I enclose the Hong Kong Aircraft Ordinance, 1912 (Revision of 1924), which I should be obliged if you would return. I am informed that no regulations have been made of the kind contemplated in Section 4 of the Ordinance.
would be:-
My own tentative reply to the two questions
Yes, the aircraft can be shot down, because otherwise it might return and drop a second bomb. If it is reasonably to be inferred from the circumstances that the dropping of bombs was an international act, authorised by the Cantones A
Malkin Esq., C.B., C.M.G., Legal Adviser,
Foreign Office,
Downing Street, S.W.1.
air commander, aircraft would be justified in bombing the Cantonese Air Base, but it would be well also to drop a message saying why we are bombing it. If, however, the circumstances are such that they point to the bombing of Hong Kong being the unauthorised act of an irrespons- ible individual, bombing of the Cantonese Air Base would not be justified; representations to Canton should instead be made.
grateful for your views.
C.19099/26
I should be very
Yours sincerely,
(Sgd.) J.M. Spaight.
Dear Smythies,
October.
Downing Street.
20 October, 1926.
Many than for your letter of the 18th
1 canot trace that any regulations have in fact buen made under hong kong Ordinee No. 26 of 1912, doubtless owing to the fart tunt ther is at present no aerodrme t hong kong. But the Ordinance itself. of winch enclose other copy, will doubtless be efficient for our ur ose,
You will no doubt let me know when Ou have heard from the Foreign Office as to (3) in my letter of the th retober.
2.3 YTHI3S, D.F.C.
Yours sincerely,
THC 19/10 10
Co 19099/26 HK
J. Harding.
Shuckburgh.
Grindle.
viy-Gore.
Clarendon.
No for my sig
Dear Smytkin,
12= 18th Oct.
Wing Commander 13. E. Smythics D.F.C.
20 Oct 1926
Kanks for your
I cannot trace that
regulations have in
trace that any
Seen made mater
HongKong Orface. No 26 of 1912, doubtles
Kili fact that then is
aerodrome at Hong Kong.
at present no
But 1: Orina.
itself, of which I enclose another appy, will
doubtless be sufficient for
You with no foush Ict an
purpose.
know when
You have heard from the Foreign Office as to (3)
in my liten the qt. Oct.
your sincerely (SK) PAL
AIR MINISTRY,
ADASTRAL HOUSE,
KINGSWAY, W.C.2.
18 Catober, 1926.
Dear Clutterbuck,
Many thanks for yours of 9th October about aircraft over Hong Kong. The regulations seem to cover all contingencies; if a bomb were dropped, the warning signal would presumably be dispensed with.
Would you let us know whether the regulations contemplated have in fact been made, and send me another copy for our legal branch.
Incidentally the D.H.9a aeroplanes used by Cantonese would almost certainly crash if attempt ing to land at the only ground available an extra inducement to stay away.
Yours sincerely,
A. chutterbuck Esq., M.C.,
Colonial Office,
Br my thirs
kong Grd.. # 1912.
Downing Street,
October, 1926.
Dear Snythier,
You will remember that at our reomt conference at the Foreign Office you raised the question of what action would be permissible in the event of a Cantonese aeroplane
(1) flying over longkong
(2) flying over Hongkong and dropping
propa, anda
(3) flying over Hongkong and dropping
a berib or bomba.
It was agreed that as (1) and (2) would
apparently be decided under Hongkong law we should look into the matter and let you know the position; and that (3) would be decided under the international code and was therefore a matter for the Foreign Offics.
As regard■ (1) and (2) I enclose for your information a copy of Hongkong Ordinance Noi 26 of 1912
IG-COMMANDER B.E.MYTHIES,
Revision
ni ofilna inraq ed Limow njidor deele te moldeang
BOEKÍQUTES Beamnéund a Yo Junve add
*sve zign (0)
anicgarh nan saobaol: twạo (niyft (3)
griqqoth ban graagi zaroahf (8)
Tadané za deod a
5 Leren (3) Jack) (1) na died beere søm #I
blunda ew wsi wrażynoli vabes bautoab ed ylduezaqga ¡mołłkog sið womt uwę dei bra tajiru odd oånt scol [amoldem^Jel add rules bebino, ed blwow (E) andå besa »»nl110 mgløte" sdë sot anddam a szetozwið aww bra oboo
tudy rol molars I (S) bas (1) ubuques aĂ
SIPI to dâ foll vonunlar? juoduoit la ygon a molimsolni
hich our Legal Adviser agrees adequately covers he position. I should be glad if you would let
know in due course the result of your enquiries to (3).
Yours sincerely,
¡J. Harding.
Shuckburgh.
Grindle.
sby-Chore.
Clarendon.
Capt. W. A. Egalón CMS. R.M
Dea Capt Egetön,
Sanythies
I enclose
with referenc
the treatment
Hongkong.
15 Wing-
Commander
to his enquiry
glantine
carsplanes flying
The Admy
The Hongkong Orface.
Your Sincacly
J. Harding.
Shuckburgh,
Grindle.
Clarendon.
Quals for my sig
Wing. Commander B.E. Smythics D.F.C.
Air Ministry
9 Oct 1926
Dear Sanythies,
You with
remember that at
Hi Fo. you
recent conference Hi quation of permissible
ava. Oplan
(1) tying
(2) flying
(3) flying
What action
wonet Sa
Cantonese
Hongkong
Hongkong
dripping propaganda
are Hongkang and dropping
It was agret that
a (1) ama K
& Secided camber
showed look into this make
wowed apparently HK law
the position; and
that (3)
would h decided
intinational code
under the
J. Harding.
therefore
Shuckburgh.
Grindle.
for the F.O.
Ly-Gore.
Clarendon.
in my dig.
Dea Shiang,
As regards (1) and (2) I encore for
Your information
copy of HK Orince
Jzquziti
Legal Adviser
1924 Revivin
the position.
No 26 Jrgizi* which
agres adequately
I showed in glad if you would let me
in the cowm the moulf
enquiries
Your sincerely
(ud) The
W. Strang Esq
Foreign Office
I Lave dent
Enquiry thing
hr Smyltis
about the treatment
Hongkong.
with reference Whis
Cantones asiflancy
I expect you
Ik Oñan. but with sendo a coffy
(VR) THE
HONG KONG
6 Nov 1926
3 NOV 26
CULATION
U.S. of S.
Cautan silñation
US. of S.
U.S. of S.
Mary of State.
Previous Paper
Sirk. Grindle MEYUTES
fir 1, Wilson
Secretary stali
Tel Klov Stach 8 Nov
above to Wellesley is North. the 10859/6.
Comy + 70. Compe 27 No. 26. 5. 21695/26.
Subsequent Paper
Yov. 20859
-14587/85 48 LLES Harrow .2832
Vit. Wilmw
As stated in the minutes on C.20376 Sir V.Wellesley asked us on the 30th October to telegraph to Hong Kong to stop the Governor communicating Foreign Office telegrams to the Executive Council. The point was that these
telegrams refer to policy in the process of formation and state what His Majesty's Government intend to do, but may very possibly not do, if
circumstances change. It would of course be a
serious disaster if the intentions of His Majesty's
Government leaked out before action was taken
especially when they are forced to alter their plans
Thus circumstances have now prevented the Government
from acting as they proposed in the telegrams about
the collection of Taxes by the Maritime Customs,
which we were at the time discussing with Sir V.
Wellesley. I prepared a draft and sent it over
to the Foreign Office, as it was obviously of no
use unless it expressed their views. Sir Austen
Chamberlain has now rejected both my draft and
the Foreign Office alternative and has prepared
the attached draft. He would like further
reference to the Foreign Office if it is not acceptable to the Secretary of State. This draft is much more full, but otherwise does not differ
much in substance from the one I prepared.
be a little awkward for the Governor if he has
been in the habit of circulating the text of Foreign Office telegrams to his Council suddenly to cease doing so, but we must remember that the Executive Council now contains a Chinese member who, though we believe him to be loyal and trust- worthy, is we know in touch with various Chinese
politicians
politicians, as well as European unofficials who
are of course in close contact with the mercantile
community of Hong Kong.
Send the telegramas drafted by Sir
Austen Chamberlain?
CYPHER TELEGRAM from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to
the Governor of Hong Kong.
(Sent 9.30 p.m. 8th November, 1926).
8.11.16.
We are anxious to keep you fully informed as to our policy in China and to place before you at earliest possible moment the telegraphic and other information on which we have to act. This will enable you to discuss with your Council the broad lines of policy and thus to call their attention to the conditions in other parts of China and in our relations with foreign powers which His Majesty's Government are bound to take into account in deciding on their course, We attach the highest importance to the influence which you can thus exercise over opinion in your Council and in Hong Kong as well as to the help you can give by expressing with equal freedon your own views to us. But the telegrams themselves are highly confidential. They are sent for your personal guidance only and unless otherwise stated should not be communicated to your Council. It might well be disastrou if by any unguarded expression of opinion by an individua member of Council the intentions of His Majesty's Government were revealed before effect was given to them. There is all the greater danger because the telegrams der with a constantly changing situation to which His Majest Government must as constantly adjust their policy. I shall be glad to receive your assurance that you have
these conditions fully in mind and that you will take t
precautions required to preserve the strictly confiden!
character of the communications passing between His
Majesty's Minister in China and the home Government.
Tot asinoloû edt 101 ajadć to quodeiceć saj mort MandGJET MERISTYL
yaoй won to romerol eda
.(osel,redmevoй d38 ..q 02. Jnse)
as ben totni yllut joy good of aucizne s'is s'h Boilzes da woy exoted easiq cd kne enido mi yeiloq we od no ngidamtotni zento bae sinqergeist end tremom eldianoq sauceib od soy olusne lliw aidī „J98 oj svad ew doidw of sunt ins yoilog to senil beord eas lionwoɔ zoy ddiw 10 ejusq rento ni anciðikos end of moiðnette Tigar Ilso Bin Abid Biswoq nylstot njiw enoiteler wo ni baa saing ai dawooss efni gásé of brod 91 Jnonisvoð a'y‡esjal
Javogin eds nosjjb 9% .98200 11and no znibioeć eaiɔ19xe Bund net woy nordw sonsulti end of sonst1oqsi Ba Ilsw a god gnoli ni wa fiowoc toy ni noinigo ze10 yobeert laupe ótiw gniɛasıqre yo evig ass woy qied erit of STE sevisament amongelat erit du: .eu od Bw9iv awo woy Lano819q woy not inga sus your „Lartnebitnoo virized sa Jon blucne bejede seiwiento esclau bas yine sonabius worteseib ed Ilsw Joyim JI IIQwOD zway of bedacicuIII ( O jubivitni na ya noiniqo to noisestyxs bebusuyau yas yɗ ti e'yjaotsi sik to anoidasini and Liongoû to redmem iment of nevig asw Joerte exteo baissver s19% JASENTOVOD vel amurzelet en sanded 19yneb nadzor, and Lle si e19NT Atasol aid doraw of molten sie zniznawo yionstanco e cijiw
I voilog ment Jajiba vidnetsnoo sa jaim jnemo19700 eved woy Jand some ́IL888 7moy evisset of baly so ilan a oded Iliw woy dødt ins bnir u vilut enoidibnoo saecú #nskitnos vidoinde sad svie8siq of bellmper enoiduBo9iq
all neowded zniwaaq anolisoiaumroo gud to rejasisno Jheniev o smod sit bas saing di Tejelník s'y‡esjek
1. E. J. Harding.
Mr. Strachey.
Sir J. Shuckburgh.
Sir G. Grindle.
Sir 0, Davis.
* Sir S. Wilson*****
Mr. Ormsby-Gore.
Earl of Clarendon.
Mr. Amery. In Mu
Cypher tel.
Governer
tong Hong
Aufry to Wellealing (120) 16 Mov. 2b,
on veut to
216907 26
Copy Do. Conf. 27 Nw. W
Cypher Faux
8th Nov. 26.
We are anxious to keep
you fully informed as to our policy
in China and to place before you at
earliest possible moment the
telegraphic and other information on
which we have to act.
This will
enable you to discuss with your
Council the broad lines of policy
and thus to call their attention to
the conditions in other parts of
China and our relations with
foreign powers which His Majesty's
Government are bound to take into
account in deciding on their course.
We attach the highest importance
to the influence which you can thus
exercise over opinion in your
Council and in Hong Kong as well as
akaryerlewdale s-gosomabbana
to the help you can give by expressing
with equal freedom your own views to
But the telegrams themselves are
highly confidential.
They are sent for
your personal guidance only and unless
otherwise stated should not be
communicated to your Council. It might
well be disastrous if by any unguarded
expression of opinion by an individual
member of Council the intentions of His
Majesty's Government were revealed before
effect was given to them. There is all the
greater danger because the telegrams deal
with a constantly changing situation to
which His Majesty's Government must as
constantly adjust their policy. I shall
be glad to receive your assurance that you
have these conditions fully in mind and
that you will take the precautions required
to preserve the strictly confidential
character
character of the communications
passing between His Majesty's
Minister in China and the home
Government.
(Intia)-A.C.-
well as t
help you
by explosi
We are anxious to keep you feally informed in to our
before 1.
a earhart posible moment the telege applice & this information on which we have Io act, thi will enable you to discuss with your Concil the broad Lines.
of boking
I call this attention to the faction flecting conditions in other part China shows relations with
foreign powers which $.5.7. bound to take into accounti
Theis course. Kt
in deciding
the highest importance to the influence which you com this exercise over filing in
your commil &
the Telegrams themselves are
in Pruftkong be highly confidential
que predon for your personal prod
Guidance only
• unless therwise
stated should not be comentarisatie # your Council. It might well be discations if by
ungerarded expression of hälen
in dividual member
of commcil the intentions of
So were moraleer forn
effect was given to them.
of these is all the greates 参
danger because the
deal with a anstaully
situation to whit
Changing must as construit,
adjust conften their footing
be glad to recorda
Your Coohsance
have these conditioni
fully in mind
• that. Gion
four will take the precautions
required
to preserve, strictly confidentive
character of the communicatin bého hr. passing
Governments
& the home
Mr. E. J. Harding.
Ir. Strachey,
Sir J. Shuckburgh,
Sir G. Grindle.
Sur 0. Davis.
HS 8. Wilson.
Ormsby-Gore.
E of Clarendon.
Mr. Amey.
DRAFT. Telegram (Cypher).
Governor. Hong Kong,
Private and Personal.
Both the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs and I realise that it is
necessary that you should be fully informed as to our policy in China and should see at the earliest possible moment the telegrams on which it is formed, but in present critical state of affairs and having regard to the delicacy of our relations to foreign powers in these matters Foreign Office are extremely anxious lest discussion of questions of general policy even under the confidential conditions of
the Executive Council should give rise to some unguarded expression of opinion
Butside by individual members that would give
some hint of our intentions in matters
of high policy before they have been
put into action. They would much prefer
that you should not communicate to the
Council the actual text of telegrams
exchanged with His Majesty's representa-
tives but should content yourself with
stating to it the policy of His Majesty's So.
in regard to the questions under dis-
cussion in so far as the interests of
Hong Kong are directly concerned in the
various issues that have arisen.
presume I may assure Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs that this is your
existing practice, but you will under-
stand that while policy is in process
of formation through discussion with
His Majesty's Minister he is anxious
that I should obtain from you an
explicit statement.
HONG KONG
17 Nov 1926
19 NOV (906
RCULATION :-
U.S. of S.
U.S. of S.
7. U.S. of S.
dary of State.
Previous Paper
Coy .22/You.26
Extract from Cabinct conclusions
Mr Clatarbuck 19/11
Mr Becket Eq
Sir G. Grindle 1918 22 88. Vitor 1/1/16 Ber of State 19/11
Subsequent Paper
447:15 12 11/25 Harrow E.235?
ako 21414
and minutes
With regard to
of extract
conclusion (5)
On 21412
I have asked Mayor Macreang
the his best with regard
speedily before the C.1.D.
Мастабу geking the 115
to be able to bution Lobe for M. Han
and with let
the result.
Itinks it &. likely Lowever that
quicker decision
if the matter is
again referred the labinct in connection with Conclusion 4.
Meanwhile I submit diff. tel. to Gov.
Covering 21414.
containing
interim reply
gencial quartion and
Substance of the Secision with regard to
frontier outräges. ( We
We were going
the lake by desp.. 20813 in sep. Sunble below.
but in view of Jor's reference
16 Nov. 21300
Lave Blainch Fo
Recirculatio
L.F. autom
Cacawan La
as 1-fap.
in his tel of
telegraph.
"the working)
DL 20813
aft. Lerewith.
TACheliasuck
5.919.14.26 Bilth at once
19.11.26.
CABINET 59(26).
Extract from Conclusions of Meeting held on Wednesday
November 17th, 1926, at 6 p.m.
scy in is Bay.
ference: inet 58 ,Con- sion 5).
1. The First Lord of the Admiralty read to the Cabinet a telegram he had received the same day from the Naval Commander-in-Chief in China, to the following effect:- Prisoners state that the pirate gang was composed of 22 men: the reports received up to now are r ther conflicting, but it seems probable that practically all the pirates have been accounted for and that the only individual missing is a passenger who is a half-caste British subject who was possibly killed or drowned: Naval units have been recalled to Hong Kong,
b.c 21413/26.
Pacy the ILGE
TELEGRAM from the Secretary of State for the Colonies
to the Governor of ong Kong.
(Sent 2.30 p.m. 20th November, 1926).
Comp 22 M/H
Your telegram 16th November piracy in view o
urgency instructions of His Majesty's Goverment were sent through Naval Commander in Chief, I am glad to learn from newspaper and other reports that the incident terminated so successfully please telegraph full
particulare as soon as available also whether any founda tion for report that outbreak also occurred on S.§. "Hongpeng".
His Majesty's Government are giving earnest consideration to the general question of the measures to to
be adopted to suppress the pirate gangs in Kwangtung and I hope shortly to be able to reply to your despatch
With reference to paragraph 7 your
secret 30 June.
despatch secret 23 July frontier outrages His Majesty's Government while sympathising with your attitude have decided that in view of the difficulty and delicacy of the situation generally they must insist that British troops should an no account be employed outside the frontier without specific instructions from His Majesty' Goverment
py, bows tel (alb) bhor
} Coughitt
Fur Laction
astroicit tek state to vinterosƐ add moTÜ YARDHJET
10 TONI9Yoð add ot
enge Is é wOY
lo viv al vosiłą 100.evoli təl
915W İkernI9VOC styjen ter all to snottoiteal yonegzu of belg mA I :i≤ɔ MÀ T·bnemmoɔ javel dquordt thea Jabloni eit tødt atroqez zadto bas neqaɖuwen mort aïse [ [[vt Nqs7g9I>‡ 9c8siq Vilutaesɔows oa batsuta!TO J lebiwot is reddede o la Iasilovs es Hooa as STDINDitisq .0.3 пo beTZWODO OBIB Xestɗtvo jest tzoqez Tot molt . "379q300M"
Jaénics gaivią was AuruT9700 a1y‡as ¿a!! BIH
16+ Betuccɔm edt to moltasup Intensg and of moléstekleno
zaufanewx ol øjnez ejanig oft as9rqque of betqoba ed dotaqaob woy of yiqsı of slan sú of tidzoda aqod I bns amul 08 texosa TOY ↑ Aqui S18q of #0:1919)er Atiy etaepal ai! 89381‡vo reitaort XIUÇ ES JØToea dodagasb evati obutitta woy Ntiw sateldteqaya eli themiS V OD to wasifob bas y‡wotrtib edt to wely ni Jarit bebloeb Reiting tent tatani jeum yodt VIIST9198 noljeutie sið
gt sbietuo bevolqme s trvossa on no bluoda aqooïd` asje! at mort analtourtant offioequ Juoddiw 19ijnorÌ
JAG MIG VOD
PAC ig/" Bucket 19
J. Harding.
Shuckburgh.
Grindle.
m-by-Gore.
Clarendon,
mery. fm b
E-r, baca.
AFT. Fel (cipher)
22/11/176 oppy Sov'stele.
21126) #16 Nov
! Coy LFF
For action
Co. C 21413/26 HK
Cyphener
20: No. 26.
For Hongkong
Your tel 16 Nov
in view of urgency
instructions of
was sent through Naval
Commande in Chief o
Learn from newspape
and other
reports that the incident teminated
Inccesfully please telegraph fall
particular
also whether
available
foundation for report
report that outbreak abso
occurred on J.S. HONGPENG O
cousituation
KIL's general
genare question
оборка I adopted to
sufferers point on pirati gangs
Kwangtung
Km able to
I hope shortly
Fap Scart
With ref. To para 7
frontièr
sympatising
Your 55% search
outrages HMG
with your Hal in
have decided
of the difficulty and
delicacy of this situation generally
must insist
showed on
that British troops
no account be employed
outside the frontier without specific insträckiong from HMS
In this wh
Tions Fance: Let 51 Con-
CABINET 58(26)
Extract from Conctusions of a Meeting held on Wednesday
November 17th, 1926, at 11.30 a.m.
The Cabinet had before then a Memorandum by
the Oversea Defence bub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, togeth r with a Bote by the Secretary explaining that the Memorandum had been circulated for consideration by the Cabinet, since, oxing to pressureof ork in connection with the Imperial Conference, it had not been found possible to convene a prior meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence (Paper C.P.272(26)).
The Cabinet were informed tht the following telegri had been received by the War Office on the previous day: -
"From the
.0.0.Hong Kong. I sending the re vest of Gove nor and Admiral two platuons of Indian infantry to reinforce Naval contingent Loving inediately for Bi Bay to resne to European women reported to be cultured by pirates, with orders that ithout your cabled authorisation they are not to luga."
In vie of the great urgency of the ster
telegram had been considered at a bastily
حمية ليل
لعمرة حمله
assembled meeting attended by the Prime Minister, the Secretary of Ette for Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of State for War and the First Lord of the Admiralty, AS
the result of which a telegram had been sent to the Naval Commander-in-Chier (this being the shortest route) 420 with instructions to repeat it to Hong Kong and Pekin,
to the effect that the information available was insufficien
that unless the women were British it was not for us to
act; pointing out the risk that on the arrival of a landing
party the women would either be moved inland or killed;
and containing instructions that the landing was not to
take place unless the women were British, all means for
rescue Byrnegotiations (including an offer of ransom)
had been exhausted, and the Admiral satisfied that the
operation could he successful and not lead to extended
operations (Appendix I). This conference had not had
before them a telegram which had been received the same
morning from the Governor of Bong Kong (Appendix II).
A furth r telegram, which had been received
the same morning, was read to the Cabinet by the First
Lord (Appendix III),
Cabinet:-
Two questions, therefore, were before the
(1) The immediate action to be taken in view of the
همرة حيل
latest outrage by pirates in Bias Bay;
(11) The general policy dealt with in Paper C.P.872(26) The former question was felt to depend upon whether the incident could be treated solely as an act of piracy, or .he-
ther the possible landing of troops on Chinese territory (even though that territory was not under effective control of the nominal Government) might involve considerations bearing on the whole interntional situation in China. 421
On a review of the relevant facts the Cabinet
(a) That the First Lord of the Adrir 1'y should be authorised
to send a telegram to the Naval Commander-in-Chief in
China to the effect that the action taken by him and
the course proposed in his latest telegram (Appendix III);
was approved by His Majesty's Government, and reverting
bim to inform the British Minister at Pekin and the
Governor of Hong Kong:
(b) That the question of policy dealt with in C.P.378(26)
should be reserved for consideration by the Committee
of Imperial Defence (if it is possible to arrange
a meeting in the present pressure of business in
connection with the Imperil Conference), or otherwise
by the Cabinet when the question of our general policy
in Chine is discussed (See Conclusion 4).
ras dry!
CABINET 58(26)
Extract from Conclusions of a Meeting held on Wednesday
November 17th, 1926, at 11.30 a.m.
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs gave the Cabinet a short summary of the present difficult situa-
: 51 LCon- In 2).
tion in China resulting from the powerlessness of the s0- called Central Government and the difficulty in securing agreement between the Great Powers. Sir Austen Chamberlair said that he was studying the question with a view to formulating a policy, and in due course he would ask the Prime Minister to have the question considered at the Cabinet.
+ I have asked Fo for a copy
REGISTERED NO. C. 22365 S
NOTICE TO BINDER
PLEASE LEAVE SPACE HERE FOR INSERTION OF SHEETS
Situation in China.
Bitiser Polrey.
(Paper not available at time of binding)
Foreign Office
70 195/1/10
NIZATION CA
15. of 5.
EG Grundle
U.S. of S.
of State.
Previous Paper
quent Paper
Harrow E.2431
HONG KONG C. 1258
Bk Jammary
Situation as Canton
Inchs expresletic comes.
Minister Retting. Mates action tatten to react a more satisfactory bans for the interchange of rifw. regarding pection si & coma sans that gutte.
5 the wfs. th
"Note the prosibility of a furthi gensal shite inltk. I have arranged with F.O. that they
Shaneh reparerande ark Sir R. Madeay
to speat
・F.o. Fil
No 15 15 Hongkong,
Ste 15 Fo 1269.
And I suburn. Eft tel. Khov. in which F.o.
also_1148, 1149, + TAChutiabank
Covering
See also min on 1148
I are afraid Borodin wont fund Zeng
at Lome.
The expiation of a cometer blockade
hade by ti I Jamison had also wesen
being about the only practicale
- if it cartan faccticall
uply to the attack
Houphong.
It would!
be perfectly justified, but I doubt if any Felling fort could be induced to give open countenance, hoween made they
hilled the
Power to
and any fort that did
furbally fall went day
o next week,
also be difficult to get the
Though at presum
handly be said to be using their inffamen
for the panporne of effectually establishing and
maintaining the principle of quel Exportunity
commvice and
moughout an
and industry of all nations kuritory of China"
& Immense loss is being inflided
The Colony
the bresiness community of
Hong Kong by the reposal of
the Canton
authorities to carry out their Healey obligations. There might be at any rate some tactical advantage in putting in a claim for damages, allkough there is
no chance of
getting the money.
I have therefore suggested a paragraph
raining the questions.
In any further communication
fak subject, please quote
95/1/10.
at to any person by nama,
"The Under-Secretary of State,"
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.i
FOREIGN OFFICE.
1. Jafary, 1920.
With reference to your letter
No. 0 365/26. of 9th. Jammary, I am directed by Secretary
sir Austen Chamberlain to enclose copies, of an interslange
of telegrams with His Majesty's Consul-General at Caston
wit.. reyard to the present situation,
2. A copy is also enclosed. of a telegram
which is being addressed to His Majesty's Minister at
Peking in which he is instructed to take advantage of tile
visit of r. O'Kelley (the recently appointed Counsellor to
His Hajesty's Legation to Tongkeng in order to reach a more satisfactory basis for the interchange of information
regarding the position in South Glina, and also to endeavour
to reach some agreed expression of view as to what definite policy (if any) can be adopted in order to remedy the
present situation.
3. Sir Austen amberlain would be grateful
if the Governor of Hongkong could be informed by telegraph.
of the action which is being taken.
we should of cousan
Tchin before
have to consult St. Kong "
Crazy thing
was done as to the psychological
Effect, but let us launch the idea a geli
it considered.
Ler-secretary of State,
Colonial office.
Your obedient Servant,
Groge Mounsey.
NO DISTRIBUTI Z
Cypher telegram to H.I's Consul-General. (Canton).
Foreign office. Jamiary 8th, 1928. 10.0. p.m.
Your telegram No. 1 (of Jamiary 7th -
Canton negotiations).
Telegraph review of the situation at Canton
outlining position of military and political parties
and of strike Committee and Russians.
Is there any prospect of General Chiang
taking independent line and fulfilling hopes expressed
Is he open
in your despatch No. 56 of November 9th 7
to influences ather than these of so-called government,
Borodin and Strike Committee ? What are chances of
influencing Janton through Peking ↑
Keep me informed on above lined.
Repeat to Paking.
p. of cư Tău 194 IUNI
© I semenni en quex
This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be
returned to the Foreign Office if not required for official use.]
11,35 am,
Decypher. H,M's Consul-General, (Canton via
Hongkong) 9th January 1925, 10th January, 1926,
9.00 4.M.
10th January, 1926.
Your telegram No. 1.
So far as I can ascertain there is no prospect of Chiang fulfilling hopes. He is here without his troops and government have stated that he is an ordinary soldier subject to civil control as in Europe,
(2) Chances of Canton boing influenced through Poking are all. On the other hand it is reported that Borodin who leaves for the north about January 23rd has a mission to impress upon General Feng importance of working with southern branch of Kuo Min-teng who it is said are prepared to call off the strike if foreign povers will recoguise them as Central government of China. (In view of northern situation this is an idea worthy of consideration as that section is undoubtedly determined to institute genuine reforms as has been practically demonstrated here and is becoming restive under Russian dictation.
(3) In the meantime I suggest that local deadlock can only be solved by a blockade instituted by (7 guaranteeing powers) with concurrence of Peking and that strike committee abetted by govern- mont should arrogate to themselves the right to
dictate/
dictate revision of constitution of a British colony by insisting that they be entitled to secure their representation on legislative council is an insult not having any reason historically and especially as in their own country international zone system nowhere prevails. Negotiations having been sus- pended another general strike in Hongkong as an attempt to force hands of government is contempla- ted.
(4) At their dictation mercantile shipping og Japan and United States are already treating us practically in an unfriendly manner by ostracising Hongkong, Indian subjects guilty of no offence heve been detained in chains for 19 days: two British subjects have been deported from Pakhoi by picket and it is currently stated that Great Britain is finished,
(E) I proceed to Hongkong tomorrow to discuss the situation with the Governor and the Commander-
in-Chief.
Repeated to Peking, No. 4.
This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be returned to the Foreign Office if not required for official use.]
(F.95/1/10).
Cypher telegram to Sir R. Macleay. (Peking).
Foreign Office. January 12th, 1926. 10.0.p.m. 10. 15.
Canton telegram No. 2 (situation at Canton).
We wish to take opportunity of Mr. O'Malley's visit to Hongkong to arrange (1) for more prompt and satisfactory interchange of news between Canton, Hongkong, Peking and Foreign Office, and (2) to reach some agreed expression of view by yourself, Governor of Hongkong and Sir J. Jamieson as to what you consider a sound and practical policy for the relief of the Canton situation. If, as is possible, no such policy is at present feasible, we desire a reasoned presente- tion of the arguments on which that view is founded. Information at our disposal is not sufficient for us to decide upon any forward policy or even adequately to defend our present policy of inaction and when Parliament re-assembles we may well be pressed, We wish to be in a position to put up convincing case in reply to probable criticism.
Repeat to Canton.
Paraphrase telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor of Hong Kong.
Sent 2.28 p.m.16th January, 1926.
15.1.26.
rett Grindle
Copy #019 Jan 26
Sir R.Macleay is being asked to repeat to you the telegraphic instructions which he has received in the following Dense.
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is anxioue to come to some arrangement which would facilitate the interchange of information between His Majesty's Minister, Peking His Majesty's Consul General Canton and yourself. Mr.O'Malley who has recently been appointed Counsellor to His Majesty's Legation Peking will arrive at Hong Kong on the 20th and hisvisit would seem to provide a good opportunity for discussing the question and also for reaching an agreed view as to the policy which should be
adopted towards Canton.
jel.has gone the pp.
be recirculated
to F.E.Dept.
for paraphrase
to C.D.for
copying letter to F.0.below.
PAL 15.1.26
Backch--16
FO 1268/26 HK
Mr. Schey.
Sir J. Shuckburgh.
Sir C. Davis.
Six G. Grindle.
Si Marlerton Smith.
maby-Gore.
Mr. Amery.
19 Jan. 1926
ack. the receipt of your
13 Jan 1148
13 Jan 1149
* 14 Jou 1269
letér No. F 95/1/10 of the 13th. Jan., enclosing
copies of telegraphic correspondence
Consul Genral
with ngad
at Peking
15 Transunit
with it my Ministar
Kthe Sikation in 5 China
Ka laid before
Austen Chamberlain, the accompanyi
telegram
Secretary paraphrase of Kthe Gor of Hongkong
La difund
with reference to the frozoming
Mr O'Malley.
Jates the
Gor. J Hongkong.
to encton paraphrases of
14th Jan. fr. then
will be Broaned when the
contains
tel. of the 13th Jan.
the conclusions' nacher at Sir J. Jamieson referred
11 confecun
a report off
15 which
the last para ofhis
tel. No 2
1015. Jan. and
(enel) 115 120
conclusions
differ from
arrived at independently
the for.
lis tel.
enclosed
of which
para phron
later for this Dept the qt Jan.
In the latter for.
13th Jan.
In the latis telegram of
the hor. asks for info. At the policy of H.M.9. towards
Bolsheviks
Mr O'Malley
in porscrsion of fate infu.
aliitude of HM.?. which he
hile be able
to Hongkong.
The Foranes
To impart / during
his forthcoming
Ko Amey would baucar be plad
could be suplica to be informen what ciply, in his A. Chamberlain's Opinion
Convenient if Mr Ansy
sht be returned
hall teateret for a reply both Khis telegram
and STATE telegram JE 1415. Jany.
The League I
The suggestion is
heade Khar
Nations might be invited
condemnation of the defiance of
to expoun
the present Canton Gort.
For Emery
is will sware
that the Comes due to the present
Mr. Strachey.
Bir J. Shuckburgh.
Sir C. Davis,
Bir G. Grindle.
Sir J. Masterton Smith,
Mr. Ormaby-Gore.
Mr. Amery.
situation in chinar Care
Any means
confined to the Kading community
Boot. of Hrag-Kong,
Occurred
inflicted on
but it has
that the dawage
the Colony might-
possibly be distinguished from
that suffered by Bistish traders
The Treaty ports as involving a main direct breach of teaty
In ordeivary circumstame
a violation of treaty rights
world presumably give live to a claim for damages,
to inquire whether, in dis Auctions Austen Chamberlain's
Opinion, any good tactical on other purpose would be served claim for
by putting forward
the love suffered by stongationgan
at the first convenient
Opportunity,
or when this
decision of the League of
has been obtained, suppoming
it is decided to have Lecourse to
The League as suggasheet.
119710 *24
OLATION:-
U.S. of S
U.S. of S.
y of State,
HONG KONG
16th January
18 JAN 1996
Chines Spenal budon Tariff bonference.
-pillers Irs. copres tetec comes with
Previous Paper
ubsequent Paper
48 11/25 Harrow B.2912
MM. Munden, beting
ponsibility of a Lighly important
change of farticy
on the fort of Hope.
I do ns alicupt a
correspondance should be had in its
entinly.
Sir R. Mackay is moisting
sem lid bluntly
he wash wither accept
alle muhi
less Sangmous thann
that which he the Porilish Delegation
at the Conference have hitherto advocated. Briefly, what the F.O. fear is that the
Caution sikiation
at promt, be repeated ale ons
China, and their tels No. 381 +382 of
31 Dec +17+18 of 13 Jas. Saclif String
From the Ith point of view we showed probably
welcome, such a change
interent factor
Has Cauton
must not be nyerted as (on the assumption that
a place apart
The mouth i
due to Bolshevik influenen) and alien ti
Rather must it se
Then chocathan
assumed Kät
which owing
to Soviet inthere
ke from the ad
Lave been
Jet the root cause
д applicable to the anush
is equally
in the remainder of
I frhows thickon that to
prevent repetition of
pacification of
trouble chocachin
Aimmily a fineled towards
bem definitely pland by
Sam freground.
lovi tel.
would consist
the custong
in Sofrindle
extremely important
development of pricy and the Wils
lequire to be read fully.
Most important. It is interesting to our
the too. coming sound to the point of Vůw which has been advocalist
and the Las
H. Kong for years past.
Bee of State
sa pages (2) + (5) of the
Kj paper.
NAČar Lan
The poking of Lauding
affic posibly
deductions for loan services.
Authorities.
Sependent powers but
thus making
In the provincial
The Centre God.
ersistance for foreign
the goods will ofthe provinces
and thus arsisting the ultimati evolution of China into a collection of fedcated states.
I have asked F.O. loconsider whether anything shaned to said 16 Yor, & M. O'Malley the possibility. If this change conference at HK
this change in views of the forthcoming
but gating that hig of saying anything
to poking
vis-a-vis Caulon
not likely to be in favour
at the moment.
TAChats Suck
20./1,16
Although you probably have over there telegrams separately
the Cabinet papers, you
may like to see them all together.
I have marked in red the
interesting parts of then.
20.1.76.
This can
wow be puth.
In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. 752/10
And address not to any person by name, but to-- "The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S. W. 1.
Confidential
in Bros Nis 1928
THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
presents
compliments to the under leietary for the Colonies and, by direction of the Scoretary of State,
transmits herewith cope of the under-mentioned paper.
Foreign Office,
16 Jany, 1926.
Reference to previous correspondence
Foreign Offe
54740/25
Name and Date.
$5662/19°/1° 15 Den: 1925 Description of Enclosure.
I.M Minister
Peking Relegrams tv?
Subject.
Chinese Special
Customs Farift Conference
porence let-grams
14 (13341) 7/25 (2)
(13843) 11/25
Similar letter sent to
Beard of hone
sinup szweig „možder zili za jeskynimento sellise aa
Kamal xab© opened "amait la quererar o
Késseng erindi myronoʻi tol stać lu
eć su to noizonib yd „bas mayaq bunstorm-rdüo sat b
you driworodk
This Dogument is the Property of His Britannic Majesty a Government, and should be returned to the Foreign Office if not required for official use.]
Decypher.
Sir R. Macleay (Peking).
21st December, 1925.
5.00 p.m. 21st December, 1925.
1.50 p.m. 21st Decembor, 1925.
No. 543.
At commencement of present hostilities it was generally expected that Chang's power in Manchuria would shortly collapse, that Li would be expelled from Tientsin and that Feng and his party would be left supreme in North China at any rate for the time being. A month has since elapsed however ard while civil war is spreading, militery situation seems to be drifting into usual stalemate. Provisional government which came into existence a year ago in frankly unconstitu- tional way continues to function but in name only under Chief Executive (who is virtually a prisoner) While Feng and his Kuomintang friends wait on events. Officially it is no consolation to say that political outlook is more complex and more obscure and legal basis and status of central government more attenuated and more unrepresentative than ever before in history of Chinese Republic. No one whether Chinese or foreigner has any idea of what the outcome may be. Tariff conference for the moment in abeyance except for private discussions between delegations. Railway
Communications with Tientsin have been interrupted for
a fortnight thus preventing our representative on extra- territorial commission (7 group omitted).
In all this political turmoil there has however so far been no recrudescence of anti-foreign movem:nt except for reports of anti-Christian demonstrations to be etaged on Christmas Day. These have elicited strongly worded warning against disorder from Peking garrison commander who is one of Feng's men. Chinese are generally too frightened and pre-occupied with their own affairs to give any attention to foreigners and there ere indeed even indications locally of (? explosion of) anti-Bolshevik feeling.
Inspector General of Customs who, es you are aware is inclined to be somewhat of an alarmist, is freely predicting complete disintegration of the govern- ment owing to lack of funds and is suggesting privately desirability of bolstering up some semblance of central government by continuing famine relief surtax under another name as to purpose, proceeds to be allocated to essential government expenses such as upkeep of ministries and payment of police under some sort of temporary foreign control to be exercised presumably through him, His panic is, think, mainly a financial one motived by fears of a raid on hia cuetoms. internal loan fund. In spite of civil war, customs revenues are pouring in end again beating all records so that he is likely to have a considerable surplus after meeting his consolidated internal loan service. This surplus he would like to retain for taking over service as soon as possible of 96,000,000 dollars loan which we of course hold should be dealt with in general debt consolidation arrangement with the rest
of unsecured debt.
If we desire to keep some kind of central govern- ment in being for the purpose of tariff conference we seem to be approaching moment when we shall have to try and devise means of finding funds for that purpose. No sources other than customs revenues are available. Three courses seem to be open to us, namely:
1. Enforcement of Washington surtaxes and advances by banks secured thereon,
2. Continuance of famine relief surtaxes for upkeep of central goverment services.
Release of Inspector General of Customs sur-
plus or a portion thereof for the same purpose.
Principal factor in deciding on course of action
must be importance of safeguarding ourselves as far as
possible against provincial opposition to provision
of free money to central government out of customs
revenues. To this end amount of funds provided must
be as (? small) as possible and their expenditure as
far as possible controlled.
(This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be returned to the Foreign Office if not required for official use.}
Decypher.
Sir R. Macleay,
(Peking)
23rd December, 1925.
1.40.p.m. 9.00.a.m.
23rd December, 1925.
25th December, 1925.
EURENCE.
Your telegram No. 375.
At present provinces, by illegal seizure of salt taxes, railwey funds etc., not to mention likin charges, are getting too much not too little of funds necessary for Central goverment purposes. alteration of Customs however (as distinct from Tariff) at present time might very well destroy principal remaining prop of Chinese unity and bulwark against Bolshevik influences. Great caution is needed in making of any such proposals.
In our view arrangements are possible which will breach the likin fortress on Aglen lines but we shall be a voice crying in the wilderness if we refuse to take into account necessity for doing something to mect growing bankruptcy of China. The last estimate is dollars 15 hundred million of unsecured debts including provincial debts which of course complicate solution of likin problem but not including railway bonds which will shortly be in pretty complete default unless there is a rapid change in the situation.
Customs tariff is the only source available at present for new income and we think a little over double the present revenue (excluding likin compensation
tax) is limit which can be prudently imposed as an interim measure from the point of view of reveme production.
Best Chinese opinion is by no means averse to maintenance or even strengthening of the present Customs régime and we are of opinion that even an indirect strengthening such as likin compensation collected by Customs but allocated to provinces coupled with measures for protection of funds allocated to consolidate debt which will be held largely by Chinese will benefit China as a whole,
It is to be borne in mind that practically the whole yield of any surtaxes likely to be granted during interim period will be absorbed by provincial allocations for likin compensation and by debt service. So far as we can judge provinces will not recent tariff increases in them- selves. They probably think that the foreign trader and not the consumer pays while in any case as they show by their own actions they are indifferent to imposition of burdens on the tax- payer. Recentment is likely therefore only to be provoked by creation of three surplus Customs revemes available for the sole benefit of the Central government. This situation may arise when tariff autonomy is due and foreign powers in framing their policies towards China may then have to face the dilemma that if as a result of tariff autonomy substantial surplus accrues to Central
government
"BETONTENT" ||
government there will be provincial resentment 441 while without such surplus Central government cannot hope to transfer itself into a reality. But before that time comes Central government,already shadowy, may suffer complete collapse, an event which might arouse Chinese to danger of total disruption and make the provinces willing to assign larger revenue for support of an effective Central govermont. hether or not such an opportunity of dealing with above dilema materi- lises we consider the only practicable way out will be through institution of likin compensation tax.
Our suggested figure for this tax will make proportion of taxation on imports to be allocated to provinces during interim period one quarter. We fear more is not at present practicable but on the advant of tariff autonomy increase in this proportion could be considered.
In any case we must proceed step by step and our proposals will make a start with principle of provincial allocation and will only be accepted by other foreign powers if they also include provision for debts.
We believe moreover that this latter feature will also be of real constructive benefit to China as a whole because (1) It will help to prevent relapse of China into Bolshevism by preserving
self respect of Chinese whose traditions and innate sense of honesty make them dislike the idea of debt repudiation despite Bolshevik promptings. (2)
Chinese credit must be rehabilitated some day if her prosperity is to return and measures of debt consolidation now proposed will maintain the fabric of her credit against the day that her credit can be usefully employed while they will not give her any surplus security which would enable her to indulge in immediate further borrowings. (3) It will strengthen Customs administration, de-centralisation of which would be likely to multiply intrigues end exploit both external and internal (Gr. omitted) and increase forces of disruption.
Maintenance of Customs administration is therefore in cur view of first class importance in itself and is also essential to success of other two main features of our proposals, namely likin compensation and debt consolidation. We believe moreover that generally speaking Chinese who fully realise their own defencelessness against military extortion are anxious in the interests of internal credit to maintain reality of present Customs control though of course the more Chinese the façade can be made the better.
We hope that in the light of this further
explanation.....
explanation His Majesty's Government will approve of our attitude and trust that we may be informed immediately if any modification is desired as questions of debts and Customs control are subjects of constant informal but important discussions.
This Dogument is the Property of His Britannic Majesty & Government, and should be returned to the Foreign Office if not required for official use.?
7/2/110.)
Cypher telegram to Sir R. Macleay (Peking).
Foreign Office. 31st December, 1925, 10,0 a.m.
No. 381.
Your telegram No. 543,
While fully realizing the dangers of the present situation and the possibility of still more serious developments, I an satisfied that you have correctly appreciated the causes of Sir Francis Aglen's panic and that we should avoid being stampeded by him into hastily adopting expedients which may postpone but will certainly aggravate the dangers with which we are threatened. It should be quite easy for the government to obtain enough money for current expences from customs revenues and you should therefore dis-
courage all proposals for continuing famine relief surtaxes or advances by berks or temporary foreign control.
The suggestion that a shadowy central government in Peking, incapable of functioning as a government
anywhere else in China, should be bolstered up with
foreign loans for the sole purpose of signing a
treaty with the foreign powers binding the whole of
China is a reductio ad absurdum of the policy of
intervention in China's domestic affairs (mainly in
the interests of foreign lenders) which has grown
up since the revolution of 1911, and of which the
principal feature is control of the Chinese customs
revenues
revenues by the machinery of the diplomatic bodyĄ 15 inspector general and custodian banks. In ite essentials this means that customs revenues collected all over China reach the hands of the Peking govern- ment only because the foreign powers have been prepared to use force against any Chinese official attempting to prevent their doing so. If this system is perpetuated and enlarged to deal with the much larger revonues accruing from surtaxes and later tariff autonomy and the loan services swelled by the inclusion of a thousand million dollars odd of unsecured debts, I fear that the present disastrous situation at Canton may be duplicated all over China, and the foreign secured bondholder may be dragged under by the load of unsecured debt tacked on to him and the customs administration which is the sheet anchor of our trede may be destroyed. The only way to guard against these dangers is to substitute for this system a policy of non interference in China's domestic affairs, the main feature of which as expleined in my telegram No. 375 would be the distribution of customs revenues among the provinces involving complete modification of existing control machinery.
In order to give effect to this new policy we contemplate that you should announce that His Majesty's Government can no longer support the system initiated by the agreement of January 30th, 1912, by which control of customs revenues is vested in the diplomatic body inspector general and
custodian
custodian banks and that in future the Chinese government should have full control of these reverues the custody of which should be in Chinese and not in foreign hands; that is to say the commissioner of customs at each port would hand over the revenues to his Chinese colleague, the superintendent, retaining possibly a percentage to be calculated for each port,
for the service of the foreign secured loans.
adoption of this policy would of course entail
relegation of unsecured debts to be dealt with out-
side the conference. Its advantages may be enumera-
ted as follows:-
1. It would be interpreted as a liberal
gesture and a recognition of China's right to be
mistress in her own house.
2. It would automatically achieve provincial
allocation. If the Chinese wish the revenues to
flow to Peking and be used for foreign and domestic loans they must make their own arrangements without
invoking foreign gunboats.
The customs administration would be seved
from destruction.
It might pacify Canton.
It would save the secured foreign bond- holder who otherwise will be dragged under by the
unsecured debtor.
6. It would facilitate abolition of likin. Please telegraph your considered observations on this proposed policy. The matter should be treated as confidential but you should take an
opportunity
opportunity of privately advising Sir Francis Aglen that he will not again be supported (as in 1921) in recisting orders of Chinese government as to disposal of customs revenues even though such orders involve reid on internal loan fund, and that in my opinion he should not undertake fresh responsibilities in regard to internal loans which he may not have power to carry out.
Repeat to Tokyo.
This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be returned to the Foreign Office if not required for official use.
(F.6117/2/10).
Cypher telegram to Sir R.Macleay, (Peking),
Foreign Office,
December 31st 1925. 10.0 a.m.
You will have seen from my immediately preceding telegram that we are inclined to make considerable sacrifices to reach a practical policy of provincial allocation. In other words we consider that Peking'B reign is over and that independent or semi-independent administrations are forming round principal revenue- collecting centres, viz., Manchuria, Tientsin, Hankow, Shanghai, Canton.
Are we to continue to support a fictitious government at Feking? Or are we to break with the past and through allocation of revenues attempt to assist evolution on federal basis?
Choice of one of these alternatives is essential to stabilise our China policy, and I request your observations by telegraph.
(This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be returned to the Foreign Office if not required for official use.
FFERENCE
Decypher.
Sir R. Macleay. (Peking).
January 6th, 1926.
12.5 p.m.
9.00 a.m.
January 6th, 1926.
January 6th, 1926.
Your telegram No. 381.
Your proposal to revert to pre-1912 customs system and to drop any debt consolidation by confer- ence appeared to us dangerously destructive in existing conditions; see my telegram No. 2.
Debt consolidation has been regarded since the start by all parties to conference including chinese as an essential object and we have, in accordance with your instructions, acquiesced in this speculation; at the same time we have kept likin abolition and compen. sation to provinces to the front in spite of indiffer- ence or worse of other powers. If we now oppose debt consolidation the hope of carrying any likin dues plans would be remote. Such action would probably lead to breakdown of conference resulting in revival of demand for unconditional tariff autonomy and
practically repudiation of foreign debts. Incidentally we should lay ourselves open to a charge of bad faith.
(This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be returned to the Foreign Office if not required for official use.
Decypher.
Sir R. Macleay, (Peking).
5th January 1926.
5.35 p.. 5th January 1926.
3.30 p.m. 5th January 1926.
Your telegrams Nos. 381 and 382.
Change of policy which you appear to contemplate
in regard to control and distribution of customs
revenues and treatment of unsecured debts and your suggestion that we should practically cease to regard Peking as the political capital of China, appear to me to be based on a misconception of the actual conditions and on erroneous assumptions in regard to attitude of provinces, various factions and military leaders to- wards these questions.
(1) While it is true that present Central goverN- ment is a mere shadow with practically no effective authority or constitutional status, Poking is still considered and treated by all component parts of the Kepublic including opponente of present goverment (with the exception of Red faction in control of Canton) as the seat of government and diplomatic capital of China, where her foreign relations are and
It is significant must necessarily be conducted.
that while independent or semi-independent military leaders may and do appropriate state revenues and otherwise defy authority of Central goverment,
have .***
have not, with the exception of cigarette tax ingle which is a special case, attempted to repudiate treaties or failed to recomize Ching's forel obligations, and 11 a dispute arises in the area under their control in regard to interpretation of foreign rights under trenties which cannot be arranged locally, they refer it as a matter of course to Peking to be discussed by Ministry of soreign Affairs with Legations concerned.
Leaving aside Bolshevik domination in Canton and some other places there is no question bo-day of a definite political cleavage between North and South as seemed likely to develop in the early years of the Republic, but there is a growing tendency for the country to split up into zones controlled by inde- pendent military leaders purely in their own self- interest. It must however be borne in mind that de- gree of control, which independent military leaders or factions at present exercise over these groups, provinces or smaller areas, is constantly changing and liable to sudden collapse and that they are no more representative of local public opinion than recent goverments in Peking, to which it has been the practice of independent military chiefs to accredit official representatives, So long as present con- ditions of civil strife continue there seem to me no grounds for the assumption that if China were encourag- ed to revert to fiscal system in force before 1911, military lenders who happen to control a large treaty
port, would allow customs revenues collected there to be distributed to any other province or part of it to go to Central government. The reversion to such an arrangement would render any systematized likin abolition much more difficult if not impossible, and would encourage interior provinces not in possession of a large treaty port, to secure their share of taxation of foreign trade by levying all kinds of additional duties. Moreover in some cases authority to control treaty port may not be the same as that controlling provincial capital; while financial prizes offered by possession of ports, would be likely to promote civil wars and political disintegration.
I am in entire agreement with view that future of China lies in evolution on a federal and decentral- ized basis, but necessity of a Central government for conduct of the nations' foreign relations must remain and is, I believe, recognized by all Chinese. _ta further of opinion that the only prospect of tariff conference achieving any useful result is for Powers to continue to treat with whatever goverment may emerge in Peking, and to refrain from dealing with independent leaders and provincial factions. Such action by encouraging disintegration and secession
would be disastrous to our interests and to difficult
and delicate task of treaty revision which is now in
progress.
While therefore I fully realize objections to
bolstering up a Central government by such doubtful
means as continuance of famine relies surtax I think we should do all we can to assist Chinese in endeavours they are now making to establish some sort of a govern- ment representative of various factions, and it might well be worth considering whether foreign delegations could not issue some form of public appeal to the country, inviting different leaders to sink differences and unite to for coalition goverment to conclude work of con- ference as first step towards re-organization of country in the general interests of China as a whole. Only objection I can see at present to such a move would be opportunity which might thus be afforded to anti-foreign Extremists to raise the cry of foreign intervention in China's internal affairs.
2. It must be remembered that practical effect of 1913 agreement has been to place control of allo- cation of surplus customs revenues entirely in the hands of inspector-general, who is the servant of the Chinese government, and diplomatic body have publicly declared that they have no treaty right to decide use to which customs surplus revenues shall be put by Chinese govern- ment, or power under 1912 arrangement to allocate such surplus. Except therefore for maintenance the arrange- ment whereby in order to safeguard foreign loans and indemnities, whole revenue collected by maritime customs administration is temporarily lodged in two foreign banks in Shanghai mi arrangement which we recognized
will have to be modified by admission of Chinese banks in
foreign control of this revenue or its expenditure. I do not therefore see why announcement of with- drawal of His Majesty's Covernment's support of 1900 agreement contemplated in paragraph 4 of your telegram No. 381 could be regarded as a liberal gesture.
Since threat of Sun Yat Sen in (? 1923) (see annual report of that year) there has not been any further attempt on the part of independent military leader or province to interfere with meritime customs nor to my knowledge have there been any other com- plaints by Chiness of inequity of existing system of custody and control whereby surplus after all the prior foreign obligations have been met has been hypothecated by mandate of central government for service of internal loan nor has any claim been put forward for distribution of surplus among provinces. The only real grievance provincial authorities have in respect of existing system of collection and distribution is that proceeds of transit pass fees levied by customs in lieu of likin go to central government instead of to them and this is precisely what we hope to be able to remedy, see conference telegram No. 31. If central government is to be maintained at all
must be able to count on fixed state of revenues and why should His Majesty's Government promote process of disintegration by facili tating seizure by provinces of revenues which are definitely allocated to the state under the consti- tution? So far from saving customs administration
I fear system you contemplate may well wreck it and destroy the only foundation on which some form of fiscal nity of China could be built. Moreover if customs revenues disappear as far as central government are concerned salt and railway revenues could hardly be preserved and whole structure of Chinese centralization of finance would be dissolved with disastrous results to very large British interests concerned.
As long as Canton remains under direct influence and control of Soviet agents no such concession
in the matter of customs revenue is likely to satisfy them.
I propose to deal with question of unsecured debta in another telegram.
This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be
returned to the Foreign Office if not required for official use.]
Cypher telegram to Lir Racleay (Peking),
Foreign Offico, 13th January, 1936.
8.45 p.m.
Your telegrems los.1 en 2 (of January 5th: British policy at Tariff Conference).
Cur change of policy was only put forward tentatively. There is no intention of springing it on the conference. If adopted it would have to be done in consultation with the Powers probably in London. No charge of bad faith could therefore justly be 191d.
Without wishing to minimise the force of your arguments against it we are not yet convinced that it saould be definitely abandoned before it has been probed a little further.
While we fully appreciate your efforts to secure abolition of likin and shall welcome any success you may obtain in that direction it seems to us that the grant of tariff autonomy in the immediate future has radically changed the situation and has to a large extent relegated likin and unsecured debts into the background, The question which now appears to us to overshadow all others is whether or not the vastly increased revenues resulting from tariff autonomy shall continue to be collected and controlled by the
Powers.....
Powers for t: bencfia of Peking. Will the
provinces in the altered circumstances stand this?
Will it not provoke a direct attack on the customs
to be followed by a similar attack on the salt and
even on the whole system of extraterritoriality?
We are fully alive to the dangers of the proposed
change of policy which you rightly fear but is not
this a far greater dangerî If we are to abandon the
precent proposal you do not tell us how to guard against such a danger? Or do you consider we are
roatly overestimating danger? If so, give reasons so that we may finally decide whether or not to
pursue this idea further.
Further telegram follows giving our views at
greater length.
This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be returned to the Foreign Office if not required for official use.]
(F.52/10/10).
Cypher telegram to Sir R.lc.cleay, (Peking),
Foreign Office, January 13th 1926.
11.50 p.m.
My immediately preceding telegram.
If our view is, as you say, based on misconception of actual conditions, it would be better to see wherein difference of opinion lies rather than for us to argue points of detail.
Our position is this:
(a) We are apprehensive lest in placing an over- whelming charge upon the very large new revenues accru- ing under interim surtaxes and later under tariff autonomy and in trying to make charge effective by maintaining or strengthening foreign control our action might, in present state of nationalist feeling, be re- sented as unwarrantable interference in Chinese domestic affairs; and lest we might be placing too heavy a re- sponsibility on customs administration and so jeopardis- ing its existence.
(b) We fear further that such a charge being largely in the interest of unsecured debts end to that extent solely for the benefit of the Central Government and its purposes might arouse resentment in China at large both against the Central Government for the time Jeing in office and against the foreign powers who alone have made possible both the raising and consolidating of these almost wholly disreputable loans.
Case against huge annual charge on customs is well put in paragraph 1 of your Conference telegram
ito, siginleg 90A.
VEROL DISANgunədə vājoda juomis sealÍJ
No.23 and is all the stronger if charge is for un-
secured debts end not likin.
(c) We have no wish to see Central Government
at Peking disappear or formelly to recognise provincial
independence, We think however that only sound
arrangement is that Central Government should exist
by voluntary consent of provinces rather than rest on
outside support. Might not withdrawal of support promote thief Our point is admirably stated about the middle of paragraph 5 of your Conference telegram No.31.
(d) We regerd Canton as a good illustration of the evils inherent in present régime (1) because the boycott is ruining Hongkong and our shipping trade, (2) because it seems to foreshadow what may easily
happen elsewhere.
We are not convinced that Canton is merely Bolshevik and therefore alien to the rest of China and not Emonable to the same treatment, Though boycott is prompted by Bolsheviks does dos root not lie rather in past refusal to allot dus share of customs to Canton? Would not concession in matter of custans revenue8 tend to promote settlement by strengthening hand of Right or even Left Kuomintang who are unessy under Soviet domiration? And if Conference persisto in present course is there not real danger of ultimato scizure of custome revenues or establishment of rival local custom house at Canton and reproduction of Canton situation elsewhere? Present policy of Conference recms to us to be direct descendant of policy of inter-
interference that has been largely responsible for present position at Canton (see annual report 1923 Sections 151-157).
Principal differences between you and us thus seem to amount to this:-
(a) Attitude of Chinese to Foreign Control. You say (Conference telegram No.31) that "best Chinese opinion is not averse to maintenance or strengthening of customs régime which protects revenues against militarists and that debt consolidation under Bystem of customs charge and control would be generally regarded as of benefit to China as a whole. Now how far is "best Chinese opinion" really representative of China or how far merely of Poking? How far is it qualified to speak for and guarantee the acquiescence Viewed from this end
of nationalists and provinces?
we seem to be face to face with a strong widespread and growing nationalist movement, not confined to a few students but embracing Chinese of diverse classes and opinions, and aiming at total elimination of foreign interference. It has every appearance of being the real force of the future in China, Do we over-estimate its influence?
No doubt any government with which we negotiate being human will welcome foreign control in its own interest. But in view of nationalist aspirations have present goverment shown any views on the subject? if present control is to continue, ought it not at least to be only at their own open request.
hink whey would resent the new policy we are dis- cusɛing?
(b) Attitude of Provinces,
Your view is tet provinces are already getting more than their due share of revenue, that their only real grievance is the almost negligible one of transit pass dues, that present system is not generally regarded as inequitable and that there is no general genuine demand for distribution of customs revenues or immediate threat of seizure. Our criticism of this is that it seems prima facie to under-estimate the significance of Canton and what it stands for (see above) and hardly accords with your telegram No.282 of 1924 (Chang Tso Lin), yourdespatch No.843 of 1925 (Wu Pei Fu) and your telegram No.11 and paragraph 2 of Canton telegram No.2 of this year. Are you still convinced that you are right? If so, it obviously radically affects our whole proposal and shows that we made it under an entire misconception of internal political situation. We therefore wish to be absolutely clear on this point which is fundamental.
To sum up, the fact that China is in a position to exact concessions from the powers at a time when she is less than ever before in a position wisely to use them no doubt makes any policy a choice of evils. you see great dangers in our policy, we fear even greater from the longer point of view in yours.
healthy develop-
We had thought that ours might promote
ments, perhaps in the distant future. We fear yours
may be too much rooted in the past, end may achively promote disruption. We are definitely apprehensive that your policy might wreck customs machinery by overloading it and our hope was that oure might save it by lightening its responsibilities.
5. In view of the impracticability at the present time of a constructive policy the moet we can do 16 to guard against certain obvious dutgers. There- fore our immediato object mot Sa (1) te remedy the Canton situation and prevent repetition elsewhere, (2) to save customs collecting machinery and (3) to safe.
guard the foreign secured debtor. Other things are
subsidiary. It is true that you adduce weighty reasons
against our proposals. But we are not yet convinced
that your arguments are final. The dangers ahead of
us are very real, and we comot afford to leave any
possible avenue unexplored. If, therefore, you still
maintain your objectious against our scheme we are
bound to look to you for some elternative. We frankly
do not like that which you have put up.
6. You are doubtless fully conscious of another possibility, nemely that United States goverment will soon realise, if they have not already done so, that Conference is at present needing For complete forein Echtrol over new revenues, a thing hitherto totally opposed to their principles. We may well find our--- selves faced with an American initiative forcing us ultimately to follow instead of leading in some such policy as we are now discussing with you.
We therefore feel that the present lull in the Conference negotiations should be used to coneider very carefully whither we are heading; and to satisfy ourselves that a policy of drift, if it proves to be the lesser of two evils, is the right one and will not ultimately land us on rocks that might with greater foresight have been avoided.
264/9/10
IS. of S.
1.5. of S.
[+/-State.****
HONG KONG
22th January
22 JAN 1006
Special Tariff Conferen
Ls. Copy
see. No.3.
Minister, heting relating
Turkey to British Policy at —
Previous Paper
This continues the discussions
to 70's proposed
hearted passage
bsequent Paper
45% 1726 Arrow 2.2831
special withest to us.
Bee of State
2579/26 G.H. 25.1.26
You have wen to prosions
like to are
this. It is pir h. Macleay'
anowar to the 8.0 Telajam coking
fim what alternative policy
he affected
he did not
afree with their properols.
Beeby bee of Blate
any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. 72644/8/19
And address—not to any persch by name, but to-
the Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. t.
THE Under-Secretary of State for Friga
presents his
compliments to under feiretary
the Glouces, and, by direction of the Secretary of State,
transmits herewith copie of the under-mentioned paper.
Foreign Office,
22nd Jany 1926.
Reference to previous correspondence:
752/10/10 16 Janclosure. Description of
Name and Date.
R. Mackay Pekin q
Delegation
Jany 1926.
ce letter
Subject.
British froking at
Spomine. Tariff
Compereme
14 (13341) 7/25 (2)
Similar letter sent to
India office
(13551) 9/25
This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be returned to the Foreign Office if not required for offdink namā me
Sir R.Macleay, (Poking) 22 JAN 1926
Decypher.
January 20th 1926.
9.0 p.m. 9.0 a.m.
January 30th 1026.
January 21st 1926.
CONFERENCE.
Your telegram No.13.
We do not propose unless you desire us to do so to elaborate in greater detail, arguments in regard to objections and dangers involved in new policy you suggest. To sum up position as we see it you are taking too long a view in disregarding immediate consequences which would in our considered opinion gravely prejudice prospect of ultimate restoration of unity on federal or any other basis and be dangerously destructive to whole edifice of Chinese government's finance and to customs administration in both of which British interests in Far East are so deeply concerned.
You asked for alternative policy and we suggest that this may be found on line of insisting as far as may be possible on provincial endorsement of any arrangements made by Conference and avoiding undue commitment in regard to custody of surtax revenue for likin abolition and "other purposes including debt consolidation. We may then be able if the dangers you anticipate materialize later on to dizsociaba ouzesives from assisting Central Government in collection of surplus revenue in face of provincial opposition and
if necessary endeavour to bargain with provinces for service debt charges. We do not consider anything
is to be gained by trying to (grp. undec.) details of such a policy now include extent to which it may or may not be possible to differentiate between old and new charges and we would urge that we should rather wait and see how conference develops bearing principles of your ideas in mind. We have ourselves been at work for some time on concrete (? grp. ontd.) which we shall shortly lay before other delegations for levying likin compensation tax at rate of one-third of imort duty proceeds of which will be controlled by Chinese likin compensation furd committes with fullest pro- vincial reprezentation and distributed by latter to provinces who would thus receive one-quarter of total proceeds of tax collected by customs from (gtp.unoc.) whatever they might amount to. In the meantime Chinese delegation are acting in accordance with our views in marking time and refusing to negotiate peading establishment of a more representative government and when negotiations are resumed we will keep question of ways und means of securing provincial acceptance of proposed arrangements constantly in the foreground. We gather danger you anticipate to customs may be zumed up under three main hoads:
1. Attitude or provincial enthorities or in
other worda of leading provincial militarists like Sun,
Wa Fel-fu and Charg.
2. Attitude of nationaliste, that is to Bay of
studenta
students and intelligentsia and:
That of Cantolere.
As regards 1 While it is impossible to be con- vinced of anything in Chinese affairs at present we believe that you have altogether over-estimated pro- vincial demands for distribution of custom revenues in which Chinese in many large provincial centres are now deeply interested through internal loans. Provinces have never shown any hostility to meeting debt charges out of customs revenue and we think that we should see what reception our proposals meet with amongst provinces before considering alternatives. foreign delegations could agree on a general plan in- cluding a large measure of provincial allocation in form of likin compensation on lines of our proposals it might be possible to give publicity to general out- lines of scheme and watch reaction in provinces thereto.
As regarde 2. We are in agreement as to existence of widespread nationalist movement aiming at total elimination of foreign interference in China's affairs and of importance of giving sympathetic consideration to this popular feeling. This movement however has not yet attacked existing arrangements for collecting customs revenue which in existing conditions in China by saving funds from grasp of militarists are obviously for benefit of China as a whole and we believe that it would be a disastrous misteke to consider surrender of these revenues to be squandered on civil wars before there is at least some definite indication of widespread objectio
to existing system. The proper way of mesting this nationalist movement eo far as customs are concerned will in our opinion lie in gradual increase in pro- portion of Chinese in customs personnel rather than by suddenly reverting at present moment to status quo ante 1911.
As regards 3. We do not think that you are correct in holding that attitude adopted three years ago towards Canton claim for share of customs revenue is responsible for present trouble in Hongkong arising out of Bolshevik incitement consequent on Shanghai shooting incident last summer nor do we believe that immediate declaration of new policy in regard to collection of customs revenue would have effect of remedying that trouble. As regards Canton's attitude towards conference negotiations His Majesty's Consul General is of the opinion that local authorities will continue to respect existing foreign loan charges but will insist on receiving proceeds of any tariff in- creases; while extreme Kuo-min-tang elements generally are of course constantly advertising their hostility to holding of conference at all and their insistence on inmediate promulgation of unconditionel tariff autonomy.
We think that conference proposals should be put before Canton as before other semi-independent pro- vincial authorities and if majority of provinces come in and Canton refuse to do so we may then have to con- sider whether it may not be feasible either to ignore
or to make separate arrangements for Canton administra- tion if such arrangements can be effected without un- duly embarressing ourselves elsewhere in China. 470 It is unlikely however that Canton would wish to be differentiated permanently from rest of China so that any proposal for their exclusion should be only a temporary arrangement.
As to your enquiry whether withdrawal of our support might not promote establishment of government existing by consent of provinces Central Government have of course for years past been receiving no free money from customs revenue so that we are not afford- ing them in this respect any support which we might withdraw.
As regards your enquiry whether Central Govern- ment themselves are or are not in favour of foreign control we believe you have misumlerstood the position and altogether over-rated measure of foreign control of customs revenue likely to be secured through con- ference while there appears to be some confusion of thought between us as to what we mean by foreign con- trol which may be analysed as follows: (a) foreign assistance in collection of revenues involves handling of actual funds by customs (grp. undec.) which would represent reverting to status quo ante 1911; (b) foreign custodianship namely lodging of customs funds in banks beyond reach of military; (c) foreign control of allocation of surtax of customs revenue which is now practically non-existent except in so
far as it is exercised through inspector general under Chinese government a mandate.
We are not aware of any demands from any quarter for for (a) which would mean under existing conditions in China,dissolution of Chinese government's revemics and wholesale repudiation of Chinese national debt. Chiness demands with regard to (b) namely par- ticipation of Chinese banks in custodianship arrangements will probably be reasonably and easily met.
With regard to (c) while it is true that Sun Yat Sen in 1923 objected to earmarking of customs surplus for service of internal loan and that the assumption of these responsibilities by inspector general has been severely criticised by foreign holders of earlier obligations, it is unlikely that present occupant of post, who la convinced that he has thereby secured Chinese support for his administration could be in- duced to resign (? his) trust while Chinese banka would probably not permit Chinese government to divest him of it by mandate, It is, however, improbable that service of new charges to be imposed on surtax on revenue will be entrusted to his sole care (in the same way as theot)old and we ourselves shall do nothing to encourage such a course. As regards the United States' ettitude the American delegation have so far been protagonists of foreign control for debt con- solidation which we for our part have throughout treated as a cecondary consideration to that of likin abolition.
70 7278/10/10
CIRCULATION :--
1 U.S. of S.
for G. Grinder 2...
Perry! [15-of S,"
Path U.S. of S.
- of State.
Previous Paper
may be p
copy above to
Conf. ff.
- 2 feb. H
Subsequent Paper
HONG KONG
24th January
28 JAN 026
Adunal his applici for permission
to purchase ammun ? from Naval Authentic
Plato Subus obins
32 48 11/25 Harrow E.232
To the argument's
adidas Cl
letter it might be aprind
(') it is doubtful if the antagonian of the
Caution fort could be increased :
inaction on
part way merely increase
them contempt for
(2) he 52870 the for sets out the seuncio
(3) the sur7o the for discounts this
objection in advance
On the then Land
it in deare
from the trims of the Wls exchanged with Inf hunchay (58020+58550) that 70. have gone with this affile in an altitudes favorette
& 18hong, and sine
They now
find themarle unath
I dons fel
sha be justified
pressing them.
? Wel as in aft
as parfarea & 70, adus we
La soy further communication
on this subject, please quote
F 278/10/10
and address-
not to any person by name, but to
"The Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office,
London, S.W.L.
identiel and Urgent.
28 JAN 1996
FOREIGN OFFICE.
27th January, 1926.
HBecker 271/26
(on simping up hibrose toget his consumen
in diffe. I lean that this Callin in
outcome of a long debati in 7o. : so
A fet the decision changed.
I also learn
that the Redo
cow vesz
Hainan- which
place for cecruiting domestic servante for malaga).
The F.O. must decide.
G.G. 29.1.26
Bearby Bee of State in
In reply to your letter No. 0.1671/26 of the 22nd instant on the subject of Admiral Li's application for permission to purchase supplies of ammunition etc. from the naval authorities in Hongkong, I am directed by Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain to refer to Sir R. Macleay's telegram No. 545 of December 23rd last, forwarded to your department in Foreign Office letter P 6144/194/10 of December 30th.
2. The arguments therein adduced against providing Admiral Li with munitions apply as strongly now as they did a month ago. To the se arguments should be added the probability that any overt assistance given by His Majesty's Goverment to Admiral Li would only serve to intensify the antagonism of the Canton Government and even to add to its national strength.
In any case,
it is most unlikely that Admiral li with one small oruiser
could take any decisive action against Canton; (3),
and in view of
the proved unreliability of the Chinese navy and the frequency with which ite units have changed their political allegiance, it is by no means impossible that ammunition supplied to the "Tung Chi" might ultimately be used by a mutinous crew in favour of the Cantonese nationalista.
3. Copies of this letter are being sent to the Admiralty, the War Office and the Director of Naval Intelligence.
er Secretary of State,
Your obedient Servant,
Groogs Mounsey
alal office.
Paraphrase telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor of Hong Kong.
Sent 4.50 p.m., 29th January,1926.
In consultation with the Foreign Office I have
given careful consideration to the matter submitted to
me in your telegram of the 19th of January.
the disadvantages of complying with the request of Admiral
chuckburghli, be: -
(1) Breach of our obligations in regard to Ams
Wilson. Embargo.
(2) The moral effect which would be likely to be caused in Canton and elsewhere.
We very much wish to assist the Colony but we feel that the disadvantages (particularly as it would be difficult for Li with one ship, to take effective action, and in view of the possibility that he might go over to the other side) are such as to outweigh the advantages of giving him the suggested assistance.
To af the fontrally in terms of this.
Paraphrase telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor of Hong Kong.
Sent 4.50 p.m., 29th January,1926.
pinatà, vha
In consultation with the Foreign Office I have given careful consideration to the matter submitted to
me in your telegram of the 19th of January. Among the disadvantages of complying with the request of admiral Libe:
(1) Breach of our obligations in regard to Arma Embargo.
(2) The moral effect which would be likely to be caused in Canton and elsewhere.
We very much wish to assist the Colony but we feel that the disadvantages (particularly as it would be difficult for Li with one ship, to take effective action, and in view of the possibility that he might go over to the other side) are such as to outweigh the advantages of giving him the suggested assistance.
adi vel stadů. To pradorasƐ oďt mor? margofod szaziqara¶
pool gaeli to zoazeveð að? ot asino fod
avad i sol110 apiste› sốt đêłw noitativnavo ni
of bestimise tattam náð at noitarskianas futstad nevin
Czarnet le 1301 add to mongoled THOY Bİ SE
Levimba to Jesuper odi deiw yndyiqmoo Ze nonatravbanib edi
BOZA OF DIANET NË KUI‡anilos que te doastă (I)
Joette Lavon edr (2)
.Tozrenie bau noj nat ni boRNAD
WW II CHOžeŭ and satens að duże doưm year of
[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be returned to the Foreign Office if not required for official use.
(F.278/10/10).
Cypher telegram to Sir R. Macleay (Peking).
Foreign Office, January 27th 1926. 3.40 p.m.
Hoitoa svijestio salat ot,qida uno d‡iw II TOT SINGITYJE
ai rut bị để đo để đoạt tài khoiason and to rely at Bi
to usgajnavba sili dva natum of na dora exa (ukla zadło salt
· ODKAZE İBNa bojuszam AIR MAN naivin
Hongkong has again raised question of desirability of supply of ammunition to Miral
Li who represents himself as able to pay and acting
on orders of Peking Minister of Marine.
Colonial Office have been referred to your telegram No.545 (76144/194/10 of 23rd December) and any departure from policy of strict Leutrality has been deprecated.
REGISTERED No... C. 2365 S
NOTICE TO BINDER
PLEASE LEAVE SPACE HERE FOR INSERTION OF & SHEETS
From.....
Date 28/ 26
Subject Canton Vilnation.
{Paper not available at time of binding}
HONG KONG
7285/255/10
CIRCULATION :--
U.S.bf S.
ar US of S.
of State.
Previous Paper
China Committee
has care famation of the
relating to the
This has already affeand in
tan Press.
This Committee will matterally
itself with Hong Kong.
There are already
a number of
questions in Parliament about
and wary sign of public
discussion on the situation. Jou isill comember that the Governor
48M 11/25 HALTOR
"Cametly hoped
that it comes
crisis at it. Kong might be
teht out
of the newspapers as: incourage Canion to persist in
Cublicatitis would
boycose." ( 57064/(c). So will
continual advertisement of the success
the strike Committe
of the Russians.
in getting negotiations broken off.
I suggest that the S.ff.
should sitter with himself on
allow me
to write confidan tially
to Fond Southborough, Enclosing a
Why & 57064/25, calling his
attention
to the last sentence,
Darying that,
that public discussion of
avoided,
a situation cannot be
Mhe. Amely hopes he will
when opportunity offers treep tho
the matter even
aspect of the
the Governor before his
Committee.
Bee of plate.
I think Land Bouthborough's
tention should be called it la
point mentioned by Bis ffrindle.
Angle 12 5. f my sig
Не Вескит
Fcb: 2321928
Dear Secuting of bule.
Thank you for Joa
of gesterday
for her kine, reference
of law I
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have already had differellig
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for particularly, refer namch,
mauthorized publication
I hope these ima
ingenious action
tut this
Cook may
of thing in The delinquent the Chinence of
astonished Jun Kanill
Aur fur in Aplanation..
diffually
have représenbelwa
Ja treased apfrein
sins lance,
Свольный кру
Cinema4x4
informative fun
refrennetwis
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have lows their
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aught to see!
for kuns I with de
awk Relom.
but with
ast from
L. J. Amery met.
in any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. 1-185/153
and address-not to any person fy name, but to--
Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S. W. 1.
THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his
compliments to The
for the Colonies
under Sciretary of State
and, by direction of the Secretary of State,
transmits herewith copies of the under-mentionen-papa
Foreign Office,
IC. 2451
FEB 1926
Reference to previous correspon
Description of Enclosure.
Name and Date.
Subject.
The China
Committee
14 (13341) 7/25 (2)
(13843) 10/25
Formation of the
"China Committee.
Similar letter sent to Be and of hade
Department of overseas have 心 *ས་རི་ག༧༥
1(x_288/295/10)
Telephone
Regent 6080,
ŢI ORINA COMMITTER
39, St. James's Street,
22nd Jennɛry, 1926.
The very serious condition of political ›nd commerciɛl affairs in China is the cruse of much ɑnxiety to British manufacturers and tr.dere both at home nd in the Fer Boat, many of whom are suffering he› vy losses end who, generally, see no prospect of any improvement in the outlook.
Representatives of sommeroiul and industri:1 bodies intereste in Chin huve been watching the development of the situɛtion with greve apprehenɛion at a recent meeting they decided, with the gener: 1 resent of the bodies concerned, to appoint & Committee to be oɛlled "THE CHIN COMMITTEE" to study ɛnd match the political position in the Fur Beet ›nd to make such represent tions from time to time to His Mɛ jesty's Government as the airouzet, noes may đem nd,
The Committe» feel confident thịt the Secret:.ry of State will be glad to know that such a represent tive body has been brought together and I beg to encloɛe, for Sir naten Chamberlɛin's informati n, a list of the DƐRON Of the meab re of this Committee. In addition, power has been tɛken to co-opt »ny other person or persons of large experience in the Ohim trade.
The Ocmmittee desire to render &reistands
to His Majesty's Government and venture to hope thɛt ider-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
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the Secretɛry of Atute will impose upon ite member a any duty advisory or otherwire, which their experience will onɛble them tổ perform.
I have been nomin:ted Chairman of the Committee.
Youre ate..
(Signed) Southborough.
PONOŽKOKIS viedi delav ‚#%EwIndło to yzonivă: přib yas
Voortbound add to muretudo bet, nimom used svud i
....STO #TROY
„ÉZUS KOEKJUrð (human)
CHINA COMMITTEE
The Rt. Hon. Lord Southborough, F.0.,0.0.B....0.0,M.G....G.C.V.D.,
K.0.3.I.
Mr. David Landɛls
representing The Chin Association.
Mr. G. Horren Swire)
Sir K. Cunliffe-Owen, Bart..) Col. 0.0. Armstrong, D.8,0. }
Ixepresenting the eder: tion of
British Industries,
Kr. 1. Andereon
Mr. 8. Dodwell
Mr. R.D. Holt
representing the London Chamber of Comer an
representing the Chamber of shipping.
Sir Bewton J. Stebb representing Hongzong -nd Shɛnghỉi
Banking Corporation.
Mr. L., Leafe
Lt. Gen. Bir George Mɛedonogh
G.B.E..1.0.B.,K.C.M.G.,
x-officio nombers of the Chins
„dvisory Committee.
(Do-optál.)
(00-opted.)
Bir R. Weley Cohen, ¿si: tie Petroleum Co. Ltd., Me for V.B. Hɛthon, 0.M.G., Pekin Syndicate
BEORKT/RT
Kr. W.V. Jenkina,
Feder: tion of British Industries
(Far East Section)
7:96/288/10
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Ky Lord,
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{LDOT "FISD*
29th Juneɛry, 1926,
I am directed by Secretɛry Sir /maten dhɛaberlɛ in to Łoknowledge the receipt of your letter of Januɛry 27th informing him of the establishment of "The Chin: Committee” under your shɛiraɛnship.
MINU GET Baituono :qezi
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Bir noten Chamberlɛin welcomes the appointment of so influential a committee to study ɛnd wɛ teh the politia:1 position in the Far Best in the interorts of British commercišā and industri: 1 bodies scanesteɛ with chime, ind will glɛdly swɛil himself of their offer to so-operate with His Mɛjørty's Government. In this difficult time it behovaR
ali persane with sposiɛl experience to o atribute to the eɛmaan ateok of jdena and knowledge on the Chinɛ question, end he will welcome any pristies1 ; në constructive rakomos which the wide experience embodied in your committee mɛy iron time to time suggeɛt far the relief of the present serious situation.
THL THH DEE
My Lord,
Your obedient Servsat,
(5... GEORGE MOUNBEY,
ht Honourable
Southborough, P ̧* ̧.0.0.1.0.0.M...@...,0,0.7.0.,K,4.8.1.,
The ChɛirmaLER,
The Ching Committen,
St. James'a Street.
22nd February 1926
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„noitutio
My dear Southborock
I have read with very great interest of the appointment of the China Committee, of which you are Chairman. The Foreign office have already witten to you in the name of Hia Xajesty's Government welcoming the appointment of the Committee, and I need hardly tell you that I agree with everything they say.
There is just one point which I feel I ought to mention to you. Some time ago (in December) I had occasion to communicate with the Governor of Hong rong about a telegram which had appeared in the Times dealing with the financial position there. In his reply, which I enclose, the Governor said "I earnestly hope that these matters may be kept out of the news- papers as publication would encourage Canton to persist in boycott." I quite recognise that public discussion of so
■erious a situation as that in Hone Kong and South China cannot be avoided but I hope that, when opportunityoffers, you will
#Id vinozol
,6987 Lapoð VRID MET
Leather 1571
to 2451 Ha.
keep the aspect of the matter mentioned by the Governor before your Committee.
"Yo mund
L. 9. A.
J. Harding.
Shawkburgh.
Cirinale. 16
eld sosol
MARTÍ VÍÐ SET
1993 22:00 Ridb sdt
«'nomat „18 21.
22/2/26 487
Fly-Gore.
'larendon.
I have read
freat interest
the appointment
tom Load South borough,
CB, Scar, gevo
For hit 18 the (57064)
The China Commannilte
Chariman. The 7o. have
written to
of Hug welcoming the
Will you
Clu, and I wred
Lardly say that I everything they say.
there is just
fount which
I feel I ought to mention t
Some time ago (in December) of rad
occasion
communicate with the for.
of Houghing about telepon which
had affessed in the Tamen dealing with
The Imanciest position there, he his reply, which Ievelove,
ufisting to the breakdown of the theme tuomet, the for. said " I carently hope that there
be kept out of the newspapers
as publication would encourage Canton
to persist in bogestt."
I quiti recognise
that intlic discussion
so serious
se Puation
that in Ha & S. Chuin cannot be avoided
hat I hope that, when offortunity offers, you with Keep the aspect of the mother mentioned by i'm for. before your
Committee.
(SSS) R.S.A
F0439/1/10
RCULATION :
Beckett Elle
U.S. of S.
Sirh. Grindle
U.S. of S.
U.S. of S.
stary of State.
Previous Paper
Subsequent Paper
11 Harro 1.2332
HONEKONS
Canton situation Самой
18 FEB 1926
See also 3105, 3807, +4071.
The F.O. memo.
Very fairly
puts the position
and includes the arquenculó
advanced from tium Klime
In Appendix XIX will be found.
(paraphrase; of the HK tel. Of the
for posed
6th Feb. which it was
3026 15 circulate the Cabinet.
In ten circumstance it would not
appear that from the political point of view
a separate Co. meme is required but it could no doubt be Scriable for.
mems. dealing
the financial aspect the circulated
to the Cabinet. This however canont
be prepared unter a
to the tel. which was
On the loan bp.
in riccircl
recently sent & Cor.
art Lopeful and
The result
examinadesa Las
of virtually In the policy of holding true that they
out all allinating
looking further into the
question of organising
Countă. boycot
an intanational
but in view of the difficully If securing the adhesion of other Powers, and artably of Japan America who
benefiting by present conditions, the propeds
of this letter indicates that litte is likely
Itý examination.
Alltough HK has stressed the violation
and Ticulain Treaties (Appendix
Is afford
Suggestions
the tapis.
instanu,
the possibility of
Nothing, fr
revolutionary
Customs policy which
raging prospects thann
en con raging
other proposal that has yet been made.
- See in his connection Fotel
Fo telo ni 3814.
the language of parano
I understand
hBY LONG
that thing
Comesharing
proposal for cuting off Chinese immigration
Malaya".
The Nanking XXII & FO. hems) and the desirability of argent action
the terms of the cores. lear
if fratl.
cantur, is
lai 289.
to suspect that they had no
Lope that
Mivelihood.
necesary suggestica
would be foracticable, and this impression the despatches received this
is confirmed by
and circulated separably. The lates Hough writion earlier than the Fels. of 26 Jau (2166) and 6 Feb (3026) save 15 shows Sir
Has HK Lopes are really centred on C. Clementi's Songs and to indicati (a possibility of internal dissensions as Canton Soner sighs of which have
HK with no therefore be
FO conclusions.
lately accersarity
been discernible.
Sisappointed
also be boom in beind that
the F.O. Lave not yet exhausted ale
Chinen shipping
the Bjest of Sepriving
of their principal meany
an stiri there fore
On the immediate quation we
avcam tang
to explore.
must await
the further F.O. khür promised ui para 5
and also the Boons of the Service Defts. Which
we consulted on 3026.
In the meantime
it would not appear In Sarirable trend KHK, unles for. foresses for infr.
Pallatic back
1013 2012
We should circulate our own
The Cobinct as soon as possible,
lave our own pomb
wish if the
present situation continues much longer
to ask H.M. G. to supporb-
He Kong financially. We could not of course
to so without having giden warning.
we cazar
Dr. Half Sing
the least we can do is to explain
Telegraph to the Governor conveying the expressions of appreciation in whiche S.AS. for Foreign Affairs concues. Go
on to say
the S. guns. has been in consultation with the S. fr. for F.a.
to the Governor's telegram of
6th of Febe (L.C. the late from reporting the O'Malley conference), & taking the Goo's
- or rather the conferences. suggestions seriatim explain the view
$ 4.1.4.
on taon.
F.D. Concertence
should be sought in the draft. In
would be well to get this off
quickly.
24.2.16.
In any further communication
on this subject, please quote
No. F 439/1/10.
and addreas
not to any person by name,
but to→→
"The Under-Secretary of State,"
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.
CONFIDENTIAL.
FOREIGN OFFICE.
17th February, 1926.
I am directed by Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. C 2081/26 of the 3rd instant, and to state that he much appreciates the very full information furnished to this department as to the situation in Hongkong and Vanton. 2. I am to enclose herein, for the information
of Mr. Secretary Amery, copy of a memorandum, already circulated to the Cabinet, in which the history of the efforts made to cope with the problem is set forth in detail.
In appendix XVIII will be found copies of recent telegrams exchanged between His Majesty's Minister, Peking, His Majesty's Consul-General, Canton, and this department,
referred to by the Governor of Hongkong in his secret
telegram No. 0.0.31 of February 6th. The Memorandum should
be treated as strictly confidential, seeing that it contains
the unparaphrased texts of cypher telegrams.
At the discussions at Hongkong on January
25th, the following suggestions were put forward:
Whether it would be possible to induce
the League of Nations unanimously to pass censure
on the existing Government of Canton for its
defiance of the Treaties;
Whether, in the event of the Canton
Goverment ignoring such a censure, all the
Powers will be willing to institute a boycott
of Canton.
The Under-Secretary of State,
Colonial office.
The objections to the first of these suggestions were set forth in this department's letter
No. F 242/1/10 of January 28th last. Further objections will be found in Peking telegram No. 39, and Sir Austen Chamberlain considers that the idea is not practicable for the reasons already given.
As regards suggestion (ii), apart from the appeal to the League, the possible organisation of an international counter-boycott of Canton, though it is likely to encounter great practical difficulties, seems the one active policy which deserves further examination. This matter is being fully examined and a further letter will be addressed to your department at a later date. It will not in any case be an easy task to enlist the active support of the other Powers, some of whom are profiting by the present state of affairs.
The possibility of exerting pressure on Moscow with a view to obtaining the removal of all Bolsheviks
from Kwangtung has also been dealt with in Foreign Office
letter of January 28th, and, as will be seen from Foreign
office telegram to Peking No. 35 of January 29th, the
only weapon available for this purpose would be a threat
to withdraw His Majesty's Mission from Moscow, and it is
doubtful whether even this would prove effective.
is not one that could profitably be adopted.
The idea
The question of actual hostilities with Canton
has not yet arisen, and, in view of its effect both on
this country and on the rest of China, it is clearly most
desirable that it should not arise. Quite apart from the
attitude of the other treaty Powers, it seema highly
problematical whether on balance British interests would
profit by such action.
Two further lines of action have been discussed in Foreign Office telegram to Peking No. 35, and in the replies of His Majesty's Minister, and of His Majesty's Consul-General, Canton, viz. (1) assistance to an anti- communist leader and (2) conciliation. To intervene in the internal affairs of China, by supporting one faction against another, would constitute a reversal of the policy consistently followed until now, and would probably entail. the graveat consequences: it would moreover be in direct contradiction with the considered opinion of His Majesty's Government's advisers in China, quite apart from this
objection there seen at present, to be no element in Kwantung or outside it, which we could at this juncture
support with any prospect of attaining the object in view.
As to conciliation, it has now become evident
that there is little to be gained by further efforts in
this direction at present, so long as the Government at
Canton remains under the combined influences of the Russian
extremists and the Strike Committee. Sir J. Jamieson's
telegrams show pretty clearly that conciliation has practically
no chance of success as things are at present.
Thus, while fully realising the grave difficulty
and loss to which the colony of Hongkong has been and is
being exposed the conclusion seems inevitable that there is
no possible alternative to a policy of patience and moderation
as announced in the House of Commons in reply to Mr. Looker
on February 10th,
With reference to the concluding sentence of
your letter under reference, Sir Austen Chamberlain fully
agrees that the Governor of Hongkong and Mr. Fletcher have shown
both tact and discretion in most difficult circumstances,
and that they should receive an expression of satisfaction at the manner in which they have
dealt with a particularly baffling situation.
Your obedient Servant,
Grorge Mounsey.
Circulated
[This Document is the Property of His Britanic Majesty's Government.]
CONFIDENTIAL.
[February 3, 1926.]
SECTION 1.
[F 518/1/10]
MEMORANDUM RESPECTING CANTON.
CANTON has been the scene of two wars with China, 1839-41 and 1856–57. In each case British military action, chiefly naval, had to be taken after a prolonged course of provocation by the Chinese. In some respects Canton is cut off from the rest of China, and there is no through railway communication with the north. It is also more immediately and exclusively in touch with the British Empire than any other part of China, since it is situated about a hundred miles up the Pearl River, at the mouth of which is the British colony of Hong Kong. The Cantonese people, however, are scattered very widely throughout China, and, being on the whole more intelligent and more restless than other Chinese, have had great influence on its modern development, usually in a revolutionary and progressive direction.
The latest phase in the history of Canton opens in 1918. In that year the Kump of the Peking Parliament, consisting of the Kuomintang party which asserted that they had been illegally ejected from Peking by Tuan Chi-jui and the militarists, set up a rival existence at Canton and claimed, ineffectively, to be recognised by the Powers as the Government of China, This movement was led by Sun Yat-sen (who died in the spring of 1925). It continued to press for its share of the customs revenues, which are collected in the interests of the Peking Govern- ment and the foreign bondholders. It offered to secure to the latter their due ratio, but objected to the balance being remitted to the Central Government for purposes contrary to their wishes. Attempts were at first made by the Diplomatic Body in Peking to secure allotment of these revenues to Canton, but these soon ceased. The foreign Powers insisted on the principle of maintaining the integrity of the customs revenues, and when Canton threatened to seize them in 1918, 1919 and 1920, we proposed to take the following action:-
(a) The Government of Hong Kong should intercept all cargo for Canton and
refuse entry to all cargo from Canton,
(b) Customs duties at Canton should be paid by British subjects to His Majesty's consul-general, who would hold them in trust for the Inspector- General of Customs,
(c) If necessary, a British naval guard might be placed round the custom-house
on behalf of its British owner, the inspector-general.
(d) All Allied vessels should be asked to refuse to carry Chinese postal matter
to or from any port in Kwangtung or Kwangsi.
Canton gave way at that time. Another attempt to seize the customs was made in 1923. This led to a naval demonstration, and Canton again gave way.
These facts are quoted to show that a genuine grievance has existed for some time at Canton, and that the methods of boycott which are being now applied against our trade resemble the methods which the foreign Powers themselves proposed to use against Canton. During this time the Government of Hong Kong was in favour of showing consideration to the Cantonese grievances; and Canton in general, and the Kuomintang in particular, have been distinctly anti-British, as can be seen in their connection with and support of the Hong Kong seamen's strike in 1922. Early in 1923 a new factor was introduced by the opening of a Soviet consulate at 1, and from that date the dissemination of advanced political theories and anti-foreign symptoms amongst students and officials became more manifest. At the same time, the extremist wing of the Kuomintang obtained control of the party machine, including Dr. Sun. Dr. Sun died in March 1925, and this removed the last moderating influence.
In May and June there was fighting in Canton between an army of Yunnanese mercenaries, who were in temporary occupation of the city, and a combination of a Cantonese force with the cadet army of the Whampoa Military College (trained and armed by the Bolsheviks see Annex II). On the eve of the fighting the Yunnanese commander stated to His Majesty's consul-general (Peking despatch
342 of the 19th May):
3296 [14166]
Of the members of the Kuomintang in this province and Hong Kong, less than 10 per cent. are imbued with Communistic principles, the rest being too apathetic or too ignorant to take an intelligent interest in the conduct of affairs: by the extremist section of the former. This section is under the leadership. of Chiang Chung-cheng (or Chiang Kai-shek), an extremely able and unscrupulous individual, who received a military training in Japan and Germany, has the closest relations with Moscow, and is at the moment head of the military school at Whampoa. Collaborating with him are the late Civil Governor, Liao Chung-K'ai, head of the labour unions, and Tsou Lu, presid of the university. These three are rapidly establishing a dictatorship, which is likely, in the near future, to prove all powerful. Whereas they have nominally at their disposal a force of only some 7,000 to 8,000 men, in which are included officers, cadets and Russians, their potential strength lies in members of the labour and agricultural unions, who, in lots of 200 to 300 at a time undergo one month's intensive training in rifle-target practice, and are then dismissed to their homes to be called out and armed when necessary. The unlimited supplies of money, rifles, Thompson and machine guns and ammunition, which they receive regularly from Russia, enable this military training to be carried on continuously."*
By the 13th June the Yunnanese were driven from the city and many of them, massacred (see Naval Intelligence Summary, Annex V). The victors Kuomintang. labour unions, cadets and Russians-at once began to utilise the news of the Shanghai shooting on the 30th May as propaganda to win popularity for themselves and establish their position. The general strike in Hong Kong and South China ports commenced on the 20th June. At Canton a monster demonstration in front of the foreign concession at Shameen was arranged for the 23rd June. As it was generally believed that this would be made an occasion for creating an incident similar to that at Shanghai, His Majesty's consul-general sent a special note of warning to the Canton Government (see Annex IV). The demonstration took place. and soldiers on the Canton side opened fire on Shameen (though no Chinese will probably ever admit this); the fire was returned by the foreign troops in Shanice (French and British) and some fifty-two Chinese were killed, of whom about half were soldiers carrying arms (for details of the incident see accounts by His Majesty' consul-general, by Commander Maxwell Scott, R.N., and by Mr. Fu Ping-ch'ang un Annexes VI, V and VII, and for details regarding Chinese killed and wounded see Annex VIII). No women were killed. On the Shameen side, one French civilian was killed, and there were French, British and Japanese wounded. Foreign women and children were at once evacuated to Hong Kong, and the British garrison at Shameen was strengthened by two platoons of Indian troops. On the 26th June the Canton Commissioner for Foreign Affairs addressed the following "five demands to the British and French consuls-general (see Annex VII):
"Inasmuch as the recent massacres of Chinese subjects constitutes a complete abrogation of all the laws of humanity and cannot, by universal law. be tolerated, we make the following demands:
"1. Apologies will be made by High Commissioners appointed by the
Powers interested to the Government of Canton.
2. The senior officers responsible shall be punished.
3. With the exception of two despatch vessels, all naval units of the
Powers interested shall be withdrawn.
4. Shameen shall be returned to the Government of Kwangtung and
placed under the administration thereof.
5. The victims and their families shall be compensated."
The French Minister and British Chargé d'Affaires at Peking instructed their representatives at Canton to reply that they were unable to take such demands into consideration (Peking telegram No. 175 of the 29th June). Meanwhile, the strike
• For a general review of political conditions at Canton in the summer of 1925, see also Mr. A. L. Scott's memorandum in Annex III.
✦ A memoraudum by Sir R. E. Stubbs on the strike at Hong Kong will be found in Annex IX.
According to a report in Canton telegram No. 14 of the 22nd August; "Latvian customs explore encountered in city in the afternoon of the 20th August a Russian soldier, of whom there are 400, who in an effusire moment volunteered statement: I fired second shot against Shameen on the 23rd June Ivanovitch fired the first, but it took us three weeks to get the promised reward out of Borodin.""
but gradually narrowing down to one against British goods alone. The carrying developed into a boycott-first of the goods of all foreign" Imperialist out of the boycott strengthened the power of the strike committees by giving them revenue (from fines, &c.), which, by the end of the year, was greater than that 496 accruing to the so-called Government. The strike committees have throughont acted virtual masters of Canton. under the guidance of Borodin* and other Russian "advisers"; and they are the
At the end of June, the position of the small foreign community at Shameen (about seventy-five civilians, besides troops) appeared to be a very dangerous one. They were isolated by about 100 miles of hostile river, and were faced by a Chinese city with a population of about 1 million persons, with a rising tide of fanatical anti- foreign feeling, with a weak and treacherous Government, with a trained Communist army, and with an active band of Soviet agents straining every nerve to provoke trouble between Great Britain and China.
On the 7th July (telegram No. 182 to Paris, &c., in F 2944) we consulted the Washington Treaty Powers as to the serious position in China; and as regards Canton, we said
The aggressive attitude of the Communist Government now installed at Canton is proved by recent events, and it is impossible not to feel considerable uneasiness about the position of the foreign community at Shameen, who are on the defensive. The danger presented by Canton is not purely local. The Canton authorities possess, in the Whampoa Officers' Training School, an insti- tution which, as His Majesty's Government are reliably informed. is a distinct military asset. It is partly staffed with Russian instructors, and must be regarded as the possible nucleus of a military force which, under the conditions now prevailing, may seriously effect the whole Chinese situation, incidents appear, in the opinion of His Majesty's naval authorities. to indicate Recent the possibility of a Russo-Chinese attempt to block the passage to Canton.
The Governments of the Powers were asked for their observations on the dangerous developments throughout China, and the steps which should be taken to meet them. With the exception of France, none of the Powers had much to suggest regarding the Canton situation. The Belgian Government (Brussels telegram No. 72 of the 15th July) were doubtful as to the specifically Communist character of the Canton Government. The Japanese Government (Tokyo telegram No. 171) agreed that Canton was a exaggerated; they considered naval or military action impossible at present, and danger spot," but thought that our apprehensions were that the United States would not consent to it. The French Government replied (Paris despatch No. 1670):-
In the Canton area, where the situation is very complex and uncertain. and may develop in unexpected directions, we must act with the greatest circumspection so as to avoid further outbreaks of xenophobia. But, while limiting our action for the time being to assuring the lives and property of our nationals, we should arrange, so as not to be taken unawares by events, for the establishment of close co-operation between the British and French naval authorities, and, if possible, those of other Powers as well, so as to study the measures to be taken at the first threat of more serious trouble. These measures might aim, for instance, at the institution of surveillance over the ways of access to Canton, the Cantonese authorities being eventually notified of the decision of the Powers themselves to assure liberty of communication between Canton and the sea, as in the north of China between Peking and the sea."
This proposal of the French Government was not pursued further.
The question of operations in China was considered by the Chief of Staffs Sub-Committee on the 25th June (C.I.D. Paper, Secret, No. 617-B). Their general view was that offensive action in China on a large scale was not possible for the British Empire acting alone, and that finality could not be hoped for from any operation within our capacity. As regards Canton in particular, they observed that [at first sight it would appear that the easiest way to strike a blow would be by means
* Ilia official position is that of adviser to the Canton Government and to the Central Committee of the Kintang. There are thirty-eight other Russian "advisers" (Peking despatch No. 851 in F 306). Kalin is mer military adviser, and Smirnov (or Semenov) chief naval adviser (Canton despatch No. 26 of 24th July),
of air forces based on Hong Kong, but here there was doubt as to whether the construction of an air base at Hong Kong was permissible under article 19 of the Washington Naval Treaty; and, in any case, the provision of an aerodrome presented difficulty owing to the absence of any suitable site. Given sufficient time for prepara- tion, the necessary troops and the acquiescence of the other foreign Powers, it might be possible to capture Canton.
Our Canton policy, therefore, from the outset, had to be guided by two considerations (a) assistance from other foreign Powers would be at the best half- hearted, and (b) isolated military action was almost out of the question. We had to adopt a policy of inaction. This seems to have surprised the Canton Governmen At least, according to the "Morning Post" of the 26th January, 1926 :—
Immediately after the Shameen shooting incidents, when ill-feeling was at its highest, the Canton Government expected to be attacked, and have now admitted they had made all plans to retire into the country, leaving the city in cccupation of foreign troops. They would then have raised the banner of hatred from north to south and embroiled every nation in the quarrel. This scheme. which probably emanated from Soviet influence, was foiled by our inaction."
However, on learning that the Cantonese were strengthening the forts at the mouth of the river, His Majesty's Admiralty despatched the aircraft carrier H.M.S. Hermes to Hong Kong, so as to make sure that communications with Shameen could not be interrupted. H.M.S. Hermes arrived at Hong Kong on the 10th August.
The question of Soviet support to anti-British agitations in China generally. and in Canton in particular, had at once received the careful attention of the Foreign Office. There can be no doubt whatever that both the Third Communist Inter- national and the Soviet Government are deeply implicated in the agitation in China, that they have supported such agitation with large supplies of money, arms and munitions, and that they have deliberately directed this agitation in an anti-British channel. The question of counter-action to be taken by ourselves at Moscow in order to secure a cessation of these activities was fully investigated at the end of June.
It was then decided that diplomatic action (e.g., withdrawal of recognition from Russia) could not be taken on the sole initiative of His Majesty's Governmeш, though we would be ready to consider any initiative from Japan, the United States of America or France on these lines. Our general feeling (see Annex I) was thot Bolshevism was its own most effective enemy and would eventually discredit itself in China, as it has done elsewhere. To launch a general attack against the Bolsheviks would exaggerate the importance of their enmity and thus would help to prolong their influence.
Meanwhile, at the beginning of July, the new Canton Government was formed. It consisted chiefly of Kuomintang elements, and it opened its career with grandiloquent manifesto, announcing that Canton had been under the economic and political domination of Hong Kong, but that a new era of independence and municipal improvement was at hand (see Annex X). It was not until August that the extremists gained complete control at Canton, and throughout July an eventual settlement seemed not impossible. The boycott of "imperialist "goods and shipping i continued, with great loss, especially to the colony of Hong Kong. In August steps were taken to confine the boycott to British and Japanese goods only.
On the 13th August. His Majesty's consul-general at Canton telegraphed (Canton telegram No. 10) that three new Navigation Rules" had been published by the Canton Government :-
1. Steamers of any nationality except British and Japanese are allowed to ply
between various ports provided they do not call at Hong Kong.
2. On entering ports, all vessels must be subject to inspection of labour picket-
of the anti-Imperialist Union,
3. Exports of food-stuffs and raw materials prohibited.
• Government consisted of Hsu Chung-chih (Minister of War); Hu Aan-min (Minister for Foreign Affairs); Liao Chung-k'ai (Minister of Finance); George Hau-chien (Minister of Justice). Besides the Government, a regular committee for general affairs was elected consisting of Wang Ching-wei, Es Chung-chih, Tan Yen-kai, Bu Han-min and Lin Sen. Liao Chung-k'a (a violent Communist) was assassinated towards the end of August; and, shortly after Liao's death, Hu Han-min found Canton too hot for bio and left on a political mission to Moscow. C. C. Wu has been (and is) head of the municipality, but he assists In the direction of foreign affairs in co-operation with Borodin.
Sir J. Jamieson has recently (Canton telegram No. 5 of the 2nd February, 1926) paid an unex pected tribute to this extreme Kuomintang Government, as "the best Kwangtung has ever had."
His Majesty's consul-general suggested that the maritime treaty Powers thus dictated to should immediately institute a blockade at the entrance to the river, which could easily be effected. On the 16th August, the Commodore at Hong Kong telegraphed that a blockade would prevent the importation of munitions of war which had been arriving freely in Canton lately (mostly from Russian sources) and might bring about the overthrow of Bolshevik elements at Canton through popular indignation or otherwise force an issue (Canton telegram No. 11). About the same time, the French Government were suggesting a naval demonstration at Canton.
On the 20th August, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Peking telegraphed (Peking telegram No. 322) that as the "Navigation Rules" affected all Powers having ships plying to Canton, he suggested that co-operation of all the Powers concerned would be advisable if the blockade were decided on. At the same time, he did not feel that such an action was either necessary or advisable, or that it would bring about the downfall of the Communist Canton Government. He added that in the opinion of His Majesty's consul-general nothing short of abrogation of the treaties would placate the local Government and end the strike.
On the 22nd August, the Foreign Office suggested to Peking (telegram to Peking No. 214) the following course of action which should be taken jointly by the Powers: That the attention of the Chinese Government should be drawn to the unjustifiable regulations issued by the Canton authorities in breach of treaty rights, together with a warning that, unless the Chinese Government could secure their withdrawal within a specified time limit, the Powers would be obliged to take further measures; but it was also suggested that if this action further united the Chinese against us, the game might not be worth the candle.
His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires replied (Peking telegram No. 329) that according to the Japanese consul at Canton the "Navigation Rules" had been issued merely for effect and were not intended to be enforced, and that consequently neither the Japanese Minister nor himself were making any formal protest at present to the Chinese Government, who, besides, professed ignorance of the whole matter. Further the Japanese Minister had expressed some apprehension at newspaper reports as to the intransigent attitude of His Majesty's Government. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires expressed his opinion that British business circles were inclined to take too alarmist and exaggerated a view of the whole matter, which did not seem to have developed far enough for so drastic a step as a blockade. In any case, he said, Japanese co-operation was essential, since their shipping was bracketed with ours, and American co-operation highly desirable. He considered that isolated British action would be fatal, and that a joint warning by the British, American and Japanese Governments, with as many others as would join, would certainly be Leneficial if it became necessary.
At the same time, His Majesty's consul-general at Canton reported that the Canton Government had informed him that they had neither published nor approved the Navigation Rules" (Canton telegram No. 16). Technically, this may be true, as it has since become manifest that the rules are published and enforced by the strike committees; but at that date (the end of August) the standing and power of the strike committees were by no means so clear as they are now. In any case, the Japanese assurance that these rules were published merely for effect has not turned out to be true-except perhaps as regards Japanese shipping. The rules are the backbone of the anti-British boycott, and have been most strenuously enforced.
Meanwhile, the Foreign Office had received a series of appeals from British firms and from such representative bodies as the China Association and the Imperial Merchant Service Guild, asking for "action" as regards Canton, The Colonial Office enquired as to our attitude. and passed on strongly-worded resolutions from the Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong, which demanded an immediate ultimatum to Canton followed by strong action. Both British and Chinese interests at Hong Kong and the Hong Kong Government itself impressed upon us that they were threatened with immediate ruin. These enquiries were answered on the following lines:-
"Mr. Chamberlain doubts whether a blockade would do more than provide anti-British propaganda in Canton and the rest of China, but any more drastic action than a blockade he is certain would have a most unfortunate reaction. It must be remembered, too, that we are bound by the Washington China Treaty to full and friendly communication with other Powers concerned before taking any steps affecting the sovereignty and independence of China. Any
independent step, therefore, which His Majesty's Government may take at Canton will at once affect not only the rest of China but our relations with other Powers having interests in the Far East. The provocative attitude of the group of Extremists now in control at Canton may be deliberately calculated to provoke retaliatory measures whereby they hope to gain in popularity in their own country and to single out Great Britain as the oppressor of China. Such a development would be specially unfortunate at the present moment, when the Tariff Conference is about to meet at Peking and solidarity among the Powers and conviction of our good intentions on the part of the Chinese people are particularly necessary. Mr. Chamberlain will not hesitate to recommend strong action if and when it is considered that the situation would be permanently improved thereby. But he would prefer to take such action in concert with the other Powers whose treaty rights are equally at stake, and whom. as explained above, we are under an obligation to consult. He would be most reluctant to act alone except in circumstances where it would be clear to unprejudiced opinion that he had no reasonable alternative (letter to Colonial Office of the 5th September).