FCO 21/998 Proposals for developing relations between China and UK

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............................In Confidence

Department

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PERMANENT UNDER ·

SECRETARY AND THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR: 29 DECEMBER 1972

Present:

My Jaunt,

Herewith a draft record), Fly Sing's table with the P.J.S on 29 December. have omitted bilatera questions (which were Covered in FCD N N° ¡¡76,

attached at Flag 4).

H.L..DAVISS

3/1

Permanent Under-Secretary

HE Mr Sung Chih-Kuang

H L Davies

Mr Chiang En-Chu

1. Sir Denis Greenhill said that we attached

importance to continuing a dialogue with the Chinese

Government on international matters affecting the two

countries, He mentioned in particular the questions of

Vietnam and the South Asian Sub-continent.

VIET NAM

An Davies (FED)

Many thounker. Could you please have this typed fair and distributed as you

you think fi not forgetting Ministers a...

2. Mr Sung agreed about the desirability of con-

to the tinued discussions. He asked what HMG considered/the

real intention of the United States in Viet Nam.

Sir Denis Greenhill said that he thought that the US

intention was to secure a settlement of an enduring

apponik? character which did not contain the seeds of future

Markwhich

which had arisen Julţ conflict and misunderstanding, of the sort contained in

earlier agreements. Presumably the US Government did

not feel that the point reached in the negotiations in

/Paris

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gave

CONFIDENTIAL

Paris wee of a sufficiently firm basis for a

genuinely lasting settlement. He emphasised that we

Whuth

did not know of the precise points the US Government

Mint Tholly found unsatisfactory but it seemed likely to Involved

the supervisory machinery, the number of North

Viet-flamese troops in the south, and the intentions

of Hanoi towards a separate South Vietnamese Govern-

The

ment. He acknowledged that the Chinese views as

in Persing, expressed to the Secretary of State, e. that a good

agreement does not require supervisory machinery, was

Sensible

in theory correct. Past experience however suggested

the need for some kind of effective supervisory

machinery.

3. Er Sung said he had three points to make.

First

it was his impression that the US had already reached

9 Point

a nine-point agreement with Hanoi and had now re-

tracted. He did not think that the reasons which had

that is that there were been leaked by the Americans, for this retraction, ise.

problems about supervision and the interpretation of

certain terms, were sufficient to overthrow the entire

9 Pant

nine-point agreement. Even if di sagreements existed

the negotiations should continue.

Secondly, the

wantonness of American bombing of North Viet Nam had

few parallels in history; It was indi

minate and being indixenminately braqubed.

hospitals, schools and populated areas were ineluded.

He did not know how Sir Denis felt but he personally

felt indignant.

Thirdly, if the Americans intended

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to use bombs to force concessions from Hanoi, he did not

think that this would succeed; the North Viet-flame se

would become more resolute.

4. Sir Denis Greenhill agreed that bombing was

deplorable, as we had good reason to know from our

London Blitz.

experience in the war, His view was, however, that the

9 Points

nine points were not a satisfactory basis for peace,

because of the ambiguities they contained,

Although we

did not know the detailed reasoning behind the American

Washington

decision to resume bombing, they must have concluded

that Hanoi was not prepared to make the necessary

9 Pants

the agreement improvements on the nine points to make a binding.

settlement. He was sure that Mr Sung knew that during

the bombing pause the North Viet Namese had not halted

their military activities in the southnor their military

preparations in the north. This could not have given

particular confidence to the Americans. Mr Sung drew

attention to the differing explanations for the resump-

tion of bombing given by Dr Kissinger and, the Pentagon

and frem Saigon. The Pentagon had said there was no

sign that the North was about to launch a big offensive

and Saigon had said military activities were at their

lowest.

SOUTH ASIAN SUB-CONTINENT

15.

Sir Denis Greenhill said that it was his impression

that progress was being made by India and Pakistan/over

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both

/their

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their frontier problems and/general wish to permit a

wider development of relations, but there was little

progress to report between Bangladesh and Pakistan,

help to

We were doing what we could to promote this. kr Sung

that is)

said that China and Britain had the same wish,to see

peace in the Sub-continent.

The crux

lay writte

was the POW

$1471

question and the two UN resolutions/

Sir Denis

asked if Mr Sung had any comments on the Secretary+of+

State's suggestion in Peking that Peking and Delhi

should improve their relations.

Mr Sung said that his interpretation of the

Chinese Government's position was that they wished to

maintain good relations with Pakistan and to establish

good relations with both the Indian Government and the

present Government of Bangladesh.. However, the

Chinese found it difficult to contact the Indians

before the two UN resolutions were carried out and

90,000 POWs were released. In addition, it would be

easier for China to have good relations with India

and Bangladesh when India and Pakistan, and Pakistan

and Bangladesh had normal relations again. It was not

Chinese policy(as alleged by the Indians) to support

Pakistan against India or to play one off against the

other; good relations between Pakistan and India were

also to the benefit of China, As for Bangladesh, the

Chinese position was clear. China wanted good relations

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with the people of Bangladesh. In the past China's

relaith the people of East Pakistan were more

intimate than those with West Pakistan. China

harboured no animosity for Sheik Mujibur Rahman.

Mr Sung had recently met a Bangale diplomat at a

reception, He had shaken hands with him and told him

that China used to have good relations with the people

of East Pakistan but that until Pakistan and Bangladesh

solved their problems it would be difficult for the

Chinese to make contact with the Bengales. The diplomat

replied that he knew the Chinese position well.

UNITED NATIONS

Sir Denis Greenhill enquired about Chinese reactions

to the first full session of the General Assembly at

which they had been represented.

Kr Sung said that the

thi seigent Chinese had published an editorial/in the People's Daily.

In short, they thought that there had been some

desirable changes in the UN, Member states and had had

a chance to speak up and play a role in the UN; this

was a change from situation where one or two auper

powers monopolised proceedings, But at present the UN

could not actually solve problems. Everybody needed to

make efforts to improve the situation.

RHODESIA

8. Sir Denis Greenhill agreed but said that it was a

member chatts

question of attitud

question of/attitude and not of the organisation,

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/referred

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referred to the question of Rhodesia. The extreme

attitude of African countries which was divorced from

they were blocking

人

the realities of the situation;p

a solution te

the problem which, although by no means ideal, would

provide great improvements in the position of the

Rhodesian Africans. By stressing their extreme position

the Africans were preventing a practical solution which-

would be a step in the right direction.

KIDDLE EAST

9. Mr Sung said that he had read in the press about

a speech by Hr Harold Wilson suggesting that there had

been a significant change in the British position on

the Middle East. Sir Denis Greenhill said there had

been no change in British policy since the

Secretaryfof/state's Harrogate speech in 1970.

Mr Wilson was referring to our recent vote on the

Egyptian resolution; we considered this entirely con-

morty Come

sistent with/Resolution No.242. HMG had very good

relations with Israel but we believed that the Israeli

Government were mistaken in taking so inflexible an

attitude to negotiations with Egypt. We hoped that

early in the New Year negotiations could be started

at least towards an interim solution. We were afraid

that consistent deferment of a solution would have

the same effect as A deferment of a solution in the

quarrel between Pakistan and India.

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1972

TO PRIORITY PEKING TELNO 1176 OF 29 DECEMBER/INFO GOVERNOR HONG KONG (PERSONAL) -

MI PT.

1. DURING HIS CALL ON THE PUS ON 29 DECHIBER THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR ASKED WHAT THE BRITISH SIDE HAD IN MIND FOR THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT of Sino-BRITISH RELATIONS DURING 1973.

20 GREENKILL MENTIONED FORTICOMING NÎMÏSTERÏAL VISĪTS ÎN BOTH DIRECTIONS AND OUR HOPE OF INCREASED CONTACTS BOTH COMMERCIAL AND POLITICAL WITH CHINA, HE EMPHASISED OUR DESIRE TO CONTINUE POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS ON INTERIATIONAL AFFAIRS,

3. AT THE END OF THE GENERAL DISCUSSION HIGH FOLLOWE (AND MICH CONCENTRATED LARGELY ON HITERIATIONM, MATTERS) SUNG REVERTED TO BI-LATERAL QUESTIONS. EMPHASISING THAT HE WAS SPEAKING PERSONALLY AND NOT ON INSTRUCTIONS, HE SAID THAT HE CELIEVED THAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WAS SATISFIED WITH RECENT ACTIONS BY THE HONG KONG COVERIENT AGAINST SOVIET AND KMT EPIES. THESE ACTIONS DISPLAYED A FRIENDLY ATTITUDE TOWARDS CHINA.

A SING THEM REFERRED TO THE QUESTION OF CHINESE OFFICIA. REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG, HE ENQUIRED MIETHER THERE HAD BEEN MY DEVELOPMENTS SINCE DISCUSSED MIS QUESTION WITH THE CHINESE PRIME MINISTER AID FOREIGN MINISTER IN PEKING. HE THOUGHT THE BRITISH SIDE QUOTE DID NOT FULLY UNDERSTAND AND HAD MISGIVINGS ADOUT CHINESE POLICIES AND WORKING STYLE UNQUOTE, OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG COULD ONLY HELP STABILITY IN HONG KONG AND RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND CURA: IT COULD NOT HAVE A NEGATIVE AFFECT. GREENHILL TOOK NOTH AND TOLD THE MBASSADOR THAT I WAS GIVING THE MATTER HY PERSONAL CONGIDERATION. HE EMPHASISED, HOWEVER, THE PROBLEMS MICHI THE PROPOSAL RAISED FOR US AND SAID THAT FOR THIS REASON CONSIDERATION WOULD HAVE TO DE LONG AND CAREFUL.

DOUGLAS-HOME

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FEC 3/548/8

CONFIDENTIAL

1972

TOP COPY

ORITY PEKING TELNO 1176 OF 29 DECEMBER/INFO GOVERNOR HONG KONG (PERSONAL)

MIPT.

1. DURING HIS CALL ON THE PUS ON 29 DECEMBER THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR ASKED WHAT THE BRITISH SIDE HAD IN MIND FOR THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF $1:10-BRITISH RELATIONS DURING 1973.

2. GREENHILL MENTIONED FORTHCOMING MINISTERIAL VISITS IN BOTH DIRECTIONS AND OUR HOPE OF INCREASED CONTACTS BOTH COMMERCIAL AID POLITICAL WITH CHINA. HE EMPHASISED OUR DESIRE TO CONTINUE - POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

3. AT THE END OF THE GENERAL DISCUSSION WHICH FOLLOWING (AND WHICH CONCENTRATED LARGELY ON INTERNATIONAL MATTERS) SUNG REVERTED TO BI-LATERAL QUESTIONS. EMPHASISING THAT HE WAS SPEAKING PERSONALLY AND NOT ON INSTRUCTIONS, HE SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WAS SATISFIED WITH RECENT ACTIONS BY THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT AGAINST SOVIET AND KMT SPIES. THESE ACTIONS DISPLAYED A FRIENDLY ATTITUDE TOWARDS CHINA.

4. SUNG THEN REFERRED TO THE QUESTION OF CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG. HE ENQUIRED WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1 DISCUSSED THIS QUESTION WITH THE CHINESE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER IN PEKING. HE THOUGHT THE BRITISH SIDE QUOTE DID NOT FULLY UNDERSTAND AND HAD MISGIVINGS ABOUT CHINESE POLICIES AND WORKING STYLE UNQUOTE. OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG COULD ONLY HELP STABILITY IN HONG KONG AND RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND CHINA: IT COULD NOT HAVE A NEGATIVE AFFECT. GREENHILL TOOK NOTE AND TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT I WAS GIVING THE MATTER MY PERSONAL CONSIDERATION. HE EMPHASISED, HOWEVER, THE PROBLEMS WHICH THE PROPOSAL RAISED FOR US AND SAID THAT FOR THIS REASON CONSIDERATION WOULD HAVE TO BE LONG AND CAREFUL.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES:

HEAD OF FED

HEAD OF HKIOD

HEAD OF FUSD PS

PS TO MR. ROYLE

PS TO PUS

SIR E. NORRIS MR. WILFORD

SIR D. WATSON

CONFIDENTIAL

11/10⋅

(2)

The Evans Rd. To Heavy s.r The Mask 414 You have not, I think, seen

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN

AND COMIOIMIALTH AFFAIRS AND THE CHINESE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER

AT THE ті

ISED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS AT 4.00 P.M. ON MONDAY 30 OCTOBER 1972

this.

Present:

The Rt Hon Joseph Godber [MP ·

Sir Colin Crowe

Mr M I Goulding

է:

1 Fe

Mr Ch'iao Kuan-Hua

Interpreter

Vietnam

After compliments had been exchanged about the Secretary of State's current visit to Peking, Mr Godber asked Mr Ch'iao how he saw the prospect for an early agreement in Vietnam. Mr Ch'iao said that both sides wanted a very early end to the war and had now agreed on the 9 points after four years of negotiations. There therefore seemed no need for further delay.

2. Mr Godber pointed out that Dr Kissinger had said that there were still some points to be finalised and went on to say that Mr Waldheim was anxious that the UN should play a role, e.g. in supervising the agreement. What was the Chine se attitude to this? Mr Chiao said that Mr Waldheim had raised this with him too. China however did not favour any role for the UN in supervising the cease-fire or the subsequent elections. For years the important problems in the East had been settled outside the UN (e.g. at Geneva in 1954 and 1961-2). was not impartial between the parties (for instance there were South Korean troops in Vietnam and the UN was already involved on one side in Korea) and the North Vietnamese did not like the idea of UN involvement. Mr Ch'iao had therefore advised the Secretary General not to involve himself. It would be better for the two sides to agree on other supervision arrangements. UN involvement would merely complicate matters.

The UN

3. Mr Godber agreed that it was desirable for the two sides to reach agreement as soon as possible but wondered whether thereafter the UN might not be able to help. To that extent he was sympathetic to the Secretary General's point of view. Mr Ch'iao said that he hoped Mr Godber would think further about this. The International Control Commission in Indo-China was not a happy precedent. Mr Godber said that he was reporting

/ Mr Waldheim's

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Mr Waldheim's approach to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and would take account of the views Mr Ch'iao had expressed.

Disarmament

Mr Godber then raised the World Disarmament Conference on which he had set out the British view in his speech to the First Committee. This seemed to be a matter on which there was agreement between the United States and China (Mr Ch'iao interjected "you sound like Malik"). HMG were interested

in the Argentine proposal for a study group on the WDC. Did the Chinese Government see any merit in this idea? Mr Ch'iao said that the Argentines had mentioned the idea in general terms but that he was not yet clear what the actual content of a draft resolution would be. Mr Godber said that in our view it was essential that all five nuclear powers should participate. Mr Ch'iao said that this was a point of fundamental difference between Britain and China. China was prepared to contemplate the possibility of a study group which would sound out the views of the various parties but she would find it difficult to accept that such a study group should include the five nuclear powers, partly because of the previous Soviet proposal for a conference of the five nuclear powers.

Mr Ch'iao said that on the whole issue of disarmament there were wide differences of opinion. It was in everybody's interest to try to bridge these differences and discussion at the United Nations helped towards this objective. China had certainly not reached any agreement with the United States.

Bangladesh

6. Mr Ch'iao went on to ask whether Britain could do anything to postpone discussion of Bangladesh in the General Assembly. Mr Godber pointed out that as Bangladesh was a member of the Commonwealth and Britain had recognised her we had no alternative but to support her application for membership of the United Nations. Sir Colin Crowe added that we had told the Yugoslavs /co-sponsor that we would not/support their resolution, that we did not

want a divisive debate and that we hoped they would postpone discussion of Bangladesh.

7. Mr Ch'iao said that he had discussed Bangladesh frankly with HM Ambassador in Peking and had complained that Britain had found it necessary to co-sponsor the resolution in the Security Council with the Soviet Union. However that was in the past and he had noted that Britain had adopted a more conciliatory attitude during the current session of the General Assembly. Sir Colin Crowe asked whether the Yugoslav Representative

- 2

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/ had

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had shown the Chinese his draft resolution. Mr Ch'iao said that he had not done so but that the Chinese had obtained from friends a general idea of what the draft contained. The Chinese position was that if it came to a debate there would be another quarrel; they were quite prepared for this but did not see how it would help the cause of peace and reconciliation in the sub-continent. It would be helpful if Britain could convey this point to the parties, with all of whom she was on friendly terms.

8. Mr Godber confirmed that it was our wish to be on friendly terms with India, Bangladesh and Pakistan, and that we wished to reduce tension. Feelings however were running high and time was needed for the bitterness to be eased. Sheikh Mujib needed recognition for the security of his country and a possibility of agreement seemed to lie in the return of the prisoners of war in exchange for recognition of Bangladesh. Mr Ch'iao said that he disagreed on one point of principle. Pakistan had been defeated in the war and had adopted a conciliatory attitude. It was wrong in principle for India and Bangladesh to hold the prisoners of war as hostages. China had not done this in the 1962 war and had even returned the territory she had occupied.

9. Sir Colin Crowe said that China had made it clear to all concerned that she would prefer no debate at all. But if there were to be a debate would she in all circumstances oppose the Yugoslav resolution? The Yugoslavs hoped that their resolution would make things easier for Pakistan and China. Mr Ch'iao repeated that he had not yet seen the Yugoslav draft. But if it contained no mention of the resolutions which had been passed last year, it would be very difficult for China to accept it. In conclusion it was agreed that the two delegations should keep in close touch.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London

- 3-

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Copied to:

Private Secretary

PS/Lady Tweedsmuir PS/Mr Royle

PS/Mr Kershaw

Mr Daunt

Mr Wilford

Mr Rose

FED (to enter)

SEAD

ACDD

SAD

UND

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Chanceries in:

Peking

Saigon

Washington

New Delhi

Islamabad

Dacca

UKMis New York

UKDis Geneva (in New York)

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RECORD OF CONVERSATION AT THE CHINEGE EMBASSY AT 2.30 PM ON 27 OCTOBER

l'resent:

HE Kr Sung Chih-kuang

'r Liu Keng-yuan

(First secretary)

ur Chiang En-chu (Interpreter)

Kr MD Butler

(Head of European Integration

Department)

kr H L1 Davies

(Far Eastern Department)

Er Butler outlined the decisions reached at the European

Summit. Re explained how far the communiqué reflected HG'

position on a number of questions.

2. My Lung asked Er Butler to say something about President

¡ ompidou's proposal for the establishment of a Furopean union.

kr. Butler explained that President Pompidou had made no

precise proposals. The intention was to begin to transform

the full complex of relations between our countries into a

European union. To this end the Heads of Government and

State agreed to have proposals drawn up by the end of 1975.

By that time there should have been considerable progress in

monetary and economic union, The British idea was to

proceed pragmatically towards greater unity and to get away

from the old quarrel about Federalism,

3. Er gung said that, according to the press, the sest

Germans had proposed the establishment of a permanent institution

for the dialogue between the United States and the enlarged

Community. France had opposed this and Britain had supported

France.

Was this true? Er Butler said that it was broadly

true. Our view was that this was one of the subjects which

formed part of a long-standing argument between France and the

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/rest

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rest of the Community.

pattern.

We wished to get away from this old

The important thing was to have a constructive

dialogue. The Prime Minister had therefore said that the

FTC should first agree on medium and long term foreign policy

positions. We could then speak in accordance with these to

the Americans and others; there would be no need for new

institutions.

Hz Sung said that the press had expressed the view that

the Summit was a success because it was dealing with principles

and not details; they had suggested that disagreements might

emerge next year when details were discussed. Fr Butler said

that many disagreements were possible, but emphasized that wa

now had an agreed set of guidelines which were already being

referred to. It might be difficult to reach some of the

agreements by the dates laid down, but we considered it should

be possible by hard work. In the past the Community had

always met its deadlines. The summit was probably more or

success than the newspapers had suggested. Heads of

Government and State had agreed to a set of principles, and

no-one would wish to undo the agreements reached. The logic

was that the Community would be propelled towards further

agreemonts,

5. Fr Sung asked about relations between UK and other ESO

zerbers. With which country did we have most common ground,

for instance West Germany or France? Er Butler replied that

the Prime Minister had exceptionally good relations with both

President Pompidou and Herr Brandt. Clearly there were some

issues on which we agreed with one side rather than the other.

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/In

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In our view the reason why the Community had worked was that all

members realised that by making concessions on some points they

would gain on others and that in the end all benefitted.

were no animosities at the Summit.

delegations were very good.

Relations between all

There

6. Er Liu asked how the agreement on the establishment of a

monetary co-operative Pund was to be implemented,

Fr Butler

explained that the Fund's objective was to improve the

functioning of the arrangements for fixed (but adjustable)

parities within narrow sargins.

to be settled.

Some of the details were still

DISTRIBUTION:

Private Secretary

Kr Logan

Kr Daunt

3ir T Briniow

sir E Norris

Fr ilford

Mr Robins on

Vr Wiggin

XID

FED

WED

Chanceries:

l'eking

Brussels

Paris

Bonn

· 3 -

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WEANT TOAX 6

ELR 1972, AT 11 IN

Xr AC Semua 1.

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Ky th1iao Xuan-b

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ndor said that the Vice-Rinister"

Lesti

Alor on 20 Augurt had been reported to the Foreign und Canciómenalth Office. Že vus nov instructed by his Se are vary of state thank Mr Ok1iso for this frank statement of the Chinase Government's views and to give him in return an nesouns of the British Government'a vieso. The Jearɑtury at 3ta DE particularly wished Hz Ch'ins to have this statement booKILDE hoped to meet him soon either in London or in New York.

held that for quità a long time the British. Goverment had been asking oveấy effort de bring about a meeting butusen President Emitte ini melih Mujib. La de Cà1ian imey, the zitantion had

roached na ispadnej 72saidens Mentšo vošli nos reosgnise befare bulku; thɛlih Kajib would not talk before ru cognition. The British Goverment had saad the oppori nity

of Sheikh, Jajib's

in London up to 21 August, and th Secretary of 3ṣats visited his in hospital gad tế Prine Finister had soon his skila ho ma soovaioeeing, • 'On both comsalons, and

Just before he left London, tellà tujih hot

ade it alesr

day be mated sa nest Pragidant lutio and bigin the process of poemailiation, but he insisted that President

site Zangladesh. bo ter placed then

· should like then

deterzinsi kis attitude,

my talks with

what were th In the first place

and

must first Sheikh 3xjáb ma kás point of view

wiions shieh

that he

they nei

President Bhutto esuld not

could not negotiate

agotinte sa aquale sɛhala, and this implied ¡rier roosgnition,

dly he felt that Abe damage done by the Pukioton Arny in Fongladesh had been terrible that the people of Bangladesh would not understand 11 1f

net Presidenă lutte any other basis than a eleen break alth

2009, and this aŢain 1splied "rior recognition. It was el

thắt this question of recognitions wo of the highest inportsman to him and vou a na:10 of principle.

everything we could, but he

CONFIDENTIAL

ODEFI DESFIAZ,

preli

the position of Pakistan, Kr idéia anid that President Bhutto's attitude had not bon entirely consistent and Ladood had remntly hardened. As long ago as last Kurah, President Ihutte had told the British Government that he vea villing to giw

arbaking in writing se recognise Bangladech imediately afver

seting, This showed that he had no objection of recognitiott, In fast until a for weeks ago it sermed would recognise Bangladesh quickly and without preconditions, sooned to bave changed his kind. Ve žid not know why, but

pposition might have played a part, To ascepted that he having internal difficulties bas hing'a rélations with Pakistan vers els Mỹ the Chinese could do to help Presi diffimilty of mesognition wwald er atly strengthen the hopes of all

sevålenent in the Sub-Continent.

for

not a new factor. friendly, anything us Mutha over this

With regard to the debate in the Security Council, Kr 166in

had put forward bar application for

had had no seloɛ baš te suppert it. We had alwuyu

pported and if necessary

vies of the Commonwealtà, and it was reinforced in th

the Sub-Continent and by

working tomrda a stable situatie

bangladesh had been an inspange

fed applies tioma by mamă

ve had found ourse299a 18,

à point of principle by our historical relati al role we had in

8.pport for th

we appreciated motives of sme other on-syonpore had been very differ at

these ware set considerations which we would allow enge our attitude. squally we could not be influenced

to plonss any third party.

dagi,ze

Hr Addis said that this vna

ko had been instrueted to make but he wished to explain that his instruations had boon ressived on 24 Auguet and therefore reprɛsented the British Governmenk'a vior of the silantiam an it had been son inga previously. Sings then there had been developmonta which might

be favourable.

As to the did set

in reply

ven grateful for this communiontim..

mes of the problem, it was clear that the two sides

He would like therefow to make a few brief remarka The first point he viabad to neke vas that the reasons given by theikh Mujib Žor refusing to talk to President Amtto vere not valid. Recognition of longladesh would surely be implied 12 salku besynen President Thɛɛtto and Sbeikh Mujib took place, Did not President Bhutto's declared willingness to nões meikh Mujib dop

odgement of the reality of bangladesh? China me friendly the people of sant Pakistan and oberished no 111 feelings thežih Mujib personally but there was something very stre

/about

CIPE DIPPE AL

OCHPIDERELAL

ملد

It could only be that he was being manipulated kitäin night disagres, and indeod had every right to the way the affair had daveløyed it me alear that me behind Sheikh Mujik, Ro had said that he could President Hutto unissä the latter first recognised lut me it not a fact that representatives of bai taibed with othɛrs who did not rossguise Bangladesh cab Foreign Becretary had talked with President Dixon Ɛnited_States and reangnised Bangladesh. Theikh Mujib's lasm for refusing to meet President Elutte did not stand

it was clear, is trying to make tro.bls.

regard to the attitude of Fresident Lbuttế, Hr Ch1ine laitted the truth of the Ambassador's remark that Fresident had earlier been prepared to signify in writing his willinghose Las Bangladesh," It was trua xlso that he had bɛɛn about to matter to the National Assembly in August, Mhy then bad the tion changed? President Brutée had at first thought that the

of recognition oeuld be salva: after preliminary talks,

tă vas a goatry defeated in mar, bemands were now being made that should boy hor head and resojaise Bangladesh without pralinisary talks. It vao mly natural that the people of inkissa should feel that they would not do this. Prezident Mukio w to be bilpot. Mr Ch lao mid that he kissɗlf had reosatiy vi ? Jintan and gould say that President 20u.ko's sititude renuined of resmailiation. During their dissuasions Presidant žužto hat a,id that he was still prepared to talk with Sheikh Kujib without

eomditioma. It should not be forget that President Karbo zairamed theilh kujia vithout conditions hon be soulä vell bevO adsytei " differvas polity and du måned in. should not be se ungrateful. One should be fair, whether in dealing with abounty, party or an individual, the thinese Government were quite elasṛ About the attitude of recaidens matio. They could not agree with the British viev šhad inturnal difficulties had forced him to okange his attitude or be fall inte inosasisioney, The important point was that President Ebutts still insisted that talks should take place

ind that no proklon existed which sould not be solved by talks. This attitude should be accorded respect, Zakirian was Britain's friend no much China's, (Ir išdis irdiested näsızt.) The fact

she no longer belonged to the Commncuren1th ma no reason to treat differently. The uniser had to be seen in the videst poraysosive. Pakistan vas in a difficult situation. vanis right to apply much

Vessures to a country in such ・ situation? There should be no place for this sort of tháng in international relations.

Botaning to his sarlier rusart about Sheikh Mujib's release fran detention, Hr Ch'iao stressed that theikh Mujib had pronized President Bhulte that he would open talks the causet be returned se

Xa Ch'ine said that during his swooni vials 10 1813062NE President Mitte kad offered to uber hin documentary evidente of this. He had replied that this vna not neurogazy slane he believed him,

/9.

CONTI HUSET AL

OOHTIMISTIAL

Turning to the session of the Security Counel) dabase, Œ1iao said that be wizbed the intamundor de understand that

Chinese Goverement had wanted only to postpone discussion of

lush's_ap;ligstion for kosboruhly of the UK, China mo net

Loved to adulasion as much, bas had felt that bự postponing pouasion, the possiƐility of talks taking plase between the parties

be ingraved. Unfortunately complications bad arisen and China's efforts sa achieve a post;omoment had failed, Hoverike1000, the vote had shown that other coʻntriss besides Chian would have referred to see a postponement. Two Żuropean countries, Italy

Belgian, hal supported the idea, We had three Afrissa natisnom, Britain #84 sily, the United States, kad met oppomet it. In the event, China's efforts had failed, but so too bad the revelation Lưvouring the admission of bangladesh, Er Ch'ias very skfort on his part he would still is made: and joined the Govist Csion and Tagoslovia in se'ution. ïvon df this nation backed so f

Ivich pažiny, it had helped the Soviet era extent had rum osaker to the spirit of his in. Hơ lai to say that be felt mosh Jimatisfied. the situation facing brisala was not the

in offerin

that despite why Britain oring the

and to this

preciated tha

China, ` Hyverübele de China had hoped initially that kitala right join her in offeris is néhteva z dolišion. This no doubt had saking too much, þat the Chinese Roveromint kad bezed that Brát would at least ident a neutral stand, Hovawr, not only bad met done so, she had sekuklly joined with the luscians to some ca resolution," Onoe Britain had agreed to set ne cs-3Ƒènser in this a confrontation with China via ineviMble, the Doviet Union dou2tless seen the rengintion as a means of innlating Chinn, but would not baɛpan, Kort of the Neslen neŝione sicre against admit Bangladesh in such a hurry. So were many Afriens oe ntries, në as a member of Tureneha and latin jaɑrioja natione. The Chinese Bơte :ment would not be intimidated by srbutasieu of the resolution to the Jomorni issoɛbly where it would sellest at moet 10% votos, but almost certainly fever. And in any ocne China werālā veto again vhen it ved referred back to the Security Coɛseil. Be had said as openly in Pakistan and he took the present opportunity to my so

MOKING KÝ OK ino said that he winked to say candidly that the stondy

肉 improv of relations betwen Britain and China, the exchange af

ore, the reevni visit to Chim of Ar nogle sit hopes for the afolding of omutuato bate in the bro sountries in many fields had

Chinese devermaat se kopa that in the matter of Bangladesi Britain night have stood a little more "loed. la it vas, Britain's netion had mesaed China.

The forging of the debate

and vaše in the Bearity Ceunoil nai the idea of slitting the Lagus do the tenseul. Ansembly were all part of a berish expansioKLES

adyazbago: ¿id Britain hope to memurs by standing at the side of the Bovi· € Dhalen? 2ut she hope nquiense the Soviet Valon out of the 2-b-continent?. This was hardly " wsible. LumaÉlate consequenos of Erimin's action had merely bien pull Soviet miestaita out of the fire. The Chinees side had voll satisfied with the gutome of their talks with ke aayis.

Parre!

OCHPI DERTAL

OQEII IMETI AL

There were many points upon which China and Britain did not agree but 11 had been shơm, thes there were also polake on thich they did ngr Go If things developed as they had over Bangladesh, however, of what signifiernosu ve ẽ much talks? For this reason, Mr Ch'ins said, he feLS is nebenonry to speak freakly. He izvunded_te'apask equally frankly he met the raretary of State, therɩ Bangladesh rea sunearned,

ko driven by ng ulterior motiv ́s and could therefore say spoily

felt. Her sály àîn van te kantat in the areation of

Lone im uhlah saliks between the parties donetrasi, including (adia, anuld make lase, China bort ne ill feeling towards india that

ild rớt be readily di600)

10.

aly

rele of India, MP Oh 113) and something had to

been adopted by

implemented. If things continued do they bankruptay at the Vll.

said that resointiene be done to see that they are at prescah, thé Caian had roanast fær

Ghandi as Prime Minister of India but the Inet remained that helding in de ention seme 90,000 Zukistami, prisoners of waz, had been anić soneubero thes the release of these prisoner: would four divisions to the čakistani szny, but bad net India, through her *

ande with bangladesh, increase; her payslation by 70 million? Why devain the printers of war? It van moet unreasonabis. During the fighting vith India in 1958 China had captured two brigades of Indian troops, what had sho' dana vith them?" the had slanned their trucks and rifles for shư and then sent then land to India. Res Shanii

remember this and rescuelier har tyrabians of the Pakistani ore of vær. 1-2 motive in bolding them aspoured so be to bring pansouro to bear ›

the

-risoners and the Vanèmár prot

handed down from relazed ninosphocho fought dié van a var.

ti.

tro.ble

She had talked in car breath about

biri the latter was an old dispute be settled pousefully in a

that the Indians the ght they

had been fought for them by lipe this. If things vent on

14 gain it" Britain would not gɛis such, It she had pönetimă întors

11. Loseeking that chat be had said a. the dee.rity Council fabase ma te same extent past hisɔery, sinee Chisa had already used her vote, är Ch'ine mail that Chinese Government hayed that if ENTETİK PAM raise the laque in the General. Anambly Chimm

would notogLEN LANA Shina: Ivus ocntreating one another, had not understood Britain's attitude in joining the Soviet Valom Ölmi, ezber the leo pity Council's riselction, bars she hoped that 2sitäin ve.24 oekt lirie tokaşk TAKELITATE Mmet talks" between

Donearmed. If the 3 ziles penevymed would talk and resek emont, Chim and britain ve li both be squally musistioi, and there

be na nova for accusations and counterwa-ednations in the UX.

ms to be a debate, be it, but China for her part did not

Kr Ch'iso stressed again that China had no interests de

to purposes of her own in the Jub-continent. If the vozes an varot and the Joviet Inte sooured complete control of the

/tab-continent

OGEFİ DERVLAK

Bub-continent it could not kn helped. If she were to use the

itiment sa n kane for an atinok en Chian, that could not be helped either.

12.

nder said that he thought that on the central 12v va allarga measure of Agremnant between the two doverments, zoth wanted to do what they sould to help the parkins cones.bed dismiss a procedu...s for settling outstanding questions the Bul-sontiment, loth wished to prevent the expantion on the Jud-soniinant of Sevias ixkinanas. The diffe.oneɑs that had arison bet son Britain and China had been over methods, tixing prosedure, not over sina and objestivum. do regrettøể thus à LOLOLO of confrontation ånd ovvurred in the Bosurity Coumeil. dɔ would havs preferred to avoid it, but given that the of Bangladesh žai

forvarð we had no alternative but

Ang muid that ko novopted the first point, bat not the sanone 17% sada's support for hangisisah's appliestien vika undara ...) ndahinj her joining the Joyisi önlen in no-specsoring

isaing replied that while Britsin kod net înşet for the company Min had been obliged to hooy, her apocial zalakionakip with Sungladesh and her aim of ambieving reconciliation be tiden. ths" pactis benoemted had left her no alternative but to tecke the

13.

be miing said he would like to ng aɛada VRAS

sere general way to Me Merzak, the Jailog Xingdom. Dolagat la lơn Terk het propagated the vis cha? Chinh mưulid not go to the lengths of using her vete,

PULER. ANTAMALion on mia ykich he would be ready, to žive

tratury...af "itate, 11 ma satimiy falas to

TÍCH

hear it suggested that the "zilət

kazen

devorisent kuor full vell that Clins would use her vete rezolutely, they had provvidad to se-mpuksee the reaal-tion, mering that 29 sould not suspect. chavers kritain's mukjratívu intexason, may have been been, objestivaly she zvanih had been that she had joined the scvi.3 Unica. Pha dubsaneder replied that he was surprised te

Lagion Delegation had spread He had nota ne reports from How Tõrk to support this vine l as glad that kư Cất ino bud

ponožudad his skin remarks with the muggertion that Britain and (hias abo:lê vork together towards reomciliation. In the

23.58 una uhas the britisk Gerezanurt alno vinted. The latest av diabin infomation appeared to offer a 15÷tig -naosvaginext. sanording to a savé report of 5 September/250 ting ́n report from 26lt of the day befers, the Banglné vah

Kladney had said that his sountry va ready to nagetinio ith Pakistan if the latter would define its attitude or, secerding to an alternativ. varsion, iis territorine. the report Yas not alsar, but it night perhaše lažlozbe mace progress," kg Chẳng said that he hoped that was so. ile kaped the Briti à dove naenk #o.16 sontimus their offerta. heir fificzne with Bangladesh wa perkasa grester than with India, There was an old C. mese saying about onarying on fighting whila beth aime were tied behind one's brak. that it meant var that anybody pashed into a corner

/WOUL

BORTY TREEI AL

COMFY DEETIAZ

would fight. Reliance en eutside feroes to bally and mwiliade

Is seek reacting only of Pakistan was a short-sighted (91109. irmediate interasta. In the long run nothing would be gained, The Chinese Government for their part fully miṛported_Président Mhutho's attitude to rummoiliation, as he had made clear in his speech at Islambat,

Xr Ch'ian repented his view tåxt inplementation of last- Jour's UI Zacolution had been prevented by the attitude of India and Bangladesh, who now talked not only of the recognition of Bangladesh, buì of a witlement in Juch-X:mimir sa prior conditions for talks. The question of the Pakis-mi prisoner's eť var had been linked with a final settlement in Jumam --Kiumbai 1.2"% 12 india md Jengladesh were to stick to this position ther would be ne vey out, and tension in the 3:5-Cortinent would pentinua. Chẳng had ne direct antnot with Zangladesh, nor did she intend to ope- diret centrot at present, ca the older hand Britain was in belo and would giv. the louders of danglade sh ker ndvice. Ye_2441" said that doma"ltation between the British Bop-Iraent and the în "Ladosh Revezmuent ma a continuing prošení,

15.

Kr ištis muid that he vnd under further instr.etions te a Comunalestión en the ribject of Karva. Za vas ready to at once if Er th1ise viabelj er he could make the munieștian at a separa's posting with, the Assistant foreign Finies.r. Kr.ChVino mid he world be glad to receive the

Paisation 255, Koláždia muid thai the British forırtment

Hint vished to give the Calpe ● Uɔvuraamt advance notice that on the request of the So.th Førvan Governmeus they had agreed to propose in the Deneral Committee that discission of the Körsan itone on

They sims santed the provisional agenda should be deferrei,

explain to the Chinese Goverment why they had reached this decision. ve hoped that early swogress va ld be made in tha tuo robe of talks between the two parts of Korea, the Red Cross talka

The Co.th Zeruans were OʻT and the int"r-Jovernmental talks.

¡rienda, and we judged tha. they would be loog ready to make positive and constrictiva asntribution in the talks if the two Úll bodies on which they had dependet for so long for their s,284 of sun.rity,vkCisa and the ull Coc, andywers in any way threatened, The Algeriška resol/tion, which the Chinese Government supportež, would lost pæreinily to an attack on the posities of JAGUIX ma

Và did not see how it soŭld be argued that a debate in the ill at this time would help the prozem of reunification. Cs til osztrary, a debate would surely stimulado

the old füure and the unhelpful refignes which we knew fron puši, at a tine stez xhuỷ ve yanted coat was to heig for ará proosza si reponciliation . therefore falt that defernent

be helpful and vald emirikute të progresa soveria

Indevu the progress alɛckly made night net Leen possible if thore ånd boon a debate last year in the funeral isomħħly, As regards Saviion, we thougų" 11

COEPT PRETLA..

/wo 14

CONFERENTI AL

would be baster to take the low:y on a miter of prosedur. im bài Druered Goma,teɩm tham to hamu, a fulladrone debuts in the General kasanbly.

ft. KE Mliss thanked ir žádia for this adviços notion of STARIS), GEVcument's intention. No muất hè veld prvi z met Comment incediately. Dimension of the question soulé. De santined It How Torka

17.

jšia asked Xe Ch'ias if there

ponsibility of his

stem: 12g"54"In London an the way to or frui Hoa Tørk, ENCHA implied that it would not be possible for kin te vinit London kid vẩy to New York, "s he had too much to ốc tạp Peking. IS night Lowever do possible on his way hana. Ka asked vžen the Geertany of State we-là le ip New York. Endžia neid that vo: 24 make enquiries. Ko nakid Kự Ch•iảo Kale yet knew his pan desat, Mr. Shiing said that be expected te va in Ber Tork_by the ・nd of Se tenter and welld like to most the Bearyturn of Stame the if concible. He had had netwe". In the post with the

•

ory of Stað, who mo as old friend.

FED. FOD

55f1or of the Political Lävi::er Hong Kong DYKIS New York

QORF I DESELAL

Minister

Thiseen

good start.

A.R

C. AVIC IN

VIRY NA TO

We have now reached agreement for you to nold a lunch in honour of Mr. Sung. It seems that the best day would be Tuesday, 26 September, and we have ascertained that Lancaster House is available for the function.

I have thought out a suggested guest list, and wonder whether you would care to cast your eye over it.

Host: Mr. and Mrs. Anthony Royle

Guest of Honour:

H.E.Mr. and Mrs. Sung Chin-Kuang

Guests: H.E. Mr. and Mrs. Walter Annenberg,

FEL 358

Is this alright?

(w.!! w."

Heads of 4 BDAC, Romboyce

CS. Ch. Sir Harold thompson

RA_Ser Zuma Raton

5391 for July Kerada

U.S. Ambassador

H.E. Monsieur and Madame Jacques

Beaumarchais, French Ambassador

Gie John and Ludy Keewick, Sino-Britisn

Trade Council

& the G. Tuttle

Cip George and Lady Edwards, Britis

Aircraft Corporation

Ø-Sip-Arr:old Hull, Hawker Siddeley

The Rt. Hon. John and Mrs. Davies, D.T...

6-37th The Talium The 1), mask

Viar

X Mr. and Mre. Mionaci Heseltine,

D.T.I.

Mr. and Mrs. Poi Tšlen-chang, Counsellor,

Chinese Embassy

Interprets for Pei Mr Chi

Chiang En-chu, Attacné, Chinese Embassy (Interpreter)

a ins

• Mr. Yu Ex-kuang, Head of New China News

Agency

O The Rt. Hon. Jeremy Thorpe

Mes.

The Rt. Mor, and Hes, Denis Houley

The Rt. Hon.. Michael and Mrs. Stewart

Sir Joan and Ludy Rogers " P.

✔o Lord and Lady Trevelyan, British Museum 235-4503

Professor and Mrs. C.H. Phillips, Director of

the School of Oriental and African Studies

O Sir Denis and Lady Greenhill

✓

Sir Eric and Lady Norris

X Hr. Richard Evers

Private Secretary

Kiss Árjola liatcher

Mus

Logan.

I am suggesting about 40 names, but we are limited to about 34 by the accommodation.

ходим за з Whey

31 July, 1972

Maer Mis Adam Batten M.C.

Vom

Селства

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Mifol Wekt

M.F. Forrester

Нате

* 17.7" Alan Hare.

n" #Z $、os,、(༠༢-ia+"-、-)

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John Lane

3/16

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH EMBASSY

FEXING

7 August 1972

[letter plans relevant perm] CCSA) (paras 8-10

(NENAD (paren 11-13)

Enter reabout

LODED (8-16)

H L1 Davies Esg TED

300

Dear ligh

PUSD 5

LATED! While record

4RD

ROLFETY

KEETING TITH ASSISTANT NINISTER FOR FOREIG: SF.IRS

then Mrilelay

The Jenne Подей

to see

1. I enclose under cover of this letter two copies of the full record of the Ambassador's meeting on 27 July with Assistant Minister Chang Wen-chin. The substance of Chang's remarks on international issues us transuitted on 28 July in our telegrams 752-757 inclusive.

2. I am sorry to say that copying facilities here remain virtually non-existent and that I must ask you again to kindly undertake both local and, where appropriate, overseas distribution.

(T H Preston)

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2D OF A MEETING AT THE "IZISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

IRSDAY, 27 JULY 1972, AT 9.30 a.E.

HM Ambassador

Mr H Morgan

Fresent:

Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs Er Chang Wen-chin

Kr Wang Fen-chou

Mr T H Preston

Mr Chang I-chlin

Mr Yeh Wei-hsin

1. The Assistant Minister said that he had seen a report of the recent meeting between Er Royle and the Chinese Ambassador, Mr Sung. They appeared to have had an interesting discussion, continuing the talks begun during Mr Royle's visit to China. Mr Royle had made a number of positive proposals which the Chinese side were now studying. Mr Chang added that he had just seen a Hsinhua report of a meeting the previous day between Mr Sung and the Secretary of State and Xr Davies. The Embassy's report of this meeting had not yet been received in the Foreign Ministry, but presumably it had been in the nature of a courtesy call by Mr Sung, in which case discussion would have centred on bilateral matters.

The Ambassador said that he proposed, with Mr Chang's agreement, to leave bilateral matters for discussion on a separate occasion with Mr Yang Tung, and to use the present occasion to continue the exchange of views on international matters begun during r Royle's visit. In the two months since Kr Royle's visit there had been interesting and important developments in a number of countries: in Korea, the Joint North-South Announcement of 4 July; in Japan, the formation of a new government; in the Sub-Continent, the Simla Agreement; in the Mediterranean, the very importent amouncement by President Sadat of the expulsion from Egypt of Soviet advisers and technicians; and finally, from Europe, the visits to China of Schumann and Dr Schroeder.

CONFIDENTIAL

/KORKA

CONFIDENTIAL

KOREA

3. Kr Addis reminded Mr Chang that on the day of the publication of the Joint Agreement (4 July) the British Government had issued a statement welcoming the successful outcome of the talks between North and South Korea as a most important development. Hr Addis said that he took a close personal interest in the Korean question. After leaving China in 1950 he had worked for nearly four years in the Foreign Office as an assistant in the Department dealing with China and Korea. He had regretted, in 1953, after the signing of the Armistice, that it had not been possible to move on to the political conference to which the terms of the Armistice had looked forward. Again, in 1954, it had been a matter of regret to him, as a member of the British delegation to the Geneva Conference on Korea, that it had not been possible for that Conference to achieve a successful outcome. The news, after nearly 20 years, that the two parts of divided Korea had now got together and taken the first step towards an agreement between themselves was, therefore, particularly welcome. It seemed however that this was only a first step in what would necessarily be a long process. Britain of course knew the southern part of the country better than the north; nonetheless she was aware that on both sides misgivings and fears existed that could only be overcome slowly. However, the Joint Agreement was a first step, and Britain was glad that it had been taken.

4. Er Chang said that the Chinese Government also welcomed the Joint Agreement. Their attitude to it he been indicated, first, in an article in the Feople's Daily and, subsequently, in the speech delivered by Prime Minister Chou En-lai on 9 July at the banquet in honour of the visiting South Yemeni government delegation. It appeared to be a feeling common to both China and Britain that the inability of the two parts of Korea, after so long a period of division and war and even after the signing of an Armistice, to agree to maintain contact with one another and move forward towards unity was regrettable. The Ambassador would remember well the policy of Er Dulles, which had been to obstruct even the most minor agreement between North and South. This was the reason why no useful result had been achieved at the Geneva Conference. At last, however, even the United States had come to see that Mr Dulles's policies towards China and the Far East in general were divorced from reality. The desire of the Korean people for national unity and to shake off outside interference was now growing more and more powerful This was a good thing, but it was only the first stage in a very long process.

CONFIDENT IAL

15.

CONFIDENTIAL

3 -

Er Chang said that, in general, foreign reaction to the developments in Korea had been favourable. Efforts towards reconciliation between North and South would have to depend mainly on the Korean people themselves, but other countries should, wherever possible, help the process, and not obstract it. He recalled that Vice-Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua had suggested to Hr Royle that Great Britain and China should consider together what they could do to help forward the process of Korean reconciliation. We should now look forward to the handling of the Korean issue at this year's UN General Assembly. The Chinese Government held the view that the Korean question should be discussed this year. Thirteen countries, led by Algeria, had already tabled a resolution supporting the inclusion of the Korean question on this year's General Assembly agenda. The Chinese Government welcomed this. Mr Royle had said that he would report the views of the Chinese Government on the Korean question to the British Government. Had the British Government yet formed a view, or was the question still under consideration? Er Aliis replied that as far as he was aware the question was still under consideration. He then sked Mr Chang if what he had just said meant that the Chinese Government supported the 13-nation Algerian resolution. Mr Chang said it did. Mr Addis remarked that this appeared to represent a new development. He would sec that it was reported to his Government.

5. Er Addie, said, in conclusion, that 1 8.ened to him that the Koreans were setting about the next ste, tovaris reconciliation in the right way, concentrating on extending the talks between the two Red Cross Organisations so as to facilitate the exchange of messages between families, etc. Mr Clang relied that he shared the Ambassador's view.

CONFIDENTIAL

JAPAN

CONFIDENTIAL

-4

JAFAN

7. Hr Adiis said that, while he himself had little to say about the formation of the new government in Japan, he would be grateful for Er Chang's views on the appointment of Er Tanaka and Kr Öhira. Mỵ Chan; reminded the Ambassador that Tanaka's, like Sato's before it, 798 a Liberal Democratic Party government. It had stetel that its general policy would remain unchangol. Nonetheless, Tanaka seemed to have recognised that tincs ka? changed and that new steps were necessary. On policy towards China he differed from Sato in that he appeared to be taking an "active attitude". He had stated on several occasions that he hoped to realise the normalisation of relations between the two countries as soon as possible. The views of the new Government had been reflected to some extent by recent Japanese visitors to Feking, though these latter did not represent the Japanese Government. Similarly, from the Chinese side, contact had recently been made in Tokyo both with the new Foreign Minister, Ohira, and with the new Minister-Without-Portfolio, iki, but these contacts too had been non-governmental. They might help to promote the normalisation of relations between Japan and China, but they were no substitute for contacts between the two governments. Whether and when these took place would depend on how the situation developed. It was apparent that the extreme right- wing in Japan did not welcome the momentum of the Tanaka Government towards normalisation, and extremists in the Liberal Democratic Party, including men like Kishi and Kaya, had been making a major effort to sabotage the trend towards normalisation. China for her part welcome the desire of the Japanese Jovernment to normalise relations; but the latter so far had taken no concrete steps. Their attitude wa B positive, but at the ange time prudent and careful; Tanaka had to maintain a balance between the verious points of view. It had been reported that he would meet President Nixon in Hawaii in late August or early September. According to the foreign press the main subjects to be discussed were economic relations between Japan and the US and the normalisation of relations between Japan and China. These foreign press reports were probably well based. Japan was still very closely allied to the United States, whose agreement would be nogled before any major move could be mr.de At the same time Japan was also preparing for talks with the Soviet Union it: a view to concluding a Peace Treaty. Thus, as could be seen, Japan was now engaged in simultaneous activities in a number of directions. Hr Addis commented that Vice-Minister Ch'iao Kuan- hua had said to Kr Royle that Japan now stood at the crossroads.

CONFIDENTIAL

/Developments

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

Developments since thst meeting had seemed to reinforce

this view. Hr

Mr Chang sai that he agreed. Hr Addis said that as far as relations between Japan and China were concerned the next move seemed to be the establishment of official contact between the two rovernments. Nr Cheng agreed that this was the "trend". Er Addis referred to newspaper reports that Er Tanaka or r Ohira or both might visit Peking before the end of September. Er Chang said that he had not seen these reports, but thought a decision on this could not be taken before Tanaka peceived the agreement of the Americane in Hawaii. He might be wrong about this, but it was what he felt. Kr is said his own impression was that Japan was capable of making her own decisions without first obtaining the permission of the United States. Mr Chang replied that Japan's relations with the United States vere so deep that she could not break free. The "overhead diplomacy" of the United States last year had led some people in Japan to suggest that Japan should engage in the same sort of thing, but in his, Mr Chang's, opinion the Japanese would lack the courage to do this, because they knew the United States would only go over their heads once again. Ir Addis said that it was right to recognise that Japan's relations with the United Sates were very deep and would continue to be so even though Japan might adjust its position with regard to China. Mr Chang commented that he understood Mr Heath would be going to Japan in September. Mr Addis confirmed that this

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Kr Addis said that he wished to make a short statement on the Simla Agreement. As in the case of Korea, the British Government welcomed the improvement in relations between India and Pakistan. They regarded the Simla Agreement as the first step and as laying a helpful foundation for further progress towards a general settlement. A particular merit of the Simla Agreement was that it separated the problems of Kashmir and the West from other issues, such as that of the FO75, which also affected Bangladesh and were thus of a tripartite nature. A start had been made on bilateral issues between India and Pakistan. It was to be hoped that this would be followed by progress on trips rtite issues, Recognition of Bangladesh by Pakistan would help forward discussion of tripartite matters. The holding of an eventual tripartite summit meeting was some thing to be looked forward to.

9. Ir Chang thanked the Ambassador for this account of the British Government's view of recent events in the Sub-Continent. He id the Chinese Government also saw the Simla Agreement as first ste, towards a relaxation in relations between India and Pakistan ani believe it deserved welcome, especially since agreement had been reached that troops on the India/West Fakist n border should be drawn back. This would help towards a relaxation of tension. The Chinese Govement had noted that Fresident Bhutto had adhered to the principles upon which he had always insisted, while at the same time making efforts towards relaxation.

10. Ir Chang said that the Chinese Government for their part supported the relevant UN resolution. Vice-Minister Ch'ião Kuan-hua had made this point during his talks with Mr Royle. The most important aspect of the UN resolution was the demand that troops should be withdrawn from occupied territories. Nothing had yet happened on this. Indin still detained several hundred thousand Pakistani POWs. This was entirely unreasonable. Fossibly the Indians were attempting in this way to Hackmail Pakistan. If so, it was a tactic China opposed. Relations between Pakistan and East Bengal were a matter for Pakistan alone. China would not intervene. China had not recognised Bangladesh, nor had she considered doing so. How could she when Rangladesh had not yet been recognised by Pakistan? The Chinese Government adhered to last year's UN resolution. Until Indian troops were withdrawn from occupied territory and until such questions as that of the F078 were settled, it would be

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impossible for China to adopt any other stond. The reason for this was very simple. Last year China bad raised her hand in support of the UN resolution. If within a year she were simply to abandon it, her membership of UN would lack all significance. One did not support a resolution today and then refuse to recognise it tomorrow. The fact that over 70 countries had now recognised Bangladesh made no difference to the policy adopted by China. In conclusion, Ir Chang remarked that India and Pakistan had now held bilateral talks; the problems between Pakistan and East Bengal should equally be settled between the two parties. Nr Addis said he entirely agreed.

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KIDDLE EAST

11.

Vr Aldis said that he wished to say something about President Sadat's decision to invite the Soviet Union to withdraw its military advisers from Ecypt. The British Government had known for some time pest of the increasing strain in relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union, for which there seemed to be three main reasons: dissatisfaction in Egypt with the failure of the Soviet Union to supply important offensive weapons; a rather more gener 1 sense of frustration at the lack of forward movement with regard to the Arab-Israeli dispute; and, in the higher ranks of the Egyptian armed forces, a widespread dislike of the Joviet militery advisers. Against this general background of political relations between the two countries there must have been pressure on Fresident 3adat from within the armed forces to ask the Russians to withdraw. At the same time Fresident Sadat was also perhaps trying to buy time for the survival of his régime.

12. Mr Addis said that, as the British Government understood it, there were three categories of Soviet military presence in Egypt: Soviet training staff and advisers attached to the three Services; Soviet personnel involved in Egyptian air defence; and autonomous Soviet military units, e.g. fighter squadrons, the maritize air squadron and Soviet naval personnel at Egyptian ports. If President Sadat's statement was taken at its face value that all Soviet experts and advisers were to be withdrawn, this would mean about 7,000 out of a total Soviet military presence in Egypt of between 15-20,000. There had, however, been some reports suggesting that only the advisers were to be withdraw and that the instructors would remain. In that event the effect would be much less. It was not yet clear whether the President's announcement should be considered as the prelude to a request for the withdrawal of the autonomous units. It was clear, however, that it is important for both the Egyptian and Soviet Governments that they should reach some sort of agreement between themselves. It was to be expected, therefore, that import int negotiations would take place between them. It was possible that Fresident Sadat had deliberately taken the present tough stand in order to strengthen his bargaining position. There were thus still many uncertainties, but plainly the Soviet Union hal suffered a severe setback which would have imlications for their policy in the Middle East gencrally. As to the possibility of a furtier Arab-Israeli war, it scemed on the whole that the effect of the 1resident's statement would be to make the resumption of fighting leas likely. It was bound to increase strains ithin the country. It would be welcome to the High Command and to the middle classes, but not to the radical elements or to the younger officers of the armed forces.

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13. Mr Chang said that what the Ambassador had said in the earlier part of his remarks coincided more or less with the appreciation of the Chinese Government. The Chinese Government saw the affair as an expression of the discontent felt by the Egyptian people and Government at the role of the Soviet Union in their country. China had long pointed out that while Egypt might have been accepting aid from the Soviet Union for the purpose of safeguarding her independence and sovereignty and resisting Israeli aggression, the Soviet Union was sure to try to exploit the opportunity to exercise control over Egyptian affairs. It had been impossible to imagine that Egypt would accept such control in exchange for help in countering aggression from Israel. It had therefore been entirely predictable that something of the present sort would happen. The Chinese Government of course had had some personal experience of the character of Soviet aid, although they had never received it on the same large scale. But they could well imagine the reactions of the Egyptians. President Sadat had

teken a very brave decision which might entail certain difficulties, but no matter how wide the effect of his decision to ask for the withdrawal of Soviet military personnel, the direction of his move was correct. What he had done was in the interests of the Egyptian people; the Egyptian people had therefore welcomed it. The Chinese Government were aware of this from their contacts with friends in the area. As far as future developments were concerned, Egypt was far from China and China was less familiar with the Kiddle East than Britain; the points made by the Ambassador were therefore most helpful. It seemed, however, that neither the Soviet Union nor Egypt wanted the latest step to be irrevocable. Meanwhile the United States seemed to be adopting the prudent attitude of making no comment. The British and French Governments seemed to be taking a similar prudent line. The attitude of Israel was less clear. The Egyptians claimed to have shot down an intruding Israeli aircraft, but the Israelis denied this, and there had been no repercussions. It looked as though the situation would remain calm.

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GERVAITY

14. Er AMia commented that there was no need for him to say anything, or to ask puestions, about the recent visit to China of Schumann. Nr Chang would know that the British had been in close touch over this with their French friends. Dr Schroeder's visit, however, was a rather different matter, since there was course no permanent West German representative in Feting. Kr Addis sail that he was aware that Dr Schroeder's visit had been an unofficial one and that he had come to China with no mandate to speal for the West. German Government. Nevertheless he would appreciate Mr Chang's comments, in the light of the visit, on the state of Sino-West German relations and on China's attitude to the question of German representation at the UN.

15. Mr Chang said that Dr Schroeder had visited China in his capacity as Chairman of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee. His visit had not been authorised by the West German Government. Nevertheless, the question which clearly had most interested him had been that of the establishment of formal relations between the two countries. He had wanted to know whether China desired the establishment of relations and, if so, on what terms. There had of course been no question of negotiating with Dr Schroeder, but he had been told that China's terms for recognition of Test Germany were the same as for all other countries, namely acceptance of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. Otherwise, so far as China 798 concerned, there was no barrier. Dr. Schroeder had remarked that there was equally no barrier on the West German side, since the Federal Government neither had relations with, nor recognised, Taiwan.

Now it

16. Mr Chang said that the speed with which relations between the two countries were established depended upon the West German Government. In the past they had said that they were in no hurry to adjust relations with China before the readjustment of their relations with the Soviet Union. was the general election which was making their intention difficult to divine However, China, for her part, was in no hurry. Mr Chang commented that Dr Schroeder had scened to understand the Chinese position, and had promised to make efforts on his return to Germany in favour of improved relations. This was an attitude to be welcomed.

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17. Hr Chang said that due to the very little contact there had been between China and Test Germany, the t÷lks with Dr Schroeder had gone on for rather a long time. Both sides had needed to acquaint the other with their positions on various questions. The question of representation of the tvo Germanies at the United Nations had been among the matters discussed. China's attitude to this was very simple. In reality there were two Germanies; both should therefore be represanted.

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13. Fr A lis said there was one more question of a rather different nature which he wished to take the opportunity to raise. This my the question of visits and travel in Ching by himself and members of his staff.

It was unnecessary to argue with Mr Chang the importance of Embassy staff getting to know China: it was common ground between Kr Chang and himself that this was an important aspect of the Embassy's work. In practice however members of the Embassy found themselves in an under-rivileged position. Unofficial, short-tera visitors to China, even those from Great Britain, secmed to be allowed to visit places and institutions to which members of the Embassy were not permitted ucceвs. His Philippinend American friends came here on unofficial visits and were granted facilities that were denied to the Embassy. For example, he had himself suggested visiting the North-East but was told it was not possible. Yet a Philippine friend was able to visit Shenyang and other places. Again, Trofessor Jerome Cohen told Ir Addis of his visit to Peking University, while

r Addis's own request to visit the University was outstanding for nearly six months. He mentioned these two examples merely by way of illustrations. Again, making the comparison with his own and Mr Morgan's experience 15 years ago, the present situation was much less favourable and the restrictions much greater. For example, in the period between 1954-1957 he had himself made extensive tours in the North-East, in Central China and in the South-West. Other British colleagues had visited these and other areas. During the last six months before his departure from China in 1957 he had visited a total of 18 universities or institutes of higher education. Against this he had been in China now for six months and apart from one brief visit with Mr Royle to Tsinghua University had not been able to visit any universities. It was not his wish to waste the time of Mr Chang on the details of the matter, but he did wish to raise the general question of access and visits. If a general instruction could be issued that requests should be met in so far as circumstances permitted, this would be most helpful.

19. Mr Cheng said that he fully understood the Ambassador's dosire to know more about China. It was 18o right that the Ambassador had brought out the point that it had been possible to travel more widely 15 years ago than it was now. In recent years, of course, the Cultural Revolution d taken place and many departments and institutions were still undergoing

As a result their capacity and ability to

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receive foreign guests was limited. However, this state of affairs would probably not continue much longer. There would be a gradual expansion of the number of places and institutions open to foreigners. For example, this year's diplomatic tour had included Loyang and Tachai, whereas last year's tour had not. It was right of course that diplomats should go to more places. But efforts had also to be made to enable short-term visitors to Bee 58 much 19 possible of China and it had perhaps been assumed that because diplomats remainel in Peking a long time they could afford to be more patient. When asked by the Ambassador how long this patience was expected to last, Mr Chang replied thot it was difficult for him to give a precise answer. Access had already been expanded, and special access had occasionally been allowed in special circumst.nces. For instance, the Canadian Ambassador, who hil been born in Kunming, had wished to re-visit that city. He had been allowed to do so. A further consideration was that the Diplomatic Corps had now grown quite large. However he was willing to admit that not enough was being one in respect of access for diplomats and since the Ambassador had raised the question he would try and see that more was done. Mr Addis said that it sometimes seemed that there was discrimination against resident diplomats. Ir Chang said that it was not the policy of the Chinese Government to refuse diplomats access to places and institutions. He imagined the problem was that the departments concerned thought it better to try and receive then at a later date. The intention was to gradually expand access, but it was impossible to say definitely when a particular place or institution would be opened or, in general, how wide this expansion of access would be. There were difficulties about issuing a general direction in concrete terms, but as far as specific visits were concerned contact could be made with the department concerned to see what might be done. Er Addis thanked Er Chang for allowing him to make his point and sai that having made it he would not pursue it further.

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20. Kr Chang remarked that the questions raised by the Ambassador during the course of their conversation were major questions of interest to both Britain and China. As he was not well prepared he did not propose to take advantage of the present opportunity to raise any questions of his own. He would like to propose instead that he and the Ambassador should have a further conversation on another occasion. Kir Addig said he would find it very valuable to continue with Mr Chang their discussion of international matters.

21. "r Chang said he thought it right that the Ambassador should discuss bilateral matters with Er Wang. He explained that West European and American Department was soon to be divided with Mr Yang becoming Director of the new West European Department. Once he had had an opportunity to study the outcome of the recent discussions between Mr Royle and Ambassador Sung, Mr Wand would be happy to meet the Ambassador to lacuse outstanding bilateral issues. Some of these bilateral issues might be settled quickly; others would need further discussion.

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COR OF A FISTIKO AT THE MIDISTRY

ON THURSDAY. 27 JULY 1972. AT 9.30 8.1.

PORZION APPAIRS

H I Ambassador

Mr I H Morgan

Present:

Assistant Kinister for Foreign Affairs Mr Chang Wen-chin

Er Wang Pen-shou

HrTH Preston

Mr Chang I-chün

Ir Yeh Tei-hain

The Assistant Minister said that he had seen a report of the recent meeting between Mr Royle and the Chinese Ambassador, Mr Sung. They appeared to have had an interesting discussion, contiming the talks begun during Ir Royle's visit to China. Er Royle had made a number of positive proposals which the Chinese side were now studying. Mr Chang added that ke had just seen a Hsinkus report of a meeting the previous day between Ir Sung and the Secretary of State and Ir Davies. Tha Kubassy's report of this meeting had not yet been received in the Foreign Ministry, but presumably it had been in the nature of a courtesy call by Ir Sung, in which case discussion would have centred on bilateral matters.

The Ambassador said that he proposed, with Mr Chang's agreement, to leave bilateral matters for discussion on a separate occasion with Ir Wang Tung, and to use the present occasion to continue the exchange of views on international matters begun during Vr Royle's visit. In the two months sinoe Ir Royle's visit there had been interesting and important developments in a number of countries: in Korea, the Joint North-South Announcement of 4 July; in Japan, the formation of a new government; in the Sub-Continent, the Simla Agreement; in the Mediterranean, the very important amouncement by President Sadat of the expulsion from Egypt of Soviet advisers and technicians; and finally, from Europe, the visits to China of I Sohumaa and Dr Schroeder.

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KORRA

3. Kr Addis roninded Mr Chang that on the day of the publication of the Joint Agreement (į July) the British Government had issued a statement welcoming the successful outcome of the talks between North and South Korea as a most important development. Mr Addis said that he took a close personal interest in the Korean question. After leaving China in 1950 he had worked for nearly four years in the Foreign office as an assistant in the Department dealing with China and Korea. He had regretted, in 1953, after the signing of the Armistice, that it had not been possible to move on to the political conference to which the terms of the Armistics had looked forward. Again, in 1954, it had been a matter of regret to him, as a member of the British delegation to the Geneva Conference on Korea, that it had not been possible for that Conference to achieve a successful outcome.

The news, after nearly 20 years, that the two parts of divided Korea had now got together and taken the first step towards an agreement between themselves was, therefore, particularly welcome. It seemed however that this was only a first step in what would necessarily be a long process. Britain of course knew the southern part of the country better than the north; nonetheless she was aware that on both sides alsgivings and fears existed that could only be overcome slowly. However, the Joint Agreement was a first step, and Britain was glad that it had been täken.

4. Mr Chang said that the Chinese Goverment also welcomed the Joint Agreement. Their attitude to it had been indicated, first, in an article in the People's Daily ́nd, subsequently, in the speech delivered by Prime Minister Chou Enlai on 9 July at the banquet in honour of the visiting South Yemeni government delegation. It appeared to be a feeling common to both China and Britain that the inability of the two parts of Korea, after so long a period of division and war and even after the signing of an Armistice, to agree to maintain contact with one another and move forward towards uni ty was regrettable. The Ambassador would remember well the policy of Ir Dulles, which had been to obstract even the most minor agreement between North and South. This was the reason why no useful result had been achieved at the Geneva Conference. At last, however, even the United States had come to me that Ir Dulios' policies towards China and the Far East in general were divorced from reality. The desire of the Korean people for national unity and to shake off outside interbrence was now growing more and more powerful. This was a good thing, but it was only the first stage in a very long proo838. process.

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Er Chang said that, in general, foreign reaction to the developments in Korea had been favourable. Efforts towards reconciliation between North and South would haYS to depend mainly on the Korem people themselves, but other countries should, wherever possible, help the process, and not obstruct it. He recalled that Vice-Kinister Ch'iao Kuan-hua had suggested to Hr Royle that Great Britain and China should consider together what they could do to help forward the process of Korean reconciliation. We should now look forward to the handling of the Korean issue at this year's UN General Assembly." The Chinese Government held the view that the Korean question should be discussed this year. Thirteen countries, led by Algeria, had already tabled a resolution supporting the inclusion of the Korean question on this year's General Assembly agenda. The Chinese Government welcomed this. Er Royle had said

Er Royle had said that he would report the views of the Chinese Government on the Korean question to the British Government. Had the British Government yet formed a view, or was the question still under consideration? Er Addis replied that as far sé he was aware the question ms still under consideration. He then asked Ir Chang if what he had just said meant that the Chinese Government supported the 13-nation Algerian resolution. Er Chang said it did. Mr Addis remarked that this appeared to represent a new development. He would see that it was reported to his Government.

6. Nr Addis said, in conclusion, that it seemed to him that the Koreans were setting about the next step towards reconciliation in the right way, concentrating on extending the talks between the two Red Cross Organisations so as to facilitate the exchange of messages between families, etc. Hn Chang replied that he shared the Ambassador's view.

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7. No Addin said that, while be himself had little to say about the formation of the new government in Japan, he would be grateful for Mr Chang's views on the appointment of Ir Tanaka and Mr Ohira. He Chang reminded the Ambassador that Tanaka's, like Sato's before it, was a Liberal Democratic Party government. It had stated that its general policy would remain unchanged. Nonetheless, Tanaka seemed to have recognised that times had changed and that new steps were necessary. On policy towards China he differed from Sato in that he appeared to be taking an "active attitude". He had stated on several occasions that he hoped to realise the nomalisation of relations between the two countries as soon as possible. The views of the new Government had been reflected to some extent by recent Japanese visitors to Peking, though these latter did not represent the Japanese Government. 8imilarly, from the Chinese side, contact had recently been made in Tokyo both with the new Foreign Minister, Ohira, md with the new Minister-Without-Portfolio, Wiki, but these contacts too had been non-governmental, They might help to promote the normalisation of relations between Japan and China, but they were no substitute for contacts between the two governments. Whether and when these took plaos would depend on how the situation developed. It was apparent that the extreme right- wing in Japan did not welcome the momentum of the Tanaka Government towards normalisation, and extremists in the Liberal Democratic Party, including men like Kishi and Kaya, had been making a major effort to sabotage the trend towards normalisation. China for her part welcomed the desire of the Japanese Government to normalise relations; but the latter so far had taken no conarete steps. Their attitude was positive, but at the same time prudent and careful; Tanaka had to maintain a balance between the various points of view. It had been reported that he would met President Nixon in Hawaii in late August or early September. According to the foreign press the sain subjects to be discussed were economie relations between Japan and the US and the normalisation of relations between Japan and China. These foreign press reports were probably well based. Japan was still very closely allied to the United States, whose agreement would be needed before any major move could be made. At the same time Japan was also preparing for talks with the Soviet Union with a view to concluding a Pence Treaty. Thus, as could be seen, Japan was now engaged in simultaneous activities in a number of directions. Ir Addde comented that Vice-Minister Ch'iao Kuan- hua had said to ir Royle that Japan now stood at the crossroads.

Alloy so that

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Developments since that meeting had seemed to reinforce this view. Mr Chang said that he agreed, Mr Addis said that as far as relations between Japan and China were concerned the next nove acemed to be the establishment of official contact between the two covernments. Mr Chang agreed that this was the "trend". Kp Addis referred to neways jer reports that Ir Tanaka or Hr Ohira or both sight visit Paking before the end of September. Kr Chang said that he had not seen these reporte, but thought a decision on this could not be taken before Tanaka received the agreement of the Americans in Hawaii. He might be wrong about this, but it was what he felt. Mr Adpis said his om impression was that Japan was capable of making her own decisions without first obtaining the permission of the United States. Mr Chang replied that Japan's relations with the United States were so deep that she could not break free. The "overhead diplomacy" of the United States last year had led some people in Japan to suggest that Japan should engage in the same sort of thing, but in his, Ir Chang's, opinion the Japanese would lack the courage do this, because they knew the United States would only go Over their heads once again. Er Addis said that it was right to recognise that Japan's relations with the United Sates were very deep and would continue to be so even though Japan night adjust its position with regard to China. My Chang commented that he understood Mr Heath would be

going to Japan in September. Ir Addig confirmed that this

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Mr Addia said that he wished to make a short statement on the Simla Agreement. As in the case of Korea, the British Goverment welcomed the improvement in relations between India and Pakistan. They regarded the Simla Agreement as the first step and as laying a helpful foundation for further progress tomrds a general settlement. A particular merit of the Simla Agreement was that it separated the problems of Kashmir and the West from other issues, sich as that of the POWs, which also affected Bangladesh and were thus of a tripartite nature. A start had been made on bilateral issues between India and Pakistan. It was to be hoped that this would be followed by progress on tripartita issues. Recognition of Bangladesh by Pakistan would help forward discussion of tripartite mattere, The holding of an eventual tripartite sumit meeting was something to be looked forward to.

9. Ir Chang thanked the Ambassador for this account of the British Government's view of recent events in the Sub-Contiment. He said the Chinese Government also saw the Simla Agreement as a first step towards a relaxation in relations between India and Pakistan and believed it deserved welcome, especially since agreement had been reached that troops on the Inaia/west Pakistɔn border should be drawn back. This would help towards a relaxation of tension. The Chinese Government had noted that President Bhutto had adhered to the principles upon which he had always insisted, while at the same time making efforts towards relaxation.

10. Mr Chang ssid that the Chinese Government for their part supported the relevant UN resolution. Vice-Minister Ch'iao Kuan-kun had made this point during his talks with Mr Royle. The most important aspect of the UK resolution was the demand that troops should be withdrawn from occupied territories. Nothing had yet happened on this. India still detained several hundred thousand Pakistani POWs, This was entirely unreasonable. Possibly the Indians were attempting in this way to Buckmail Pakistan. If so, it was a tactic China opposed. Relations between Pakistan and East Bengal were a matter for Pakistan alone. China would not intervene. China had not recognised Bangladesh, nor had the considered doing so. How could she when Bangladesh had not yet been recognised by Pakistan? The Chinese Government adhered to last year's UN resolution. Until Indian troops were withdrawn from occupied territory and until such questions as that of the POWs were settled, it would be

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One did

impossible for China to adopt any other stand. The reason for this was very simple. Last year China had raised her hand in support of the UN resolution. If within a year she were simply to abandon it, her membership of UI would lack all significanos. not support a resolution today and then refuse to recognise it tomorrow, The fact that over 70 countries had now recognised Bangladesh nado no difference to the policy adopted by China. In conelusion, Kr Chang

Hi remarked that India and Pakistan had now held bilateral talks; the problems between Pakistan and Bast Bengal should equally be settled between the two parties. Er Addip said he entirely agreed.

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11. Er Addis said that he wished to say something about President Sadat's decision to invite the Soviet Union to withdraw its military advisers from Egypt. The British Government had known for some time past of the increasing strain in relations between Egyrt and the Soviet Union, for which there seemed to be three main reasons: dissatisfaction in Egypt with the failure of the Soviet Union to supply important offensive wespons; a rather more gener: 1 sense of frustration at the lack of forward movement with regard to the Arab-Israeli dispute; and, in the higher ranks of the Egyptian armed forces, a widespread dislike of the 3oviet military advisers. Against this general background of political relations between the two countries there must have been pressure on President Sadat from within the armed forces to ask the Russians to withdraw. At the same tine President Badat was also perhaps trying to buy time for the survival of his régime.

12. Mr Addis said that, as the British Government understood it, there were three categories of Soviet military presence in Egypt: Soviet training staff and advisers attached to the three Børvices; Boviet personnel involved in Egyptian air defence; and autonomous Soviet military units, e.g. fighter squadrons, the maritime air squadron and Soviet naval personnel at Egyptian ports. If President Sadat's statement was taken at its face value that all Soviet experts and advisers were to be withdraw, this would mean about 7,000 out of a total Soviet military presenos in Egypt of between 15-20,000. There had, however, been some reports suggesting that only the advisers were to be withdrawn and that the instructors would remain. In that event the effect would be much less. It was not yet clear whether the President's announcement should be considered as the prelude to a request for the withdrawal of the automomous units. It was clear, however, that it was important for both the Egyptian and Soviet Governments that they should reach sono sort of agreement between themselves. It was to be expected, therefore, that important negotiations would take place between them. It was possible that President Sadat had deliberately taken the present tough stand in order to strengthen his bargaining position. There were thus still many uncertainties, but plainly the Soviet Union had suffered a severe setback which would have implications for their policy in the Fiddle East generally. As to the possibility of a further Arab-Israeli it seemed on the whole that the effect of the resident' statement would be to make the resumption of fighting lens likely. It was bound to increase strains within the country. It would be welcome to the High Command and to the middle classes, but not to the radical elements or to the younger officers of the armed forces.

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13. I Un Chạng said that what the Ambassador had said in the earlier part of his remarks coincided more or less with the appreciation of the Chinese Government. The Chinese Government saw the affair as an expression of the discontent felt by the Fgyptian people and Government at the role of the Soviet Union in their country. Chine had long pointed out that while Egypt might have been accepting aid from the Soviet Union for the purpose of safeguarding her independence and sovereignty and resisting Israeli aggression, the Soviet Union was sure to try to exploit the opportunity to sœrcise control over Egyptian affairs. It had been impossible to imagine that Egypt would accept such control in exchange for help in countering aggression from Israel. It had therefore been entirely predictable that something of the present sort would happen. The Chinese Government of course had had some personal experience of the character of Soviet aid, although they had nover received it on the same large sdale. But they could well imagine the reactions of the Egyptians. President Sadat had taken a very brave decision which might entail certain difficulties, but no matter how wide the effect of his decision to ask for the withdrawal of Soviet military personel, the direction of his move was correct. What he had done was in the interests of the Egyptian people; the Egyptian people had therefore welcomed it. The Chinese Government were aware of this from their contacts with friends in the area. As far a future developments were concerned, Egypt was far from China and China was less familiar with the Kiddle East than Britain; the points made by the Ambassador were therefore most helpful. It seemed, however, that neither the Soviet Union nor Egypt wanted the latest step to be irrevocable. Meanwhile the United States seemed to be adopting the prudent attitude of making no comment. The British and French Governments seemed to be taking a sinflar prudent line. The attitude of Israel was less clear. The Egyptians claimed to have shot down an intruding Israeli aircraft, but the Israelis denied this, and there had been no repercussions, It looked as though the situation would remain calm.

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14. Mr Addis commented that there was no need for him to say any king, or to ask questions, about the recent visit to China of 1 Schuman, Ir Chang would know that the British had bem in close touch over this with their French friends. Dr Schroeder'a visit, however, was I rather different matter, since there was of course no permanent West German representative in Pexing.

Pexing. Ir Addis said that he was aware that Dr 3chroeder's visit had been an unofficial one and that he had oose to China with no mandate to speak for the West German Government. Nevertheless he would appreciate Er Chang's comments, in the light of the visit on the state of Sino-West German relations and on China's attitude to the question of German representation at the UIF.

15. Mr Chang said that Dr Schroader had visited China in his capacity as Chairman of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Gommittee. His visit had not been authorised by the West German Government. Nevertheless, the question which clearly had most interested him had been that of the establishment of formal relations between the two countries. He had wanted to know whether China desired the establishment of relations and, if so, on what terms, There had of course been no question of negotiating with Dr Schroeder, but he had been told that China's terms for recognition of "est Germany were the same as for all other countries, namely seceptance of the Five Principles of Peaceful čo-existence. Otherwise, so far as China was concerned, there was no barrier. Dr. Schroeder had remarked that there was equally no barrier on the West German side, since the Federal Government neither had relations with, nor recognised, Taiwan,

16. Mr Chang said that the speed with which relations between the two countries were established depended upon the Weat German Government, In the past they had said that they were in no hurry to adjust relations with China before the readjustment of their relations with the Soviet Union. Now it was the general election which was mking their intention difficult to divine. However, China, for her part, vas in no hurry. Mr Chang commented that Dr Schroeder had seemed to understand the Chinese position, and had promised to make efforts on his rotum to Germay in favour of improved. relations. This was an attitude to be welcomed.

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11 - 14

17. Mr Chang seid that due to the very little contact there had been between China and West Germany, the talks with Dr Schroeder had gone on for rather a long time. Both sides had needed to acquaint the other with their positions on various questions. The question of representation of the two Germanias at the United Nations had been among the matters discussed, China's attitude to this was very simple. In reality there were two Germanies; both should therefore be represented.

VISITS AND TRAVEL IN CHIBA

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VISITS AND TRAVEL IN

18. Yr Addis said there was one more question of a rather different nature which he wished to take the opportunity to raise. This we the question of visits and travel in China by himself and members of his staff, It was unnecessary to argue with Mr Chang the importance of Embassy staff getting to know China: it was common ground between Kr Chang and himself that this was an important aspect of the Embassy's work. In practice however members of the Embassy found themselves in an under-privilegad position. Unofficial, short-term visitors to China, even those from Great Britain, seemed to be allowed to visit places and institutions to which members of the Embassy were not permitted a0cess. His Philippine and American friends came here on unofficial visits and were granted facilities that were denied to the Embassy. For example, he had himself suggested visiting the North-East but was told it was not possible. Yet a Philippine friend was able to visit Shenyang and other places. Again, Professor Jerome Cohen told Kr Addis of his visit to Peking University, vhile Mr Addis's own request to visit the University was outstanding for nearly six months. He mentioned these two examples merely by way of illustration Again, making the comparison with his om and Ir Morgan's experiencs 15 years ago, the present situation was much less favourable and the restrictions much greater. For example, in the period between 1954-1957 he had himself made extensive tours in the Nortk-Kaat, in Central China and in the South-West.

the South-West, Other British colleagues had visited these and other areas. During the last six months before his departure from China in 1957 he had visited a total of 18 universities or institutes of higher education. Against this he had been in China now for six months and apart from one brief visit with Mr Royle to Tsinghua University had not been able to visit any universities. It was not his wish waste the time of Ir Chang on the details of the matter, but he did wish to raise the general question of socess and visits. If a general instruction sould be issued that requests should be met in so far as circumstances permitted, this would be most helpful.

19. Mr Chạng said that he fully understood the Ambassador's desire to know more about China. It was also right that the Ambassador had brought out the point that it had been possibl to travel more widely 15 years ago than it was now, In recent years, of course, the Cultural Revolution had taken place and many departments and institutions were still undergoing reorganisation. As a result their capacity and ability to

/receive

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13-

receive foreign guests was limited. However, this state of affairs would probably not contimme much longer. There would be a gradual expansion of the number of places and institutions open to foreigners. For example, this year's diplomatic tour had included Loyang and Tachai, whereas last year's tour had not. It was right of course that diplomats should go to more places. But efforts had also to be made to enable short-term visitors to see as much as possible of China and it had perhaps been assumed that because diplomats remained in Peking a long time they could afford to be more patient. When asked by the Ambassador how long this patience was expected to last, Kr Chang replied that it was difficult for him to give a precise answer. Access had already been expanded, and special nocess had occasionally been allowed in special circumstances. For instance, the Canadian Ambassador, who had been born in Kunning, had wished to re-visit that city. He had been allowed to do so. A further consideration ms that the Diplomatic Corps had now grow quite large. However he was willing to admit that not enough was being done in respect of access for diplomats and since the Ambassador had raised the question he would try and see that more was done. Me Addis said that it sometimes seemed that there was discrimination against resident diplomats. Ir Chang said that it was not the policy of the Chinese Government to refuse diplomats acosss to places and institutions. imagined the problem was that the departments concerned thought it better to try and receive them at a later date. The intention was to gradually expand access, but it was impossible to say definitely when a particular place or institution would be opened or, in general, how wide this expansion of access would be. There were difficulties about issuing a general direction in concrete terms, but as far as specific visits were concerned contact could be ma de with the department concerned to see what might be done. Ir Addig thanked Ir Chang for allowing him to make his point and said that having made it he would not pursue it further.

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/CONCLUSION

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CONCLUSION

20. Ir Chang remarked that the questions raised by the Ambassador during the course of their conversation were major questions of interest to both Britain and China. As he was not well prepared he did not propose to take advantage of the present opportunity to raise my questions of his owR. He would like to propose instead that he mi the Ambassador should have a further conversation on another occasion. Ir Addig said he would find it very valuable to continue with ir Chang their discussion of international matters.

21. Kr Chang said he thought it right that the Ambassador should discuss bilateral matters with Ir Wang. He explained that West European and American Department was soon to be divided with Er Wang becoming Director of the new Test European Department. Once he had had an opportunity to study the outcome of the recent discussions between Ir Royle and Ambassador 8ưng, Ir Wang would be happy to met Ambassador to discuss outstanding bilateral issues. 8ome of these bilateral issues might be settled quickly; others would need further discussion.

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WASHINGTON.

MY TELNO 7521 CONVERSATION WITH CHANG WEN-CHIN ASSISTANT MINISTER

FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS: JAPAN,

E4 3/25/8

1. I ASKED FOR CHANG'S VIEW OF MR TANAKA'S APPOINTMENT. CHANG REMARKED THAT MR TANAKA'S WAS STILL A LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY GOVERNMENT WHICH HAD STATED THAT ITS GENERAL POLICY REMAINED

UNCHANGED, BUT IT APPEARED TO HAVE RECOGNISED THAT TIMES HAD CHANGED. ITS POLICY TOWARDS CHINA DIFFERED FROM SATO'S IN THAT IT APPEARED TO BE TAKING AN ACTIVE ATTITUDE. TANAKA HAD ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS SAID THAT HE HOPED TO REALISE THE NORMALISATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THIS VIEW HAD BEEN REFLECTED IN VARIOUS UNOFFICIAL EXCHANGES, WHICH MIGHT HELP TO PROMOTE NORMALISATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND CHINA BUT STILL COULD NOT SERVE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR CONTACTS BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. GOVERNMENT CONTACTS WOULD DEPEND ON HOW THE SITUATION DEVELOPED. IT WAS APPARENT THAT THE EXTREME RIGHT WING IN JAPAN DID NOT WELCOME TANAKA'S MOVEMENT TOWARDS NORMALISATION AND EXTREMISTS IN THE LDP, INCLUDING MR KISHI, HAD BEEN MAKING A MAJOR EFFORT TO SABOTAGE THIS, CHINA FOR HER PART WELCOMED THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT'S DESIRE FOR NORMALISATION THOUGH SO FAR THE JAPANESE HAD TAKER NO CONCRETE STEPS.

2. WHEN I REMARKED THAT THE NEXT MOVE SEEMED TO BE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL CONTACT AND ASKED ABOUT REPORTS THAT TANAKA AND/OR CHIRA WERE PLANNING TO VISIT PEKING BEFORE THE END OF SEPTEMBER, CHANG AGREED THAT THERE WAS A ''TREND** TOWARDS OFFICIAL CONTACT BUT THOUGHT THAT NO DECISION ON A VISIT TO CHINA COULD BE REACHED UNTIL MR TANAKA HAD RECEIVED THE AGREEMENT OF THE AMERICANS AT THE HAWAII MEETING''. HE BELIEVED THAT JAPAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES WERE TOO DEEP FOR HER TO PREAK FREE. SOME JAPANESE WERE REMEMBERING AMERICAN 'OVERHEAD DIPLOMACY'' LAST YEAR AND THOUGHT THAT JAPAN SHOULD ENGAGE IN THE SAME GAME, CHANG THOUGHT THAT THE JAPANESE WOULD LACK THE COURAGE TO DO THIS BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES WOULD ONLY GO OVER THEIR HEADS AGAIN,

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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 753 OF 28 JULY INFO PRIORITY SEOUL TOK YO WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AND SAVING HONG KONG.

MY TELNO 752 CONVERSATION WITH ASSISTANT FOREIGN MINISTER: KOREA

1. CHANG SAID THAT EFFORTS TOWARDS RECONCILIATION BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA WOULD HAVE TO DEPEND MAINLY ON THE KOREAN PEOPLE THEMSELVES BUT OTHER COUNTRIES SHOULD HELP RATHER THAN OBSTRUCT THE PROCESS. HE SAID THAT VICE MINISTER CH'IAD HAD SUGGESTED TO MR ROYLE THAT OUR TWO COUNTRIES SHOULD CONSIDER TOGETHER WHAT WE COULD DO TO HELP FORWARD THE PROCESS OF KOREAN RECONCILIATION. WE SHOULD NOW LOOK AT THE QUESTION OF HOW TO DEAL WITH THE KOREAN ISSUE AT THE UNITED NATIONS. THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HELD THE VIEW THAT THE KOREAN QUESTION OUGHT TO BE DISCUSSED THIS YEAR, THIRTEEN COUNTRIES LED BY ALGERIA HAD ALREADY TABLED A MOTION SUPPORTING ITS INCLUSION ON THIS YEAR'S AGENDA: THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WELCOMED THIS. CHANG ENQUIRED WHETHER THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD YET FORMED A VIEW OF THE NEW SITUATION. I SAID THAT IT WAS STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION AND ASKED WHETHER THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT SUPPORTED THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION: CHANG CONFIRMED THAT THEY DID. FCO PSE PASS SAVING HONG KONG.

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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 756 OF 28 JULY INFO PRIORITY CAIRO HOSCOW AND WASHINGTON.

MY TELEGRAM NO 752: CONVERSATION WITH ASSISTANT FOREIGN MINISTER: EGYPT AND THE SOVIET UNION.

1. I SPOKE ON THE LINES OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO 86 TO NAIROBI AND CHANG SAID THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT'S APPRECIATION OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND EGYPT COINCIDED MORE OR LESS WITH OUR OWN.

2. THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT SAW THESE DEVELOPMENTS AS AN EXPRESSION

OF DISCONTENT FELT BY THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT AT

THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THEIR COUNTRY.

CHINA HAD LONG POINTED OUT THAT, WHILE EGYPT MIGHT BE ACCEPTING AID FROM THE SOVIET UNION FOR THE PURPOSE OF SAFEGUARDING

HER INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY AND RESISTING ISRAEL! AGGRESSION, THE SOVIET UNION FOR ITS PART WAS SURE TO TRY TO EXPLOIT THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXERCISE CONTROL OVER EGYPTIAN AFFAIRS.-

IT HAD BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO IMAGINE THAT EGYPT WOULD ACCEPT SUCH CONTROL IN EXCHANGE FOR HELP IN COUNTERING AGGRESSION FROM ISRAEL, IT HAD BEEN ENTIRELY PREDICTABLE THAT SOMETHING OF THE PRESENT SORT WOULD HAPPEN. THE CHINESE OF COURSE HAD SOME PERSONAL EXPERIENCE OF THE CHARACTER OF SOVIET AID, ALTHOUGH THEY HAD NEVER RECEIVED IT ON THE SAME LARGE SCALE. HOWEVER THEY COULD WELL IMAGINE THE REACTIONS OF THE EGYPTIANS. PRESIDENT SADAT HAD TAKEN A VERY BRAVE DECISION WHICH MIGHT ENTAIL CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES, BUT NO MATTER HOW WIDE THE EFFECT OF HIS DECISION TO ASK FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL THE DIRECTION OF HIS MOVE WAS CORRECT.

WHAT HE HAD DONE WAS IN THE INTERESTS OF THE EGYPTIANS, THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLE HAD THEREFORE WELCOMED IT.

THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WERE AWARE OF THIS FROM THEIR CONTACTS WITH FRIENDS IN THE AREA.

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3. WITH REGARD TO FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS, CHANG SAID IT SEEMED THAT NEITHER THE SOVIET UNION NOR EGYPT WANTED THE STEP JUST

TAKEN TO BE IRREVOCABLE.

THE UNITED STATES SEEMED TO BE ADOPTING THE PRUDENT ATTITUDE OF AVOIDING COMMENT AND THE BRITISH AND FRENCH GOVERNMENTS

SEEMED TO BE TAKING A SIMILAR PRUDENT LINE.

THE ATTITUDE OF ISRAEL WAS LESS CLEAR.

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TO PRIORITY FCO TELEGRAM NO 755 OF 28 JULY INFO PRIORITY DACCA NEW DELHI ISLAMABAD WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELNO 752. AND DACCA TELNO 793 OF 26 JUNE ( NOT TO ALL): CONVERSATION WITH ASSISTANT FOREIGN MINISTER: SUB-KONTINENT.

w/re

I OPENED WITH A SHORT STATEMENT OF HIG'S ATTITUDE TO THE SIMLA AGREEMENT. CHANG. THANKED ME AND COMMENTED THAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT ALSO SAW THE SINLA AGREEMENT AS A FIRST STEP TOWARDS A RELAXATION IN INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS AND BELIEVED IT DESERVED WELCOME. THE AGREEMENT THAT TROOPS ON THE INDO- WEST PAKISTAN BORDER SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN IN PARTICULAR WOULD HELP TO RELIEVE TENSION. THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HAD NOTED

· THAT BHUTTO HAD ADHERED TO THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH HE HAD ALWAYS INSISTED WHILST MAKING EFFORTS TOWARDS RELAXATION.

2. CHANG SAID THAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT FOR THEIR PART SUPPORTED THE RELEVANT UN RESOLUTION, THE MOST IMPORTANT ASPECT OF WHICH WAS THE DEMAND THAT TROOPS SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. NOTHING

NOTHINGHAD YET HAPPENED ON THIS. CHINA HAD LAST YEAR SUPPORTED THE UN RESOLUTION AND COULD NOT ABANDON IT WITHIN A YEAR OF DOING SO IF HER ENTRY TO THE UN WAS TO HAVE ANY SIGNIFICANCE)

CHANG SAID THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND EAST BENGAL WERE A MATTER FOR THE TWO PARTIES AND CHINA WOULD NOT INTERVENE.CHINA HAD NETTFER RECOGNISED BANGLADESH NOR CONSIDERED DOING SO.

HOW COULD SHE WHEN BANGLADESH HAD NOT YET BEEN RECOGNISED BY PAKISTAN?. CHINA WAS AWARE THAT OVER 70 COUNTRIES HAD NOW RECOGNISED BANGLADESH BUT THIS HAD NO IMPACT ON HER OWN POLICY. UNTIL INDIAN TROOPS WERE WITHDRAWN FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORY AND SUCH QUESTIONS' AS THAT OF THE POWS WERE SETTLED CHINA COULD NOT ADOPT ANY OTHER STAND TOWARDS BATSLADESH.

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I JUDGED IT WISER NOT TO ASK ABOUT CHINA'S ATTITUDE ON THE ADMISSION OF BANGLADESH TO THE UN BECAUSE TO JUDGE FROM WHAT HAD GONE BEFORE I WOULD ONLY HAVE GOT A HARSH NAD UNCOMPROMISING ANSWER.

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TO PRIORITY FCO TELEGRAM NO 752 OF 28 JULY INFO PRIORITY TOKYO SEOUL DACCA NEW DELHI ISLAMABAD BONN BERLIN CAIRO MOSCOW AND

UKMIS NEW YORK.

CONVERSATION WITH ASSISTANT FOREIGN MINISTER,

1. 1 CALLED ON ASSISTANT FOREIGN MINISTER CHANG WEN-CHIN YESTERDAY. 1 SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF HE AND I MET FROM TIME TO TIME TO CONTINUE THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON INTERNATIONAL MATTERS WYICH MR ROYLE HAD INITIATED HERE AND THAT I SHOULD DISCUSS BILATERAL QUESTIONS WITH WANG TUNG (WHO WE LEARN IS ABOUT TO BE APPOINTED DIRECTOR OF A NEW WEST EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT FORMED BY SPLITTING THE FORMER WEST EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT).

CHANG AGREED AND I SUGGESTED FURTHER THAT WE SHOULD DISCUSS THE AREAS IN WHICH THERE HAD BEEN IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS SINCE MR ROYLE'S VISIT- KOREA ( JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT OF 4 JULY) JAPAN ( NEW GOVERNMENT), SUB-CONTINENT ( SIMLA AGREEMENT), MEDITERRANEAN (EXPULSION OF SOVIET ADVISERS FROM EGYPT) AND EUROPE ( VISITS TO CHINA OF SCHUMANN AND DR SCHROEDER).

THIS TOOK UP THE WHOLE OF OUR MEETING AND CHANG WHO CLEARLY HAD SOME POINT OR POINTS THAT HE WANTED TO RAISE HIMSELF SUGGESTED THAT WE MEET AGAIN SHORTLY.

2. YOUR TELEGRAM NO 860 TO NAIROBI WAS MOST TIMELY AND USEFUL. IT WOULD BE A GREAT HELP TO ME IF FROM TIME TO TIME I COULD BE SUPPLIED SIMILAR BACKGROUND INFORMATION NOT ONLY ON AREAS IN WHICH THE CHINESE ARE NOT CLOSELY CONCERNED, SUCH AS THE MIDDLE EAST, BUT ALSO ON AREAS WHERE THEY HAVE A DIRECT INTEREST SUCH AS THE SUB-CONTINENT. IF WE CAN KEEP UP THE DIALOGUE HERE THERE WILL BE THE DOUBLE ADVANTAGE OF EDUCATING THEM ON SOME

MATTERS AND LEARNING THEIR VIEWS ON OTHERS. 13. MY IMMEDIATELY

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3. MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAMS, REPEATED APPROPRIATELY,

CONTAIN MAIN POINTS OF DISCUSSIONS. FULL RECORD FOLLOWS BY

BAG.

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TO PRIORITY FCO TELEGRAM NO 683 OF 11 JULY INFO ROUTINE PARIS, ROME AND WASHINGTON.

KY TELMO 6711 M SCHUMANN'S VISIT TO CHIE

1. FITAL MEETING WITH CHI PENC-FEI ON SUNDAY MORNING WAS

CONCERNED WITH RILATERAL MATTERS.

2. SUNDAY EVINING CHOU FR-LAI CAVE A RANQUET FOR M SCHUMANN WITH OʻLY FRENCH AND CHINESE OFFICIALS PRESENT, WHICH WAS FOLLOWED BY A FORMAL DISCUSSION.

AFTER ABOUT AN HOUR CHOU EN-LAI SAID THAT HE WAS TAKING M SCHUMANN TO CALL OF CHAIRMAN MAO AND THAT ACCORDING TO THE CHAIRMAN'S USUAL PRACTICE HE WOULD RECEIVE M SCHUMANN ALONE.

H SCHUMANN TOLD ME AT THE AIRPORT THIS MORNING THAT BOTH VAO AND CHOU HAD SHOW. KEEF INTEREST IN THE PRITISH POSITION IN RELATION TO EUROPE. THE REPEATED QUESTIC WAS

WAS '' IS BRITAIN'S

ENTRY INTO EUROPE AM IRREVOCABLE PROCESS 7

R.E.

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Joint Service Intelligence Staff HONG KONG

British Forces Post Office I

HONG KONG 238111 Ext: 3308

12 June 1972

SINO-UK RELATIONS

Flight Lieutenant R A MI Burr, CSOS HONG KONG, attended the reception held in the HONG KONG Club on 17 May 72 to mark NORWAY's National Day. He has reported that various Communist Chinese attending the reception went out of their way to emphasise the improvement in Sino-UK relations.

While standing with a group which included Mr A O BLISHEN, British Trade Commissioner, and Mr A BORALE, Consul General of the Arab Republic of EGYPT, they were joined by the Vice Chairman of the New CHINA News Agency (NGNA) and an interpreter, and shortly thereafter by the editors of TA KUNG PAO and Easter Horizons. The conversation turned to recently published photographe of CHINA and BURR expressed admiration for some of the views. He was told that the relationship between CHINA and the UK was improving so rapidly that he might be able to see these views for himself very shortly.

Having already been introduced as an RAF Officer who was serving in HONG KONG, he made the point that this would be difficult for him and, in any case, he had only about a year left to sorve in the Colony. The Vice- Chairman of HCNA, however, indicated that he thought the fact that BUR was a serviceman was no drawback and that the opportunity to visit CHINA might well be available much sooner than he thought. Indeed, during conversations within the group, when the topic could well have changed, the Chinese continued to make a point of stressing the improvement in Sino-UK relations.

4. While BURR was unable to remember the names of the Chinese who were introduced to him, their appointments were as specified. It is likely that the people he met were SHIH Shao-hua (Vice Chairman NCNA), FEI Yi-ming (Editor TÅ KUNG PAO), LEE Tsung-ying (Editor Bastem Horizons)

би

D ́S HAWKER

Lieutenant Colonel

Head of Service Intelligence

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From the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

19 June, 1972

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As the Minister responsible for Far Eastern C

affairs, I am replying to your letter of 4 June to Priscilla Tweedsmuir about the proposal of the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires that you should take a number of MPS to the Chinese Embassy "for a discussion".

In the light of what I learnt during my recent visit to Peking, I am sure that it would be a good idea for you to take up the proposal. As I said in the lisuse on 12 June, one of the subjects which I discussed in Peking was the possibility of a visit to China by a Parliamentary delegation. I suggest the following candidates from the Government side in the two Houses:

Adam Butler

Charles Fletcher-Cooke

Winston Churchill

William Deedes

Douglas Dodds-Parker

Joan Vickers

John Hill

Alfred Hall-Davis

Tom Boardman

Sir John Rodgers Patrick Cormack

I do hope that you will also be able to include Michael Stewart and Jeremy Thorpe.

Deedes,

/Stewart

Stewart and Thorpe are members of the Great Britain/ China Committee, which has recently been established to promote contacts between Britain and China in the fields of culture and sport.

The Lord Kennet, 100 Bayswater Road, London,

W2 3HJ.

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Anthony Royle

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I attach a draft reply to Lord Kennet's letter of 4 June.

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Forrester who has agreed that Fr Royle may wish to suggest

the majority of the names. I have therefore inserted the

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MINISTER OF STATE

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Mr an said that he had asked Mr Addis t come round in order to live 1 the reply to several questions. bo first were questions raiše1 Juring his talk with. Mr Cháng Wen-chin, now on Assistant to the Sinister ^n 4 May. Mr Addis said that he must congratulate Mr Chen. en-chin Mr wang said that there was also a question raised a 11 May. To demi first with mattero raiced on '4 May, First the visit of the Secretary of State to China.

V19129

C. Fr Chi Feng-fei had instructed him to issue an official invita- tion to Sir Alec Douglas-Home to visit Clea between October and 6 November. The dates were in accordance with ton zritish suɛɛeɛti.n. Mr addig snið that he knew this fitted in with ske

.. er-tery of time schedule. lir Bang said t, as Mr A is knew, the practice in Ching was to issue invition orally but they were Lonetheless official. That he was putting forward was, therefo e an official invitation. Mr Wang turned next to the visit of Kr hoyle. The Foreign Minister would like to oyfend an invitation to Kr Royle to visit China between 30 Ky and 0 Jwie, He said that Be fur la he knew Mr Ch'iso Kuan-hua would like to have the

be opportunity of meeting Mr Royle. Sext was tho Britic). Gov rnment invitation to Mr C. i ŕon, -fei. Minister 0:4 wished to accept in principle but to leave the time to be discussed luler. As Mr Að is

uld kno..., the Pinistry of To eign Affairs were very busy at present and for the time being they had not worked out " plan. Once the plan was complete they would be able to let lin ow the timing of Fr vi uthe-foi's visit to Pritain. They were very grateful for the invitation Finally the e had been the invitation to Er ✪ '160 Luan-hus to visit Britain en route to other countries. Kr Ciao wo very grateful and would like to accept this but again the que tion of dates would have to be settled later on. Er diis thanked Mr Wang very much for this information; be voul. convey tho for invitation to the Foreign Secret-ry and expected in turn tɔ be mile to convey his formal reply in a few days. He knew that

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Bir Alec would be very glad to learn that Mr Chi had accepted his invitation in principle and would quite understnd that the date had to be fixed later. He also expressed particular thanks for the invitation to Mr Royle in view of the shortness of the notice which the Chinesc Government had bean given about this visit. He said that he had some det:ils to discuss on the Royle visit and naked whether Mr Wang would like to take this now or later. Ir dar, esked for the details. Er Addis said that Mr Royle would like to come with Mrs Royle," his Trivate Secretary Mr Logan, and Mr Evans, Rand of the Department dealing with Chine in the Foreign and Commonweal th office. His idea was to -pend some days in Faking and some daya elsewhere in China, He would arrive in shanghai by Air France on 30 May, catch the connection to Feking and reach Faking at 19.35 hours on the same evening. He was thinking in terms of spending about five days in Peking and trevelling in Chins for about four days. He would have to leave China on Friday, 9 June, for Burns. le had put forward the idea of visiting Sinn, Chengtu and Kunming and then tekin, the air service from Kunming to Burna, as one proposal. Alternatively he could visit Fanking, Seochow, Hagchow and Shang-ni, mad take the air service from Shanghai to Burza. Perhaps the Chinese would consider these suggestions and then let the Embas y know their view. Kr Ad. is said that he had one other question, which he would like to put on a personal basis. He would be happy to have ir Royle and his party to stay in his house. If, however, the Chinese Government wanted to have the party as their guests in the Chinese Government guest-house he would for his part be happy to fall in with tlat arrangement. He was asking Mr wang'a view on this point on sa infomal and exploratory basis. Mr wang said that since Mr Royle and ida party were the guests of the Foreign Minister, he was sure that they would errane everything. In reply to Mr Addis's question fr Wong confirmed that by this he meant that the Chine ́e Government wanted Mr Royle and his party to stay in their guest-house. He expressed pleasure at hearing that the Department Head in the Foreign Offico delling with Chinese affairs would be coming to China. Mr ddis said that he was particularly glad that Er Evans was comin, since le led only recently take: over es Hord of the Department. It would be very useful to him after an absor.ce to come back and see developments, in dhan, said that since he had beer. in Chins before he was entitled to make comparisons. Ec believed that he would be the first official dealing with Chinese "ffairs to visit Chin" since the status of the two zissions h. d been

hd raised. It would provide an opportunity for an exchange of views. Ir addis mentioned that in daturday 3 June there woul! be é queen's Birthday Morty Reo rtion from 6 - 7 on at the Embas^y, Er bang took

irthday arty Rec rtion from note of this. He asked if Mr Addis bad any idea what kind of programme Mr Royle would like to have in Foking and elsewhor.. Mr A is Baid that he had no idea but would send a telegran to try to get an

Fr Mang anid that is the Chinese co:ld get early information they would avoid having to arrange a proprame without respecting the wishes of their guests. A more detailed pro, rampe for the visit could be worked out later.

answer tomorrow

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VIETNAM

Mr Mang said that he would like to pasɛ on to I'r Morgan's discussion about Vietnas with Mr Chang wan-chin on 11 Hay. Er Chang had mentioned then that the Chinese Government intended to issue a statement. That statement hd subsequently been. is, ued expounding the Chinese Government's position on Vietna, which was one of resolute support for the Vietnamese peopl s' ́stand Linst the Americm invṛders. Both the DKV and the PHG in South Vietnam maintained that the Foris talks should be continued. But they did not favour reconvening the Geneva Conference or talks in any other intern tions' bodies. The Chinese Government supported their send on this. Mr is said that the British concern was to get some process of conciliation going that would put an end to the fighting. It was for this reason that they had sug ested roconvening the Genova Conference, since they were Co-Chairman. But ho knew that his Government would support a proposal for talks in any other forum that might lead to a solution of the problem. Certainly if it was possible to have useful discussions in Faris the British Govurament would support further talks there. The trouble was that from the rublished accounts it did not seem possible to make much progress in F ris. If it were, however, the British Governzent would support talks there. He hoped that the Chinese Government could use their authority with the North Vietnamese to persuade them to enguge in really useful discussions in Pɛris. He himself had only yesterd-y been comparing the most accent Vietnameze įroƑosals and the neric n proposals there were so many similar points in the two sides' proposals that it would surely be posible to use them as a basis for constructive talks. Er Wegs said that Mr Morgan had mentioned various points on 11 May whic

miliarised the Chinese Government with the British position. F had himself also hed talks with Mr Mális during the recant diplomatic journey. He thought that b:tà sides understood the other's position. Kr Addis had just given the British position again. The Chinese view was that the Americans should pull out of Vietnam unconditionally and bring their "Egression there to a hlt.

If they

did so, the problems thereafter could be easily tackleč. Since Britain wom Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference he as used that it was clear to their si e who had violated it. There was an old Whinese saying that what had been done must be undone by the door. Mr Adčia had just mentioned that Britain favoured talks in Furic. The Vietnamese toe vera 14 avour of this and the Chinese Governsent supported their view. Mr is nake: whether thero was any r. al na, urance that these talks could be profitably resumed. Mr Jeng said that it remained to be seen what was the attitude of the An ricans in expanding the war in Vietnam which had not only been condemned in Vie non and all over the world but 1so opposed by the Azeriern people. The position was very clearly expressed in the Chinese Government's Bursement. Er ad is said that the Dritish and Chinese Governments recognised that there was s

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wide gulf between their two positions. His only urpose in raising the matter agrin wos to and whether in the improved relations betw. n the two countries it would be possible to consider together how useful discuscions for a Vietnam settloment could be encouraged. If at any time Mr Wang on his side could su, gest ideas for getting useful negotiations going he would be happy to have then and to pass then on. He thought that the British and Chincse Governgents agreed that there should be a negotiated set:lement; the question was how to get constructive negotiations going. Kel kang said that the North Vietnesese favoured Perio and the Chinece Government supported then. Mr Ad is said that our problem was now how to persuzde

How could we the Americans that talks could usefully be resumed. persuade them? Nr -ing said that the Kerth Vietnamese bad already made it clear that they did not favour an international conference; the Chinese Government could only support their position.

MR ROYL • VISIT

He acid

4. Mr Wong then turned back again to Mr Royle's visit. that it would be useful to have such a vi:it betwecr. a British Mizister and the Chinese Gov. rnment and he hoped the talks would be very frank on both sidec, Mr Adlis said that this was the British Government's view too. The right way was to recognise frankly the differences between the two sides and then proceed to try to find Mr Wang said that that was the points on which they could agree.

busis on whicl. the Chinese Gov-rnment had conducted their talks with President Nixon. With Bino-British relations on their present besis it would be a very different mater.

SING-ERITISH RELATIONS

5. Er duia said that he had had an interesting talk the day before with the ro; rërentatives of Rolls Royce who wore here on a visit. They had been most pleased with their reception here and with the discussions which they had had in the field of ceronautics. He very much hoped that concrete results would come from these talks. This was precisely the kind of cooperation betwe u the two countries in the technological field which he was sure would be very profitable to both. He said that anoth r visit which he also hoped would be profitable was that of the Fresident and two senior members of the Royal Soci ty who would arrive on 20 May for discussions with the Academica Sinics. He hoped that during the vicit the two sides could sketch our the areas of sci-nce and technology in which the two countries could cooperate so that detailed programmes could be worked out afterwards,

fterwards, That would be a good way of e:rrying out the thought that Mr Chou An-la. had expressed to Felix Greene in his recent interview that there should be scientific and technological cooperation between the two countries. Er Ang agreed that these /discussions

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discussions should be very fruitful. Mr Addi

right way was to have an initial approach at 2 Thôught that the

high level to work

out a broad general plan, and to fill in the details 1:ter on. Mr Vans said that the Academia Sinica and other bodies concerned were still involved in the "struggle, criticism and transform-tion" movement. However the two sides could exchange general views at present and fill in the details subsequently. Er 14 is agreed that what was wented was a stap-by-step approach, and tlore were good prospects for this.

Copied to Far Eastern Department PCO

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Record of Neeting at the Ministry of forei♫ Alfairs on Thursday 4 Moy at 10.00 a.

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FrecentI

Mr J M Addis

Kr H H Morgan

Mr M J kichardson

Mr Chang Neu-chin

Mr Chang Yi-chan

For finis

K Anbas ador reminded the Head of Western Luropean and K. Americ:ä Department East they had discussed the possibility of Ministerial visits when they had last net at the end of March. Chang hind referred to the Foreign Secretory's statement in the liou: of Commons that he would like to visit C ius and had asked if he had further information. He was now authorised to say that if the ;roposal was acceptable to the Cinose Government the Poreign Secretry would be glad to visit China before the end of the year.

The earliest dates he could manage cll betwɛen the end of October and the beginning of November, He was committed in London on 28 October and again on 6 Novem) or Lut between those

If dates he could fit in a visit of between 4-5 days to China. this was possible he hoped that his visit would be balanced by a return visit by China's Foreign Minister Chi ien-fei to Britsin. He ad surgested that if Mr Chi was planning a eturn visit to France after the visit of M Schumann in July, he might perhaps extend it to cover a visit to Britain.

Kr Chang thanked the Ambassador for this information. had reported unofficially to Lis Government what hɛd been discussed et their last meeting, and was pleased to be able to infor: hím that his Government took a very favourable view of the Ministerial visita su, osted. He therefore believed that the Chinesa Government would welcome a visit by the Foreign Secretary to China if he wie willing to come. If an invit tien would be accepted the inese Government would be able to consider sending it at an appropriate time. He would also unofficially report the dates proposed to see whether they wore suitable to the Chinese side. He could not of course make any definite commitment himself but be thought that the dates ·roposed night vel. be possible. when the dates had been fixed the Chinese Government could extend a formal invitation. For addis said that he thought this was an excellent

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way to handle the question. Mr Cheng said that of course the Poreign Minister, Mr Chi Peng-fei, would want to pay a return visit if the Foreign Decretery come to China. He had already promised to visit France at a suitable time after the visit of M Schumarın, whose visit to China had already been fixed, as the Amba: sador knew. The timing of Mr Chi's return visit had not bean fixed. It might be at the end of this year or at the beginning of next. But in general the suggestion that Mr Chi should combine his visit to France with is visit to Britain was an excellent idea. He would put it up to Mr Chi for consideration. *Although our discussions were still unofficial we could say that we had rerched agreement in principle to visits by the British Foreign secretary to China and by the Foreign Midster, Chi Teng- fei, to Britain and we would work to achieve this end.

The

3. Mr Addis said that this was very satisfactory. They had áiscussed Tast time on the same basis the possibility of an exchɛn ̧❤ visit at Vice-Ministerial level. He had proposed an invit: tion to Mr Ch'ico Kuan-hua to visit Britain, counter-balanced by a visit to China by Mr Royle, the Minister of State in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office dealing with Asian affairs. It had been suggested that Kr Cu'iao might stop in London either on his way to or on his way back from the United Nations General Assembly. British side thought that there would be advantage if it was possible for Mr Boyle to visit China before the Foreign Secretary came in October/November. ho Hr whang kinh, British Ministers had always to consider the Farliamentary pro, rame, The only time before the Foreign Secretary's proposed visit possible for Mr Royle would be during the Whitsun recess between 29 Hay and 12 June. He know that this was short notice but if it were possible Mr Royle could strive in China on 30 Kɔy. Mr Chang said if Mr Royle came to China then had the imbas ador any iuea How long he would stay? Er Addis replied that if possible he would like to stay in Peking for five daya and then travel elsewhere in China for four or five days. He would arrive on 30 Ny and leave on June. He proposed to visit Burwa on his way bɛck, Mr Cian, asked whether he planned to visit any other countries. Kr addis re:lied that he did not. Fr Cheng undertook to report to is Ministers. Although the notice vas .crt he would do 13 best to give an oerly answer.

4. Ir Addis thanked Mr Chang and said that he would like to discuss come oflier points which they had raised at their last meeting. He had now a list of schools wuicl it was thou,,ht might be suitable for the English language training requirements for Chinese students waich the Chinese ruthorities hɩd in mind.

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First, there was the British Council English Lenguage Training Institute, at which the six Chinese students attached to the Embassy in London were ɛt present studying. There were also three private schools sad two stato schools which might be able to provide suitable traininų. In addition to these there was the possibility of arranging a special course at one or two universi:ies. He suggested that if the Chinese side could let him know how many students were likely to be involved, what sort of course was envisa¿ed, and any other points, a concrète programme could be drawn up. The academic year in Britain began in September; this wo:ld therefore be convenient but not a binding date to aim for. Ir Chang replied that this was excellent information which he would convey to the Departments concerned, If they required more details then he would ap roach Mr Addis. The process of struggle, criticima and trans- formation in schools in China had not yet been completed. The question of sending students abroad was under consider:tion but no decision had been reached and no concrete plans made.

He was, however, very rateful for the fact that Britain was so ready to accept Chinese studenta and he hoped that this would act as a spur to the Departments concerned.

Mr addis said that what fir Chaug had just said partly ensvered his next question which concerned the possibility of British Diplomatic service language students coming to China to study in schools and institutions. The numbers involved would be no more than two or three per year and they would wish to come probably for nor more than a year. Nr Lang undertook to convey this request to the appropriate authoritios tut again he thought that no decision had bean rerched about accepting foreign students.

hr Addis said that they had also đi, cu zặd at their last meet- ing e question of English language teaching by radio. The bassy had eceived some material from the BBC but it was not yet complete. It would be better to wait until they hɛd received a complete set which they could then hand over to the Chinose side. Ho sl.o wished to ropose that an official from the BBC conc rned with this question should come to China to discuss it with the appropriate Chinese authorities. The official he had in mind was MT:Lowse, who was not only an expert in english languaực tế chẳng by radio, but also a Chinese scholar. He could come si her soon to explain the material which the BBC was sending or later to discuss it after it had been·tudied by the Chinese authorities. Mr Shang thanked the Ambassador for these proposals.

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17.

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Hr Addis said that there was one other matter following on from their Isat meeting which concerned relations between the Royal Society and the Academia sinica. The proposal had been made by the Royal Society on 9 March to the academia Sinica for a visit by a Royal Society delegation to China on 20 May. The delegation would consist of the President, Executive Secretary, and Forei ̧n secretary of the Royal Society, who were experts respectively in biophysics, chemistry and geology. In the present state of relations between Britain and China he thought it would be very useful to have a top-level visit from the Royal Society to counterparts in the Academia Sinica. But their latest information was that the Royal Society had not yet received an affirmative reply from the Academia Sinica, Mr Chang said that he was aware of the Royal Society's proposal and he understood that it was being considered by the Academia Jinica. He did not know about the answer but he was glad that the Ambassador had brought it up. de would immediately get in touch with the Academia winica and have it expedited. He personally approved the proposal that leading members of the two institutions should meet to have discussions over a wide range of subjects which would then point the way for contacts in different fiel E. Was he correkt in a:suming that the Royal Society still wished to send a delegation on 20 May if the Acadonia sinica were able to reply? Mr iddio confirmed that this nasumption was correct. He went on to say 35% there was another opportunity of scientific exchange which had been proposed. Frofessor Dorothy Hodgkin, an expert on insulin, had asked a Chinese expert to join a symposium on insulin in Eritain on 11 May. Although no reply had been received from the Chinese authorities she was still very anxious thịt her Chinese colle gue should go to Britain. She hersel had won the Nobel Irize in 1964. She too wished to vi. it China in sept aber if it we e possible. Mr Chang said he was not ware of this invitation, but would get in touch with the Aozdenia Dinica, whether the snawer was yes or no he would ask them to make a reply.

My addia said that there was one other matter concerning the BBC that he wished to mention. The BBC would like to send someone to Onina, a Mr singer, who was in charge of features pro¿rammes for BBQ Television, to discuss the possibility of making up to two hours of film in China on such. subjecto na Quinese medicine, recent history and culture. If t..is could be agreed in principle by the Chinese muthorities, concrete arrangements could be made. Nr Cummg said tuat he thought the BBC had rectly sent a team to Mhina, although it covered different subjects. He would bring the matter to the attention of the Inform"tion Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affnirs who would then get in touca with the Bebesby.

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COMPEDENTIAL

9. fir addis then banded Mr Chang a piece of paper on the newly formed treet Britain/China Committee. Hanid that similar informa-r The idea was that, tion had already been given to Mr Fei in London. with the improvement in relations between the two countries marked by the exchange of Ambassadors, an organisation should be set up concomed with cultural and similar exchanges, arrangements of

The programmes for Chinese visitors to Britain, exhibit ons etc. piece of paper described the terms of reference of the Committee. The President was their old friend Kr Malcolm MacDonald, the Vice-President Lord Trevelyan and members of the Committee included the former foreign uncretary, är Michael Stewart and Sir John Leswick. Mr Chang said that he thought that this Committee would be able to muke e bi, contribution to cultural exchanges and people-to-people contacts. It would help the work of the two Babassies through another channel,

10.

Mr Chang went on to say that at their last me ting he had mentioned in connection with questions concerning Hong Kông that in order to facilitate the handling of those questions and of relations between Hong Kong and China the linese Government would The Ambassador like to send a special Commissioner to Hong long-

He had looked had asked what functions such an official would have. up old files and found that in 1955 in Febru: Ty the Chinese For-ign Minisry had nada concrete proposals on this question. The status and functions of the proposed office were explained quite clearly in these proposals. In 1958 the British For ign Office had replied that in their view the atmosphere of relations between the two countries were not right for such a proposal, so the matter h‹d been suspended. The situation was now very different from that in 1958. Morooyer before 1949 curing the time of the Kuomintang Government, there had been Chinese diplomatic representation in Hong Kong. It was only efter 1949 that it land been discontinued. Past ● perience had therefore shown that the existence of such an organ of representation was to the benefit of both sides, and that there was a noce city for such a presence. He did not know whether Mr Addis was familiar with the details of the 1956 proposals. He hoped the British Government would consider then agcin. Mr Addis said that he would have to find out about the proposals Tron London and

Vas they could then disouss them in more detril at a later date. the Chinese view that the roposals made by the Chinese Governnant in 1956 should, in their broad essentials, vo made again now? Mr Crang replied that he thought that the proposels made then were considered ones; the idea was one which ought to be considered

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since the matter had not been discussed in detail in the past be would like to know what the British Government thought of then. Basically speaking the Chinese Government wished for some kind of diplom-tic representation in Hong Kong. Är Addis replied that be thought it better that he should not comment at all at this stage until he had seen the 1956 proposals. They could then meet again and have another discussion. What they both wanted was an arrangement to suit both sides. Mr Chang agre d and said that after the Ambassador had studied the proposal they could me t agɛin and continue the discussion on the same exploratory basis as before, without comitment on either side.

11. Mr Chang said that they had also discussed the poscibility of opening civil aviation and telecommuniction links between Hong Kong and Garton. These questions were now under consider tion. There was also the question of improved communic tions between Hong Kong and Canton which was also under consideration. As things stood there had been a big increase in traffic on this route. The need to improve communications was important to both side.

Copied to:-

Far Easter. Depertuant 100

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CONFIMENTI AL

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V prooch ilody ntête schools 1. lu dition to 11: rry y lap a muccini cou.76) nå en det if the G. 1. ese sido could I 14: ly to be involved, it can other points, : concrété ro; = Fors in Britoir bogen in -mplant bornenient but not a biud nj; drt. Chi: uro excellent infomation " vt tenta conscrnod. In übɔ

hotel. Me ducis. The TUCE of straggle, criticien CIR or ation in se ́ools in C ins law not yet la confletoá, que: tion o ser ding stude: to acum id vas vait consider: Lion bt 10 ice:sion had beon Terobed and no concrete plmua mrde.

lio 1:5. .onover, VOIS rateful for the 2. it that Tri' in was so ze dy to

cot Chiveso "tudents ed lo he od that this would act a " apr

he ileperticuús concerod.

re; li d that ich it would cui với to ti 'quired zoro dotrils thou Go world

יוי

l'r ddia soid that what ...: Chọng, had just erið porty

råd 131 0100 112c wixt questio whiel concerned time rozsibility of Britian ip omatic Servico lengur e stars its conf. to Ü Ina to study in Lei.. ols and insitutiors. When bero in ɔly d would be no pro

Luo or tirno por yeer nie 7 vorla misli to come profily for or sore ton a year. IT UNSER

xdertook to convey thie r qu et to be opprotriaz (uthoriti:" lus

btched et out accepting for

vin le fru, hit thrt no dei lo d en stuča 250.

lr 'öle said tint U47 1:1so di cued at their lit 100%-

ou : the quait of 20: 11 h 1ge tene i te radio.

Ye mb EROY rd ·ccoived zone met riri from 1 to 130 but it are not yet co plote. it :ould be better to riù until they lze recoivod a corul te so

11 h they could then lipu ovn ropose that en offici 1 aro r: tiòn should come to C dar të 163 ruthorivies. The offic was not only în experù in ut cleo e Chinese se..öl: r. lin The material which the 350 wrD

2 r it had been studiod by the 41: mod the Anlasardor for Vi er

obie Chim se side. why do mi hal šie i cɔe med with ties direus 17 viðh the oppró ri la

3 ho hd 2. rind wre a lit

Π iri. 1mm

to ci ing by rio,

ין

-י

י.

e uld con el her soon to

din, or later to discuss it Jhineno ultorilios. Ir

Toporale.

CONFIDE

IAL

17.

Er Addis said that th

لي

is one obim në her folving e cerned rd: blona between the

nic. The za coal bed ban rude So the Aer Fanta

in vinden fo... a vírit Jeing on

The d leation xecutiv

ne ti, visie.. Ro; il tocicly and the le: duni. - or the Bogel - cincy on liare by a doyni bociety dolog toni would consist of the 1: ident, -ccrobery of 10 Royal inciet, bic physica, el mistry me poole relations betizen Brit di alt us ful to b v. a top-lov 1 vint colatexperts in the load air pr. that the Loyal Society had re; ly from the oedonia - Inic....... of the imyel oociety's pronosa! dolar, conside ed by the c:út in wer ku" Le vas glad that t Viz would inncdistely; at in tw it expedited. ilo parson-17 2 me: bore of tito two iurli uti-a ov ra vile reage of subject: 1 co tacts in differact fiol 5. Ro, al society still wished to Ac dezirizien were ably to relyi

int en: imption was correct. op ortuity of scientific exot 12 Tonnor Barothy lod· ki.. Ct. ncao expert to jeia e oy jolan

:ritain in 11 i.cy. Alhoub no : ply hrd beon ree Yod from 112 9. 1200 authoriɛie:

van still very puxions th her dainor- collu que roule go

We Hotel ri o in 1904. Ska too

r Cher r if it wo o possible. vis tiou, Ta vld get in tɔuc.

ii I tha inn, x 12 yes or

eX to be

2011 or in do wre e crùs - specti ol· in v. In tu.zeit abi la of

no ho ng lúc ta đi trould bay r

: ii from Ul. Asjol society t: ler. But their latest to or 'ation it got rockivel ca affixa tire

En Greyorki tunt ke v.a wore ind be unferobsad that it was

Jihica. Han not kno: amut tie mbunusador Med brought it up.

rið hav

وا

to Britain. he horsul bed w wi keď to vi it China is wort se d be ves not aware of this with the hard nia Sinic:. vi

would sl: the.. to make a reply.

. viti. tha kondemia siric roved the ;roposal that Iɔnd ing Timuld moes to have disou ni ›De io: would jen point the ey for the commt in asumine tiit the

da dolction on 20 Ny i th

in confirmed that this

L'ere was wɔthir 1 propose i.

lød ne'et r

on to e which. ¡ wrt on

on ima in it

fr udela said that tho BB; TAG He...shed to me lion to Jitin: e ir Singer, 110 17 fo: Elk Velevision, to cirown two hours of lm in Chim c.. roonistor, and culture. I by the Chiner" ruthoriti -5, c> la Capun, paid that he tions 2. Ina, -1thou h it cov · 17 tia maer to the attention di De Infor På: Department of thi

was one obhur witer conc ring the

The Bid would like to neid aQM YOU* In charge of dentures pro, rai nes ko pazzi!ility or saki

up to en subject: Wineso tirine, t.is oquld be gread in | ri cipio 1.

vole any

tr. could 19 : ade

►

Ki istry of Loreign Art ive -

Aff

o 30 have .rent au' jeol.1

•

y sent : tren ùọ He would STE

would the 100 Li touc viti thi

1,06

ana

/0.

ir ddin Chon honuq. ir v AC krisin/Chidon Cosmidi ion and elrend; been gives to ra 21. he improve out in vel alion

Ola ozolengo of debat OFF, De med vith culturel se sink) 10jpares for Chinena vis" bor i i .CO. of prover divcribed later

silent va their ol: ri lee- ircsident Jord Truvel, en ee 10 zozmer -orei;a u-crctmy, in O pr said thrt he thou hè tr .0 i contribution to cultur vi.. eis. It would help the worl. Lot' 'r chronol.

g a pie of paper on the n wl; 0. 210 that cinilor in oxi -

oi in 1. otween orumis axchtn Britein, vt

of referuum

wo countries an ke

should be not up ITTON{FF), rts of ibit ons clo. *110 of the down. tt :0

ir blood i redongle, the

Lembora mu the Comite> nc udrà Lebjol i et ad Sir John om iet..

thâu Conisbee would to bl to (erchen or mal poople-to-pe ple of the tin bescios thrɔ"ji

ile Chen went on to sy tiet their 1 at ne ting la b d It onen in connection with que ior conc 2 được Long Long ti t

r MG or to Poilitate d'e hnúti of thone ucctions mid of lations betwe ʼn liong koo, and " Inr. the Ult on Govezaten, wulč

n ike to send a moecial Cor iio. 2 to long and The .mb si don

da sited wilst Junotions such a fficial rald have. die k d d lool ed › old files ar. 2.nd thrt in 1 3 in Zubrusy the Chinese bo v izja lui ry had neda concrete rojo", 13 on thir vestion. be tun 'une biore of the propoel of. `30 1020 er 1.ined quite cler

it' jce proposals. In 1949 the it in their view the escuaph - cun rios were not right for run

ispudod.

The situation una no

pre y 1 before 1949 durin; the ! ad been Chinese diplos tie s only after 1949 that in bed

herefore al own that tuo exir ope contution ung to the benefit hove city for such a presence.

erilirr with the dctic oi ritish Gov.zanent vorld com 10 ant ho would b ve to find out et

oy could be diccuss the in

Snose vier that the 10,0 1.20 should, in their 2.000 * C me replied that he t'ow ht one Gored ones; the car you o

vitial To 1 · Office hed relia of relations between the wo

1 projom: 1, so the arter b 1 b en very different from thet in 195 i.

:o of tho to of the loominɩng Gove ur mt, represent in Hong Ko 'g.

dinoontimed. last o ez Lenno once of muel, in orn of of both nigen, and thet tier wis We did not low whether - ildfa no 1956 · ro og lɛ. L'e ho see ter then r;.in. Fr '20is si id ut tuo noa: lo arom Bun lor and ró de mil it a later date, 158 a nude by ho Chinese dovr 033 V entials, te perdo alein 10:17 bat the Tɔjossle made üben wer 3

whion ought to le consið ›rel ̧

QUI PIJAMA L

ince the matter hed not bcn Circ, osed in cot: 1.1 in the paɛt ba

Cat

vuld liko ta ki ow what the Eritir" GoyoNE

io 117 perking the Olia ze boo mbona va lotic representation 1 lic

dou; it is better that he rœuld it comien

Mattht of then. 21 for como ki id ɔf He replied that he 711 at this t: 0

vra on repenge art

: vil he had seen the 1916 ropos- จ. Fueg e vid the net age in I have twother discussion. Wat they halli prila

Bvit both sides, fr the grɛrt and salt tt efter the

roros they call to agrin erd continvo

plor ory busi: ro tafore, with out

i bas vador hod studied tốn Ao discuzaion on the sate somi ment on either side.

.1. ir Chery said that they hot also dinou rod the possibility of

• ani 1; civil aviation and ciccomic bio. 11, hetween Iong Fo

E nd Canton. There questior › were ow unle: conifertion There

s cleo the question of ir moved omranio: "Soms loturen lioig kong und Canton which was also uxor en sider iti. o things stood dore hd been a big incronac iz "ffic on tis route, The need › improve communications was important to lot. eidos.

Jonic1 to:-

ricaturi Department FCO JUD 200

:.ics of the lolitical

avirer in 'g Kong

...itish imbassy Washington

COR DE TI

Consular Dept.

Thi Heiwey fair.

него Mi Davies7% M: Cronypion

Eve

No Dough weisich Antivolia

Howe clow The auch angeove.

Bay реаборі Letter and the 9/5

рестора

در

Francis Jones?

Newt

Depi shi sen hasz 9.

have

ᄀ

2.C.10/5.

R.E.

9/5.

ir K

Fri

1. viti In

1160

Snsular

さ

questions Mifectin

Leer

allow u

crae

uncentrble ti

n tied tort or a 12). it vickej to raise, " let ne i

two Pellion in M

int of thao van led to a 9 inear w

n ever since i dy

op de bin ter

vid until

-↑ ALA BO2,

rition low wr

o the Futuri de

ummit Lis

༞ཎཱ port,

te t

erzit Ma

er 20

serait for

put sărită

: held it to

esent ove

qularitie....

lɛ neti nelite won awer "rit:

W the

VICUOU

1. 05. 0.

triz

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t t:

ii.

ilit

せい

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mide

ritin

wide ou

JONNIDES TIAL

f'r Addis thought that the other orse in

anghai, that of

Mr iðnunds Kr Edmunds and his family, was also familier to Mr Chang. was a very old man, now §85, married to a Chinese wife. They had one daughter of their own, who left China in July 1971 and now lived abroad. They also had a child whom they had adopted within a few hours of her

she was now birth mc whom they had brought up as their own: dưughter,

2′′ and lived in whangha' with her parents. He understood thethir and Krs Edmunds were free to leave China at any timo. Lut they too were unwilling to leave unles they c uld take their y anger daughter with then. fi, wished to raise their case too on coz; aŭsionste grunds so that an old man o uld return home toguth r with a doughter he regarded as his own.

Er vhang esked whether the dopted child to whom th. Anbas ador had referred Hai a British passport. Mr Addis replied that she had not.

Mr Addis By Cheng asked whether she wished to go with her parents. replied that she did, Mr Chang then said that Lc took note of what of what Er Addie had said, and would convey it to the local authorities for consideration.

is said that he wished to mention the few British subjects detained 2. Toking. There had originally bee: four british subjects defined iz reking towards the end of 1967. But one, Ira Gladys Tant, Lad Lee, rolezsed at the end of March. The remainin, thres vare

When he had mentioned "heir cases Krs Datein, Mr Crook and Fr Jha, iro. to Cha L-chin in a general way Chang had told that Mrs Yang was alout to be released md alsọ thất he hoped tɔ be able to give biz news 0: the other three soon. He now wished to ask whether there was any further revs. ir Chang replied that the authori:ies concerned were making enquiries into their cases. He woul: inform the acboscedor of any resul·

and

2. wished to remind the imbasador of the Chinese detained in

ng Hong and said la hoped they would be set frec 28 soon a possible. ir.. La said that he would like to any a few worda about these Hong Kong Fricons: Fr Chang was aware of the circum lancus in which they had beer arreated in 1967. All these people (there were 21 still in prison) were not merely being investigated, but had been charge, tried and sentenced under a Court of Law. In that rospect thoir a.tuation was quite different from that of the three British subjects still being investigated in lekizş Moreover these persons in Hong Kong had been art sted not for laking part in demonstrations or for political" nelivitio, ut for criminal offences such as the plating of bombs etc, whic had they exploded could have kil ed many innocent people. This was an thar respect in which the situation of the 21 prisoners in Hong Kong was quite different from that of the three Britons detained in Feking. The teras of sentence of the prisone, a varied in length, but under Hong Kong law there was provision Tho R-vie Boar: could for a regul r series of Reviews of their case: "

recommend that certain risoners could be relo-sol before the end of their sentence The review procure naturally operated in the case of thos co, deamed for of enges committeed during the 1967 troubles as well as any other rinoners. ▲ number of tues prisoners had alr dy been released

The saba before to eni of their sentences under this codurc.

CONFIDENTIAL

/had

CONVL-NTIAL

hod in the past notified the Ministry of Aaroi release:. The review process rema.ned in net from time to time to consider caser,

A::sira of icponding

and the Board replied thʊt on sed persona in

he question of charges and sentences of · bong Kang the Chiness authorities had v differnt point of view. But he did not wish to discuss it that sor.. say that he hoped they would soon be out fre to report what he said.

lie wished on y to

My Addão underbook

5. Mr Chang said that so far as the three ritous wer: concerned, be would re for

if what the Ambassador had ashot to the appropriate authorities. Er addis said that the Dritis. vido would be grateful if it would be possible for theas people still amber investigation to send and receive mesanges to and from their failious lie understood that they had had no messɛges for some time.

thus said that 20cording to Chinese 1 w në communicatie IX. or Musilə during the

le period of investigation. He o uld however

Vie Azbasedor that they wore perfectly fit and in good shape.

in asked if he aould pass this information on to their relatives in critain, said that he could. Er Addis thanked in and teld that this would : ew are then very aud!..

6. Mr Ad is said that he now wished to discuss two people in bientalnı two Chinese ladies, the widows 22 wish mustanda, one called Ers lateman and the other called Miru (haliton. Mrs P-taman use in regular contact with the Embassy and My Michardson had recently bear to Tientsin to see her and talk to bar. irs Patesen was now sick and lonely. She ould not move from har reon, Her Cr nese friends did not eŋma to see her and she was Eoct upont aloul tuic. Menzers of the fabussy continued to see her but a turally not very often,

For this reason it would be very helpful if the appropriate authorities in -leutsin e:uld do what they could to help by rosseuring her thịt her friends were quite free to con: and see her. Main would nɛke her feel less lonely. Mr Chong, replied at this nutter was ne. to hin Jen rally speaking i. Uh re were no pro:lenc involved her friends chould be free to ¿ and seo her. Me tidig said that the other person,

had sent recently two letters to the abasay, saking if são could see á neyber of the Arbassy. Muan vir kichardson 8,plied to visit her in Tientsin be was told that it was not possible, In her two let'orc, she had asked to diɛcuse her situati, with a member of the

The imbassy therefore wished on

winued therefore to ask wheth r the approrin- in suntling a member of the Embassy to on que ves Chineso, fr diis replied thrk cho and married an islamu, who had since woa tornidured a hritis: subject. Kr

́ies Lould aɛnsider ker oase S

fut

was

un she would be dealt with acocTM

touch wit ber. nd utkerity could assist

asked whether

Comm

form in liony Eo-e

for Pritis. low she

at the Chinese 2tionality. If ahe V: ¿imose lat.

17.

OCE DETIA.

OUS LESTIAL

kr Addis said tust there was one other case of a British subject in 21 ina about whion the Jubanny know very litt.e They had recently heard from ang,zod of a firs Long Bo Cau a British subject married to a Chinese who had lived in Peking for sany years. They had very few particulars about her, Sho was married to a ühinese who hʊd been terching at a University in Feking. Dər 'endly had had no nexe a: hor for 9 years. The subassy bad tulegru; had to London for more

zibanny Cotoilu, buch as which Diversity beg Bos w been tesching at, and her last wow. Ski 64 + Bake SA he would convey it doe Department's noticvi 2 peran concerned. it vac Habel Bronner.

hubject Irina about when I was one

zat, e

DALTON, Bion was received 1964 Japa to Consular

ang replied that he find nevur heard of the was her saiden name? In Aduža replied that Hr Chang undertook to Angule.

What

The Azbas: (dor said that was all be vished to say about British subjects in China. He was most grateful for Mr Chang's considerction. There was however one question concerning en Australian which be wished to raise on behalf of the Australia Government. The person concerned was called Francis Janos, a jou nulist lost heard of in Chẳng u' the end of 1969. The Rubassy und Gant at the request of the Australian Government some two notes askin. for inforzation. If thero uno any news that be osild pass on to the Australian Government he would be grateful. ie Chang asked wh tàir ho was an Australien citirer. i'r ddis replied U1t he was.

Iz Addie went on to say that when he had had his talk with Mr Jhang den-chân, he had expressed the hope that there would be an incro se in visità among Chinese going to britain and iritish people comin, to China.

China. Na urally if British people wished to come tỏ China op lieat ons for entry vinne were made to the Chinese Embassy in Lemini. But would it be of assistance to the Chinese cuthorities when they considered these applications if the Embassy made sentrat with Conouler Department and give them particulɛ. and indiested wh their they had the support of the British Inbasayi Hrlang, onid that generally spealing applications had to be filed at the Chinese

mbassy in Lundeh. They transmitted them to loling. Mr Alia said tuat perhaps in particular casne wiiet had the support of the Brillian Government, the Britia) Embassy here could no fry Consular Department and give further particulars. Mr Steng cald twat if the British side thought thác was necessary be bid du objection. ie midin said that he did not intend to give Jonsular Departsmit te übly Vut he thought it would be helpful if the Lab_asy gave then a. laziestion of which >pplications they supportoŭ. One particular class of visits which they suported in gen rol was visita ty journalist, Be wished to mention one particular in tance. The Daily Telegraph, one of Britain' lending newspapere, h‐d applied to the Chinese kobassy to open an

The British Fabe sy would vike to support t ́is

/pplication

D Peking.

COL VIDATIAL

journalists and

said that he Hletion in Londo

dent journalist

application. They would like to sve morɑ Brit Britia'. nowspɩpara represented in Peking. Mr presumed tue people cinoerned had filed the If it was for a permaneat office staf ed by he would pass on what the Anbaurador had said to the department водоеме . Ky addig said that there weɛe twɔ Routers corre: pondents ir Pezim, now; The Daily Telegraph application was the first instemos of a named newspaper wanting to be "e revented in Peking.

10. On the general question of visas Fe ddio wished to mcation snoth r subject. Be thought it would be convenient for the C ine 34 autiorities if, when he and oth r members of his staff invited relatives or friends to visit lekinɛ, they wrote a note to Consuler D.part ent setting out the circumstances of such people comin, to Pokinų, moking clear that they were the personal quests of members 0. Lus "Ebassy who woulú make al' the necessɛry arrangements and be responsible for them. Naturally the persons conć roed would make applications to the appropriate Chinese Office. Would this be cozvecíent for the Chinese authoritise? Me Barn, said that it would.

wis said that he had now remobøl Lc and of his questior: and be via v ry grateful to fiz Chang for lis's in, to t'en for so louɛ, Mr Jan; replied that he vele sad such discussions. Ambalator welòome to oɑme at any time to di-cuss any poblens.

11.

503 tại

Frate a Department POD

to.itical Adviser's Office Hong Kong

CONFIDENTIAL

FEC 3/548/8

xr xvans

Mr Wilford

Iles.

19/4

Please

Eniei.

Mi Davies - please also send copies

to Hong Kong Department and

Conschor Department.

MR ADDIS'S MEETING WITH CHANG WEN-CHIN 27 MARCH

1. You may wish to see the full record of this meeting. Mr Addis has of course already reported the salient points very fully by telegram.

2. of the remainder of his discussion not covered in his telegrams the main points related to the possibility of engaging in cultural exchanges. It is encouraging to see (paragraph 15) that the Chinese are contemplating sending their Exhibition of Cultural relics abroad. This would create considerable interest in this country.

Mr Chang's "frank" reply in the same paragraph about the possibility of visits to China by British touring groups is disappointing but hardly surprising. We have been advising organisers of prospective groups precisely in these terms. Chang's remarks will usefully provide us with a more authoritative reply to future enquiries until the situation changes.

Incidentally Mr Addia's reference (paragraph 12) to the use of metal detectors in archeology would not be welcomed by serious archeologists in this country, who deplore the widespread use of these machines by amateur treasure seekers.

5. I have sent copies of the record to Cultural Exchange Department and Research Department.

18 April 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

H L1 Davies

Far Eastern Department

/ The

The record is a basic document, to which MI Add's will probably veter a good dead during the month's To come. You may wish to keep this copy for your own file.

R.M. Evons

18 April, 1972.

I have read this record with interest.

Mr Evans suggested to me that we should probably get echoes of the Chinese record of this meeting. I think that if you look at the minute which I wrote recording my conversation with Mr Pei on 7 April you will see that the subjects which he raised Secretary of State's visit, Chinese representation in Hong Kong must both have been on the basis of having seen the Chinese record of Mr Addis's talk. For example, he specifically mentioned that the representative would come from the MFA a point which was not, I think, mentioned in Mr Addis's telegram.

18 April 1972

Mr.

KM Wilford

FEC 3/548/8

CONFIDETI AL

RG IN.

Recort of a mating wit!. Cheng Wen-chin, birretén of Zuzorka ma Ariern Department at the nitrit kan on on 2/ Farch 1974 at 11,00 a m

Fresenti

IM Ambassador

Mr Chong Von-clin

Mr R C Samuol

Ir M J Richardson

ir Chang Ti-clası Er Ye Wei lision

II' Anbr

or said that he had naked for an int rvi:w with. the Director of the Western Suro; ean and American Dopart en tais porninu in order to follow up the exchengo of telegramo botwren the Chim, a Iremier and the British Irine Kinister in which 1.oy - Bel of S. development of good relations between their two exunt vict Bented to un'ortako with Mr Chang on infor al .neral view 2 bilatır. 1 matters to aco if there we a pointe on which it woul 10 posle to nake concreto ¡rujosals to the Gov rasenta o tot' si les a to: propro s. Many said that this was an e.collont idea. The rel: ALOND botsoon the Two countries had turned over a new page. It uro v IT useful for hin and the Arbasse lor to review matters which gone rul the botil. Ir Mia caid that he bad a short list of things to diceuan. Fringe ir Chang, had oo:e too, Jono od tba tida ̄n on "lu list concerned other Dopart. ents and orgenisat ons Luv ho wĩ hòa tɔ raiso them in the first in:tanco with fir Ohen

2. Kr. Mdia said that he wished to mention firmi se possibility of Mining. Pic: vi:its and official vi. ite nt a 1% low 1. o

ገር esphasised Strt he had no instruct ons to eke soulfic properate but he wished to mention the mubject in a pen zei wey on his own 10aponsibility, The only 7 nisterial visit et me da conter lit was the oubtending invitation ex endod last year to the Finister of Foreign Trado, Iri Huinng-lauo, to visit Britain.

Fei

Alioned t i;

because the invitation still stood and could be tela web nay ti Chang onid that the Minister of Foreign Trado and tea"

કપૂ

vo receive the invitation. At the tia; howevr in "ima Ablo had been very tight and he had not then beer in & roiion to take it u. The Binister had not however for,,atten it, rr' he would rilas to the Minister what the Asbaugudor had said, be bi intr 14 n number of other invitations, for example from the relleno, inlin said that he appreciated that the Binister of servig: Tenuo 1035 very busy but the British side hoped that he would con id r taking up the invitation when he next drow up his long-term table.

CONFIDENTIAL

13.

CONTIDENTIAL

Sunna thon said that he had noted Dir Alec Jau las-lona's stat>- sent when serce ent had been reached on an excl."nge ɔi & bangedorg that he would like to visit China rut was at prenent vully comitted. He asked Mr Aadis if he had any jurther infora tion on the porcrit...ity of a visit by the British forsign Jeorotery. Fr dais repliol that he had no further information Lut he had also plk: die!! Lu raise thin question in a conoral way himmelf, although again ou a jurely personal baola, without in tructions. He had also wond red n'out the ponaicility of the Chin. a "orriɛn liinist r, Chi 1 ng-fai netbg a ropean tur which would include iritain. Wht be had in viri ves klet treh olde could infor: their respectivo l'inistra that 11 g bad di' cu zed tho question of such visits informally, on the unforg in that if the poso,bility of cuch visits were acceptable t Mt', näing invitatione could be o:tended. For o: anle if two Chinose Forci, niinio' r vru planning to make a tri: to Purpe he was sure it culd be "rron ed for it to be invited to vi-it Britain 13.11.0 reid that or sa he old recoll the Cline a Foreign Kizdos r le 22 ending invit :ions from the French and the Yu:08] sval The immo' test iga Pinising who visiting China in July. The Chinese Foreig inis¦ ̧r šra oblitz! to make a return visit which would rot take pires Lesen July, but t'k Liring of which bad not yet laen fixo le lMin poid 11st if the Chinese Foreign Minister went to Prince he "upaka Vogaj liet be would come to Britain no well. His was cure that I 11 Gov. Q* wulu wich to issue an irvitation. It would however be bo ter not to exlond e forul invitat on until both sides and consulted.

hin noi. Vir Miệc vougins-lone if he e uld look fortnie to a line when ho would be able to visit China.

Avotir poss bility wra ʼn visit by Vics Mining ('inọ luɛn-it 2. Ch'iso had told him reanal's that he had ney r bne to Britain except two hours at Ionio, sir, ort in 1550. Ir Cl'ino to the

WC G General 'Aspe y 1oter bats ytr he won: d ir be a vid stop in Londen

o for a Bw dayn for discussions with, the Foreign Offiec put other Lritich offici-le. If thin was a possibility lo ins Gure en Avitelion Lould to Forthooning. China thanked the Aubras dor for ta eze onala. Fris noid that quei ly dip ng keuse in hin elf could be in

"quelly"

twin corki: J invit tlonu sl. any time. Clan, mild that he 2nd not

Yeen to t wiryort. I'm tellin soft the ageinst the back to dad of

1 lor cosporation between western uropean countries in politia:1 "att rele thought it w.uld be caoy to arrange a cone rie! Anvit in for Dr CNG, to vinit Europeer countries, including Britein. In ret the quest on hid air ady been discussed informally been hẳn clima nuabr of his West m uropean coilecguro in Foking.

Che

expressed his tha's but said that unfortunately it woo not u to in o ircide on mich a mtur. Nr bile maid he hoped the quention of øvel. vizite c ́uld be followed up ri o later date.

CCHFIDENTIAL

15.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Addio went on to ray that we also wished to briefly questions of trade end cuRLEION.

Friefly

tinh y T

departmento

being dealt with very ectively at the protok Vime nointained conutral contact with the corporation concernod. Delegations of British business non ce e frequently to Chine; one had come the day before. The Bri'ich nião ver ba with the way these relations were devolo ing. He ho improvement in cur ;olitical relation they would go Ching onid that he believed this would be co.

J' that will the urther for unde

Mr Aldis said that he wished also to mention du pattara which would be taken up in detail with Consuler Depart out 1 ter. The first concerned British subjects in Shanghai who we to lesse China, whose cessa he visbod to raise on compassien de grounds. -k na was an old ligimon of 9, merriel to ? chinesa, wo ket due, daugher and one younger dwighter who hel born rdenbe

in curly infancy. Ro wan now living in Chonghai with his wife cnd minglet doughter and was not willing to leave without the edopted deyildim, wien beɑ wea she was Chinese he understood was not eligible for an exit per it. The name of the femily wao Wronde. He h point the inese ruthorities would consider letting the family mo lam. not on politierl gr unds but ce a purely bursiturin

In ankel this vostion.

The cond case was one thrt/lind beer plannin to mention 100 he had received a telethone all enrlier in the merr ju, ra a risult of

might well have been resolved. Disc re conc raid which the probi

43. busin en English lady, Prs Cheng, formerly unrried to a U who had since died. che lived in .harp ai wiki lc on Ho ariran

he 2 born in Scotland, and was therefore under British tena. Tritic · citizen. lo-ribly under Chinere law the siten-ie' Chang acre Low old these poo:le were. ir 12ÄN YO were $2 and 24 respective'7. Fro Chung wish be to do so without the child. had been glad to HA, T{

That Log

int

rivat

** C**TS ?

weld oc 2

sho had been rented en exit vica but the situg' qe vitit recent to

He would no Jeubt knou her son va not got clear. of the next few days end the result would effect . to Consuler Popert ́nt,

G. The third ccncular it a wes already well Incw It e ́re race the cone of Gladys Yong, onu fie ern Cree', Chapero. G replied that he had some in orn: .2 concerning 1.9 I ng, and at this point he picked u read from it. Mrs Y-ng hnd co-mitted offelen on

to i'r Chan:. :: tein and

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So the Cuinase authorities concarned had decižou to be lentent an! to roleano hor. She would be allowed to rolum to ir hom the aut

dag.

CONFIDENTIAL

COLFI E.TIAL

day. In the case of the oth r the e, the authoritien cene med in continuing their investigations. II, un rt of to li

now when there w's more nous and hoped

t lo e mi

mantled. je tutis caid he was glad of thir.

e socio la ♪ Flífsent and in th

irriteit in vino-Brition relations.

tho in

droild en y dy G A * et ind

i L. Pra, thy comitated m

who led bo

25 va pool o

to pazo on Shrug onld that he hered all questio... of this sort left over from the fact could be solved quickly.

He understood from Hong Kon; but on in prison there had been r· lesod. One ne duo fos lut 3 vould still be loft. Ha hoped riups would be respect and Slet the question would soon be cotţi. Aue rett laing prisonera would be riled as 100. hat he world report what i'r Jeng bød - al. the eos, le hal been "enter:cod for ord:

under review frem time to ti

e cose c

bel toen wey zal zeloram ir mitv:sce a gri le i not wi" to go into Je het eling with delo in r1-tida.. chussions could be settled. atr both to Londo. and to inc

that 1 crute.

all

of there Chino pelecse this per

truan ia tir

Le bored i t o ible. Br difficult,

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15.

noth. etter which fr Zidis ve the purstion of Inglich langur.. to.

hei radio hed started 126 ish Inqu

3 in Lendo bat undo n wito and had a worl) vide reput wanderni ulather their knowlel, e vo ld be of Gov prent, To was cure that they vo lễ là v this :bel2. The Chinery Gov parrot MÅ D ingle to deton to study the i d'anto

pople to ieting to di:ourn myn'!

at there was in 'ood great lak

134 i

t..

.1.1:1: conveg Ür à 'ie's gugu concerned. I'r Mir puid that this pos

7 P

Ce.. that he too was personally intang 314 now of or a personal au et on. tno ponsibility of jeryle reing o Britain or Chine. Wuld it be po cible for the 1921fR authorities some printed matter, for ex met Arlo, co that there coul be 103 ony moetings that sight take place? for such material by telegraph the scdu W 11.

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Mr A is went on to say that he would tak nitinct, the posi'ility of ociclist vi it`. place in tle cornerciel field. cor ex: la fin Chinese deloɛstion cone rned with the petro-ch nio:] industry viriting

דיה

CONFIDENTIAL

/irituin

CONFIDENTIAL

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Britain. Other such visit, related to corm rei·l ne 1*** planned. Ne visbod therefor to cention on his own And UF: +İve a rstır broader prospcolive of visits with longer tera objec ́ive-, in seftific and releted fields. For example ho hôl callel rèc:ni ce the 110, 7 volutionɛry Committee and had had an intere ting 61 tion on t problems of urben development, catellite to. ns, the ony rerumt, rollution. Vould merbors of the laking Revolution: desnitten or the Qlanghai Revolutionary Committee, for instance, emaič.r visiting Brisbin to loa fron Fritic experience and Brition, 15 bạt dù b

1.2 fiolda? Sinilarly would other Depart: onts derling with octontifia and technologionl matt ra conuider sending visitor to ritrin to onchi nije oxp riences? Another idea flowed from the me the Feople's Republic of China in the United in tiena part in cycolalised ogoncies. Would it bo us ful to Gran, u ox; eriencòa in the United King on in the pier 1 fiel of Law? Britsin was a place where a special study led question and there were institutes and organicctions es International Lew which night well be of inter t of Government.

ita

king

Interet kan d

lo of 1: ned with Viiners

in viich

in for

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12. Tot another field of possible mutual inter-st, Pr Aldis had a personal interet, was archaeolovic 1`r wond red the ther tür Ching e authorities colo med val t it useful to discuss the latent scientific tochaiqien i l' in field. For example there were now new devices inv ute.. for a.. rotala under (round 1 a Gevelopment of the mino da ceber tio r. Clyne asked if this type of machine was cle 1r A 18 2u. Tied that it was used extrusively in late

110 archcoologists in other c entries. Anov r * in which there hed toen advances ura in dating, vali of carbon 14 end ther ol uninosor ne^ If there wer 0: the Chineno cuthorities core rned we could ob ein fer! All the so were ideɛs o' out possilla Fields of cutter

in cac. und by of are

t to

infor.

anta 15 U.

13. As far as visite fron Britain to Ching vapa c. 10 of course now a gent interest in Brit în în pl British ride oped thṛt now that political relatio o: uld to cloner coordination in arracjing Beit Art vị lf the Chinese authorities wiɛhod to invito sicci-'le' the Labassy would be glad to ariançe ay ropriüle feltiin, for 1% Chinese Gav :zont to enable them to obtain tio lost me nelių for possiblo (2^u}B. Cr alternatively if the Chinese Govan tod i r

ork through thoir &bassy in London, he knes As A t. to glad to help in the nazo way. It was fully unters! sche cases the Chinese Government wi..hed to meke their But i'r Addis hoped that tuo Embassy would bo ke: ₺ ful. arren,od in this way. As an exa' ple of wust had been i

100 woyla art in

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ening in 1:

OCHFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDEN FIAL

paat he underst od that there were 10 doctors now vid ing Ching. Plus Dubnery know nothing about their trip. Chen,nfo 1 Hole or woult: tie.,

3 Daid that this group had bee.. organised by 10 China Ma vel ♬ rvien n'A ware paying their own expense", Bir A in coil Mhat he kapal it voorle

Paid tins de Le porsible for meny zoro tourists 15 vi It Cine. idea wao a good one, The difficulty was that the tri vil servico won not fully dovoloped and it was difficult to o tin to vir esacrata

:1:" conditiono wore it sny one tine. Hr Ad'in paid that is :lso hope! that rore jourrellata would to able to col to Chidan,

Che vo outstanding a ¡lications at the present bine, Lo cover the Cinton P ir, one for a BIG oficial to cock

1 one for, the Daily Tolopili to oron a Bur a in i dân,. there norely ca exemples, in order to emphasize the that the critich side saveure? iner Food Journalistik - dhe diça unt equally that they should take place in the oth r jirueti

Te ire

of the o 1 #1 0 tons to Cina,

mentione 1 1 priimti.11

for e

end of lit

& come to

tre could n-S

LANTE P 2

On the gonorul question of cul'ur: 1 oxcina c. Fir *hat ther wold be increetel mov.rent in bot. di akic in the fiolds of ballot, opara and art oxhibitions, jeer a Chine o bullet [roup tourin,; Europe had vanto Britsin. There had been some disu-point- ni tant a fam be found for tho:1. lio ventod to my luat for's 1.2.. it was necessary to give long tv mu notien, rbout ; orform-ncns. There, wore only two big the tỷ 3 in 10. da, 2015 y wore booked up long, in wivonent, Gjeong bald Grek Na Salle ma e albel ch.io.

It had eriginally been intender that this way olmali vizit Itrly, ncc on the UK, but "rrenta broio do. Wie man the

-1° notice Led team too short.

15.

My talin nodd that ha lind been in cum 1

oxhibition of cul url relics in the Torbirden 0:17.

i: porter' exhibition,

If there was any possibili.

in uropo it would create a chorous ir sien wel v

nhance Ül:inocu prati(0.

יי

Chung acid that the un

Ngr the

ped

ilt 01.

1 tl insie mbinition 12

e it comh not Ari to ie 37°

in: in i

Goy runen ire? clre dy rui 2 tand they would Franco.

lin did not see any reason why if i. vent go lo Britain ao vell. Er Addia anld that lev. this. lendon who of garu Lie cenir for år kumi vplied that the Chinese Gov Inneut un Tun

Tio ide, Ir dio void that he would al o la

to Cl i2-0 Arht-tivi với Tus pose bility of vini's it t culturel (roups.

For example, nuxt year tu kerel or / 291 neriti 1

bo in sanghony orchestra and the Royal Lokesperra Cou! 227 22 ¡lon;; Fong. It might bo possible to arrange for hu i although this had not yet been direurned in London. The thing of interest to the Chinese ruthorities, or was bli right? Cheng said that he was not very familiar wit

Lo Chinc Ain nort of Die not t

7 AL

/conditions

CONFIDENTIAL

S 11

conditions in this field but since the Ambassador hr. v ry ir kly naked him he would toply very frankly cltimgh his vi miht not be curr cl. He said that perhaps thò táme wis not at righ" for much visite. Tore hnd not yet been a similar vi:il for pooja Teen countries to Cina, Er Alia soid that naturally que. A visit ouly be of road internal i! performances e ul take 2.en tefore a wide group of reoplo, especially young people, and 2) elties other than Foking. There would be no interest in nên duy a coup werely to perform before the Diplomelic Corpo. Chong grid t ́t he wro14 hoop in touch with the Azbanzador on thin w 95 et mi lot in gans

new

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10. Hr Müiin said that he now wished to mention of munienti no different Gost; a matter, in fact, which fir Be ain ng quired wife te Chineso authorities last your. The Britint rationi tra crnceznei- like to establish a Telox" Jini bobwgen Hong Kong, en for the spring and autumn Fairs. Cham; anko link would only work during the purious of the Fire otill be worth vicle. fir à Nis replied & he won ho thought it would be worlmulle and that once ing called its use could be extendel if censzary, won to eat-lich discussions at a working low) tel iL C nton end in Hong Ken, to work out the proble a understood that Hong Kong, personnel had rim ben the Clinomu autì.orities or r thin wet .r.

17.

or hun.

■

kuna nɔUM

bonel. vig

any in tii ir onto from liv

enuzans were

119 cuch

dhon, then said that he wished to bærek in vi har torsoni

oie bed zentione" delish teraliz 41. of hol ing ✪ inoso "tudentu to lesin saline. or school in Brilain which speciali od in tơ elin =^ \ For Lost who knew no oluer foroi,m lan; u Ehort? Ne Mlis replied at he did not law of J- Chought Tim Tritish Counell could "lroat centriol; es il undort. ok to find out. More svin t t .. Wyther the Gi,incoe Govorasene world ueni alilolita .vit in cr n Hernally the Chineur Gov muent c^uld out fi Â" "IP-ou in Iorder Find out about such things from tba Brickor dejes If lir à di, could find out this in arrat on ini

+ Ju...ul t ☺ ir own peo le cone Inet englis.... wis rath r lov. - would like to neo 1 i and that tim. Fritial Counc:1 hrå made " oprol teachers of unglist. It would nlzent e rtrinly le in that rield. Ir Allis said that he would find out 1 to crualet lot Mr Chung know

; י]

11 to

Jetble to 1

ta)

12. He would now like to return to the quo. tion of em nunie:4,'e

He would like to eat in Utopsy Letween Nong Kong and Centon. Be it wo ld be vorful at this stage to think in 250 01 · tablislin, : dir.ct oir link betwn the two cities.

Police tub la neg :"t vory fo: ilier with this; roblou, although it van ono liek pang fhe con visitora reized, But because in the past our r.1 Lions ind nôt bei good it had not been given serious consideration. No Phong the i a

/diret

CONSILLITIAL

OCHYID_NTIAL

dirvot air link could be sus. up it wol bly-f·cilit to trivel Lor vi åbørn, How long would it tako t flx

1. Aug. 1 anil that they thought about half-an-hour and that he woull Tailo: 19 question ur. De Chang said that he would ker il rollo ed un las,

111

10.

A related question, Mr Cheng said, crou, from when su Tere. 1971 ir nier Chow un-lai had recived Er Den.ön ént üleurord r letien. betwn their two combrier. I had rind An old question the t clong timɛny affairs which involved tus Kong Hor vu'lariti Chine sono were t ken up with th• ornarl Gov.incent end some ; i1h the local authoritica. This clots of of virg was not convinient Iremier Clon had raked whether it would be 79. Lɛle to send an oifizini

:10 aund rappantsletive to long. Kong. Whet ven 1.

rection? Nella sci that Le would have to find cut. No to 14 le glad to ke enquiries, Chang and i What this wee an old quest Cu lutemniter inw to b biken up in thigh' of the new il-binnp. k. W on the two coun rie, which were now movin for.. E

retions for the officing the Chinese Goy 12, aling this "roposal. fx Chane replied &rk, lâu inprouale. was 1.

1 the original ¡roposal wus for By C. in; so 11: to send a p prevent tive to Hong Kong. Twend what Amelioùs it ros anvisnged that no dould

20.

b·

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تا

Az neked whet

id in At 1!!

Gry of Ver in a Pins

re to find out

גי

L rri.

The

islin said that ja ha ang other pain uld gents Hour ḥ sending a note to th H. 1 tzy gf foreign affis about dinis, arising from ov jam it out on, reti kroz rử i ba over in 20 at peers by the nenn

ut o i d

PUT to ringe t! British Gov rauent's po·l ́ins on r copi. 岿 Cid not pink that there would le any need for li cu rieng de dot-il.

21.

I ACMAR snid he at raw come to the g

dis 1 srid tlt he ha rai ed quite " lurjo must " of cutiens. ail a

e la lit.

11 of

· 11 jou ores and ther wer ni vedi for c

'd: o...A Choy would oreh bo dealt with un! sat led nas 1. Beid wat bo thou ht it was en exccllen dda bo vi ques" SubNU EEN. I

in & ral way and tiwa follow the u Anil isle. ar od oul cai that sort of then clearly reco to to d the Deportzents cone rned. If obstacle: oɛe Amel di cu vir 1

" he and the À la valor could rest gain to vio

•

CONFIDENTIAL

}

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

ROCSIVED IN

REGISTRY No. 52

29 MAR 1972

CYPHER CAT 4.

FM PEKING 2910077.

CONFIDENTIAL.

TO PRIORITY FCO TELEGRAM NO. 250 OF 29 MARCH.

MY TELIO 247.

AFTERNOON.

SINO/BRITISH RELATIONS.

Fe 3+48

시

1. I PRESENTED A COPY OF PY CREDENTIALS TO CHI PENG-FEI THIS HE EXPRESSED HIS GOVERNMENT'S SATISFACTION AT THE AGREEMENT ON AMBASSADORS AND SAID HE HOPED THAT OUR RELATIONS WOULD DEVELOP BETTER IN THE FUTURE. HE ASSURED PE THAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WOULD DO WHATEVER THEY COULD TO HELP ME WORK FOR THIS END.

2. CHI PENG-FEI CUESTIONED ME IN SOME DETAIL ABOUT THE SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND, AND SAID THAT HE LOOKED FORWARD TO FUTURE

CPPORTUNITIES TO DISCUSS THIS AND OTHER MATTERS AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF OUR IMPROVED RELATIONS.

3. I AM GOING DOWN TO CANTON TOMORROW MORNING AND WILL BE PRESENTING CREDENTIALS TO TUNG PI-WU THAT AFTERNOON OR ON 34 MARCH.

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Now see

PRIORTAY

CYPHER CAT A.

PEKING 2349837.

COPFIDENTIAL.

REGIST:ty No. 22

CONFIDENTIAL

29 Mak 1972

FC 3/548

INFO

TO PRIORITY FCO TELEGRAM KO. 247 CF 23 MARCH.

HONG KONG.

SINO-BRITISH RELATIONS.

ORDER

1. AT THE OUTSET OF MY MEETING WITH CHANG WEN-CHIN YESTERDAY MORNING 1 SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD UNDERTAKE IN A FRANK AND FRIENDLY WAY A GEMERAL REVIEW OF PILATERAL QUESTIONS IN TO SEF WHETHER IT VOULD NOT PE APPROPRIATE TO TAKE ACTION IN ANY PARTICULAR MATTERS TO FURTHER THE AIM OF IMPROVINGGOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES WHICH WAS THE THEME OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES WITH CHOU EM-LAI.

CHANG WEN-CHIN RESPONDED WELL TO THIS AND SAID THAT WE HAD

***OW TURVED OVER A NEW LEAF AND THAT PROGRESS SHOULD BE POSSIBLE

IN A MUMBER OF FIELDS. HE REPEATED MORE THAN ONCE THAT THE

BASIS HAD TEEN CREATED FOR THE RESOLUTION OF VARIOUS OUTSTANDING ISSUES.

. THE TOME OF OUR CONVERSATION WAS EXCEPTIONALLY AMICABLE THROUGHOUT, EVEN BY CHANG'S OWN CIVILISED STANDARDS. HE SHOWED

A WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS AND TO EXPANDON THE VARIOUS TOPICS I BROUGHT UP, WHICH INDEED I FOUND QUITE SUPPRISING. FURTHERMORE MRS YANG'S RELEASE AND THE GRANTING OF AN EXIT VISA TO MRS CHANG IN SHANGHAI CANNOT HAVE BEEN COINCIDENTAL: THESE WERE OBVIOUSLY INTENDED AS GOODWILL GESTURES ON THE PART OF THE

CHINESE TO MARK THE IMPROVEMENT IN IRELATIONS.

3. THE TONE OF OUR CONVERSATION ABOUT MINISTERIAL VISITS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THESE WOULD NOW BE WELCOME TO THE CHINESE IN PRINCIPLE AND THAT THEY ARE READY TO IMPROVE POLITICAL CONTACTS BETWEEN THE TWO- COUNTRIES AT VARIOUS LEVELS. PROGRESS ON EXCHANGES IN SPECIALIST

FIELDS OUTSIDE SINO-BRITISH COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WILL PROBABLY SE SLOWER, IF ONLY PECAUSE THE CHINESE HAVE NOT YET SETTLED THEIR OYY POLITICAL ATTITUDE TO THE TYPE AND EXTENT OF SUCCCH CONTACTS FOLLOWING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION.

CHANG'S ATTITUDE TOVARDS IMPROVED CONNEXIONS BETWEEN HONG FOLG AND CANTON WAS ALSO UNEXPECTEDLY FORTHCOMING, BUT IT MAY DE S'E TIME PEFORE ANYTHING TANGIBLE EMERGES.

/5. HE WAY

CONFITA

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CONFIDENTIAL

5. THE WAY IN WHICH CHANG PESURRECTED THE CHINESE PROPOSAL COR AV OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN HONG KONG AND THEIR HOPES FOR THE EARLY RELEASE OF RETAINING CONFRONTATION PRISONERS WAS, I THINK, INTENDED TO PUT US ON NOTICE THAT THESE ARE THO ISSUES WHICH THE CHINESE FOR THEIR PART HOPE TO SEE SATISFACTORILY SETTLED IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR NEW RELATIONSHIP.

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