FCO 40/107 Disturbances in Hong Kong propaganda

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SECRET

COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

DEPT..

ist

4916

INFORMATION AND!.

TITLE: HONG KONG!.

PROPAGANDA ASPECTS:

DISTURBANCES 1967:

REFER TO

DEPT.

DATE DEPT.

NAME

My faminen 21/2

N.. Hall

San. Are them for anthony.

No. Hall од

11/5

M. Gaminan 20/5

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FILE

OPENED

2318

REFER TO

NAME

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DATE DEPT.

NAME

DATE

2318

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318

701/07702

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SECRET

PART

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8th February 1968

4/5

(Dear Lad Hill

May I call your attention to a BBC-2 Television programme about Hong Kong which was broadcast on 9th January at 9.55 p.m., and for which I gave an interview here to Mr. Pettifer.

Before this interview, Mr. Pettifer sub- mitted his proposed questions to me, at my request. found a number of these to be unsatisfactory, being either excessively hypothetical or so framed as to require me to deal with the question-begging imputations which were contained in them, before coming to the question itself. In short, the questions were not really designed to elicit information, but to entrap me into a situation in which the interview lent credence to Mr. Pettifer's imputations. While this may be in the BBC's current interviewing style, it is nevertheless as silly as it is unmannerly; and I was naturally not prepared to fall for any such tricks.

I then discussed with Mr. Pettifer a number of alternative questions which would have had the effect of enabling me to express what I really thought. am grateful to Mr. Pettifer that he did eventually although with some reluctance consent to questions which were more or less acceptable to me. With one exception which I will refer to later, these were the questions which were in fact asked during a longish interview, and which I answered to the best of my ability. I was able in the answers to cover the situation here with reasonable accuracy and in some detail. One way and another, the whole business

took up two or three hours of my time.

Lord Hill of Luton,

Chairman, BBC,

Broadcasting House, London, W.1.

וי

Sir Arthur Galsworthy

cc:

Hon. C.S.

DIS

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Presumably your with In such prorrænum.5

is to inform your audiences through persons gasified to know something of the subject antiter. Would you, hometer, please look at the final result, as it appears from the transcript? About 60% of the programme was riven over to the comments of Mr. Pattifer and Mr. Michelmore's introduction. While Mr. Pettifor, of course, knows practically notning about Bor Konr, this part of the programme does contain a certain amount of fairly lementary factual material, accurate enough within the limits of

but at the accuracy commor to progrUNKCE of this type: same time, whenever a view la expressed it is almost invariably tendentiour. I could pick most of these remarks to pieces, but it is not really my purpose to comment In detail in this letter. It would take too long.

Of the remaining 40% of the programme,

about 30% is given over be the views of Mr. Davies, who has been here about 1-3 years only. He is well-known an an open critic of the Colony Government, although his views command no real following here and in particular they emphatically do not represent any considerable body of responsible Chinese opinion. I do not of course object to a critic being riven a place on the programme. It is the relative prominence given to his opinious, without a chance of rebuttal, which is objectionable.

　　　　　　　　　　Finally. I en allowed the romeining one- tenth part of a programmo to which four people have contributed. of all that was recorded I am permitted to make two remarks only. The first was not preroded by the question I was supposed to be answering, and is therefore out of conterb. Moreover, it deals with one of the least important rolete vovered in the actusi interview, in the sense that Lus content is already well and widely known. The remora remark which survived editing, on the other rang, la preceded by Mr. Pettifer's question; and this question is one which Mr. Pebilfry interpolated without prior egr ement. You will notice that it is hypothetical, clented, and calls for a

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comparison that cannot commute to made. I hone that these were not, as appears, the attributes which in fact gained 15 a place in the programme. You will notice also, on the other bord that Mr. Pettifer's questions to Mr. Pavics viri.ally invited replies hostile to this Gove "nmen

про

　　　　　　　　　　After en 24 pt to make me lend my presence to supporting nojarsi?lable imputations, then, two short extracts :f' '. one intervlow were actually broadcast as purporting to convey the views of the

1.0 Governor on the current situation in Hong Kong. pretend that these extracts fairly represented those views as they were actually expressed, or to pretend that your audience has been given valid first-hand information on the subject matter of the programme, is to affront the intelligence. The fart le that programmes of this type, containing interviews auch ae this, are mere fabrications of the BBC's masqueradinat under the muise of truth. They are falsifiel material, issued by means of a species of confidence trick in violation of the name and personality of the unfortunate pereor subjected to this kind of treatment.

If the PRC werts its audiences to know what people on the spot think about any given situation, why cannot they select thorn who are most familiar with it and let them have "hel say in answer to straightforward questions? The result will sometimes need to be shortened, no doubt, but way dammot the essence of what is said he held in respuet? Inis, in my experience, is the more usual practice wite similar television programmes in other English speaking countries; and the results appear to me to command just as much attention as do BBC programmes Furthermor, reing obviously more honest, they are that much the more credible.

　　　　　　　　　　I regret welting to you in these terms but I do feel some obligation to try to protect this complex, courageous and self-reliant community from the gratuitous misrepresentation it has too often suffered

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at the BBC's hands recently. The situation is delicate

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　including many enough here, and much is at stake:

Surely Hong people's security and Imired their lives. Kong merits some effort et being reported objectively and fairly? Furthermore, I would have thought it obvious that the BBC representatives are unlikely to continue to receive ruen co-operation when those who try to assist them are subjected to what I can only describe as professionally dubious practices at the nands of their abf.

　　　　　　　　　　　　　I have conied this letter to Sir Arthur Galsworthy in the Commonwealth Office.

MANA

Haunch.

(Sir David Trench)

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yś

Reference.............

LAST

REF.

Sir John Johnston

We had a brief word on the telephone this afternoon about the attached copy of a letter which Sir David Trench has sent to Lord Hill, complaining in particular about a BBC 2 television programme about Hong Kong on January 9th, and more generally about the attitude of the BBC towards Hong Kong. 2. The first point I would like to make is that Sir David Trench is essentially a liberal man and a liberal Governor, and not a man to resent or be afraid of criticism. That he should have felt he

must express himself as frankly as he has done in this letter is an indication of the strength of his feeling about the BBC's attitude towards Hong Kong. Over the past two years in particular, while I have been visiting Hong Kong or Sir David has been in the United Kingdom, he has frequently let off steam about the BBC in its portrayal of Hong Kong; and I think that the television programme on January 9th must have been pretty well the final straw.

3. I myself did not see this programme, but Mr. Hall did. He tells me that when he saw it he felt considerable indignation about it. In his view it gave an entirely wrong impression of Hong Kong, put the Hong Kong Government and HMG in the worst possible light, and in his view, had it been seen by the Communists, would unquestionably have given them much comfort and satisfaction.

4. Prior and subsequent to Lord Shepherd's visit to Hong Kong we have had occasion to tell the BBC that we thought they were doing the United Kingdom a disservice in their sensational and inaccurate reporting of events in Hong Kong. In particular we criticised them for some pretty inflated (and inaccurate) accounts of what was happening on the border area; and there was one notable occasion when an incident in Kowloon in a relatively minor key which took the Police precisely 15 minutes to deal with was headlined by the BBC as "Hong Kong has another night of violence". This particular report caused a good deal of indignation in Hong Kong at the time, and I know for a fact that it led to a number of private letters from residents in the Colony to their families over here telling them to disregard BBC reports about Hong Kong.

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5. I hope that we can back up the representations

which Sir David Trench has made to the BBC.

Perhaps

we can have another word about this when you have

read this letter?

ANS

(A.N. Galsworthy)

14th February, 1968

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Reference..........

Sir A. Galsworthy

Hong Kong and the B.B.C.

Your minute of 14 February below. I am in

no doubt that the Governor has every right to the

anger reflected in his letter to Lord Hill. But

in terms of impact on the B.B.C., who are adept

at every kind of self-defence in these situations,

it has two disadvantages

(1) at no_point does it prove the bias of the

DIT

ETF.

B.B.C. programme. It makes its case by

unsupported assertion.

(11) The B.B.C. will not accept that either

the Governor or ourselves are objective

judges of programmes critical of Hong Kong

and of H.M.G.

Nevertheless, I think there is sufficient in

the letter to establish that the programme was

produced in a pretty discreditable manner and to

make a prima facie case for bias, if not for

malevolence, despite the absence of chapter and

verse.

3. The question now is what action we can take

with the B.B.C. which will most effectively re-

inforce the Governor's case, without giving grounds

to those elements in the B.B.C. who will seek to

dismiss it as an example of the Establishment's

intolerance of criticism.

4. I think this might best be done by a follow-

up letter to Lord Hill either from Lord Shepherd

or the Secretary of State, if it is possible for

us to write the right sort of letter i.e. one

containing dispassionate chapter and verse, and

/not

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not relying too much on generalised assertions.

The example quoted in paragraph 4 of your minute

about the incident in Kowloon would be ideal for

inclusion. Do you think it is possible for the

Department to produce a draft which would refer

to the Governor's letter and express a general

Ministerial disquiet about the attitude of the

B.B.C. to Hong Kong illustrated by a series of

specific examples including if possible team

endorsement of the Governor's strictures on the

programme of 9 January specifying and establishing

the bias or falsity of the programme?

JB Instan

(J. B. Johnston)

19 February 1968.

Mr. Carter

I think this is a

I think we have quite

material

on record

kindly prepare a

very helpful suppestini.

a lit

А вмерция

Carld you very

draft, & which Mr. Hall

may also wish to cartii lite.

ANS.

20/2

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Mr. Gaminara

This is an

awkward one

Lue

need

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describes in para 4

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BEF

2072

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Konverterall

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54 PALL MALL

LONDON S.W.

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CONFIDENTIAL

N.J.V. Watt, Esq., 0.B.E.,

Director of Information Services, Beaconsfield louse,

HƯNG KONG,

22nd February 1968

Further to my letter of February 19th, the meeting between members of the Committee of the liong Kong Association and B.B.C. officials duly took place yesterday. It was a luncheon meeting, and I gather the atmosphere was extremely cordial. The Hong Kong Association representa- tives expressed concern about a certain lack of perspective in recent B.B.C. sound and television reports on Hong Kong affairs, and I understand they received a very sympathetic hearing. H.E.'s letter to Lord Hill was not mentioned, but the l'ettifer report in the BFC-TV "Twenty-four Hours" programme, which gave rise to it, was referred to.

The Hong Kong Association representatives were Mr. Jeffry Hamm, chairman, Mr. John Keswick (who is, incidentally, a member of the B.B.C.'s General Advisory Council), ír. Bryan Barlow, and Ir. H. J. Collar, secretary. The B.b.C. officials were Mr. C.J. Curran, Director, External broadcasting, and Ir. J.C. Crawley, Foreign Editor, News and Current Affairs.

Mr. Collar will be reporting more fully to Susan Yuen, and he will ask her to keep you informed.

(Ronald Boxall)

Copy: A.W. Gaminara, Esq., C.M.G.,

Commonwealth Office.

RB/SC

Mt.

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遍

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS OF THE

HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICE

Ramon.

54 PALL MALL

LONDON S.W.

01-930 7951

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Report

from

Parker, Bishop Limited

Broadway Court, Brighton Road, Lancing, Sussex.

Telephone: Lancing 2844/5

Tolex 87171

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Report No.... HK.113.

Length 10. 40"

Transmitted on

BBC Television- "Twenty-Four Hours"

Date 9th January, 1968. Time 9.55p.m.

Short Title Situation in Hong Kong.

Cliff Michelmore:

　　　　　　　　　　　　　Last year, the British Crown Colony of Hong Kong was suddenly caught up in the revolution. going on in communist China, riots, bomb explosions, demonstrations and strikes swept Hong Kong and Julian Pettifer reported then for "Twenty-Four Hours". Now,

on his way back to Vietnam, he's been through Hong Kong

again.

Julian Pettifer:

This time last year, I was reporting

on the activities of the Red Guards who brought such turmoil to the neighbouring Portuguese Colony of Macao. And I can remember standing right here and speculating on whether the shock-waves of China's cultural revolution would be felt in Hong Kong during 1967. Well, of course, they were and, for proof, you only have to look at the New Year's Honours List, which contains the names of no less than 22 Hong Kong policemen, including the Commissioner, and a bomb disposal expert, who were all honoured for the part they played in helping to restore order to the gravely- troubled Colony.

SHA

TAU KOK

　　　I was remembering, too, the bands of Red Guards closing in on Government House, chanting quotations from the

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Ι "Thoughts of Chairman Mao" and most unnerving of all, recalled the incident at Château Coque on the border when men and Chinese attacked a British police post, killing five men and bringing a dangerously tense situation to the frontier area. In those summer days, Hong Kong trembled and many of the rich and middle-class Chinese

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Report No......HK...113..

Continuation No.........1.

booked their airline tickets for Taiwan, while money poured out of the Colony in the same direction.

　　But now, outwardly at least, Hong Kong is peaceful and not only peaceful, but prosperous. Business in the stores expect for those run by the communists, has set new records. Just to see the way people are dressed and the goods they're buying is to realise that despite its troubles, the Colony's economic miracle has continued almost unchecked. Of course, there is still poverty, plenty of it, and gross inequalities. But wages have risen by 80% in the past seven years and it shows. Perhaps that was the fkrst of many communist mistakes. They rocked the boat just at the moment when the mass of the people here had begun to taste the rewards of a decade of struggle. And so, not out of any loyalty, but out of solid self-interest, which is a much more reliable emotion, the population backed the Government. Almost everyone for a change had a good word to say for the police and British officials congratulate themselves on weathering the storm.

　　Since the strikes fizzled out, public transport has returned to normal, with only the wire grilles around the drivers' cabs on the trams as a reminder that a few weeks

　　hundreds of bombs were being scattered through the Colony every day. Although bomb disposal crews still stand by twenty-four hours a day, calls on their services are diminishing and, in most cases, the bizarre collection of tin cans, bags and bottles, either fail to explode or are found to contain nothing more dangerous than sand and scraps

of old iron.

|| ago, hundreds of

　　But as the violence diminishes, there is some evidence that the Hong Kong communist hierarchy is beginning to learn from its past mistakes. Today, the bright red banners bear a different message. Bombs failed to win them friends but

Nonsense

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Report No..... HK..113....

Continuation No...........2.............

devaluation could have given them a most popular grievance. In this 50' lampoon, Britain, the Imperialist assassin, is shown slinking off with the loot, and the caption tells the Chinese that the thieving character of the British will never change. By devaluation they've stolen two hundred and ten million dollars, from the people of Hong Kong, it says. Fortunately, after initial devaluation, the Colony was able to revalue its dollar to within 5% of its old worth and a drastic rise in prices has been prevented. But it's towards sensitive areas like this, to the sweat shops of this city, where neither wages nor working con- ditions are what they should be, that the communists may turn their attention. Remember that it was in an artificial

　flower factory like this one that the trouble started last May. It began when Union leaders launched a calculated campaign of violence in reprisal for a management lock-out and the same sort of thing could easily happen again.

　　　　The Government says that it's aware that in the over- crowded, ill-ventilated workshops, labour management relations are in a bad way. But it's under attack for doing little or nothing to improve the situation. As the communists may have discovered, Hong Kong is a place more concerned with economic realities, with money, than with social and political theory. I discussed its problems with the Editor of the "Far Eastern Economic Review" Mr.

Derek Davies.

Mr. Davies, there seems to be a certain amount of self- congratulation in official circles that the Colony's weathered the storm in the past year. this euphoria's justified?

Do you feel that

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Report No.... HK.113.....

Continuation No.3,

Mr. Davies: Well in many senses, yes. They've got

　everything to pat themselves on the back about. After all we've had a very a very tough year indeed and we've come through with all flags flying. Look at the harbour, look at everything around you. Building's starting again. The money that left the banking system is starting to come back. Exports during '67 went up by 12% and we export about 90% of what we make. I think there's every reason to be self- satisfied, but self-satisfaction and complacency is, in fact, our greatest danger today rather than the communists. We should be very grateful to the communists for making such an utter 'cock-up' of their campaign. They made every possible mistake they could, including disobeying Chairman Mao's instructions to go amongst the population like fishes in water and win mass support.

Instead they shut themselves away in their barricaded Union headquarters and threw bombs and tried to harm the economy and put everyone against them. It's almost impossible that a communist movement should have managed to get 90, or 95% of a Colonialist population behind the Imperialist Government, but that's in fact, what the communists have done. Sir David Trench, Governor of Hong Kong: Certainly, there The violence does appear to have been a change in tactics.

in the last ten days or so seems largely to have gone out of the situation. I'm judging now by their own press when I say that, apparently, their tactics now is to consolidate their supporters to persuade them to study the works of Chairman Mao and generally to reaffirm themselves in their faith. This in itself is an unexceptionable method of procedure and may I stress that it's no crime to be a communist in Hong Kong, it's only a crime to disobey the

law.

What their tactics from there on will be, nobody really knows. After all, the only way we have of judging

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Report No......HK.113....

Continuation No. 4.

is by reading their newspapers and that is what they are concentrating on now, united front work.

J. Pettifer: If they should switch their tactics for example, to stirring up trouble on the labour front, do you think they'd be a greater threat to the Colony in that respect than they are when they take to the streets.

Sir David: Well it depends entirely on what they do, doesn't it, whether they're a greater threat or not. I have to know precisely what you're suggesting they might do, before I could say it'd be a worse threat. There are certain things they could do which might be anembarrasment but, in general, of course, ordinary industrial action within the law is not something we would object to at all. J. Pettifer: To visit the smaller work places in Hong Kong you'd imagine that the Colony had no labour legislation of any kind.

　　　　　　　　　　This is not the case, the laws are on the books, but, largely because of corruption in the labour department and police force and because of the fantastic Chinese will to work under any condition, the law is rarely enforced.

　　　　　There's a regulation that forbids the employment of children under 14 but where the child wants to work and where the employer pays off the factory inspector, the law means nothing. What's more, only factories registered with the Labour Department are ever inspected by anyone and there are thousands of small concerns that are unregistered and left to their own Dickensian devices.

Now, Government talks an awful lot about labour

relations.

　　　　　　　　　　They seem to be aware that something needs to be done. So far the only practical step that I've heard about has been the Government has talked about calling in two experts. Now does this seem to you to be enough?

　　　　Davies: Far from it and I don't know what two foreign experts would be able to do in this can of worms here.

Mr.

We've

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Report No... HK.113...

Continuation No...5..........

got no Unions, we've got no tradition of collective bargain- ing, well we have got Unions but they're terrifically split between the ultra Left Wing and the ultra Right Wing. If the employers try and do something about it, to create a middle of the road movement, which they could bargain with, it would be condemned as a 'yellow' Union. No, I don't feel legislation is the answer. I feel the answer is higher wages. J. Pettifer: Why is Government weak on its labour front here? Mr. Davies: Well it's embraced this 19th Century laissez faire attitude, leave us alone, don't interfere, it's worked well so far, why shouldn't it go on working, and it's very difficult to get through the head of a 55-year old bureau- crat that the circumstances have changed. That's the trouble. They don't want to intervene, there's no tradition for intervening and you can't persuade them that this is the 20th Century.

　　J. Pettifer: This being the case, what is your prediction for the coming year. Are you gloomy about it because of

this attitude?

•

After all, we've which dominates us,

and

Mr. Davies: No, I'm very far from gloomy. come through '67 in which China economic co-operation with China is absolutely essential

to the future of Hong Kong, its whole raison d'etre during that year, China has been putting politics to the fore and during that year, she stepped back from a con- frontation with Hong Kong. She didn't want to take it over, she didn't want to harm it too much, and so this,

in my mind, constitutes the best guarantee we have for the future. I think the Year of the Monkey, 1968, is the year of the monkey for Chinese, the signs are set fair. Kenneth Allsop: Julian Pettifer, reporting from Hong Kong.

..00000...

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CONFIDENTIAL

501/2

N.J.V. Watt, Msq., 0.B.E.,

Director

Information Services Department, Beaconsfield House, HCNG ECG.

27th February 1968

Further to my letter of February 22nd, concerning H.E.'s letter to Lord Hill about a recent item on the BBC-TV programme "venty-four Hours", I an enclosing: with Mr. Collar's permission, a copy of his report to Mrs. Susan Yuen on the meeting between representatives of the Hong Kong Association and of the B.B.C.

LAST AF

(Ronald Boxall)

Enc.

- CC:

A.W. Gaminara, Esq., C.M.G.,

Commonwealth Office.

RB/SC

Mc Carter.

? Fill

may

Stile be with

you. Mus

JP. 2,68.

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HJC/OMR

COPY

80/€

26th February, 1968.

S. Yuen,

The Hong Kong Association (Hong Kong Branch),

United Chinese Bank Building,

31-37 Des Voeux Road, C.,

HONG KONG.

Dear Mrs. Yuen,

BBC BROADCASTS

You will have noted from the Minutes of our Meeting of January 31st that we were very critical of a BBC broadcast on the "24 Hours" series on January 9th and that Mr. Keswick undertook to make renresentations.

He is unfortunately no longer on the idvisory Board of the B.B.C., having served the statuter Period, but through his contacts there was able to arrange a luncheon with four senior officiels of the PPC. These were:-

C.J. Curran

B.P.C., Director of External Broad-

casting

B.P.C., Head of Far Eastern Service

Huch Howse

John Crawley

Arthur Hutchinson

* .

Editor News 214 Cu-rent Affairs

8.P.C., Foreign news Editor

Supporting Mr. Keswick were Jeffrey Hamm,

Brian Barlow and myself.

We told our mests of the Association's concern in connection with the broadenst en or 9th January in the programme introduced ho Mr. Pettifer. The inaccuracies and innutetions in that intervi, torether with the lock of balance ir presentatier, and the treatment of the inter- view with 4.4., hd caused considerable degree of misgiving amongst us syd it was on this most recent exam-le of irresponsible reporting that we breed our discussion. It was rointed out that it was not only the integrity of the interviewer in this type of programme that was at stake but, mone immortant, the internity of the P.B.C. The Associ-tion was concerned with exrorts to the Far East and, nrticularly, to ong Kong, and it was, therefore, 'fundamental to the British image that B.".0. "pompormes should present the facts and not slent on Aistort t'qm

　　　　We felt that the standard of reporting in the P.B.C. generally has been slowly deteriorating for the past year or two and it is no secret that the rather angry young intellectuals are mainly resposible. Tere is, of course, a natural tendency for programmes to be slanted either to the right or to the left, but it is highly desirable that a proner balance should be maintained and this does not appear to be the case any longer. The pendulum has swung rather too far to the left and an ears to remain there.

COPY

/-2-

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- 2 -

rs. S. Yuen.

26th February, 1968.

We were not strongly critical of their news broadcasts, although as our guests said, news has to go out the air so soon after it is received, that they have Jittle opportunity of intervention if the need should arise. We did, however, point out th t the continued reporting of the spectacular, as in the case of the demonstrations and bomb incidents in Hong Kong, without any balancing feature, gives by accumulatior en adverse and inaccurate picture.

Here

Our main complaint concerned the treatment of documentaries, where the time factor is not important. again, the reporter tends to dwell on the spectacular, and appears to be more concerned with creating a sensational than e balanced picture possibly thinking that it enhances his om reputation.

Our quests took all this in good part.

They of course have their own difficulties. The B..C. is a great organisatior and wary of the programe units have to be given e fair measure of freedom and the nature of the chain of commend in the organisation makes control difficult.

The talked to us with considerable freedom, and I do not think that it would be fair to them to set down our conversation in detail. We had the impression that they were well aware that our criticisms were well founded, and that they themselves were very concerned over the situation. Incidentally, there was an admission that they had been in trouble over Pettifer, but did not say if it was in respect of the Janu ry 9th programme, nor did we press them on this.

There were certain concrete results of the talk. They said that it would be most helpful if there were one or two people in the Association on whom they could rely to appear on Television at short notice to comment on matters of current interest.

　　　　They would also like to feel that they could approach us for background information, and hoped that we would be able to give them advance advice of matters of importance which were likely to make the news.

　　　　They also agreed that we could probably be very helpful to their renorters, by briefing them before their departure, and helping them to make the contacts most suited to their purpose in Hong Kong. These prorosals certainly suggest that they wish to improve the objectivity of their progra mes.

　　　　Mr. Keswick said that he would be happy to meet our guests again for further talks, or to meet some of those actually engaged in programe production if this would be halrful.

Our ge eral conclusion was that the talks were of great value to both sides, and that our points were not only well taken, but were probably timely.

c.c. to .H. Homr, Esq.

John Keswick,

Esq., B.I. Barlow, Esq.,

R. Boxall, Esq.

C.M.G.

Yours sincerely,

H.J. Collar Secretary

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Reference...

Mr. Carter

With reference to your minute at (77), the transcript of the B.B.C. programme in question is now at (79).

2. The Governor's letter at E/75 in effect deals with the matter under two heads, namely that of programme content and that of format and presentation. So far as content is concerned, the only specific comments made by the Governor are:

ANZA

(1) that whenever a view expressed by

Mr. Pettifer it was almost invariably

tendetious;

(11) that a question interpolated by Mr. Pettifer and posed to the Governor, without prior agreement, was hypothetical, slanted and called for a comparison that could not cogently be made; whilst Mr. Pettifer's questions to Mr. Davies "virtually invited replies hostile to this Government".

Apart from these comments which were specifically related to this particular programme the Governor expressed general views on this type of programme as put out by the B.B.C.

3. There is no doubt whatever that the general content of the programme is slanted and includes continual sniping at authority, usually by innuendo. This appears to be the popular pastime today of those who themselves carry no responsibility. There is very little that one can pick on of factual inaccuracy; but there is one statement on page 2 of the transcript to the effect that "a few weeks ago, hundreds of bombs were being scattered through the Colony every day". I have been through our records of bomb reports since the beginning of the disturbances on May 11th. From that date until the 7th February, 1968, there was a total of 8,379 reports of bomb incidents; of this total 6959 proved to be either false alarms or hoax bombs leaving a total of 1420 genuine bomb incidents. If the false alarms and hoax bombs are included in the total, then this works out at an average of approximately 32 bomb incidents a day throughout the whole period. If the false alarms and hoax bombs are not included in the total, this works out at an average of about 5 genuine bomb incidents per day throughout the whole period. The maximum number of bomb reports received in any one week throughout the period was 1,044 during the week October 11

18.

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　of this total, 818 proved to be either false alarms or hoax bombs. The next highest total for any one week was 755 during the period 1 8 November: of this total 626 of the reports were false alarms or hoax bombs. But I doubt if it is worth making an issue of all this.

←

4. I am not familiar with the occasion to which Sir Arthur Galsworthy refers in the early part of paragraph 4 of his minue at (75). So far as I know we have no written record of any communication to the B.B.C. of the kind mentioned. Sir Arthur mentions an incident in Kowloon, but the only incident of this kind that I can recall, related to a report in, I think, the Evening Standard, to the effect that "Hong Kong has another night of hell". In fact, I am

/afraid

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afraid that we are not in a position to quote chapter and verse in support of our criticisms of the B.B.C.' attitude towards Hong Kong as suggested by

Sir John Johnstone. The only incident that I can

recall is that referred to at (59) and (61), Flags F and G on File HWB 4/1. But this hardly can be quoted as I an examplí.

It so happens that on the day after your minute at (77) was written, a meeting took place between members of the Committee of the Hong Kong Association and B.B.C. officials. The Hong Kong Association representatives included Mr. John Keswick who is also a member of the B.B.C. General Advisory Council. At this meeting, the representatives of the Hong Kong Association raised the whole question of the B.B.C.'s attitude towards Hong Kong and in particular they referred to the programme which was the subject of the Governor's letter at (E/75). The meeting is mentioned in the letter at (78). I met Mr. Collar, the Secretary of the Association, on the 22nd February, and asked him how the meeting had gone. He sfad that the atmosphere had been very cordial but that the B.B.C. had made no admissions and that was about all he could tell me about the meeting. I gathered however that the B.B.C. suffers from the fact that the heads of its various programmes are all independent in their own right and there seems to be a general lack of direction so far as policy is concerned. Moreover, Mr. Boxall, Information Officer at the Hong Kong Government Office in London, tells me that the usual B.B.C. representative in Hong Kong (Mr. Anthony Lawrence) who is a well respected person in the Colony, and very knowledgeable in the affairs of Hong Kong, was away from the Colony thoughout the period of the disturbances and the people who took his place did not have his experience or his knowledge of Hong Kong affairs.

So much for the programme content. The other head of the Governor's criticism of the transcript at (79) was that of presentation. Her I suggest that the Governor is fully justified in all the criticisms that he makes under this head. He has almost been squeezed off the scene altogether.

7. I have tried my hand at a draft letter to Lord Hil) as a follow up to the Governor's letter. It is a weak draft but I feel that some form of follow up is necessary. Lord Hill knows that the Governor has copied his letter to this office and if nothing happens here it may leave the Governor rather out on a limb.

(A.W. GAMINARA)

February, 1968.

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28/2.

BBC

for

With compliments

of the

Chairman

Rt Hon. Lord Hill of Luton

MR. Carter

Nov v. helpful-rul

Шерния

Malu für d. Trench

even wadder. I still link in

Shed weigh in.

Aug.

碗

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}

26th February 1968

вг

　　Thank you very much for your letter of 8th February. I apologise for the delay in replying, but I have had a very careful investigation made into the circumstances of the item, transmitted on the 9th January in "24 Hours", of which you wrote.

Let me start by thanking you for your assistance to the BBC since you have been Governor. In the last few years, as you know, the BBC has given a great deal of attention to Hong Kong. Indeed I think it can be said to be largely through television that the people of this country understand the problems and achievements of Hong Kong much better than before. We have all been given a vivid idea of your situation and the complexities of life in Hong Kong.

✓

　　I am particularly sorry therefore that you have falt that there has been cause on this occasion to take exception to this item. On the whole it told a positive story about the achievements of Hong Kong in 1967 and its attitude to 1963 was hopeful and optimistic. The itom ended with Davies saying:

"No, I'm very far from gloomy. After all we've come through '67 in which China which dominates us, our economic co-operation with China is absolutely essential to the future of Hong Kong, its whole raison d'etre, and during that year China has been putting politics to the fore, and during that year, she stepped back from the confrontation with Hong Kong, she didn't want to take it over, she didn't want to harm it too much. And so this in my mind constitutes the best guarantee we have for the future. I think the Year of the Monkey - 1963 is the Year of the Monkey for the Chinese - the signs are set fair,"

ALL ALF.

125

(Cont'd.)

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Sir David Tronch, K.C.M.G., M.C.

Pottifor said:

26th February 1968

"But now outwardly at least, Hong Kong is pracoful.

And not only peaceful but prosperous. Business, oxcept in the stores run by the Communists, has set now records. Just to see the way people are drossed and the goods they are buying is to realise that despite its troubles, the Colony's economic miracle has continued almost unchocked."

I'm sorry you feel that your time was wasted.

Your contribution I think I must

to the film, although short, was essential and cogont. point out that thore was no transposition in the extract from your inter- viov. It has been verified that the question is the original recorded on the spot.

　The only critical note in the piece was about the labour conditions in segments of industry, and this is, as you know, an area of social legislation which has been criticized elsewhoro,

　It soems that Pettifer was not at his bost on this occasion. But I hops that on reflection you may think that the BBC does not deserve the full rigour of your criticisms. wrote to no about your misgivings.

In any event I am glad that you We snall bear them in mind.

Hue y Lestan

Sir David Trench, K.0.H.G., M.C.,

Government Houso,

Hong Kong.

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W(B)L SI-7433

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry WB 13/22

No.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.

Secret.

Confidential.

Restricted.

Unclassified,

PRIVACY MARKING

Copy to:

In Confidence

Sir David Trench

DRAFT

LETTER

To:-

The Right Hon.

Lord Hill of Luton,

Chairman,

British Broadcasting

Corporation,

Broadcasting House,

London, W.1.

See vermed

Type 1 +

From

Lord Shepherd

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

My attention has been drawn to a copy of

a letter dated 8 February addressed to you by

the Governor of Hong Kong, Sir David Trench,

concerning a B.B.C. television programme on

9 January about Hong Kong,

Quart

your resul

I have studied the transcript of the

programme in question and have no hesitation

in saying that I agree wholeheartedly with the

strictures contained in the Gove mor's letter

both as regards the content of the programme

and the manner in which it was presented.

The first point I would like to make is

that Sir David Trench is essentially a liberal

man and a liberal Governor and is not one to

resent or be afraid of criticism.

That he

should have written to you in this manner is

an indication of the strength of his feeling

on the subject. I really do not see why busy

people who carry a very heavy burden of

responsibility, and Sir David certainly comes

within this category, should be expected to

give up their valuable time to help in the

compilation of programmes of this kind if

their efforts to co-operate are to be treated

in this cavalier manner. Indeed, although I

did not see the programme myself, reading the

transcript gives one the impression that not

only did the programme give an entirely false

picture of Hong Kong, and put both the

/Hong Kong

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Hong Kong Government and the British

Government in the worst possible light, but

must have given the Chinese Mission in

Portland Place much satisfaction.

This view

is shared by others who did watch the

N.?#

programme in question.

ん

To suggest, as

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

it would be suprama of I were

Darwine, considering

The amount of "hot-

morey Hong Kong attracts,

Mr. Pettifer did in his opening remarks that

"money poured out of the Colony" in those

difficult weeks in the middle of 1967 is

quite false (unsubstantiated reports of this

nature were circulating at the time, fostered

by those in Singapore and Taiwan who hoped to

benefit from any flight of funds from Hong Kong). There

The faste are that no more than £ of all

funds deposited in Hong Kong banks were

out of the Wlony

transferred, in the period May

July 1967

and some of these transfers were in the nature

of ordinary monetary movements in connection

with normal commercial operations.

And to

imply, as he did later, that the support of

the people for the Hong Kong Government was

nor to sentiment and loyalty but

due entirely to material self-interest

imputation

(an assertion supported by the highly conten-

tious statement that they were afraid of losing "the rewards of a decade of struggle") ignores

altogether the fact that more than a million

of the Colony's population are refugees from

communism who "voted with their feet" for the

kind of life they can live in Hong Kong. X

Furthermore the denigratory references in two

places to officials congratulating themselves

imputation on weathering the storm, with the implication

of complacency and a return to inertia, are

/ quite

There was

Undombledly some

movement of funds one-of the Colony But", While Iclod bank

deposits fell by 12% drome, the ferron May-July 1967,

bruch of this was due to the Chimine preference Po hold them money themselves in time of uncertainty

and hithe

of the reduction represented an out-flow of carpent onl from the Colon.

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Dd.033009 Gp.863

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

quite unjustified.

Among officials and the

general public there is understandably considerable relief (and, as Mr. Davies

remarked, some reason for self-satisfaction) that the communist campaign of violence has

been successfully overcome. But there are no

illusions in any quarter as to the nature of

thecontinuing communist threat that lies ahead.

That much remains to be done on the labour

front is indisputable, not only because there is an obvious responsibility to do what we can to improve working conditions in step with

growing economic prosperity but also because

by so doing we give the communists less

opportunity to exploit genuine grievances.

It would be nice to think that the answer is

so simple as Mr. Davies suggests in his final

contribution to the programme, i.e. higher

wages. The superficial treatment of this

issue is illustrated by the apparent

inconsistency of Mr. Davies' views at this

point: he does not feel that legislation

is the answer but at the same time he appears

to deplore the Hong Kong Government's failure

to intervene.

e.]

Some journalists' licence we must allow

to the programme, and I will not therefore

take issue with the statement that

"a few weeks ago hundreds of bombs were being

scattered through the Colony every day"

(though even including false alarms and hoax

bombs it is something of an overstatement for

the worst weeks in October and November).

I would add that I have already aired my

views on the s tandard of B.B.C. reporting a

Hong Kong to members of the staff of the

/Corporation

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Corporation. I did this at a press

conference I gave after my return from Hong

Kong in October when I had fresh in my mind

the inaccuracy and exaggeration of B.B.G.

(malucing B.B. C.xpotos

news reports, particularly on incidents in

the border area.

It is difficult for me

now to quote chapter and verse in support of

this criticism but I know that my views

were shared by others both in this country

and in Hong Kong. I do appreciate that if

reports are to remain newsworthy they must be

issued quickly, often before their accuracy

can be verified or corroborated or their

significance appraised, and that, because of

this need for speed, inaccurate reports are

an occasional and inevitable hazard. My

concern is more with the lack of balance,

the writing up and exaggeration of spectacular

but often quite insignificant events,

particularly in the news headlines.

I am

not, however, charging the B.B.C. with any

lapse quite so blatant as one headline in a

midday edition of the Evening Standard

("Another night of terror in Hong Kong")

which bore no relation whatsoever to the

contents of the report that followed or to

the official reports received in telegrams

that morning in London covering the night

in question.

I must stress the point the Governor

makes in the penultimate paragraph of his

letter about how much there is at stake in

Hong Kong at the present time. Situated as

the Colony is on the borders of China, a

/powerful

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

powerful and unfriendly neighbour, public

confidence there in its continuing existence

is vital; but that confidence is inevitably

a somewhat delicate plant. It depends

substantially on the knowledge that we in this

country will support and sustain the Colony.

I and my ministerial colleagues have been at

pains in recent months to stress that we do

stand behind it. It does not help that from

this country there has issued from the press

has

and other communication media a steady volume

of ill-informed critical comment and mis-

representation of events and conditions in the

Colony which is interpretedlocally as evidence,

not merely of a lack of sympathy or under-

standing here, but of a lack of support. I

have heard it said in Hong Kong that they wonder

sometimes who and where their enemies are!

I have mentioned that others share my

views. Indeed, I understand that certain of

your officials have recently had a meeting with

members of the Committee of the Hong Kong

Association at which the latter made representa-

tions on this same subject.

I trust that the combined effect of the

Governor's letter, the representations referred

to above and this letter, will serve to convince

you that the B.B.C's. reporting on events in

Hong Kong over the past few months has been

considerably less than fair and objective and

leaves plenty of room for improvement.

I am sending a copy of this letter to

Sir David Trench, and I shall be grateful if I

may be sent a copy of your reply to his letter,

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HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICE

$ 4

PALL

MALL

LONDON S. W. I

Our Ref: 3/42/220CD.

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Bunny,

7th March, 1968.

No. Gamykania

R.38

میں نا

8/3

Rak. ANG

11.3.6P.

Hong Kong's Overseas Public Relations.

　　　　　　I enclose for your information and retention two copies of a revised paper on "Overseas Confidence in Hong Kong" which has been produced by the Overseas Public Relations Co-Ordination Committee in Hong Kong together with a note containing comments on Hong Kong's image in Britain by a group of visiting British travel agents.

Copies of both documents have been sent to Carrocher as a member of the Hong Kong Public Relations Coordination Committee here which will discuss them at its next meeting on 25th March, 1968.

Yours sincerely,

tut (P.C.M.Sedgwick).

W.S.Carter, Esq., C.V.0., Commonwealth Office,

H.K. & West Indian Department, Curtis Green Building, Victoria Embankment, LONDON, S.W.1.

RECEIVED IN

1.53

11 MARTOO

HWB13/22

013/22

Endi (2) PCMS/VMH.

TELEPHONE WHITEHALL 01-930-7951

CABLES HONGAID LONDON S.W.I

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HONG KONG GOVERNMENT

INFORMATION

SERVICES

PALL MALL

LONDON

S.W.1

Phone: 01-930-7951 ·

Increasing Overseas Confidence

CONFIDENTIAL

Hong Kong

INTRODUCTION

83/E

(6/50)

1. This is the second paper on "Overseas Confidence in

Hong Kong" produced by the Overseas Public Relations Co-ordination Committee in Hong Kong. The membership of this committee is given at the end of this paper.

2. This up-dates and supercedes the paper produced in

October 1967. Comments on the first paper were received from all overseas agencies participating in the effort to improve Hong Kong's inage, and these comments have been incorporated in the revised paper. intended as general guidance for all those involved in Hong Kong's public relations work.

This is

3. The paper does not attempt to record in detail the

activities of all agencies; information is given on any one agencies' function, where it is considered that such information night assist other agencies in an overall co-ordination of effort.

CILATGES SINCE OCTOBER 1967

4. It is no longer appropriate to explain so fully the

security situation in the Colony. This is best left to inference from the many other facts about Hong Kong which can be described. The predominant theme should now be Hong Kong's increasing attractiveness for buyers, tourists, investors and sellers.

5. An important omission from the October 1967 paper was

the existence of the Overseas Chinese as a public relations target. The Chinese from Hong Kong who live abroad and who still have connections with the Colony continue to be a potential influchce on not only the people of the country in which they live but also on their relatives or associates in the Colony. It is improtant that the Overseas Chinese retain a balanced view of Hong Kong affairs and do not become jaundiced by any other Chinese language information which might be detrimental to Hong Kong's interests. There is always the potential dangor that an incident could occur abroad which might provoke an unfavourable reaction either for or in Hong Kong. A section has been included in this paper on the Overseas Chinose.

/-2-

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

A N

PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE

PUBLIC RELATIONS EFFORT

There is much that can be said in Hong Kong's favour when promoting confidence overseas, so much so that it is both unnecessary and counter-productive to attempt to gloss over any of the difficulties facing the Colony. As a busic principle, especially when the P.R. effort Can be made verbally, franl. truthfulness imparted with the vigour, colour and self-confidence so typical of the Colony is the best way of foscoring an increased awareness of, and confidence in, Hong Kong. It is the colour which evokes the interest, the frankness which inspires the confidence, the performance record which generates the faith and the opportunities thus exposed lead on to the business.

The Overseas Public Relations Co-ordination Committee has considered the question of how far the effort should extend towards influencing public opinion in the target countries. It is considered uneconomic to make over- seas public opinion a target in itself except in the very important field of tourist promotion. There is little evidence that public opinion affects the retail purchase of Hong Kong's goods, nor is there evidence. that it has much of an effect on those who engage or might engage in business with Hong Kong: such business- men are more influenced by other businessmen or direct contact with the leaders of Hong Kong's commerce. Thus, although it might seen desirable to create a favourable image among the public at large in each country, it is better to apply such efforts to the more specialised field of tourist promotion. The efforts made at reach- ing the more carefully selected targets is of greater importance and is likely to have some impact on the general public: taking everything into account this is about all that can usefully be achieved. Put another way, the precision rifle technique is better than using a shotgun.

Public Relations work is not only best done through individual, personalized contacts ("eyeball to eyeball") but is most effective when Hong Kong is "sold" by someone who knows the Colony well. Such people are those who are engaged full-time on promoting Hong Kong's interests, who have lived in the Colony and who make frequent visits to see for themselves.

A second group

is those who are interested in the Colony's affairs who can be persuaded to make the trip to liong Kong and . then be prepared to speak with all the assurance of having seen for themselves: much of the Public Relations effort should be devoted to increasing the number of people in this group. In a third group is the Hong Kong businessman who, when abroad, speaks confidently and knowledgeably about the Colony. The encouragement and briefing of such a person and the core of him when he is abroad is a vital field of operations. A fourth group consists of those who are well-briefed on Hong Kong affairs by the other groups and able to devote time to talking to others about them.

9. The distribution of literature of a promotional nature is

an important if subsidiary public relations function which can cover a larger number of people but with less impact. The direct mailing of information about Hong Kong is a way of sustaining the interest and confidence attained by personal contact or visits to the Colony.

CONFIDENTIAL

1-3-

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11.

CONFIDENTIAL

THEMES TO ENHANCE HONG KONG'S

OVERSEAS IMAGE

"The fast rate of expansion of Hong Kong's Economy" A wealth of evidence of this comes to hand frequently. Examples are:-

Export figures

Gross increase in the number of factories Overall increase in the number of

indusurial workers The opening-up of new industrial ventures (e.g. the manufacture of watch parts) ·

"Continued growth of the Colony's industrial infra-structure'

Examples are

The expansion of the Electricity Power

Plover Cove reservoir

12.

"Hong Kong looks ahead"

Companies

New roads: the Lion Rock Tunnel

Resettlement housing, low-cost housing,

private housing estates.

Some examples are :-

Reclamation at Hung lion and Wanchai

Opening up of new towns at Kwai Chung,

Castle Feak and Shatin

The airport extensions

New reservoirs being planned

Hass Transport Survey: the resiting of

the railway yards.

13.

"Steady inprovement in labour conditions"

are;

Some examples

Larger factories already very modern and efficient

1+.

Works Committees mooted

Apprenticeship schemes started

Hore legislation in interests of

workers' employment and safety.

"More Tourists praise Hong Kong" Some examples are:

Overseas tourist agencies visit Hong Kong to see for themselves

Well-knom personalities stay in Hong Kong and lavish praise

Hotels earn high praise.

CONFIDENTIAL

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COFIDENTIAL

15. Government helps people.

16.

For example:

Legal Aid Scheme

Youth Employment Advisory Service

City District Office Administration

Rapid provision of recreational

UNDERLYING POLITICAL SECURITY

facilities.

It is recognised that during personal contacts with persons likely to visit or do business with Hong Kong there is certain to be some curiosity about Hong Kong's political situation. It is not intended that a description of security matters should be initiated by

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　if the those helping to improve Hong Kong's image: inference from other information is enough so much the better. Lowever questions may be asked. In thesc circumstances the following themes should be stressed:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(a)

The Hong Kong population continues firm in its wish to be able to progress under the existing administration.

The efficient Police Force is even better prepared to deal with any occurrence and maintain good law and order.

Britain will be retaining her garrison at full strength.

The tiny Communist minority is now pursuing peaceful and lawful means of extending its influence mainly by propaganda but having little effect on people who are more interested in

improving their living conditions.

There are signs that the Comunists too. wish to resume business in the most profitable way.

TARGETS

Brief notes are given below to illustrate (A) those facets of Hong Kong thich are most conducive to improved business and (B) the factors which underlie those facets.

17. Target : BUYERS

(A) Image

Good profits.

2. Goods casy to sell.

3. Value for money.

Quick delivery.

5. Business conducted

in Euglish.

(B) Factors supporting the image

(a)

Feople work hard, quickly and efficiently with work conditions improving con- stantly and steadily.

(b) Lively, intelligent, enter- prising and dynamic manage- monts

high degree of manual skills and dexterity; and ingenious processes used.

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1-5-

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18.

19.

Target: BUYERS

CONFIDENTIAL

(d) Production highly flex- ible both in volume and product design.

(e) Sophisticated and experi-

enced commercial infra- structure.

(f) Sound banking facilities.

(g) Minimum and easy document-

ation procedures.

(h) Ufficient cargo handling

both by air and by sea.

(i) Frequent air servicus in

and out of liong Kong which is centrally located for other East Asian destinat- ions.

Target : TOURISTS

(A) Inage

1. Good shopping.

2. Western comforts,

Eastern mystery.

3. Luxurious yet

inexpensive.

4. Visitors well cared for.

5. English widely used.

(B) Factors supporting image

(a) Hotels rated among the best

in the world.

(b) Bright lights.

Oriental sights.

(d) Charming Oriental

customs and manners.

(e) Friendly people give gracious service.

(f) Villages and temples

ruminiscent of old China.

(g) Frequent services by air

and soa.

(h) Centrally located among

other East Asian destin- ations.

Target INVESTORS

(A) Image

1. Rapid returns.

2. High growth rate from

high base.

3. Stabic Government.

4. Stable economy.

5. Dedierted to frec

enterprise.

6. Low taxation,

(B) Factors supporting inago

(a) Free port stakes.

(b) Sophisticated and expuri-

unced comcrcial infra- structure.

ications.

(a) Convenient and efficient

cargo-handling and godown facilities.

COFIDENTIAL

1-6-

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CONFIDENTIAL

Target INVESTORS

7. Loading world trading unit.

supplies.

(f) Well established trade

links throughout E. and S.E. Asia.

(g) Reasonable conditions of

work constantly and steadily improving.

20.

Target : SELLERS

(A)

Image

Largo and rapidly expanding import market.

Strategically well placed and well- equipped distribution centre for E. and S.E. Asia.

Resourceless economy terms of materials.

(B)

Factors supporting the image

(a) Free port status.

(b) Sophisticated commercial

infra-structure.

ations.

(d) Convenient and efficient

cargo-handling facilities.

(e) Consumer preference for

imported goods.

(f) Business conducted in

English.

(g) No discrimination between domestic and overseas supplies.

(h) Well established trade

links throughout E. and 3.E. Asia.

21.

Target: OVERSEAS CHINESE

(A) Imoge

Continuing community harmony and progress.

Hodern developments with rising standards.

3. Steadily improving

amenities.

Opportunities for

investment.

(B)

Factors supporting the image

(a) School building programme. (b) Development of Chinese

University.

Public Service.

(d) Resettlement and low-cost

housing programmes.

(e) Building of parks and

playgrounds.

CONFIDENTIAL

1-7-

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CONFIDENTIAL

AGENCIES PROMOTING HONG KONG'S

PUBLIC RELATIONS OVERSEAS

Each of the agencies listed plays a greater or lesser Part according to its facilities and appropriateness for the task.

22. In Hong Kong :

(a)

(b)

Government Information Services.

Department of Commerce and Industry.

(a)

Foderation of ilong Kong Industries.

(e) Tourist Association.

(f) Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce.

23.

In the U.S.1. :

(a) Washington D.C.

24.

(b) New York

(d)

(0)

British Embassy

Counsellor for Hong Kong

Commercial Affairs at the British Embassy

Tourist Association's represent-

ative..

British Information Services

T.D.C.'s representative

Tourist Association's

representative

British Consulates-General

Tourist Association's representative in San Francisco, and consultants in Los Angeles, Chicago, Boston and Dallas.

Chambers of Commerce

In Canada

British High Commission, Ottawa and Trade Commissioners in provincial capitals.

(a)

(b)

Tourist Association Consultants in Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver.

25.

In Britain :

(a) Hong Kong Covernment's London Office incorporating

the Department of Commerce and Industry and the Government Information Services.

(b)

Fublic Relations Liaison Committee.

(d) Trade Development Council's representative and F.R.

consultants.

CONFIDLTIAL

1-8-

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CONFIDENTIAL

(e) Tourist Association representative.

(f) Hong Kong Association.

(6)

A Ship Guners sub-committee dealing especially with scemon.

(h) Chambers of Commerce.

26.

In Europe:

―

27.

(a)

(b)

(c)

British Missions in all capitals and consular posts in many cities.

Counsellors for Hong Kong Commercial Affairs, British Enbassy, Brussels und British Mission, Geneva.

7.D.C. representatives in Europe (operating from Brussels) with the services of Public Relations consultants in Paris, Bonn, Oslo, Copenhagon, Helsinki, Geneva, Milan, Hamburg, Stockholm and Barcelona.

(a) H.R.0.A. through T.M.C.

(e)

Chambers of Commerce.

In Japan:

(a)

British Embassy in Tokyo and consular posts in certain major cities.

(b) Tourist Association's representative.

28. In Australia: -

(a)

Britich High Comissioner's Office and Deputy High Comissioner's Office in state capitals.

(b) Sydney .D.C.'s representative.

(a) Chambers of Commerce.

Other Countries:

29.

(a)

(b)

British Missions in all capitals, and consulates in many major cities.

Charbers of Commerce.

(a) Tourist Association's represent, tive in Beirut.

CONFIDENTIAL

/-9-

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30.

31.

32.

CONFIDENTIAL

CO-ORDINATION

The various agencies overseas are in frequent and constant touch with their offices in Hong Kong. Those listed in paragraph 22 meet together in Hong Kong at approximately fortnightly intervals to discuss matters of common interest. One such matter is the question of the distri- bution of literature about Hong Kong : it is hoped that when one agency produces a feature, maximum and the most officient and appropriate form of distribution can be arranged through each of the agencies.

It is hoped that there is good liaison between agencies which have offices in the same countries. In Britain there is the London Public Relations Liaison Committee which meets regularly to discuss activities in Britain.

One of the most effective media for putting across long Kong's message is the use of films. The Government Information Services is constantly producing both short newsreel filas as well as the occasional longer feature. It is hoped that agencies will make the fullest possible use of these films.

E N D

CONFIDENTIAL

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COMMENTS BY VISITING U.K. CONVENTION

ORGANISERS GROUP

This group commented on the prevalence of

conversion tables for US dollars in tourist literature and

the appearance of goods marked in US dollars in Hong Kong's

shops whereas there was no mention of the Pound Sterling.

The criticism was quite valid although the relat-

ive importance of the number of U.K. tourists compared with

U.S. visitors and the common usage of US dollar travellers

cheques was pointed out. This started a general discussion

on Hong Kong's development and the massive local investments

by Overseas Chinese, American and Japanese concerns as

compared with their British counterparts.

At this point a number of comments were made by

the visiting delegates which can be summerized as follows:

A. They were not aware of any significant favourable

publicity for Hong Kong in the U.K.

Hong Kong still has a third rate image there.

In particular it is still considered to be a 'Colonial'

Territory with the associated ideas of remoteness,

backwardness and instability duc to unwarrented British

control.

It is still a place producing shoddy goods for the

lowest prices; textile goods that are not expected to

survive more than one or two washes and tin toys of a

chcap and nasty type.

There is no knowledge of investment possibilitics.

There is no knowledge of the activities of other

nationalities in the investment field. Delegates were

genuinely astonished to find massive industries, а

modern sky scraper city and all the latest commercial

developments comparable with any Western Nation.

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It was generally believed that the Colony was quite unstable politically and socially in a manner similar to Vietnam or iden. The press, radio and television

reporting in U.K. of the events last May/June and sub

sequently was, in their opinion, sensational and highly

misloading. They had the impression that the majority

of the population were involved in anti-British political

agitation and the reports had served to confirm vague

ideas already hold. They were not aware of any signi-

ficant or offcctive counter-campaign on Hong Kong's

behalf.

The recent article in the Daily Mirror was sighted and

lead them to believe the stories of 'sweated labour' and

general poverty. Also they believed that no kind of

health organization existed, let alone a properly

controlled Public Health Authority. One experienced

member of the group said that, if he had not visited

Hong Kong, he would not have believed a report that, a

Cholera epidemic resulted in only 120 odd cases and

14 deaths.

They were sure Hong Kong had a great interest for con-

ventioneers and an excellent potential for convention

and similar business. It was significant that they

already considered Japan to be one of the most important

centres for International moetings. In this connection

they particularly stressed Japan's success in changing

her image in Europe by a concorted PR and publicity

campaign. She was now recognised as a producer of

quality goods and an innovatcr in design and miniatur-

isation. They could not understand why Hong Kong had

not waged a similar PR and publicity campaign at least

in U.K., if not in the rest of Europe.

/-3-

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- 3-

The seven agents concerned are experienced

travel industry leaders. Last year between them they

produced £8,000,000 of business for one airline alone

(EOAC): With their fundamental interest in overseas areas,

their opinion of Hong Kong's image in U.K. is significant.

EN D

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LAST

Mr. Hax

You will

Reference.

打

(2)

Lord Hill at

on Tong Tong.

recall ir vid Trench's letter to

75 about a B.3.3. television programme

It was agreed between Sir Arthur Gulsworthy and Sir John Johnston at (75) and (76) that a follow-up letter should be prepared for signature of Lord Chepherd or the Secretary of State.

We have found this by no means an easy task. Cur first draft was about to be sibmitted, when Lord Hill's reply to the Governor (flugge was received; our further draft below tukes account

of this.

3. It is the slant and balance rather than the Factual accuracy of the pro ramme in question that the Governor criticises. The same has to a considerable extent been the fault in B.B.C. radio reporting. I cannot now give chapter nd verse for any past excesses. Nor can we identify the "notable occasion" to which Sir A. Galsworthy refers in paragraph 4 of his minute (although I recall an occasion "hen the midday edition of the Evening Standard bore a headline "ight of terror in Hong Kong" which bore no relation whatsoever to the contents of the report tit follored or to the official reports in telegrams received that morning in London covering the events of the night in question). The failing of the B.B.C's. radio broadcasts has been the inclusion of reports hot from Hong Kong sometimes inaccurate or exaggerated and

more often given a significance which they did not possess. On this aspect I think the Hong Kong Associ tion struck the ri ht note in the

represent: tions they have made to the B.3.0, as reported at X of 'r. Collar's letter flagged K.

4. As mentioned above, the Ton Tong Association has entered the lists in support of the Gov nor (they have a copy of his lette, although their initiative was independently insired), led by Mr. Keswick who until recently was a member of the B.B.C. General Advisory Council. I feel that a Minister must also lend the Governor support, particularly since Lord Hill's reply is so unhelpful. I have drafted for the signature of Lord Chepherd

who has already crossed swords with officials of

the B.B.).

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the B.B.C. But it seems to me advisable that our intervention should now be as speedy as possible and that if Lord Shepherd's return is unduly delayed, we should consider whether the letter should issue from

the Secretary of State.

8 March, 1968

Sir Anthon foleanthy.

4.5 Carter

(W.S. Carter)

LAUGH

11/3

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Registry No.

DRAFT LETTER

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

To:-

Top Secret.

Secret.

Confidential.

Restricted.

Unclassified.

PRIVACY MARKING

Copy to:

---In Confidence

Sir David Trench

The Right Hon.

Lord Hill of Luton, Chairman,

British Broadcasting Corporation, Broadcasting House, London, W. 1.

Type 1+ 3

From

Lord Shepherd

Telephone No. & Brt.

Department

May I invite your attention to the

exchange of letters between the Governor of Hong Kong (Sir David Trench) and yourself,

concerning the B.B.C's. television programme

on 9 January about Hong Kong.

On receipt of my copy of the Governor's

letter to you of 8 February, I studied the

transcript of the programme in question and

found myself in wholehearted agreement with the

comments contained in that letter, both as

regards the content of the programme and the

manner in which it was presented. I have

since received a copy of your reply to the

Governor which, in my view, makes very little

attempt to answer his strictures.

That he

The first point I would like to make is

that Sir David Trench is essentially a liberal

man and a liberal Governor and is not one to

resent or to be afraid of criticism.

should have written to you in this manner is

an indication of the strength of his feeling on

the subject. I really do not see why busy

people who carry a very heavy burden of

responsibility, and Sir David certainly comes within this category, should be expected to

give up their valuable time to help in the

compilation of programmes of this kind if their

efforts to co-operate are to be treated in

this cavalier manner.

Although I did not see

14.

W(B)L 51-7433

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

/ the

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the programme myself, reading the transcript

gives one the impression that not only did the

programme give an entirely false picture of

Hong Kong and put both the Hong Kong Government

and the British Government in the worst possible

light, but must also have given the Chinese

ission in Fortland Place and their sympathiser

This view is shared by

much satisfaction.

others who did watch the programme in question.

To suggest, as Ir. Pettifer did in his

opening remarks that "money poured out of the

Colony" in those difficult weeks in the middle of 1967 is quite false (unsubstantiated reports

of this mature were circulating at the time,

　fostered by those in Singapore and Taiwan who hoped to benefit from any flight of funds from

!ong Kong).

There was undoubtedly some move-

ment of funds out of the Colony;

it would be

　surprising if it were otherwise, considering the amount of "hot" money Hong Kong attracts.

But

while total bank deposits fell by 12% during the

period May - July 1967, much of this was due to

the Chinese preference to hold their money

themselves in time of uncertainty and little

of the reduction represented an outflow of

And to imply, as he capital from the Colony. did later, that the support of the people for the Hong Kong Government was due not to sentiment and loyalty but entirely to material self-interest (an imputation supported by the

highly contentious statement that they were afraid of losing "the rewards of a decade of struggle") ignores altogether the fact that more than a million of the Colony's population

/ are

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

( The underlining mine).

are refugees from communism who "voted with their feet" for the kind of life they can live

in Hong Kong.

Mr. Pettifer seems incapable of paying any tribute to those in authority without turning

it into a backhander by the inclusion of some

sour qualification, Take his statement: "almost everyone for a change had a good word to say for the police, and British officials congratulated themselves on weathering the

storm." There is another and later reference by Mr. Pettifer to "self-congratulation in

official circles" which he describes as

'euphoria". It is a pity that he should

sly denigration"

indulge in this sort of serversion.

Among

officials and the general public in Hong Kong

there is understandably considerable relief

(and as Mr. Davies remarked, some reason for self-satisfaction) that the communist campaign

of violence has been successfully overcome.

But there are no illusions in any quarter as

to the nature of the continuing communist

threat that lies ahead.

I have already aired my views on the

standard of B.B.C. reporting on Hong Kong to

members of the staff of the Corporation.

did this at a press conference I gave after my

return from Hong Kong in October when I had

fresh in my mind the inaccuracy and exaggera-

tion of reports (including B.B.C. reports),

particularly on incidents in the border area.

It is difficult for me now to quote chapter

and verse in support of this criticism but I

know that my views were shared by others, both

I do in this country and in Hong Kong.

/appreciate..

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[

appreciate that if reports are to remain

newsworthy they must be issued quickly, often

before their accuracy can be verified or

corroborated or their significance appraised,

and that because of this need for speed,

inaccuratic

Some

uice-reberated reports are an occasional and

inevitable hazard. These considerations do

not, however, apply in the case of a programme

such as the one now under consideration.

journalistic licence we must allow, but I do

not consider that this licence should be

carried to the point of giving a totally

misleading impression of a situation to those

who are not in a position to question what they

are told. For example, Mr. Pettifer said

that "a few weeks ago, hundreds of bombs were

being scattered throughout the Colony every

day". The maximum number of bomb incidents

in any one week throughout the period

11 May, 1967 to the end of February, 1968, was

1,044.

This would give a daily average of

149 incidents during the week in question,

were it not for the fact that, out of the total

of 1,044 incidents, 818 were due either to

false alarms or to hoax bombs. This reduces

the daily tally to 32 genuine bomb incidents

: during the week in question:

and throughout

the whole period of the disturbances, the

daily average of genuine bomb incidents was

five or six. Faphene this remark of

r. Pettifer's is what you had in mind when you

said in your reply the Gov nor that

"we have all been given a vivid idea of your

situation and the complications of life in Long Trong "

/ I

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

I must stress the point that the Governor

made in the penultimate paragraph of his letter

about how much there is at stake in Hong Kong

at the present time.

Situated as the Colony

is on the borders of China, a powerful and

unfriendly neighbour, the Colony's confidence

in its own continuing existence is vital, but

because of the Colony's exposed position that

confidence is inevitably a somewhat delicate

plant. It depends substantially on the

knowledge that we in this country will support

and sustain the Colony. I and my Ministerial

colleagues have been at pains in recent months

to stress that .. Government will do just this.

It does not help that from this country there

has issued from the press and other mass

communication media, a steady volume of ill-

informed critical comment and misrepresentation

of events and conditions in the Colony which

is interpreted locally as evidence, not merely

of a lack of sympathy or understanding here,

but of a lack of support.

I have heard it said

in Hong Kong that they sometimes wonder who and

where their enemies are!

views.

I have mentioned that others share my

Indeed, I understand that certain of

your officials have recently had a meeting with

members of the Committee of the Hong Kong Association at which the latter made represen-

tations on this very subject.

I trust that

the combined effect of the Governor's letter,

the representations referred to above and

/this

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this letter will serve to convince you that the

B.B.C's. reporting on events in Hong Kong over

the past few months has been considerably less

than fair and objective and leaves plenty of

room for improvement.

I am sending a copy of this letter to

Sir David Trench.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

(002+) PA 558ZE "PO

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W(B)L 51-7433

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry No.

DRAFT LETTER

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

To:-

Top Secret,

Secret.

Confidential,

Restricted.

Unclassified.

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

oopy to:

Sir David Trench,

H.M. Governor, Hong Kong.

The Rt. Hon. Lord Hill of Luton Chairman,

British Broadcasting Corpn., Broadcasting House,

London, W.1.

revved draft-

FOR SIGNATURK BY LORD SHEPHERD

See

Type 1+3

From

Mr. Gaminara 5/3

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

May I invite your attention to the exchange of

letters between the Governor of Hong Kong

Sir David Trench) and yourself, concerning the B.B.C.'S

television programme on 9th January about Hong Kong.

On receipt of my copy of the Governor's letter

to you of 8th February, I studied the transcript of the programme in question and found myself in wholehearted

Comments agreement with the staletur contained in the that

Governante letter, both as regards the content of the

programme and the manner in which it was presented.

I have since received a copy of your reply to the

Governor which, in my view, makes very little attempt

Strictures

to answer his or

I am afraid that I cannot

stand by and see the very cogent

brushed acide

cortices of the

Governor treated in what appears to me to be an

extremely offhand manner.

The first point I would like to make is that

Sir David Trench is essentially a liberal man and a

liberal Governor and is not one to resent or to be

afraid of criticism.

That he should have written

to you in this manner is an indication of the strength

of his feeling on the subject. I really do not see

why busy people who carry a very heavy burden of

responsibility, and Sir David certainly comes within

this category, should be expected to give up their

valuable time to help in the compilation of programmes

of this kind if their efforts to co-operate are to be

/treated

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៥

ון

treated in this cavalier manner.

Although I did not see

the programme myself, reading the transcript gives one

the impression that not only did the programme give an

entirely false picture of Hong Kong and put both the

Hong Kong Government and the British Government in the

worst possible light, but must also have given the

cind theri Sympathvars Chinese Mission in Portland Place/mu

much satisfaction.

Indeed, one might be forgiven for having the impression

that the programme was designed to this end This view

is shared by others who did watch the programme in

question.

Taken mix-x

be one who likes

On p. 2 of frerions

'draft.

indulge in the practice of continual sniping at those

in authority (currently a very popular pastime,

them solvi

particularly amongst those who carry little or no

responsibility).

For example, he stated quite cate-

Exponent but

gorically that the support of the people for the Hong

not to any since of Leyalty, to the Crowne

Quee

Kong Government was due entirely to material self-

interest (an assertion supported by the highly contentious

statement that the people were afraid of losing "the

rewards of a decade of struggle"). This allegation

ignores altogether the fact that more than a million of

the Colony's population are refugees from communism who

"voted with their feet" for the kind of life they can

take his Live in Hong Kong.Again, Mr, Pettiferie statement:

"almost everyone for a change had a good word to say

for the police, and British officials congratulated

M.PH Mr. Pellyfer seama inicanable themselves on weathering the storm The wards under-

paying any Fribirte to those in authority lined indicate his apparent inability to pay any sort

of compliment te officialdom without turning it into a

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Sour backhander by the inclusion of some see of qualification

There is another and later reference by Mr. Pettifer

to "self-congratulation in official circles" which he

describes as "euphoria".

It is a pity that the chip City

en Mr. Pettifer*s/should is his to indulge in this

/sort

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

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Dd. 32855 Ed (4200)

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

perversion

of Benark. Among officials and the general public in Hong Kong there is understandably considerable

relief (and as Mr. Davies remarked, some reason for

self-satisfaction) that the communist campaign of

has

violence have been successfully overcome.

are no állusions in

any quarter

aturt

But there

as to the nature of the

continuing communist threat that lies ahead.

I have already aired my views on the standard of B.B.C. reporting... on Hong Kong to members of the staff

of the Corporation. I did this at a press conference

It is

I gave after my return from Hong Kong in October

when I had fresh in my mind the inaccuracy and

exaggeration of reports (including B.B.C. reports)

particularly on incidents in the border area.

difficult for me now to quote chapter and verse in

support of this criticism but I know that my views

were shared by others, both in this country and in

Hong Kong. I do appreciate that if reports are to

remain newsworthy they must be issued quickly, often

before their accuracy can be verified or corroborated

their Semetreener

or very significantly appraised, and that because of

this need for speed uncorroborated reports are an

occasional and inevitably hazard. These considera-

tions do not, however, apply in the case of a programme

such as the one now under consideration.

Some

journalistic licente we must allow, but I do not

consider that this license should be carried to the point

of giving a totally misleading impression of a situation

to those who are not in a position to question what they Live tok

hazr. For example, Mr. Pettifer said that "a few

weeks ago, hundreds of bombs were being scattered

throughout the Colony every day". The maximum

number of bomb incidents in any one week throughout

/the

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the period 11th May 1967 to the end of February, 1968,

was 1,044. This would give a daily average of 149

incidents during the week in question Here it not for

1044

the fact that out of the total of incidents, 818 were

due either to false alarus or to hoax bombs. This

reduces the daily tally to 32 genuine bomb incidents

during the week in question: and throughout the whole

period of the disturbances, the daily average of genuine bomb incidents was five or six. Perhaps this remark

of Mr. Pettifers is what you had in mind when you said

in your reply to the Governor that "we have all been

given a vivid idea of your situation and the complications

of life in Hong Kong"?

I must stress the point that the Governor made in

the penultimate paragraph of his letter about how much

there is at stake in Hong Kong at the present time.

Situated as the Colony is on the borders of China, a

powerful and unfriendly neighbour, the Colony's

ing

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

confidence in its own continue existence is vital, but because of the Colony's

that confidence is inevitably a somewhat delicate plant.

It depends substantially on the knowledge that we in

this country will support and sustain the Colony. I

and my Ministerial colleagues have been at pains in

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　will recent months to stress that H.M. Government do just

this. It does not help that from this country there

has issued from the press and other mass communication

media, a steady volume of ill-informed critical comment

and misrepresentation of events and conditions in the

Colony which is interpreted locally as evidence, not

merely of a lack of sympathy or understanding here,

but of a lack of support, I have heard it said in

Hong Kong that they sometimes wonder who and where

their enemies are!

of the Colony's exposed

position

/I have

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Dd. 32855 Ed (4200)

I have mentioned that others share my views.

Indeed, I understand that certain of your officials

have recently had a meeting with members of the Committee of the Hong Kong Association at which the latter

made representations of this very subject. I trust that

the combined effect of the Governor's letter, the

representations referred to above and this letter will

serve to convince you that the B.B.C's. reporting on

events in Hong Kong over the past few months has been

considerably less than fair and objective and leaves

plenty of room for improvement.

I am sending a copy of this letter to

Sir David Trench.

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EJ (1626)

LAST

REF

Reference.....

Mr. Carter

Sir Arthur Galsworthy discussed this with the Minister of State this morning. It was agreed that the proposed letter should not issue, on the grounds that it might be counter productive at this stage, but that Lord Shepherd should (if the opportunity should arise) try and raise this matter with Lord Hill next time they meet in the Lords.

2. In the circumstances I think these papers can be put by.

вони

(C. H. Godden) 15 March, 1968

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HWB 13/22

19 March, 1968.

We have followed with sympathy the exchange of letters between yourself and Lord Hill concerning the B.B.C's television programme on 9 January about Hong Kong.

We fully share your views about the programme and were about to put up to Lord Shepherd, for his signature, a letter to Lord Hill in support of your views when a copy of the latter's reply to you was received. This we regard as a quite unhelpful and inadequate effort to answer your points; to our mind it was obviously the work of the B.B.C. officials. After discussion between the Minister and Arthur Galsworthy it was decided that since a letter from the Minister might meet the same fate it would be better for him not to write to Lord Hill but to put his views over in person at an early opportunity. Accordingly it has been decided that Lord Shepherd should try and raise this matter directly with Lord Hill next time they meet in the House of Lords,

I thought you would like to know this in case you had any doubts that, because of our silence, Ministers were not prepared to back you in your criticisms of the B.B.C's handling of Hong Kong.

да

ہو

25, 3,68.

SIR DAVID TRENCH, K.C.M.G., M.C.

(H.P. Hall)

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W(B)L, 51-74 33

Registry No.

DRAFT

LETTER

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

To:-

Top Secret, Secret.

Confidential.

Restricted. Unclassified.

PRIVACY MARKING

..In Confidence

H.E. Sir David Trench,

KCMG., MC.,

Government House,

Victoria.

Type 1 +

From

Mr. H. Hall

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

86.

NOTHING TO BE Written in THIS MARGIN

19/3

Mr. Hara

f/s

In deianssiasi of The demon recorded in No. Godden's minute of 15th March, We agreed that it hd. be deniable to write to the Caernar Draft submitted

b.s. Carte

18/3/65

Views

N.?. #

M.2

We have followed with sympathy the exchange of letters between yourself and Lord Hill concerning the B.B.C's. television programme on 9 January about Hong Kong fully share your strictures about the programne and were about to put up to Lord Shepherd, for his signature, a letter to Lord Hill in support of your views when a copy of the latter's

to you

This we

Lord Hill's reply, was received.

regard as a quite unhelpful and inadequate effort to answer your points; to our mind it was obviously the work of the B.B.C. officials. After discussion between the Minister and Arthur Galsworthy it was decided

Since a letter fromm that in case, the Minister letter might meet the same fate it might be better for him not to write to Lord Hill but to put his views over in person at an early opportunity. Accordingly it has been decided that Lord Shepherd should try and raise this matter directly with Lord Hill next time they meet in

the House of Lords.

I thought you would like to know this in case you had any doubts that, because of their silence, Ministers were not prepared to back you in your criticisms of the B.B.C's. handling of Hong Kong. affairs.

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K2.318

My Carter

The was addund "Personal" to Su A folumit

of I have operant

it in his strecen.

With the Compliment 507 the file

His Excellency the Governor

Has the returned

reture's yet? 14615.3.63

upy

22/3

A.. Gampaic

This has crossed Monstall's

letter for

2571/

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87/2/

J/०

8th March 1968.

$75

Thank you for the courtesy of your

letter of 26th February in reply to my letter of 8th February. I am grateful to you for your response, I although I would be less than honest with you if I

did not make it clear that I feel it evades the main points I raised in my letter.

　　　　　However, while re-iterating that I do not feel disposed to modify the views expressed in my letter in any way (nor indeed can I subscribe whole-heartedly to the view that the BBC has assisted the people of Britain to understand the problems and achievements of Hong Kong much better than before) nevertheless I am content to let the whole matter rest now that I have brought it to your attention: and I shall continue to do my best to see that the BBC gets all reasonable co-operation here.

BEC. TRENC

Lord Hill of Luton, Chairman, BBC

Broadcasting House, London, W.1.

RECEIVED IN

ARCHA PRMA 13 25 MARIO

HWAP/L

c.c.: Sir Arthur, Galsworthy (with copy of Lord Hill's

letter)

Hon. C.S.

D.I.S.

26,3,68

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DBC

BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION

PO BOX 1AA BROADCASTING HOUSE LONDON W1 -

TELEPHONE 01.560 4468 TELEGRAMS BROADCASTS LONDON TELEX

CABLES BROADCASTS LONDON-W1 TELEX 22182

26th February 1968

Dearker Davad,

I apologise investipation

Thank you very much for your letter of 3th Feuruerg for the delo in replying, but 1 have had a very cure mado into une cire cutenees of the iton, bransmitted on the 9th January in "24 Hours", of which you wrote.

　　　　　Let me start or thanking you for your saistance to the EBC since you have beau Joverno

In the last few years, 23 you know, the BBC Indeed I think it can be said to us larely through television that uns people of this countrmer, tak sne moblems and achievements of nong Rong much better tuan before. Je nave all been given a vivid ilen of your situation and the complexities of life in Hon, Kong.

has given a Teki deal of attention to hong hone.

arry therefore that you have felt that there has been cane on this concic to take exception to this item. On the whole

shout the ac.. levements of Hong Kong in 1967 1965 M upoľal and qutimin nie. The item ended with

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Dir David Trench, K.Û.M.G., M..

Pettifer said:

26th February 1968

"But now outwardly at least, Hong Kong is peaceful.

And not only peaceful but prosperous. Business, except in the stores run by the Communists, has set new records. Just to see the way people are dressed and the goods they are buying is to realise that despite its troubles, the Colony's economic miracle has continued almost unchecked."

I'm sorry you feel that your time was wasted.

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Your contributi d to the film, although short, was essential and cogent.

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　I think I must point out that there was no transposition in the extract from your inte view. It has been verified that the question is the original recorded on the spot.

The only critical note in the piece was about the labour conditions in segments of industry, and this is, as you know, an area of social legislation which has been criticized elsewhere.

　　　　It seems that Fettifer was not at his best on this occasion. But I hope that on reflection you may think that the BBC does not deserve the full rigour of your criticisms. wrote to me about your misgivings.

In any event I am glad that you We shall bear them in mind.

Sir David Trench, A....ů., d.........,

Government lionse,

Long Kong.

mis sincenly

Hilly Luton

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ogional Information Office. 501 Ridler Hause,

2 Upper Albert Ho ad,

HON, KON.

28 March, 1968.

B.B.C. Coverage of Hong Kong

You may already know that from the overnor downwards, Hong Kong Government has for some time haen extremely ritated by the 9.6.0. radio and talavision COVETAPs of

repurtine

ก

Korg affairs. This stems from the *e disorders last summer and it recently culminated in personal representation from th O Terno r to Lord H↑ 11.

idence as

I have tried to obtain som

the grounds for these complaints but have been unable to discover anything specific apart from the fact that viulent excepti 。

taven to the B.B.C. '24 Hours

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ProgramDO E on lione Vong white MAN tv vised a fow months

It is all largely w over-sensitivity on the part of people here and a typical Tack of understanding that correspondents write what they see

י:

d r..

ago

►

CASO

t what they are told to write by those on thì ko t

•

▸

1 A concerned that if this attitude persists

Government officials and others it will save fect of alienating n. 2

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　DOPPAS Pendants and thu vtters Vorse. I think it would be worthwhile if, when eat meat Hugh House, you could rently put it to him le here are very much concerned to publicise the

•

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and economic viability of

to what is said about the place,

and are

that

but

they don't!

wilson Esq.,

f. rmation

tverwalk House

TILAUK,

3.1.

arch Department,

JCCHAT

Ashworth)

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Miss Stowe J.I.F.G.D.

Copy to Mr. Gaminara

SECRET

Hong Kong and West Indies Dept. Commonwealth Office.

with!

We spoke today about the relations between the B.B.C. and the Hong Kong government, referred to in this letter from Mr. Ashworth. I had heard rumblings off stage about the dissatisfaction of the Hong Kong government about certain B.B.C. programmes which he confirms. Hugh Howse of the Far Eastern Service had also told me that he had attended a lunch recently given by lr. John Keswick with representatives from other B.B.0. services to discuss the corporations's coverage of events in Hong Kong which I presume arose out of the Governor's representations to Lord Hill.

I think you will agree from what we have seon and heard of the handling of foreign correspondents in Hong Kong that Mr. Ashworth's criticisms are probably justified.

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　The Hong Kong government has shown itself to be over-sensitive about the criticisms of the syston in Hong Kong and slightly naive about the function of a journalist, believing that he ought to write what he is told and not what he sees.

3. I do not think that the Far Eastern Service is at fæilt here, it is T.V. and Home Sefvices which have annoyed the Hong Kong government. If you think an approach should be made to the B.B.C. it might be better to do it through your contacts with the latter's services rather than with Hugh Howse. My own feeling is that the lunch given by Mr. Keswick is probably sufficient, but Mr. Gaminara to whom I am sending a copy of my minute, may know more about the results of this lunch.

HWA 13/22

(C. Wilson) 4 April, 1968.

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Ed (4206)

Reference

Thank

with (88)

Hu Wish

Vey (186) The 18/16

We spoke about (88): I am afraid I do

проже

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this

matter. Hong Kong's viry existence depends on the maintenance of external confonce in

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Irzfart

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conditions & counts live. But

it could not object to objective reporting.

will find all the papers.

2. You relevent (except

tim's file

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Ashworth at 1x of & would savor any

juseful purpose and in any went I do

with the line that he suggesti

that a goue phased be taken.

2. Miss Stowe may wish to see.

MIG

ریار کی

68.

At Miss Stowe

Miss Stone J. P. G.D. Прева

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6/89

FLEET STREET LETTER

72,FLEET STREET, LONDON, EC4. PHONE: FLE 7571 CABLES: FLEETEST, LONDON, EC4.

The Walon Meas Puis My gurled

ار

4th April 1908 FSL 1070

HOME AFFAIRS

New Plot

Mr. Wilson reacted characteristically to Labour's disastrous by-election defeats last week. When sim- ilarly under pressure after his austerity moves in July, 1966, he hastily discovered a "plot" alleged to have been inspired by Mr. Callaghan. No one else ever found any real evidence for this supposed conspiracy.

And within a few house of last Thursday's by-election debacle, Mr. Wilson seemed equally determined to un- cover another plot this time by friends of Mr. Jenkins. The Prime Minister's associates lelephoned newspapers to enquire what their Lobby Correspondents were re- porting on the subject. They said they had heard of a "round robin", which some backbenchers were circula- ting, calling for Mr. Jenkins to replace Mr. Wilson.

The correspondents were reporting nothing of the kind, because no round robin had been hatched. In any case the day was Friday when most MPs had already quit Westminster. But the seed was sown and rumours started. It was not long before the anti-Jenkins fac- tions, which include left-wingers and many trade union MPs, were thoroughly alerted, rallying to Mr. Wilson and smearing Mr. Jenkins as Mr. Callaghan had been smeared in July, 1967.

Happily for the Chancellor he was in Stockholm at a "Group of Ten" meeting. To this extent he could not be blamed for anything his supporters were supposed to be doing. But Mr. Brown was absent in Brussels last December when the Prime Minister's supporters were busy blaming him for the South African arms deal, Indeed this kind of Wilson operation has provided Mr. Denis Healey with one of his favourite cocktall party quips: "Ho who is absent is wrong".

Shuffle

Mr. Wilson's next move was to authorise Mr. Rich- ard Crossman to announce Impending cabinel changes. There are few more effective ways of containing discon- tented MPs than the hint they may soon gel a place in the government. But Mr. Crossman's exercise out- raged ministers. In a disciplined cabinel it would be impossible for a relatively junior member- Mr. Cross- man is number six in order of precedent - to call upon the Prime Minister to sack some of his colleagues.

Mr. Crossman's performance only emphasised the excitable, unruly nature of this government and the ex- treme crisis it is in. It also underlined the privileged position of people, like Mr. Crossman, who are in Mr. Wilson's ruling "clique", This, of course, is the pre- cise charge which Mr. George Brown, among others, has levelled at the Prime Minister.

But it was not only Mr. Wilson who approved Mr. Crossman's speech in advance. Mrs. Barbara Castle did go too. She is currently enjoying a spoll as one of the most Influential Ministers, though some cabinet

colleagues partly, perhaps, through Jealousy - resent her ascendancy.

But Mrs. Castle has used her opportunities skilfully. As Transport Minister she has produced "socialist" legislation which has made her popular with the left. She has kept ostentallously aloof from economic policfes which have outraged the party. And she is still treated with considerable deference by the Prime Minister although she regards him as "weak".

Indeed, Many Labour MPs say that if Mrs. Castle did not suffer the undeniable political disadvantage of being a woman, she would have a better chance than Mr. Jenkins of succeeding Mr. Wilson.

Tuesday night's meeting on the government's com- pulsory wages curb between Mr. Jonkins and the 100 strong trade union group of MPs was extremely heated. Leading members of the group have since described the Chancellor in the vitriolle terms they normally reserve for Mr. Peter Shore, Economic Secretary. Some 30 members of the group are likely to abstain in the cru- clat vote on the issue. Since the Tories will vote ag- ainst, the government's majority could fall to 40-50- but not enough to require its resignation.

Tory Tactics

The Tory Shadow Cabinet met early this week to consider opposition tacties in the light of the govern- ment's defents in last week's by-elections. It agreed a series of directives to the Party.

Firstly the opposition should drop the tactics (main- ly used by Mr. Macleod) of singling out the Prime Min- ister as the main target. Mr. Wilson is discredited enough at the moment, the Tory leaders decided. There is a real danger that Labour may drop him and survive under Mr. Jenkins. From now on the Torles will deliv- er their main attacks against the cabinet as a whole in an attempt to make the blame for failure stick collectively.

Secondly the Shadow Cabinet have advised Tory MPs not to try to force "artificial" points of conflict in the Commons. This, they argue, would lead to govern- ment victories in the division lobbles, thus emphasis- ing that it still has a majority of 74.

Thirdly Tory backbenchers have been warned not to expect the government to be defeated on the Prices and incomes Bill. Though cabinet ministers confess they do not know whether they can get the Bill through, the Tory leaders are certain that Labour rebels will not force a government defeat on it.

Lastly the Shadow Cabinet decided that the Tories must produce a provisional election manifesto showing how they would meet current problems. They feel that public opinion will soon demand they say how they would cope with problems which have overwhelmed Labour.

THIS

WORLD Vietnam Peace?; Hong Kong; Nasser Speaks: Grechko's Tour; Rumania; Jordan; French Africa CITY... Outlook; Gilts; Investment Trusts; Dunford & Elliott; Income Portfolio; Neville Group

EDITOR: WILFRED RVDER

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WORLD AFFAIRS

Peace?

Out of the confusion which President Johnson created by his speech on March 31 at least one thing is clear - he has tried to give himself greater freedom of action. He always tried to keep as many options open as possible. and he had got himself Into a position where most were closed. Now that he is out of the election campaign, he is better placed either to engage in peace talks, or to continue the war.

The area of North Vietnam in which the bombing has continued is so large that it appeared certain that Hanoi would refuse peace talks. Yet Hanoi on April 3 agreed to talks "to decide with the U.S. side on the uncondition- al cessation of the bombing and of all acts of war ng- ainst the DRV so that peace talks can begin" This is a change ofaltitude. Hitherto Hanol has insisted on a complete and unconditional end to the bombing before any kind of talks could begin. Now it has agreed to talk before the bombing has completely ended.

But it is too early to Judge whether Hanol's acceptance of talks with the U.S. is more than a device to sap the fighting spirit of American and South Vietnamese troops If it is, then two factors would be relevant. One is the publication on March 21 by Hanoi of a decree on counter revolutionary crimes. Among them were sabotage. armed rebellion, defection to the enemy and "under- mining national defence and the struggle against U.S. aggression, which is aimed at defending the North, lib- erating the South and reunifying the country". The same day Nhan Dan, the main Hanoi paper, attacked "elements who have been engaged in plotting to check the northern people's support for the southern compatriots' war of liberation".

Clearly there has been considerable opposition to con- tinuing the war in North Vietnam. But what is most sig- nificant is that this decree, though published only in March, was in fact signed last November at the end of a campaign in September and October on the need to strengthen internal security. It now begins to appear that there could have been a fierce debate last autumn in the Central Committee on the advisability of contin- uing or ending the war and that the hawks won approval for a last massive offensive to try to end It the Tet offensive which in fact proved inconclusive.

The second factor that is relevant to Hanoi's changed allitude is that there has been a significant reduction in recent months in Chinese aid. Sabotage, absenteelam and anarchism in the wake of the cultural revolution have hit particularly coal and oil production and the railway system all of which play a vital role in keep- ing supplies moving to Vietnam. Soviet shipments through China must also have been affected, and they had already been hit by the closing of the Suez Canal.

Hong Kong

• Hong Kong is expecting more disorders this coming summer. Minor clashes with the police are already commonplace. The oppressive heat of summer, it is feared, will ignite the tinder left over from last year's troubles the most serious since the war. And when schools and colleges close for the holidays, thousands of students will become available for agitators to exploit.

Three reasons lie behind this pessimism. Firally there is continued dissatisfaction with labour conditions: though the standard of living has risen impressively in recent years, sweatshops have not entirely disappeared. Secondly there is discontent at a government system in which the people have no say (both the Legislative and Executive Councils are appointed, not elected, bodies). And thirdly the overwhelming majority of the population resents being ruled by the 1.5% who are not Chinese.

Most observers believe that the police, who were extremely efficient last year, should be well able to cope again. They might lose control only if the com- munists, who alone have any degree of real organisa- tion, go all out to cause trouble which is unlikely. Even last year, when China's cultural revolution was at its height, they did not pull out all the stops. And China, from where the marching orders come, has proved in the past to be well aware of the economic ad- vantages of a prosperous Hong Kong through which half her foreign exchange comes.

FSL Dec 21, '67; "Close friends report Pres. Johnson is very tired and might drop out of the election race". This report in greater detail was repeated March 24 1968. He Announced he will not stand again April 1.

• FSL Mar 28, '68: "Western Ambassa - dors in Washington report the Preal- dent will order a pause in the bomb- ing when he believes the time is ripe". He announced the pause April 1.

So the communists are likely to use latent discontent to cause enough trouble to embarraan Britain, white Peking will keep a finger on the safety-catch. Tho danger is that non-communist discontents, outside the Immediate control of the Party, may enter the fray in sufficient numbers for the police to have difficulty in maintaining control.

This is why more and more voices are heard urging the Hong Kong government to change its ways. Up till now it has seen its role as purely 'responsive" to dev- elopments as they happen. Now there is a growing feel- ing that it should be looking ahead and initiating action

in such fields as labour and electoral reform

in an effort to avoid trouble, rather than simply sitting back and waiting for it.

Nasser Speaks

On March 30 President Nasser announced a major programme of political reform which is to be put to a referendum on May 2. If it is approved, he will set i in motion by naming a committee to prepare electiona for a National Congress of the Arab Socialist Union, Egypt's only political party. The Congress will meet on July 23 and, if it wishes, can take on the task of drafting a constitution: this has hitherto been the res- ponsibility of the present National Assembly, which thus ends its life with its work unfinished. Completion of the new constitution is in effect put off to the indef- inite future because it is to be approved by a plebiscite only "after the elimination of the consequences of ag- gression". Elections will be held for a new National Assembly and President under the new constitution.

This new political programme is designed to prevent further demonstrations by students like those in Febru- ary (FSL 1065, 66); they had in fact planned more for this week. Nasser can argue that their demanda for free elections and the rule of law are granted in his new pro- gramme. But the students in fact are likely to feel that his proposals are not only insufficient but unlikely to be seriously implemented. However, the plebiscite on May 2 and the organisation of elections for the Nat- lonal Assembly on July 23 will conveniently straddle the first anniversary of the June war - potentially a dangerous time, when new demonstrations are likely.

Nasser insisted that priority would be given to prep- arations for the next battle with the enemy, a battle which would "efface all traces of aggression". Yet,

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FSL 1070

"We have declared already many times and we continue to declare that we are still ready to accept a political solution" with Israel. He never even mentioned Israel's attacks on Jordan of March 21 and 29. King Hussein must have fell as unsatisfied listening to the speech as the Egyptian students. The only person who has any reason for satisfaction is Ali Sabri, ASU Prealdent.

Grechko

Marshal Grechko, Soviet Defence Minister, arrived unexpectedly in Cairo from Damascus on March 30. When he left Moscow on March 20 he was scheduled to visit only Iraq and Syria. Meanwhile a new faract- Jordan clash occurred on March 29, following those of February 16 and March 21. The question his visit rai- aes is whether the Soviet Union will let Egypt come to Jordan's ald in further clashes with Israel. Since the Soviet Union has replaced 80% of the arms Egypt lost last June and has thousands of instructors in key post- tions in her armed forces, Egypt cannot move without Soviet permission.

There have been reports from Cairo this week that in the light of Israel's continued Intransigence, the Soviet Union has decided that it has no choice but to back Egypt in an attempt to regain Sinal. There have also been reports that on March 21 President Nasser offered King Hussein air cover, but that the King declined the offer In order to avoid escalation; for the same reason be has not used Jordan's Hunter jets in any recent incident. Yet on March 26 Egyptian military transport planes landed supplies at Amman airport.

Whitehall still believes, however, that the Soviet Union does not want Egypt to become involved, either on her own or on Jordan's side, in a new confrontation with Israel which might bring the Soviet Union into a clash with the U.B. which would back Israel. The Sov- let Union is certainly holding Egypt back. She did so on March 21 when Egypt ongaged in a 20 minute artll- lory duel across the Canal an incident that was not reported in the Egyptian press. And Nasser completely Ignored laraeli attacks on Jordan in his March 30 speech.

Moreover, in the Security Counell debates after the incidents of March 21 and March 20, Mr. Malik waLB moderately constructive. He argued in favour of sanc- tions against larael, but settled for observers along the Jordan River. On this analysis, Marshal Grechko's tour has been designed to hold the Arabs back, not to spur them on.

But Soviet pressure on Syria and Iraq is unlikely to be as effective as on Egypt. The role of the 12,000 Iraqi troops in Jordan is particularly interesting. The Jordan government, which would very much like to see them return home, has succeeded so far in keeping the bulk of them well away from the front line. But there was considerable movement by these troops on March 21; it may not have been due entirely to replacements. Moreover there are small Iraqi anti-aircraft units in the hills overlooking the Jordan and they went into act- ion on March 29. If Iraqi troops in Jordan Join in act- lon against Israel, this will introduce a new element Into the Middle Exst situation over which the Soviets will not have full control.

Rumania

• New details have reached London on the way the Ceau- saacu regime is restricting conlacts between Humani- ana and foreigners, particularly Russians and east Fur- opeana (F8L 1066). The restrictions are listed in a decree dated May, 1966, which has never been published, and for a long time was not fully implemented But for several weeks now the security anthopties have been calling meetings in ministries, foreign trade organisa-

tions, universities, technical schools and factories to publicise the decree.

It requires every Rumanian to: report any contact with a foreigner, whether he is from another commun- ist country or not; report any conversation with a for- eigner overheard in a public place; bring any letter re- ceived from abroad to his place of work; ask permission before offering or accepting any hospitality or invitation from a foreigner: submit a report after a visit abroad; and declare any present from a foreigner.

As a result of the strict enforcement of these re- strictions, Rumaniane who were normally accessible to foreign embassies or to visiting journalists or business- men, now ask that arrangements be made for meetings through the Foreign Ministry. But the restrictions are being applied more to contacts with Russians and east Europeans than to those with westerners. Rumanian officials state apologetically to westerners that the restrictions are not aimed mainly at them. And atta- chés of Soviet and east European embassies grumble to their western colleagues that their contacts with Rum- anians have declined drastically.

Three reasons are believed to lie behind the restric- tions: Firstly a desire to make it more difficult for either Russians or eastern Europeans to seek allien inside Rumania to overthrow Mr. Ceausescu the 'on- fant terrible' of the Warsaw Pact; secondly the secret police, still smarting under Ceausescu's attack on them last July for inefficiency, are showing how they have reformed; thirdly the Rumanian leader views with alarm the liberal ferment in Czechoslovakia and is de- termined that it will not infect Rumania.

In a speech on March 22 Ceausescuclaimed that the Party Congress in July 1965 had "resolutely embarked on the path of doing away with conservative tendencies to stiffness and rigidity in economic, social and poltt- ical life". He called for a "debate on the crucial la- sues of the development of our society with the broad mass of the people". But the party is to be "the true motive force, leading and guiding the whole activity, mobilising the masses to implement party polley". The masses are thus not to participate in discussions but to be merely passive instruments implementing It. The National Assembly bolds two sessions of two days each year and never modifies pre-determined party policy.

Cables

AMMAN: At one of his restricted meetings with gov- ernment, political, business and academic leaders on March 5, King Hussein said he would like to cooperate with "Bound elements" among the guerillas but he hoped to control the more Irresponsible elements who might force the Arab atatea into a war with Israel for which they are not prepared. The King has been encouraging moves to form a National Front government under Bul- elman al Nabulsi (Premier in 1956) who le distinctly pro-Nasser. It would include prominent Palestinians from the West Bank, leftists, Banthists (Arab Social- lela) and Moslem Brothers, but not apparently guerillas,

PARIS: French Embassies in Africa are reported to have been informed by the Elysee that France would Intervene militarily to prevent a change of government in seven out of fifteen former French African colonies: Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Niger, Cameroon, Gabon, Congo Brazzaville and Madagascar. Senegal and Mad- agascar have French naval bases, Niger and Gabon uranium. In the Congo Brazzaville, France's interest is in preventing a shift of government to the extreme left, not to the right. Excluded from the list as of "no permanent interest" to France are Mauritania, Mali, fiuinea, Chad, Upper Volta, the CAR, Togo, and Dahomey.

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151

CITY AFFAIRS

Outlook

The investment environny al is changing these day S at a bewildering speed. No sooner was Britain's bod get out of the way a key element in international con fidence - than Stockholm esme, with the Finely trying to shoot down the Special Drawing Rights" (SDR

The

bankers' paper gold scheme. The fact that Feness's EEC partners split with her over this issue is signifi ent. They put the stability of the international ʼn one- tary system over their loyalty to an EEC partner ind served notice on de Gaulle that he eath to only so far in his destructive war against the Anglo- Saxons, reement on SDIt's does not solve the world " mon y problems, but it would have been disastrous, the re had been no agreement

The Johnson bombshell really does after the econ omic outlook. If Vietnam peace moves succeed, then the D. S. balance of payments deficit may at last be ended. At the same time there would be a long period. of readjustment on Wall Street from an economy half- geared to war to one geared to settling the problems. of peace. For the U.S. this means re-absorbing the men in Vietnam and getting to grips with the cancer of slums and civil riots. Part of what was spent on the war will be spent on improving the lot of the American poor. Economic growth should not come to a full stop. But dollars will be spent internally, instead of abroad, to the benefit of the balance of payments.

This does not suddenly make Wall Street attractive. There are still many imponderables in the equation. European stock markets still look better. If the Amer- icans can win more room for manoeuvre in curbing their balance of payments deficit, the Europeans are likely to reflate more generously. But as stockbrokers Simon and Coates point out in their Investment letter, if the Americans enn now win back their own self-respect and constructive world leadership, then American business- men will be galvanised into taking their customary op- timistic view of future growth prospects.

Gilts

This week it has been the gilt-edged market's turn to make the running. Sterling's good performance fol- lowing the Stockholm agreement on SDRs led to revival of hopes for another cut in Bank Rate and a good de- mand for gilt-edged right across the board. City ex- perts are suggesting a gentle rise is in prospect, pos- sibly developing into something stronger, should the re be no further upsets in the international monetary field. Over the coming weeks a good deal of money may move from the short to the long end of the market.

Investment Trusts

time of the few sectors of the markel which is not to be subjected to dividend limitation is investment trusts. This is logical since they are essentially a post box. passing dividends from companies to their shareholders However, it means that those trusts with a good earn- ings cover will be able to raise their dividends, if they are so inclined. Two leading investment trusts in this happy position are Cable & Wireless and Globe Tele- graph which look very attractive at their current prices.

There are a number of points in their favour. The past growth performances of both companies are belter than those of many leading trusts. This makes both stocks look undervalued on discounts of around 167,

compareil with the average discount of 10..

Both trustR

drive a wide spread of investments round the world.

I ranked income requirements are not pressing, and neither trust will have to make large investments in prefen nee shares to make up for the anticipated fall in their foreign memuse. Roth coinjanies have large Tiquid resources av adabte for investiment and the shares. of each are easily marketable. At 25s Dd for Cable and 25s 1'd for Globe, there is little to choose between

Both are a sound investment at present levels.

Dunford

Controlled since January last year by Win. Brandt. the merchant bankers, Dunford and Ellol supplies. steel bars and sections, rolled and treated at ibc own works, Dunford has about 15 of the market and its biggest customer is the motor trade.

Last December the company took over Hadfields of Sheffield which not only gives Dunford a captive supply. of special steels but also brings in extra technical know- how Hadfields is being extensively reorganised and full integration should boost Dunford's prefils consid- erably. Since Dunford Financed the acquisition through cash and loun stock, the full benefits of any profit re- covery in Hadfields will rebound to the benefit of Dun- ford shareholders.

Thus if Hadfields' profits were merely restored to the previous year's level of £286,000, and Dunford maintained its own, group earnings would be 54%, ag- ainst Dunford's present share earnings of 33%. AL 228 9d this would put the shares on a price/earnings ratio of just over 8 times. They must be cheap.

Portfolio

• The eighth choice for our income portfolio is the Neville Group, the Birmingham finance and issuing house. After a meteoric rise when they first went pub- lic, the shares have lately languished. Part of the rea- son is that the group is classed as an Industrial holding company and they still carry a bad name in the City. Neville's profits have fluctuated over the years but over- all they have grown sharply. It is the financial side which has fluctuated most; the trading side has expand- ed steadily for ten years. The capital structure is such that it weighs against the ordinary, until profits are over the £1.1 million mark, nearly twice the average of the last five years. Nevertheless the yield is very attract- ive and is well covered, and at 138 the shares look a good income stock with the chance of material growth once profits start moving.

Bought

Income Portfolio

Giltapur Investments Hick Hargreaves Arbiter and Weston Pillar Holdings Woolworth

S. and W. Berisford Angus Steak Houses Neville Group

Now

Yield at

Cost Price

Gs 9d 6s 42d

68 1'd

9.8%

6s Bld

7.44

38 101d

38 Od

17.0%

98 9d xd

10s 9 d

6.0%

17s Od

188 21d

5.5%

9. 3d

Bs 10 d

5.67

10s Od

139 Od

98 9d

7.9%

8.5

For an index to shares covered in 1967 just telephone or send a card.

Published by the Fleet Street Letter Ltd., 72 Fleet Street, London E.C.4 Printed by Collins & Walterstow Ltd., 36 Rosoman Street, London, E.C.1

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Me. Gayorava Commonwealth

office

With the compliments of

FOREIGN OFFICE/COMMONWEALTH

OFFICE

PA.

AG8..

C. Wilson

I.R.D.

8 April, 1968

LONDON, S.W.1.

CG 318

M. Caylor with 9/4

For information AWG 8.4.6.

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Foreign Office/0.0.,

Riverwalk House, Hillbank,

London .

5 April, 1960.

I enclose a copy of the latest edition of the Fleet Street Letter produced by Wilfred Ryder which gets a fairly wide distribution in business and city circles and some circulation abroad. I do not know what the precise

circulation is but since it appears to pay its way it must be reasonably sizeable.

2. I spoke to him about the article on Hong Kon; which we discussed on the telephone and ho explained that the material we provided by one of his former contributors who had just returned from a visit to Hong Kong. As you can sce it indulges in the kind of gloomy speculation which we would not want to circulate around the city. I told him that the picture did not square with our view of current developments in Hong Kong. He does not get any material from your office and I suggested to him that he should do 00. He said that he will be getting in touch with you shortly and I strongly recommend. that he should be placed on your mailing list. As a contact we have always found hin reasonable and sensible to deal with.

-9. R1958

R. Boxall, Esq.,

Hong Kong Govern ent

Information Serviceo.

HWA 13/22

(C. Wilson)

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HONG KONG

PALL

RECEIVED IN

OFFIC

GOVERNMENZ APRICO

MALL

LONDO-

5 W

TELEPHONE: WHITEHALL 7951 CABLES HONGAID, LONDON, SWI

R.318

Bitti aprik

+968

All Camara 1 Dear Beyfing, 1914

information

of enclose for your

revited paper by

The Hongkong Guertens Public Relating Coordination Com the designed t

increise

overseas confidence

Carrocher will be receiving

Hongkong.

direce

a member of my

cofres

let

Liaison Committee but I can

ра

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23.4

have additional coppes of

you require them. "The paper Lo. will be discussed

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17:

HONG KONG GOVERNMENT

INFORMATION SERVICES

€190

54 PALL MALL

LONDON S.W. 1

Phone: 01-930-7951

With the compliments of the

Secretary

RECEIVED IN

**-.63

22 AFRIC

HWDB/22

Overseas Public Relations Co-ordination Committee

The attached paper is forwarded as confidential background information for those concerned with retaining and fostering overseas confidence in Hong Kong. The reader should note that the paper does not describe all the themes which can be used to promote Hong Kong's image, nor does it deal with themes in detail. It is intended that others will be added or improved upon as time progresses.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Increasing Overseas Confidence

Hong Kong

Elgo

INTRODUCTION

1. This is the second paper on "Overseas Confidence in Hong Kong"

produced by the Overseas Public Relations Co-ordination Committee in Hong Kong. The membership of this committee is given at the end of this paper.

2. This supersedes the paper produced in October 1967.

Comments

on the first paper were received from some overseas agencies participating in the effort to improve Hong Kong's image, and these comments have been incorporated in the revised paper. This is intended as general guidance for all those involved in Hong Kong's public relations work.

3. The paper does not attempt to record in detail the activities of all agencies; information is given on any one agency's function, where it is considered that such information might assist other agencies in an overall co-ordination of effort.

CHANGES SINCE OCTOBER 1967

4. It is no longer appropriate to explain so fully the security situation in the Colony. This is best left to inference from the many other facts about Hong Kong which can be described. The predominant theme should now be Hong Kong's increasing attractiveness for buyers, tourists, investors and sellers. The Hong Kong Chinese overseas as a public relations target were omitted from the Uctober 1967 paper.

5. Chinese from Hong Kong who live abroad and who still have connections with the Colony continue to be a potential influence on not only the people of the country in which they live but also on their relatives or associates in the Colony. It is important that the Hong Kong Overseas Chinese retain a balanced view of Hong Kong affairs and do not become jaundiced by any other Chinese language information which might be detrimental to Hong Kong's interests. is always the potential danger that an incident could occur abroad which might provoke an unfavourable reaction either for or in Hong Kong. A section has been included in this paper on the Hong Kong Overseas Chinese.

PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE PUBLIC RELATIONS EFFORT

There

6. There is much that can be said in Hong Kong's favour when promoting confidence overseas, so much so that it is both unnecessary and counter-productive to attempt to gloss over any of the difficulties facing the Colony. As a basic principle, especially when the P.R. effort can be made

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIA L

verbally, frank truthfulness imparted with the vigour, colour and self-confidence so typical of the Colony is the best way of fostering an increased awareness of, and confidence in, Hong Kong. It is the colour which evokes the interest, the frankness which inspires the confidence, the performance record which generates the faith and the opportunities thus exposed lead on to the business.

7. While there is a need to convince potential retail purchasers that Hong Kong goods have quality and give value for money it would be prohibitively expensive and of doubtful value to embark on a wide public relations campaign aimed at the general public with a view to instilling confidence in and admiration for Hong Kong. It is not thought that the social conditions in Hong Kong induce retail-sales resistance. There is a need to reach the general public in overseas countries in the more specialised field of tourist promotion.

8. Public Relations work is not only best done through carefully chosen individual, personal contacts but is most effective when Hong Kong is "sold" by someone who knows the Colony well. Such people are those who are engaged full-time on promoting Hong Kong's interests, who have lived in the Colony and who make frequent visits to see for themselves. A second group

is those who are interested in the Colony's affairs who can be persuaded to make the trip to Hong Kong and then be prepared to speak with all the assurance of having seen for themselves: much of the Public Relations effort should be devoted to increasing the number of people in this group. In a third group is the Hong Kong businessman who, when abroad, speaks confidently and knowledgeably about the Colony. The encouragement and briefing of such a person and the care of him when he is abroad is a vital field of operations. fourth group consists of those who are well-briefed on Hong Kong affairs by the other groups and able to devote time to talking to others about them.

The

9. The distribution of literature of a promotional nature is an

important if subsidiary public relations function which can cover a larger number of people but with less impact. direct mailing of information about Hong Kong is a way of sustaining the interest and confidence attained by personal contact or visits to the Colony. One of the most effective media for putting across Hong Kong's message is the use of films. The Government Information Services is constantly produc ng both short newsreel films as well as the occasional longer feature. It is hoped that agencies will make the fullest possible use of these films. Films are also produced by the Tourist Association for specific purposes.

THEMES TO ENHANCE HONG KONG'S OVERSEAS IMAGE

A wealth Examples are:-

10. "The fast rate of expansion of Hong Kong's Economy"

of evidence of this comes to hand frequently.

Export figures

Gross increase in the number of factories

Overall increase in the number of industrial workers The opening-up of new industrial ventures

(e.g. the manufacture of watch parts).

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

11. "Continued growth of the Colony's industrial infra-structure"

Examples are:-

The expansion of the Electricity Power Companies

Plover Cove reservoir

New roads: the Lion Rock Tunnel

Resettlement housing, low-cost housing, private housing

estates.

12. "Hong Kong looks ahead" Some examples are:

Reclamation at Hung Hom and Wanchai

Opening up of new towns at Kwai Chung, Castle Peak and

Shatin

The airport extensions

Cable and Wireless Satellite Station

New reservoirs being planned

Mass Transport Survey: the resiting of the railway yards.

13. "Steady improvement in labour conditions"

Some examples are:

Larger factories already very modern and efficient Works Committees mooted

Apprenticeship schemes

More legislation in interests of workers' employment and

safety.

14. "More tourists praise Hong Kong" Some examples are:-

Excellent facilitation of Airport and Sea Terminal Overseas tourist agencies visit Hong Kong to see for

themselves

Well-known personalities stay in Hong Kong and lavish

praise

Hotels and restaurants earn high praise for variety and

service.

15. "Government helps people' For example:-

Legal Aid Scheme

Youth Employment Advisory Service

City District Office Administration.

Rapid provision of recreational facilities

Excellent modern hospitals.

UNDERLYING POLITICAL SECURITY

16. It is recognised that during personal contacts with persons

likely to visit or do business with Hong Kong there is certain to be some curiosity about Hong Kong's political situation. It is not intended that a description of security matters should be initiated by those helping to improve Hong Kong's image: if the inference from other information is enough so much the better. However, questions may be asked. these circumstances the following themes should be stressed:

(a) The Hong Kong population continues firm

in its wish to be able to progress under the existing administration.

(b) The efficient Police Force is even better

prepared to deal with any occurrence and maintain good law and order.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

full strength.

(d) The tiny Communist minority is now pursuing

peaceful and lawful means of extending its influence mainly by propaganda but having little effect on people who are more interested in improving their living conditions. There are signs that the Communists too wish to resume business in the most profitable way.

TARGETS

Brief notes are given below to illustrate (A) those facets of Hong Kong which are most conducive to improved business, and (B) the factors which underlie those facets.

17. Target: BUYERS

(A) Image

(B)

Good profits

(a)

Quality goods easy

to sell

Value for money

(b)

Quick delivery

Business conducted in

English.

(c)

Factors supporting the image People work hard, quickly and

efficiently with work conditions improving constantly and steadily.

Lively, intelligent, enter-

prising and dynamic managements.

Chinese workers have very high degree of manual skills and dexterity; and ingenious

processes used.

(a) Production highly flexible. both in volume and product design.

(e)

(f)

Sophisticated and experienced commercial infra-structure.

Sound banking facilities.

(g) Minimum and easy documentation

procedures.

(h)

(i)

Efficient cargo handling both by air and by sea.

Frequent air services in and

out of Hong Kong which is centrally located for other East Asian destinations.

18.

Target:

TOURISTS

(3)

(A)

Image

Good shopping

(a)

Western comforts,

Eastern mystery

(b)

Luxurious yet

inexpensive

for

Visitors well cared

Factors supporting the image

Hotels rated among the best in the world

Excellent variety of cuisine and good wines

(a) Exceptional sights, Oriental

sights

CONFIDENTIAL

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FIDENTIAL

English widely used

No currency restric-

tions, easy convertibility Freedom of movement

19. Target: INVESTORS

(A) Image

(e)

Charming Oriental customs and manners

(f) Friendly people give

gracious service

(g) Villages and temples

reminiscent of old China (h) Frequent services by air

and sea

(i) Centrally located among

other East Asian destinations.

(E)

1. Rapid returns

(a)

High growth rate from

high base

(b)

3. Stable Government

(c)

Stable economy

(a)

Dedicated to free

enterprise

(c)

Low taxation

(1)

Leading world trading

unit.

Factors supporting the image Free port status

commercial infra-structure

Good air and sea communications

Convenient and efficient cargo-handling and godown facilities

Equal access for all supplies

Well established trade links throughout E. and S.E. Asia

(g) Reasonable conditions of work

constantly and steadily improving

(h)

Unrestricted remittance of

profits and movement of

capital in and out.

Sophisticated and experienced

20. Target: (A)

SELLERS

Image

(B)

Large and rapidly

(a)

expanding import market

(b)

Strategically well

distribution centre for

placed and well-equipped (c)

Factors supporting the image

Sophisticated commercial

infrastructure

Good air and sea communications

Free port status

E. and 3.E. Asia

(a)

Convenient and efficient cargo- handling facilities

Resourceless economy

in terms of materials

(e)

Consumer preference for

imported goods

(f)

Business conducted in English

(g)

No discrimination between

domestic and overseas supplies

(h)

(i)

Well established trade links throughout E. and S.E. sia

Efficient cargo handling both by air and by sea.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTI

21. Target:

OVERSELS CHINESE

(1) Image

(B)

Factors supporting the image

Continuing community

(a)

School building programme

harmony and progress

(b)

Modern developments

Development of Chinese University

with rising standards

(c)

Steadily improving amenities

Local officers in the Public Service

(a)

Opportunities for investment.

Resettlement and low-cost housing programmes

(e) Building of parks and

playgrounds

(f) Unrestricted remittance of

profits and movement of capital in and out.

AGENCIES PROMOTING HONG KONG'S PUBLIC RELATIONS OVERSEAS

Each of the agencies listed plays a greater or lesser part according to its facilities and appropriateness for the task.

22. In Hong Kong:-

(a) Government Information Services

(b) Department of Commerce and Industry (c) The Hong Kong Trade Development Council (a) The Federation of Hong Kong Industries (e) The Hong Kong Tourist Association (f) Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce.

23. In the U.S....:

(a) Washington D.C.

(b) New York

(c)

In major cities

(d)

- British Embassy

Counsellor for Hong Kong

Commercial Affairs at the British Embassy

Tourist association's

representative.

British Information Services

T.D.C.'s representative

Tourist Association's

representative.

British Consulates-General.

Tourist Association's representative in

San Francisco, and consultants in Los Angeles, Chicago, Boston and Dallas.

(e) Chambers of Commerce.

24. In Canada:-

(a)

British High Commission, Ottawa and Trade. Commissioners in provincial capitals.

(b)

Tourist Association Consultants in Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver.

CONFIDENTIAL

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25. In Britain:-

CONFIDENTI

(a) Hong Kong Government's London Office

incorporating the Department of Commerce and Industry and the Government Information Services.

(b) Public Relations Liaison Committee.

(d) Trade Development Council's representative and

P.R. consultants.

(e) Tourist Association representative.

(f)

(e)

Hong Kong association

Ship Owners sub-committee dealing especially with seamen.

(h) Chambers of Commerce.

26. In Europe:-

(a) British Missions in all capitals and consular

posts in many cities.

(b) Counsellors for Hong Kong Commercial Affairs,

Eritish Embassy, Brussels and British Mission, Geneva.

from Frussels) with the services of Public Relations consultants in Paris, Bonn, Oslo, Copenhagen, Helsinki, Geneva, Milan, Hamburg, Stockholm, and Barcelona.

(d) Tourist Association's representative.

(e)

Chambers of Commerce.

27. In Japan:-

(a) British Embassy in Tokyo and consular posts in

certain major cities.

(b) Tourist Association's representative.

28. In Australia:

(a) British High Commissioner's Office and

Deputy High Commissioner's Office in state capitals.

(b) Sydney - T.D.C.'s representative.

29. Other Countries:-

(a)

(b)

(c)

British Missions in all capitals, and consulates in many major cities.

Chambers of Commerce.

Trade Development Council's representative in Nairobi.

CONFIDENT 1. L

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CONFIDENTI

CO-ORDIN..TION

The various agencies overseas are in frequent and constant touch with their offices in Hong Kong. Those listed in paragraph 22 meet together in Hong Kong at approximately fortnightly intervals to discuss matters of common interest. One such matter is the question of the distribution of literature about Hong Kong: it is hoped that when one agency produces a feature, maximum and the most efficient and appropriate form of distribution can be arranged through each of the agencies.

31. It is hoped that there is good liaison between agencies

which have offices in the same countries. In Britain there is the London Public Relations Liaison Committee which meets regularly to discuss activities in Britain.

MEMBERS!!IP OF THE OVERSELS PUBLIC RELATIONS CO-ORDINATION

COMMITTEE

*J. Cater, Deputy Colonial Secretary (Chairman)

Mrs. S. Yuen, Executive Director, Federation of

Hong Kong Industries

Mr. G. Archer, Executive Director, Hong Kong General

Chamber of Commerce

**Mr. R.G.L. Oliphant, Executive Director, Hong Kong

Trade Development Council

Major H.F. Stanley, Executive Director, Hong Kong

Tourist association

N.J.V. Watt, Director of Government Information Services C.P. Haddon-Cave, Deputy Economic Secretary

D.H. Jordan, Deputy Director of Commerce & Industry

J.R. Locking, assistant Secretary, Colonial Secretariat

(Secretary)

*will be replaced by Mr. A. Todd, Defence Secretary

w.e.f.

1.4.68.

**will be replaced by Mr. J. Cater, Executive Director,

Hong Kong Trade Development Council.

Colonial Secretariat

Hong Kong.

March, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

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DS. Form 4

With the Compliments of

D.F. Plans

RICHED IN

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MP No. 63 No.63

13 AUG 1968

Main Building, Whitehall+KIC 12/22

London, S.W.1. WHitehall 7022

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MICE OPERATIONS

CENTRE

12 AUG1:68

CONFIDENTIAL

Category AC: no unclassified reply or reference

MINISTRY OF BLLLLL

CONFIDENTIAL

DOPE

From: CINCFE

To:

MOD UK

Info: CBF Hong Kong

HQ FARELF

HQLF Hong Kong

W 2

E 1

E 2

S050

Duty

Officer

Fil.

0809202 Alte

Date: B.B.

Recd: 1250%

RECIRCULATION - 1.0.50 AUTHORISED PY DOP

WARNING

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED

NO UNCLASSIFIED REPLY OR REFERENCE

KBC/SEASEC 21

Subject: Retention of AIT in Hong Kong.

References: A, CINCFE 2607352 Jan, SEASEC 02.

MOD (UK) RTT/051845Z Feb.

CBF Hong Kong has reported Governor's request for retention of AIT in Hong Kong for further year as follows.

2. Begins. Governor has asked that AIT should remain in Colony for further twelve months from expiry of present tour (that is, until 31 March 1970) under same financial terms as at present. During this period, team will have under instruction one existing Government mobile firm team and a second which is being formed. The aim being for the nucleus of a Government organisation to gain experience by working jointly with ATT. For reasons mentioned in paragraph two of Reference A, I am sure that this extra period is necessary, both to mest foreseeable commitments, and to

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　This team continues to make train up an adequate Government organisation.

It has also

a very big contribution to hearts and minds operations here, been a big factor in arousing general awareness of the possibilities of this type of operation. Ends.

This headquarters strongly endorses the proposal. If approved request MOD (Army) be invited to make necessary detailed arrangements direct with HQ FARELF.

Governor is telegraphing Commonwealth Office on similar lines.

R. 318

Rak

ANG

15.8.6.

TIM Distribution

080920Z

EAST

วง

१ 13.

TJ/50

CONFIDENTIAL

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2600027

C.S. ZOA

From the Governor, Hong Kong

To the Secretary of State for

Repeated to:

Repeated to:-

CONFIDENTIAL

SAVINGXX DISPATCH

RECEIVED AN

ARCHIVES No. 56

Commonwealth Affairs.

HUB

Aff88.700 No...1003

192

Dote..................... My Reference........

7th August, 1968 SCR. 34/1486/67

Your Reference...

No.

ви

one week

1 #5141

ARCHIV

SAUG 1968

COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, DIPENDON TERITORIES

13 AUG 1968

FT Smith

Army Information Team

　　Your telegram No. 204 indicated that the Army Information Team's tour in Hong Kong could be extended until 31st March, 1969 on the basis of the then existing financial arrangements. We have in the meantime been examining further the means of carrying on this work on a civilian basis, and have come to the conclusion that while we shall not be in a position to take over the commitment by the date mentioned, we can most effectively move in this direction at an early date by integrating civilian personnel to work under the direction of the Army Information Team for a time sufficient to identify and overcome any operational problems that might arise from civilianisation.

(a)

The proposal is that:

our Information Services Department mobile film team which operates in the urban area shall as soon as possible be put under the overall direction of the Officer Commanding the Army Information Team; and,

(b) additional supernumerary posts would be sought urgently to

enable a further team to be formed, and to enable one officer to gain experience of the control and administration of this kind of operation. If approval of these posts is forthcoming we can then hope to integrate soldiers and civilians into three teams, so as to get the best value out of the Army Information Team while it remains here.

　　　There would not however be time for all this to be carried out and for the necessary experience to be gained by 31st March, 1969 and I hope therefore that it may be possible for the Ministry of Defence to agree to a further extension of the tour in

　　　KCK 3/22 After speaking to Hong Kong for the Army Information Team to 31st March, 1970

Mr Boyd (FE.D.)

Miss Sammiers (vice to Wilson) IRD

Bla

We should, of course, under the current financial arrangements. have to accept that if the team were for overriding reasons urgently required elsewhere it would have to be withdrawn.

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　The Commander, British Forces, has forwarded a I love

　　　　　request to the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, for this proposed Moextension.

(Mr Peel) wat

LAST

outport (91)

AT:man

So do Mod & they will send was copy

NEDENTIAL

copy of the

thing to (2)

to @2). ANG!!

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MR. SAVINARA.

Rm 318.

DS. Form 4

BU. for Mr. Gaminera,

Ang

With the Compliments of

D.F.

D. F. PlangRECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES No: 63

MINISTRY OF DEFENC16 AUG 1968

Main Building, Whitball

London, S.W.I.

Whitehall 7022

HWA 13/22

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CONFIDENTIAL

Idangby ACP ho urclassified reply or reference

Instructions on completing this for tre in Office Instructions MOD Manual 2

PRECEDENCE-ACTION

ROUTINE

FOR COMMCEN USE

PRIMARY

ROUTING

PRECEDENCE

ROUT

MOD UK

FROM

Form 31

K-TIME GROUP | MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS

1.20 HUG.

TIME

OPERATOR

COPIES

DESPATCH

TIME

Te (One addressee to a line)

DEFENCE CAERATION CENTRE

16 AUG 968

INISTRY OF DEFENCE

CBF HONG KONG

HIG **RELF

HQLF HONG KONG

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION *(Messages referring to a classi- fied inc cage must be classified Restricted or above)

CONFIDENTIAL

SERIAL No. (Inserted by COMMCEN)

OPERATOR

CHECK

SECSEA21

911

Reference:

KBC/0809: OZ/SEASEC 21.

The retention of No 1 A

Information

until 31st March 1970 is approved under the s

in Hong Kong

.C fi ncial terms

as at present.

MOD (Army) are making delil à arrangements wa A H ARELF.

W 1

LAST

pre

Additional to SDL

FI (Army)

DISTRIBUTION (To include originator)

TLM DIST

Plus F/L)

FILE NUMBER

Py Przy

DRAFTER'S NAME IN BLOCK

LETTERS

DIV./DIR./BRANCH

is I5 4/0

B.C. ELGOOD

DOC

TELEPHONE NUMBER

RELEASING OFFICER'S

BUILDING:

MAIN.

EXTENSION. 6586

SIGNATURE

Page......... of

1..... Pages

refers to a classified message

This message (Tick appropriate box)

does not refer to a classified message

Note: Messages ci

DATE

NAME IN

BLOCK LETTERS

15.8.68

RANK

CONFIDENTIAL

R.N. HEARD

Captain, RN

B&S Led 51-4533

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CONFIDENTIAL

سازن

H3.13/22

SAVING DESPATCH

From the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs

To the Officer Administering the Government of

Date

27 AUGUST, 1968

No. 523 Saving.

HONG KONG,

Your saving despatch 1003 of 7 August 1968.

Army Information Team

As you have no doubt already heard from the Commander, British Forces the Ministry of Defence has agreed to the retention of the No.1 Army Information Team in Hong Kong until 31 March 1970, under the same financial terms as at present.

رهاب

27.

68.

LAST

REF.

RCF

CONFIDENTIAL

LAST PAPER

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Enclosures

File No....

нив 13/zz

DRAFT SAVINGRAM

94)

Addressed

No.

Repeated

No.

File refs.

0.a.G., Hong Kong

521

his

SAUG 1968 >

27 August 1968

Confidential...

(Insert appropriate security marking)

Your pelosomes Saving despatch 1003

Army Information Team

of rangust

1968

you

have no

doubt

Further Action

already heard from the

Commander

British Forces

the ministry of Defence

has agreed to

the

retention

of the

то

1 army

No Printing

Information Team in Hong

Kong until 31 March 1970 under

the

same

financial terms

as at present.

+45 23/8

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Reference.

6.2.69.

OSED

DATE (6.2-109 STINUED OF HICK 13/16.

(ter Army Information lean)

анкк 12/20

te Wecial Voblici

ten it-

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FOLIO NUMBERS OF TOP SECRET AND SECRET DOCUMENTS IN THIS JACKET

FORMER FILES

DARN AND

RELATED FILES

HWB 1/17 Mary Kary Wististances HWA 7/16 Economic & Financial consequendo

I Disturbances

H4B4/1 Bordes Incidents-

(3696) D. 338324 104m (2 sorts) 12/66 P.I. Gp. 610

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