village Association.

13. Shun Tak Fraternal Association.

14. Hunan Provincial Fellow-countrymen Association.

15. Ka Ying District Association.

16. Ng Wah District Association.

APPENDIX I-Contd.

DISTRICT ASSOCIATIONS-Contd.

APPENDIX I-Contd.

17. Hing Ning District Association.

18. Tsiu Ling District Association.

19. Chiu Chow Residents Public Association.

20. The Foo Chow, Chiu Chow & Wai Chow Natives Association.

21. The Luk Fung District Association.

22. The Hopei Natives Association in Hong Kong.

23. Association of Siulamese in Hong Kong.

24. Chiu Yang Residents' Association,

25. Wai Loi Residents' Association.

26. The Po On District Association,

27. The Pok Law District Association.

28. Hong Kong Hupeh Province Fellow Countrymen Association Ltd.

29. The Association of Natives of Kochow & Liuchow Districts.

30. Hong Kong Sun Wui Chat Po Clan Association Ltd.

31. The Chung Shan District Association Yuen Long Branch Association.

32. Tung Koon District Association, Tai Po Branch Association.

33. The Ho Yuen District Association.

34. The Tze Kam District Association.

35. The Lung Chuen District Association.

36. The Hoi Fung District Association.

37. The Five-Districts Association,

38. Kiangsu & Chekiang Natives Association.

39. Fa Yuen District Association.

40. Nam Hoi District Association, Hong Kong.

41. Nam Hoi Sha Tau Association, Hong Kong.

42. Tsuen Wan Northern Chinese Welfare Association.

43. Lung Yap District Association.

44. Kow Kong District Association.

45. The Sun Wui Ku Cheng District Association.

46. Pak Miu Countrymen Association Ltd.

47. Hoi Ping Cheung Kiu Village Clansmen's Association.

48. Six-Districts Natives Fraternal Association.

49. The Hong Kong Chung Shan Lung Chan Natives Association.

50. Sun Wui Po Tong District Association.

51. Sun Wui Shek Tsui District Association. 52. Shanghainese Association, Hong Kong.

DISTRICT ASSOCIATIONS-Contd.

53. Preparatory Committee of Sun Wui Shek Po Natives Association.

54. The Society of Natives of Chung Fa.

55. Kiu Kong Wan Fow Club.

56. To Ching Countrymen's Association.

57. Lin Yeung Natives Association, Hong Kong.

58. The So Pei District Association.

59. Wai Chow & Chiu Chow District Fraternal Association.

60. Lo Ting District Association Ltd,

61. Yeung Kong District Association.

62. Toi Shan Tsang Sam Shing Tong Fraternity Association of Hong Kong. 63. Ku Kong District Association.

64. Sze Wui and Kwong Ning Clansmen's Association (Hong Kong) Ltd.

65. Lung Moon Clansmen Society, Hong Kong.

66. Hong Kong Kwong-Si Countrymen Association.

67. Ning Po District Association.

68. Pun U District Association.

69. The Society of Natives of Chiu Lin District in Hong Kong.

70. The Preparation Committee of Sunyi District Association, Hong Kong.

71. Yun Ping Tai Kwong District Association.

72. Hong Kong Northern Kiangsu Clansmen Association.

73. Po On Fellowship Association.

74. The Wai Yeung Distribution and its Branches in the New Territories.

75. The Wai Chow District Association & its Branches in the New Territories.

76. Sze Yap Clansmen's Association, Yuen Long Branch, New Territories.

Total: 76

HAWKERS

1. Hong Kong & Kowloon Licensed Hawkers Association, Ltd.

2. Kowloon Licensed Hawkers Mutual Aid Society Ltd.

3. Western District Licensed Hawkers Mutual-Assistance Society.

4. Hong Kong Eastern District Licensed Hawkers Association.

5. Eastern District Hawkers Society.

6. Tsuen Wan Licensed Hawkers' Association.

7. Hong Kong & Kowloon Newspapers Hawkers Association,

Total: 7

APPENDIX I-Contd.

TRADE UNIONS

1. Cotton Industry Workers General Union, Hong Kong.

2. Hong Kong & Kowloon Drawn-work & Embroidery Trade Workers Union.

3. The Hong Kong & Kowloon Tea House & Restaurant Workers Association.

4. The Hong Kong & Kowloon Labourers Welfare Promotion Association.

5. Hong Kong Kowloon Building & Stone Mason Workers Union Shing Yee. 6. The Hong Kong Dockyard Workers Association.

7. Hong Kong & Kowloon Hair Dressing Trade Workers Union.

8. Hong Kong & Kowloon Trades Union Council.

9. Hong Kong Garment Industry Free Workers General Union.

10. Hong Kong Machine Wood Sawing Workers Union.

11. The Hong Kong & Kowloon Ferry Workers General Union.

12. Hong Kong & Kowloon Marine and Land Painters Free Union.

　13. Hong Kong & Kowloon Free Workers Fellowship Association. 14. Professional Musicians Union.

15. Hong Kong & Kowloon Restaurant and Café Workers General Union.

16. Hong Kong & Kowloon Quarry Engineering and Materials Supervisors Union.

17. Hong Kong & Kowloon Machine Stone Crushing Trade Workers' Union.

18. Hong Kong Ivory Manufacturing Workers General Union.

19. Hong Kong & Kowloon Newspaper Hawkers General Labour Union.

20. Hong Kong & Kowloon Tea-House Workers General Union,

21. Hong Kong & Kowloon Cane-woven Ware Makers' Union,

22. The Hong Kong & Kowloon Clerical Staff Association. 23. Kowloon Jewellery-Clerks Association.

24. Army Department Civilian Staff Association, Hong Kong.

25. The Senior Non-Expatriate Officers Association.

26. Hong Kong & Kowloon Free Clerical Workers' Union.

27. Amalgamated Union of Seafarers Hong Kong.

28. Urban Services Department Kowloon Workers General Union.

Total: 28

AGRICULTURAL/FISHERY---Contd.

8. The Hong Kong Pigeon Association.

9. Hong Kong and Kowloon Fisheries & Agriculture Members' Association.

10.

Fanling Farmers Mutual Assistance Society.

11.

New Territories_Agricultural & Veterinary Medicine & Animal Feed Merchants* Association, Ltd.

12.

Lamma Island Vegetable Garden.

13. Hong Kong Wai, Wong Chuk Hang Agricultural Mutual Assistance Society.

14. Hung Shui Kiu, Ten Sai Pig Keeping Co-operative Society Ltd. New Territories.

Total: 14

COMMERCIAL FIRMS

1. Chinese Refugees Industrial Organization (Hong Kong) Ltd.

Tsuen Wan Woollen Textile Manufactory.

3. Doran Brothers Ltd.

4. Mandarin Industries Ltd.

Hop Sing Lung Oyster Sauce Manufactory.

6. Hanimex (Hong Kong) Ltd.

7. Spence Robinson, Chartered Architects,

8. On Hing Tong, Ltd.

Total: 8

Nil.

INDIVIDUALS

AGRICULTURAL/FISHERY

1. Hong Kong Fishing Industry Commercial General Association.

2. The Federation of Pig-Raising Co-operative Societies of Hong Kong, Kowloon

and New Territories.

3. The Federation of Vegetable Marketing Co-operative Societies.

4. New Territories Poultry Breeders Association.

5. Hong Kong & New Territories Fish Culture Association.

6. Yuen Long Agricultural Mutual Assistance Society,

7. The Fisheries General Association.

GROUPS OF INDIVIDUALS

1. J. Dickson LEACH on behalf of Unofficial Justices of Peace,

2. Mr. S. B. WEERASINGHE on behalf of the Ceylonese Community of Hong Kong.

3. All Members of Toi Shan Chamber of Commerce, Hong Kong.

4. Residents of Tai Hang Tung Resettlement Estate.

5. Students, Hong Kong Technical College.

Total: 5

APPENDIX II

TRANSPORTATION USED & IMPORT TONNAGE OF ALL GOODS (INCLUDING FOOD SUPPLIES)

FROM CHINA FOR 1967 (Figures for 1966 in brackets)

(Paragraph 90)

1967

River Trade

Month

Tonnage of Imports

Rail

Road

Ocean-going Vessels

No. of River Boats/Junks

Tonnage of Imports

No. of Freight Wagons

Tonnage of Imports

No. of

Vessels

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

FFF

May

Jun.

Jul.

---

Aug.

Sep.

Oct.

Nov.

..་

Dec.

TOTAL

MONTHLY

159.344(146,416)|

117,102 ( 161,562)|

160,693 ( 161,925)

146,073 (138,698)| 155,472 143,131)|

112,023 ( 144,170)||

90,371 ( 106,312)

56,765 ( 159,339)|

70,864 ( 178,421)|

80,778 150,385)|

74,740 ( 189,889)|

78,152( 168,573)||

1,302,377 (1,848,821)

AVERAGE 108,365(154,068)||

1,365 (1,092) 31,345 (34,509)| 1,053 (1,612) 35,535 35,374)| 1,340 ( 1,248) 42,673 (48,113)|| 1,226 (1,184)| 44,361 (43,846) 1,326 (1,216)| 65,416 (68,031) 2,614 (2,725)| 1,047 (1,243)| 30,253 ( 64,582) 1,450 ( 2,585)| 748 (1,231) 30,666 ( 22,316)|| 1,677 ( 3,884)| 633 (1,369) 4,098 (63,907) 369 (4,084)] 746 (1,333) 3,839 ( 67,908) 399 (4,207) 751 (1,321) 31,480 ( 65,951) 2,634 ( 4,309)| 770 (1,379) 28,833 (57,035) 2,694 (3,739)| 7571,375) 34,478 ( 56,875)| 2,392 ( 3,636) 11,762 (15,603)| 382,997 (628,447)| 24,719 (38,933)| 980 (1,300) 31,916 (52,370)] 2,060 (3,244)| NOTE: (a) Disruption in rail supplies 1st- 13th September, 1967. (5) Man Kam To Bridge closed - 10th-25th August, 1967, 15th October-25th November, 1967.

2,548 (2,475)

2,373 (1,956)

2,866 (2,614)|

2,703 ( 2,719)|

6,814 (6,483)|

4,180 ( 7,432)|

3,744 (7,050)

3,788 ( 3,780)|

4,235 (6,283)

3,442 ( 6,022)

80,952 ( 60,536)

93 (106) 83,648 (56,617)| 91 (101) 100,368 ( 80,056) 110 (103) 85,062 ( 69,996)| 91 (101) 78,525 (~72,456); 95 (102) 49,370 ( 58,465) 63 (101) 2,963 ( 6,024) 20,727 ( 73,003)| 1,430 (5,477)| 9,201 ( 49,879) 5,928 (7,417) | 36,499 (92,632)| 46 (97) 2,498 (9,316)| 48,700 (109,092) 33 ( 94) 230 (8,524) 49,039 102,676)| 50 (99) 4,200 ( 9,403)| 23,993 (237,731) 50 (110) 43,452 (83,211}| 668,084 (1,063,149), 815 (1,218)

44 (91)

27 (113)

3,621 (6,934)| 55,673 (88,595) 68 (101)

IMPORT OF FOODSTUFFS FROM CHINA

(Paragraph 91)

APPENDIX III

Month

Swine (Hds.)

Cattle (Hds.)

Vegetables (M/ton)]

Fish (M/ton)

Frozen Meat

(M/ton)

January

173,288

12,326

19,610

3,187

1,945

February

143,139

8,245

11,332

3,123

2,777

March

160,563

8,227

16,812

3,083

2,914

April

165,484

7,711

9,126

2,396

3,209

May

158,708

9,015

7,801

2,733

2,666

June

131,305

6,557

5,352

2,100

992

July

158,968

5,772

16,900

1,971

1,638

August

74,359

1,114

13,241

2,323

351

September...

83,372

3,371

11,007

2,327

1,669

October

144,943

11,533

15,888

2,238

2,885

November...

135,337

12,538

16,858

2,096

2,439

December

140,983

11,538

19,391

2,237

2,509

GENERAL CONSUMER PRICE INDEX FIGURES FOR EACH MONTH FROM SEPTEMBER 1966 TO DECEMBER 1967 (1963/64-100)

(Paragraph 92)

APPENDIX IV

2961 000

1961 'AON

£961 "PO

1961 'idag

1961 Boy

1961 Ajor

1961 an

2961 ABIN

ཎྜ སྟྲཎྜཎྜ སྦྱིཎྜ

ཎྜ ལྦ ལྦུ

+01 201 001 66 66 66 001 001 66 86 86 66 86 86 86 16

SOT FOI FOI TOT EOI FOI 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201

៩ ៖

1968 XY = Ể % % & ế ế ế 2

1961 "JEW

1961 "q

48.3 109 106 106 108 113 113 112 114 110 119 119 135 140 121 119 121

101 201 201

...

201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 251... 201 201 101 001 001 001 101 100 101 000 000 000

901 801 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 12

...

Section of commodity/service

I. Foodstuffs...

II. Housing

***

III. Fuel and light

...

IV. Alcoholic drink and tobacco

V. Clothing and

footwear

VI. Durable goods

+++

VII. Miscellaneous goods

VIII. Transport and vehicles

...

3.0 99 100 100

3.3 106 106 106 106 105 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 105

1961 "ues

9961 ***

9961 MON

9961 "PO

9961 "das

៩ ≡

8082

៩ ម

སྟྲ

IX. Services

117

6101

100.0 106 104 104 105 108 108 107 108 106 111 111 119 121 112 111 112

All Items...

EMERGENCY REGULATIONS

MADE BETWEEN MAY AND 31ST DECEMBER 1967

(Paragraph 181)

APPENDIX V

1. The Emergency (Courts) Regulations, enacted on 23rd May, gave judges and magistrates the power to clear their courts and the buildings if they considered this necessary; and empowered the Police to remove from the precincts of the courts any person whose conduct interfered with the proper administration of justice.

2. The Emergency (Prevention of Inflammatory Speeches) Regulations, enacted on 24th May, were designed to enable effective action to be taken against vocal incitements by loudspeaker and other means to violence and law-breaking, and to undermining the loyalty of the Police.

3. The Emergency (Prevention of Inflammatory Posters) Regulations, enacted on 1st June, were directed against inflammatory posters-that is posters containing incitement to violence or lawlessness or which spread disaffection or attempt to under- mine the loyalty of the Police Force or the public service or to stir up ill-will in the community. Enactment of these regulations also enabled the Police to warn the owners of property where these posters are displayed, as well as giving the Police power to remove or obliterate them.

4. The Emergency (Prevention of Intimidation) Regulations, introduced on 24th June, strengthened the law relating to criminal intimidation. These Regulations were revoked on the enactment of the Public Order Ordinance, 1967, which contains similar provisions.

5. The object of the Emergency (Closed Areas) Regulations also introduced on 24th June, was to increase the security of certain essential installations by making it an offence to enter or be in such premises without permission or authority. Only three installations-the two electricity power stations and the tramways depot-were gazetted.

6. The Emergency (Principal) Regulations (Commencement) Order, enacted on 20th July, brought into force the Emergency (Principal) Regulations Nos. 27, 41, 88, 92, 96, 107, 113, 127 and 129. These emergency regulations had been on the statute book since 1949, though none of them were in force. They were brought into force in order to meet a new phase of terrorist activity and in particular:

(a) to legalize the use of the military to reinforce the Police Force-regulations

96 and 113;

(b) to give power to the Governor and the Commissioner of Police to prohibit

assemblies if this should be necessary-regulations 107 and 127;

tion 129;

(d) to impose penalties for the dissemination of false reports-regulation 27; (e) to permit the holding of trials in camera if necessary-regulation 88; (f) to permit the Governor to order the opening or closing of any class of shops

or businesses-regulation 92,

APPENDIX V-Contd.

　　　7. The Emergency (Public Health and Urban Services Ordinance) (Amendment) Regulations 1967, enacted on 21st July, amended the Public Health and Urban Services Ordinance to provide that a person having the right to dispose of a dead body must not only make a claim to do so within forty-eight hours of the body being received into a mortuary,

　　　　　　　　　　but must also remove the dead body within forty-eight hours of making the claim. This legislation enabled the Urban Services Department to carry out the burials of dead bodies which were unclaimed or for which no arrangements for burial had been made by the next-of-kin.

8. The Emergency (Principal) (Amendment) Regulations, introduced on 22nd July, were designed:

(a) to give Police officers power to enter and search premises without warrant where they suspected that arms, offensive weapons or explosives are held -regulation 41;

(b) to make it an offence to frequent or be found in such premises-regulation 119A. (A person charged with this offence had a good defence if he could show that he did not know that the weapons, etc, were on the premises.); (c) to make it an offence to be in premises access to which is barred to Police

officers--regulation 119B;

(d) to make it an offence to be in unlawful possession of corrosive substances,

acids, etc.-regulation 119C;

(e) to make it an offence to consort with persons possessing offensive weapons

intending to use them unlawfully-regulations 118 and 119;

(f) to fill a gap in the present public order legislation in authorizing the use of such force as may be necessary to implement these regulations (regulation 100A). (Regulation 100B sets out the common law principle that the degree of force used should not be more than is necessary to achieve the objective.)

The Emergency (Principal) Regulations (Commencement) (No. 3) Order, enacted on 28th July, brought into force regulations 29(1), 30 and 31, concerning detention by the Colonial Secretary. These regulations enabled action to be taken against persons who stimulated or encouraged acts of violence and lawlessness but did not themselves take any part in these acts.

10. The Emergency (Principal) (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations, brought into force on 1st August, enabled the District Court to impose heavier sentences than its normal jurisdiction allowed in respect of a limited number of offences against the Emergency (Principal) Regulations. The maximum penalty for offences against the majority of these regulations, set out in regulation 136 was 5 years/$10,000 on indict- ment, these penalties being within the normal sentencing powers of the District Court. However, regulations 117 and 118 dealing with unlawful possession of arms, offensive weapons, explosives, etc. had as befits the seriousness of those offences a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment. This penalty could normally be imposed only by the Supreme Court. Since it was regarded as important that persons arrested in con- nection with arms and explosives offences should be brought before a Court as quickly as possible, the District Courts were also given powers to impose sentences of up to 10 years imprisonment for such offences. By virtue of the Emergency (Legal Aid Criminal Cases) (District Court) Regulations, brought into force on 1st September free legal aid was made available to persons charged with such offences who were brought before the District Courts.

APPENDIX V-Contd.

11. The possession of simulated bombs or the presence of any persons in premises where simulated bombs were made or stored was made an offence by the Emergency (Principal) (Amendment) (No. 3) Regulations, which were enacted on 5th September,

12. As the gunpowder in fireworks could be used to manufacture bombs the Emergency (Fireworks) Regulations were enacted on 8th September to empower the Government to seize and take into safe custody all fireworks in the possession of dealers or private individuals. All persons who were in lawful possession of fireworks seized were entitled to compensation.

13. The Emergency (Committee of Review) (Amendment) Rules, made on 23rd October required the disclosure of information concerning the reason for the arrest of any person that the Colonial Secretary had ordered to be detained, under the powers referred to in paragraph 9 above; provided that in the opinion of the Colonial Secretary such disclosure would not be contrary to the public interest.

14. The Emergency (Amendment of Magistrates Ordinance) Regulations, enacted on 24th October provided that offences under section 3 of the Explosive Substance Ordin- ances and under sections 28 and 29 of the Offences against the Person Ordinance could be transferred from the Magistrates Courts to the District Courts as well as to the Supreme Court.

15. The Emergency (Principal) (Amendment) (No. 4) Regulations, enacted on 24th October:

(a) empowered a court to order that any case before it be held in camera; and (b) increased the list of offences which could be dealt with by District Courts

under the extended jurisdiction described in paragraph 10 above.

APPENDIX VI

CONFRONTATION STATISTICS

AS AT 31ST DECEMBER 1967

(Paragraph 194)

CASUALTIES

(a) Killed

Police

Military

Fire Service Others

(1) Police

Killed by explosion Killed by stabbing Killed by shooting

(ii) Military

Killed by explosion.

(iii) Fire Service

Killed by explosion.

(iv) Others

Killed by explosion

Shot by Police

Killed by incendiary attack

NNW

Found dead, or found seriously injured and subsequently

died...

---

Died in the course of riots but not through Police action

Died whilst in Police custody

202

PERSONS CONVICTED

(i) Riot

(ii) Unlawful Assembly (iii) Breach of curfew

FIL

(iv) Possession of bombs (real)...

(v) Possession of bombs (simulated)

(vi) Explosive offences

(vii) Possession of inflammatory posters

(viii) Inflammatory Speech

(ix) Intimidating Assembly

(x) Other offences

3. DAMAGE TO PROPERTY

(a) Buildings

Post Offices

...

Resettlement Estate Offices...

Police Stations/Posts Rural Committee Offices Banks

Cinemas/Theatres

Other buildings

(b) Vehicles

Government

Buses

Trams...

Taxis

Public cars

APPENDIX VI-Contd.

Total

318

465

232

33 209

185

328

1,936

Sakwau 00

253

8,074

1,167

146

164

564

Other vehicles

2151

། ཾ།

BOMBS

Uncontrolled Explosions

Suspected bombs dealt with by bomb disposal teams No. of genuine bombs

Bombs discovered as a result of Police action before

planting

Sticks of gelignite seized

Sticks of dynamite seized

212

CURFEWS

Kowloon

585

Hong Kong Island

832

New Territories (border area)

POLICE RAIDS ON SUSPECTED PREMISES

Grand Total

NOTE 'Others' killed by explosion include 4 persons in possession of

bombs which exploded.

(b) Injured

Police

Armed Forces

Fire Brigade

Hawker Control Force

Others

1,281

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SPBE

Printed by the Government Printer

CS. 40

2600079

20,000-2/68-859873

(CONFIDENTIAL

No. SCR 68/3371/67

COLONIAL SECRETARIAT,

LOWER ALBERT ROAD. HONG KONG,

3rd January, 1969.

Dear Gaminera,

deld in 16271

Here are twelve copies of a report

on the 1967 Disturbances in Hong Kong for such distribution as you think necessary in London.

　　　　Copies have been distributed locally within Government and to Unofficial Members here as well as to the Services. In addition it has been sent to those listed at Annexe.

Yours sincerel Hollan

(J. A. Harrison)

A. W. Gaminara, Esq., C. M. G.,

Foreign and Commonwealth

Office,

Whitehall,

London S. W.1

Encls.

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31

i 4 JAN 1969

HICK 1/18

CONFIDENTIAL

SCR 68/3371/67

Secretary of State

P. A. Singapore JIC(FE)

Chancery Washington

Peking

Bangkok

Saigon

Pnompenh

Manila

Seoul

Tokyo

Vientiane

H. C. Kuala Lumpur

Singapore

Canberra

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEXE

DISTRIBUTION

Wellington

Ottawa

British Consulate General Tamsui British Trade Commissioner H. K. Australian Trade Commissioner H. K. New Zealand Commissioner H. K. Cnadian Trade Commissioner H. K.

Trade Development Council H. K. (for Mr. Cater) U.S. Consulate General, H. K.

CONFIDENTIAL

Hong Kong Department

HKK 1/18

27 January, 1969

Thank you for your letter

SCR 68/3371/67 of the 3rd January, 1969

and for the copies of the Report on the 1967 disturbances.

　　We consider that this Report will be a very useful reference document, apart from the fact that it presents a comprehensive account of the disturbances. We are arranging distribution accordingly.

(A. W. Gaminara)

Major J. A. Harrison,

Colonial Secretariat,

HONG KONG.

CONFIDENTIAL

Ld (5084))

Mr. Bailey.

Pe.

Reference will (12

notation above

see the. Gaminara's of 24/1. The enclosed loose copy

my minute of 24/1.

of the report should be sent to the Murray (FIED) not to the Library. The remaining (12th)

on the file which should be

copy stays returned to me pl.

Cop sent both Muna, EE.D

Rest &

le. publy.

Atha - 23/4

Albai

287

Ed (4206)

Reference il

Mer. Loveld.

Kang

in the case of the distribution of the Special Branch Reports from Haus Keny I should be grateful for your

the distribution

Disturbancer (Enel. W/(11)) Copies will of

required for our fill & you

course be required for

advice an

the

report

the 1967

file & for FED

& I.P.D.

ты

16/1

Mr Marsh

Mart 20/1

Wie fake. Could I please have mmision of four and of fosable five ofres #

Copies sent - 1 Cabinet Office

Rust

1 D.I. 2

2 Others.

A Swell 57

I Retained by Mr. Lovell.

Pl. take action as above (minute of 17/1) Then Bill. file on 24/1 for remaining distribution

Icha's sent to In Lovell

24/1

Dow 21/1

8.10

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Research Dift.

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22%

kr. Gamina

A5 2.71.169.

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should go toFED

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Copy should go

Mr. Carter. - has been

& copy.

Enclosed is a copy of the

repeat referred to at (12) for the learter. Apart from the fill copy (encl W (127)

we have

one other rapy which I propose to send to

the the Library. The other copies have been

distributed as shown

му

the entries above.

54/1

CS. 41A

2600077

5,000-2/69-870130

REF.

SCR 17/67 II

等

Dear Bild,

SECRET

COLONIAL SECRETARIAT LOWER ALBERT ROAD HONG KONG

20th May, 1969

Since July 1967, we have been periodically revising the directive on the Joint Command and Control Organisation for dealing with emergencies. The actual machinery has been modified as the times and circumstances have dictated and has coped successfully with all the problems with which we have been faced. We have, however, found some difficulty in defining the machinery in terms which satisfy the need of both the Services and the Police for a fairly rigid command structure, while retaining the flexibility which is essential if the Administration is to play its part fully.

Four copies of the final paper, approved by the Governor's Committee, are attached for your information and such distribution as you think necessary. Copies have been sent to Singapore and the Services have also distributed copies through their own channels. It is not proposed to review this agreed structure for twelve months.

Yours sincerely

Almikuk

(Alastair Todd)

A.W. Gaminara, Esq., C.M.G., Foreign & Commonwealth Office,

Whitehall,

London, S.W.1.

Encls.

K.171

RaR.

帆

*7.5269

LAST

PTF

2 copies entit

Gidden I chased in Hicks

Dail of

RECEIVED IN

REGISTRY No.51 - 2 JUN 1969

HICK 1/1

Yo Marsh

P. sand 2 cipio f

cucho Surt

15 M. Pettitt (PUSD) & me

Mr Hicks.

ما

MV Boga, to

Thanks

Sce

Then pass to

SECRETING

& return

.૧.

to make

0003160 Ki.E'. 316

SCR 17/67 II

SECRET

COMMAND AND CONTROL ORGANISATION FOR EMERGENCIES.

INTRODUCTION.

14/2

It is essential that thoro is full consultation botwoon the throo olomonts of tho Administration, the Polico and tho Servicos and that plans and overall control for omorgoncios aro considered on a tripartito basis.

To provide for this, thoro must bo machinery for 1-

(a) assossmont of the situation on a tripartito basis;

(b) joint reporting;

(d) joint docisions at tho appropriato levol;

(o) joint action,

The oxprossion "joint" in paragraph 2 moans that the issuos concerned must be considered jointly, and joint conclusions roached if possiblo, Final responsibility does not, however, rost with the joint organisation but remains with the arm of the organisation officially rosponsiblo. Whore disagreemont arisos and it is necessary to rofor tho matter upwards, all difforing viows should bo transmitted, in order that full consideration may be givon to tho mattor.

Boaring in mind tho continuing naturo of the throats to the socurity of the Colony and their over-changing pattern, thero is also a nood, on a tripartito basis, for froquent review of countor moasures and ways of taking positivo action.

There are throo levels of tripartite planning and direction :-

(a) Tho Policy-making Lovel

represented by the Governor in the Govornor's Committee.

(b) The Lovol of Planning and

Direction, Colony-wido,

(i)

Joint Emorgency Control Committoo (J.E.C.C.);

(ii)

Dofonce Branch through

Defence Operations Staff

SECRET

(D.0.5.) (soo para. 13)

and the Civil Coordination Contro (C.C.C.) (soo para. 14).

/ (c).

000) 160 G.F. 346

SECRET

- 2 -

Direction and Implomontation,

so far only found in the Now Torritorios whore it is roprosented by PAGENT. Similar committoos can easily be formed in othor Districts if required.

POLICY-MAKING LEVEL

Policy is mado by the Govornor in the Govornor's Committoo, which consists of 1-

Commander British Forces

Colonial Secretary

Attorney General

Commissioner of Polico (assisted by Director, Special Branch0 Defence Socrotary

Political Advisor

Director of Information Sorvicos.

and such othor officers, as may be required from timo to timo by H. E. the Governor.

If time docs not allow for H. E. the Governor to mako docisions in this Committoo, the Colonial Socrotary, if necessary after consultation with Commander British Forces, the Commissioner of Police and other mombors, may givo a decision himself if ho considers that this is appropriato. Otherwiso, ho submits the mattor to H. E. the Governor who makes a decision, consulting such members of the Committoe as ho wishes.

8. In a prolongod omorgency or at times of particularly intensivo activity a small Defence Sub-Committee consisting of the C.B.F., C.P. and Defence Secrotary may meot from time to time as required to koop operations under review.

The Governor's Committoo is served by a small secretariat, consisting of one officer oach from the Colonial Secretariat and Hoadquartors British Forcos, and working within Defence Branch and roinforced when circumstances so require by a third officer to bo provided from Defence Branch. The records of meetings of the Governor's Committoo confirm the authority for action which may be taken immediately if circumstances so dictato, The minutes are in abbreviated form and clarification should be sought in the ovent of any doubts arising as to thoir moaning.

LEVEL OF PLANNING AND DIRECTION, COLONY-WIDE.

10. J.E.C.C. is the tripartito organisation for planning and direction Colony-wide, which acts as a link between the policy-making levol of H. E. the Governor and his advisers on the one hand, and tho cxecutive lovol of PAGENT, in oxorcise of its oxocutive functions, and othor District hoadquarters on the other. This committoo, which meets as required, comprises -

/ Doputy

SECRET

0001160 G.N. 316

SECRET

- 3 -

Doputy Defonco Secretary

Doputy Commissionor of Polico (Oporations)

Deputy Commandor Land Forces

Commodore-in-Chargo, Hong Kong) as appropriate.

Commander R.A.F. Hong Kong

}

and such othor officors aro thoy may from timo to timo coopt.

11.

Directions from J.E.C.C. aro dissominatod oithor direct to PAGENT and othor District H. Q. or through Colony FOIMIL Hoadquartors, as appropriato,

12.

13.

J.E.C.C. has the following responsibilitios -

(a) to consult on the docisions and directions to be given to

PAGENT and othor Districts, within approved Govornmont policy;

(b)

on its own initiativo, or as a rosult of recommendations from PAGENT and othor Districtz, to recommend to Government changos in policy;

mado to implement the policy of H. E. the Govornor, and to endorse or comment on plans mado by PAGENT;

(d) to ensure that, where other plans have been mado by ad hoc

working groups, advico is given on the operational aspects of all plans which have a POIMIL bearing;

(e) to assess curront operational situations for the guidance

of the Governor's Committee and to endorse or comment on such assossments made by PAGENT:

(f) to provide tho Governor's Committoo with tripartito planning support on oporational mattors affecting the security of tho Colony.

D.0.5. is established at Colony FOLMIL to provide the moans for direct consultation on political/civil matters, for the prompt passage of information to the Dofonco Secretary and of instructions and information to Government Departments/Agoncios/Services through C,c.c.

14.

C.C.C. is established in the Colonial Secrotariat and is rosponsible for keeping Govornmont Dopartments/Agencios/Services informed of dovolopments and for coordinating their activities.

15.

LEVEL OF LOCAL PLANNING DIRECTION AND IMPLEMENTATION

A local "Security Committoo" has so far been found necessary in tho Now Territories only, whore PAGENT (Police Army Govornmont Emergency Committee New Territories) consists of District Commissioner Now Territories, Commander 48 Brigado and Assistant Commissioner of Police/ New Territories.

/ COMMAND

SECRET

0003160 G.T. 315

SECRET

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF SECURITY FORCES.

16.

The actual Command and Control of operations by the Security Forces is carried out by Police and Military Commandors using their normal chain of command but sitting side by side and integrating their actions in POLMILS which oxist at Colony, District and Divisional level. Whore political advice is requirod during tho actual conduct of operations, this will bo supplied by an officer of the Dofence Operations Staff and/or the Political Adviser's office at Colony POLMIL and of tho Now Torritorios Administration at Now Torritorios (N. T.) POLMIL. Technical advico from Governmont Departments will, if necossary, bo made availablo on the same basis.

17.

The chinory bolow Colony POLL for co-ordinating action by tho Socurity Forcos to implement the policy laid down by H. E. tho Governor is based upon tho Polico District organisation, and is as follows :-

18.

(a) Island. The Island District POLMIL H.Q. is at Island

District Police Headquartors and is formed from that Headquarters, and the oadquarters of the Island Battalion. In the event that serious disturbancos call for more than one battalion to be deployed on the Island, a brigade hoadquarters may take over the military commitment at Island FOLMIL, H.Q.

The Administration is not normally reprosontod, but could bo if nooded,

(b) Kowloon. The Kowloon District POLMIL H.Q. is at Kowloon District Police Headquarters and is formed from that Headquarters and Headquartors 51 Brigado, The Administration is not normally roprosented, but could be if required.

Headquarters 48 Brigade, Sek Kong, and is formed from that Headquarters and Now Torritories Police Headquarters. It is rosponsible for the conduct of operations as directed by Colony POLMIL or PAGENT as appropriate. The New Territories Administration can be represented during oporations if required.

Roo1

(d) Marine. The Marino POLMIL H.Q. is at the Marine Police

Headquartors at Tsim Sha Tsui, Kowloon, and the Naval Oporations

is linked to it. Representation from Headquartors 51 Brigado is as appropriato to tho situation and to 51 Brigade's othor commitmont, Liaison is maintained between Marine POLIL Headquarters, the District Commissioner or his roprosentativo and tho Director of Marino, because of thoso two officers' spocial responsibilities. In addition to theso arrangements, the Commodore-in-Charge, the Director of Marino, and the District Commissioner (or their representatives) will attend Marino POLMIL Headquarters as required.

Royal Air Force participation may be required in operations in any of those districts and when necessary, Commander R.A.F. will provido liaison with any of the above organisations.

SECRET

/ CHANNELS

0003160 G.F. 316

SECRET

- 5-

CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION.

19.

20.

Tho channels of communication are as follows :-

(a) directivos amanating from the Governor's Committoo

which affoot more than ono Sorvico aro issued through the Dofonco Socrotary to J.E.C.C. and thonco to PAGENT or Colony POLMIL as appropriato;

(b)

the channols for roports, requests and recommendations from PAGENT and othor Districts is to J.E.C.C. and thenco, as appropriato, to the Dofonco Secrotary, with copies for information to Hoadquarters British Forces (HQ3F) and Polico Hoadquarters. If it is not possible for agrocd joint rocommondations to bo forwarded, divorgont viows must bo roprosontod and rulings roquestod;

(c) the channols for orders to Police and Military formations and units, ovon though rosulting from joint consultation, planning and decisions, will remain singlo-Sorvico.

Puroly singlo-Sorvico mattors continue to be dealt with through singlo-Sorvico channels, but any circunvontion of the abovo channels for joint matters can only lead to confusion, Howovor, D.C.N.T. rotains his right to have direct access to H. E. and all departments and branchos of Govornmont on political aspects of oporational nattors and, to ensure that there is no delay in bringing urgont matters to the attention of tho Govornor, D.C.N.T. is authorised at his discrotion to communicato PAGENT submissions to Dofonce Branch and .4.3.F. for information at the s tim as they are communicated to J.E.C.C. or Colony POLIL H.4.

21.

22.

PASSAGE OF INFORMATION,

(a) Whoro mattors of policy are involved, copios of papors

sent from PAGENT or other Districts to J.E.C.C. (or vico vorsa) are copioa, for information, to Dofonco Branch and H.Q.B.F.

(b) Reports of major incidents and operational dovolopments

agrood jointly if possible aro to bo passed as quickly as possiblo to Colony FOLMIL Headquarters, and thenco dissoninated to J.E.C.C., Dofonco Branch, H.Q.B.F. and Colony Polico Hoadquarters.

Communications. Socuro communications are to be maintainod to link the Colonial Socrotariat, H.Q.B.F., tho three singlo-Servico Headquartors, and the Police District organisation.

COLONIAL SECRETARIAT.

1st May, 1969.

SECRET

with (14)

Reference...

McCarter.

You may

wish to be aware of

the enclosure

6- (14).

나

i2. Although Mr Todd mentions that they have,

in Hong Kong,

been persilically revising

& mockifying the machinery described in (14/4)

I cannot Frace chaving ve

received any

earlie

dition. I do not think. The paper calls for

any

comment from

ANG

10.6.69.

11/4/69

o.q.vce.

176

(HKK 1/18)

SECRET

(15)

Hong Kong Department,

10 June, 1969

This is, I am afraid, a very belated acknowledgement of your letter SCR 17/67 II of 20 May.

We are most grateful for the four copies of the enclosure to your letter which we have distributed to interested Departments here.

(A. W. Gaminara)

A. Todd, EBQ.,

Colonial Secretariat,

HONG KONG.

SECRET

LART

REF

NEAT

REF.

Nam Tau

HONG KONG AND THE EW TERRITORIES

Á TAN G T H B Đ

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ISLANDS

Compiled & Drawn by Crown Lands & Survey Office. Hong Kong, 1967 Printed at the Government Press. Hong Kong. Code No.: 0550367

Price: 50 centi.

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Crown Copyright Reserved

ㄛˊˋ

16/6/

Events in

Hong Kong-1987

Limited edition. Published February 1968.

an official report

The Face of Confrontation

EVENTS IN HONG KONG - 1967

The pictures in this report bring some of the facts of Hong Kong's months of confrontation into focus. They give some idea of the problems faced by the police who displayed great discipline and tolerance throughout and who dealt with the early disturbances with the minimum of force. They show too, moments of human kindness in the midst of violence. Most pictures in this booklet were taken by photog- raphers of the Colony's newspapers.

Here, a police cordon quietly stands its ground against a barrage of heckling

and abuse.

SINCE May 1967, communist organizations in Hong Kong have sought to impose their will on the government and the people by intimidating workers, fomenting work stoppages, by demonstra- tions and rioting, and by indiscriminate violence. It has been a testing time for the people of Hong Kong.

But these events must be seen in their proper perspective. The communist-initiated confrontation, between themselves and the Hong Kong Government is in no sense a popular movement; indeed it does not have the support of any significant section of the people, much less of the people as a whole. Those who have taken part represent a very small fraction of the population, and they have had no success in their attempts, either by persuasion or by intimi dation, to gain support for their cause. The overwhelming majority of the people have shown clearly that they support the government and the maintenance of law and order.

Moreover, despite the claims made by the communist press, and despite the impression that might have been given by the world wide press coverage given to the disturbances, the ordinary life of the Colony has not been disrupted. The rioting that has taken place has been limited in area and in scope and has been contained. The stoppages that were called have had little effect on the Colony's economy. Throughout the summer, when the effects of confronta- tion were at their height, the ordinary man in the street was able to go about his work, not quite as usual and not without con- siderable inconvenience at times, but sufficiently easily to keep the business of the Colony operating efficiently.

The origins of confrontation stem directly from the cultural revolution in China, which has inculcated among its adherents a fervent patriotism and an intense adulation of Chairman Mao Tse Tung and his teachings. The dedicated Maoist has come to believe

that he has a duty to propagate the gospel of the cultural revolution and that armed with the Thoughts of Mao he is invincible. Hong Kong was an obvious target for this missionary zeal. Its population is predominantly Chinese by race, who as 'compatriots' could be expected to rally to the attack against a colonial government; and its free economy is an affront to revolutionary doctrine. The recent events in nearby Macau had shown that a colonial government could be made to accept the communist demands; while nearer home a similar confrontation had been successful, in March 1967, in a dispute with a major shipping company in Hong Kong. It must have seemed to many ardent communists in the Colony that the time was ripe to bring the cultural revolution to Hong Kong.

The less fanatical among the communists may have been more concerned to preserve the very real economic advantages that a stable and prosperous Hong Kong has tor China, and no doubt for themselves as well. But they could not oppose confrontation without appearing to oppose the teachings of Chairman Mao Tse Tung; they could only hope and do what they could to ensure that its physical effects would be limited. The outbreaks of violence that have occurred and the attempts that have been made to disrupt the economy of the Colony have made it clear that they have been unable to restrain or effectively control the more hot-headed elements among them, whose aim it is to dominate the government by any means. It was the latter who precipitated confrontation, as a result of a comparatively minor incident arising from a labour dispute.

　　In the early months of the year industrial relations in the Colony were generally good but there were a few disputes which had either been artificially inspired by the communists or were the result of deliberate political exploitation of a genuine industrial grievance. These involved four taxi companies, a textile factory, a cement company and the Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works. The Hong Kong Seamen's Union was engaged in a dispute with a shipping company and, at the same time, it continued its official boycott of the Government Seamen's Recruiting Office. These disputes were all confined to undertakings where there was a predominant or strong communist element in the work force, or where a communist trade union was involved.

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The tactics employed were identical in each case. Workers were intimidated and threatened with physical violence. Attempts to settle the disputes were deliberately frustrated by the injection of political issues, expressed in the form of demands which were required to be accepted 'unconditionally'. These demands were followed by a succession of rowdy demonstrations, designed to intimidate the management, in which slogans and extracts from The Thoughts of Mao Tse Tung were chanted in unison. The attitude of the unions became increasingly truculent. A press photographer taking pictures of a typical demonstration was attacked and a demand was made that his camera be confiscated. Offers made by the Labour Department to mediate in disputes were dismissed as 'unwelcome meddling'. It became clear that the extremist elements among the communists might provoke a major clash at any moment.

The opportunity was provided on May 6. A group of dismissed workers from the Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works at San Po Kong were picketing the factory premises and, ignoring repeated warnings from the police, they persisted in illegally trying to prevent the removal of goods by the management. The police finally intervened and arrested 21 men. It was a minor incident; there was little or no violence and no one was seriously injured. It was, how- ever, enough to provoke an immediate reaction; headlines appeared in the communist newspapers denouncing the government and accusing the police, in the most violent terms, of persecution and of brutally attacking unarmed workers. The Hong Kong and Kowloon Rubber and Plastics Workers Union, whose chairman was among those arrested, published four demands:

The Hong Kong Government must cease its brutality immediately and ensure that it is not repeated; All the arrested people must be released immediately; Compensa- tion must be paid by the government for all injuries and damage and those responsible must be punished; There must be no government interference in labour disputes. These demands were endorsed by the Hong Kong and Kowloon Federation of Trade Unions. Meetings were held in pro-communist organizations in support of the arrested workers and posters began to appear attacking the government and protesting against police brutality.

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;

At the San Po Kong factory itself there were further demon- strations, with processions and the chanting of slogans. These inevitably attracted crowds of idle spectators as well as hooligans and mischief-makers and, when, on May 11, communist pickets threatened to break into the factory and there was a further clash with the police, there was a mob at hand ripe for violence. There was serious rioting, which spread from the streets in the vicinity of the factory to adjacent areas of Kowloon, and for three days mobs, including many who were paid to take part, battled the police, attacked and set fire to buses and other vehicles and broke into and looted government offices and staff quarters in an orgy of destruction. A curfew was imposed in the affected areas during the nights of the 11th, 12th and 13th, but it was not until the 14th that calm was restored. These disturbances were dealt with firmly by the police but with the minimum of force; no firearms were used and the army was not called upon for assistance.

Meanwhile, a campaign of intimidation had also begun on Hong Kong Island. An 'All-Circles Anti-Persecution Struggle Committec" was formed, with a membership drawn from all communist organizations in the Colony. It was given considerable publicity in the communist press. Delegations of employees of communist newspapers and department stores and representatives of communist trade unions and other organizations began to converge on Govern- ment House with petitions protesting against government brutality and insisting that the communist demands be met.

On May 15 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Peking issued a statement protesting against the action taken by the British au- thorities against Chinese residents in Hong Kong. (This statement possibly reflected the highly coloured reports put out by the com- munist press in Hong Kong. On May 23, for example, the New China News Agency alleged that 200 people had been killed or injured. As a matter of record, one person had been killed and not by police action but probably by a brick thrown or dropped from above him by one of the rioters).

In the days that followed the demonstrations at Government House increased; the demonstrators became more unruly and aggressive and the posters, both at the gates of Government House and elsewhere, more violent and seditious. Powerful loudspeakers

◄Chanting demonstrators plaster

the gateway of Government House

with posters.

were mounted on the Bank of China building, in the centre of the banking and business area of Hong Kong, which encouraged the demonstrators forming up in the vicinity with a stream of violently provocative propaganda, including vicious personal attacks on the Governor.

Propaganda was broadcast from other communist buildings in Hong Kong and Kowloon; the press campaign increased in violence; and there was an outbreak of rioting in Kowloon in the vicinity of the Magistrates Court where cases against those arrested at San Po Kong were being heard.

　　On May 20 it was announced by the government that while it was not proposed to revoke the right of any person to present a petition to the Governor, this must be done in an orderly manner. No further processions would be allowed and delegations wishing to present petitions must not exceed 20 people.

This decision was challenged on the following morning when organized groups of communists formed up at the bottom of Garden Road and demanded to be allowed to pass through the police cordon on their way to Government House. Permission was refused and there were a number of scuffles in the vicinity. The crowd, which had grown to more than a thousand, was dispersed by tear gas and by the early evening the situation was quiet.

On May 22 the communists returned to the attack and it soon became clear that they had planned a propaganda 'incident'. Groups of people again formed up in Garden Road and the police were again subjected to a barrage of heckling and abuse. Crowds were building up in nearby Statue Square and the loudspeakers at the Bank of China boomed out a continual stream of threats and appeals to violence. In this daunting atmosphere the police quietly stood their ground and in an impressive display of discipline ignored both the verbal provocation to which they were subjected, as well as the threatening gestures of the mob that faced them. But the communists were out to provoke violence. A constable was kicked and others were attacked. The police moved forward to arrest the man responsible. There was a general melée and the police used their batons. At once many of the demonstrators fell to the ground whether they had been hit or not; bandages (some of them already provided with artificial 'bloodstains') were produced and

applied; the blood of those who had really been injured was liberally daubed on others. The results of these childish expedients were duly photographed by the communist press and subsequently published as evidence of police brutality, though what little effect this might have had was spoiled by the crowds of witnesses looking on from the Hilton Hotel, as well as by the full coverage of the scene by impartial press and television cameramen,

Further demonstrators appeared during the day and some buses and taxis were abandoned in the area, in an attempt to cause traffic jams and to add to the confusion. There was intermit- tent violence in Queen's Road and the adjoining streets and at 6.30 p.m., for the first time since the war, a curfew was imposed on Hong Kong Island.

It soon became apparent that anti-government propaganda and the spreading of false and malicious rumours was to be a major weapon in the communists' tactics. Communist newspapers published highly distorted accounts of the events that were taking place, designed to present the police and government in the worst possible light, and accompanied, as in the case of the disturbances of May 22, by contrived or unashamedly faked photographs. Rumours were fabricated with the intention of spreading confusion and panic; some plausible and more difficult to combat, others too improbable to deceive even the most credulous.

To a large extent these propaganda efforts were most effectively countered by the reports of the non-communist press, as well as by the Colony's wireless and television services that produced a steady stream of factual reports and pictures. Further counter- measures were taken by government departments and by the Department of Information Services in particular, which took immediate steps to keep the public constantly informed of the true state of affairs by wireless broadcasts, press releases, short films that were distributed to all cinemas, and, where necessary and practicable, by word of mouth.

Additional, and unusual, publicity methods were brought into use. The loudspeakers at the Bank of China building were countered by setting up rival and more powerful loudspeakers at buildings in the vicinity which regaled the public with the music of Cantonese opera and effectively drowned the stream of communist propaganda.

The battle was deafening and caused considerable amusement to the onlookers, but it ended in the defeat of the communists who were unable to make any further effective use of this weapon.

The tactics employed by the communists up to the major incident on May 22 had not attracted any noticeable increase in support for confrontation and the attempts to make political capital out of the clash on that day met with little success. Indeed the feeling of the majority of the population was made clear by a number of public expressions of support for the government. A group of businessmen in the Colony set up a fund for the higher education of the children of police officers, which attracted support and donations from thousands of individuals. In a fortnight it reached a total of $3 million, an extraordinary acknowledgement by the people of Hong Kong of the debt that they owed the police.

　　The Hong Kong Federation of Students, as well as kaifong associations and leading members of the community, publicly expressed their loyalty and confidence in the government. This lead was followed by similar expressions of support from numerous organizations representing a complete cross-section of the Colony and ranging from hawker associations to professional associations and business houses. They included clansmen and district asso- ciations, multi-storey building management associations, religious organizations and social organizations of almost every kind. In all some 620 letters, petitions and statements of support were received and, while it is difficult to estimate the total number of people they represented, the Hong Kong Buddhist Association and the kaifong associations between them claimed membership of well over a million people. In a political situation of such gravity, where many factors might lead people not to express an opinion, such massive support for law and order was particularly impressive.

　　There is no doubt that it also affected communist strategy as the tactics of street demonstrations and provocation did not continue on May 23. The campaign then entered a new phase; slogans were painted on the walls of public buildings and there was a rash of inflammatory posters. At the same time a series of token stoppages was engineered affecting transport, including the cross harbour ferries, the port and the dock companies and the main utility and service organizations. These stoppages had a certain

Some of the young troublemakers who harassed the police with stones and bottles. The smoke is from a fire, typical of the many started by hooligans when mobs took to the streets of Kowloon in May.

amount of nuisance value, particularly those in the transport field, but they caused no lasting inconvenience.

On June 1, emergency regulations were made strengthening the law against the display of inflammatory posters and action was taken to remove them from government buildings and elsewhere. In the doctrine of the cultural revolution street posters are regarded almost as sacrosanct as being the visible expression of the will of 'the masses', and in Hong Kong they were defended with the utmost tenacity.

　Some impetus was given to the force of this reaction by an editorial in the Peking People's Daily of June 3, which called on the Chinese in Hong Kong to organize a courageous struggle against the British and to be ready to respond to the call of the motherland for smashing the reactionary rule of the British'. The article also stressed that the working class in Hong Kong was to remain the main force in the struggle, but in Hong Kong the communist press chose to interpret it as a declaration of active support by the Peking Government and gave it wide publicity. Employees of the Star Ferry Company stopped work in protest at the removal of posters. At the Taikoo Dockyard the general manager and two senior staff members were surrounded and held prisoner by their employees. Workers at the government electrical and mechanical workshops, in Kowloon, and at the nearby Kowloon depot of the Hong Kong and China Gas Company, barricaded the door and armed them- selves with iron bars and other offensive weapons. Police forced their way into both premises and arrested more than 500 workers, of whom 120 were charged with various offences. There were stoppages of work in other concerns and numerous scuffles and minor incidents occurred at several other places throughout the Colony. The People's Daily provided more fuel for the flames on June 10 by urging workers, peasants, the Peoples Liberation Army and the revolutionary masses' in China to prepare to support the struggle in Hong Kong with concrete action. Broadcasts on similar lines were put out by Radio Peking.

　On June 23 there was another major incident. A small police party, photographing posters in Canton Road, was suddenly at- tacked by a gang of men armed with iron bars, bottles and sharpened iles. The police, in self-defence, opened fire with their revolvers and

Police moved in swiftly to arrest law-breakers.

in the ensuing battle two policemen were injured and one of the assailants was fatally wounded. The remaining attackers retreated into the premises of the Hong Kong Rubber and Plastic Workers Union, which was close by, and a strong police party was called up which, with some difficulty, forced an entry into the union premises. After fierce resistance, in which a number of police were injured, 53 people were arrested, of whom three later died of the injuries they had received.

　This period of unrest came to a head on June 24 when a 'general strike' was called, heralded by another fanfare from the People's Daily. In spite of lavish payments by the communist unions, sup- ported by a gift of $10 million from the All China Federation of Trade Unions, it was not a success. The Kowloon Motor Bus Company was the most seriously affected, but nevertheless managed to continue to provide an emergency service. The other transport companies maintained a reduced service, while the utility companies, though short-staffed, continued to operate effectively. The public was considerably inconvenienced, but a fleet of private cars and nine-seater vans appeared on the streets to fill the gap caused by the shortage of public transport and, despite claims to the con- trary by the communist press, life went on much as usual.

One of the major factors that led to the comparative failure of these stoppages was the firm action taken by the government in dealing with its own employees. They were warned that these were not legal 'strikes' arising from an industrial dispute and that if they took part they would be liable to dismissal. Those who did take part, including, in the first phase, some staff of the Marine Department and the Waterworks, were interdicted from duty or discharged. Those who could subsequently show that they acted under duress, that they were forced to withdraw their labour through intimidation and the threat of violence, were reinstated and returned to work. Following this lead, similar action was taken by private companies affected which gave notice that absent employees would be considered for re-employment if they registered ithin a limited period. Those who did not do so were considered be dismissed and were not paid from the time that they stopped ork. Emergency regulations were also enacted by the government make it an offence to intimidate or threaten any worker who

wished to continue at work. These measures made it possible for both the government and private firms, by selective re-employment, to weed out those responsible for intimidation in their labour force and at the same time they encouraged the flow of loyal workers returning to work.

A further attempt to intimidate the government by the declara- tion of a four-day 'food strike' had little better success. Supplies of foodstuffs from China were refused by local communist importers- though by an apparent lack of co-ordination they continued to arrive by train at the frontier-and there was a shortage of pork and vegetables and a consequent rise in prices. The stoppage came to an end on July 2, and food prices returned almost to normal.

Later in the month there was to be a more serious threat to food supplies caused, not by confrontation in Hong Kong, but by the unsettled conditions in China, which led to a general disruption of communications. No trains arrived on the border on July 24 and 25 and, though there was an irregular passenger service there- aster, it was not until September 14 that any substantial imports arrived by rail. The main commodities affected were pigs and vegetables. Although limited quantities continued to arrive, ir- regularly, by sea and by road from China, the quantity was well below demand. Some of the shortfall was made good by imports from other countries, but a sharp increase in prices reflected the general scarcity. The situation slowly improved towards the end of September, by which time the amount of foodstuffs imported from China had again almost returned to normal.

One of the main targets in this phase had been the Port of Hong Kong, which was the subject of some of the most extravagant claims in the communist press. In fact, while the stoppage caused some disruption in the working of cargoes, the general efficiency of the port had been surprisingly little affected and an adequate service was maintained throughout. A further attack was launched in the middle of July by the Seamen's Union, which declared a general boycott of the port. Goods from Chinese ports by-passed Hong Kong and were re-routed through Singapore or through Japanese ports, while goods already landed from China and await- ing transhipment in Hong Kong were retained in the godowns. Communist organizations in Hong Kong declared that, because of

BL11

the boycott, the port was at a complete standstill and advised leading shipping lines to tranship cargoes at other ports. This propaganda had some effect, in that some cargoes were diverted to other ports and some shipowners re-arranged their schedules to sail ships either to Hong Kong or to China ports, but not to both. The threat offered by the boycott in Hong Kong itself was met by an intensive counter-propaganda campaign mounted by the Marine Department to explain the facts and to answer queries from seamen and to counter the intimidation, both veiled and direct, to which they had been subjected. As a result 1,222 seamen reported for jobs at the Government Seamen's Recruiting Office during the first ten days the boycott was supposed to be in operation and in only two cases (where there were other considerations) were ships delayed for lack of a crew. A small number of seamen signed off their ships but were replaced, without difficulty, through the Seamen's Recruiting Office. Indeed in many cases those who had signed off re-applied for employment after spending a day or two ashore having, no doubt, decided for themselves that all was well in the Colony. During the second week of September four ships arrived in the port from China to discharge cargo consigned to Hong Kong, to mark the first break in the boycott; and since then the tonnage of cargoes from China has steadily increased.

These work stoppages, both in the port and elsewhere, were purely political and there is no substance in the suggestion that labour conditions have been the underlying cause of confrontation in Hong Kong. The labour dispute at the artificial flower works was discarded as soon as confrontation was under way, and the voluminous poster campaign and the endless propaganda that emanated from communist sources during the summer made no mention at all of industrial conditions.

While these events had been taking place in the urban areas the New Territories had remained comparatively quiet. There had been some demonstrations and a sporadic display of posters in the market towns and in the industrial complex of Tsuen Wan but, mainly due to the firm line taken by the leaders of the New Territories Heung Yee Kuk, who came out strongly on the side of law and order, there had been only a few minor incidents. In the sensitive area of the land frontier with China it had been mainly

◄A blind woman is led safely away from a street mob.

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a propaganda war carried out on the Chinese side of the border. There had been demonstrations, often on a large scale; a loud- speaker had been set up at the border station of Lo Wu which at regular intervals poured out a stream of anti-British propaganda; trains from China were plastered with posters and even cattle imported into the Colony had slogans painted on their sides.

There was, however, no violence until June 24 when a crowd of about 200 people attacked the police post at Sha Tau Kok with stones and bottles. They were dispersed by gas shells and order was restored. This incident was followed on June 26, by the first protest made by the Peking Government at diplomatic level since confrontation began.

On July 8 there was a further mob attack at Sha Tau Kok. The police post was attacked and, when the police opened fire with gas and wooden 'baton' projectiles, both the post and the Rural Committee Office, where another police company had been stationed, came under heavy sniping and machine gun fire. A detachment from the 1/10 Gurkha Rifles was called out to assist the police and, with the aid of armoured cars, they relieved the police companies, which by then had five men killed and 11 wounded.

This incident received wide publicity and gave rise to some exaggerated and alarmist reports overseas. It was a serious affair but it was not an attempt at armed invasion of the Colony, No regular units of the Chinese Army were involved. All the evidence suggests that it was a purely local affair organized and executed by the villagers in the immediate vicinity.

Since then the border remained unsettled and, while there was no repetition of violence on the same scale, there was a succession of incidents at Lo Wu, at Sha Tau Kok, and at the road crossings at Man Kam To. A number of farmers living on the Chinese side own land in British Territory and, by long-standing agreement, they have been allowed to cross the border to work their fields. This practice has continued, but the truculent attitude displayed by the farmers has led to constant friction. The border bridge at Man Kam To has had to be closed for periods of several weeks, despite

protests from the Chinese side, and because of the continuing unrest the army took over from the police the responsibility for patrolling the whole of the border area. Man Kam To, however, remained a trouble spot. Two off-duty policemen who inadvertently crossed the border at this point were forcibly detained; and a senior police inspector, who was engaged in trying to conciliate a group of villagers in the vicinity of the bridge, was seized by them and forcibly taken over the border. The inspector managed to escape, after being held for 36 days, and made his way back to Hong Kong. The two policemen were returned to the Colony at the end of November after talks held with Chinese border officials.

The Sha Tau Kok incident was interpreted by the communist press in Hong Kong as armed support for confrontation and it was followed by renewed violence both in Kowloon and on Hong Kong Island. Demonstrations were staged in the vicinity of communist shops and other premises from which gangs emerged to ambush the police as they arrived to investigate. Attacks were made on police units and on drivers of public vehicles. From July 9 to 12 there was a widespread succession of incidents in which one police- man and seven rioters lost their lives.

July 12 marked a turning point. Up to this time the various methods of attack by the communists had been met and contained and they had gained no ground in their struggle. But it was they that had done most of the attacking and they had put considerable strain on the police and on the many public servants and others who had been forced to work long hours in the maintenance of public order. On July 12 the acting Colonial Secretary announced in the Legislative Council that from then on the government was deter- mined to grasp and maintain the initiative. This promise was followed by immediate action. On that day, and on the days follow- ing, strong parties of police, backed up by military units, raided the principal communist strongholds, including union premises and schools; they seized stocks of home-made weapons and explosives as well as inflammatory posters and literature, and they took into custody a number of people suspected of subversive activities.

The initial raids were strenuously resisted. In an action against the Kowloon Dock Workers Amalgamated Union premises the defenders used bottles, daggers, acid and firebombs and it took

the police three hours to complete the break in. The secretary of the union was killed during the struggle; and 81 people were arrested, to the obvious approval of other occupants of the building. Sub- sequent raids met with little or no physical opposition. Indeed the threat of invasion by the police, at any time, forced the opposition to avoid gathering for meetings at their usual premises and many centres that were raided were found to be unoccupied. Sporadic violence continued, but the communist organizations were disrupted and driven underground. They began to talk of a long struggle and, although their newspapers continued their stream of inflam- matory propaganda and were now inciting to armed insurrection, their readers grew less and support for confrontation dwindled to a hard core of dedicated and fanatical men and women.

Pressure against the communist organizations was maintained. Action was taken against known centres of subversive activity and, in August, three communist newspapers were suppressed and two of their editors were prosecuted for sedition, an action which resulted in a strong protest from Peking. A similar protest had been made in July when an employee of the New China News Agency was arrested for taking part in an illegal assembly. The protest was rejected and was followed by the Reuters corre. spondent in Peking being placed under house arrest. Two other employees of the New China News Agency in Hong Kong were subsequently arrested on similar charges and the Peking Govern. ment, on August 20, issued what amounted to an ultimatum. Within 48 hours all three employees of the New China News Agency must be released and action against the newspapers and their editors must be withdrawn. Failure to do so would result in 'serious consequences'. This demand was also rejected. The threatened reprisal took place, not against Hong Kong, but against the office of the British Chargé d'Affaires in Peking, which was sacked by a mob on August 22.

In Hong Kong, confrontation entered a new phase of indis- criminate 'bomb' attacks. There was a hint of terrorism to come in the publication, in August, of a list of prominent members of the community who were said to be marked for assassination. But, in the event, the only victims were a well-known wireless commentator, Mr Lam Bun, and his cousin who, together, were drenched in petrol

In the midst of all the noise and violence a policeman finds time to comfort a frightened child.

and burned to death in a particularly vicious attack which excited horror and disgust. Attacks were also made on individual police officers in order to gain possession of their firearms. In four such attacks two police constables were killed, an inspector severely injured and another constable slightly injured.

Explosive attacks, which at first were directed at selective targets, became indiscriminate. All known stocks of explosives and fireworks in the Colony were called in during August and September, but it is apparent that some stocks evaded the government net and the planting of bombs, both genuine and simulated, continued. This campaign was essentially a propaganda move, to stimulate the flagging communist support by a show of strength. Most of the *bombs' have been simulated and many of them carried such messages as 'compatriots don't touch'. The majority of the real ones were made from black powder extracted from fireworks and produced more noise than danger. But some were deadly and all had to be treated with the utmost care. While the more militant among the communists no doubt hoped that these devices would cause casualties, particularly among the police and military bomb disposal squads that had to deal with them, the main aim appeared to be to sap public morale by the disruption that was caused and by the constant threat of danger. When innocent passers-by were killed or injured, as inevitably happened, the communist press sought to evade responsibility by describing the matter as an *unfortunate accident' or by putting about that not all bombs were planted by communists. But, whatever their intentions, the deaths that were caused, and particularly those of two young children, brought a general revulsion of feeling against the perpe-

trators.

　　Bomb attacks continued as an almost daily occurrence until the end of December. The visit to the Colony in October by the Minister of State for Commonwealth Affairs, Lord Shepherd, was marked by a noticeable increase of both real and simulated bombs, while in November there was a flurry of violence directed against police units. Since December 25, however, no explosive bombs have been planted and, while a number of suspicious objects continued to be reported, it appears to be likely that this violent phase of confronta- tion has come to an end. Since it began the police and service bomb

disposal units dealt with 8,074 suspected bombs, of which 1,167

were genuine bombs.

In many cases children took part in these attacks. Teen-age girls have been arrested in possession of explosive bombs and, in at least one case, a schoolboy was injured by the explosion of a bomb he was carrying. Indeed, towards the end of the year there was a noticeable increase in the number of schoolchildren involved in activities connected with confrontation and in the truculence to- wards authority they displayed. These children were almost all pupils of communist-dominated schools in the Colony and it must be concluded that they were being encouraged in these activities by their teachers as part of a concerted plan by the communists to bolster up their dwindling ranks. Many of these schools had become centres for the storage and dissemination of inflammatory literature and even for the manufacture of bombs, both simulated and real. On November 27 a youth was severely injured in an explosion in the Chung Wah Middle School. The school was closed by the government, and this action evoked a protest from Peking.

Not all of those who took part in the demonstrations and riots have subscribed to the communist aims. Many were employees in communist concerns who were instructed to take part, and others-particularly the hooligans who exploited the initial riots at San Po Kong-were paid to do so. It a sad commentary on communist tactics that they should have to employ children as well in these activities and to expose them, not only to arrest and imprisonment for their seditious activities, but also to physical danger.

It is also a reflection on their failure to gain general support for their cause. The incidents which attracted so much publicity overseas, have been the work of a small minority. The bulk of the population refused to become involved and has gone about its normal work. Indeed, in spite of the strident claims in the com- munist press, the efficiency of the Colony has been surprisingly little disturbed. While it is as yet too early to assess the long-term economic effects of confrontation, present evidence suggests that there has been no significant disruption in any of the major sectors. Industrial production was not affected at all, and exports continued

at substantially higher levels than in previous years. The tourist trade continued satisfactorily in spite of alarmist headlines in some overseas newspapers. At the height of the disturbances substantial deposits were withdrawn from banks but, as most of the sums withdrawn were converted into Hong Kong currency, outflow of capital was contained within fairly narrow limits, although it was accelerated to some extent in June by the Middle East crisis and consequent pressure on sterling. Their strong liquidity position enabled the banks to withstand these withdrawals without difficulty and without imposing any serious restriction on credit. From the end of August deposits began to return to the banks at a satisfactory rate. There had been no significant adverse effects on public revenue.

　The bus companies, which were perhaps the hardest hit by confrontation, have made substantial progress in getting their flects back on the road; other public transport services were almost back to normal at the end of the year. When on June 7, voting took place for five vacant seats on the Urban Council, the election passed off without incident and, indeed, a record percentage (for Hong Kong) of the electorate cast their votes. Confrontation did not affect such annual events as the cross harbour swimming race, the dragon boat races and the Cheung Chau bun festival while, in the autumn, the racing and football season started on schedule. A determined attempt was made to wreck Hong Kong Week which was held between October 30 and November 5 to publicize Hong Kong products. But, in spite of a marked increase in explosive attacks, the colourful festivities took place as planned and met with an enthusiastic reception from the many visitors who attended. The Chinese Manufacturers' Association's Jubilee Exhibition, in December, attracted a record number of visitors.

　For many people the main preoccupation during the summer has been not so much confrontation as the water supply position. Hong Kong has no sizeable rivers and it is dependent on rainfall which is collected in reservoirs. By the current agreement with China, an additional 15,000 million gallons of water (which is paid for at the rate of $1.06 for a thousand gallons) is provided from her more ample resources each year, to be drawn during the period from October to June. By the end of 1966 the storage position was causing some anxiety and by an ad hoc agreement a further 1,800

Bomb disposal men in action on Hong Kong Island,

million gallons was made available from China. In February, as a precaution, the daily supply period in Hong Kong was reduced from 24 hours to 16 hours.

　　Rainfall during May and June was below average. The full ration from China, including the agreed additions, was drawn by June 25 and during the month the supply period had to be reduced to eight hours a day and then to four hours every other day. On July 11, the total storage in the reservoirs stood at 3,277 million gallons, that is about 50 days supply. A request for an additional supply from China went unanswered and the situation was serious. On July 13 the supply period was further reduced to four hours every fourth day. Hospitals and other essential users continued to be given a full supply while squatter areas and industries received a daily four-hour supply and the resettlement estates a four-hour supply every other day.

　　As in the previous severe drought of 1963, the population put up with the discomfort with remarkable patience and cheerfulness despite communist attempts to exploit the situation. The position, however, was critical; any further reduction in the supply period would have been almost insupportable and would in any case have been unlikely to reduce materially the rate of consumption. Various possibilities were considered of obtaining additional water from other sources, but they offered little hope of success.

　　By good fortune there was timely rain in mid-July which eased the situation, and further heavy rain in mid-August and September. At the end of September it was possible to revert to a four-hour daily supply and with the resumption of water from China on October 1 at the beginning of a new supply period-the full 24-hour supply was reinstated.

In order to conserve supplies, however, saline water from Plover Cove was added to the water issued for general consumption. The resulting mixture, although salty to the taste, is below the maximum limit recommended by the World Health Organization and it has no ill-effects. It has, however, provided the communists with the opportunity to work up a campaign against this 'con- tamination'.

They have also seized upon the adjustments made to the exchange rates for the Hong Kong dollar, following the devaluation of

sterling by Great Britain, and propaganda on this issue, and on the salinity of the water, provided the main themes for their news- paper and radio coverage for several weeks. The tone of this pro- paganda was, however, noticeably more moderate: the arguments were carefully presented and were designed to attract the support of those sections of the population which were most closely con- cerned. This departure from the violent language used by the communist press in previous months, as well as the apparent cessa- tion of physical violence, may well indicate that a new phase of confrontation has begun.

Hong Kong has no quarrel with China, nor indeed with the communists as such. It is not an offence to be a communist (or to belong to any other political party) nor to practise the doctrines and beliefs of communism although it is an offence to translate these beliefs into action that conflicts with the law. The government has taken action against the supporters of confrontation, not because of their political beliefs, as the communist press has asserted, but simply because they have broken the law. Its basic aim and policy, throughout, has been to preserve law and order and to regain for the Colony its traditional role of providing a place for people to live and work in peace, whatever their race or political belief.

In this it has succeeded, at a cost to the Colony of 51 lives. Fifteen people were killed by bomb explosions, including two members of the police, an army sergeant and an officer of the Fire Services; and eight police officers were killed in other incidents.

The various counter measures that have been taken in Hong Kong have had the full support of Her Majesty's Government in London which has, on several occasions expressed its admira- tion for the determination with which confrontation has been contained. The three main phases of the communist attack; demon- strations to gain popular support; stoppages of work to paralyse the Colony's economy; terrorism to undermine morale; have a!' failed. Great credit is due to the police who have, through, un, exercised the greatest steadiness and restraint under the se rest provocation and who have, at the same time, dealt firm with violence, when it has arisen, with the minimum of force and at the cost of severe casualties to themselves. But the same spirit of deter mination and resolution informed all others who were concerned.

whether they were members of the government, members of the armed forces or other auxiliary units, or private individuals. Con- frontation is an issue that ultimately affected the lives of everyone in the Colony and they all played a part in meeting it: some in the planning and organization required to contain the different phases of the communist attacks; others by cheerfully working long hours, often under conditions of imminent personal danger, to keep the Colony functioning efficiently; and others, again, simply by going about their normal work and refusing to be panicked by communist threats and propaganda.

Confrontation may continue for some time in one form or another. With this spirit and with the firm support that has been given by Her Majesty's Government, the people of Hong Kong will continue to overcome whatever new threats they may have to face and, with their inimitable energy, will drive Hong Kong on to new peaks of prosperity and progress.

PUBLISHED FEBRUARY 1968

| This 12-year old boy lost an eye when a communist planted bomb exploded in a street near his home.

Out to

provoke violence,

nists turn hostile.

Commu-

PRINTED BY THE GOVERNMENT PRINTER, HONG KONG

Reference

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REF.

CR L/M 14/69 in

SCR 68/3371/67

Dear Jaminara,

¡CONFIDENTIAL LOWER ALBERT ROAD

COLONIAL SECRETARIAT

Report on 1967 Disturbances.

HONG KONG

20th June, 1969

After the issue of our confidential report Hong Kong Disturbances 1967 we received a number of requests from our diplomatic posts in S.E. Asia for extra copies and permission to pass them on to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Security and to the Police in the countries to which they were accredited. Careful consideration was given to these requests and it was decided on balance that it would be better not to provide copies of the confidential report but to prepare a less sensitive version for such distribution, Four copies of this are attached and a list of addressees to whom we have sent copies is annexed.

In effect, this report is no more than a slightly revised reprint of the first chapter of the 1967 Year Book, As such its wide distribution presents no problems. We do not intend, however, to let it be too generously circulated. This would negate the whole object of the exercise which is to satisfy enquiries from abroad without endangering our security in any way.

yous sincerel

A. W. Gaminara, Esq., C.M.G., Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Whitehall,

London S.W.1.

Encls.

(J.A. Harrison)

1.271

R&R. ANG

3 copies send

b Librong

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No.51

20/8/70

-2 JUL 1969

HKKI/18

KEN

EDI.

CONFIUNT:

2.7-69

CONFIDENTIAL

0.003210

G.P. 323

CONFIDENTIAL

Chancory

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Bangkok Djakarta Manila

Moscow Peking

Promponh

Rangoon

Saigon

Seoul

Tokyo

Vientiano

annnnnngnan

High Commissions

Kuala Lumpur Now Delhi

Rawalpindi

www

Political

Adviser

Singaporo

B.I.S. Now York

Deputy High Commission or

Dacca

British Consulate

Tasui

CONFIDENTIAL

10/

Way Kary: The Slaw June 24

AKI

DME

HEALEY ALARMS HK REDS

ONGKONG'S top Reds are alarmed by British Defence Sec- retary, Denis Healey's remarks that our 1967 disturbances were caused by factions acting against the real wishes of China's leaders,

And The STAIU's own sources say now they are preparing a report for Peking claiming the Brit- ish are trying to split and discredit them.

The Red "Little Cabinet met hurriedly at the New China newsagency yesterday to consider Mr Healey's statement at Kaitak before he flow to Singapore.

　　　In discussion top Reds admitted they first act- ed in the 1907 disturbances without any specific instructions from Peking, according to The STAR's own sources.

Violence

They agreed violence was not restrained until after the ransacking and burning of the Chancel- lory of the British Mission in Peking.

Restraining action followed the arrest of the ringleaders of the attack on the British Mission,

The rluglendørs jailed in Peking wore Yno Tong-shan, returned Acting Charge d'Affaires from Jakarta, and Alsa Yloh Yuan-chlà, a 11slu- liwa University leader, Yao is understood to be still in custody in Peking.

The STAR'S sources claim the "Little Cabinet" yesterday also discussed Deputy Secretary for Home Affairs, Mr Denis Bray's statement this week that Hongkong could not expect to see our colonial form of government changed as far na

any of us could look ahead,"

The Rods thought this meant Britain Intended to stay in Hongkong until the New Territories lease expires, and then attempt to renew the lease.

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No.51

2 JUL 1969

JARKI 18

(HKK 1/18)

CONFIDENTIAL

Hong Kong Department,

16 July, 1969

I am replying to Harrison's letter CR I/M 14/69 of 20 June with which he enclosed copies of an edited version of the report on the 1967 disturbances.

We do not require any further copies of the report here, but we should be grateful if copies could be sent to our High Commissioner at Singapore (I note that the Political Adviser, Singapore, has already received copies) and to our Hission at Katmandu.

ฟ

(A. W. Gaminara)

EAST

RET

16.7.68.

R. Locking, Esq.,

Defence Branch,

Secretariat,

HONG KONG,

CONFIDENTIAL

W(B)L 51-7406

IN THIS MARGIN

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN

SECRET

Note No.

VISIT OF DEPUTY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE

(SIR LESLIE MONSON)

TO HONG KONG, OCTOBER,

OCTOBER, 1969

COMMUNIST CONFRONTATION

There are three issues arising out of

Communist confrontation which present particular

problems:

the

(a)/Communist press

(b) Communist schools

thove

long term sentences for offences connected

with the 1967 disturbances.

[ Take wishy]

The Communists have always attached great

importance to (a) and (b) above which are

(=)

is dealt with ini a

separate Notiz prepared by

the subject of Sumo /

Far Eastern Department

Hong Kong/ Boetic relations generally.

.ג

The notes tebowy

On for t

The Communurts have always attached

Great importance to tal

اسلام

what they

as their mani instruments to further their

Campargin of Subversion. Сатралей

The notes

12use

aspect's below are mamly for information; we

have no

points to raise

it seeme

(a), and on (6,

necessary only to show interest

in the progress being made to find ways

atts of confining that communist of effort

on to expand their activitie

in the educational field.

ciently sophisticated to have some immunity to

SECRET

/ the

W(B)L 51-7406

SECRET

and is so regarded by the

is so

is apt to Who hash instance

Can Garemor

this as at

example of how

Hong Kong is already to some extent in a " Macau-type hoselion)

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

and if so whether they are doing so to an extent which extent which

is giving strick's cause for concer to the authoriti in Hong Kong

the more outrageous and extreme forms of

Communist propaganda; and so long as the

Communist press refrains from publishing

material of a blatantly seditious and

inflammatory nature the authorities accordingly

take no action against it. Although this could

be regarded (and is regarded by the Governor)-

as a "concession" to the Communista we consider that

so long as public confidence in the Colony is

not thereby seriously affected, it is the best

course to adopt in the interests of Sino/British

relations generally.

Sino/British

3. It would be helpful to know whether and If

se to what extent the Communist press still

persist in publishing material which in more

normal circumstances would lead to legal action

_against them,

Communier set0018

4- We learnt from the Governor in July this

year that he had set up a Schools Steering

Committee, a small official body with the

function of watching Communist schools generally

and suggesting ways and means, whenever possible,

of inhibiting their activities within the very

limited scope that exists for doing so. The fact so that the Communist schools have a

captive clientele in the families of active

supporters, trade union members and employees

of Communist concerns. Against the forms of

pressure and persuasion that can be brought to

bear, Government measures to wean parents from

sending their children to Communist schools are

unlikely to succeed. Conversely there is no

sure

evidence that Communist schools are at the

present time attracting children from non-

/ Communist

SECRET

W{B}L 51-7406

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Communist families

SECRET

except perhaps in a few

areas where other facilities may be inadequate

(and it is present policy to plug any such gaps

as a matter of priority): inferior educational

standards in Communist curricular could probably

be relied upon to deter most non-Communists from Nevertheless sending their children to these schools, even if it is considered desuable to try to contain the spread of the free-facilities were offered. Communal educational effort.

The Governor also informed us in July that

the drafting of amendments to the Education

Ordinance was proceeding slowly although it was

not an easy matter. It would be helpful to find

out how this exercise is progressing and what

progress is being made generally in forestalling

the Communist by providing Government schools

in such areas aà Tai Po and Sha Tin in the New

Territories.

BACKGROUND

General

36.

It is now nearly two years since the end

of the Communist campaign of violence against the

Hong Kong authorities. During this period there

has been no organised violence in the Colony;

there have been sporadic incidents involving

violence on a minor scale but such incidents are

believed to have been entirely spontaneous in

origin and to have received no instigation or

encouragement from the Communist authorities in

Peking. In fact such violence as there has been

may reasonably be attributed to the protracted

difficulties experienced by the local Communist

leadership in convincing (under directions from

Peking) their more militant cadres of the

desirability of abandoning violence in favour

of a long term ideological campaign to win public

support for their cause.

SECRET

/7....

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

W(B)L, 51-7406

SECRET

ค

The New Chine News Agency representative to

whom the message was

declined to accept grixw

the Hong Kong version of the incidents, but apart

from

this mommy

　　he brew the message.

vceelock

Soofer as is

repykes brow xt to this

This latter course has been followed by the

Communists for a considerable time now and as

part of their campaign they seek every opportu-

nity of criticising the authorities on the ground of real or alleged deficiencies in the

administration of the Colony's affairs. They

have been particularly critical in the spheres

of public transport, crime, labour disputes,

hawkers and resettlement schemes; but they do

not hesitate to seize upon any opportunity

which presents itself of furthering their

ultimate objective, which is to undermine the

authority of the Government. There is no

evidence to suggest that they are achieving

any success in their campaign (except possibly

in the sphere of education); nor is there any

reason whatever to suppose that they have any

intention of abandoning their efforts to attain

their ultimate objective.

Recent Incidents and Current Situation

During August there were several incursions

into Colony waters by motorised junks from

Chinese territory in pursuit of illegal immi-

grants into the Colony. Encounters with police

patrol launches were involved and the incidents

led to a message of protest being handed to the

New China News Agency by the Hong Kong authori-

ties early in September.

ス

Minor stoning and fireworks incidents have

occurred from time to time in the vicinity of

the border. This area is always a sensitive

one and such incidents do not normally excite

comment. However, their frequency increased at

the end of August and on 20 September a message

was passed to the New China News Agency asking

them to draw the attention of the appropriate

/ Chinese

SECRET

W(B)L 51-7406

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

SECRET

has

Chinese authorities to the incidents. No reply been received to this menaçe, 7. The recent introduction of regulations

controlling the activities of light buses (mini buses) has given rise to a certain amount of

trouble. An incident occurred on 27 September

which involved the arrest of the crew of a mini-

And

bus in the New Territories /which eventually necessitated the use of tear smoke by the police,

and which led to fifteen appeste.

The following

day public mini- bus drivers throughout the

Colony stopped work for several hours in protest

against the enforcement of the regulations.

Although several Communist supporters were

involved in the original incident, the latter

was entirely spontaneous and the Communist trade

union concerned subsequently made it clear that

the stoppage did not have their backing.

8. The Communist Chinese National Day Celebra-

tions on 1 October were the most uneventful for

several years. It was evident that the local

Communist leadership did everything possible to

avoid any action which might provoke an incident.

Communist Press

912. This is naturally an instrument of which

the Communists made full use in pursuing their

long term policy. Although the general tone of

wal

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　1967 propaganda is less extreme than it has been in

the past, the Communist press continues its

vilification of the Government and it not in-

Quest

frequently publishes material of a seditious

[ Fake in A-(A)

nature. Take

Communist Schools

10 13:

11-23.

Although the total enrolment at these

schools (26,167 in March, 1969) represents no

more than 2.4% of the total school enrolment in

SECRET

/ the

SECRET

W(8)L 51-7406

the Colony, the Communist effort in this sphere

gives cause for some concern. These schools are

increasing in numbers; their total enrolment

increased by some 6,000 during the period March,

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

1968

March, 1969; they provide for a high

level of indoctrination and they are not easy

Control

to deal with.

It is expected that Communiat

educational circles will continue and intensify

their campaign to extend their influence-among-

Government and private schools.

12/14.

Take in B-B On pp 2-3J

This subject was discussed in London with

the Governor in October 1968. The Governor

then mentioned certain measures which he had

fondamming the creat

under consideration for dealing with the problem. of the Commandmist aducational effort These included the opening of additional

Government schools in areas where gaps existed

which might otherwise be exploited by Communist

and

schools; tightening up the Educational Ordinance on a non-discremmatory basis (argo gausing the

　(e and the criteria applied to school premises standards of school fremises before registration is permitted. It was agreed

that the Governor should continue to pursue

these measures, consulting us at appropriate

stages and giving us advance information of the

application of any of the measures.

لم میں انگر

Confrontation Prisoners_

15 There is still a considerable number of

Communist prisoners serving long term sentences for offences committed during the disturbances

of 1967. According to the expected pattern of

releases, based on figures given to us by the

Governor in 1968 and assuming full remission in

each case, the number of those remaining in

custody at the end of 1969 and of subsequent

years will be as follows:

SECRET

End

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

W(B)L SI-7406

SECRET

End 1969

140

1970

1971

1978

1973

1974

197/5

1976

1977

(life sentences)

Над кад

Des

Octour, 1969.

SECRET

تن

NO HONG KON

FAHREND

1269

ND TION

Congratation

13/10

fle

There are thre iemacu aricin, out of Communit Gezzundat confrontation which procent particular problemo:-

(n) the Communiat preno

(b)

Comunist schools

len tur nentences for offernen connected rith the 1967 diaturiones8.

(c) is dealt with in u arpurate kete propared by or Pastorn Dugurtaunt on the subject of Tino/ilong eng Eritich rolutioan Konurally.

The notes on these

re have no printa

The Communists have almya attached grent importance to (n) und (b), which they ace as their zein instruments to farther their cispelen of rubyoraton, Ampects belos ere meinly for inferantion; to raise on (0), and on (b) it decas necess:ry only to show interent in the progreng being auds to rinč zuya of confining qo munist offorts to expend their activities in the od eational field.

BACH ZUR

3. It is now nearly two youre since the end of the Communiat armpaign or violence against the Hong Kong eutheritisn.

Barắng thir period there her been no organised violence in the Colony;

　　there have wean sporudic incidento involving violence on a minor achle but such incidenta are believed to have been

LAST PAPER

SECRET

/entirely

entirely spontaneous in drigin and to have received no inetigation or encouragement from the Consunint authorities in Peking. In fuct such violenga "n there has boon mag reasonably be attributed to the protrustoŭ Jifficulties experienced by the local Gorranist Lendorship in convincing (under directions from Peking) their more militant endram of the Cesirability of abindoning violence in feyors of a long trum ideologiona compaign to vin public support for their

coure,

4. Chân Intter course beg been follo ed by the Communists for a considerable lite nue and as part of their caspelen they Geek every opportunity of criticising the authorities on the

und of rest or alle, ed Gericiencies in the uninistration of the Colony'e affairs, They have been particul: rly critical in the spheres of public crannport, crime, inbour disputoa, halatora and renettico, no nehomees silk they do noi 1992 Gold to delze upon eny esportunity which premento Iteef of furthering their ultimate objective, which is to undermine the authority of the Goverment. Thore in no ovidence to surgent that they are schirving may succons in their enmpaign (excuņt ponsibly In the nphorn of education); nor is thera eny reuron whatever to suppore that they have any intention of abandoning thoir efforts to attain their ultimate cojective.

Korent Incidents and Current Bituation

5. Daring Augunt thera sore several incurcions inte Gelony natura by motorised junks item Gainete territory in gurauit of illewal issigmenta into the fojony, inacantern with police

petrol launchee zaro Luvolved and the incidents led to a message of protest bein, handed to the New Châu hers Aɛchlor by the Hon Nory authorities diriy in September. The "ler Chẳng Nem Agency roprocant ative to chon the meannga was given declined to accept the Hong Kong version of the incidents, but apart from this no reply to the mesnage han born received.

/6.

OFREMS

6. Rinor atoning and #frowork# incidento have becurred from ting to time in the vicinity of the border. This crea la Ažvage a genuitive eng and euch insidente do not normally excite comment. Honavor, their fro uency increennd at the end of Lugunt end on 20 Beptember a Engnage tue papred to the fey China Have Scenog anhẳng, then to drag the attention of the appropri› to Chinsam autho. Atien to the incidents.

7. The recent introcvovich (2 rigużatlonu controlling the nativition of light cunea (mini-busna) hun zivon rino to a certain amount of troulla. An incidens eccurred on 27 September which involved the arroat of the CUM OF A pins-bus In the New Territories and ebuh aventually redmonitofná tho the of tone molte by the police. The fol20. Ing dng publie gind-lan drivere throughout the Gelony stopped ·ork for WA70143 Hoare in prot851 niñot the enturesment of sho

14hah sev pel Conguniat maporters were Involved in th- oriųțin a incident, the letter can entirely Vochtruous and the Connmårt trade under concerned cubøéquantly aɛde it clear that the stoppuga alá not hava their bucking.

6. "ho Co @mint Chinese fational Day Celebrations on

1 Cetober mere the maet uneventful for several, resre, tub ovident that the loc 1 Communiat lev.derdily did Everything possible to avoid any action which niht provoke an ieldent,

Comet Das

of this

9. The Spraradęta enda 2011 uns/in pureding their long tore policy. Although the general tone of propagande is Zene oxtrome than it wwe in 1967 the Communiat preca continuco its vilifiertion of the Goverment end it not infre uently publishos maturini of a ezditiouo netare, The Hong Kong Goverment fa Anhibited from taking lapal action vscaune of cxtums 0.7.0. sensitivity to any action which might be construed ca an attempt to control the activities of the Cossmint presc.

/degree

Tho

vnd

Cerrse of this sensitivity w-t cisuris evidenced during the

:tarbanecs of 1367 then, in Mugust or that Perr) ~rocerutions eysinrt 1)ene landing Consundet nowspapers in Hong Kong for the publication of seditiouc material led directly and Innadietoly to the casking of our Hission In in

Peking. Tt. La bollevad that the general putilo in liong Hong

ore sufficiently rophietigstad to hero pose immunity to the more outrageous and extrar: forms of Communist propagando; zo long an tive Co caniat press raïmáne fron publiebing #cteriol of a blstently weditious end inflammatory nature Che anthoritize accordingly take no wetion egrinet it,

2though this could be reperisë na a "concession" to the

Cocsumicta (and le co rag:rded by the (lovernor, who is upt to inateneo thin se on exʊzle of how lagg heng de okronČy

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　te to poke extzat in a "Memau-type" poudsion), va erneider that co long on public conficonen in the Colony in not thereby roriously arrested, is do the best courne to adopt in the interests of Sino,Bang Kong/British roislionn generally,

30, 12though the total cutämnt at times rahools (26,367 in March, 1969) ~prseento ao cors thon Call of the totựl school chrylarnt in the Colony, tie femmunist affert in this sphore ivse cauta for some concomp Thisa Beketle dig inertneing in qumbers; their total ongelmant ine:ecced by kuma 8,000 Curing the period #‹rch, 1768 - Murch, 1965; they provide fen & high level of Ankeetrinstion and they are not cany

to control.

11.

some

Communist echools have a captive clientals in the facilica of agtive supportare, trede union acmbars anû waployees of Cortunist concerns. Ageinst the farms of pesgnure and pornacaion that can he brought to boar, loverment mendures to ros perente from sanding their children to Jos unint schools are unlikely to ruscnød. Convorasly there in no ovidence

vaan

/that

that Communiat schooln are at the presont time attracting- children from non-Commmint familica " except perhaps in a for aroun where other facilition may be inadeșuste (ond it is prenent policy to play any ruch gapn an a matter of priority): inferior educational atomlerde in Communist cuʻriculo could probably be lelied upon to deter boat nun-Communiate from` cending their children to these schools. Nevertheless it is

acnnidered denirable to try to contain the ap:oad of the Comunint adueɛtionɛl of crt.

Thin subject we discussed In London Ith the Governor in October 1968. The Governor then mentioned certain connures which he had under consideration. These included the opening of additional Government sohcolo in areas where E-pe existed chich might othorvino be exploited by Communiat nelicolo; and tightening up the "duentional Ordinance on non-discriminatory basis (c.g. ruining the standards of nchaol prosires before registration is permitted). It was agreed that the Governor should continue to pursue theno monauros, consulting un at appropriate ntugon and giving us advance information of the uppliestien of any new menoured.

Hong Kong Dparkent

Jctober 1969.

CLOSED

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