FCO 21/806 Chinese foreign policy

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FOREIGN POLICY OF CHINA

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F0021/806

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The ion John Wilson OMG Test African Department

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Copy to the J. Johnson / IK..

Posa, Col. Noir

BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION

FREETOWN

13 August 1971 Enter

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1 As reported in my telegram No 279 the information transmitted in my telegram No 293 came from Nancy o through a close relative of hers who met the retuning

rty at the airport. lthough she may well have exngre the Timess, and possibly the size, of the Chinese com mont, there is no obvious reason that I can see why cho should have invented anything or got any of her facts ed vrom. On the face of it, a Chinese bribe of this mitūdo secms highly impropeble, and I was in two minds whether to await further developmaits. On the whole, in view of the source of the report and its extremoly factual ir ture it seemed to me post to let you have the details strai¿lit FaVey in case they fitted in with other knowledge of Clinuse 11.tentions. Again as I said in my telegram No 297, thi is so far no independent collateral here, aside from the strange little rumour, which the Americans have got solely, trt the railway is to be "rescued". After the initial publicity for the decision to exchange Ambassador, thum has ooon a completo blackout, and the Ministry of Extoral Mficirs Inows nothing.

ist, to comment on the individual items of the lou, on the assumption that the report is correct in broad ontlin.

-abilitation of the Railway

3 Only major work on the railway could, along with the otitat items, make up a sum anywhere near £60m (or even 260m 11' that were indeed the currency in which the loan is expromi).

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At the same time, I do not see how any sort of precise "rice tag could have been put on this: whatever sort of work is intended - and I would guess that the most likely plan would be to superimpose a štandard gauge line on moï'e or less the existing alignment - a feasibility study or survey will be needed to establish some idea of costs. This would seem to make it likely that this part of the Chinese 10an was expressed in an "up to Xm" sort of formula.

4 Attractions for Sierra Leone in this would be:

(a) prestige; to be the only sizeable West African

territory without a railway would be bad enough; to have to dismantle an existing railway, at thi behest of the IF, is even worse;

(b) one must remember that Solomon Pratt was General

Manager of Sierra Leone Railways and doubtless resents the decision to phase out the railway;

programine; the two vital sectors of the East/West Road Bo-Kenema and Freetown-Waterloo, bot the rasponsibility of IBD are pedly behind hand cad look like taking yeers to finish; this delay provides some case for retation of the railway if it could be made to operate properly; it might even be argued that an efficient standari gauge railway might make limited economic sense Ir capital costs could be virtually ignored, as they would be under a loan or the sort nov proposed; Tari Sierra Leone might rather enjoy the opportunity to cock a snook at the IRD - having as usual fai loci Tailoc to look ahead to the risks she may run of being black-balled by the whole multilateral aid community;

(d) there has, for some time, bean political opposition

to phasing out the railway, stemning from four or dislocation, with the inadequate road system and the inefficiency of the Road Transport Corporation, and from the redundancy which will inevitably be involved.

5 Attractions in this for the Chinese would be:

(a) if, as one imagines, their offer is to "look into"

rehabilitation of the railway, they will leve achieved

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maximum propaganda impact coupled with flexibility, low initial cost and no firm eventual commitment;

(b) the initial survey, and later, if this actually

follows, construction of the railway, would enable than to penetrate deeply into the country, in large numbers.

Gur Boats

6 The attractions for Sierra Leone are :

(a) prestige, inter alia vis-à-vis Guinea;

(b) they would provide an answer to the current very

genuine invasion hysteria;

to 200 miles a slightly less empty gesture;

(a) they fit in with Stevens' thought on the need for

Customs launches; he has probably given up any hope of getting these from us and would doubtless argue that by their patrolling, the gun boots would have a deterrent effect even if they could not follow smugglers into shallow waters.

7 The obvious bonus for the Chinese apart from 1stige, is that they would for the foreseeable future have to provide the officers, training for the crews and maintenance facilities, including possibly permanent dock installations in Freetovi. If this last is indeed the intention, then this perhaps could be the first step in the establishment

of a Chinese Naval base.

Helicopters

8 Advantages for Sierra Leone are:

(a) again, prestige; Stevens can now dispense with

the Gúinean helicopter which he has had on loan;

(b) the internal security uses are obvious;

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/ (c)

north where the road network is particularly bad.

9 For the Chinese, there is again the provision of crows and maintenance, and possibly the setting up of some small base in Freetown at the very least a hard standing: raki a hangar. Alternatively, Lungi could be developed as a helicopter base, thus bringing the Chinese in there.

Mility Experts

10 This is an area where Nancy Steele's obvious axe to grind may have led her to exaggerate the firmess of the commitment. The proposal is nonetheless inherently likely and rumours of possible Chinese training for the militia have been current for some time. The implications are particularly sinister because :

(a) of the inherent dangers of civil war between an

cmed and trained party militia and the army;

(b) these dangers have been made very clear to Stevens

by Colonel Momoh, the Force Commander and by

MacGillivray, the Head of latchguard International, and the inference is therefore that Stevens has been over-persuaded by Nancy Steele or bullied into this by his wild young men;

kind into the two most extreme elements in the A the women and the youth. It is very typical that the Sierra Leone Government should be asking us to help train their new recruits to the cpmy and cimultaneously bidding for Chinese assistance with their militia. A specifically party militia of this kind would have an obvious application in tim next elections.

11 Having added all this up, one is still loft with tho feeling that the whole propósition is grossly out of scale. Why should Sierra Leone be worth £60 Million to the Chinese? Motives, insofar as we can analyse them hero, might

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include:

(a) the situation in the United Nations; Sierra

Leone's current Security Council seat might I suppose be useful, and I believe that at present she my hold the balance between pro- and anti- Communist Chinese in the Afro-Asian bloo;

(b) I suppose this acquisition might fit into Chinese West African strategy, particularly if the aim in a bloc comprising Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberi: solidly under Chinese influence, with a usefu strategic position on the African bulge and useful economic resources; I am no expert on Chinese reval strategy but it sticks out a mile that Sierra Leone's only real claim to fame is the port of Freetown; are the Chinese planning a major llest African base (cf para 7 above)?

Leone is far too small a market to interest Chim, out doos China need Sierra Leone proțiuce, eg diamonds? Just conceivably, plans to rémüilitate the railway might be conected with an extension into Guinea to provide an outlet for mineral exports via Freeton. Is there a catch perhaps in the oxtrc- ordinery 20-year grace period an arrangement for instance for offset purchases by Sierra Leone of

Chinese goods? Perhaps the Tanzam railway reemont offers a parallel?

1. How far does all this represent a serious move to the Fort? Recognition of Communist China is, of course, ruspuotrole enough. It has been, and will continue to vo, represented here as a further step in non-alignment, onl most of the politicians will, I suspect, persunie thonncol. von quite genuinely that nothing much has changed. Those, fcling probably Solomon Pratt himself, who really olieve ir non-alignment above all because it ummbles Sierra Leone to fish profitably in: both comps will doubtless regard this as a highly favourable deal and will shrup of my risk of Chinese influence or infiltration with a confident assertion of Sierra Leone's ability to ride the Liger. With the incredible Sierra Leone propensity for rot seeing beyond their noses, many will not even get that fw.

/ A few

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few Kancy Steele cortainly; S I Koroma probably; Komara-Taylor perhaps, I am beginning to wonder about him will welcome this as a precursor to closer relations with China and a move towards a more authoritarian, one- Jarty State without, however, quite realising wint they have done.

13 For if China is really going in on this scale, she presumably means business. The shape of the aid offer is ideally designed to facilitate Chinese penetration ad subversion. I think, nonetheless, that any shirt by Sierra. Leone into the Communist camp would come vory slowly. First, because the Sierra Leoneans have their full sk.PO of African touchiness and the Chinese will need to move cautiously if they want to avoid the situation bloving up in their face; I would imagine that this would fit in with the Chinese om ideas they se always credited with working to a long time-scale and the 20-year grace poriad would fit in with this. Secondly, because, though o should not over-estimate the effectiveness of sentimental popular feelings against a ruthless and determined regime and of course, the Creoles, the min ropository of those feelings, are not the stuff that martyrs are made of there is a pretty deep and widespread abhorrence here of the more repressive features of dictatorship - Secret Folico, Poople's Courts and the rest; and attachment to Common- wealth membership, which might, I suppose, be at risk, adds depth to this feeling. Finally, Sierra Lóone is very dependent on Western cid and even moro so on Westem investment, and will not lightly put these at risk. Stevens, Tumore-Trylor and the other more important members of the tovernmont realise that the balance of conficence cm b

ily upsot.

14 There are two possible qualifications to this. First, tho APC is such a loose and impressionable organisation that it might not be too difficult a job for really tough oporators to take it over. The militant wings, the youth cind the women, already exercise far more influence then their numbers warrant, and it is precisely here that Chinese leverage would be applied. Secondly, there is inhere t in this whole loa-cun-recognition transaction the implication that Stevens is either further Left than we have so far juiged, or has been overridden. Even so, he remins both

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obstinate and indispensable to the APC, and I do not see them pushing him too far, too fast.

15 Against this background, and assuming that the report moves to be broadly correct, where do we stand a vint ought we to do? It would clearly be a mistake to ove react, at least initially, or to suggest that there is ything inherently wrong in relations with Communist China as such. But I think there are a good many people here, including some Ministers and perhaps ever. Stevi. himself, who might be receptive to the argument that the Chinese Communists, like all other Communists, remin fundamentally hostile to the est; that there is no question of our or the other Jestern Powers viching: in any way to weaken the traditional friendly relations between us and Sierra Leone, but that this is prcise, the Chinese will be aiming for; and tint Sierra 190 must be careful not to land herself to this sort or trio. Incipient examples are the sort of double talk which Mak Taylor indulged in in North Korea when he said that diam Leone had long wanted diplomatic relations with "to ive people of the Far East.....but the Imperialists vių allow it". One could point out that, carried through it

fanta action, this sort of nonsense must inevitably provoke rocction in the West. In the longer run, if things stimu getting really rough, we might have to rethink our positi... Palically, including our aid policy. Meanwilile, then certain minor directions, coout which I have writta separately to Huijsmon, in which we should go slow till .. see how the land lies.

13 For the moment, the most important thing we can do vi. De to buttress our friends hore. I still number_Steven:: emoist these. As ortod in my telegram No 279, ti

o hints that, faced perhaps with a Yos or to popol ti i Poking, the Delegation took the decision without wor ing Stevens. In that crse, further handling of the worke

·lair would be for discussion in Cabinet as soon Taylor and Solomon Pratt retum - and this could perin unolain the blackout mawhile. I have written to you separately about a possible peg on which to hang en un 24, personal approach by myself to Stevens.

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Stephen

S JL VIVO.

073005

Nesta from HŠINGUA NETIS AOPNICY

communique on establishment of diplomatic relations between people's republic of china and republic of sierra Leone

peking, July 30 Chsinhuaɔ --

communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the poople's republic of china and the republic of sierra Leone

the government of the people's rapublic of china and the government of the republic of sierra Leone, in conformity with the interests and desire of the people of the two countries, have decided to establish diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial Level with ir mediate effect.

the chinese government and people firmly support the government and people of the republic of sierra Leone in their struggle of opposing imperialist, colonialism and no- colonialism and safeguarding national independence and state sovereignty.

the government of sierra Leone recognizes the government of the people's republic of china as the sole Legal government ropresenting the entire chinose poople.

the two governments agree to develop the diplomatic relations, friendship and cooperation between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.

chi pang-fai

acting minister of foreign affairs of the people's republic of china

end item

solomon athanasius james pratt minister of external affairs o the ropublic of siarra Leone

peking, July 29, 1971

-3-

073004

SATURDAY, JULY 31, 1971.

communique on establishment of diplomatic relations between china and sierra Leona signed in peking

agreements on economic and technical cooperation and trade and payments of two countries signad peking, July 30 chainhua) -- & communique on the establishmont of the diplomatic relations between the People's republic of china and the ropublic of sierra Leone was signed in peking on the 29th, an agreemont on economic and technical cooperation and an agreement on trado and payments between the govori:ants of the two countrios wore also signod.

attending the signing cent may were chou en-Lol, premier of the state council, cir vis promior li hsien uien.

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attending the chamag woyo 0.8, Mittwertigten, mita stun of finance of the ritin ef ædeera Trim End £90 general of the ell pluplete compread, and all thi of the governattagion of the republic of 63. 1 he is Loading.

chi pong-fei, acting chtings foraága edatsten, ond 2,8,j, pratt, winistor of custri. Luffiths or the papusite of

1 sierra Leone, signed th respective povcrivents.

Ci. N

L1 hsion-nien, vice-premise of the atto council, ond c.n. kamara-taylor, Leader of the government delegation of the republic of siipra Leone and minister of 13:59, eloned the agreement on economic and technical ezept. (tien én the agreement on trade and payments on balalf of turin poop seliv governments.

also present at the ceremony on both sides wore:

members of the govornaont delegation of the republic of sierra Leone d.f. ähsors, 8.a, kobo, £28, nancy steolo edward Lenin, a, scray murie, alinany kamara, 8.r. fillie- faboo, 0.0, Cole and à‚s.n. johnson; ot:d

Leading members and staff mobors of the chinose deportments concerned fong yl, Li chiang, yuan hus-ping, ho kung-kai, han hsu, chong fel, hei yon-shɔ̃ng, hau erh-vel, yang yu- yung and tang won-chong." end itca

073006

IHUA

communique on visit of government delegation of republic of sierra Leona to people's rapublic of china

peking, july 30 Chsinhua)

communique on the visit of the government delegation of the republic of sierra Leone to the people's republic of china

at the invitation of the government of the people's republic of china, the govern.ont delegation of the republic of sierra Leone Led by his excellency c.a. kamera-taylor, minister of finance of the republic of sierra Leone, paid an official friendly visit to the people's republic of china from july 24 to 30, 1971.

the delegation consists of: his excellency c.a, kaṇara- taylor, minister of finance and Leador of the delegation, his excellency s.a.j. pratt, minister of external affairs; his excellency d.t. shears, minister of works; honourable 3.4. keba, mender of parliament; alderman mrs. nancy staale, director of the ports authority; aldiman me, edzard Lumin. chair, in of the rice corporation; -n, no moray-uuries

ma, 2, KA 1200; . s.r. fillis Jah, 7. J.a. cole; and me. 8.5.m. johnson,

during the visit, chou en-bat, gror of the state council of the people's repustio ef hún, cut the delegation,

lin, and the two sides had a cordiit ... endly conversation. vice-protne if the state council 11:4 n-nien, acting

LE foreign.

chi pang-fet and v *"ister of foreign trade li viiang and other reopornit

s of the departments concerned held talks in a cordial and friendly atmosphère with c.a, kamara-taylor, minister of finance of the republic of sierra Leone, 3,a.]. pratt, minister of external affairs, d.f. shears, minister of works, alderman mrs. nancy steele, director of the ports authority, and alderzan ér, advard Lamin, chairman of the rice corporation.

the two sides held discussions on the development of the relations between china and sierra Leone in the political, economic, trade and other fields, the two sides have reached a satisfactory agreement on the establishzent of diplomatic relations. an agreement on economic and technical cooperation and an agreement on trade and payments have been signed by the two sides. the two sides express high satisfaction at the fact that the relations between the two countries in the political, economic and other fiolds have entered a new stage, the two sides are determined to remove every stumbling-block which has been put by the imperialists in the way of fruitful cooperation between our two countries.

SATURDAY, JULY 31, 1971.

the sierra Leone side highly praises the fact that his excellency chairman mao tsetung's thoughts have swept across the oceans and wonded their way into the hearts of progressive africans. the sierra Leone side expresses firm support for the restoration of all the legitimate rights of the people's rapublic of china in the united nations and the expulsion of the so-called representatives of chiang Kai-shek in all the u.n. organizations. the sierra Leone side holds that the government of the people's republic of china is the sole Legal government representing the chinese people, that taiwan is an inalienable part of chinese territory and that the taiwan question is china's internal affair in which no foreign country has the right to interfere, the chinese side expresses sincere thanks to the government of sierra Leone for its just stand and for its support.

the chinese side heartily rejoices over the continuous victories won by the people of sierra Leone under the Leadership of his excellency president siaka stevens in the struggle to safeguard nationat independence and state sovereignty and frustrate the imperialist schemes of subversion and expresses admiration for the pursuance of an anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist policy of non-alignment by the government of sierra Leone in international affairs, for its support

to the african people's struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism and racial discrimination and for its contributions to the afro-asien paople's cause of unity against imperialism, the chinese side firmly supports the Government and people of siorra Leone in their just struggle to defend their right over 200-nautical-mile territoriat sea and in their just struggle against imperialist and colonialist powers.

the two sides note with satisfaction the good development of the friendly relations and cooperation between china and sierra Leone on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence and believe that with the joint efforts of the governments and people of the two countries, such relations will certainly grow daily.

the two sides point out with pleasure that the present visit to china by the government delegation of sierra Leone hoaded by his excellency c.a. kamara-taylor has made positive contributions to the further development of the friendly relations and cooperation between china and sierra Leone and to the afro-asian people's cause of unity against imperialism.

end item

done at peking, the 30th

day of july, 1971

The Hon J Wilson, WAD

CONFIDENTIAL

이

FEC

CHINA AND SIBERA LEONE

1. Thank you for sending us a copy of your submission of

12 August.

2. As far as I can escortain, FED were not consulted on this

submission. If we had been we should have had some suggestions

to make, especially on those paragraphs (6 and 7) which coment

on China's diplomatic offensive in West Africa, In particular

we should have liked to refer to Peking's decire to undermine

the position of the Nationalists there, The latter have hitherto

been strongly entrenched but their position is now beginning

to look a litle shaky.

3. Might I ask you to include Sir 3 Tomlinsen amongst the

recipients of any future submissions of this kind?

13 August 1971

RB CrossON

Far Eastern Department

OCKFIDENTIAL

My Herning

Do we want

to comment further at

this stage?

Crayzan

No,

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to 1: LeQuesne, Miss Romwell, Washing FED Nam American Dept. IRD, POSD Reser. 201. P. Mon Cabiner office.

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The hon J Wilson Esq G West Africa. Department Voreign and Commonwealth office London S.1

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le reported in our telepra ↑ No 285 the are not Sierra Leone had recognised the 'eople's degradio r the ao countries had agreed to stablish a rol: bions. At the same time Sierra Leone rocÒ{}

'pople's Reļuolic as we solo legal Government). reprocenting the entire Chinese people.

I must admit that we ind not expect d tllic re GO CO. SV serly Kamera-la, lor, tho is, or cou Docrewy Gonoral of the APC as well as Minist omirsised to me jim verore Lojature wat die ..

or delegation. In suuition, the ratic: "MUSSEXOr nere, Admiral Hoh-Tu Liu, ind Dean : Sour

...ay or so before the Delepation lout time w

io of my inmuiate Pcquition of sted på erefore thought it while the Delegation mit Mine intentions re discuss the possibility

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diplomatic ruletios, no decision would os wit ter by returned, ad the amour cement coucou surprise in Freetown. I thought that we huvi tundum Leon intentions fairly accurately, but tim can y President Nixon tutu iried to visit dui. Me viole situation. Just beforce lert, ulom. Coin the Americen Charge d'affaiyos that no cha umĻ

lot the Americ: ne pot shund of Sierra Leone. planation ves given by Joctor stovus tɔ bu nes unoassauür 1.6. the Ambassador rimli Joe him vitor the anouncement had u en mue. chat Sjorra Leone expocted a olamgjon in l' vour vi

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recognition of Red Chirn to start rolling and decided to jump on fast lost they be left behind.

3 This is douotless the explcation for vao sudden, in but I think that Sierra Leone must also have outained tangible benefits in exchange for recognition. Indeed, it appears that Tuci nical and Leonomic, and Tredo,quo More signed in Peking though no-one here lecst of AN the inistry of External Afairs knows crything about their contents. The Nationalist Chinese provide about ca exports on rice: rowing who are spread in a muwer of Gonoustration faims throughout the country. In punert. Leir efforts have been successful and have been a rei by the Sierra Leone Government since rice is th. su do cad one of the important aims of (gricultural policy i: attain self-sufficiency in rice production. 01 be interested therefore, to see exactly what are theperi offered by the led Chinese to replace this assistance,

As I said, the main motive for the move by two stor Leoneas seems to be to avoid being left behia in th

octed rush to recognise Communist China and we go 100 we this as a real step to the left by the Sienn Ivor zovernment. ilovever, it is also likely to be presunte tensible proof of Sierra Leone's non-lignentkez Me venefits of the move to a public. A contimin, a for the change to a republic during the last year has that it would enhance Sierra Leone's international st nd give roof of her non-aligned status. Also I hov. 15 doubt that Pratt wishes to oulld himself up as a dynuzlo Minister of external Mfairs and that this is one 3. the process. And indeca the Ministry of External Aff vore as surprised as anyone else by tins whole trazes uti and still have no knowledge of the details.

5 The most unpleasant part of the whole oficir in t My the Goverment have treated the hatialist Chf. voo. he first their ambassador knew about the affair ve ti He rond the anouncement in the local press. It was .ome time before lie was able to see the Presium & Vai, interview, explained that Sierra one did not it w loft child by the Americas. He did not express AVE

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the mumer in which liationalist China had been rentou thanks for the aid they had given in the prot. The ist Chinese Ambassador is still in Freetown, having hi orders to pack up but he is awaiting instructiom čuot ni.. departure. We assume that he will love fairly soon a... that the various rice growing experts will also be or oral to leave. It is interosting that "Unity" viich is al supported recognition of Red China should have ublicis leader deploring the treatment of the Nationalist Ching o One constantly complains about Unity's Editor, San Hetzger,

ut there are times when he shows courage and fair-minuguuto.n. This seems to be one of them.

J' -

6 The Delegation went on to North Korea viore lanur- Taylor made a statement that the two Governments intended to raise their diplomatic relations to Amtessadorial level. This was reported in our telogramm No 288. This was lore categorical than the anouncement about relations withi Communist China and, es far us we can see, die rot imply the severing of relations with South Koreź whose Anordni with typical Sierra Leonean timing visited ruotovil bita before the Delegation's departure to prosent his craldick. to the resident. We do not know whether South Korea vona bo willing to acquiese in a "two Koreas" policy, and su are still awaiting their reaction. Again, the inistry of External Tairs seems to have had no irkling of what was going to happen nor do they know anything about t agrements which have beon signed.

7 I am sending copies of this letter to J'Deusa in rel and Nigel Trench in Seoul.

uten

Your

Stephen

S J L Olver

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Lage A

and C

Nr Le Quesne

CHINA AND SIERRA LEONE

You will have seen kir Olver's letter of 6 August and Freetown telegrams 293 and 294 (copies attached).

2. Er Olver's letter records the reactions in Freetown to the announcement that Sierra Leone had recognised the Feople's Republic of China, It seems to have surprised Sierra Leoneans in general and the Ministry of External Affairs in particular. The shabby treatment of the Nationalist Chinese has not gone unnoticed

3. Mr Olver reports in paragraph 3 of his letter that Technical, Economic and Trade agreements were probably signed in Peking at the

same time. His two telegrams go a stage further. The first reports that, according to a "well placed" but undisclosed source, the Chinese Government have offered a loan on very easy terms of £60 million to the Sierra Leone Government to cover the rehabilita-

tion of the railway, agriculture, the supply of gunboats, helicopters, arms and ammunition and military training. The second telegram comments on the offer and, assuming the report is true, concludes that the aid items are plausible. Kr Olver however thinks that the amount said to be involved is excessive.

4. The question was discussed at some length at a CIG meeting on 10 August when it was established that there had been no confirmation of this report from any other source. Enquiries will continue. The Committee agreed that all the suggested aid items were of the kind to appeal to the Sierra Leoneans and, except for the helicopters, had all been offered previously by the Chinese to other aid clients. The Committee also thought that the amount said to be involved seemed excessive and thought that $60 million would be more in line withi present Chinese practice.

5. If the report is true, it indicates a further distinct move to the left by the Sierra Leone Government and a victory for the ruling party's extremists. It will be an unwelcome development from our point of view but I do not think it calls for any change in our present policies towards Sierra Leone, either politically or from the aid aspect.

6. This report is one more piece of evidence to indicate a growing Chinese interest in West Africa. Four countries in the area have recently established diplomatic relations with China - Nigeria, the Cameroons, Equatorial Guinea and now Sierra Leone. Recent announcements and reports on Chinese offers of aid total over £120 million. "Substantial" aid to Congo Brazzaville to build a hydro electric power station and a 200 bed hospital has already becn announced, as has an offer to Mauritania to build the port at

/Nouakchatt

SECRET

Nouakchatt at a cost of up to £8 million. We have seen reports of a Chinese offer of aid to Mali to build the Manantuli Dan (at a cost of about £50 million), and now there is this report of an offer of £60 million to Sierra Leone. There have also been reports of military assistance including training to Congo Brazzaville, Mali and Sierra Leone.

The Chinese are of course already strongly entrenched in East Africa, both politically and economically, and it appears

The that they are now making a real drive in West Africa. situation created by President Nixon's plan to go to Feking and the likely admission of mainland China to the UN this autumn is a favourable one for a drive of this sort. We will keep a close oye on the situation. It seems that President Senghor's fears of the encirclement of Senegal by China (which he has expressed to the Americans and Italians in private talks) may have some validity, and the French are also, as you know, concerned.

12 August 1971

ce kr Worgan (FED)✓

FUSD IRD

Kr Le Tocq

Mr Macrae

Research Department Planning Staff

John Wilson

a new tel. (Bedip) has came in frame to Olver this manj

you will

see a copy.

SECRET

5/3

Copy

h Hi Leuuerne, diss Komary, waɔmmyan FED North American Dept, IRD, POSD · Resson".

2001. P. Moss Caliner free.

M: Bambuny 4. Adams

The Ilon J Wilson Esq ONG West African Department Foreign and Commonwealth Office London S./1

Dear John.

ELATIONS WITH MIINA

BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION ij.

FREETOWN

6 August 1971

1 Ve reported in our telegram No 285 the tre feet thi Sierra Leone had recognised the People's Republic of Ch nl the two countries had agreed to ustąblish diplor ti a Polations. At the same time Sierra Leone recognised Go l'eople's Republic as the sole legal Government of Chr representing the entire Chinese people.

I must admit that we had not, expected tins recenti uh to CM so early. Kamara-Taylor, tho is, of course, Secretary General of the APC cs well as dinistur u omphasised to me just jefore coperture that this wS a jorty delegation. In addition, the lationlist Ambassador here, Admiral Hoh-Tu Líu, lui de en estala v t. day or so before the Delegation luft til teZO WO question of uy immediate ücqnition of Rou. tinerofore thought that while the Delegation mill 011 Chinore intentions rnd discuss the possibility or wil, ing: diplomatic rulations, no uecicion would be to y alter thy returned, and the nouncement caused fi surprise in Freetown. I thought that we huu analgaon Leonorn intentions fairly accurately, but the camión by President Mixon that he intended to visit Chic the wiplo situation. Just veľ'oro o leit, Jolomo Gold the Americṛn Charge d'Affaires that hó uld not to lot the Americans get ahead of Sierra Leono. explanation was given by Doctor Stevens to the Chinese Ambassadör vine: the Ambassador finally MOLE

I GAV, soo him after the amoun.cement had been macio. that Sierra Leque expected a bendwaggon in favour oï'

tiv

/rucophis

ACSTATCTED

recognition of led China to start rolling and decided to jump on fast lest they be left behinkl.

3 This is doubtless the explantion for the sudden awk,, but I think that Sierra Leone must also levo odveined a SRU tengible benefits in exchange for recognition. Indoo it appears that Tecimical and Economic, and Trado, Agrochéhoz word signed in Peking though no-one herə least of lt in tho Ministry of External Affairs knows anything abont thoir contents. The Nationalist Chinese provice avob la equrts on rice growing who are spread in a mumour of demonstration faims throughout the country. In general their efforts inve been successful and have been up.ch: by the Jiorra Leone Goverment since rice is the sun do ci

10 and one of the important aims of agricultural policy ic to autain self-sufficiency in ice production. o vill bo v intorested therefore, to see exactly what are theœnoficz: offered by the Red Chinese to replace this assistanco.

י.

A As I said, the main motive for the move by the diurs. Iwoners seems to be to avoid being loft uehind in te apooted rush to recognise Communist China and we do not seû this as a real step to the left by the Sierra Leone Goverment. Ilowever, it is also likely to be pitcutle terr;ible proof of Sierra Leone's non-aligument" cná en una ca the Donorits of the move to a Republic. A contiming, Patt for the change to a Republic during the last year ins US Uut it would enhance Sierra Leone's international strn 3. and givo roof of her non-aligod status. Also I have 1 doubt that Pratt visios to build himself up es a dyrmic

luister of external Mfairs and thet this is one ate o 1 the process. And indeed the Ministry of Axtornal Arabia vere as surprised as anyone else by this whole tractio. end still have no knowledge of the details.

li...

5 The most unpleasant part of the whole affair in way the Govermout have treated the Rationlist Ohileno. The first their Ambassador knew about tho azir vos v... he read the announcement in the local pross. It wa It was como time oefore he was able to see the President vin, interview, explained timt Sierra Leone did not vert ti loft ochind by the Americans. He did not express 1

PET st

/the mone

RESTRICTED

the ramer in which lationalist Chine had been trontod or thanks for the aid they had given in the past. The ni and- ist Chinese Ambassador is still in Freetov, having had orders to pack up out ho is awaiting instructions Zout ink, acjuture. We assume that he will locva fairly soon mu out the various rice growing experts will also e ordeal Lo lonvo. It is interesting that "Unity" which ins l supported recognition of Red China should inve jublishuu. loader deploring the treatment of the Natioelist Uhlioco. One constantly complains about Unity's Editor, Sam Hotspur,

ut thoro are times when he shows courage and fair-minicana This soeurs to be one of thon.

[

| |

6 The Delegation went on to North Korea, vinere Ko P Trylor male a statement that the two Governments intoxica to raise their diplomatic relations to Ambassadorial level. Tiris was reported in our tologran No 288. This was loo categorical than the ai nowicement about relations with Communist China and, as far as vo con soe, did not imply dic severing of relations with South Korea, whose Ama 30

visited routovn with typical Sierra Leonean timing perore the Delegation's departure to present his credanti to the President. We do not know whether South Korea voulo in willing to acquiese in a "two Koreas" policy, WO o still awaiting their reaction. Again, the iginurg of External Afairs seems to have had no irking of vint was going to happen nor do they know anything about the arcoments which have boon signed.

7 I am sending copies of this letter to 'Denson in reki ari Nigol Trench in Seoul.

Your

Stephen

out en

S J L Olver

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 293 OF 8 AUGUST

INFO PEKING AND SAVING

TO WASHINGTON DAKAR MONROVIA ACCRA AND LAGOS,

MY TELNO 285: RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST CHINA,

ACCORDING TO A WELL PLACED SOURCE, AGREEMENT WAS REACHED, AT THE SAME TIME AS THE NEGOTIATIONS TO OPEN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BY THE SIERRA LEONE DELEGATION TO PEKING, ON CHIHESE GOVERNMENT LOAN TO SIERRA LEONE OF £60 (SIXTY

MILLICH STERLING) REPAYABLE WITHOUT INTEREST AND OVER AN EXTENDED PERIOD AFTER AN INITIAL GRACE OF TWENTY YEARS,.

2. THE LOAN IS SAID TO COVER:

(A) REHABILITATION OF THE RAILWAY-

(6) AGRICULTURE, INCLUDING TWELVE TRACTORS=

(0) THREEE HELICOPTERS='

(E) ARMS AND AMMUNITION FOR (C) AND (P)

(F) TEN KILITARY EXPERTS TO TRAIN A P C (THE GOVERNMENT PARTY) SUPPORTERS.

3. SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

F C O PASS ROUTINE PEKING AND SAVING TO WASHINGTON DAKAR MONRÒVIA ACCRA AND LAGOS.

•

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DAKAR HOURVOIA ACCRA AND LAGOS.

MY IP T.

ASSUMING A CHINESE DECISION THAT SIERRA LEONE IS WORTH HIVESTING

IN ON THIS SCALE., THE SUGGESTED DETAILS ARE PLAUSIBLE. (^) IMPORTANT SECTIONS OF A PC HAVE FOR LONG BEEN OPPOSED TO DISHARTLING THE RAILWAY A DECISION IMPOSED BY I M F= TO QUOTE RESCUE UNQUOTE THE RAILWAY WOULD BE POLITICALLY

POPULAR AND SOLVE DIFFICULT REDUNDANCY PROBLEMS* AND ́A

STANDARD GAUGE RAILWAY WHICH CHINESE MIGHT HAVE IN MIND

WOULD BE PRESTIGIOUS=

(B) A REPLACEMENT WILL BE NEEDED FOR THE NATIONALIST CHINESE AGRICULTURAL ASSISTANCE WHICH WILL NOW PRESUMABLY

BE DISMANTLED-

(C) GUNBOATS WOULD MINISTER NATIONAL PRESTIGE AND FIT IN WITH THE CURRENT INVASION HYSTERIA, WITH THE NEW 209 MILE TERRITORIAL LIMIT AND WITH STEVENS' REQUEST TO ME FOR CUSTOMS LAUNCHES=

(D) HELICOPTERS WOULD BE USED FOR INTERNAL SECURITY AND V 1 P. TRANSPORT, AND WOULD REPLACE THE ONE AT PRESENT ON LOAN

FROM GUINEA-

(F) THE CHINESE HAVE LONG BEE!! THOUGHT LIKELY TO PROVIDE

TRAINING FOR THE PROPOSED MILITIA AND THIS WOULD SIGNIFY A DECISION TO PROMOTE THIS SERIOUSLY.

2. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE CHINESE DECISION COULD BE... · (1) APPARENT SIERKA, LEONE BEADINESS TO ACCEPT ONE CHINA, DREAK RELATIONS WITH NATIONALIST CHINA AND JETTISON HER IN THE UN.

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(11) A CONFIDENT BELIEF THAT GIVE TIME SIERRA LEONE AND GUINCA (AND PERHAPS POST TUBMAN LIBERIA) CAN BE WELDED TO A CHINESE STRONCHOLD IN WEST AFRICA BUT THE SIZE OF THE LOA SEEKS OUT OF SCALE. I SHOULD HAVE THOUGHT (3) TO (F) ABOVE WOULD HAVE BEEN ENOUGH TO BUY SIERRA LEONE. IT MAY BE THAT (A) WAS A TEITATIVE UNDERTAKING TO LOOK INTO REHABILITATION AND THAT THE LOAN WAS EXPRESSED

AS AN UNDERTAKING TO SPEND UPTO £63 MILLION

(OR PERHAPS SIXTY MILLION DOLLARS)

3. THE AGREEMENT IS SHREWDLY TAILORED TO THE SIERRA LEONE GOVERNMENT'S POLITICAL TASTE. THE GOVERNMENT PROBABLY DOES NOT SEE IT AS MORE THAN AN ASSERTION OF NON ALIGNMENT, AND WITH TYPICAL SIERRA LEONE OVER-CONFIDENCE AND SHORTSIGHTEDNESS

HAY BELIEVE IT CAN RIDE THE TIGER AND CONTINUE TO HAVE THE

BEST OF BOTH WORLDS.

EVEN AT THAT IT REPRESENTS BOTH POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY A

VICTORY FOR THE LESS RESPONSIBLE ELEMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT.

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نما كنت

Sir S Tomlingai

Mr 2

CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

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ARV

Fee

1. In his minute on my submission of 28 July attaching the

record of a conversation between the Canadian and Chinese

Assistant Military Attachés in Faris, Jr Royle asked whether

we had received any other similar reports.

2. We have seen no further reports but this is no doubt

because the Chinese have made public their demands as regarde

the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United

States. These are reported in paragraph 2 of Peking telegram

no 695.

As regards the part played by the Chinese Embassy in Paris

in re-opening the dialogue between China and the US (Mr Spreckley's

letter of 23 July) you may wish to see Wr Samuel's letter of

27 July, in particular paragraph 5.

4 August 1971

Copied to:

Mr Jaunt

Mr Drinkall WED

Mr Overton N America Department Mr Stratton UN (Pol) Department Hr Gadock Danning Staff

Mr Hickman SWPD

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1.B. hum.

RB Crowson

Far Eastern Department

8 13/5

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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 731 OF 3 AUGUST INFO HONG KONG, WASHINGTON, PARIS, TOKYO, CANBERRA AND MOSCOW INFO SAVING WELLINGTON.

FEC 10/10

MIPT: CHINESE ARMY DAY EDITORIAL

FOREIGN POLICY.

Ec 2/1

1. THE EDITORIAL CONCENTRATES TO AN UNUSUAL EXTENT ON FOREIGN POLICY FOR AN ARMY DAY ANNIVERSARY, PROBABLY BECAUSE THIS IS THE MOST SUITABLE OCCASION SINCE THE CHOU-KISSINGER TALKS FOR A FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW. THE EDITORIAL REFLECTS THE CONFIDENCE OF THE CHINESE IN THE STRENGTH OF THEIR PRESENT DIPLOMATIC POSITION,

WHICH IS ATTRIBUTED TO MAO'S QUOTE REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC LINE UNQUOTE. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THAT SUCH A PHRASE HAS BEEN USED AND IT SETS THE SEAL OF HIGHEST AUTHORITY ON PRESENT POLICIES. MOREOVER, THE CHINESE HAVE TAKEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO REASSURE THEIR ASIAN ALLIES AND REVOLUTIONARY SUPPORTERS BY SPELLING OUT THE CHINESE DEMAND THAT THE US MUST WITHDRAW MOT ONLY FROM INDO- CHINA AND TAIWAN, BUT ALSO FROM JAPAN, KOREA AND OTHER PARTS OF

ASIA.

2. THE MAIN LINES OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY SET OUT IN THE EDITORIAL (PARA 2(G) OF MIPT) ARE THE SAME IN CONTENT AND PRIORITY AS THOSE SET OUT BY VICE-CHAIRMAN LIN PIAO IN HIS REPORT TO THE NINTH PARTY CONGRESS IN APRIL 1969, IN WHICH HE RATED SUPPORT FOR REVO- LUTIONARY MOVEMENTS HIGHER THAN RELATIONS ON THE BASIS OF PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE. THE LONG LIST OF QUOTE STRUGGLES UNQUOTE FOR WHICH THE CHINESE DECLARE THEIR SUPPORT IS ON FAMILIAR LINES. THE CHINESE EMPHASISE THAT THEY WILL SUPPORT THE WAR IN INDOCHINA

QUOTE TO THE END UNQUOTE. IN THE CASE OF KOREA, HOWEVER, THEY MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WHAT THEY SUPPORT IS THE QUOTE PEACEFUL UNQUOTE REUNIFICATION.

3. CONSIDERABLE CRITICISM IS METED OUT TO BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE US. NO CRITICISM IS MADE OF THE LEADERS BY NAME ALTHOUGH GREAT PLAY IS MADE OF THE OPPOSITION TO AND LOSS OF CONFIDENCE IN THE ADMINISTRATION WITHIN THE US. THE EDITORIAL CHARACTERISES THE US AS GROWING PROGRESSIVELY WEAKER, BUT THE SOVIET UNION IS DEPICTED AS A POWER WHOSE QUOTE EXPANSIONIST AND AGGRESSIVE

NATURE UNQUOTE STILL GIVES CAUSE FOR CONSIDERABLE CONCERN.

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4. PASSAGES ON QUOTE IMPERIALISM UNQUOTE NOT CHANGING ITS AGGRESSIVE NATURE, ON THE AMBITIONS OF THE SUPER-POWERS IN THE QUOTE INTERMEDIATE ZONE UNQUOTE AND ON THE ABILITY OF IMPERIAL TO QUOTE PLAY EVERY KIND OF INSIDIOUS TRICK UNQUOTE REFLECT CHINESE UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE RESULTS WHICH THEY CAN ACHIEVE FROM NEGOTIATING WITH THE RUSSIANS AND PROBABLY ALSO SOUND A NOTE

OF CAUTION ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR THE CHOU-NIXON TALKS. THE CRITICISM OF THE SOVIET/US ATTITUDE TOWARDS DISARMAMENT IS IN LINE WITH THE CHINESE REJECTION OF THE RECENT SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A FIVE POWER CONFERENCE.

5. THE OPPORTUNITY IS TAKEN TO RESTATE IN FULL THE CHINESE POSITION THAT TAIWAN IS AN INALIENABLE PART OF CHINA AND ITS OPPOSITION TO THE QUOTE FALLACY UNQUOTE THAT ITS STATUS QUOTE REMAINS TO SETTLED UNQUOTE, IT IS SIGNIFICANT HOWEVER THAT THE SECTION ON TAIWAN FOLLOWS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE PASSAGE QUOTE WE WILL NOT ATTACK UNLESS WE ARE ATTACKED...UNQUOTE AND THAT IT CONTAINS A NEW

FORMULA EXPRESSING CONFIDENCE THAT THE QUOTE COMPATRIOTS IN TAIWAN UNQUOTE WILL NOT ALLOW THE ISLAND TO BE DETACHED FROM CHINA BY QUOTE FOREIGN FORCES OF AGGRESSION UNQUOTE. (THE CHINESE WORD USED FOR QUOTE FORCES UNQUOTE IS QUOTE SHIH-LI UNQUOTE WHICH HAS AN ABSTRACT RATHER THAN A SPECIFIC MILITARY MEANING), THIS MAY PRESAGE A RESTATEMENT AT SOME STAGE OF CHOU EN-LAI'S 33 JULY 1955 OFFER OF A QUOTÉ PEACEFUL UNQUOTE SOLUTION OF THE TAIWAN PROBLEM BY DIRECT NEGOTIATION LINKED TO A US WITHDRAWAL FROM THE

AREA.

6. ON THE MILITARY SIDE THE EDITORIAL POINTS UP THE STRENGTH OF THE POSITION OF THE CHINESE ARMY. CONFIDENCE IN ITS PERFORMANCE IS REFLECTED IN THE REFERENCE TO THE ARMY MAINTAINING QUOTE REMAR- KABLE UNITY UNQUOTE IN ITS OWN RANKS AS WELL AS WITH THOSE OUTSIDE ITS RANKS. WHILE THE EDITORIAL REFERS IN CONVENTIONAL TERMS TO THE ARMY'S POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AND ROLE IN CIVILIAN AFFAIRS, CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION IS PLACED ON BUILDING UP ITS MILITARY CAPABILITY. THIS PROBABLY REFLECTS A GRADUAL RETURN TO NORMALITY WITH THE ARMY CONTINUING TO PLAY A ROLE IN CIVILIAN AFFAIRS, BUT AT A REDUCED LEVEL.

FCO PASS ALL EXCEPT HONG KONG AND SAVING TO WELLINGTON.

DENISON

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CHINESE FORSIGN POLICY: PING PONG ED AFTER

ALTH OFFICE

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409 AT 048 RE TION

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1971

EC 2/1

↓

Summary of FAKING Despatch of 27 July 1971

The despatch examines whether the aims and methods of Chinese

foreign policy have changed since the advent of ping pong diplomacy and the announcerent of President Nixon's visit

to China, noting the traditional Chinese attitude to foreign

affairs.

(Faragraphs 1-2)

To the normally defined ains of Chinese foreign policy protection of national security, dominance in sin, leader- ship of the Communist World, the replacing of Western and Soviet influence in the Third World, may now be added the attempt to lead a united front against the super-powers. Chinese methods include the development of official and unofficial relations including "popular" diplomacy and

relations with Communist parties.

(Paragraphs 3-6)

National socurity. The bilator i talks with the Soviet Union have so far yielded no result but their continuation

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ful 70

Submitted for

A mos Denon La Mo

CONFIDENTIAL

A favourable

Chinese attitude to European interration is largely to be seen in the context of security against the Soviet Union. The Chinese probably no longer fear an immcdiate American threat but harp on encirclement and in the longer term still

The chances of involving the fear & re-militarised Japan.

has resulted in no incidents on the ground.

Chinese in meaningful discussion on disarmament are slight.

(Paragraphs 7111)

Dominance in Asia,

The Chinese seem now to be more in

favour of a negotiation over Indo-China provided American

troop withdrawals are agreed.

llorth Vietnacse ambitions.

They probably aim to curb

Indo-China will be high on

The Fresident may

the agenda for President Nixon's visit.

have to make concessions not to go nway ezpty handed as well as to acquiose beforchand in Taiwan's expulsion from the United Nations. The announcement of the visit has enhanced China's prestige and rcised doubts among some friends of the United States, in particuler Japan. chances of China achieving domination must therefore have increased though she has not yet deilod how to deal with

Japun.

(Taragraphs 12-15)

The

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Leadership of the Communist World.

China has not unde

and is unlikely to make progress though relations with the

Romanian and Herth Korean parties have improved.

(baru wh 16)

China and the Tird World.

number of Third World

countries have recently recognised Cina. By dislerntic

relations, trade and aid Chine is having some success, though:

China

in aid giving she cannot compete with her rivals. is unsuitable as a model for development in other countries. China will maintain her commitment to support revolutionary movements everywher: but may be more selective in choosing thom in the interests of inter-stutc relations. my be more difficult to strike in the future.

(Miragonghs 17-20)

China and the super-powOTE.

The balance

China's attempt to pose as

champion of scull and middle-Lized nations ginst the boviet Union and the United St-tes takon varicus forms including calls for economic independ ̈nce, support of claius on territorial waters and opposition to Luclear nonopoly.

The Chinese my pick up sc.u dividends but success will be

limited.

(Paragraphs 21-22)

CONFILE.TIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

China now wishes to enter the United Nations. She may be

difficult to deal with but the ground will be unfamiliar

and she may go quietly at first.

(Pragraphs 23)

On improving national security China has had some success. There have been gains in Asia, scne in the Third World but fcw in the Communist World. The new flexibility in Chinese

The present tactics indicates cohesion in the leadership.

tactics will continue and in general bencfit the pursuit of Chinese ai:21. But she now has a large number of balls

in the air end sons are bound to drop.

(Paragraphs 24-25)

རྩྭ་

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OFFICE OF THE BRIBL>H CHARGE D'AFFAIRES PEKING

2/1

The Right Honourable

Sir Alec Douglas-Home KT MP

etc etc etc

27 July 1971

CHINESE FORZIGN POLICY: PING PONG AND AFTER

Sir

When I last reviewed Chinese foreign policy in a

despatch written in November 1969, I concluded that the Chinese

were content to "sit on the mountain and watch the tigers

fighting". Since then they have been descending steadily into

the arena. Their entry was dramatised in April by the

reception of the United States Table Tennis Team which ushered

in a phase of so-called ping pong diplomacy while ten days ago

an astonished world learned that a few days before Dr Kissinger had been in Peking and Fresident Nixon had accepted an invita-

tion to visit China next year. That there has been a change

Does this of approach by the Chinese is obvious enough. betoken any change in the basic aims of Chinese foreign policy,

how drastic or permanent are likely to be the changes in Chinese method, and what are China's current priorities in the

external field? These are the questions which this despatch

seeks to answer.

CONFIDES:TIAL

هسته

CONFIDENTIAL

The Chinese sometimes accuse foreigners, especially

Interners, of taking insufficient account of the effect of

hi tory on the Chinose rind in its formation of foreign

policy. By this they usually moan the effect of the roal

cmi supposed brilistions suffered by China at the hands of

foreigners in the past. They convenicutly forgot their own

national characteristics and prejudices which militate

Gesinst the development of relations on a basis of genuine

un.orstanding and equality. With the prospect of the

ee reditation of the first Chinese Communist Ambassador in

* (as well as the visit to China of an American Fresident),

tight be well before embarking on our analysis to recall

an exchange which took place in 1878 between the Empress synger and the Marquis Tseng on his departure to take up his

a ointment as Minister in London and Paris.

"press Dowager: It is very difficult to manage foreign

arcirs....

Huis Tseng: The difficulty in hendling diplomatic affairs

in the fact that foreigners ere unreasonable, while

('masse are ignorant of current events and circumstances.

Luso ministers and people usually hate foreigners, as goes

without saying, but we must plan gradually to make ourselves

ung before anything can be done..."

Th presont trend may seem to blie a part of this attitude

}

• it would bo unwise to dismiss it too easily.

CONFIDE: TIAL

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Ains of Chinese Foreign Folicy

ろ。

The aims of China have been defined as:

¿. To defend her territory, to secure her bounderics

by the settlement of outstanding bordur questions and

to recover certain territories which she claims to be

integral parts of China.

To establish herself as the dominant power in Asia,

replacing American and other Western influence and

countering the growth of Soviet influence.

C. To replace Soviet influence by Chinese influence

within the world Communist movement and in the leng

torm to become the loader of world communism.

To replace Western and Soviet influence in the

countries of the Third World where necessary by

championing revolution provided it springs from

indigenous roots; and to set herself up as the rode?

for political, social and economic development.

There is no evidence to suggest that these aims have changed;

but another might be added thoug. it is to some extent subsurd

under the other heads.

To secure a position of maximum importance in the world by making common cause with small and medium- sized countries against the super-powers while profes: -

ing not to aspire to super-power status herself; ultimately to load an international united front against

and

then.

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Methods

The Chinese have in the past used a mumber of methods

to extend their influence:

(i) diplomatic relations, including the provision of aid,

or where these are impossible commercial relations; (ii) unofficial relations including support for dissident

groups and "popular" diplomacy that is an appeal over the heads of governments to persons and groups

sympathetic to China;

(iii) relations with Communist parties.

During the Cultural Revolution there was little progress in (i) but it has been striking that since Canada broke the ice, eight other countries havo opened relations and several nore are in prospect. "Forular" diplomacy superseded

conventional diplomacy during the Culturel Revolution and the ping pong phase is merely another variety of it made nore immediate and vivid by the presence of foreign groups and

As regards individuals, particularly Americans, in China. Party relations, the Chinese have gained no worthwhile new adherents though useful progress has been made with North Korea and Ro. ania which will be discussed later.

Is the Nixon visit to be characterised as another method? It remains to be seen whether it is the only one of its kind, or whether for example Mr Sato will now angle for an invita- tion. For the want of a better term, it might be called

CONFIDENTIAL

stratosphoric ping pong diplonacy, that is to say personal

high level contect preceding any formal improvement in inter- stato rolatione during which the participants can clarify their positions, and if necossery reach song measure of under-

otending without definite commitment. How it will work out

nobody knows,

Tho remainder of the despatch will exaine how the

Chinose e pursuing their foreign policy aims as defined

using the various methods I havo outlined.

Medicnal Security

The Chinese probably judge that botwo on the two main

onomios the moro immediate throat still comes from the Soviet

Union. The border talks which have been going on in Poking

since Octobor, 1969 have, so far as we know, produced no agree-

nent on any matter of substance and show no sign of doing so.

The Chincse arc standing pat on the position they took up

before tho talks startɔd: thoy went military disongagoront

behind a line they dofing and they want the Soviet Union to

recognise that earlier troaties were "unoqual". But the talks

somehow continuo. Inter-state relations, including trade,

have devolopod and a potentilly dangerous situation has been

do-fused, incidents on the bordor having virtually consed.

The Chinose campaign for proparations against war continues

in its varicus domestic aspects, but in a lower koy. This

thon is an example of the application of the diplomatic method

to the achievonent of a rajer Chinese ain in a situation

CONFIDENTIAL

where ideological rapprocherent is inconceivable and any

The Chinese are form of popular apporl wuld be futile.

not yet secure but they have obtained a respite and as the talks drag on the likelihood of a resort to force by the Soviet Union, which the Chinese genuinely feared in 1969,

recodes.

China's increasingly favourable attitude towards W stern European integration and private tolerance of NATO havean obvicus significance in terms of security vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. For the same reason China dislikes the Ostpolitik of Herr Brandt and moves towards a European

ecurity Treaty.

The latter was a sticking point during

the recent visit of M. Ceausescu,

Logically therefore they

should see the point of Western determin. tion to protect their rights in Berlin. In private they nay, but publicly they are in a dilemne because for wedge driving purposes they wish to seem to suport East Grmany more strongly than the Russians and bcc.use of their attachment to the hoary propa-

This is one of a randa theme of West German "revanchise".

number of contradictions apparent in their attitude to Europe where their understanding is lirited and their scope for exorcising influence small, though they wndoubtedly exploit

ર best they can the independence of the French on defence and

clear watters 28 well as their anti-Americanism in Asia

and clacwhere.

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concern.

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China's southern borders are a cause of less real

Though

The risk of the Vietnam war leading to American

ground involvement in North Vietnar has disappeared and the

Chinese Lust now be convinced that the Aericons intend to

disongago; the questio is, how soon and how fully.

the Chinese have recently declared that the removal of the

Anerican military presence fron Taiwan is a condition for the

normalisation of relations with the United States, this is

bocause the presence, in Chinese eyes, is an interference in

the country's internal affairs rather then constituting any

throat cr potential threat. The recent repeal by the Senato

of the 1955 Joint Resolution under which, among other things,

military action could be taken if an attack on the offshore

islands were dooned to be the prelude to an attack on Taiwen

or the Fescader.s will have been a reassuring sign. The

Chinese continue however to harp on the theme of military

encircleucnt and to condemn alliances such as SEATO and ANZUS

their objections were put very strongly to the leader of the Australian Labour Farty during his recent visit. The Asian

allics of the United States are without discrimination

designated as "puppets" whose crmed forces are there to carry

out the American policy of using "asians to fight isians".

Though there can be nt reel fear by China cf any of her nain- land neighbours the Chinese roncin uneasy about the building up of indigenous militery strungth backed by the West and hence

condemn the Nixon doctrine as a "froud".

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Beneath the mess of propaganda verbirge the Chinese have gnuine and deep-seated fear for their security from

one quarter in Asia

Japan. ..t heart they right well

profer të see the american military presence continue rather than Japan taking over a more active militery, in particular

nuclear, mle. The Chinese were concerned about Me sata's

re-arks on the importance to Japan of Taiwan and South Kor.n.

Because of Japan's links with Teiwen, diplomatic relations

between China and Japan seem out of the question at the moment.

The Chinese are however assiduously woning these political

parties and sections of opini-n in Japan favourable to then.

Hardly a day passus without a fresh delogation from Japan

arriving in Peking. All are received at a gratifyingly high

level and have the evils of resurgent Japancs. militarisa and

the bon.fits of friendship drummed into then. The Chinesc

stop short at ~fficial discussions n political netters which

the Japanes. w.uld welccse, but they have received v-ricus

sonier my burs of the Liberal Demccratic Party and are no

doubt le kin to fronte's departure. Were he to "sk tu cone,

The risks for

I do not entirely rule out his being received.

him would be greater then for the Chincs.. In the present

clite and iven the underlying disinclination of ny

Japanese, particul-rly the young, to boc re militarily involved

overguas ngai: the present brand of unoffici·1 Chinesc diplncy

probably pays off.

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11.

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While the Chinese work to contain the military

the cat by various cans they continuo to build up their

nuclear strength.

Their attitude to disema:ent is deter-

ni:.ed largely by the need to retain freedom of action in the nucucar field. They rust recognise that their proposols for e suxit conference of all powers to discuss disar rent and agree on the destruction of nuclear weapons is quite unrealistic, but it serves as a useful positi n on which to fa l back. This is what they have done in private in response to the b:viet pr posal for a Five Fower Confurenco. The chances of involving tho. in any eaningful discussion of the kind proposed soɑz to ne very slim. protestations that she will never be the first to use nuclear weapons are probably accepted in the Third World and her ability as an under-devoloped country to Lake nuclear weapons undoubtedly enhances her prestige cmong those nations, as well as benefitting her security vis-a-vis

+ weigh errefully the ether nuclert ww ng who inges

now

Chine's

rick of involve ent at a nuclear level even with prvor so

f behind then.

Deinance in sin

...s I love surgested in the precoding section

12.

Vi. tno!!

and by exte:sion Inc. -China is no longer a cause

←

fo concurn to Ching for russons rf security.

But the

qustion of influence remains.

Chine has entorsed the

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Sex in Points nor positively then any previous North

Vic naneso peace proposal. Statorents by Chou En-lai have

nad: it clear that Vietnam will be high on the agenda in

tels with Fresident Kizen. North Vietnamese reactions

to the visit have been defensive in Prris and obliquely

he ile at home. While there has been no weakening in the

baric Chinese position, amely that there can be no negotia- ti before crican military withdrawal, the Chinese now

so to be looking forward to a negotiation and to the kind of Indo-Ching which night energe from it. They will wish to see a total withdrawal of American militery support in all

fc: s fro Vietne, Cambodia and Laus, but not necessarily wi drawel of other support, and to formatirn of broadly bad "neutr:list" governments on a thing like the Leotian

now ul.

This presents formidable problems in South Vietnan

The Chinese nigh*

if anything more so in Carbodia.

be willing to go further to noot Weatorn suscootibilitius th: the Mrth Vietnamese, and by au doing they would ein tc urb North Vietnamese ambitions in Ino-China, 13 tuor tr.ed to do by making Phan Van Dong give an assurance te bi nouk that "after the war" when he had o turned to pcwur Nech Vietman would respect the incpomience and severeignty of Imbodia. In the long to this right not roin much, but th Chinese might see advantage in putting to Fresident Nix:n ti. idea of a donilitcrised, noutral Indo-China (in effect

CONFIDENTLI 10

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excluding North Vietnam) underwritten by the interested

powers, hinting that China would keep North Vietna: in i ́s

ploco.

13.

One of the objects of ping pong diplo acy in its

criginal forn was clearly to bring influence to bear on the

American Administration to accelerate withdrawal from Vietnær.

The aerican table tennis ter were acce-panied by and

foll wed by crioer. journalists :est of who were to a

greater or lesser extent critics of the war. The Chino: 2

indicated that they alas intended to invite politicians -f

the cand complexion. ..t this time they knew that the visit

-f high level ·fficial criss:ry was in prospect but they we

not sure until Dr Kissinger arrived that the Fresident w uld

COMC. It is now open to then to proced with their original

plex. if they wish nd use the presence of syrmathisors to

exert pressure for sens concussin when the tire cores.

President has gained an rävantage over his opponents in thot

the glaucur an effect of the vicit of any werican politicier

beferohend has been eclipsed by the prospect of his own, out

he has also placel hi self in the difficulty that he can

harvily loave Teking with nothing to show for the visit.

Chinese knew this and are the of re in positi n to ask A

fairly stiff price whether on Vietna er, for cxa.ple Thiwan.

They have chosen seen after Dr Kissinger's departure to ke

public the conditions for a nerulisution of rol-ti:ns with t` ·

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The

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United States thus narrowing the President's room for

to withdraw

igreurunt to the visit if American conduct, for emple at

the United Nations, offends the:t. The likelihood the fore

is that the ricans will acquiesce as gracefully as they

con in Trivan's expulsion.

ranoeuvre and they hold yet another card

14.

..grcerent to the Fixon visit can do the Chinese

nothing but gre in asia. erhanced. The an unconsnt f the visit has seri usly upset Mr Date who is seen by his opponents to have been upst ged by

Their prestige has boon i ensely

the Americans.

This way wc kon his position and the t of his

supporters and haster the "dvance of th-so in the Lib.r 1 Democratic Farty inclined towards a more rapid détente with Chine. Elsewboze there has been ? rush by geverrionts allied with or friendly to the United States to state that

This is nt they too so better relations with Poking.

in itself : be thing, ner has it follow, when the dust } a settlo', that there will be any rapi chang.. .:f clign- pont, but it = ns that at finest - cost the Chinese have i..tensifie" pressures on a number of asian countries towards nom: licatior of relations with then, the mini uz price for which will be the cstrcising and further

is l tiy of Taiwan, and tn. longer term effect in s

crses will be a losuning of ties with the Must.

f :ilure of the United States të çivo any warring af vir

CONFIDENTI.L 12

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intentions,

and the obvi.us dorostic politic 1a tivation

of the :: ve,comt fril to weaken the future credibility of

t..

the United St tos sa bulwark ngainst Chin" in sin. For

zory countries relati ns with the West and with the vict

Unin are tor ipertent to be easily disc do but w/the

legiti: rey of China has been as it were und rsed by the

United States and Chine's entry int: the United Fations will

set the curl n the process thetural forces workin

tw rds the rusu pti'n of rugi nel min ti n by Chine : ust

increase.

15.

The uncertain factor for the Chines, in this cquetin,

es in the crse of defence, is Japan. The Chinese w. ke up

very late to the twering eernuric strength f Japan and evan now they have probably not thought through how they right

deal with a th、r isian netion which ust eventually assert

its plitical influence in the region oven if it does not

p so a military threat. Inia has disappeared from the lists and theref^re i pr ved relating and a bounery settlement will be low on China's prioritics quite apart from the difficulty presented by her close relations with

Ins: far as the Chinese and lepenience on the S viet Union,

f cus n the or ble f Japan at cll outsi'e the defence ontext, they probably regard Jap ́n es destined to play a nagur son uic but a suc nitry p. litierl relo in a region over which thuy will assure the natural leadership.

CCHFIDE TIL 13

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Leadership of the Cer-munist World

16. .t the Ninth Congress of the Chincae Cormunist

Party in ..pril, 1969, Lin Fia: procinined the right of other

Comunist partics to fellow th ir own line and condorned the

soviet Union for trying to i: pose unif¬mity. The number

of parties professing full support for the Chinese brand of

Comunist at that time was not i'pressive and the position

has not changed. Party relati ns with North Korea have

beccro closur in step with inter-state relations, which have

i pr^ved as China's public opposition to the supposed increase

in Japan's :ilitary r-le in usia has intensified. But North

Kerca unlike Albania is far from being a Party satellite of

Chinh: Relations with the Rovenian Communist Party have

becue very cordial and the recent visit of M. Ceausescu and

his Farty as well as gevorm ental capacity was an cutstanding

success. But he referred pointedly t: there being no centre

of world ecmunism and, with tightened Sevict control in

Eastern Europe, the Chinese can hope to make no progress

towards their air of h.rding an Eastern orthodox church of

There has any size let alone superseding that in the Wost. been no progress in Party relations with Yugoslavia which Ching spp rustly does not regard de Comunist but inter-

atute rolati ns aro ruch better.

The Chinese continue to

pay clab-ra e :ttention to the various "erthodox" splinter

CONFIDENTLL 14

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parties, but probably regard -ny as being wock instruunts

in comparison with more broadly based loft wing revolution-

ary movements or even friendship groups through which the

Chinose can conduct populer diplonacy. There cre cxa ples

in Lytin serica where ang competing Communist and left

wing (ups the Chinese have not apparently accorlel even the

position of primus inter paros to the "crthodox" party.

China and the Third World

17.

China's activities divide between the cultivati:n of

relations and the prevision of oil to countries who they

recognise, the developront of trade and occasional gestures

of assistance to those whom they do not, and the enc...urage-

nent perally el materially of rev-lutionary :: vorents in

certain c.untries whose govern ents they disapprove of. The

second and thir? type of cetivity occasionally coincide as in

the case of Malaysia and Thailand.

18.

Since the favourable vote in the United Nations last

Nove bor, Chinc has donc quite well in securing recognition

fro Third World ecuntri-5: Ethiopia, Nigeris, Caroroon,

Chile, luwait and Equatorial Guinea have poned relations

while Libya has rade a leclaration of intent. China has

mended fences with some African countries, notably Mali, and

launched her rost arbitious forcign aid project, the

US$400 million Tenzor: railway.

In 1970 alone the Chinese

CONFIDENTIAL 15

CONFIDENTI.L

signed economic and militery aid agreements valued et well over a billion US dollars, involving an annual disbursement of sever 1 hundred.illion dollars which is consider ble for

In the Third World and else- a country in China's position.

where, notably Romania as well as in Albania, North Vietnam and Fakistan, China has shown promptness and generosity in

This prying out, particularly at times of special need. has also applied to contributions for relief in case of disasters, for example in Malaysia and Turkey with which Chine has no relations. China can still never compete as an aid giver with the Soviet Union let alone the West, but by selectivo gener-sity and the careful husbanding of resources, including modest living standards for Chinese workers and experts abroad which is beneficial als: for other reasons, the Chinese contrive to make an i-pact; in cert in countries, for exemple Tanzania and in a different way Nepal, the political dividends can be great.

19.

and

is a nodel for developucnt, economic, social and

Though politic:1, China's success cannot be rated high. recovery from; the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution will have restored China's prestige as a well-organised country, fow could hope to emulate the Chinese model which demands unrelenting hard work, iron discipline and a dedicated and

Most Third World countries will incorrupt bureaucracy.

prefer to admiro and do otherwise,

CONFIDENTL.L 16

Thus the opportunities

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for China to undermine the position of the West and the

Soviet Union by this eans are slight. What Chine can do is

to reap public political dividends in the forr. of the condemnation of "imperialis::" and exploitation from.

countries which continue to enjoy the benefit of Western

assistancc and investment.

20.

The present trend in Chinese dipl:recy, in

particular the invitation to President Nixon, has ro-

awokonać doubts which are alrendy being voiced by colleagues

here about how firm and all-embracing is the Chinese co mit-

ment to support revolutirnary ...ve? ents everywhore.

In fact

the Chinese have always buen selective in their support, and their treatment of developments in East Pakistan and Ceylon show that when state rolations are consifcred of

overriding ipertence reveluti nury reverents of demonstrable legitimacy can be writton eff, though in the case of East Pakistan the Chinese have kept their optins open by silence. Chinese frilure to recognise the rcv lutionary verent in Chad, where gevermont ondervours at suppression are being assisted by the French, is a lesser but significant example. Whatever accomodations the Chinese may roko, the principle of support for revolution is so fundamental to their positi ́n within the Communist world, deriving as it does from their own experionce in China which they have clov ted to a universal level, that it could not be abandon. 1, even after

CONFIZENTIL

■

Mao goes.

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What the Chinese could do is to be mora select-

ive about the revolutionary Levements they publicise and

support. There will still be ., wy in frica and Latin .nerica which they c-n espouse without risk to any of their other intercats. There may be eases such as Thailand which will be difficult to resolve oven fter en -storic:n withdrawal from Vietner, and the Chinese may try to have it both ways, as they now do in Laos, by having relations and supporting revolutionary movements. This is another dilemma they will

have to face. Iz the Middle East they are so firmly anchored to the revolutionary event that it is hard to see how they could disengage even if they wished to, though by their extrorisu they alicnate influenti:l Arab countries

end allow the Soviet Union to increase their influence,

Undoubtedly particularly with the United Arab Republic.

the Ching so are worthier champions of revolution than the Russians. The question is the extent to which. it will benefit then, now or in the future, to be the national advocate of all power "sprin, ing from the ber el of a gun". ..lrealy they have drawn back in the esse of hi-jacking. Their position on political kidnapping and urben guerrillas is unclear. ..pperently the number of guns and calibro

count. ..s China becomes increasingly ruspcctable

internationally, this problem: may loon larger.

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[

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China and the Super-powers

21. Over the past year the Chinese have increasingly cest

themselves in the role of the champion of small and redium

sized powers in their efforts to resist the imposition of

heger.ory by the United States and the Boviet Unir, as the

Chinese chose to portray it. The Chinese profess never to

wish to become a super-p-wor.

In view of the distance they

lng behind, this ray be only a sensible rati ́nalis¬tion of the inevitable. ..t the sac tinc their orneaytion of

their own world role would not permit then either to sido with one of the super-pcware, or son to accept e subordinate status to either, leaving aside the particular problems this would involve. Though they will so the prospect of - greater measure of détente with on: to unnerve the other

In the

the Russians have nade clear thèi apprehenson about President's Kixon's visit there vill bo e linit beyond which they will not go. The Chinese moito much of their independence (and self-reliance) and connend this policy to others. Third World it takes the form of calls for concric independence, including greater benefit from foreign exploita- Her Western cruntries are tion of natural rezcurces og oil. lumped together with the United States and the contest takes on Nerth versus South, character.

* mitosial vators is

another problur: which can be turn to useful account se

both the United States and the viet Union have najer

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fisheries interests.

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The Chinese position is to support

the right of my country to clain whatever extent of

territorial waters and seabed it chooses. What their

reaction would be if an unfriendly nation mado a claim

which encroached on what they regard as Chinese waters would be instructive. They hav: certainly been prompt in neking

the caximr claim for islands in the China pea, including

JĈ

the Senkakus which on sone Chinese maps is not shown as Chincsc. This particular policy has an obvious appeal in Latin merica, but if the Chinese bocene involved in serious discussion et, for exaple, a future conference on the law e the sea, they ray find it less easy to maintain.

22.

On a more general level, the Chinese commend all demonstrations of national independence vis-a-vis the

United States and the Soviet Union.

They champion the righ"

of all countries (except West Germany and Japan) to have nuclear weapons, and they oppose the non-proliferation treaty. The national position adopted by General de Gaulle was their hodel for a "good" Western European country. They see the Comion Narket as an assertion of economic and political independence from the United States and exaggerate the extent to which this will crode bilateral relations between the norbers and the United States, on the rno fund,

For obviouɛ reasons, and the Soviet Union on the ether. relations betweon the super-powers and smaller countries

CONFIDENTL.L

in the world are too importent for these countries to Luke then lightly, and the Chinese :bition to establish a special position by leading a united front gainst ther.

cannot be oasily realised.

But there is probably sufficient

disquiet in a variety of countries at the prospect of their destiny being decided, over their heads, by the supcr-p: wers for the Chinose to pick up scne divide ds.

China and the United hutions

23.

To enter the United Nations cannot be called an ein of Chinese foreign policy; it is in any case now inevitable But the Chinese desire to tolong socner rather than later. to the organisation has narkedly increased since the Culturel Revoluti‹n died down. In the past the organisati, n was conderned as the suprene example of super-power hogatony - Th: Chinese have presumably now decided that their policios will be better served inside than outside.

Furthercro

If in the

they could hardly refuse the seat if it is offered. Chineso had said in private that they will behave reasczablj in the United Nations and play by the rules. United Nations contex. they pursue vigorously the various ai:s which I havo discussed, they are likely to be awkward customers, particularly for example on colonial questi vis,

The United Nations will po^cu-keeping and disarma cent.

however be unfamiliar ground for then and they nay fin it

difficult at first to make the rapid tactical adjustme: te

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J-

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necessary to thrive in that unique environment.

They will

of course have no public cpini:n to worry about at hore but

if they are seen to make too many compromises with thei

principal enonier it could drags their image as the lender

of world revolution and the champion of the unter-isg.

guess is that they will behave quictly et cny rate at first,

and despite their attitude to the super-powers will not be

keen to see the structure of the organisation tapered with,

in particular any change in the composition of the Secu ity

Council.

Conclusions

24.

In the pursuit of their ains the Chinese c. n sh w

sonic success in improving their national sucurity thoug

they will remain pre-occupied with it. In Asia, choy ave

nade sorte pains, in the Commist World fow. They may have.

sone further success in the Third World against th、 Wern

and the Sovit Union, but their resources will rensin

lirited and rest countries will wish to be en good ter s

with all sides and take the rxirur. help from ther. By the

same token China's stand as a champion against th: super-

powers will not have a univers: 1 ppeal.

25.

The fact that the Chinese are able to con.uct bing ng

diplomacy in its normal and strate spheric victi.s

demonstrates the confince the lership in China's

ability to stop cut into the world and take a more act ve

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part in world politics.

CONFITET TIL

It also shows that there must be

reasonable cohesion within the leadership and agreement on

foreign policy ains between Mao Tsetung hinself, Chou En-lai

and the army.

The invitation to Frosident Nixon was a

striking example of a new flexibility and imagination in Chinese tactics. We must be prepared for other examples

in the future. merican interest in improving relations

with Chine will cause the recognition band-wagen to roll faster. In cases here recognition is ruled out for any reason the Chinese can be expected to encourage further commercial relations and to intcneify "popular" diplomacy. They nay at times run into difficulties over support for revolutionary nevonents but they can be expected strongly to maintain the principle, because an important part of their international raison d'etre is their clain to be the leader of world evolution. The new Chinese posture should on the whole facilitate the pursuit of their foreign policy aims and make the Chinese harder to doel with, though: casier

ut the suo time, the to talk to, than in the past.

Chinese have a large number of balls in the air and the

number may increase.

Thɔugh juggling is a very encient

skill in this country the long absence of the Chinese

from the international stag: ..cans that they lack experience

in certain fields.

Incvitably sore of the balls will drop ·

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from time to time and it will be up to the West to see how

they can bost be fielded.

26.

I ar sending a copy of this despatch to H M Inbassadors at Washington, Moscow, Paris, Tokyo, Seoul, Ulan Bator, Bangl:ok,

the British High Saigon, Vientianc and Phnom Fonh;

Commissioners at Canberra, Wellington, New Delhi and

Rawalpindi; the Governor Hong Kong and to E M Consul at Tamsui.

I have the honour to be Šir

Your obedient Servant

John Denson

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2017

Sir S Tomlinson

Mr Logan

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На Стоговом

Наш

Any other similes

A.R

.R.

CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

Ec 2

1. I think you will be interested to see the attached

letter from our Embassy in Paris enclosing the record of a

conversation between the Canadian and Chinese Assistant

Military Attachés there.

2. As you will see, the Chinese position as regards

relations with the United States in the light of the

announcement of President Nixon's visit remains uncompromising.

28 July 1971

1.1. Luan.

RB Crowson

Far Eastern Department

Tomlinson

Copied to:

Mr Drinkall WED

Mr Overton North America Department

Xr Stratton UN (Pol) Department

Mir Cradock Planning Staff

Mr Daunt

подать

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2/59

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British Embassy

Paris

23 July 1971

RB Crowson Esq

Far Eastern Department

Dear Cumiem.

CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

FEL R

You may be interested to see the enclosed copy of a minute by our Defence Attaché reporting a conversation with his Canadian colleague about an approach made by the Chinese to the Canadians here in Paris. The minute speaks for itself. I would add, however, that the fact that this approach was made here might reflect the fact that the Chinese Embassy in Paris, headed as it is by a member of the Central Committee, remains one of the most important points of contact the Chinese have with the western world. We would be interested to hear whether you receive reports of the same operation having taken place here in Paris with respect to other western Embassies, or of the same sort of thing happening in other capitals.

Copies to "

Chanceries: Peking

Washington Ottawa

Tokyo

Saigon

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Yuna

ext,

Nicholas Sparkly

JNT Spreckley

Alo 1828

Returence

PAR/S1205/Air

H of C

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You may like to know that this morning the Assistant Military attaché, Peoples Republic of China, asited for and was given an immediate appointment with the Assistant Canadian Armed Forces Attaché. His interview lasted 1hr 20 mins, in the course of which he carefully rehearsed, calmly and without polemics, the Chinese position with regard to her differences with the US, The Attaché spoke from written notes and covered all the well-known problems. He said he had been instructed to make clear to China's Canadian friends what she hoped to gain by opening a dialogue with the US, starting with President Nixon's visit. As the Canadiand were among the more important nations to have recognised the Peoples Republic and to have estab- lished full diplomatic relations with them, they wished them to understand fully the implications of the recent developments in Chinese relations with the US.

There was no bacic change in China's position but it was clear that there could be no advance in the struggle to achieve what China wanted without substantive discussions with the Americans. She would enter these discussions in good faith but it had to be clearly understood that there would be no compromise on the following issues:

The total withdrawal of all US Armed Forces from the Far East.

The return of Formosa to the Peoples Republic.

China wanted to take her place in UNO but would not do so whilst Nationalist China was represented there,

All the foregoing was recounted to me by my Canadian colleague, Colonel Power. I said that I thought it strange for the Chinese to make their point to the military side of the Canadian Embassy and at Assistant Attaché level. He agreed but said that in his dealings with the Chinese Embassy he had noticed thet they do not observe the strict division between purely diplomatic and military activities that is so charact- eristic of Western Embassies, As to the level, this was simply a question of language. The Chinese Military Attaché, Pang Ten, does not himself speak French and rather than get into the protocol diffi- culties of an assistant asking for an appointment with an Attaché so much senior, they had opted for the method described.

/Finally

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Reference

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Finally, Colonel Power gave it as his opinion that whatever reason the Chinese gave for having made their demarche, the real reason was to ensure that what they, the Chinese, had had to say would be passed on to other Western missions including the American. He said that he thought a similar exercise would be going on in other capitals as part of a world-wide operation.

22nd July 1971

NE HOAD Air Care D & AA

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L..

FEC 2/1

J B Denson Esq OBE

PEKING

CONFIDENTIAL

Despatched

20 July 1971

2017

नंदर

CHINESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

You might like to know that Mr Royle commented on your despatch of 29 June

"An absorbing report our Mission have done well with their research".

COMFIDENTIAL

J A L Morgan

Far Eastern Department

501

21 JUL 1971

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ANGLO-GERMAN POLITICAL CONSULTATION

16 JULY 1971

BACKGROUND BRIEF ITEM I

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'CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

17/213

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1. During recent months the trend towards more moderate

and conciliatory policies in China's conduct of her

This has

relations with other countries has continued.

been accompanied by a number of well-publicised gestures

designed to underline China's more accommodating attitude

towards the West. Examples are the adroit use made by the

Chinese of recent visits by ping-pong teams from the

United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, friendly

references by Chinese leaders to the "American people" and

the statement by Mao Tse Tung that he would be prepared to

receive President Nixon in China. Despite these tactical

shifts basic Chinese policies remain unchanged. Peking

has been careful to differentiate between governmental

exchanges and "people-to-people" contacts. As long as the

question of Taiwan remains unsolved there is unlikely to

be any response on the Chinese side to overtures from the

US Government. Similarly China is unlikely to relax her

hostility to the Soviet Union as the other super-power and

her rival for the leadership of the world communist

movement.

2. The objectives of recent Chinese diplomacy appear to

be 4-fold

to repair the harm caused to China's prestige

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by the Cultural Revolution, to intensify her campaign to

achieve wider diplomatic recognition, to further her

efforts to gain admission to the United Nations and to

reduce Soviet and US influence in Asia and elsewhere in

the "Third World". China's return to a more traditional

approach to foreign policy has already begun to pay off.

Since October 1970 ten countries, including Canada, Italy

and Austria, have agreed to establish diplomatic relations

with Peking. It now seems probable that the People's

Republic of China will occupy the China seat in the United

Nations this year.

3. We believe that it is right that Peking should occupy

the Chine seat in all the organs of the UN. This is why

we have voted for the Substantive Resolution, the so-called

Albanian Resolution which calls for the seating of Peking

and the expulsion of Taiwan, every year since it was first

tabled in 1961. In our view the absence of a country

containing a quarter of the world's population is bound to

detract from the effectiveness of a worldwide organisation

and to make the solution of many pressing problems all the

more difficult. There are a number of issues of fundamen-

tal importance such as disarmament, the seabed, population

control etc where through membership of the UN the Chinese

Government could play an important role and indeed nake a

helpful contribution if they so wished. It is clearly in

our interest to encourage them to do so.

CONFIDENTIAL

♫ . When the Substantive Resolution obtained a simple

majority for the first time last year a new situation

was created We have been reviewing our policy in the

light of this and the imporvement in our relations with

China since the end of last year. As the West German

and other friendly Governments have been informed in

strict confidence we have sought agrément from the

Chinese for a named Ambassador to Peking. In doing so we

have informed the Chinese that we no longer intend to

support the "Important Question" Resolution in the United

Nations nor any procedural initiative which might have the

effect of delaying the seating of Peking. We have also

said that on recept of a favourable response from the

Chinese we will take steps to remove our official repre-

sentation on Taiwan. In taking this action it has not of

course been our intention to seek to influence any

government's attitude towards voting in the United Nations.

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FEC

Despatcher

J B Denson Esq OF: FAKING

9 July 1971

917

CHIJËSE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. We greatly enjoyed your despatch and Gordon Burras memorandum on the inner workings of the Chinese Foreign. Ministry. I am sure that the China-watching community here will find it compelling reading. We have given the despatch wide circulation in Whitehall.

2. It is reassuring to find that, as one would expect, foreign policy issues are now being discussed rationally and pragmatically in the Foreign Ministry. This is aleurly

But we at the root of their present conciliatory line. too have fouma that, despite their obvious sophistication in comparison with their less widely-travelled colleagues, the Chinese here still have difficulty in understanding how the British system operates. This applies particularly to the workings of the press and public opinion.

3. We were rather surprised to read Asigaard's account of his talk with Ch'i Peng-fei about Chinese preparations for the United Nations (your telegram No 604). I would have expected the Chinese to 'have made more of an effort to train a cadre of United Nations experts but, as your despatch shows, they are obviously under-staffed through- out the Ministry.

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J AL Morgan

Far Eastern Department

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Mr Wilford

Sir S Tomlinson

Mr Logan

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Mission have dan well with their research.

4.R

CHINESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. Mr Denson's despatch provides a fascinating glimpse of

the inner workings of the Chinese Foreign Ministry. I have

not sent the despatch for printing but we are giving it

wide circulation in Whitehall.

to thank him for the despatch.

I have written to Mr Denson

.30

9 July 1971

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BALLISH GOVERNMENT CHANGES

BRITISH EMBASSY,

STOCKHOLM.

7 July 1971

cc Chy Peking

し

SM 13.7

The news of Torsten Nilsson's retirement last week reached hê on my way to Scotland and as I only returned yesterday I have not and time to make many enquiries as to why it happened so suddenly, lie had of course been expected to be the next to go after Lange but apart from noting that "he would not leave before the spring" I had made no forecast and frankly had lost sight of the need to replace this old-timer some day. I think zont of us here were equally surprised. However, with the benefit of hindsight one can say that a fainéant Minister for Foreign Affairs, reluctant to exert himself and prone to bouts of fatigue but unwilling to retire haa become increasingly out

place and indeed intolerable in view of the situation facing sweden in connection with the negotiations with the EEC, Sweden's diplomacy in fact badly needed a new look, What must have precipitated the change is the prospect of Schumann's visit to Stockholm in a fortnight's time. It is obvious that Kilsson was incapable of holding discussions of the greatest significence for Sweden's future relations with the EEC with the Foreign Minister of France and it would presumably have been unacceptable to Scaumann, if not galling for Nilsson, for the discussions to be conducted with Feldt, who though clever, is young, inexperienced Lac lucking in personality. It la probably also true that as I suggested in my despatch 6/3 of 23 November 1970 Xilsson was, with String, a force within the Government opposang Palme's More imaginativo approach to the EEC and that his departure cleara The way for the negotiations which Falme must hope will be less of - ficsco than the "fact finding talks" in Brussels have been,

On a higher political plane Nilsson's departure has made it roosisie, as perhaps nothing else would have done, for Falme to Rune Johansson back into the Government. Ever since 1967 i muva regarded this can as a possible future Frime Minister

remember Falme telling me after the 1970 election how lucky 3 to nave Johansson as leader of the Social Democratic Party He is just the an Falme needed not only to bridge the

18 confidence gap between government and industry (he is at the

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moment the government director on the board of the Enskilda Banken!) but also improve the govemment's image within the Party and in the country at large. From this point of view I should say that be more than compensates for Nilsson's departure, and if Falme should have to stand down later now and the 1973 election Johansson would seem the obvious successor & Frime Minister,

3. I do not want to speculate too far. The fact remains. thet, whatever the reason, Nilsson has gone, mourned, apparently, by few outside the Social Democratic Press, and even they appear to mourn him more as a good Party man than as a Foreign Minister, As one bourgeois paper put it, Nilsson was scarcely one of the Felme Government's trump cards, and the general consensus with which I agree, seems to be that what the Government has lost in Nilsson's strength in the Party will be more than made up for by the arrival of the more energetic Wickman at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the return to the Government of Rune Johansson, also a strong Party man and one, moreover, who enjoys considerable respect on both sides of the Party line, an undoubted adventage in dealing with industrial policy. In recent years, particularly Nilsson has often seened a passenger at the Foreign Kinistry, allowing policy to be shaped more by the short-term demands of the radical young faction in the Party, or outside it, than by the Foreign Minister. While he was the author in 1965 of the staterent that Swedish neutrality is not ideological (whatever else it is), it is difficult to recall many statements by Nilsson since then which throw much light on Sweden's foreign policy: what springs to mind are the concessions to the Left, the catablishment of missions in Cuba and Hanoi, the rash announcement of massive aid to Vietnen (later corrected by events) at e Farty Congress in 1969, the slump in Swedish-American relations. and, lastly, the rejection of full membership of the EEC as a negotiating gembit. While the Government no doubt appreciated his services in controlling the radical Stockholm branch of the Party, of which he was chairman, the tail often appeared to be wagging the dog, and the fact remains that while the job should have been virtually incompatible with that of Foreign Minister, Nilsson nevertheless chose not to relinquish it, It is also worth noting that he was largely responsible as far as we understand for adding further conditions (maintenance of social policies) to Swedish EEC policy in the 1970 Kramfors Election Kanifesto and consequently in the Swedish memo of 10 November 1970,

4. It must be said at once that ickman'a appointment gives an entirely new and more up-to-date look to the Govemment and in particular to its EEC policy, Wickman is much more firmly committed to the "close, comprehensive and durable relations" of officiel policy and reiterated this commitment in interviews on his appointment, He is free from the close ties Nilsson had with Party opinion, and he has a clean slate as far as earlier statements on foreign policy are concerned. He therefore represents in many respects a fresh start, although he has of course been careful to emphasise that his appointment represents

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no change in policy. He has a degree in economics. speaks several languages and has international negotiating experiences - Swedish representative in the Group of Ten and the OECD. Although a convinced Social Democrat, he is a technocrat of the new school, who has risen through the administration rather than the Party, and, as such, is of a kind with Palme and Feldt. At time when foreign relations as such are tending to become moze anu more prerogative of Frime Ministers while foreign zinistries deal more anú more in matters of trade and aconcaic policy, Wickman is en obvious choice. There seems no reason to put undue emphasis on his "failure" at the Ministry of Industry as highlighted by the row over the State Enterprises (zze Stockholm despatch of the 14th of April). He was,

He was, after all, creating a new Ministry to implement a new policy, which had, perhaps, been presented in unduly political terms. He was also £ newcomer to politics as such and by temperament perhaps inclined to be impatient, The teething troubles of the Ministry of Industry need be no reflection on Wickman's ability, which is considerable.

5. The newspapers have noted the emergence of a new forceful troika in the foreign affairs field in the shape of Palze, Wickman

nd Feldt. Johansson steps directly into another troika in the domcatic field consisting of himself, Holmquist at the Kinistry of the Interior, and String at the Ministry of Finance. As much no anything else, their function will be to hold the Party behind the Government, and the country behind the Party. More onanger should probably be expected however. While it will stil11 be necessary to retain a solid block of trusted figures for llection purposes, it seems likely that, fortified by his ouccess in surviving the first session of the new Riksdag Palme will want to re-tailor his Government in a manner more to his own liking.

5. A curious incident during Wicken's first press conference is worthy of comments. He was reminded that as Minister of Industry he had been invited to visit China and was asked whether in his low capacity he would be carrying out the visit. Ee answered "Yes, Isn't it fun? And I shall be taking Rune Johansson along too", This unrehearsed and unguarded remark created some ccnnternation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and two officials have assured my Commercial Counsellor that they sz. ROS o hii, to get him off this particuler hook on the grounds that it is inconceivable for a new Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs To make Peking his first port of call, Wickman'a remark was entirely spontaneous and of course the Chinese have not been consulted; it was likely that another invitation to coincide

ith the date of the proposed visit would be engineered and that Rune Johansson would take his place in China.

7. I enclose copies of the biographical notes released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in connection with the new appointments,

Yours ever,

Arawie Ross.

AFFAIRS

July, 1971

RUNE JOHAN.

Xinister of Industry

Hr. Johansson was born in Växjë, Småland (south central Swodon) in 1915. Ey profession a baker (and an azacour football playor in his spare tima), he soon entered politics, first on the local level. He was a member of the Kunicipal Board of Ljungby (still his home torm) and of the Kronoberg County Council. In 1951, he beccze a member of Parliament. Ha was a member of the board of Sveriges Kreditbank (the Credit Bank of Sweden) 1955-1957.

In 1957, Rune Johansson was appointed Minister of the In- terior.. He was responsible for several modical care re- forma, also for industrial location policy and housing -

He left the Cabinet in 1969 and became President of the Co-operative Building Organization of the Swedish Trade Vaions. Ho became Chairman of the Board of the Swedish Waste Conversion Co. in the same year,

When the National Swedish Enterprise Ltd (Statsföretag AB) was formed in 1970, To coordinate government owned in- dustrial enterprises, Mr. Johansson became Vice Chairman of the Board. In the spring of 1971, he was named ita Chairman.

Mr. Johanacon was Parliemontery Group Leador for the Social Democrat Party in the now unicomoral Swedish parliamont during the first half of 1971, or until he was appointed Minister of Industry (July 1, 1971).

Eo is married to the former Gulli Kristiansson.

LI KIVISARY OR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

July, 1971

VELN, Minister for Foreign Affairs

Kr. Violasan hus bout e'member of the Swedish Cabines since 1957. He was born in Stockholm in April, 1924. His father, the lave Johannes Wieltman, was one of Sweden's most prominent journalists, and for several years foreign policy columnist in the Liboral defly, Dagens Nyheter.

Krister Wickman studied law at the University of Stockholm and graduated in 1943. He did postgraduate work in economica and obtained his advanced economics degree in 1953. He then

advanoed.écozomics worked as the National Institute of Economic Research.

In 1959, Mr. Vickman was eppointed Under Secretary in the Ministry of Pinanco, where he soon gained the reputation of a skilful negotiator and leader or budgetary work. He became e maxber of the then First Chamber of the Swedish Parliament in 1906.

Appointed Minister without Portfolio in 1967, Mr. Wickama assumed special responsibility for internal economic affairs, Among other things, he introduced the proposal on the State Investment Bank.

When the Ministry of Industry was established in 1969, Mr. Wickman naturally became its first head' and the spokesman at home and abroad for the Swedish mixed economy that he pas been so instrumental in shaping.

Kr. Wickman was appointed Foreign Minister July 1, 1971.

Kr. Fioleman's wide variety of interests may be illustrated by the fact that he was Chairman of the Swedish Film In- stitute 1963-67.

Copies to: Chanceries

Oslo Copenhagen Helsinki

UK Delegation Brussels UK Kission Geneva

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The Right Honourable

Sir Alec Douglas-Home KT MP ctc etc oto

Office of the British Chargé

PEKING

29 June 1971

d'Affaires

- 6 JUL 1971

CHINESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Sir

1. It is very rare to have the opportunity to catch a glimpse of

the inner workings of a Chinese government department.

This can

never be done at first hand but an opportunity to do so at second hand occurred during a recent diplomatic tour in China when

The

Mr G S Barrass and Mr K C Walker, First Secretaries of this Mission, were in the company of officials of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs for prolonged periods and wore able to glean some information to which I venture to invite your attention. Chinese officials concerned were relatively junior, being at desk officer level, and the picture which they drew may not be comprehensive, but I am convinced that within its limits it is

correct.

2. I attach a memorandum prepared by Mr Barrass which sets down the

main points which emerged.

3. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs sucus to have survived reasonably well from the turbulence of the Cultural Revolution.

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Fontidi

AND

ALIM

- 6 JUL 1971

IT AUG

CONFIENTIAL

The Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, who was severely criticised in 1967 and later, is now said to be still Foreign Minister and not to be functioning cnly because of ill health. One of the main instigators of discrder in the Ministry, Yao Tong-shan, a former Chargé d'Affaires in Indonesia, and incidentally the prime mover in the attack on the British Chancery in 1967 has buen recently exposed to public criticism and according to varying reports either executed or committed to imprisonmont. He was at the same time the leader of the faction which is believed to have attacked the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister, Chou En-lai. Other officials have

disappeared, apparently permanently, though some may yet re-emerge. The rest have worked their passage and it is significant that nearly all of the Ambassadors recently appointed are career diplomats of long standing.

There has been a considerable reduction in the number of officials working at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This includes some who have been purged, others who are attending cadre schools in the country where they engage in physical labour and allegedly learn from the peasants while others are filling posts in the increasing number of Chinc se diplomatic missions abroad. As a result those who are at the Ministry are required to work very hard. In the summer work starts at 8 am and officially ends at 6.00 pm but according to Mr Barrass's informants many work until after 9.30 pm and often work also in Sundays.

Foreign Ministry officials

enjoy some privileges in that they have access to the foreign press and foreign publications and they receive invitations to official

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[

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functions and have the opportunity to nect foreigners.

Nevertheless they can hardly be called a privileged caste. The

salary of the Director of the Western European and American

Department is ¥200 a month (bout £33 sterling) while an experienced

desk officer receives about £18 sterling. Those figures are to

scne extent unrealistic in that accommodation in the shape of a

nodest flat can be obtained for not more than 40p a month while

food and various services are correspondingly cheap. Nonetholoss

living in austere and the gap between the Establishment and the

masses has been sharply narrowed. In the junior ranks of the

Foreign Ministry at least dress is no longer a mark of position

and there secas indeed to be a studied attempt at unsmartness.

Most Foreign Ministry officials drink little and do not hold their

drink well. Their pain outlet is cigarette sncking, the dangers

of lung cancer apparently being unknown.

5. The officials Mr Barrass and Mr Walker talked to and others

whom we have not strike us as intelligent, dedicated and very

hard working. They uni..ubtedly represent an elite who by Chinese

standards are outgring and cosmopolitan. But as the memorandun

indicates, there are remarkable and potentially alarning gaps

in their knowledge of the outside world. They retain a nandarin

attitude which is Maoist and not Confucian but is above all Sino-

centric. They enquire diligently about life and politics in other

countries but they and the Ministry as a whole have not apparently

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reached the stage where they understand the significance of

consultation in our sense. Possibly by the time that cur informants on this diplomatic tour have reached positions of real responsibility we may have been able to educate the Chinese in the facts of international life; but it is going to be an up-hill tesk and we shall be confronted by persons of formidable quality arned with the traditional moral rectitude and self-rightecusness of Chinese

officials down the ages.

6. Wo await with interest any indications of a Plowden or Duncan report in the Chinese Foreign Service. Moanwhile the memorandum night give ford for thought to those who are concerned about cur

cwn conditions of service.

7. I an copying this Despatch to H M Ambassadors at Washington,

the British High Commissioners Moscow, Tokyo, Paris and Ulan Bator; at Canberra and Wellington, the United Kingdon Permanent

Representative to the United Nations,

New York;

the Governcr

of Hong Kong and the Chairman of the Diplomatic Service Association.

I have the honcur to be Sir

Your obedient Servant

John Denson

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LIFE AT THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The two Chinese officials from the Western European Section of the MFA, who accompanied Mr Walker and me on the "junior" diplomatic tour from 28 May 9 June, threw interesting light in the course of conversation on daily life at the Ministry.

Organisation

They told us that China's foreign affairs machine had been

The simplified considerably during the Cultural Revolution.

number of diplomatic officers working in the Ministry was now only half what it was before the Cultural Revolution. The Foreign Affairs Office of the State Council, which used to be the co- ordinating body on foreign policy, had been abolished; several departments within the Ministry had been merged (eg Consular Depart- ment and Legal Department) or reduced to the status of sub-sections. The Ministry was moved last year from what was originally the French Embassy,, a compound with a number of old, rather rambling buildings to a more functional, undistinguished multi-storey building in the north-east of the city.

3. One of our companions said that it had been very easy to work with a reduced staff when China had no foreign policy (ie during the Cultural Revolution), but now the situation was becoming intolerable. Normal working hours at the Ministry in summer were from 8 am till 6 pm, six days a week, but about half the staff were still working at the desks as late as 9.30 pm. Our companion said that he thought that the Ministry would soon have to call in more staff and re-establish and expand some of the old sections which had been abolished or cut back.

Co-ordinating Policy

We were told that important policy decisions are taken only after consultations between the Ministry and Premier Chou En-lai's Private Office, unless they relate to inter-Party matters, which are the responsibility of the International

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Liaison Department of the Central Committee under the former Ambassador to Albania, Keng Piao. There is no group within the Central Committee which acts as a foreign affairs "watch-dog", or any other group outside the Ministry which has the specific task of co-ordinating foreign policy. Chou En-lai and the Ministry are firmly in command.

Party control in the Ministry, which at the higher levels is staffed nainly by Party members, is exercised indirectly through an interin committee nade up largely of senior party members. A new committee has not been elected since the Cultural Revolution. It does, however, include two military nen Li Yao-wen and Ma Wen-po who are described as "leading members" of the Ministry; they are said to be experienced political conmissars who were transferred to the Ministry in the latter part of the Cultural Revolution. They are responsible for improving political work within the Ministry. Although they still wear military uniform, they appear no longer to have any direct connection with the army.

6. Party members in the Ministry meet fairly frequently to discuss party matters, but there are no formal Mao-Thought study classes, They are expected to study Mao's works in their own time. The aim seens to be not to hinder then fron getting on with their other work. The Ministry's militia unit is very substandard because it does not spend enough time in training. As one of our companions put it, "our militie group is never likely to be named as a model unit."

The Effect of the Cultural Revolution

7. Our companions claimed to be happy about the impact the Cultural Revolution had had on the Ministry, despite their initial apprehensions. One of them adnitted that the Cultural Revolution had come as a complete shock to him at first. He found it difficult to believe that President Liu Shao-ch'i had

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really been intriguing for so long against Chairman Mao, but as the issues were debated during the Cultural Revolution, he had becone convinced that Liu's policies were leading China along the road to ruin end that Mao's line was the correct one for China. His own dislike of the over-emphasis on seniority and position in the Ministry had nade it easier for him to see what the Cultural Revolution was about.

8. Our companions clained that the Cultural Revolution had cleared away ruch of the bureaucratic stuffiness in the Ministry and they had now been given ruch more responsibility. They were called in to brief Vice-Ministers and even Premier Chou En-lai personally in a way which would have been inconceivable before the Cultural Revolution. These days, they said, there was much less minuting and "paper pushing". Oral briefings rather than written submissions were now standard. Officials derived much of their information of world affairs from the Western news agencies and our informants claimed to see all the relevant clippings each day,

9. This led me to ask if the "struggle" within the Ministry during the Cultural Revolution had made open discussion on foreign policy difficult. I was told that there was now plenty of Good discussion indeed, at times too much. The Cultural Revolution had demonstrated that Chairman Mao's general line on foreign policy was right what they were doing now was discussing the best way of implementing it. During the Cultural Revolution, a tremendous amount of mud had been thrown about in the Ministry, but those had a 'borrect outlook" had been able to look after themselves. Epithets of "revisionist" and "bad element" had been used so indiscriminately during the Cultural Revolution that they were now something of a joke. My informant had himself been criticised as a revisionist at one stage, but he was no longer worried about such things. The leading menbers of the Ministry were much nore interested in coherent thinking than in none calling. Serious discussion of professional questions was

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getting easier and easier.

Morale and "Down to the Countryside"

The

10. Our companions gave us the impression that morale within the Ministry was at present high. Despite the upheavals there during the Cultural Revolution and subsequent streamlining, relatively few people had lost their jobs altogether. politically less nimble "reactionaries" and "ultra-leftists" were purged, sone of the older members of the service were retired and sone other members were transferred to other govern- nental work, sonetices in the provinces. Our companions were at pains to point out that Marshal Ch'en Yi was "still Foreign Minister". It was only "ill-health" which had prevented hin

Those who had criticised fron playing an stive role since 1967. hin were ultra-leftists who were really opposed to Mao and their criticism was largely unjustified.

11.

In the early part of the Cultural Revolution, many of the less progressive members of the Ministry and almost all the diplomats recalled fron abroad were sent down to the countryside to be re-educated by the "nasses". The aim was to rid them of their bureaucratic airs, to bring hone to then the realities of life in modern China and to prevent Chinese diplomats from becoming too "foreign".in their ways. This was a less traumatic

Most were not sent experience than most of them had feared. alone or in su:311 groups: they went in large groups to special

suall Ministry schools for cadres which had been set up in varicus rural areas. For a part of the tine they worked on the land with local peasants and part of the time they studied Meo's philosophy. During the slack season, they were allowed to study foreign languages and to catch up on their reading foreign publications. They received their full salaries throughout. Some enjoyed the scout camp atmosphere of the cadre schools and the relative pence that this afforded after

Sone the sonetimes acute struggles of the Cultural Revolution. people only stayed for three or four months, thers got stuck

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for eighteen months or more. Husbands and wives, even if they both worked in the Ministry, rarely went together to the cadre schools, partly because it was thought that this would be dis- tracting for then, but also, in many cases, because someone had to stay in Peking to look after the children.

12. Several of the MFA people who had been down to the country- side seemed fairly confident about their future, because they could now clain sone knowledge of what the Cultural Revolution was all about. There are some people including one of our companions who was a fairly sophisticated intellectual type with a keen and unconcealed interest in Chinese poetry and the finer things of life who had not been down to the countryside, even though they had been in the Ministry since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. In due course, however, all members of the Ministry are expected to go down to the countryside on a rotation basis, but as the demand grows for more staff in the Ministry and more diplomats are needed abroad, the visits to the countryside are likely to get shorter.

Recruitment and Training

The Ministry's

13. In recent years, very few people have been recruited into the Ministry. The Ministry is now faced with the task of deciding on the selection and training of new entrants. According to one of our companions, an extensive debate on the subject is now in full swing and no definite decisions had been taken. Diplomatic academy is still closed but he hoped that it would soon be reactivated in one forn or another: there was an urgent need for an official institution to provide training in foreign languages and the principles of diplomacy. needed, he thought, to be more relevant to the work in hand than the old ones had been, HG himself had been obliged to study Chaucer more then scened relevant to an understanding of British life and foreign policy. It should, he thought, also preferably be interspersed with training on the job in the Ministry. There was also a good deal of argument within the

The new courses

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Ministry about the best way to acquire an understanding of foreign attitudes and about the extent to which Chinese diplomatsc should be allowed to acquire such knowledge by immersing then-

selves in foreign ways of life.

Standard of Living

For

14. By Chinese standards, Ministry officials are reasonably well paid, but cannot be considered a privileged class. instance, a desk officer in his early thirties who has not previously served abroad earns about 60-70 yuan a month (£10-12); a desk officer in his later thirties who has served abroad and who speaks English fluently earns over 80 yuan (£14) a month; a section head dealing with, say, France, Italy and Switzerland gets about 130 yuan (£22) a month; the head of the American and Western European Department is believed to get about 200 yuan a nonth (£33). The real value of their salaries is greater than it scens. Accommodation, for most members of the Ministry, for example, is provided in a compound near one of Peking's diplomatic quarters for 1-2 yuan a month. The accomodation is almost as modest as the rent. A couple without children usually have a one rooned flat (plus snall kitchen and toilet) and even a fairly senior counsellor with only one child could not expect to have more than a two roomed flat. Sone of the very senior officials have small three rouned flats, whereas before the Cultural Revolution senior officials could have expected something a little more opulent.

15. The Ministry has a good canteen and nost people eat both lunch and dinner there. Rice with meat and one vegetable costs about 20 cents (4 np) which is less than what the same would cost at an outside restaurant. With a few exceptions, the nen

They from the Ministry are neither great nor good drinkers. normally ease their nervous tensions by smoking. Vice-Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua seers to set the pace with about 60 cigarettes a day. Many of his juniors smoke 25-30 a day, which costs then another 30-50 cents (12-17 np).

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16.

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Officials do not spend much on their personal appearance. Most of the juniors now have a studied sloppiness about their dress, which is usually a rather scrappy assortment of Mao jackets and beggy trousers. The more senior ones have better cut clothes in better materials, but in Peking they all wear modern Chinese style clothes, not western ones.

Wives 17. The interests of wives are usually sacrificed to those of the service. If a wife cannot be found work for which she is qualified in the post to which her husband is being sent, she has usually to remain in Peking. This sometines happens when the wife works in the Ministry but has a different speciality to her husband. On the other hand, wives often prefer to remain in Peking with the children and see then through school. Once again, however, wives of hendis of missions are going abroad with their husbands nore regularly, even when they have school-age children. Even in Peking children pose problems. The Ministry only gives the usual paid caternity leave of 56 days. There is a nursery boarding school which takes in many MFA children five days and four nights weck at the cost of 18 yuan a month (compared with a general rate of 25 yuan a month). Sometimes neighbours look after the very sall children of working mothers without payment, but at other times it is necessary to hire a nanny, at a rate of about 25 yuan (£4.25) a month.

Compensations

18. Life at the MPA does, however, have its compensations. Officials have, and evidently welcome, easy access to the Western press and if they have the time they can also read Western literature. Contacts with foreigners provide opportunities for discussion about any things which cannot otherwide be discussed freely in present-day China. In addition, officials' social lives are nade rather livelier than those of their contemporaries as they are increasingly invited to (and are allowed to attend) functions given by foreign missions, such as film shows, concerts

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and dinner parties.

19.

During our long discussions with our Chinese companions, we were often struck by their skill in putting their case and in defending the positions which they had taken up. Some of thes had a very Mandarin quality of mind, though with a Maoist, not Confucian, outlook. Their experience in debating ideological and theoretical questions helped then to get out of many tight corners. However, this sane experience naturally led then to proceed from the general to the specific rather than the other way round. When we discussed European affairs with then, we were impressed by their detailed factual knowledge of many Europoan questions and by a few good insights they had gained from their long-tern theoretical analysis of the situation; but we were appalled by their abysmal ignorance of the interrelation between the verious European problems and the nature of life in Europe. For example, they found it very difficult to understand that a European accepted that elliances were necessary and that nutual influence was a natural part of a system of interdepen-

dence.

20. ccording to our informants, the Chinese diplomatic service remains nuch the same professional body that it was formerly, despite the upheavals of the cultural Revolution; it has not been forced to take in outsiders, other than a few political commissare from the army who do not seem to interfere ruch in the formulation of policy. Ironically, it seems that it is the success of Mao's line in foreign policy so far which is helping to unify the Chinese diplomatic service after the setbacks it suffered during Mao's Cultural Revolution.

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29 June 1971

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The Right Honourable

Sir Alec Douglas-Home KT MP

etc etc etc

Office of the British Chargé d'Affaires PEKING

29 June 1971

CHINESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Sir

It is very rare to have the opportunity to catch a glimpse of

the inner workings of a Chinese government department. This can

never be done at first hand but an opportunity to do so at second

hand occurred during a recent diplomatic tour in China when

Mr G S Barrass and Mr KC Walker, First Secretarics of this Mission,

were in the company of officials of the Chinese Ministry of

Foreign Affairs for prolonged periods and were able to glean somo

information to which I venture to invite your attention. The

Chinese officials concerned were relatively junior, being at desk

officer level, and the picture which they drow may not be

comprehensive, but I am convinced that within its limits it is

correct.

2. I attach a memorandum prepared by Mr Barrass which sets down the

main points which emerged.

3. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs soms to have survived

reasonably well from the turbulence of the Cultural Revolution.

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The Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, who was severely criticised in 1967

and later, is now said to bo still Foreign Minister and not to be

functioning only because of ill health. One of the main instigators

of disorder in the Ministry, Yao Teng-shan, a former Chargé

d'Affaires in Indonesia, and incidentally the prime mover in the

attack on the British Chancery in 1967 has buen recently exposed to

public criticism and according to varying reports either executed cr

committed to imprisonment. Hu was at the same time the leader of

the faction which is believed to have attacked the Foreign Minister

and the Prime Minister, Chou En-lai. Other officials have

disappeared, apparently permanently, though some may yet re-emerge.

The rest have worked their passage and it is significant that

nearly all of the Ambassadors recently appointed are carcer diplomats

of long standing.

4. There has boon a considerable reduction in the number of

officials working at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This includes

some who have been purged, others who are attending cadre schools in

the country where they engage in physical labour and allegedly

learn from the peasants while others are filling posts in the

increasing number of Chinese diplomatic missions abroad. As a

result those who are at the Ministry are required to work very hard.

In the summer work starts at 8 am and officially ends at 6.00 p m

but according to Mr Barrass's informants many work until after

9.30 pm and cfton work also on Sundays.

Foreign Ministry officials

enjoy some privileges in that they have access to the foreign press and foreign publications and they receive invitations to official

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functions and have the opportunity to meet foreigners.

Nevertheless they can hardly be called a privileged caste. The

salary of the Director of the Western European and American

Department is ¥200 a month (about £33 sterling) while an experienced desk officer receives about £18 sterling. These figures are to

Nonetheless

In the junior ranks of the

some extent unrealistic in that accommodation in the shape of a

modest flat can be obtained for not more than 40p a month while

food and varicus services are correspondingly cheap.

living is austere and the gap between the Establishment and the

masses has been sharply narrowed.

Foreign Ministry at least dress is no longer a mark of position

and there seems indeed to be a studied attempt at unsnartness.

Most Foreign Ministry officials drink little and do not hold their

drink well. Their main cutlet is cigarette smoking, the dangers

of lung cancer apparently being unknown.

5. The officials Mr Berrass and Mr Walker talked to and others

whom we have not strike us as intelligent, dedicated and very

hard working. They undoubtedly represent an elite who by Chinese

standards are outgring and cosmopitan.

cosmopitan. But as the menorandun

indicates, there are remarkable and potentially alarning gaps

in their knowledge of the utside world. They retain a nandarin

attitude which is Maoist and not Confucian but is above all Sino-

contric. They enquire diligently about life and politics in other

countries but they and the Ministry as a whole have not apparently

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reached the stage where they understand the significance of

consultation in our sense. Possibly by the time that cur informants on this diplomatic tour have reached positions of real responsibility we may have been able to educate the Chinese in the facts of international life; but it is gcing to be an up-hill task and we shall be confronted by persons of formidable quality armed with the traditional moral rectitude and self-righteousness of Chinese

officials down the ages.

6. We await with interest any indications of a Plowden or Duncan report in the Chinese Foreign Service. Meanwhile the memorandum might give food for thought to th: se who are concerned about our

cwn conditi^ns of service,

I am copying this Despatch to H M Ambassadors at Washington,

the British High Commissioners Mesecw, Tokyo, Paris and Ulan Bator; at Canberra and Wellington, the United Kingdon Permanent

Representative to the United Nations,

New York;

the Governor

of Hong Kong and the Cheirmar. of the Diplomatic Service Association.

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I have the honcur to be Sir

Your bedient Servant

John Denson

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RE.L..

¡R. GOTRY No.50 2-JUN1971

OFFICE OF THE BRITISH CHARGE D'. ITAIRES PEKING

15 June 1971

2/1

L V Appleyard Esq Far astern Dept 700

My Dear hen,

CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

FEC 2

Ст

Pla

1. During the "junior" diplomatic tour, which took place from 28 Tay to 9 June, Cuendet (the Swiss Counsellor), LeClercq (the Trench junior Counsellor), Ken Walker and I had a series of lengthy and interesting discussions about forcim affairs with Ya Hui-min (head the 3 Chinese LFA officials accompanying us

of section for France, Italy and Switzerland), Chang I-chun (Ccsk officer for Britain) and T'ao Hsiang-chen (desk officer fcr lost Germany).

2. s you will see below what the Chinese said generally confirms our reporting, though they often stated their position moro explicitly. Before going into details of what was said I would like to give you a thumb nail sketch of our interlocutors and some idea of the atmosphere in which our discussions took -Lice.

3. Wi, probably in his late 40s, is a graduate of a Jesuit University in shanghai, The subtlety of his defence does credit to his teachers. He served in Switzerland for several years and later in Algeria, where he acems to have westernised his Chinese charm. During the Cultural Revolution he spent 18 Eonths in physical work at the 7 Kay School for cadres from the Foreign Ministry. Chang, who is in his late 30s, served in London for 7 years and has been closely associatcă with Sino- British affairs for a very long time. Though more dishevilled

The real looking than Yu, Chang shares much of his affability. surprise for us was T'eo, who seems to be something of a 34 year olá ch'iao Kuan-hua. He combincs a sophisticated intellectual aprcarance (plus a keen interest in ancient Chinese poetry and painting) with a good explanation of why the Cultural Revolution

And he still has not been down to the W28 ncccssary for China. countryside!

4. Our Chinese companions were in an affable mood and willing to talk (and drink) late into the night, either in groups or singly. Both sides usually spoke in a rather detached and

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academic way frequently prefacing their remarks with "speaking personally" or "as I see it."

5. The Chinese were clearly working to a brief. They were to get our respective views on Britain's entry into the Common Harkot, Anglo-French relations, the future of nglo-US and US- Conron Market relations, the future of West Germany and the procent international monetary situation. In return they were willing to talk in a relaxed way about the same subjects, life at the Foreign Ministry (about riich I will bewriting later), and China's views on the US, Japan, revolution, Indochina and Cigarmament.

6. hat struck us after these discussions, which on foreign

drs alone went on for more than 30 hours, was that the Chinese had a detailed knowledge of the facts concerning many Tarczcan/US/Sovict questions, a few good insights from their long term theoretical analysis of the situation and an abysmal ignorance of subtle interrelations between thes: verious

stions. They kept talking in terms of Lurope being under US "hegemony" and the need for rope to follow France's cxample and ursue an "independent" policy. They found it very

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di. cult to understand that European countries, including Tanec now, accepted that alliances were necessary, and that autugi pressure was a natural part of a system of interdepend- uncu. Kore specifically, LeClercq described Yu's thinking on Comy as "stone age" and was horrified by his totally Harist/

oist and unflattering analysis of French society.

Common Market. The first item on the agenda was the chances of witain entering the Common Market. Once Clercq had said that he thought Britains entry was "settled" cur Chinese com-

nions were in an almost cuphoric mood. What they really wanted to know was how Britain's entry into the Common Farket would afict Inglo-US relations and uropean-US relations. Chang Broll coherently and precisely about Britain's changing position and .nglo-US relations, but was surprised by the cxtent that we and the Common Karket countrics accepted the problems of inter- dependence.

8. Then Yu said that China favoured Lurope for the Europeans, Quenict quickly interjected "That is what Mr Hitler said in 1941" which gave the Chinese something to think about! Our Chinese companions constantly tried to lead us into making anti US statements. Yu suggested to leClercq that after the Heath- Pouridou talks that Britain and urope would take a line more indendent of the US. Leclercq, who shares my view that no one has done more than General de Gaulle to confuse Chinoso thinking on Europe, felt obliged to remind Yu that President Pompidou had spoken recently about the need for good relations with both US and East Europe. France was after all a morber of the stern Alliance and even the General had not asked for US troops to withdraw from Europe. By the end of our discussion we got the feeling that the Chinoso believed that for some time to

/ come

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come the best place fr Soviet and American troops was Durope

Parably the outer fringcs. This would give both the Kastern and Western European countries a chance to assert more "independence" without frocing the US and the Soviet Union of their mutual preoccupation with Europe.

I noticed that

the Chou/Ccausescu communique signed on 9 Junc there ms to have been some decline in Chinese hositility to uropean Security Treaty.

9. Both Yu and T'no spoke at length (and sometimus passionately) About Just German revanchism. They argued that Germany novor rospected treaties, that it was already beginning to throw its economic weight about, that there would be a decline in West Germany's rate of economic growth which would lead to a russurgence of Nazism and that one day West Germany would irlement the stated aims of its recent leaders to rounité Gurmany. After this rousing rendering of Götterdämmerung wo 7ure presscd for our views on Germany. We replied, almost in unison, thrt European countries saw the situation vory differently and did not share Chinese fears. The situation and balance of power in Jurope was now very different. There was no reason to expect a repetition of history. The Chinese expressed great interest in this "European" view of Germany. Inter, however, when I spoke with Ya alone he told me that although Leclercq and I had carlier spoken with similar voices about Germany his own impression from talking to the French" was that they feared the growing strength of Germany and in his view this had contributed to the improvement of Anglo-

rench relations. The conversation was interrupted before a Tuply was called for.

But

10. hen I discussed the prospects for improved relations with

est fermany with T'ao, he replicd, in the usual sinocentric

that it was up to "est Germany to make the first move. Paul there be any difficulties, I asked, if fuc Germany was i ng to recognise the PRC as the "sole lugal government of Tiin. He said that Ching did not accept the st German 2nd on Berlin. (later ng Yun-yi; the desk officer for Last Germany, told Cucndet that China supported the East Gurten stand on Berlin.) T'ho scemed unaware of the fact that

Year.nin had rulations with both parts of Gorman I then

sked him if China would be willing to recognise cst Germany bufere a settlement of the question of innor-German relations. T'ao hodged by saying that it as a hypothetical question, but if at Germany "sincerely" ented relations with China he trought that the problem would not be insurmountable.

11. Indochina. In our tour d'horizon it was not surprising that wo eventually got onto the problems of Indochina. Chang took a hard line. He said that thort would be no settlement until the

When US thdrew completely and unconditionally from Indochina. I seinted out that as a Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference we flv ured the withdrawal of all foreign forces from South

Wietnam

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Vietnam and Laos he retorted that Britain could not hope to play a role in the settlement of the Indochina question if we had such a "negative attitude." I asked if he disagreed with ny roposition that there were other foreign forces in Laos. Po, ho said, there wore North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam where they had the right to be. Our discussion made no progress.

12. t one point in a later discussion when LeClercq said that some some countries feared that the present situation in Indochina would lead to a North Victnamusu hegemony, Yi replied that China "understood" this fear, but would not be drawn on how China would deal with the problem.

13. Subsequently I asked Chrng if the Moo quote ("If anyone among us should say that we should not help the Vietnamese poole in their struggle.....that will be betrayal, betrayal of the revolution.") which Chou In-lai had used in Hanoi on

arch was a recent one or one dating from 1965/66. Chang said that he "thought" that Kao had made this statement towards the ond of last year, but that it had not been in connection with a scricus debate within the leadership or the MF... (A Sovict collunque told me recently that the Chinese had given them almost the same reply shortly after Chou quoted Fac's remark). This fits in with our interpretation that Chou quoted this

Pk to allay North Vietnamese doubts about the firmness of Chincse support.

1. Our discussions on Indochine led on to Sino-US relations. Despite the fact that the Chinese were in a relaxed and detached mood they offered not the slightest hope of a nodus vivendi with the US other than on their torns. We spent hours with the Chinese individually discussing all sorts of possibilitics for a Padal casing of tensions and the long-term settlement of the Toi.an problem, but got nowhere.

15. Janan. The attitude of our Chinese companions towards Japan was equally uncompromising. They said that they had no hope of an improvement until after Sato had gone. Even then a now Japanose government would have to recognise that the PRC as the sole legal governorth of Ching. (including Taiwan). If Japan adopted the correct attitude problems like the renuncia- tion of the peace treaty between Japan and Taiwan could be "s.lvod".

16. Disarmament. In connection with the Chinese views about the resurgence of Japan wo asked them what attitude they took to nuclear disarmament. It became clear from what Chang said that China was finding it difficult to oppose IT because so many countrics favcured it. Lowever, Chang said that China was very opposed to any schone that would restrict the spread of nuclear weapons and consolidate the "hegemony" of the super

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powers. He said that China favoured the spread of nuclear *ns because this would put an end to nuclear blackmail, (but he had no wish to discuss cst Germany or Japan in this certuxt). Hc recognised that the spread of nuclear weapons was not without its risks, but he claimed that they wore a lops evil than domination by the super powers.

China was rundy, he said, to abolish all muclear weapone if all other countrica cgrood.

17. Who Dollar "Crisis" te word closely questioned at all

vels on this subject, even by Pu Hao, the Dictor of the eneral Office of the MPX who this loading the tour. 11though the Chinese had many of the key figures at their finger-tips they were not all conversant with complext economic and political relations which cxist within the Western international

notery system. It took hours to gut across the point that von those Luropean countrics who disagreed with the US about the position of the dollar (and understood financial matters) did not wish to see the dollar pushed into devaluation.

18. China's support for Revolution. I put it to Chang that we found it very difficult to reconcile China's call for peaceful cocxistence with its moral and material support for revolutionary movements. At first he took the line about China's "bounden internationalist duty," but changed his tack in face of our hostility to his views. Ho then tried to casuïc us that China would not be as active cs wo foarod. We were not very convinc cd by his sudden change of mcód and for good measure left him with the thought that it would be impossible for Ching to enjoy good relations with Jurope if it actively supported subversive move- ments abroad.

1 g. You will have noticed that I have given this lotter a very limited distribution. The reason is that Cucndet, Leclercq, Ken Talker and I hope to have further such changes in Peking with Fur Chinese companions. It would be difficult to do this if their namçe and remarks were made known outside of the Office. Per t'is reason I have prepared a sanitised version of this luster for you, John Boyd and Chris Howells to pass to the Imuricans only. Copies of the sanitised letter are also being sont to cur Chancerics in Koscow, Tokyo, Paris, Erlin, Bonn, aniqui, to UKDELS in Brussels and Geneva, and t. UKHIS New York.

You

Ext

Soudn

Gordon 8 rrass

Conicd to:

CJ Rowclls, Hong Kong

JDI Boyd, Washington

G Tuff, PUSD, FCO

7 Trever CHO, OBE, Rescarch Dept, FCO

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OFFICE OF THE BRITISH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES PIKING

15 June 1971

L Vṛpleyard Esq Par astern Dept TCO

My Dear her,

CHINO FOREIGN POLICY

Please refer to paragraph 19 of my letter 2/1 to you (nct to all) of today's date.

During the "Junior" diplomatic tour, which took place from 28 ay to 9 June, Ken Walker and had a series of lengthy and intoresting discussions about foreign affairs with some of the Chinese FFA •fficials accompanying us.

3. s you will see below what the Chinese said generally confirms our reporting, though they often stated their position more explicitly. Our Chinese companions were in an affable mood and willing to talk (and drink) late into the night, either in groups or singly. Both sides usually spoke in a rather detached and academic way frequently prefacing their remarke with "speaking personally" or "as I see it."

The Chinese were clearly working to a brief. They were to get our respective views on Britain's entry into the Common Harket, Anglo-French relations, the future of Inglo-US and JS- Common "arket relations, the future of West Germany and the present international monetary situation. In return they were willing to talk in a relaxed way about the same subjects, life at the Toreign Winistry (about which I will be writing later), and China's views on the US, Japan, Indochina, disarmament and revolution.

5. That struck us after these discussions, which on foreign afsirs alone went on for more than 30 hours, was that the Chinese had a detailed knowledge of the facts concerning many European/ U3/Sovict questions, a few good insights from their long term theoretical analysis of the situation and an abysmal ignorance of subtle interrelations between those various questions. They kopt talking in terms of Europe being under US "hegemony" and the need for Europe to follow France's example and pursue an "Incupendent" policy. They found it very difficult to

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understand that European countries, including France now accepted that alliances were necessary and that mutual gressure was a natural part of a system of interdependence. Koro specifically, a European colleague described our companions' thinking on Germany as "stone age" and was horrified by their totally Farxist/Maoist and unflattering analysis of his country's society.

6. Common Market. The first item on the agenda was the

Once a Common chances of Britain entering the Common Market. Kari:et colleague had said that he thought Britain's entry was "suttled" our Chinese companions were in an almost euphoric Lood. That they really wanted to know was how Britain's entry into the Common Market would affect Anglo-US relations and

One of our Chinese companions spoke Eropean-US relations.

conciently and precisely about Britain's changing position and Anglo-US relations, but was surprised by the extent that we and the Common Market countries accopted the problems of intcråcpendence.

7. Then one of the Chinese said that China favoured Europe for the Luropeans, a European colleague quickly interjected "That is what Ir Hitler said in 1941" which gave the Chinese Our Chinese companions constantly 3cm.tling to think about! trico to lead us into making anti-US statements. They suggested that after the Heath-Pompidou talks that Britain and Europe would

A Furopean colleague tek. c line more independent of the US. felt obliged to remind the Chinese that resident Pompidou had spoken recently about the nood for good relations with both US

nd Last Europe.

France was after all a member of the Western Alliance and even General de culle had not asked for US troops

By the end of our discussion we got to ithdraw from Europe. the feeling that the Chinese believed that for some time to come the best place for Soviet and Imerican troops was Turope

This would give both the preferably the outer fringes. Eastern and Western Turopean countries a chance to assert more "independence" without freeing the US and the Soviet Union of

I noticed that in the their mutual preoccupation with Lurope. Chou/Ceausescu communique signed on 9 June there seems to have bucn some decline in Chinese hostility to a uropean Security grenty.

8. Our Chinese companions spoke at length (and sometimes

++ They argued that passionately) about West German "revanchism." Curmeny never respected treaties, that it was already beginning to throw its economic weight about, that there would be a dec.inc in "est Germany's rate of economic growth which would lund to a ressurgence of Nazism and that one day lost Germany would implement the stated aims of its recent leaders to reunite Germany. After this rousing renduring of cottcräämmerung we

We replied, almost in· voro pressed for our views on Germany. unison, that European countries saw the situation very differently

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and did not share Chinese fears. The situation and balance

of over in Europe was now very different. There was no reason to expect a repetition of history. The Chinese capressed great interest in this "European" view of Germany. Intur, however, when I spoke with one of the Chinese alone he told me that his own impression from talking to "the French" as that they feared the growing strength of Germany and in his view this had contributed to the improvement of Anglo- French relations, The conversation was interrupted before a roply was called for.

9. Then we discussed the prospects for improved relations with Test Germany the Chinese caid, in their usual Sinocentric way, that it was up to West Germany to make the first move. But would there be any difficulties, I asked, if West Germany was willing to recognise the FRC as the "sole legal government of Ching." They said that China did not accopt the West German stand on Berlin. (Later the desk officer for East Cerny, told us that China supported the East German stand on Berlin). We then asked if China would be willing to recognisc Fest Germany before a settlement of the question of inner-German relations. The Chinese hedged by saying that it was a hy othetical question, but if West Germany "sincerely" wanted relations with China they thought that the problem would not be insurmountable.

10. Indochina. In our tour d'horizon it was not surprising that we eventually got onto the problems of Indochina. One of our Chinese companions took a hard line. He said that there would bu no settlement until the US withdrew completely and uncondi- tionally from Indochina. When I pointed out that as a Co- Chairman of the Geneva Conference we favoured the withdrawal of all foreign forces from South Vietnam and Laos he retorted that Ditzin could not hope to play a role in the settlement of th. Indochina question if we had such a "negative attitude." I asked if he disagreed with my proposition that there were other foreign forces in Laos. No, he said, there were forth Victamnese troops in South Vietnam where they had the right to bc. Our discussion made no progress.

11...t one point in a Inter discussion when a colleague said that some countries feared that the present situation in Indochina would lead to a North Vietnamese hegemony, his Chinese companion replied that China "understood" this fear, but would not be drawn on how China would deal with the problem.

12. Subsequently I asked one of our Chinese companions if the Kao quote ("If anyone among us should say that we should not help the Vietnamese people in their struggle....that will be betrayal, betrayal of the revolution.") which Chou In-lai had used in Hanoi on 6 Harch was a recent one or ono dating from 1965/66. He said that he "thought" that Wao had made this statement towards the end of last year, but that it had not buon in connection with a scrious debate within the leadership

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or the PĂ.. (A Soviet colleague told me recently that the Chinese had given them almost the same reply shortly after Chou quoted Mao's remark). This fits in with our interpre- tation that Chou quoted this remark to allay North Vietnamese doubts about the firmness of Chinese support.

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13. Cur discussions on Indochina led on to Sino-US relations. Despite the fact that the Chinese were in a relaxed and detached mood they offered not the slightest hope of a modus vivondi with the US other than on their terms. "e spent hours with the Chinese individually discussing all sorts of ¡ossibilities for a gradual casing of tensions and the long term settlement of the Taiwan problem, but got nowhere.

14. Japan.

The attitude of our Chinese companions towards Japan was equally uncompromising. They said that they had no hope of an improvement until after Sato had gone. Even then a now Japanese government would have to recognise that the PRC as the solo legal government of China (including Taivan). If Jepen adopted the correct attitude problems like the renuncia- tion of the peace treaty between Japan and Taiwan could be "solved,"

15. Disarmament. In connection with the Chinese views about the :-surgence of Japan we asked them what attitude they took to nuclear disarmament. It became clear from what the Chinese said that China was finding it difficult to oppose SALT because so my countrics favoured it. However, they said that China was very opposed to any scheme that would restrict the spread of nuclear weapons and consolidate the "hegemony" of the super novers. One said that China favoured the spread of nuclear

carons because this would put an end to nuclear blackmail, (but he and no wish to discuss Test Germany or Japan in this oɔntext). He recognised that the spread of nuclear weapons was not without its risks, but he claimed that they were a losser evil than douination by the super powers. Ching was rendy, he said, to abolish all nuclear weapons if all other countries agreed,

16. The Dollar "Crisis". We were closely questioned at all levels on this subject. Although the Chinese had many of the Key figures at their finger-tips they were not all conversant with complex economic and political relations which exist within the Western international monetary system. It took hours to get across the point that even those European countrics who dis:grced with the US about the position of the dollar (and undstood financial matters) did not wish to sue the dollar pushed into devaluation.

17. China's support for Revolution. I put it to one of our Chinese companions that we found it very difficult to reconcile China's call for peaceful cocxistence with its moral and material surmort for revolutionary movements. At first he took the line about China's "bounden internationalist duty", but changed his

/tack

CONFIDENTIAL

tack in face of our hostility to his views. He then tried to assure us that China would not be as active as we feared. We were not very convinced by his sudden change of mood and for good measure left him with the thought that it would be imposs- ible for China to enjoy good relations with Europe it it actively supported subversive movements abroad.

18. Ken Walker and I hope to continue these conversation in Peking. We would be grateful, therefore, if the contents of this lotter are treated in confidence. We have no objection to copies of this letter being passed to the Americans in London, Washington and Hong Kong, but would not like references to be made to those conversations outside of official channels.

You

fad

Gordon S Parrass

Copied to:

CJ Howells, Hong Kong

JD I Boyd, Washington

G Duff, FUSD, FCO

7 Brower CHO, OBE, Research Dept, FCO

Chancories: Moscow, Tokyo, Paris, Berlin, Bonn, 3aigon UKDELS: Brussels and Geneva, UNIS New York.

CONFIDENTIAL

LV Appleyard Esq Far Eastern Department

F CO

Wear Appleyard

CHI..A/LATÍ! AMERICA

CONSIDIKTIAL

RECEIVED IN

REGISTRY No.50

FEC 2/1

367

BRITISH EMBASSY

QUIZO

17 June 1971

We were interested in Barrass' letter 3/22 of 4 Lay to you to read that the Chilean Chargé d'Affaires in Peking believed that Ecuador would soon make a move to recognise China.

2. Although it is possible that Ecuador would vote for China's being seated in the UN, we think that, on present evidence, it is very doubtful whether the present Ecuadorean Government would establish diplomatic relations with China. They et valuable technical assistance in the agricultural field from the Taipei Government, which they would be reluctant to give up without an effective quid pro quo. If there is a "Two Chinas" solution to the U problem, I can conceive that cuador might receive a resident Chinese trade mission.

Your rincerely

any ewly

H Lewty

We put Ecandar in the po Pering

cc. Miss K Draycott, Information Research Department, FC

wavered

F Arewer Esq CAG OP, Research Department, FCC noeomment. G Duff Esq, PUSD, FOO

JDI Boyd, Esq, Washington P Hewitt 8q OBE, Canberra

C J Howells Esq, Hong Kong

A C Ashworth Esq 038, Hong Kong Chanceries: Wellington

Tokyo Lima Santiago

G S Barrass Esq, Peking

Mrṛłagan

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MA416

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CONFIDENTIAL

BPAI~x

217

1217

3/28 & 2/1

J AL Morgan Esq

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通

OFFICE OF THE BRITISH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES

PEKING

24 May 1971

Cappy to 8088 (tur Auff) SAD (Hur. Syfterland)

시

Dear John,

FEC

1. John Fraser, the Canadian Chargé d'Affaires, has told me that during the recent diplomatic tour he had a conversation with Lin P'ing of the Western European and American Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about Ceylon. Lin said that the Chinese fully backed the Government of Mrs Bandaranaike and that the extremists who were causing her trouble were being encouraged by the "imperialista". Fraser pointed out that this was manifestly absurd and that by taking this line the Chinese were in danger of falling into the same error as the Americans had done at certain stages in the Cold War when they attributed any development which they did not like to the machinations of the Communists. Lin said that this was not a subject on which he expected to agree with Fraser.

2. Ceylon and East Pakistan cre good examples of where the Chinese clair to support revolutionary movements everywhere comes unstuck.

IRD May

well have already considered exploiting this. I would certainly see no objection if it were done in any unattributable way. At the same time, it might be pointed out that though the Chinese have expressed

disapproval of hi-jacking (and presumably by extension of diplomatic

kidnapping) it was after all Hao who said that political power springs

from the barrel of a gun and most of the extremist groups profess support for his teachings.

cc JDI Boyd Esq Washington

Miss K Draycott IRD FČO

Chancery, Colombo

Chancery, Islamabad

Yours ever,

John

J B Jenson

RESTRICTED

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presume you are already doing this.

Marean11011

Indeed me awe

Ro(this fram wool) in as disccels in

effectan a way as we can.

JAL

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SECRET

Far Eastern Departmant

cc. P.S. to Mr. Royle

U.N. (Political) Department

AUSTRALIAN RELATIONS WITH CHINA

Gapy to Peking Chur. Jenom)

(umberra (har. Hewitt)

SWPD (krr-fiers)

Enter

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The attached letter from Mr. Pritchett arrived this morning. It shows that the interview between the Australian Ambassador in Paris and his Chinese colleague went much as you and I would have foreseen. Even if Mr. Renouf's instructions were to avoid the questions of recognition and establish ment of diplomatic relations the Chinese got straight down to both these subjects. Mr. Pritchett said this afternoon that they had had some further comment on the talk from Kr. Renouf. Basically his view was that no doors had been closed and that the Chinese Ambassador by saying that he did not wish "to discuss Taiwan today" had shown that he was willing to have another

discussion at some future date.

2. Mr. Pritchett snowed me the text of a telegram from Sir J. Plimsoll, the Australian Ambassador in Washington, regarding a conversation which he had had with the new Nationalist Ambassador, Mr. James Shen, on 25 May. The most interesting features of this

were:

(a) kr. Shen said that while his Government would vote

against Peking beng allowed into the General Assembly they could probably live with the presence of two Chinas in the General Assembly, but they (Taiwan) would have to. remain as members of the Security Council. I commented to Mr. Pritchett that this seemed wholly unrealistic.

(b) Throughout the conversation Mr. Shen referred to his

Government as exercising power throughout the whole of China of which Taiwan was a part. There was no indication of any willingness to claim a smaller sphere of influence.

(c) In answer to a question from Sir J. Plimsoll Mr. Shen said that the Nationalists had no plans for a "large scale invasion of the mainland".

(a) In response to a question about the free Taiwan movement

Mr. Shen said that 3 or 4 of the members of the Government who totalled 13 were "Taiwanese" (Sir J. Plimsoll did not take him up on this),

(e) Mr. Shen said that the President had encouraged him to

keep in touch with the White House and the State Department, but it was perhaps interesting that Mr. Shen said that nis own initial call on Mr. Rogers had lasted precisely

5 minutes. Sven given Mr. Rogers other preoccupations this seems rather short.

We should be discreet about any further discosure of what Mr.

Pritchett told me on this subject.

السلام

2 June 1971.

K M Wilford

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA.

AUSTRALIA HOUSE,

LONDON, WC2B 4LA.

1st June, 1971

Dear Mrichsel,

I informed you on 27th May of the approach being made that day by our Ambassador in Purls to the Ambassador of the People's Republic of China there as an initial step in opening a dialogue with the Govern- ment of the F.R.C., beginning with some of the mattera of mutual interest at present being landled through third parties, or not at all, and including trade, the presence in the P.R.C. of Australian nationals, cultural and sporting exchanges etc. Explicit reference to reconition and the establishment of diplomatic relations with Peking were to be avoided by our Ambassador, the Australian Government having taken no decision on these questions.

I now write to inform you that at the meeting on 27th lay our Ambassador opoke along these lines. The P.R.C. Ambassador's response was directed solely to the quetion of recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations. lie enunciated five obstacles to diplomatic relations :

(a)

(b)

"Australia followed the United States";

Australia participated in the war in

Vietnam;

(a) Australia alvocated a "two Chinas" or || China/one Taiwan" formula, and

one

(0) Australia notud in a hostile way towardu China.

In reply our Amba ondor said that:

(a) Awstralia did have extremely close relations with the United States and placed great value on thom. Thouo woro nutu al (and China should Tomombor what the V.3. And dono for hor in the Second World War). These relations would continue.

/... 2

- 2

(b)

There was "an aggressive war" in Vietnam but Australia's allies were not the aggressore. In any event, the war there was dying away: the situation was such that Australian forces were gradually being withdrawn.

(c) He did not understand the assertion that Australia acted in a hostile way towards the P.R.C. and would like an explanation.

Our Ambassador also said that surely Australia's relations with the United States and the Vietnam question could not be regarded as obstacles to the normalization of relations.

The P.R.C. Ambassador agreed that these two latter questions should not be allowed to block the normalization of relations. He went on that Australia's hostility towards the P.R.C. lay simply in the obstacles he had stated namely, Australia's relations with Taiwan and her advocacy of the "two Chinas" or "one China/one Taiwan" formula. The P.R.C. believed in the development of diplomatic relations with all countries, including Australia, on the basis of the five principles of peaceful co-existence but, in the case of Australia, there were these twin obstacles and they had first to be removed by Australia. Taiwan, he continued, was a part of China; the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations said so and even Truman had said so before the Korean war.

No further headway was made in the ensuing discussion and the meeting ended on the note that a further talk would be held if and when either side wanted it.

I should be grateful if you could pass the foregoing to your Government. May I again stress the secret nature of this information and ask that it be closely safeguarded.

Yours sincerely

(W. B. Pritchett)

Mr. K..Wilford, OMG,

Ausistant Under-Jecretary of Stute, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Downing Street (West),

London, S.W.1.

SECRET

Er Vilford

Flag A

Flag D

GOSTI DIREIAL

RECOGNITION OF MA : AUSTRIA

Ky ninute of 24 May,

On 28 May the Austrian Govemment recognised the Chinese People's :epublic, ▲ sopy of the Joint Commmiquê in attuebed. this brings the total of countries which have recognised the Chinese Zeople's Republie sine s Osteber last year to nine (plus the Republie of San Marine).

3. In their statemt the Austrians have simply recognised the Chinese People's Republic as "the sole logai Government of China' In contrast to the statements issued by the Cana ana and Italians last year, no mention is made of Taiwan, The present phrasing is the least

ouanding of the formulae on recognition which the Chinese have required of other governmenta. It omfiras our impression that the Chinese are prepared to be flexible ever vording in order to keep up the momentum of their drive for vider recognition. Host of the countries currently negotiating with the Chinese would be likely to have little difficulty in accepting the Austrian formula.

2 June 1971.

Cenz tet

Kr Logan

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Hy simona PUSO

XP Stratton UI (P01) Dept

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SCHST DESTIAL

J & L Morgan

far Bastern Departmen

Mr Tixford

CONFIDENTIAL

RECOGNITION OF CHINA

Mr Mayan

has seen

WAY

380, Ente

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FEX 2110

1. Since October last year eight countries, and the

Republic of San Marino, have recognised China. The countries

are Canada, Italy, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Chile, Nigeria,

Kuwait, and the Cameroon. A growing number of other countries

are reported either to be negdiating with the Chinese or

considering recognition. This minute gives an account of these

moves.

2. There appears to be a good chance that Iran will

recognise the Chinese People's Republic. The Shah's sisters,

the Princesses Ashraf and Fatemeh, recently made separate

visits to China where they were very courteously received.

Both spoke encouragingly on their return about prospects for

recognition though they were at pains to emphasise that the

final decision rested with the Shah. In a press interview

the Shah said that China could not be ignored, and criticised

the Nationalists for withdrawing their Embassy as soon as a

country recognised Peking.

3. The Turkish and Chinese Governments have issued

statements recently that their Embassies in Paris are

negotiating on recognition. We have no news about the progress

of the talks. Then Chou En-lai met a Turkish journalist in

- 1.

CONFIDENTIAL

This is v

important

Giril meriahan Context.

Mas

the

Peking on 13 April he made friendly remarks about Sino-

Turkish relations. The Turkish Foreign Hillister said on

25 April that "positive results" had been achieved in

discussions within his Government on recognition, but

apparently no firm decision has yet been taken. The

Chinese are reported to be interested in obtaining air

traffic rights through both Turkey and Iran. It is doubtful

whether the Chinese would have made their unprecedented

announcement that contracts were under way in Paris if they

did not consider that the prospects for success were

reasonable.

The Austrians began discussions with the Chinese through

their Embassies in Bucharest on 14 April. The Chinese are

reportedly demanding that the Austrians recognise Peking as

"the sole legal Government of the entire Chinese people" and

that they vote for the Albanian Resolution. The Austrians

are reluctant to countenance Chinese claims to Taiwan in any

form. The talks seem destined to drag on for some time. The

Belgians were originally negotiating with the Chinese but the

talks appear to have broken down. The Belgians have been

consistent advocates of a "two Chinas" approach.

5. The Senegalese are apparently under some pressure from

neighbouring countries to recognise Peking. Malian and

Kauritanian delegations have been in Feking recently

discussing aid including the

development of the Senegal River,

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTI AL

in which Senegalese participation would be almost essential.

President Senghor personally is apprehensive over the spread

of Chinese influence among his neighbours, but may eventually

have to give way to pressure from outside.

6. On 5 May the President of Mexico told the press that

his Government is studying the possibility of establishing

relations with Peking.

▲ 5-man Chinese delegation led by Deputy-Minister of

Foreign Trade, Chou Hua-min, visited Peru from 22-28 April

and signed trade agreements. The Peruvians are expected to

send a return delegation to China. Like the Mexicans, the

Peruvians are attracted by trade prospects, in their ase the

sale of fish meal, fish oil, and minerals. They are also

encouraged by Chinese expressions of support for their demand

for a 200-mile limit for territorial waters. A great deal

will depend upon Peruvian calculations of commercial interest,

but they may also be influenced by the development of Sino-

Chilean relations.

8. There have been unconfirmed reports that the Lebanese

are considering recognition, particularly following the

establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Kuwait.

Mauritius has been considering the possibility of recognition

for some time. Agreement was reached in 1968 to establish

relationa "at a convenient time", but nothing was done to

implement it. Since then the Mauritians appear to have been

dragging their feet. Relations with Ghana were suspended in

1967 and it would not be difficult to restore them. According

- 3-

CONFIDENTIAL

and orden of in 1966

to the French, the Tunisians, who recognised Peking in

1964, are about to exchange Ambassadors.

9. In the longer term Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand,

have indicated interest in moving towards a more formal

relationship with Peking, provided that the Chinese agree to

end their support for subversive movements and to recognise

the three Governments. Sino-Indonesian relations are presently

suspended; Indonesian Ministers have recently made a series

of ambiguous speeches in favour of better relations with

China provided the two conditions above were met. The Thai

Foreign Minister recently said that a policy of relaxing

tension with China had the support of the entire Thai

Government. The Thais are apparently reducing their propaganda

against China in the hope that the Chinese will reciprocate.

The visit of a Malaysian Trade Mission to Peking this month

(when the Chinese referred for the first time to Malaysia

rather than Kalaya in public statements) and the tour of

Malaysia by a Hong Kong Communist dance troupe, has led to

speculation about improved Sino-Malaysian relations. But the

Chinese have shown no disposition to withdraw support for

subversive movements in the three countries concerned, and it

looks as though any move towards mutual recognition and the

establishment of formal relations between China and Malaysia

and Thailand (and resumption of relations in the case of

Indonesia) will be a lengthy process.

CONFIDENTIAL

10.

In the short term therefore the most likely candidates

for Ecognising Peking appear to be Iran, Turkey, and Mexico,

with Peru, Senegal and Austria as rather more long-tem pros-

pects. But the movement towards recognition of Peking is

gathering

speed.

24 May 1971

Co, ied to:

Mr Logan

Mr Renwick

Mr Simons PUSD

I am

SAL Magen

J A L Morgan

Far Eastern Departent

am anxions about BOAT in the light of possibile relaties with Iron a Turkey

This will give

the Chaina

vote out va

Pakistan, Afghanistan, Svan, Turkey to

Romania. They will

Mr Stratton UN (Pol) Department Hr Smith Near Eastern Department Mr Banbury West African Department Hr Brewer Research Department

Persian Gulf longer cont Passion

rights

we shall have

contre-partie. Should

we not be more active?

- 5-

CONFIDENTKAL

تجھے

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry No.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.

Secret.

Confidential,

Restricted

Unclassified. LVA

PRIVACY MARKING

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CONFIDENTIAL

Kinute

Mn Willand

Gripy combing

Copy to:

Mr Logan

Mr Renwick

Me Villued-

In Confidence Mr Simons PUSD

Kr Stratton UN (Pol) Department The. Smith Arear Ersten began fament

Mcbantany WAS RECOGNITION OF CHINA M. Brewer Riz

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Type 1 +

From

J A..Morgan

*Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

336

1. Since October Jést year eight countries, and the

Republic of San fino, have reagnised China. The

countries are Chada, Italy, Equatorial Guinea,

Ethiopia, Chilé, Nigeria, Kuwait, and the Cameroon.

A gro:ing number of other countries are reported either

to se negotiating with the Chinese or considering recogni-

tion. This minute gives an account of these moves.

2. There appears to be a good chance that Iran will

recognise the Chinese People's Republic. The Shah's

sisters, the Princes Ashraf and Fatemeh, recently made,

Both visitei China where they were couteously received.

wing

Apok: encouragingly on their return about prospects though they were at paris to unchaice that thermal division retted will the Shah's for recognition. In a press interview the Shah said

that China could not be ignored, and criticised the

Nationalists for withdrawing their Embassy as soon as

a country recognsied Peking. There

re are indications that

the Chinese and Iranians pay aire :dy ☆ in contact

Art

suvou;l their Embrosies in a third country]

1 -

CXFIDENTIAL

TWA LEE MOGŁ DARZEZ PO (IRISH]

CONFIDENTIAL

The Turkis:1 and Chinese Governments have issued

statements recently that their Embassies in Paris are

negotiating on recognition. We have no news about the

progress of the talks. 7hen Chou On-lai met a Turkish

journalist in Feking on 13 April he me friendly

remarks about Sino-Turkish relations.

The Turkish

unprecedented

Foreign Minister said on 25 April that "positive

results" had been achieved in discussions within his

Government on recognition, but apparently no firm

decision has yet been taken. The Chinese are reported

to be interested in obtaining air traffic rights through

Iris dowliful whether the Chinese warld have heade their preceded both Turkey and Irend

immancement that contacts were underway in Paris if they 4. The Austrians began discussions with the Chinese

through their Embassies in Bucharest on 14 April. The

nov (msides (hak the Z

prospects for succes Chinese are reportedly demanding that the Austrians recognize were hopeful. Peking as "the sole legal Government of the entire Chinese people" and that they vote for the Albanian

Resolution. The Austrians are reluctant to countenance

Chinese claims to Taiwan in any for

talks seem destined to droge of

The Haldus selam destined to

the

aras on for some time. The Belgians were originally negotiating with the Chine

but the sun artear to have been

Aition. The Belgians havez

theen consistent navicates of

A "two Chiness" appprace.

5. The Senegale are apparently under some pressure fo recognise Peking from neighbouring countries, who

kave a substantiel Strinese presence. Walian

and Mauritanian delegations have ben in Feking recentl discussing aid including the development of theSenegal

wundc River, in which Senegalese participation what be abuelt

essential

Abative-attempts were made in 1961 to begin

DECOBUTIK)

between Sanogal and îhium.

President Senghor personally is azurajal apprehensive

over the spread of Chinese influence among his

neighbours, but ma

eventually have to

Pressur

CO..FIDENTIAL

to pressure from outside.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

WOBIL S1-7400

Relations wilt

Whan were suspended in

CONFIDEN. IAL

6. On 5 May the President of Mexico told

the press that his Government is studying

the possibility of establishing relatio 18

with Teking/1 5-man Chinese delegation led

by Deputy-Minister of Foreign Trade, Chou

Hua-min, visited Peru from 22-28 April and

signed trade agreemÁT. The Peruvians are

expected to send a return delegation toChina.

Like the Mexicans, the Peruvians are

attracted by frade prospects, in their case the

minerals sele of fish meal, fish oil, and

are also encouraged by Chinese expressio..s of

support for their demand for a 200-mile limit

for territorial waters die eruviais"?

will

ały sinoa tony Hi

Lisaricane-cong- tha

A great deal will depend upon

Peruvian calculations of commercial interest,

but they may also be influenced by the

development of Sino-Chilean relations.

There have been unconfirmed reports that

the Lebanese are considering recognition,

particularly following the establishment of

diplomatic relations betweenChina and Kuwait.

Mauritius has been considering the possibility

of recognition for some time. Agreement was

reached in 1968 to establish relations

" at a convenient time", but nothing was done

to implement it. Since then the Mauritians

appear to have been dragging their feet.

1967 and iturmed water affinit

- 3-

CONFIDENTIAL

for to restore them. Humming to the Frence, the

Tom sisums, who recognised Paing in 1964, are whant to

exchange Automators.

feet.,

CONFIDENTIAL

a. In the long term Malaysia, Indonesia,

and Thailand, have indicated interest in

moving towar a a more formal relationship with

Peking, provided that the Chinese agree to

end their support for subversive mov :ments

Sino-

and to recognise the thee Governments.

Indo..esian relations are presently suspended;

Indonesian Wövdusent Winisters have recently

a series of ambiguous speeches in favour of

provid better relations with China out unter the two

wirl tret

conditions above. The Thai Porin Kinister

recently said that a policy of relaxing tension

with China had the support of the entire Thai

apparivalry

Government and The Thais are reducing their

propaganda against China in the hope that the

Chinese wat reciprocate. The visit of a

Halaysian Trade Mission to Peking this month

(when the Ch.nese referred for the first time

to Malaysia rather than Kalaya inbublic

statements) and the tour of Malaysia by a

Hong Kong Communist dance troupe, has led to

speculation about peter Dino-Malaysian

relations. But the Chinese have shown no

disposition to withdraw support for subversive

movements in the three countries concerned,

and it looks as though any move towards mutual

recognition and the establishment of formal

care

between Chung and Macaqua and Vouland, Lame option of relations in the wave of Inderbia) relations/will be a lengthy process.

19. In the short term therefore themost

likely candidates for recognising Teking appear

to be Iran, Turkey, and Hexico, with Ieru,

rækker

Senegal and Austria is/ more long-term prospects.

But as the moment towards recognition of Teking 15

gatherma

gatmers speed, there could well be ajapate Of

African sad but Thamerican countries

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

WIRL S1-0406

Ghana

Belgium

Tumio

CONFIDEN.IAL

before the hinaal Aademibly debate this year on st order to demonstrate

establishing relation ef

Mogrelline

their Ma Logition and in the hope of

se/aid.

receiving Chinese/aid

- 5

CONFIDENTIAL

215

LV Appleyard Esq

Far Eastern Department

FCO

Tny. Dear hen,

RESTRICTED

CHINA/DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION

OFFICE OF THE BRITISH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES

PEKING

12 May 1971

twar

In keeping with the spirit of that great new Chinese hynn "All nations great and small the Chairmen loves them all", the People's Republic of China and the Republic of San Marino agreed in Paris to establish consular level relations as from 6 May.

2. To establish relations, San Marino was only called upon to recognise the Government of the PRC as "the sole legal Government of China". This is the same formula as was used recently when China and Kuwait established relations and is the "softest" one the Chinese have accepted in recent years. As San Marino had no relations with Taiwan, it could have been expected to get off fairly lightly, but not necessarily that lightly. It may be that the "soft"formula will now become normal at least for smaller countries. It would certainly make it easier for new recrito to flock to the Chinese standard. For their part, the Chineso

declared their respect for the "policy of neutrality pursued by the Government of the Republic of San Marino"!

る。

On 9 May, the People's Daily carried the customary editorial marking the establishment of relations. These cditorials usually ramble on about the links between the two countries and/or shercd revolutionary traditions, but in the case of San Marino, the People's Daily could find little to say on the subject (under- standably enough) except that:

"San Marino with its long history is the oldest republic in Europe...San Marino pursues a policy of neutrality. Its government and people adopt a friendly attitude towards the Chinese Government and pcoplc. The establishment of official relations...between China and San Marino opens a new (the first?) page in the friendly cooperations between the peoples of the two countries...

It was noticeable that the editorial stuered clear of the delicate subject of philately. Will China and San Marino continue to contend for hogenony in the stamp narkets of the world, or will consular relations prove to be a cover for collusion aired at dividing up the markets between then?

4. is San Marino (like the Principalities of Andorra, Liechten- stein and Monaco) is not a member of the UN, the Chinese cannot expect much in the way of political dividends. However, establishing

RESTRICTED

سیما

RESTRICTED

relations with San Marino helps to keep the ball rolling.

5. On 8 May, two days after the announcement of the establishment of relations between China and San Marino, NCNA took the unusual step of issuing a press communiqué announcing that China and Turkey had started talks in Paris on the establishment of diplo- natic rolations, This is the first time that the Chinese have made such an announcement in NONA. It suggests that the Chinese are confident that a settlement will be reached. The announcement will also have served as a useful reminder to other countries that the Chinese bandwagon is still rolling along.

6. According to the French Embassy here, the Chinose and Belgians have broken off talks for the time being because the Chinese believe that the Belgian position makes talks impossible (presumably on the expulsion of Taiwan from the UN). We would be grateful for any confirmation you,

confirmation you, Brussels or Paris may have on this.

The French have also told us that Tunisia and China are

about to exchange embassies and ambassadors. As you know, Tunisia nevor opened a mission here, though the Chinese had a mission in Tunis until they withdrew it in 1967.

izou.

Gordon S Barrass

Ford,

Copied to:

Miss K M Draycott, Information Research Department, FCC

F Brewer Esq, GMG, OBE, Research Department, FCO

G Duff Esq, PUSD, FCO

J DI Boyd Esq, Washington

P M Howitt Esq, OBE, Carberra

J Howells Esq, Hong Kong

A C Ashworth Esq, OBE, Hong Kong

Chancerius: Wollington, Tokyo, Rome, inkara, Tunis, Teheran,

Paris, Brussels, Florence

2 -

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CONTIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF THE BAITISH CHARGE D'AFFAIR_S

FEKING

4 May 1971

(3/22)

LV Appleyard Dsq

For Tastern Department

FCO

My Dear hen,

CHINA/LATIN AMERICA

FEC

Ener

LAD pa

Jee

Reki

kremt

257,-

1. A Sino-Peruvian trade crucment was signed in Lime in 29 April and the two countries were said to be "considering" et:b- lishing diplomatic relations, according to a Reut、r's Que tch free Lima on 30 April quoting the Feruvian Fresident.

soor..

2. Last week when I spoke to the Chilean Charge d' 'ff dus, Sizor Silva, he told me that he would be surprised if the Teruvians established full diplomatic relations with Chian valy

They did not wish to antagonise the US more than By could

The help and were therefore moving towards recognition slowly. same applied to Cuba. He thou_ht that Feru was likely to the Chile-n pattern and would agree to the Chinese opening a trade office in Lima before procceding to full recognition.

L .170W

3. The Peruvian Fresident's remark about establishing 21 matic relations with China may mean that things will move fast.. 31.cn Silm had envisa; ed. Perhaps Feru fuels that the US is unlikely to be very displeased at such a move because now it is so actively

China's willingress trying to improve its relations with Chine.

to conduct substantial trade with Teru might also have influenced Peru's decision. Press reports quote Peruvian officials as caying that Peru hopes to scll US860 million of fish-nual and fish vil

The trace alone to Ching over any unspccified period of time. agreement is also said to cover the sclc af Peruvian miner la/ metals to Ching in exchange for a fairly wide range of Chinese products.

4. When I asked about other Latin American Statcs which vore likely to recognise China, Silva said he believed that Sounder would make a move goon.

5. You will have noticed in NCH.. that recently the Chin-su live

For the first been giving the Cubans a more favourable press. time in many years, the Cubana mntioned in the Hay 21, uluguns hcrc. Shortly before he left at the und of ¡yril, 31 m2 C: roia, the Cuben Charge d'Affaires, who was received by Chou n-lei un 23 ril, told me that although Sino-Cuban inter-statu Alations were likely to improve considerably in the context of Ching's attempt to form a united front with the Third World, ho v

- uch

PONEZIA

LAL

CONFIZITIAL

doubted if inter-party relations would be re-establish...". difference between the two sides were very great indoor.

6. We would be interested to have Lima's views on the developments in Sino-Peruvian relations mentioned abovu.

You..

Gordas

Gordon's Barrass

Coniec to:

The

Miss K N Draycott, Information Research 7 opartment, FCC

F Brewer Esq, CMG, ObE, Research Lepartment, FCO

G Duff Esq, TUSD, FCO

J DI Boyd Esq, Washington

TM Hewitt Esq, CBE, Canberra

C J Howells 28g, Hong Kong

AC Ashworth Esq,

Chancuries:

BE, Hong Kong

Wollington, Tokyo, Lima, Santiago, Quito, F.vzn

COFTITIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Appleyard (FED)

THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

This Institute was established in 1949, with one of its declared objects being to bring together experts on international relations to advise the Chinese Government. By 1964, however, according to an NCNA report of 19 December 1964, its main function had become the carrying out of "People's diplomacy". The report claimed that the Institute had done much to strengthen China's relations with the people of various countries and to establish non-governmental relations with countries where China did not have diplomatio relations. The Institute's membership included officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affaire and other Governae nt bodies, as well as members of "front" organisations and "Friendship Associ tions". Chou Enlai and Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi were honorary Presidenta. The last press reference to the Institute which we can trace relates to September 1968 and since then most of the work formerly carried out by the Institute has been done by the "Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries". In 1954, it was announced that a group of organisations had set to found the "Chinese People's Association for Cultural Relations with Fereign Countries". In April 1966, this Association announced it was changing its name to the "Chinese People 'a Association for Cultural Relations and Friendship with Foreign Countries". The present Association appeared for the first time in October 1969, with similar personnel and functions to the "Chinese People's Association for Cultural Relations and Friendship with Foreign Countries"

The invitation to the Australian Labour Party (Canberra telegram 638 of 12 May 1971) weens to indicate that the Chinese People's Institute for Foreign Affairs is being re-activated.

JE Heare

Par Eastern Section, Research Department.

Clas To

18 May 1971.

р.а.

R. Bead Esp

plu inseamn the 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

G S Barrass Esq

Peking

CHINESEN 30AL

RESTRICTED

طح

pla 5/5/71

5 May 1971

Your letter of 20 April. You may like to have song more

background information about the confused story of contacts

between the Chinese and Senegal with a view to establishing

diplomatic relations. I enclose a copy of a minute by

Research Department on the subject.

Copied with eno, to:

J DI Boyd Esq Washington J Howells Esq Hong Kong Chancery Dakar

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LV Appleyard

Far Eastern Department

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Reference..

727

Mr Appleyard (FED)

CHINA/SENEGAL

•

1. Please refer to Gordon Barrass's latter to you entitled "Chine/Africa" of 20 April 1971. It would be very interesting if China and Senegal were to establish diplomatic relations; the story of their past reletions is a somewhat chequered one.

2. Senegal was formerly part of the Mali Federation, which maintained diplomatic relations with the Chinese Nationalists. When the Federation broke up in the summer of 1960, the Nationalists appointed a Chargé d'Affaires in Senegal, and eventually formally recognised Senegal in September 1960. However, in March 1961 the Senegalese Government announced that it intended to recognise the Chinese People's Republic (CPR) and the North Vietnamese. In a radio commentary broadcast at the time, the Minister of Information stated thet Senegal wished to pursue a policy of non-slignment and to treat as equals the divided parts of single countries.

3. The Senegalese decision was apparently taken without consulting either the Nationalists or the OPR. Our mission in Dakar reported that the Government hoped that the Nationalists (and the South Vietnamese) would continue to be represented in Senegal. In the Chinese cuse, however, the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires in Conakry, who come to Senegal immediately after the Government announcement, soon made it clear that the CPR would not be represented at Senegal's independence ceremonies unless the Nationalists were excluded. In any case, it was clear that the Senegalese Government hoped to postpone the establishment of diplomatic relations with the CPR for as long as possible.

4. The continued presence of the Nationaliste in fact meant that no CPR diplomatic mission was established then or subsequently. The Nationalists continued to be represented in Dakar at the Chargé d'Affaires level antil September 1964, when the New Ohina News Agency (NCNA) reported that the Chargé had been expelled. Our records do not show why this happened, but it seems that no replacement was sent and relations were regarded as being suspended. Sometime after this incident, NCNA established a branch office in Dakar, but ea far as is known, no moves were made either by Senegal or the CPR towards establishing diplomatic relations. At the United Nations, Senegal, which had formerly voted for the Nationalists, now switched to suport for the CPR. In 1965, 1966 and 1967, she voted against the "important question" resolution, and on the "Albanian resolution", she abstained in 1965 and voted in fevour in 1966 and 1967. According to the British

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Ambassador in Dakar in his Annual Review for 1966, the changes in Senegal's UN voting pattern aprang from a desire to please her African neighbours, while the Government itself remained wary of the CPR. This wariness evidently continued, for in June 1968 the two NCHA correspondente in Daker Were expelled, apparently because they were believed to have incited recent demonstrations by students and workers.

It mey have been their activities which led Senegal to change her UN voting again; in 1968, 1969 and 1970 she voted for the "Im, crt.nt Question" rasolution, and on the "Albanian" resolution she ebstained in 1968, voted aainst it in 1969, and ebsteined again in 1970.

5. Peking reported in June 1969 that a member of the French Embassy claimed that the CPR was attempting to make contact, with a view to establishing diplomatic relations, with Senegal and the Ivory Coast through Guinee end Meli. But our Mission in Dakar felt that this wee highly unlikely because President Senghor of Senegal was very anti-Chinese. The President believed that incidents in Senegal's schools and universities earlier in 1969 had been inspired by the Chinese. Any hopes the CPR may have had of winning over Senegal were dashed with the announcement in Dakar on 17 June 1969 thet Senegal and the Chinese Nɛtionaliste had agreed to resume diplomatic relations. According to our Consulate at Tamsui, a Nationalist Embassy was set up in, Dakar in February 1970.

Chinese interest in Senegal is thus no new thing, but with the Chinese desire for support in the UN, it is likely to become stronger. It will be interesting to see if the prospect of aid for the Senegal River Federation can be used by the Chinese to exert pressure on Senegal to agree on diplomatic relations. It may be too that China's more accomodating foreign policy will appeal to Senegal and lead her to abandon the Nationaliste.

JB Hoare

Far Eastern Section Resserch Department

3 May 1971.

Copied to:-

African Section, Research Department. West African Dept (r Bambury)

IRD (Miss Draycott

PUSD (Mr Durrycott)

Duff

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MW 77/4 SALMogen

27.4

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF THE BRITISH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES

PEKIN C

20 April 1971

351

Mr Bayan (toes again Lapore NITTO) WALD (Mr. Coding)

Enter

LV Appleyard Esq

Far Eastern Department

FCO

My Dear her,

CHINA/AFRICA

1. Tlease refer to my letters 3/2 to you of 12 and 26 Janu :ry (nct to all).

2. The visit to Feking of the Mauritanian Forcign Minister, Mouknass, pointed ur Chinese interest in both the Senegal River Federation and in Africa as a whole.

P-

According to I, the No.2 in the Mauritanian Embassy here who took part in Kouknass's talks with the Chinese, the Chinusu

The russed the Mauritanians to get Senegal to recognise China. Chinese argued (plausibly enough) that they could not give r 2 y cffective aid to the four countries of the Federation with cut being in relations with Senegal, because without its cc-opur ti n some of the projects are unfeasible, At the sore time, of cou China is interested in rounding up one more sur orter for ita into the UN.

4. The Chinese also said that after the "forthcoming" Nation? People's Congress, the Chinese hoped to son a high level Celo- ration to tour Africa. It would "probably" be headed by the finister of Forein ffairs, whoever that might be at the time, ..s you know, Ch'i Peng-fui, the acting Foreign Minister, is also the Vice-Minister responsible for Africa and the Middle East.

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5. Ly said that the other countries of the Federation agreed that Chinese aid mul? be more effective if it could be co-ordinated. Por exemple, Mali was rerticularly interested in making the senegal river mcru navigable. This would require a lot of work to be done at Bakel whore Suneral and Mauritania are the riverii o status. Ly said that discussions had taken plane with Kali nd Guines and approaches were going to be made to Senegal, H. szi that he thought that Senegal would recognise China before the UN General Assembly mecting in the autumn.

5. Lecording to Ly, Mouknass had come to China to discuss tr

rojects. One was für the supply of fresh water to Nouakchott, which would require the laying of a new wide bore ripeline 2001 as to the south of Huakchott; the other was the building of a 'er Nouakchott. The Chinese srid that they would be willing to undertake both jucts, but to my surprise Ly was emphatic that

CONFIDENTIAL

JIL

CONFIDENTIAL

ter

his government were only likely to accept Chinese assistance on one project. He said that Mauritania was also discussing the pipeline project with the West Germans and the port with some other countries. It was possible that the Germans would build

He said that the Chines. the pipeline and the Chinese the port. would soon send a technical delegation to Hauritania to study to projects. The Economic and Technical Co-Operation Agreement, signed with China on 1 April, had only been an agreement in principle. The amount of economic aid had not yet been fixeč.

7. Ly also obs-rved that although Mauritania had been satisfi d with the way the Chinese had and were carrying out their aid projects, they had to, be watched. For example, after somɩ ini, .:1 difficulties with the Chinese, the Mauritanians had been oblig.... to lay down the law and refuse to let the Embassy circulate propaganda material except through the Mauritanian Forción

Ministry.

Invitati, ns to Mauritanian nationals for film-shows

etc had to be handled in the same way.

Last week, I discussed Sino-Malian relations with the Fri.

(There are three . xieme

( Counsellor who deals with African affairs.

a Minister-Cou · 81- conseillers dealin with foreign affairs, plus lor)! French advisors working for the Malian government had, said, reported that the Chinese had made it clear to the Malia. that if they wanted more money, they would have to become much "progressive" in forción affairs. Le Clercq said that thur. i. been some signs of the Malians doing this alrendy (ie incr、as- support for the Chinese line on imperialism, national liberati etë), but no new tranche of nid had yet been a r~UČ,

.re

9. Le Clercq also told me that the Chinese were retracking t railway line from Conakry up towards the Melian berder, so as

He sai hat to make it easier to transport ore down to the coast.

1way as he understood it, there was still no plan to continue the r into Mali.

10.

If any of the African rosts to whom I am copying this hav any comments, we should be interested to see them.

ijou

Gordon S Barross

Curled to:

Miss K Draycott, Information Research Department, FOO

F Brewer Esq, CMG, OBE, Research Department, FCO

G Duff Esq, TUSD, FCO

J DI Boyd Esq, Washington

PM Howitt Eaq, OB, Canberra

C J Howells Esq, Hong Kong

AC Ashworth Es, OM, Hong Kong

Chanceries: Wellington, Tokyo, Dakar, Yaounde, Lagos, Acera,

Zambia, Dar La Salaam ›

CONFIDINTI L

125

L V Appleyard Esq Far Eastern Department

FCO

My Dear her

RESTRICTED

'ED IN

....30

CHINA/ALGERIA/WIDDLE MIST

FEC

리

OFFICE OF THE BRITISH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES

PEKING

28 April 1977

W13/v

Cym to NED, NAD

Mirim SM $.5

попада

Please refer to my letters: 3/5 to you of 29 December 1970 and 3 February 1971 (not to all).

Lecording to Leclercq, one of the French Counsellors here, the Chinese are unhappy about the present trend of Algeria's foreign policy. At first the Chinese scomod pleased with Algeria's decision to flow Libya and the Gulf States in demanding higher prices for their oil (though they never made any explicit criticism of the French or the French oil companies). Although NCNA of 23 April applauded the price risc announced by the Algerians on 12 April and the new petrolcum law which was signed the next day, the French claim that the Chinese share their fear that the Americans might now strengthen their position in Algeria at the expense of the French. Leclercq claimed that the Chinese had noted (without the French pointing it out to them) that the Algerians had paid quite good compensation to two American oil companies and were about to sign an agreement for the sale of natural gas to the American company, El Paso.

3. At the same time, Leclercq said, the Chinese are concernel about the recent report in Aviation Wock that the Russians word now deploying Mig 23s in Algeria. If it is true, the Chinese rrobably fear that the lesser French evil will not be replaced by a truly independent Algeria, but one in which the super-powers have increasing influence, which is not what the Chinese wish to

sce.

4. The Chinese seem harrier about the new Federation of Arab Republics announced on 17 April, Press comment here suggests that they feel that it reflects a strengthening of ULR resolve not to compromise with Israel. In a People's Daily "Commentator" article of 25 April: (the first Commentator article on Middle East affairs for many monthe) the Chinese took the line that:

The principled stand against negotiations and reconcilia- tion with Israel as laid down in the declaration conforms with the common aspirations of the broad masses of the Arab people and it is a blow to the scheme for a Middle East Munich being hatched by US imperialism and its accomplices.

At the same time, they refrain from criticising specific proposals for a peace settlement (with the exception of that for

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a setting up of a "Palestinian State") and the Soviet Union's close relations with the UAR. Nonetheless, Leclercq claims that the Chinese cherish few illusions about the new federation. When he spoke to them recently, they pointed to the fairly swift collapse of earlier Arab federations. However, the Chinese would like to get a foothold in Libya and may hope that the Fresent federation will bring about some change in Libya's attitude towards China and another vote in favour of China's entry to the UN.

5. As I mentioned in my letter 3/5 to you of 29 December, the Chinese are still trying to normalise interstate relations with Cairo, while voicing support (and giving arms) to the Palestinians. The more militant of rafat's remarks (though not personal attacks on other Arab leaders) are quoted frequently in the Chinese press.

6. Although the "Commentator" article is rather stronger in its tone than what was said by Ch'i P'eng-fei in his speech at the Koroccan National Day reception on 3 March, it still seems that the Chinese have no wish to be explicit about their policy. AS the UAR Commercial Counsellor put it to me on 29 January after Shukeir's visit: "China's stand on the Middle East settlement will be determined by the situation on the day a settlement is agreed."

evo

yous

Gordy

Gordon S Barrass

Coried to:

Kiss K M Draycott, Information Research Lepartment, FCO

F Brewer Esq, CMG, ORE, Research Department, FCO

G Duff Esq, FUSD, FCO

J I Boyd Esq, Washington

I M Hewitt Esq, ORE, Canberra

CJ Howells Esq, Hong Kong

AC Ashworth Esq, OBE, Hong Kong

Chanceries: Wellington, Tokyo, Algiers, Faris, Cairo, Tripoli

- 2 - RESTRICTED

COLFÌDENTIAL

A 3 Davidson Esq

UKDEL HAMMI

Par la

29 April 1971

27/0

हूँ

CHINESE POREIGN POLICY

1. Thank you for your letter of 20 April enclosing a copy of a US Note on "Peking's People's D#iplomacy". This has been read with interest here, although we were a little aystified by the last paragraph. We should be grateful for any elucidation you or John Boyd, to whom I am copying this letter, can provide.

2. We were particularly struck by the reference to the Chinese "probing around the edges of the trade question for over a year", and the hint that some carefully placed but "spectacular" trade deals with the US might be in the offing. Prima facie this suggests something on a larger scale than us engines in Berliet or Perlini trucks; we should

in periieter be grateful for John Boyd's views, and any information he can provide.

You asked in paragraph 3 of your letter if we could make available any JIC assessment of recent developments in China. I attach a copy of the latest agreed JIO contribution. We would have no obještion to this being released to HATO in the usual way.

Copy to:

JD I Boyd Beq Washington

CONFIDENTIAL

JA L Morgan

Far Eastern Department

(1918) 04 737490-750M 1 Ha

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry No.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret. Secret.

DRAFT

To:-

CONFIDENTIAL

Confidential Restricted. Unclassified.

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

A E Davidson Esq

UKDEL NATO

Gopy to

J DI Boyd Esq Washington

Type 1 +

From

JA L Morgan

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

2814

CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

1. Thank you for your letter of 20 April enclosing

a copy of a US Noé on "Peking's People's Diplomacy".

This has been pead with interest here, although we

were a little mystified by the last paragraph.

We should be grateful for any elucidation you or

John Boyd, to whom I am copying this letter, can

stomak

provide. 2 We were particularly interested by the

reference to the Chinese "probing around the edges of the trade question for over a year", and hint that /some carefully placed but "spectacular" trade deals with

he might be in the offing. Prima facie this suggests

something on a larger scale than US engines in

Berliet Bernite or Perlini trucks, wer

With evelove

Тураў раст

воль

не добера

boule

John Boyd's news

my from whomerun 3. You asked in paragraph 3 of your letter if we

could make available any JIC assessment of recent

developments in China. I attach a copy of the latest

agreed JIC contribution. We would have no objection

to this being released to NATO in the usual way.

5.M

274

CHINA: PUBLIC RSLATIONS DIPLOMACY

The Chinese have recently adopted a number of calculated

public relations gambits to refurbish their inage in the

outside world, and to demonstrate a reasonable attitude towards

western countries. These developments included invitations to

the American and British table tennis teams and attendant

journalists to visit China and Chou En-lai's studiously friendly

public references to the "American people". The gestures are

a further indication of the growing tactical flexibility

shown by the Chinese in foreign relations, though fundamental

Chinese policies, including hostility towards the us

Government, have not changed.

Chinese objectives appear to be to repair the damage to

Chinese prestige caused by the excesses of the Cultural

Revolution, to strengthen their drive to achieve wider

diplomatic recognition and to further their prospects for

gaining admission to the United Nations. The recent moves were

probably intended to influence current American deliberations

over policy towards China by appealing to middle-of-the-road

Us public opinion over the heads of the US Government,

President Nixon has responded positively to the Chinese gestures

by authorising various measures to ease trade and travel

contacts with China. Some increase in Sino-American trade,

and visits by delegations, may well follow.

well follow. The chances of a

resumption of the Sino-American Ambassadorial talks in Warsaw

may have been improved, but the Chinese have been careful to

distinguish in their publio statements between people-to-people

contacts and governmental exchanges. A further Chinese sin

CONFIDENTIAL

vas presumably to play upon Soviet suspicions of a Bino- American rapprochement so as to complicate Soviet-American exchanges over major world issuO E, The Chinese may additionally have hoped that a relaxation of Sino-American relations will

encourage Asian countries to improve their own relations with

According to some reports, the North Vietnamese reacted with disapproval to the Chinese moves.

China.

CONFIDENTAL

ياجاتي

CHINA : PUBLIC RELATIONS DIPLOMACY

1. The Chinese have recently adopted a number of calculated

public relations gambits to refurbish their image in the

outside world, and to demonstrate a reasonable attitude towards developmento

western countries. These words included invitations to the

American and British table tennis teams and attendant

journalists to visit China and Chou En-lai's studiously friendly

public references to the "American people". The gestures are

a further stndifing indication of the growing tactical flexibility

shown by the Chinese in foreign relations, though fundamental

Chinese policies, including hostility towards the US

Government, have not changed.

Chinese objectives appear to be to repair the damage to

Chinese prestige caused by the excesses of the Cultural

Revolution, to strengthen their drive to achieve wider

diplomatic recognition and to further their prospects for

gaining admission to the United Nations. The recent moves were

probably Kap intended to influence current American

deliberations over policy towards China by appealing to

middle-of-the-road US public opinion over the heads of the

US Government. President Nixon has responded positively to

Sino-American

the Chinese gestures, Some increase in Sino-American trade,

and visits by delegations, may well follow. The chances of a

resumption of the assadorial talks in Warsaw may have been

on their peublée Statements improved, but the Chinese have been careful to distinguish

Contucts

between people-to-people palks and governmental exchanges.

A further Chinese aim was presumably to play upon Soviot

suspicions of a Sino-American rapprochement so as to complicate

authorising

case

contacão

Trande cute traver

with

Chanel. CONFIDENTIAL

(3)

viet-American exchanges over major world issues. The Chinese

may additionally have hoped that a relaxation of Sino-American

nourey with

relations will encourage Asian countries to remourey

Some ட

China. According to reports from fast European sources, the North Vietnamese reacted with disapproval to the Chinese moves,

redictable line for such sources to take,

though-thi

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL COVERING SECRET

Ax6

UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION TO NATO

1110 BRUSSELS

Ente

J A L Morgan Esq

Far Eastern Department Foreign and Commonwealth London SW 1

20 April 1971

REIVED IN

TYN O

In Hemery

For dift up

Fürcht

uffyc

21.4

Dear John,

CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

FEC 2/1

1. At the weekly meeting of the Political Committee today the US representative circulated a paper of which I enclose a copy. He said that he would welcome contributions from other delegations on this subject.

2. I pointed out that the Far Eastern experts will be here during the week after next and will no doubt pay particular attention to recent developments in Chinese foreign policy. The Committee accepted that this would be a good opportunity for discussion.

3. I should however add that the report which you and your fellow experts will produce will not be available until some time after your meeting, and that the circulation in the meantime of shorter analyses will be helpful to those of our allies who are less well informed about China. If, for example, the JIC produce an assessment I hope that we can count on this being "released to NATO" in the usual way.

محمد

You wou

Alan

A E Davidson

Applegant time

неда Арт костой,

cc with enc, to Chancery

ENC

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL COVERING SECRET

2074

NATO SECRET

"FEKING'S PEOPLE'S DIPLOMACY"

U.S. Delegation April 19, 1971

Chou Ph-Lai made it clear to the U.S. table tennis delegation today that in inviting them and several U.B. journalists, Peking had opened a "new page" in-Sino-American relations. This move toward

This move toward "People's Diplomacy" alters Peking's longstanding policy of refusing to accept American visitors and revives the more flexible policy toward the U.S. inaugurated in late 1969 but broken off at the time of the Cambodian incursion. There seems little question that the shift was timed to influence opinion in the U.3. and other countries to press for China policy changes favorable to Peking. The visits may be followed by a moderate level of trade as U.S. restrictions are eased, but Peking will probably be more cautious in trade than in travel.

Peking's most immediate consideration in adopting "People's Diplomacy" toward the U.S. is presumably a belief that a show of reasonableness will fuel ita current drive for international recognition and improve prospects for allo- cation of the China seat in the United Nations to the FRC this fall. But the more flexible approach will also enhance Peking's ability to affect the merging four-power inter-relationship in East Asia, The impact on Moscow of PRC gestures to the U.S. was obviously quite strong last winter and the present steps must have been designed in part for their effect in both Moscow and Tokyo. In addition, Peking presumably hopes that Taipei's predictably anguished re- action will contribute to the PRC's long-standing and strikingly unsuccessful

effort to undermine morale on Taivan and cause the Nationalist government to collapse. It is less clear whether Peking, by responding to swiftly to the removal of U.S. travel restrictions hopes to encourage further U.S. moves.

Peking has not employed "People's Diplomacy" with the U.S. since the mid and late 1950'a when it sought agreement in the Sino-American talks for an ex- change of newsben, resumption of trade, and general cultural exchange. The Chinese characterized their strategy during that period as "creating favorable conditions for the settlement of fundamental issues (1.e. the Taiwan question). After Washington rebuffed these approad es, Peking changed its policy and announced in September 1960 that "there was no need...to waste time on minor question" at the Warsaw talks. Later U.S. exchange proposals were repeatedly rejected and virtually all American citizens who applied for visas were turned AWAY. Only Edgar Snow, a special case, and a few other Chinese Communist sympathizers vere aduitted,

The "People's Diplomacy" approach is designed to enhange Peking's image in the U.S. on the assumption that this will eventually bring changes in the govern- ment's China policy. This objective will be reflected in carefully considered invitations to selected groups. Although Peking may feel obliged to show some hospitality to ideologically congenial groups, ita invitations thus far indicate that the Chinese effort to project "reasonableness" will lead to emphasis on visitors who represent the middle range of American public opinion.

NATO SECRET

Through people of this type, Paking will hope to win propaganda benefits while avoiding the tough aubatantive issues which would inevitably arise in governmental discussions or visits by high-level 1.5. personages.

To maintain the momentum at least through this year's U.N. vote on Chinese representation, Peking may selectively invite more prominent Americans, quite possibly including members of Congress. Permitting Chinese groups such as a table tennie team to visit the U.S. would be another way of main- taining momentum and Chou hinted such a visit may well be in the ofring.

Trade with the U.S. could also fall under the rubric of "People's Diplomacy. And it would have some of the same attraction for Peking as visitor exchanges. Indeed, the Chinese have been probing around the edges of the trade question for over a year. However, even though a few carefully paced, but fairly spectacular, trade deals might be made with American companies to whet business appetities and upset Tokyo, Moscow and Taipei, any large volume of The Chinese may regard Sino-American trade still seems a distant prospect. trade as involving considerably more commitment than visitor exchanges and as an important counter in any future negotiations over the question of Taiwan. They would be reluctant to increase trade very much merely to add to the atmospherica of "People's Diplomacy." Any response to specific partial re- laxations of U.S. trade restrictions would also be inhibited by continuing questions of equality and reciprocity.

NATO SECRET

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TOP COPY

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CYPHER CAT A

F!! PEKING 190325Z

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DESKBY 190900Z

RIG

FEC 2/1

TO INMEDIATE FCO 363 OF 19 APRIL INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

AND UKMIS NEW YORK INFO PRIORITY HONG KONG MOSCOW AND PARIS

KIPT

FEE 3/30 40/1

OTHER POINTS MADE BY CH'I ARE AS FOLLOWS:

COMMON MARKET

1. IN WHAT ONE WEST EUROPEAN COLLEAGUE DESCRIBED AS THE MOST

POSITIVE CHINESE INDICATION OF APPROVAL HE HAD HEARD, CH'I

SAID THAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT FAVOUR WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

GETTING TOGETHER IN AN ENLA GED COMMON MARKET.

PAKISTAN

2. CH'I CRITICISED INDIA AND THE SOVIET UNION ON PREDICTABLE

LINES. HE COMMENTED THAT THE UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM

HAD SEEN WISER.

NUCLEAR POWERS MEETING

3. THE CHINESE CRITICISED SOVIET PROPOSAL AT CPSU CONGRESS

FOR MEETING OF THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS, MAINTAINING THAT ALL

STATES SHOULD TAKE PART IN SUCH A MEETING.

of 2014

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBSTANCE OF THESE TWO TELEGRAMS MAY BE PASSED IN

STRICT CONFIDENCE TO THE AMERICANS.

FCO PASS INMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK PRIORITY

TO MOSCOW AND PARIS

DENSON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

FED

NAM D

IRD

F-USD

GRD

NEVS D

BESD

EID

ECTU

SAD

STD

RESEARCH DEPT

(F E SECT)

AMER SECT) (SOV SECT) MOD · INTERNAL

FFFFF

CONFIDENTIAL

Mp wilford

辰

TEE 2/1

RECOGNITION OF TH? CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

The fellowing is a list of the sight sountrie áve recognised the Chinese People's Republie sines Osteber last your, the dates of reosgnition and the of these oemntries in last year's General Assembly debate

the precedural så substantive Resolutions on chinese

sentation. Canada, Iquatorial Quinon and Italy mined Peking before the vote which took plass

20 November 1970.

Country

Date of Recognition

Italy all

Procedural cubstantive Resolution Resolution

Canada

13.10.1970

(quaserini

Quinea

20.10.1970

Against

Italy

6.11.1970

POP

Ethiopia

Bh.11.1970

Against

Chile

5. 1.1971

Againes

Figeria

10. 2.1971

Against

Per

Kuwait

22. 3.1971

Against •

Aba tained

Cameroon

2. 4.1971

Abstained • Abstained

Represente abunge of voting in 1970

The change from this if all ver Peking line in the next Assembly would against the procedural resolutio substantive resolution.

straig

support a sti Layes more

nore for the

7 April 1972

Copy to:

Ke ParsaNS

J & L Borgnos

Pap Lastemu Deparins

Up Stratton (United Fations (Political) Department)

Mr Logan

Sip & Tem 11mm

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

cc. the Parsons

Registry No.

For Secret.

Meeree

Curtidential

Unelmasifed.

DRAFT CLUB MINUTE

Type 1 +

From

To:-

JA L Fórgan

Mr Wilford

Telephone No. & Ext

Dopajiment

RECOGNITION OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

The following is a list of the countries which

have recognised the Chinese/People's Republic

since October last year, the dates of recog-

nition and the votes of those countries in last

year's @eneral assembly/debate on the procedural

and substantive Resolutions on Chinese representa- tion S

Canada Equatorial Guinea and Italy all recognise

the

Teking

before the vote mtager, which took

place on 20 November 1970.

Country

Canada

Equatorial

Date of

Procedural

Substantive

Regog gnition Resolution Resolution

17.10.1970

For

For *

Guinea

/20.10.1970

Against

For *

Italy

6.11.1970

For

For *

Ethiopia

24.11.1970

Against

For

Chile

5. 1.1971

Nigeria

10. 2.1971

Against *

Against

For *

For

Kuwait

22. 3.1971

Against *

Abstain-

2. 4.1971

Abatained *

Abstain-

ed"

fur Stratton UNCPU) Age Cameroon

Mr-logan Sirs Tarlinton.

* Represents a change voting in 1970.

From the the change if all were

Straight Pakking line in the

to suppert

meet Assembly and he thuse more

against the procedunch relation

for the substantivic

and two more

resolution.

ایک

74.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

LV Appleyard Esq

Far Eastern Department

FCO

My Dear her,

RECOGNITION OF CHINA

RESTRICTED

OFFICE OF THE BRITISH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES

PEKING

4 March 1971

твоих? Бласл

Any comments on x? Entre

Cappy to NED, LAD

FEC2 EESD (har Bans) to see para $ 24.

1. Last week, in reply to a question from the Finnish Ambassador, Han Hsu (the deputy-director of Protocol) said that he expected Lebanon and Peru would be the next countries to recognise China. Negotiations with Lebanon were nearly complete and were underway with Peru,

2. On 1 March Gavris, the Rumanian First Secretary, told me that Rumania had been instrumental in getting talks started between Turkey and China. According to an Ankara datelined P despatch of 23 February, which reached here after I had scen Gavris, the Turkish Government is interested in setting up a consulate in Hong Kong and is reconsidering its policy towards China. The despatch also reported that the Rumanians had been in touch with the Turks on the question of lending rights for the Chinese. We would be grateful for any confirmation (or refutation) which you or Ankara may have of these reports.

3. Gavris also claimed that the Rumanians were putting the Iranians and the Chinese in touch, but he did not expect a speedy result from these talks. (See alsó Drace-Francis' letter 2/23 to Makinson of 15 December 1970).

4. The Burmese and Bulgarian Embassies bere have told us that Chinese Ambassadors will shortly be leaving for their respective capitals. The Mongolians claim that they are still waiting for the Chinese to make the first move in restoring Ambassadorial relations. The Czechs say that the Chinese have still not sought agrément for an Ambassador to Prague.

You

Gordon S Barrass

- 1.

RESTRICTED

CONFIDENTIAL

Hr Vilfert

Sir § Tomlinson

CHINESH

GELEESH RELATIONS VITU HALATUIA AND IEDOWEDIA

During the Anglo-Frmah talks inst week I Promen 1-

Xourice mentioned that there had bom sɛme movement in

Chinese relations with Indonesia and Malaysia during the

part for months. You may like to have our commente.

SVPD

辰

2. The Malaysian and Indonesian Governmenta are asking

intressing efforts to strike a mere ¿sian, non-aligned

posture. This attitude may stom partly fren consera óver

Uli redeployment in isia as part of the Timon doctrine,

It my alas reflest a greving realisation in both countries

that they must make more effort than in the past to

to terms with their isim surroundings. This policy

inevitably involves reaching an assommedation of some kind

with China, and ideally obtaining some gesture of acceptance

from 20king. The Chinese can be expected to exereine

growing infinase in the area, particularly in view of

their present mare active and flexible foreign policy. Both

Indonesia and Malaysia my fear that hina harbours nasomt

territorial ambitions, which might come to the fore under

nore extroulet leadership. More imediately, they are

deeply concerned about Chinese-assisted subversive novamente

and about possible links between Feking and their own

Overseas Chinees. To some extent the gestures made by both

(19

00 MFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

on towards Peking could be

local Chinese community.

sey to this

The Malaysian Government have made a series of statements

over the past months in favour of non-alignment. They have

also revived sarlier proposals for a neutralized South Hast

inia under a guarantee by the thited States, Soviet Union

and China. The Malaysian High Corgission in London has been

trying to set up a dialogue with the Chinese Office here

through the kesenian imbassy, though without success,

gestures have not gone entirely umotioed by Peking.

Chinese Red Cross resmtly offered the equivalms of

x$625,000 in supplies to the Falaysian Ted Cross for flsed

relief. The offer ma hastily accepted by the Malaysian

Bad Gross before the Government could have sosɑnd thoughts,

the Government are in no hurry to rask matters.

lanak roomtly repeated that Malaysia could not enter into

diplomatie relations with Communist Okina mtil she consed

to help the insurgente are working against the osta.lished

Government,

The Indonesien Gevemment has also made some effort

to reduce friction with Poking. They have made someosaics

to the Overseas Chinese in the form of reopening rohoals

damping down anti-Chinese attitudes.

Er Trudonu 100 ẨN

Bjakarta on his way to the Commonwealtà Conference, President

Soeharto apparistly told him that Indonesia vas willing to

normalise relations with Feking provided the latter aŭandoned

her "vituperative and suppressive saapaiga" against the

CONFIDENTIAL

COXFTEENS ZAL

Indonesian Government. This was presumably intended to

In return the Chinese hare

reach the ears of the Chinese.

refused to some extent this anti-Indonesian propaganda.

Chinese relations with Malaysia and Indonesia have toom

complicated by the gradual drift of the two countries

towards a "iro Chinas" position. The Malaysians already

have sensular relations with Taiwan, Though there has been

some strain between the two countries reonetly, the Imlaysians

are adamantly opposed to Talvan's expulsion from the Dr.

At the last General Assembly they voted agaiɔst the Importanš

"mastion Resolution bus abstained on the Albanian. The

Indenssian delegate vas "preset but not participating".

Biree then the Indonesian Government have indiested that

they too are opposed to faivan's expulsien.

mpulsion. In view of

Chinese sensitivity to issues involving the Tmited Bations and

Talvan, any aròdit on other matters assruing to the two

Governzenta in the eyes of the Chinese squld well be

dissipated by a trend towarda stronger links with Tuima,

6. Malaysia and Indonesia can be expected to continue

their efforts to reach an understanding with Peking. In the

ease of Indonesia, much will depend on the balance between

the Army and civilian representatives in the Government,

But in view of the suspicions of Peking of beth Indonesia

and Malaysia, and the problem of Taiwan, any imprOVOGERİ

in relations is likely to be precerLove,

17 March 1971.

Here JVPD

Xe Ritenis PURD

Mr Brewer Research Department

JA & Morgan

Par Instern Departnes

Registry No.

Top Secret.

Secret Conidential.. Restricted. Unclassified.

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT blue minute

Type 1 +

To:-

From

JAL Morgan

Mr Wilford

Telephone No. & BEL

Sir Tomlinson

Copied to

Mr. Aiers SWPD

Mr Ritchie PUSD

Mr Frewer Research Dept

Department

BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

NOTHING

From

globere

Passen

Swed.

lesby the Chimère canke expected to excrine frowing Inference in the areas, particularly in view of their mare active and flexible foreign, shiny

PALENT

To some whink the gestures arade by both concatres finestring

MALAYS

CHINESE RELATIONS WITH MALAYSIA AND INDONESTA

During the Anglo-French talks last

week M. Froment-Meurige mentioned that there

had been some movement in Chinese relations

with Indonesia and Malaysia during the past

few months. You may like to have our

comments.

SWPD concur.

(increasing

2. It has become increasingly clear flats

á preruences are makina kituntij The Malaysian and Indonesia anovkeen to strike a

morg Asian, non- aligned posture, This

aptitude may eten partly from concern over

US redeployment in Asia as part of the Nixon

doctrine. It may also reflect a growing

realisation in both countries that they must

make more effort than in the past to come to

terms with their Asian surroundings. This

imevi rahly

policy involves reaching an accommodation of

Obtaining some kind with China, and ideally some gesture

of acceptance from Peking. Both Indonesia and

Malaysia fear that China harbours nascent

territorial ambitions, which might come to the

fore under more extremist leadership.

immediately they are deeply concerned about

Chinese-assisted subversive movements and about Habe links

relations mi➡ Peking and their own Overseas

UNP. 3.

Chinese

as a sop bothers local (Inese, community-

The Malaysian Government

have made

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

WEDL 31-7406

CONFIDENTIAL

The Cat B

Там назива

punte nga test Malay Tam sance moto enter will iplemake bekeken with | Chane wulst she kamms to help the Anfangfalt whe

working agent the

by babimus Giant

have made a series of statements over the

past months in favour of non- alignment.

They have also revied earlier proposals for

a neutralised South East Asia under a guarantee

by the United States, Soviet Union and China

jona-dačem policy, last year in

Inst

the United Nations the Malaysians voted against

the US sponsored procedural resolution on Chinese representation, but abstained on the

substantive resolution because it contained

lowance to the bulsion of Taiwan,

The

Malaysian High Commission in London has been

trying to set up a dialogue with the Chinese office here through the Romanian Embassy, though

Dr. without success When Tun, Temat was in the United Nations last October he anders

Cangetha

the Haferelen Foreign Minister, Mr Sharp,

asked

to exam the Malaysian non- aligned stand

to Chinese. These gestures have not gone

entirely unnoticed by Peking. The Chinese

the equivalent 177

Red Cross recently offered $625,000

in food supplies the

Malaysian Red Cross for flood relief. The

accepted

offer was hastily snapped-un by the Malaysian have

Red Cross before the Government could think

suond Kinghts.

swive uncut it.

The Indonesian Government has also made

some effort to reduce friction with Peking.

They have made concessions to the Overseas

Chinese in the form of reopening schools and

damping down the anti-Chinese

When

Trudeau was in Djakarta on his way to the

Commonwealth Conference, President Saharto

apparently told him that Indonesia

was

/ willing

CONFIDEN"TAL

WEBL 51-740A

CONFIDEMIAL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

meaning

willing to normalise relations with Peking

provided the latter abandoned her "vituperative

and suppressive campaign" against the

Indonesian Government. This was presumably

intended to reach the ears of the Chinese,

In return the Chinese have reduced to some

Men's

extent anti-Indonesian propagarda, and have

given less publicity

"donesian exiles in

Chinese relations with Malaysia and

Indonesia have been complicated by the gradual

draft

raft of the two countries towards a "two Chinag

position.

The Malaysians already have

consular relations with Taiwan,

Though there

has been some strain between the two countries

recently, the Malaysians are adamantly opposed

to Taiwan's expulsion from the UN

as Indonesian delegate was "present but not

At the last foren As5 they noted against the Important to Queden Resolution but abstamed setato. in the Albanian

on other man th

any Greant fecerning to the

tro Goremments in the lies of

The Chrine fold well he

dissipated by

participating", in the chinese representation

Since then the Indonesian Government

tro

have indicated that they are opposed to Taiwan'

expulsion. In view of Chinese sensitivity to

Therfring

issues affecting the United Nations and

Taiwan, tires

Preputation & bined by bederit a pione

în nouid fell indo mich time time to come.

Crina by

Malasia and ind

artrand tourmala

stringer hinks wat Tiniwan.

warda

It seems likely that both Malaysia and

Indonesia will perasvere

can be grfected to contrans

in/†

their efforts to

reach ar understanding with Peking. In the

case of Indonesia, much will depend on the

balance between the Army and civilian representatives

Iseñorm in the Government. But in

view

suspicians of Peking entertained by both

Indonesia and Malaysians

counties and the problem of Taiwan, any

CON "IDENTIAL

of the

/ improvement

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

WEL 51-7406

CONFIDENTIAL

improvement in relations is likely to remain

precarious and subjost

periodic fluct

15.3

Far Eastern Department

RE: IN REGISTRY No.50

DIE

ET MON

BROIT

With the Compliments

- of

The British High CommissioneK.

Shell House,

Harambee Avenue,

NAIROBI.

E Clay

Ana Mayan

FEC 21

JM. 19.3

one: Nairobi 28001

egrams: UKRER

Medero

Thur Mason)

3/3

G 8 Barrasa Esq Peking

CONFIDENTIAL

British High Coumission

NAIROBI

16 March 1971

In paragraph 2 of your letter of 18 February to Appleyard in Far Easter Departaent, you said you would be interested to know if there were any signs that Kenya night change her relations with China.

The Kenyans, of course, have diplomatic relations with China, and have, since 1963, supported China's claim for a seat in the United Nations. There has been no Chinese Ambassador in Nairobi since May, 1967, when the Kenyans also withdrew their mission from Peking

grennda of

zoeizrušity. The Chinese Charge d'Affaires here in Mr. Wang Had-min. The Kenyans also restrict the movements of Chinese diplomats hereon. As grounds of ramposity.

3. Relations between Kenya and China have not been good for years. The discrediting of Oginga Odinga and the Government': revelation of Chinese support for him, exemplify Kenya's suspicions of the Chinese, This suspicion has been despened by the growing Chinese presence in Tanzania, which Kenya regarda very unfavourably. Indeed, it remains an offence in Kenya to be in possession of Chinese Communist literature,

4. At present, the sort of local politician who might be expected to be interested in fact shows little inclination to press the Government hard to improve relations with China. However, the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, when answering questions on Kenyan-Chinese relations in the National Assembly before Christmas, said that the Government was making every effort to improve them. Be also said that China had bought all Kenya's cotton the previous year, and it was hoped. that China would increase her purchases in the current year.

5. As a tailpiece however, it is worth noting that the Chinese Charge presented the President with £28,834 on 10 March to assist Kenya's drought victims. The Charge also promised that China would be prepared to supply a further £115,000 worth of food and medical supplies. The donation represents the first Chinese foray into the limelight for a long time and it has naturally earned then wide publicity and expressions of gratitude.

CONFIDENTIAL

/6. Nevertheless.............

CONFIDENTIAL

6. Nevertheless, there is little more to this than wind; and it is very unlikely that the Government would want to see anymore substance injected into Kenyan-Chinese relations in present circumstances,

Copies to:--

East African Departmeth

- Far Eastern Department

D N Biggin

Information Research Department

FOO

CONFIDENTIAL

I Clay

2/3

G 8 Barrass Esq

office of the British

Chargé d'Affaires

PEKING

CHINESE

申

BRITISH EMBASSY TUNIS

RECE:rch 1971

REGISTRY NO.50

1.:

171

FEC 2/1

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ITH APRICAN COUNTRIES

Please refer to your letter to

Appleyard of 18 February.

So far as Tunisia is concerned, there have been no developments since Tunis tele- gram no. 20 Saving of & December, which was copied to you.

Copy to

L V Appleyard Esq Far Eastern Department F.C.O.

J B Wright

Copy LORDITED TRA, PUSD

WAST

NAD Enter pla

FEC 2/

G 8 Barress Esq PEKING

SECRET

5 March 1971

THE CHINESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFPAIRS

In your letter of 6 February you asked for biographical details of all the people you have identified in the Western European, American and Australasian Department and in the General departments. I attach a copy of a Research Department minute" containing as much as we know about them, This letter is copied with enclosures to CJ Howells, Hong Kọng, A ✪ Ashworth, Regional Information Office, Hong Kong, J DI Boyd, Washington and P II Hewitt, Canberra.

SECRET

L▼ ▲ Appleyard Far Eastern" Department

ри

SECRET

Referance........

FEC 2/2

TUL IT I

115

Mr. Dure II S D feist fand a copy for selection and a second copy forties). Rr. Appleyard, FE.

THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

In his letter of 6 February Mr Barrase asks for bio- graphic details of all the people identified by Chancery in the Western European, American and Australasian depart- ment and in the general departments. The details are es follows:

Western European, Americar and Australasian Department.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua

Shen P'ing

Ling Ch'ing

T'ang Hai-kuang

Chang Wen-chin ·

Yu-Chan

Chang Yi-chun

Li Pao-Cheng

Yu Chung-chun

Became head of the Asian Department of the MFA in 1949. 1954- Vice-President of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Af airs. April 1964 was appoint- ed a Vice-Linister of Foreign Affeirs. He has been extremely active in foreign affairs since 1949.

1950 Deputy-Director, Protocol Office, MFA. 1954 Counsellor, Berne. 1955-59 Consul-General, Geneva. 1965-1969 Chargé d'Affaires 8.1. London.

1957 1st Secretary, Chinese Embassy in Indonesia. 1965 Deputy-Director of the Department of International Relations, MPA. No further reported appearances until October 1970.

1956 1st Secretary, Chinese Embassy, Denmark. 1963 Deputy-Director, Depart- ment of Western Europeen Affairs, MFA. No other reported appearances until April 1969.

1954-7 Deputy-Director, Department of Asian Affairs, MFA. 1958-64 Director, First Department of Asian Affairs. 1966-9 Ambassador to Pakistan. October 1969 member of the delegetion to neg- otiations on the Sino-Soviet border.

1958-60 2nd Secretary, The Hague. 1963 1st Secretary, Damascus. 1967-8 Charge d'Affaires 8.1. Damascus.

Interpreter, Political Science and Law Association. 1961 at Chargé d'Affaires Office, London. 1964 visited London again.

No Record.

1964 Attaché in Helsinki. No other inform tion.

SECRET.

/ Yu Hui-min.

SECRET

Yu Rui-min

Hu ?

Chu Chui-sheng

Wang Kuan-sheng

man of this name (we do not know his CCC) was on the 1958 diplomatic list as being in Switzerland. A man of this name (4416/1920/3046) was a 3rð Secretery in Algiers from 1964-1967, and accompanied Chou En-lai on his December 1963-February 1964 African trip as an interpreter.

The onlyl likely contender is Hu Pen-ya (5170/2609/5069) who was in the Embassy in East Berlin in 1957-58.

No record.

According to secret information a mah of this name (CCC unknown) attended the Second Afro-Asian Lawyers Conference in Guinea in 1962. We have no other information.

In Appendix C Yu Hun-liang is described as Head of Soviet Section. We think that this may be Yu Hung-lien (CCC unknown) who in 1962 was 2nd Secretary, Moscow, and between 1965 and 1969 was 1st Secretary, Moscow. In Appendix D Lu Vei-chao is named as a Baby responsible member. According to our records he was named a Deputy Head in June 1970.

Appendix E

Ch'en Ch'u

Hau I-hsin

Yuan Lu-lin (5913/7627/2651)

Ch'i Ming-teung

Han Heu

Wang Hai-jung

1955 Director of the USSR and East European Department, IFA. 1956-59, Moscon firstly as Acting Chargé d'Affaires and then as Counsellor. 1964 Director of West Asian and North African Affairs Department. 1966 appointed Ambassador to Ghana. August 1970 a leading member of the Information Department.

See our minute of 9 Februɛry.

1955-57 1st Secretary, Helsinki. 1963-4 Counsellor, Oppenhagen. 1964 Deputy- Director of the Information Department.

No trace.

Deputy-Director Protocol Department sinc 1959. 1964-5 Counsellor, Moscow.

According to Red Guard posters a niege of Mao Tse-tung. November 1970 was described as a leading member of Protocol Department. Active since May 1970.

/Chang Li-kuang,•

SECRET.

Reference........

Chang Li-kuang

Li Jen-chieh

Chung Lieng-hang

Wang Chung-li

Kuan Tsung-chou

Liu Ching-yu

Chi Li-te

Fu Heo

A man of this name (CCC unknown) was a 3rd Secretary in Moscow from 1954-56. A man with the CCC given was described as a representative of the Protocol Department in 1961 and as a Section Head in 1964.

No trace.

A man of this name (3769/1504/3810) was Consul-General in Damascus in 1960/61. In September 1963 he was named as Deputy-Director of the Consular Department. However in June 1970 a man of this name was

7 described as a leading member of the

MFA Asian Department.

A man of this name (CCC unknown) was an attachề in Djakarta from 1961-3.

A man of this name was Student Consul in Kedan from 1956-8. Between February 1968 and (at least) July 1970 he was Consul-General in Zanzibar.

We have very little information on him. In 1952 he was in the Consulate General, Bombey, and in 1957 was in Rengoon and Delhi.

Discussed in our February 9 minute.

22 February 1971

Elizabeth A Wright Far Eastern Section Research Department

SECRET.

L-

L V Appleyard sq

Ec de

Far Eastern Department

FCO

My Dear her,

RESTRICTED

OFFICE OF THE BRITISH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES

PEXING

17 February 1971

typy to SWPD (her. Sulliran)

M. I Depr.

MATIN (ON) Hegr

*&N (PU) Hear Mr. Nase THE THOUGHTS OF CH'IAO KUAN-TU ESD (hur-Huke)

три

Enter

In his letter 2/1 of 26 January to John Morgen the Chargé d'Affcires reported that the Russions had the feeling that Ch'iao Kuan-hua (one of the Vice-Ministers of Foreign Affeirs) was now one of the main architects of Chinese foreign policy. Recently, Ch'iao has made remarks to the Russians and Norwegions which are of sone interest. (In the casu of those nade to the former cannot of course vouch for the veracity of the reports although we do not think our informant was trying to mislead us).

2. In reply to a question from the Russians about Chinose criti- cism of Britain's Erst of Sucz policy, Ch'ieo is said to have remarked that they "should not be taken too seriously" (a phrose he scens to use frequently to get round the obstacles created by Chinese propaganda). Ho odded that the 5-power defence pact (Britain, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand) did not alter the sitution and, in effect, was "still-born". It was not a cause for Chinese concern. Tho Russians then went on to ask what Chine's attitude was to the Malaysion proposal for the neutralisation of Southeast Asia. Ch'inco said that Ching did not view the proposel scriously because it had been put forward by a "reactionery" government which had been prompted to put forward this schule by sondɔne sk. The Russians say that they got the inpression that the Chinese are not interested in the iden until the end of tho c、nflict in Indo-China.

(zu

3. As the Charge d'affaires mentioned in his letter 3/15 to John Mergan of 3 February, the Norwegian Azbessador has seen quite a lot of Ch'iac since his return. In a recent conversation anlgaerd told Chiao that he thought that the chances of China getting into the UN this your were slightly botter than 50-50. Ch'ino ceronted that he hoped that Aalgaard was right, but he feared that he was being too optimistic.

In his discussions with Aalgaard, Ch'in has shown a most positive interest in the serbed question, to which ho has returned repeatedly. He has asked the Norwegians to supply the Chinoso with as much information as possible on this subject and the Norwegians have agreed to help. Apparently a Norwegion is Deputy Secretary of the Seabed Committoo at the UN (?) and is a leading

RESTRICTED

international expert on the subject.

On the Sino-Soviet border talks Ch'iao said that no real progress had been made to date.

6. All who have not Ch'iao have been impressed by his intellect, chert and ability to discuss problems in teras other than those ised. in the Feople's Daily. At the Norwegian kibassy the other evening Chico laughed nore than politely at the Anbassador's risqué jokes and chain smoked throughout the evening. When the cigarette box was passed round after dinner, Ch'iao first took three cigarettes. When the boy brought the box to Ch'ino for the econd time Ch'ino simply coumandécred the box and refused to pass it on, Luch to the anguish of T'ang Hai-kuan, who was gasping for another cigarette.

Copied to:

You

Eve

Gordon S Borrass

Miss K i Draycott

Informction Research Department

FCO

G Duff Esq

FUSD

FCO

P N Hewitt aq, OBE

Canberra

CJ Howells Esq

Assistant

Hong Kong

Chancery

Wellington

Chancery

Moscow

Chancery

Oslo

Folitical Adviser

Frank Brower Daq, CMG, ORE Research Department

FCO

J DI Boyd Esq

Washington

R & Hibbert Esq, WIG Singapore

A C Ashworth Esq, OBC Regional Information Officer Hong Kong

Chancery Takyo

Chancery

Kuala Lumpur

UAMIS Geneva

VETIS New York

- 2 - RESTRICTED

Applezow

EIVED RESTRICTED

RYN

Fe up

LV Appleyard Esq

Far Eastern Department

Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

My Dear her,

OFFICE OF THE BRITISH

CHARGE D'AFFAIRES,

PEKING.

6 February 1971

comments?

Any further, frater

подпийнал пазна

THE CHINESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

227

Please refer to my letter to you on this subject of 20 January 1971.

Ku/2/11

2. Since I wrote to you on 20 January we have learnt of some further changes in the staffing of the MFA, more about the responsibilities of some of its officials, and discovered an error in transcription (which is hardly surprising when quite a lot of our information comes from non-Chinese speakers).

3. We would be grateful if Research Department could provide biographic details of all the people we have

identified in the Western European, American and Australasian Department and in the general departments. These are the people we are most likely to meet.

Attached is a revised and updated set of appendices.

your ever

Sady

Gordon S

355

Copied to:

Mr. Brewer, Research Department, F.C.O. Miss Draycott, Information Research Department, F.C.O. Mr. Duff, FUSD, F.C.0.

Mr. Howells, Assistant Political Adviser, Hong Kong. Mr. Ashworth, Regional Information Officer, Hong Kong. Mr. Boyd, Washington.

Mr. Hewitt, Canberra.

ncl

RESTRICTED

19T ASIA

ASIAN AND AFRICAN DEP

spensible Vice-Minister

Directer

"Deputy-Director

Chi Pang-fei

姬鹏飞

ટ્

Ho Ying

何笑

Kung Ta-fei

Deputy-Director

(To Iraq as Ambassader

15 December. Successer not yet identified)

Ho Kung-kai

UROPKAN.

AMERICAN AND

Jersensible Vice-Minister

Directer

Mainly responsible for Americas and Australasia

STRALTAM

Cilas Evan-BUR

乔冠化

Shes Ping

Deputy-Director

Responsible for Americas

and Australasia

(According to Chang

Ti-chun Shen Ping is still the Directer, although at present he is pre-occupied with some "special matters".)

Ling Ch'ing

Deputy-Director

Responsible for Western Europe

"Leading Member of Department"

Prospective Ambassador to Canada or Italy?

Head of British, Scandinavian. (Dutch?) Bection

(formerly Deputy-Director

of International

Organisations Department

T'ang Hai-kuang

汤海光

Chang Wen-chin

章文番

(Former Ambassador to

Pakistan and recently

member of the Chinese delegation to Sino- Soviet Border Talks),

Tu Chun

手俊

(Served in the Hague, speaks sexo English, personable. Bas

Has ba dealings with Dutch Missien here)

-1-

Offiser Dealing with Britain

Officer Dealing with Norway

and Demark (and Sweden?)

Officer Dealing with Finl and

tang Ti-chma

张毅君

Li Pao-chang

李宝成

(Served in Oslo, sposka

Norwegian).

Wu Chang-chun

and the Netherlands

Head of French, Swiss and Italian Section

(Served in Helsinki, Speaks Finnish and English but not Dutch)

Yu Hui-in

Head of German and Austrian section

Officer dealing with Canada

(Derved in Geneva for

many years. Excellent French. Said to be highly intelligent and good conversationalist).

(Full name unknown) (served in west Germany

and has visited Austria.

speaks German).

Chu Chui-sheng

Interpreter dealing with Canada

Wang Kuan-sheng

کھ

-2-

ᅥ

PENDIX TO

SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN DEPARTMEN

Romeasible Vice-Minister

Directer

Deputy Directors

Head of Soviet Section

Ch'ias Kuan-bata

Yu Chan

Li Ting-chuan

(Folish source)

Li Lien-ching

Yu Hun-liang

Officer dealing with Soviet Union

Li Hui-ching (1)

Head of Folish Section

וי

Liu Fish-cheng

(Folish source)

APPPIDDIID

ASIAN AFFAIRS DEPARTM

Responsible Vice-Minister

Han Tien-lung

Director

Deputy Director

Dealing mainly with Afghanistan,

Nepal, Pakistan, India, Ceylon

Deputy-Director

Dealing mainly with East Ania and South East Asia.

"Laading Member"

Hot known.

Yang Kung-su

楊公素

Tsao ke-chang

"Responsible Personnel"

Officer dealing with India

Liu Chun

刻

対恭

Tang Yeh-wen

店

Lu ei-chao

陆維訓

Kne Chien-tsai

郭

# Lit 建战

Jen Hou-kun

住摩

TI / top

Li Ta-nan

李达南

(Further enquiries

suggest that althet

Li may be Head of

also dealing with

he is not the Direc of the Department suggested by a source).

AFFENDIX E

Responsible Vice-Minister

Director

Deputy-Director

"Responsible Member"

Deputy-Director

"Leading Member

Other Officers

OTHER DEPARTMENTS

Hsu Yi-hain (7)

徐从新

INFORMATION DEPARTMENT

Ch'en Chu

陳楚

(According to Folish prei

contact Ch'en is the

Director, ▲ Soviet

Embassy official claims

that he is only a

"Responsible Member".)

Yuan Lu-lin

Ch'i Kintsung

天宗

我:琮

FROTOCOL_JALLRT INT

Han Hau

韩

Wang Hai-jung

王海容

Chang Li-kuang

张黎光

Li Jen-chich

Chung Liang-hong

宗良珩

Deputy-Director

CONSULAR DEPARTMENT

Wang Chung-li

Sectien Chiefa (?)

Interpreter

Kuan Tsung-chou

关宗周

Liu Ching-yu

刘庆有

Chi Ļi-te

Director-General

GENERAL OFFIJA

-2-

纪立德

Zu Hao

符浩

L V Appleyord Esq

Far Eastern Department

FCO

My Dear hen,

RESTRICTED

DECEIVED IN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES

OFFICE OF THE BRITISH

R...RY No. 50,

ARTE

PEKING

18 February 1971

Fk ez

влетары табы

CHINESE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH AFRICAN COUNTRIES

1. China and Nigeria agreed on 10 February to establish anbas- sadorial level relations. A copy of the communiqué is attached.

of the con- As Nigeria had no relations with Taiwan the wordin muniqué posed nc special problens. After the pro-Bicfran attitude with which the Chinese had adopted at an early stage in the civil wer, it was hardly surprising that in the cormuniqué the Nigerian recognition of the CPR as the "sole legal government representing the entire Chinese people" should have been balanced by a Chinese declaration of resolute support for the struggle of all African peoples in "safeguarding national independence, state sovereignty and territorial integrity" (ny underliñing).

2. What will be interesting to see now is which other african states will follow suit, either in recognising China or in re- establishing ambassadorirl level relations. The Chinese have put out feelers to Sonegal through the Malians and others, but both the French and the Malians here think it is unlikely that Senegal will recognise Chine in the near future, even though last year Senegal changed its vote on the Albanian Rosclution from against" to "abstention". We should be interested to know if there are any signs that Ghana, Tunisia or Kenya ere likely to change their relations with China.

3. A new Chinese ambassador will leave shortly for Morocco.

Miss K M Draycott

Information Resurrch Department

FCO

G Duff Esq,

PUSD, FCO

P M Hewitt sq, ORE

Canberra.

CJ Howells Esq

Assistant Folitical Adviser

Hong Kong

Chanceries:

Your ever, Spuda

Gordon S Barrass

F Brower Esq, CMG, OBE Research Department

FCO

JDI Boy Esq

Weshington

RA Hibbert Esq, CMG Singapore

AC Ashworth Esq, OBE

Regional Inforiction Officer

Hong Kong

Wellington, Tokyo, Lagos, Accra, Drkar, Rabat,

Nairobi, Tunis

RESTRICTED

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oaking, "barbary 3 (huishya)

jaini comnimize on the establishment of değrie Printions between the people's republic of china an' the federal republic of nigeria

in conformity with the interests and desire of their respective act, fries, the sovepisms of the people's republic of chúng and the government of the frideri republic of nigeria have on^ided to establish diplomatic relations at the.

kontā orial jest with immediate effect.

Inese dovozapent and prople resolutely support the

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Appleyard Esq

With the compliments of

THE OFFICE of

THE BRITISH CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES

"VES IN

J D Laughton

PEKING

底

CAM GORDITE, PUN, AND. The Bould with

MA1%

Charge d'Affaires

Mr Allan

Mr Barrass

Mr Galsworthy

ASTRICTED

With reference to Ir Barrass' letter of 20 January to Mr Appleyard on Personalitiea at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is worth recording that in a convers、tion on 26 January, Er Chang Ï-chun confirmed that he deals exclusively with "British external relations, including relations with China".

He claimed to know little about our economic affairs, whether domestic or international, and showed a rather old-fashioned attitude to the importance of economic matters. (I have noticed this in other MFA officials, It is of course implicit in the principle of the inseparability of politics and economics that economic factors are not in themselves very important in relations between countries. But I think this Attitude also reflects the fact that the educution and outlook of Chinese diplomatic officials is still old fashioned by our standards 1.e. humanistic and linguistic.)

3. Mr Chang I-chun remarked that 8ino-British tride accounted for less than one per cent of Britain's total trade; and was clearly implying that he was sceptica1 of the importance :hich we claim to attach to it. He also claimed to know little of our economic negotiations and intentions in Burope.

4. If Mr Chang is indeed an important link in the chain of Chinese policy making towards Britain, this brief conversation suggests there is reason for concern about their grasp of the realities of our situŭtion. have recently remarked that the People's Daily Commentary of 2 February on the Cosmonwealth Prime Minister's Conference would probably seem achronistic to an African audience, and certainly to an Asian or Latin American audience.

ce. L V Appleyard Esq, PED,

♬ D Laughton

8 February 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

Sotes of a meeting between wu Yi-kang and P.8. Mraha 11

10th February, 1971.

The meeting resulted from a request by the Chinese side,

krocenti

wu Yi-kang,

shu kuo-yu

3rd Secretary

Mr. P.5. Marshall

Miss J. Saymour.

BACKGROUND

The min matter which Wu wished to discuss concerns the recent approach to China by the organisers of the International Oceanographical Conference and Exhibition.

Following the successful 1st International Conference Brighton in 1969 on the exploitation of undersea resources, napociated with an exhibition of equipment for such purposes, an international committee has been set up with the task of organising a 2nd international conference and exhibition to take place in the V.K, in March 1972. As a result, P.S.M. had taken the secretary of the organising committee, Mr. Brooks to all on the Chinese at Gloucester Gate in December 1970. The Chinese had been given full bnekground information about the previous exhibition and conference, and had been formally invited to join the international organising committee and also to send a delegation to the 1972 conference. committee meeting vas dua to take place on January 22nd and the Chinese vere told that if it proved too difficult to send a delegate from China by that date, a representative from their London diplom tic or commercial mission would be very welcome, since some other countries also were represented at that level by diplomatic or commercial representatives stationed in London.

THE MEETING.

Wu said he had now beard from the Hinistry of Marine at Peking, in response to the invitation by the organisers of the International Üssenology Conference.

While awaiting word from China, it had not been possible for a delegate or an observer to take part in the committee meeting which took place on January 22nd.

However, the Chinese side now wished to have further information and he vished P.5.N. to seak from the secretary of the committee, the ansvars to two important questions, without informing hảm that they were put by the Chinese side, It was for this reason that he was asked to some unkocampanied by anybody from the Committee side.

France,

verei

Canada

In this on terpido, U.Þ.A. and Q.5,5*++ Yout GermaSY,

New Zealand,

.../...

They were interested in the conference, said wa, and it is possible that they could send a delegation to attend in due course, but not to participate in the exhibition, although they wish to visit it. In addition, Mr. Brooks in his last letter, written after the committee met in January, had notified them that all participating countries had been requested to give the conference details of oceanographical work and developments taking place. China would not wish to do so.

The two questions to which he required anivere værels

(1) Ima Taiwan received an invitation either to join the committes, or to participate in the conference and exhibition

(2) Does the committee, conference or exhibition have any connection with the United Nations; for instance is it a sub- organisation of the United Nations or does it have any other connection, and if so emotly what is the connection

7, and

1 nssured him that I understood the reasons why they wished to have further informtion on these subjects, and felt able to assure him even before I checked with Mr. Brooks, that no invitation had been sent to Taiwan, In fact, I had enquired on those lines myself at the outset and had received an assurance that there was no connection at all with Taiwan and people from there, had not, and would not, be invited. Following the committee meeting of the 22nd January, Miss Seymour, during a conversation with Mr. Brooks, had been told that it was quite definits that no invitation bad been issued to Diwari,

for W.

I will, of sourse, pas these questions formally to Hr. Brooka

Further conversation between no reveled that Me, Wa prefers to have a reply in writing, and that the letter should be addressed to me (P.8.M.), and no mention should be made of any enquiry by the Chinesej also, that I should not ask He, Brooks to oopy it to the Chinese, but should pass them a copy myself.

I undertook to do so within the next few days and to deliver a reply to him personally.

I said I had read with interest in the 'Peking Unily' recently, the items about joint exploitation of undersea resources off-Taiwan and other parts of nearby waters, proposed by the K.H.T. people on Taiwan, in conjunction with American and Japanese interests. 1 therefore found it quite understandable that Mr. Wu' senks further information about the proposed conference, and we have a complete understanding on this. I hope to have a reply to both questions from Mr. Brwoke within the next day or se.

Brooks has acceptable replies to both queries, and we are new drafting a suitable letter. (attiched Lesewith).

attiched heat with queries, and w

......

../...

Other subiecta discussed werei

(1) The news regarding the close-down of Rolls Royee. 1 assured him that users of Rolls Royce sero engines throughout the world need have no fears; there is no doubt at all that production of all existing soro-engines will continue and major overhauls, supply of spare parts sto, will be available as usual,

(2) ku referred to the very successful lunch party held at Mr. Eeswick's house on Tuesdy, and I said that Normon Webb and I are hoping to give a lunch party at our level, within the next ten days or so and hope he personally, and his colleague Mr. Shu, and other collongues will attend, We will send a formal invitation in a day or so.

(3)

Since Nr. ku arrived in November, the weather has not been so good, but with better weather due very soon, it is high time the t ve arranged for him and some of his colleagues to see something of British industry around the country. I hope to refer to this subject again very soon.

In an earlier proposal we had suggested that the Chinese should ake a visit in 1971 either to shipyarda, or possibly to another particular industry, such as manufacturers of heavy machine tools, or vehicles - or we might make a geographical tour, and pe for example to the North Met, Wales, or back to Midlands. I asked He, Wu and his colleagues to consider the metter, and let me know their preference in due cour*(r)+

He agreed that it is essential for him to build up good contact with British companies.

(4) I mentioned the intention of a group of Scottish bankers including the Bank of Scotland, to invite Hr. Sung Kuo-hua and one or two colleagues to pay a formal visit to banking circles in Sootland. I believe the proposal when it is formally put, will be that the banks soting as hosts, will invite Chinese colleagues to visit them for two or these days to see something of bus in ess and banking in Scotland, and to discuss matters of mutual interest.

I told him that I hope to hear very soon, that the organisation of a visit on these lines has made some progress,

{}} I spoke of the Canton Spring Fair and mentioned that I bad been discussing trade that day with the British Oxygen Company, who may wish to send a representative to either the Spring or Autumn fair. They hope to have someone travelling in the Far Mat at that time.

I also wish to attend.

bar. Ma, who seems keen that there shall be a large British contingent, said there should be no difficulty about arranging invitations.

OCEANOLOGY INTERNATIONAL

Handed 1 kans.

17-2-71

P.S. Marshall, Esq.,

Sino-British Trade Council,

25 Queen Anne's Gate,

London, S..1.

Dear Mr. Marshall,

G Lombar Street

Leben

01-723 3034 Wingraphic Address - Peepex London V7

13 February 1971.

Thank you for your message, and I quite understand your concern that the matter should be made quite clear. It is no trouble at all.

So far as your first question is concerned, I am happy to confirm to you what I said on the subject when we went to call at the Commercial Counsellor's office; namely, that we certainly have not invited the K.M.T. in Taivan to send a delegation, or to join the International Committee. Our Committee is what the name implies a committee of national representatives, and we recognise only one Government of China, which is that of the People's Republic, with its capital at Peking.

Similarly, there is no intention to invite those people to participate at any future time. In any case, once the Feople's Republic of China has taken its seat on the Committee, that would be quite out of the question.

With reference to your second question: "Have we any connection with the United Nations, are we a sub-organisation of theirs, and if not, what if any is our relationship with that organisation'? I hope

the following facts will make the position quite clear:

With the increasing interest in the exploitation of the sea and the seabed by many different countries, we obviously work closely with various United Nations organisations, but the International Advisory Committee itself is independent and operates on the instructions of member countries taking part.

It is really a co-operative effort by interested nations and as such has no political 'leanings' whatsoever. Its liaison facilities are good, since its sole interest is the peaceful exploitation of the sea and the seabed.

Please do contact me if you have any further queries and I will answer them to the best of my ability.

I am very keen to get a Chinese delegation here for the conference and they may rest assured of a very wart welcome if they come, 110 you think we should approach the Commercial Counsellor's office once again to see if we could speed things up, or should we just hold on?

P.S.

P.S. Marshall, Esq., Sino-British Trade Conncil

13 February 1971.

Please do come in when you next pass this way: I should like to discuss China with you again.

Incidentally, many thanks for sending me the cuttings from the Peking Review of January 1st, etc., about China's condemnation of the proposed plunder of the seabed off her coasts. We were all cost interested.

Thanks again for your help and best regards to Norman.

Yours sincerely,

Imall Turks

A.D.J. Brooks

on behalf of

Sceanology International Advisory Committee

I thought you might like to see, in confidence, a copy of our recent survey on Japan it shows the acute interest!

NAA Prithing NED (hur.long)

19/2

RESTRICTED

та

6/2

L V Appleyard Esq

Far Eastern Department

庇

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

My Dear Len,

OFFICE OF THE BRITISH

та

CHARGE D'AFFAIRES,

PEKING.

KARE

':/

February 1971

TALKS BETWEEN DR. SHUKEIR, SPEAKER OF THE U.A.R. NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, AND PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI, FEKING, 27-28 JANUARY 1971

1. Flease refer to ry letter 3/5 to you of 29 December, 1970.

2. According to a member of the U.A.R. Eribassy the Chinese responded to Shukeir's explanation of the U.A.R.'s position on a Middle East settlement in an equivocal way which was half expected. Although there was no real neeting of ninds on this subject, both sides were outspoken in their condemnation of the U.S. in speeches made at the banquet given by Chou En-lai on 27 January and this may have provided a focal point for some slight inprovenent in their relations.

3. lie understand from the U.A.R. Ebassy that in the talks Chou En-lai took a less roderete line than Chia Kuan-hua was alleged to have taken with the Russians on this subject.

Chiao was alloged to have said that China was not opposed to a punceful settlement in the Middle Erst if the Middle East c ́untries themselves agreed to it. (See the Chargé d'Affaires' letter 2/1 to John Morgan of 26 January). Chou's line, however, wis that, on the one hand, only the U..R. c.uld decide what to do; but, on the other hand, as the Chinese sow it (and rs Kuo Mo-jo said in his speech of 27 Janu ry) "only by defeating U.S. imperialism and driving all forces of aggression out of the Middle East, will it be prssible for the Arab people to achieve complete national independence and sovercignty". Moreover, Chou indicated that he saw little prospect of a peaceful settlement. Shukeir was left in little doubt that the hinese were trying to win whatever happened in the Middle Sast. is the U...R. Commercial Counsellor put it the dry after the talks "China's stand on the Middle East settlement will be determined by the situation on the day a settlement is agreed".

4. The nain bone of contention romains the balestinions. wrs reflected in the speeches made by Kuo and Shukeir on 27 January. Therons Kun condered the "Jordanian reactioneries"

This

-1-

RESTRICTED

for their "bloody suppression" of the Palestiniens and referred to the U.A.R. as a supporter of the Falestinian struggle, Shukoir steured clear of both subjects. Morenver,

Moreover, the Peking representative of the FLO was sat in a less important place et Shukoir's banquet than at Chou En-lai's. This nan who is very anti-U...R., was so annoyed by what Shukeir had said (and not scid) that he refused to go to the airport to say goodbye.

5. In general the Chinese have continued to be cautious in what they have said publicly ab ut the Middle Inst situation. For instance the only substantial Chinese comment on the clashes between Jordanian Government troops and the guerillas in early January was a People's Daily "Commentator" article on 12 January which was mild and detached" c^apored with what the Chinese had said a few months ago. To compensate for this NCNA and the Feople's Daily carried 21 articles quoting declarations

of support edo by the more vitriclic supporters of the Falestinians. As I mentioned in my letter of 29 Dece ber it secus that at the same time as the Chinese nderate their public remarks they will continue t. cive covert support to the Palestinians. According to the French Embassy "quite a lot" of halestinians arrived in China last summer for training and a Plish contact told me that he believed that there were till a lot of Falestinians here.

6. If the ralestinians suffer further resounding nilitary setbacks then the Chinese would no dubt ke a private and realistic assessment of their value as a revolutionary force, but at the same time maintain public support at varying levels. They probably judge that a settlement acceptable to arab Governments is still a long way off and they can therefore afford to pursue a dual policy of support for the lialestinions and limited inprovenent in relations with the U.A.R. and other more moderate

Arabs.

c.c.

your aver

Gorden.

Garden 'S Barrass

Miss Draycott, Information Research Department F.C.0.

Mr. Brower, Research Department F.C.0.

Mr. Duff, FUSD, F.C.O.

Mr. Boyd, Washington.

Fr. Hewitt, C-nberra.

Fir. Hibbert, Singapore.

Mr. Howells, assistant P litical adviser, Hong Kong.

Ar, shworth, Regional Inferntion Officer, Hồng Kàng. Chenceries:

Wellington Tokyo

Moscow

Chiro

Beirut

inman Tel Aviv

Baghdad

-2-

RESTRICTED

Mr.Banfiery

L V Appleyard Esq

CONFIDENTIAL

Far Eastern Department

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

My Dear her,

CHINA/MALI/GUINEA

OFFICE OF THE BRITISH

CHARGE D'AFFAIRES,

Enter

Capy to

FEKING.

26 January, 1971

Mrs. Narburg DEI. [ for Mas brooke)

(old I have the comments of Yourd and fection, please

Limpegod 2/2 m

WAD have seen

Thank you. Whe

In my letter 3/2 to you of 12 January Ireported that according to the Malian Counsellor here Mali had used up 80 per cent of the aid which China had granted to date. At the time I asked him what this amounted to in nonetary terus, but he claimed that he could not recall the figure, which he said was hard to calculate because many different categories of aid were involved. I have not seen him since then, but the French Counsellor hore who deals with Africa told me that according to French officials working in hali, Mali's debts towards China for development and commercial credits,

• now totalled 39,000 million Malian francs (which he said is a proximately equal to U.5. 378 million) of which approximately one quarter best been loaned in hard currency.

This figure

is much higher then the one given in appendix E to JIC(B)(70) 17(Final), which estimated that U.. 42 million had been extended to date, but this figure probably does not include commodity credits. We should be glad to have the views of the experts.

You

2. We also have some figures for Chinese aid to Guinea. will recall that on 2 November China and Guinea signed a protocol to the economic and technical co-op、ration agreement of Letober 1969 and then a few days later after the "invasion" of Guinea there were reports that the Chinese had given Guinea additional economic aid. The Guineans here acknowledged to other "frican colleagues that the Chino 9 offered them U.. 1-10 million after the invasion. It is generally believed that this is in the form of supplios which would be delivered quickly.

-1-

CONFIDENTIAL

3. We also understand from the French that the lcan agreed in October 1969 was valued at U.. $50 million.

The Guineans would not confirm this figure when I mentioned it to them, but they agrood that the loan had boen "sizeable". Last November's protocol was just to specify some of the projects which would be carried out under the terms of the agreement.

Over

Yours

fordo

Gordon S Barrass

Copied to:

Miss Draycott, Information Rese rch Department, F.C.O. Mr. Brewer, Researc': Department F.0.0.

Mr. Duff, PUSD, F.C.O.

Mr. Boyd, Washington.

Mr. Howitt, Singapore.

Mr. Howells, Assistant Felitical Advisur, Hong Kong. Mr. Ashworth, Regional Information Officer, Hong Kong. Chanceries:

Wellington Tokyo Dakar

-2-

CONFIDENTIAL

CECRET

SCR 2/4841/66 IV

26th January, 1971

Как

Chinese Foreign Policy:

Briefings

For Rong Long cadres

vienist

Your letter of 29th December quoted Greg Clark, in issue No. 48 of the Far Eastern Economic Řevier, on foreign policy briefings for lower level communist officials.

2. The tone of the reference is plausible, and may have been based on specific facts although we cannot relate this to any particular briefing. Briefings are given regularly to communist officials based in Hong Kong, who are recalled to China for the purpose. As can be seen, for example, from Part III of the Special Branch China Sítrep of 22nd January, these presentations though of interest to us are designed to stiffen the spines of the cadres in Hong Kong rather than to present an objective view of the world through Chinese eyes.

вие ук

(C.J. Howells)

Assistant Political Adviser

G.S. Barrass, Esq.,

PEKING.

c.c. L.V. Appleyard, Esq., FCO.

CECRET

FB02/1

GS Parrass

PIKING

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D'd 10/4/76

10 February 1971

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. Many thanks for your very useful letter of 20 January about the Chinese X FA. Research Department have prepared comments, which are enclosed. We repain very interested in any further light you can shed on our opposite numbers in the Ministry.

Copy (with enɑl.) to:-

J DI Boyd, Washington

CJ Howells, Hong Kong

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L ▼ Appleyard

Far Eastern De artment

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RESTRICTED

Reference

Mr Appleyard (Far Eastern Department)

PP.

прете for tomorrow's bag.

INAY

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In his letter of the 20 January ir Barrass gives

a very useful round-up on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and asks for comments. First, some additional information on the "leading members":-

Li Yao-wen

Besides appearances in connection with North Korea and Albania, he has also appeared at functions in connection with the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, South Yemen, Viet-Nam, Mali and the UAR.

Ma Wen-po

We have no confirmation that he is a PLA representative.

Li Ko-kun

According to our records is LI LO-K'UN.

Ch'en Te-ho end Fang K'o

Ch'en has been described as a "responsible member" of the MFA since June 1969. Fang first came to our notice in June 1970, when he attended a reception to celebrate the 50th birthday of the King of Nepal.

2. We have some comments on personnel listed in the appendices.

Appendix B. Western European, American and Australian Department.

We have no trace of L1 Ching or of Li Pao-cheng.

Apendix C. Soviet and East European Department.

Li T'ing-ch'uan from 1967-1969 was Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy in Albenia.

Appendix D. Asian Affairs Department.

Li Ta-nan From 1963-1968 was a Second Secretary

at the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi. In September 1970 he was described as a "responsible person of the

Asian Affairs Department".

Yang Kung au He may well be a Deputy Director,

although our records only show him as a "leading member".

Lu Wei-chao In June 1970 he was described as a Deputy Head of the Asian Department.

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Appendix E.

Had I-nsin Was last noted as a Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs in May 1970. He appears frequently, in connection with Asia and Africa, and does not appear to cover any special area.

Information Department.

Ch'en Ch'u Our records only show him to be a "leading member".

Yuan Lu-lin An NCNA report of 27 September 1969 said that he is a Deputy Director.

Consular Department

Wang Chung-li According to our records he was a Deputy Director in 1965. However, in June 1970 he was described as a leading member of the Asian Department of the MFA.

General Office

Tu Hao

According to our records, his name is Fu Hao. An NCNA report of 29 November 1970 described him as Director.

International Organisation Section

We do not have any information on the leading personnel of this section either.

Elizabeth Q. Weight

Elizabeth A Wright

Far Eastern Section, Research Department.

9 February 1971

Copied to:-

IRD

PUSD (Mr. Duff)

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2/1

CONFIDENTIAL

enter

OFFICE OFTHE BRITISH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES

PEKING

26 January 1971

Ameful later.

J AL Morgan Esq

FED

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

2M 1M41

Dear John

LAD.

1. In my Annual Review and in Barrass's letter 5/2 of 12 January to Appleyard about the recent Malian visit to Peking we mentioned what Chou En-lai had told the Foreign Minister about China's wish to support any African country which tried to break the "imperialist" hold over its economy and the importance in this context of countries freeing their major natural resources from foreign control. At about the same time as this the Chinese began stressing that they should not be regarded as a super power (notably in the New Year's Day editorial) and setting themsleves up as the champions of small and medium-sized powers against the domination of the two super powers.

2. Since then the Chinese have developed further the theme of big nation hegemony by which they mean not only attempts to dominate by the United States and the Soviet Union either individually or as the Chinese would claim in collusion with each other, but also actions by groups of developed countries contrary to the interests of the under-developed. The Chinese doctrine was laid down in a People's Daily editorial of 23 January which dealt mainly with Latin Amcriea, citing actions by the Andean Fact Crganisation to restrict the operation of US capital in their countrics, the meeting of nine Latin American countries, including Chile and Peru, to discuss defending their seabed rights and the recent seizure by Ecuador of eleven American fishing boats. The editorial concluded by saying "that more and more medium-sized and small countries in the world are rising against big nation hegemony......We firmly maintain that all nations should practise the Five Principles......We never permit other nations to encroach upon our sovereignty and interfere in our internal affairs. on our part will never encroach upon other nations sovereignty or interfere in their internal affairs". This, of course, conveniently forgets Chinese support for revolution everywhere which the Governments of Laos and Burna nightreasonably argue amounted to Chinese interference in their internal affairs,

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3. The main fields in which the Chinese have recently been pursuing the theme are:

Territorial waters and serbed questions

The Chinese have supported the claim by some Latin American countries to territorial waters 200 miles broad. As we know, this is not because China makes such a claim or is ever likely to but because the Chinese consider that each country has a right to make its own clain and because by doing so the Latin American countries are resisting what they regard as incursions by the United States and the Soviet Union into their fishery areas and possible denands in the future to exploit their senbeds. know from separate correspondence, the Chinese have also condemned the arrangements for off-shore oil drilling around Senkaku Island between the United States, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea and made various claims of their own. I think territorial waters and seabeds are questions about which we shall bear a good deal from the Chinese in 1971.

Oil Production

As you

The Chinese have prid considerable attention to the recent neetings of OF EC and criticised the Western oil companies in predictable terms for taking large profits to the detriment of the economies of the oil producing countries and the welfare of their peoples, na well as supporting demands for higher prices, greater taxation, etc. In reporting OPEC meetings they have referred by name to Algeria, Libya, Venezuela, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabin, but not so far to Bahrain and Abu Dhabi (which they no doubt regard as British dependencies) or to Indonesia.

4. The big nation hegemony theme contains some internal contradictions within it. at the arnestine as the Chinese condemn the countries with large oil companies such as the United States, the United Kingdon and the Netherlands for their practices vis-à-vis the producing countries they would also like to see countries in Europe ccting more independently from the United States and for this reason they see some advantage in European integration even though it contradicts Communist theory. On 22 January the New China News Agency printed an item in which Fresident Fompidou expressed his opposition to the "duel of the two super powers for hegemony in the Mediterranean" and advocated the unity of Westerh European countries to safeguard their interests. The remarks which may not have been quoted fully, included the statement that "through ensuring Europe's defence and through the Marshall Plan the United States had made Europe everything but Europeen" ; and a characteristically snide reference to us when after saying that things had changed since the end of the War and that the nations of Europe had rebuilt their econories and again becone aware of their identities, interests and aspirations, President Pompidou added: "Who does not think and hope that Britain in its turn is seeking its own path in international politics?". This is grist to the Chinese nill and is in line with what they said about the Irime Minister's recent visit to the United States, which I reported separately.

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5. In the light of the foregoing, you may be interested to know that a member of the Soviet Embassy recently told one of my staff that they had the feeling that Vice-lüinister Chino Kuan-hua who recently took over responsibilities for Western Europe, the Americas and Australia in addition to his existing responsibility for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, may be one of the nain architects of China's foreign policy and by implication the line which I have described. He said that in conversation with Soviet officials Chiao had put forward ideas such as the one about dealing with "socialist countries on the basis of the Five Principles and co-existence, a long tine before these became part of Chinese established doctrine. In the sore way Chino is alleged to have said about the Middle East though I find this more difficult to accept that China was not opposed to a peaceful settlement in the Middle East if the Middle East countries themselves agreed to it. What China opposed was a "diktat" by the Super Powers. I hope that over the coming months it will be possible to develop sonе dialogue with Chiao. He is for nore forthcoming then his predecessor and has already told me that he "likes to talk".

cc JDI Boyd Esq Washington

A F Maddocks Esq Hong Kong P H R Marshall Esq Paris

Miss K M Draycott IRD, FCO

Yours ever,

John

J B Denson

F Brewer Esq CMG OBE Research Dept., FCO G Duff Esq FUSD FCO

P M Hewitt Esq OBE Canberra

R A Hibbert Esq CMG Singapore

Chancery Wellington

Chancery British Embassy Dakar (2 copies)

CONFIDENTIAL

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(c)

L V Appleyard Esq

RESTRICTED

Far Eastern Department

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

My Dear her,

CHINESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE BRITISH

CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES,

PEKING.

20 January 1971

Enter camp loca.hors d12.

RD(TE)

You win no douber

with to commment

1. The MFA is now much more active than it was and although we have been told by the Chinese that its organisation has not yet been finalised I think it might be useful if we put down now what we know about it and the roles of some of its leading personalities. This will at least provide us with a starting point for further questioning of our colleagues and the Chinese about MFA affairs; it might also help Research Department and the Americans in their efforts to piece together the "order of battle" of Chinese foreign policy.

2. Although in some respects the situation is clearer than it was, in others it is more murky. New and relatively unknown figures whose responsibilities are not clear have recently appeared among the "leading members" of the MFA. However, in conversations with us the Chinese have confirmed the existence of certain departments etc. and have given us some idea of the responsibilitics of certain Vice-Ministers. From this, NCNA material and what we have heard from some of our colleagues a picture of the MFA, albeit rather vague, cmergos. First of all let us look at the "leading mebers" of the MFA who were listed by NCNA on 4 November in the order below, which presumably reflects their relativa standing in the heirarchy, though not necessarily their influence.

Personalities".)

3. Chi Fong-fei. The Foles claim that they have been told that Chi is acting Foreign Minister. (See Tony Galsworthy's letter to you of 20 Cctober 1970 about "1 October: The fact that he was listed second among the officials of "Departments under the State Council" when he attended the 1 October celebrations much higher than any other member of the MFA suggests that he might now have an additional special role. Ferhaps he is acting as both executive Foreign Minister and Director of the State Council's Foreign Affairs Bureau or a similar body responsible for co-ordinating foreign policy under Chou En-lai. Ch'en Yi held such a

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position when he was Foreign Minister. Even though over the 1.at 6 months Chi has had dealings with North Korea, Cambodia, Pakistan, Vietnam, Albania and Burma, we have seen no

indications that he is no longer the Vice-Minister responsible for West Asian and African Affairs. (For details of this Department see Apponsix A),

4. Li Yao-wen. A former military man, who is probably a FLA representative at the co-ordinating level. His public appearances have mainly been in connection with North Korea and Albania.

5. Ma Wen-po. The Foles and the Swiss say they have been led by the Chinese to believe that Ma is a military man. Like Li, Ma is also probably a PLA representative at the co-ordinating level. His public appearances have been in connection with many countries.

6. Chiao Kuan-hua. Chieo is stil the Vice-Minister responsible for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. (See Appendix B). He heads the Chinese delegation at the Sino-Soviet border talks. Recently (sec our telegram number 4) he has taken over Lo Kuei- po's responsibilities for Western Europe, the Americas and Australia. (See Appendix C). We do not know whether or not Lo hrs left the MFA purmanently, but Chigo's personality is certainly more conducive than Lo's to an inprovement of any country's relations with China, Chiao is also involved in Japanese affairs as a "leading menber" of the China-Japan Friendship Association.

7. Han Nien-lung. Viec-Minister. Responsible for Asian Affairs. (Sec appendix D). Rarely active outside of asian affairs.

8. Hsu Yi- hsin. Hsu is the fourth and lest of the pre- Cultural Revolutionary Vice-Ministers to retain his title. The fact that he has made fow public appearances and we know from the Chinese (directly or indirectly) which departments Chi, Chizo and Han look after suggests that Hsu is in charge of the Frotocol, Information and Consular Departments, plus the General Office and the International Organisations Section etc. (See Appendix E).

9. Li Fo-kun and Cheng Chi-hung. Virtually unknown. Publicly they are not very active and we have no clues to their specific responsibilities.

10. In the last few months Chen Te-ho and Fing Ke have both been described to the Ceylonese as "responsible personnel" of the MFA. The implications were that they were got mumbers of a specific geographic department. They have nade public

appearances in connection with many cuntries but their role renains uncertain.

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11.

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The upshot of the above is that the task of handling foreign affairs vis à vis foreign governments is now mainly the responsibility of three astute professional diplomats Chi, Chiao and Han who seem to be working in close co- op..rątion with Chou En-lai. As we have mentioned in earlier correspondence there are signs of differences of opinion anong Chinese leaders about the style or the content of Chinese foreign policy, but we have no evidence as to whether or not these differences of opinion are reflected among the leading neubors of the MFA or only between the MP. and other groups. latter seens ncre likely.

The

12. The burden of work now placed on the MFA is considerable. Moreover, as a result of the Cultural Revolution the staff of the MFA has been greatly reduced and departuents such as the International Organisations Department are now said to be only of section size. The problen faced by the MFA is all the greater since the value of much of the diplomatic reporting done during the Cultural Revolution Eust have been mininal as must have been the arrunt of research.

13.

One of the most noticeable results of China's attempts to cope with this new situation is that more responsibility now seems to be delegated to junior officials i.e. below the level of Deputy-Director. These people are being allowed into contact with foreign diplonata in their own right, not just as interpreters. For instance, on 13 January the Information Department of the MFA invited press attaches and journalists to a file show and cocktail party at the International Club third such event recently. Our hosts were there in force and were intent on making a favourable inpression. While a woman from the Home News section of NCNA, who had named her daughter "wei Zing" after the Chinese satellite, set to work on ny wife, Cheng Yi-chun, who acts as Tang Hai-kuang's interpreter when he deals with us and whom we believe to be the British desk officer, set to work on me.

the

14. Besides a "friendly discussion" about Sino-British relations etc., couched in traditional for:uloc, Chang raised some questions which pointed up what I have said above about the new style of Chinese diplomacy here. thought about the Frine Minister's New Delhi statement on China,

First, he asked no what I of which he had just read a digest "in AFF or Reuters". that I was unable to comment on it as the text had just arrived I said at the Mis ion as I was leaving for the Club. He then asked if wo would let him have a copy of the full text. d'affaires was able to hand it over when he saw Chiao Kuen-hua

(The Chargó the next day). Next, Chanr, turned his attention to the Connon- wealth Conference and asked why the Conservative government was intent on selling arms to 3uth Africa. In reply I exercised the points made in Guidance telegram number 233 laying particular

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stress on the growth of the Sovit navy.

wth of the Sovit navy. I said that this posed a threat which Ching no doubt apreciated. Although Chang readily admitted that China appreciated this thr.at, he carefully avoided committing himself on the question of China's stand in the event that Britain decided to go ahead with arms sales to South Africa. In due course we got around to Hong Kong and Chang noted that there had been many reports in the press ab ut the prospect of an annesty in Hong Kong and asked if we had any news on the subject. I said that we had no news but speaking personally I was always sceptical about sensational pross reports. We also talked about the MFA and Chang gave me some of the material used olsewhere in this letter. As it was sone of his remarks which spurred ne to write this letter I was not able to ask him the detailed questions which I would wish to ask him now. He has expressed the wish to continue our exchange of views, so the opportunity should arise again.

15. Meanwhile observers here are waiting to see what role is given to Keng Pian, the former Ambassador to Albania, who not only is a uan of wide diplomatic experience, but is also a nenber of the Farty Central Committee. The only other member of the MFA who currently holds this rank is Huang Chen, the Arbassador to Faris. Not surprisingly there is speculation here that Kong Piac will take over as Foreign Minister. Scre observers argue th. t this is why Chi Feng-fai still retains his responsibilities for West Asia and African affairs. We shall see.

16. Unfortunately, our biographic/apporrance records here are rather scanty and so we have not been able to examine in detail the roles of the renbers of the MFA. We will now ask our colleagues about the people who deal with their affairs and ac try to get our picture of the MFA into better focus. We would be grateful for any further information or thoughts which Research Department might have on this subject. We also hope that this and subsequent meterial will not be used in IRD publications for the time boing as we wish to use it as barter material here.

Ever

You

Fordha

Gordon S Berrasa

Copied to:

Mr. Brower, Research Department F.C.0.

Miss Draycott, Information Research Department F.C.Ó. Mr. Duff, PUSD, F.C.O.

Mr. Howells, Assistant Folitical Advisor, Hong Kong. Hr. Ashworth, Regional Information Officer, Hong Kong. Mr. Boyd, Washington.

Chancery, C.nberra.

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APPENDIX A

WEST ASIAN AND AFRICAN DEPARTMENT

Responsible Vice Minister

Directer

Deputy Director

Chi Peng-fei

Ho Ying

Kung Ta-fei

Ho Kung-kai

N.B. Division of responsibilities not known.

APFENDIX B

WESTERN EUROPEAN, AMERICAN AND AUSTRALIAN DEPARTMENT

Responsible Vice Minister

Director

Tainly responsible for Anericoa and lustralia

"Leading Member" of his staff

Deputy Director

nainly responsible for Western Europe.

Officer Dealing with Britain

Head of Scandinavian Section

Officer for Finland and Netherlands

Officer for Norway and Dennerk

Chiac Kuan-hua

Shen Ping

Li Ching

Tong Hai-kuang

Cheng Yi-chun (our view)

Yu Chun

(Norwegian source)

Vua Chung-chun

(Finnish and Dutch scurces)

Li Fao-cheng (Norwegian and Danish sources)

"Rosponsible Ferson"

doaling with France, Italy and Switzerland

Yu Hui-nir

(French, Italian and Swiss sources)

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APPENDIX C

SOVIET AND EST EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT

spensible Vice Minister

Director

Deputy Directors

Chiar Kuan-hua

Head of Folish Section

Yu Chan

Li Ting-chuan (Polish source)

Li Lien-ching

Liu Tieh-cheng (Pelish source)

APPENDIX D

LEIAN AFFAIRS DEF.RTMENT

Responsible Vice Minister

Director

Deputy Director

dealing tainly with

fghanistan, Nepal, Pakistan, India, Ceylon.

Deputy Director

Cealing nainly with East Asia and Scuth East Asia.

"Leading Merber"

"Responsible personnel"

Hon Nion-lung

Li Ta-nan (?) (Pelish scurce)

Yang Kung-su

Tsao Ke-chiang

Liu Chun.

Tang Yeh-wen

Lu Wei-chao

Kou Chien-tsai

Jon Hou-kun

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APPENDIX E

OTHER DEPARTMENTS

Responsible Vice Minister

Hsu Yi-hsin (?)

INFORMATION DEPARTMENT

Director

Deputy Director

PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT

Deputy Director

Ch'en Chu

(Folish course)

Yuan Lu-lin (Polish scurce)

Hen Hsu

(He is the Chief of Pret crl and is close to Chou En-lai. His diplomatic role is much nore important than his position suggests).

Wang Hai-jung

"Leading Member"

CONSULAR DEPARTMENT

Deputy Director

GENERAL OFFICE

Wong Chung-li (Polish source)

and mes

Director

Tu Hao

(Polish source)

INTERN.TIONAL ORGANISTION SECTION

Section exists. Loading personnel unknown

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AMENDMENT SLIP

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FEC

PEKING telegram No. 13

of 5/1/71

560-tologs

[New Years Day Editorial]

Textual

ampend myant.

repeated

as follows.

to FCO

Sentence 1 of para 3

"The editorial sees

revolutionary

situation developing faster than expected bust at the

inject

about

time seeks to

note of modesty when talking China's foreign relations. In particulas

[Delete where not applicable]

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Staff Officer Room 131

Date

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FEC 2

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 13 OF 5 JANUARY INFO HONG KONG WASHINGTON MOSCOW INFO SAVING CANBERRA POLAD SINGAPORE TOKYO AND ULAN DATOR.

MY TELNO 1 OF 2 JANUARY: NEW YEAR'S DAY EDITORIAL.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

pla

THE EDITORIAL REFLECTS CHINA'S GROWING CONFIDENCE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS. ALTHOUGH IT REITERATES CHINA'S DETERMINATION TO SUPPORT ANY REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT WHICH WILL HELP UNDERMINE THE INFLUENCE OF THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION, IT POINTS

TO SOME SHIFTS IN EMPHASIS WHICH HAVE EMERGED IN RECENT MONTHS AS A RESULT OF CONTINUING AMERICAN ACTIVITY IN INDO-CHINA AND

THE REDUCTION IN $150-SOVIET TENSION.

2. 14 LAST YEAR'S EDITORIAL THE SOVIET UNION WAS CONDEMNED BUCH MORE STRONGLY THAN THE U.S. THIS YEAR THE SITUATION IS REVERSED. WHEREAS THE EDITORIAL REFERS TO QUOTE NIXON'S REACTIONARY RULE UNQUOTE AND QUOTE U.C. AGGRESSION UNQUOTE, NO REFERENCE IS MADE TO EITHER BREZHNEV OR TO SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS, ANTI-SOVIET CRITICIS 15 FOCUSSED OF THE DOWNFALL OF COMULKA AND THE POLISH QUOTE REVISIONIST RULING CLIQUE UMUOTE ARE THE QUOTE DEEP CA1315 UNGUOTE OF QUOTE SOCIAL-

IMPERIALISM'S REVISIONIST RULE UNQUOTE 11 EASTERN EUROPE.

THE EDITORIAL SEES THE REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION DEVELOPING FASTER THAN WAS EXPECTED BUT AT [10 GROUPS UNDEC)

AN NOTE OF MODESTY CHEN TALKING ABOUT CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS. IN PARTICULAR IT SEEKS TO ALLAY THE FEAR WHICH MUST BE FILT

BY SMALLER COUNTRIES ATOUT CHINA'S CROWING STRENGTH BY FICLARINS THAT CHERA VILL HEVER BEHAVE LIKE A SUPER POWER AND QUOTE LORD IT OVER OTHERS UNQUSTE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL.

THE DIFFERENT IDELOGICAL VIEWPOINTS OF CHINA'S ARE RECOGNISED ONLY WITH ALBANIA IS CHINA SAID TO BE STRUGGLING TOGETHER AGA! QUOTE IMPERIALISM AND REVISIONISM UNQUOTE: BUT WITH NORTH VIETNAM AND NORTH KOREA CHINA IS STRUGGLING AGAINST QUOTE U.S. IMPERIALISM AND JAPANESE MILITARISM UNQUOTE. NO

MENTION IS MADE OF ROMANIA,

5. SOME OBSERVERS THINK THERE IS SIGNIFICANCE IN FORMULA USED IN CONNECTION WITH TAIWAN WHICH IS DESCRIBED AS QUOTE OUR SACRED TERRITORY OF TAIWAN PROVINCE REPEAT PROVINCE UNQUOTE. IN FACT THIS IS NOT GIVEN PROMINENCE BUT THE FUTURE OF TAIWAN (AND THE ATTITUDE OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES TO ITS STATUS) CLEARLY REMAINS ONE OF CHINA'S PRIMARY PREOCCUPATIONS.

DESPITE ITS TONE, THE EDITORIAL AS USUAL LEAVES THE OPTIONS OPEN AND THERE IS NOTHING IN IT WHICH IN MY VIEW PRECLUDES CHINA FROM CONTINUING TO TRY AND IMPROVE ITS BILATERAL STATE RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION OR AT AN APPROPRIATE POINT FROM RE-OPENING TALKS WITH THE AMERICANS

FCO PASS WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW AND SAVING TO CANBERRA POLAD

SINGAPORE AND TOKYO.

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TO ROUTINE FCO TELRO 1 OF 2 JANUARY 1971 AND TO HONG KONG,

WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW SAVING TO TOKYO, ULAN BATOR, SINGAPORE

AND CANBERRA.

CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

FOLLOWING ARE EXTRACTS FROM THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS

THE JOINT NEW YEAR'S DAY EDITORIAL.

FON

TON OF

** THE WORLD IS UNDERCOING A GREAT REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE............. (WHICH)........... IS DEVELOPING FASTER THAN WAS EXPECTED....THE

REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLES OF THE PEOPLE OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES

AGAINST FOREIGN AGGRESSION APE MERGING WITH THEIP REVOLUTIONARY

STRUGGLES AGAINST DOMESTIC REACTIONERIES.... THE WORLD PEOPLE'S

STRUGGLE AGAINST U.S. IMPERIALISM IS LINKED WITH THE STRUGGLE

OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AGAINST NIXON'S REACTIONARY RULE....THE PEOPLE OF THE THREE COUNTRIES OF VIETNAM, CAMBODIA AND LAOS HAVE KON GREAT VICTORIES IN THEIR WAR AGAINST U.S. AGGRESSION AND FOR NATIONAL SALVATION, (JAPAN, OKINAWA, PALESTINE, GUINEA AND LATIN AVERICA ARE ALSO MENTIONED)....... MANY MEDIUM SIZED AND SMALL NATIONS HAVE RISEN AGAINST THE POWER POLITICS OF THE TWO SUPER POKERS, U.S. IMPERIALISM AND SOCIAL IMPERIALISM.... THE WORKING CLASS AND THE BROAD MASSES IN POLAND HAVE WAGED A

MAMMOTH REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE AGAINST THE REVISIONIST FULING CLIQUE, BRINGING ABOUT THE DOWNFALL OF GOMULKA, WHO WENT THE SAME WAY AS KHRUSHCHOV AND NOVOTNY. SOCIAL IMPERIALISM'S

COLONIAL RULE IN EAST EUROPE IS IN A DEEP CRISIS, THIS EVENT

NOT ONLY DEMONSTRATES THE FURTHER BANKRUPTCY OF MODERN

REVISIONIS" WITH SOVIET REVISIONISH AT ITS CENTRE, BUT SHOWS THE WEAKNESS OF THE REVISIONIST RULE.

2..

**CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS ARE DAILY DEVELOPING. WE ARE

ADVANCING SHOULDER TO SHOULDER WITH THE ALBANIAN PARTY OF LABOUR...

WE ARE CLOSELY UNITED WITH THE VIETNAM WORKER'S PARTY AND THE ·

KOREAN WORKER'S PARTY 1 THE FIGHT AGAINST U.S. IMPERIALISM AND

JAPANESE MILITARISH, AND IN THIS FIGHT WE SUPPORT EACH OTHER. OUR MILITANT UNITY WITH ALL GENUINE MARXIST-LENINIST PARTIES AND

ORGANISATIONS AND THE REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE OF THE WORLD HAS

BEEN CONSTANTLY CONSOLIDATED AND STRENGTHENED..........

3..

....THE

• THE CHINESE PEOPLE FIRMLY STAND ON THE SIDE OF THE

PROLETARIAT AND THE OPPPESSED PEOPLE AND NATIONS THE WORLD OVER. AT NO TIME WILL CHINA EVER BEHAVE LIKE A SUPER POWER.......... CHINESE PEOPLE STAND FOR EQUALITY AMONG ALL NATIONS, BIG OR SHALL..........(AND)...FIRMLY SUPPORT THE REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLES OF

THE PEOPLES OF ALL COUNTRIES AND LEARN FROM THEM,'

DENSON

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